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PREFACE

Dear Father Richardson:
It is with some hesitation that I attempt to answer the two
principal questions you posed in your letter of March i f 1962.
The first touches on the initial impetus that determined the
way my thought would go. 1 The other looks for information
about the much discussed "reversal" [in my development].
I hesitate with my answers, for they are necessarily no more
than indications [of much more to be said]. The lesson of long
experience leads me to surmise that such indications will not be
taken as directions for the road of independent reflection on the
matter pointed out which each must travel for himself. [Instead
they] will gain notice as though they were an opinion I had expressed, and will be propagated as such. Every effort to bring
what has been thought closer to prevailing modes of (re)presentation must assimilate what-is-to-be-thought to those (re) presentations and thereby inevitably deform the matter.2
This preamble is not the lament of a man misunderstood; it
is rather the recognition of an almost insurmountable difficulty
in making oneself understood.
The first question in your letter reads: "How are we properly
to understand your first experience of the Being-question in
1 [Translator's note. With regard to the translation of Denken, see below, p. 16,
note 43.]
1 [Translator's note. For the translation of Vorstellung by "(re)presentation,"
see below, p. xo8, note 5.]

VORWORT

Sehr geehrter Herr P. Richardson!
Mit einigem Zögern versuche ich, die beiden Hauptfragen
Ihres Briefes vom i . März 1962 zu beantworten. Die eine Frage
betrifft den ersten Anstoß, der meinen Denkweg bestimmt hat.
Die andere Frage verlangt eine Auskunft über die vielberedete
Kehre.
Ich zögere mit den Antworten, weil sie notgedrungen nur Hinweise bleiben. Durch eine lange Erfahrung belehrt, muß ich vermuten, daß man die Hinweise nicht als Weisung aufnimmt, sich
selber auf den Weg zu machen, um der gewiesenen Sache selbständig nachzudenken. Man wird die Hinweise als eine von mir
geäußerte Meinung zur Kenntnis nehmen und als solche weiterverbreiten. Jeder Versuch, Gedachtes der herrschenden Vorstellungsweise näherzubringen, muß selber das zu Denkende diesen
Vorstellungen angleichen und dadurch die Sache notwendig verunstalten.
Diese Vorbemerkung ist kein Klagelied eines Mißverstandenen,
sondern die Feststellung einer fast unaufhebbaren Schwierigkeit
der Verständigung.
Die eine Frage Ihres Briefes lautet:
"Wie ist Ihre erste Erfahrung der Seinsfrage bei Brentano
eigentlich zu verstehen?"
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Brentano?" "In Brentano/' You have in mind the fact that the
first philosophical text through which I worked my way, again
and again from 1907 on, was Franz Brentano's dissertation: On
the Manifold Sense of Being in Aristotle (1862). On the title page
of his work, Brentano quotes Aristotle's phrase: TO OV Xsycrai
7coXXaxw<;. I translate: "A being becomes manifest (sc. with regard
to its Being) in many ways." Latent in this phrase is the question
that determined the way of my thought: what is the pervasive,
simple, unified determination of Being that permeates all of its
multiple meanings? This question raised others: What, then, does
Being mean? To what extent (why and how) does the Being
of beings unfold in the four modes which Aristotle constantly
affirms, but whose common origin he leaves undetermined? One
need but run over the names assigned to them in the language of
the philosophical tradition to be struck by the fact that they
seem, at first, irreconcilable: Being as property, Being as possibility and actuality, Being as truth, Being as schema of the
categories. What sense of Being comes to expression in these
four headings? How can they be brought into comprehensible
accord?
This accord can not be grasped without first raising and settling
the question: whence does Being as such (not merely beings
as beings) receive its determination?
Meanwhile a decade went by and a great deal of swerving and
straying through the history of Western philosophy was needed
for the above questions to reach even an initial clarity. To gain
this clarity three insights were decisive, though, to be sure, not
yet sufficient for the venture of analysing the Being-question
as a question about the sense of Being.
Dialogues with Husserl provided the immediate experience of
the phenomenological method that prepared the concept of
phenomenology explained in the Introduction to Being and Time
(§7). In this evolution a normative role was played by the reference back to fundamental words of Greek thought which I
interpreted accordingly: Xoyo? (to make manifest) and <pziveor0ai
(to show oneself).
A renewed study of the Aristotelian treatises (especially
Book IX of the Metaphysics and Book VI of the Nicomachean
Ethics) resulted in the insight into aX-qöeueiv as a process of revealment, and in the characterisation of truth as non-conceal-
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"bei Brentano" - Sie denken daran, daß die erste philosophische
Schrift, die ich seit 1907 immer wieder durcharbeitete, Franz
Brentanos Dissertation war: "Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung
des Seienden bei Aristoteles" (1862). Brentano setzte auf das
Titelblatt seiner Schrift den Satz des Aristoteles: TO 6V Xeyexat
7coXXaxw<;. Ich übersetze: "Das Seiende wird (nämlich hinsichtlich seines Seins) in vielfacher Weise offenkundig". In diesem
Satz verbirgt sich die meinen Denkweg bestimmende Frage:
Welches ist die alle mannigfachen Bedeutungen durchherrschende einfache, einheitliche Bestimmung von Sein? Diese Frage
weckt die folgenden: Was heißt denn Sein? Inwiefern (weshalb
und wie) entfaltet sich das Sein des Seienden in die von Aristoteles stets nur festgestellten, in ihrer gemeinsamen Herkunft
unbestimmt gelassenen vier Weisen? Es genügt, diese in der
Sprache der philosophischen Überlieferung auch nur zu nennen,
um von dem zunächst unvereinbar Erscheinenden betroffen zu
werden: Sein als Eigenschaft, Sein als Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit, Sein als Wahrheit, Sein als Schema der Kategorien.
Welcher Sinn von Sein spricht in diesen vier Titeln ? Wie lassen
sie sich in einen verstehbaren Einklang bringen?
Diesen Einklang können wir erst dann vernehmen, wenn zuvor
gefragt und geklärt wird: Woher empfängt das Sein als solches
(nicht nur das Seiende als Seiendes) seine Bestimmung?
Indes verging ein Jahrzehnt, und es bedurfte vieler Um- und
Abwege durch die Geschichte der abendländischen Philosophie
hindurch, bis auch nur die genannten Fragen in eine erste Klarheit gelangten. Dafür waren drei Einsichten entscheidend, die
freilich noch nicht ausreichten, um eine Erörterung der Seinsfrage als Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein zu wagen.
Durch die unmittelbare Erfahrung der phänomenologischen
Methode in Gesprächen mit Husserl bereitete sich der Begriff
von Phänomenologie vor, der in der Einleitung zu "Sein und
Zeit" (§ 7) dargestellt ist. Hierbei spielt die Rückbeziehung auf
die entsprechend ausgelegten Grundworte des griechischen Denkens: Xoyo? (offenbar machen) und cpocwsc^ai (sich zeigen) eine
maßgebende Rolle.
Ein erneutes Studium der Aristotelischen Abhandlungen (im
besonderen des neunten Buches der "Metaphysik" und des sechsten Buches der "Nikomachischen Ethik") ergab den Einblick
in das OCXYJ&EUEIV als entbergen und die Kennzeichnung der Wahr-
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ment, to which all self-manifestation of beings pertains. Only
someone who is thinking superficially or, indeed, not thinking at
all can content himself with the observation that Heidegger
conceives truth as non-concealment. As if with a-X7)Ösia what is
properly worthy-of-thought did not take merely a first approximate form.3 The situation is not improved by proposing
the translation "non-forgotten-ness" in place of 41 non-concealment.^" For "forgotten-ness" [too] must be thought in Greek
fashion as withdrawal into concealment. Correspondingly, the
counter-phenomenon to forgetting, [sc.] remembering, must
receive a [genuinely] Greek interpretation which sees it as a
striving after, an attaining to, the non-concealed. Plato's avafAvvjai;
of the Ideas implies: catching-sight-once-again, [hence] the
revealing, of beings, sc. in that by which they shine-forth.
With the insight into aX-yjOeia as non-concealment came
recognition of the fundamental trait of ou<uot, the Being of beings:
presence. But a literal translation, sc. a translation that thought
draws out of the matter itself, is expressive only when the heart
of the matter, in this case Presence as such, is brought before
thought. The disquieting, ever watchful question about Being
under the guise of Presence (Present) developed into the question
about Being in terms of its time-character. As soon as this
happened, it became clear that the traditional concept of time
was in no respect adequate even for correctly posing the question
concerning the time-character of Presence, to say nothing of
answering it. Time became questionable in the same way as
Being. The ecstatic-horizontal temporality delineated in Being
and Time is not by any means already the most proper attribute
of time that must be sought in answer to the Being-question.
Subsequent to this tentative clarification of aX7)0etoc and
ouffia, the meaning and scope of the principle of phenomenology,
"to the things themselves," became clear. As my familiarity
with phenomenology grew, no longer merely through literature
but by actual practice, the question about Being, aroused by
Brentano's work, nevertheless remained always in view. So it
was that doubt arose whether the "thing itself" was to be charac* [Translator's note. Possibly: " . . . As if fit wrre] not with a-X^^sia [that]
what is properly speaking worthy-of-thought reached a first liininal appearance. . . . " ]
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heil als Unverborgenheit, in die alles Sichzeigen des Seienden
gehört. Man denkt freilich zu kurz oder überhaupt nicht, wenn
man sich mit der Feststellung begnügt: Heidegger faßt die Wahrheit als Unverborgenheit. Als ob nicht mit der d-X^eia das eigentlich Denkwürdige erst zu einem ungefähren Vorschein käme. Der
Sache wird auch dadurch nicht geholfen, daß man statt "UnverborgenheitM die Übersetzung "UnVergessenheit" vorbringt.
Denn die "Vergessenheit" muß griechisch als Entzug in die Verbergung gedacht werden. Entsprechend muß das Gegenphänomen zum Vergessen, das Erinnern, griechisch ausgelegt werden:
als Erwerben, Erlangen des Unverborgenen. Piatons avafiv7)<n<;
der Ideen besagt: das wieder-zu~Gesicht-Bekommen, das Entbergen, nämlich des Seienden in seinem Aussehen.
Mit dem Einblick in die aX-yj&eia als Unverborgenheit wurde
der Grundzug der oucria, des Seins des Seienden erkannt: die
Anwesenheit. Aber die wörtliche, d. h. die aus der Sache gedachte Übersetzung spricht erst dann, wenn der Sachgehalt der
Sache, hier die Anwesenheit als solche, vor das Denken gebracht wird. Die beunruhigende, ständig wache Frage nach dem
Sein als Anwesenheit (Gegenwart) entfaltete sich zur Frage nach
dem Sein hinsichtlich seines Zeitcharakters. Dabei zeigte sich
alsbald, daß der überlieferte Zeitbegriff nach keiner Hinsicht
zureicht, auch nur die Frage nach dem Zeitcharakter der Anwesenheit sachgerecht zu stellen, geschweige denn, sie zu beantworten. Die Zeit wurde in derselben Weise fragwürdig wie das
Sein. Die in "Sein und Zeit" gekennzeichnete ekstatisch-horizontale Zeitlichkeit ist keineswegs schon das der Seinsfrage entsprechende gesuchte Eigenste der Zeit.
Mit der vorläufigen Aufhellung von aXYj&eia und ouaLa klärten
sich in der Folge Sinn und Tragweite des Prinzips der Phänomenologie: "zu den Sachen selbst". Bei der nicht mehr nur
literarischen sondern vollzugsmäßigen Einarbeitung in die Phänomenologie blieb jedoch die durch Brentanos Schrift erweckte
Frage nach dem Sein im Blick. Dadurch entstand der Zweifel,
ob "die Sache selbst" als das intentionale Bewußtsein oder gar

XIV

PREFACE

tensed as intentional consciousness, or even as the transcendental
ego. If, indeed, phenomenology, as the process of letting things
manifest themselves, should characterise the standard method
of philosophy, and if from ancient times the guide-question of
philosophy has perdured in the most diverse forms as the question
about the Being of beings, then Being had to remain the first
and last thing-itself of thought.4
Meanwhile "phenomenology" in Husserl's sense was elaborated
into a distinctive philosophical position according to a pattern
set by Descartes, Kant and Fichte. The historicity of thought
remained completely foreign to such a position (see the too
little observed work of Husserl: "Philosophy as a strict Science,"
which appeared 1910-11 in the review Logos, pp. 289 ft.).
The Being-question, unfolded in Being and Time, parted
company with this philosophical position, and that on the basis
of what to this day I still consider a more faithful adherence to
the principle of phenomenology.
What a few strokes can thus sketch, in retrospect that verges
constantly on retractatio, was, in its historical reality, a tangled
process, inscrutable even to me.5 This process inevitably remained
captive to contemporary modes of (re)presentation and language,
and was accompanied by inadequate explanations of its own
intentions.
Now if in the title of your book, From Phenomenology to
Thought, you understand "Phenomenology" in the sense just
described as a philosophical position of Husserl, then the title is
to the point, insofar as the Being-question as posed by me is
something completely different from that position. The title is
fully justified, if the term "Thought" is shorn of that ambiguity
which allows it to cover on the one hand metaphysical thought
(the thinking of the Being of beings) and on the other the Beingquestion, sc. the thinking of Being as such (the revealed-ness of
Being).
4 [Translator's note. For the sense of "guides-question as distinct from "ground" *
question, see below, p. 7, note 15.]
* [Translator's note. We retain the Latin form retractatio, because: the English
1 'retractation/' in the sense of "recantation," is obviously incoherent with the author's
intention, which warrants rather the notion of "retouching" ("retreatment," "rethinking") suggested by the Latin; the translation "retouching," though consistent
with the metaphor contained in the text, fails to retain the apparently deliberate
allusion to St. Augustine which retractatio contains.]
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als das transzendentale Ich zu bestimmen sei. Wenn anders die
Phänomenologie als das Sichzeigenlassen der Sache selbst die
maßgebende Methode der Philosophie bestimmen soll und wenn
die Leitfrage der Philosophie sich von alters her in den verschiedensten Gestalten als die Frage nach dem Sein des Seienden durchhielt, dann mußte das Sein die erste und letzte Sache
selbst für das Denken bleiben.
Inzwischen wurde "die Phänomenologie" im Sinne Husserls
zu einer bestimmten, von Descartes, Kant und Fichte her vorgezeichneten philosophischen Position ausgebaut. Ihr blieb die
Geschichtlichkeit des Denkens durchaus fremd (vgl. die zuwenig
beachtete Abhandlung von Husserl: "Philosophie als strenge
Wissenschaft", erschienen 1910/11 in der Zeitschrift "Logos",
S. 289 ff.).
Gegen diese philosophische Position setzte sich die in "Sein
und Zeit" entfaltete Seinsfrage ab und dies auf grund eines, wie
ich heute noch glaube, sachgerechteren Festhaltens am Prinzip
der Phänomenologie.
Was sich so durch einen Rückblick, der stets zu einer retractatio wird, in wenigen Zügen darstellen läßt, war nach seiner
geschichtlichen Wirklichkeit ein verwickelter, mir selbst undurchsichtiger Vorgang. Dieser blieb unausweichlich der zeitgenössischen Vorstellungsweise und Sprache verhaftet und führte
unzureichende Deutungen des eigenen Vorhabens mit sich.
Verstehen Sie nun im Titel Ihres Werkes "Der Weg von der
Phänomenologie zum Seinsdenken" die "Phänomenologie" in
dem zuletzt gekennzeichneten Sinne einer philosophischen Position Husserls, dann trifft der Titel die Sache, insofern die von
mir gestellte Seinsfrage etwas ganz anderes ist als jene Position.
Der Titel ist vollends berechtigt, wenn der Name "Seinsdenken"
aus der Zweideutigkeit herausgenommen wird, nach der er sowohl das Denken der Metaphysik - das Denken des Seins des
Seienden - als auch die Seinsfrage im Sinne des Denkens des
Seins als solchen (die Offenbarkeit des Seins) nennt.
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If, however, we understand "Phenomenology" as the [process
of] allowing the most proper concern of thought to show itself,
then the title should read "Through Phenomenology to the
Thinking of Being. 1 ' 6 This possessive [0/ Being], then, says that
Being as such (Beon) shows itself simultaneously as that which
is to-be-thought and as that which has want of a thought corresponding to it. 7
This indication already brings me to touch upon your second
question. It reads: "Granted that a 'reversal' has come-to-pass
in your thinking, how has it come-to-pass? In other words, how
are [we] to think this coming-to-pass itself?"
Your question admits of an answer only if first we make clear
what "reversal" means, [or] more precisely, if one is ready to
think through in becoming fashion what has already been said,
instead of constantly circulating unwarranted assertions. The
first time in my published writings that I spoke of the "reversal"
was in the "Letter on Humanism" (1947, p. 71; separate edition,
p. 17). The inference has thus been drawn that since 1947 Heidegger's thought has undergone "in-version," or even, since
1945, "con-version." No allowance whatever is made for reflection on the fact that a good number of years are needed before
the thinking through of so decisive a matter can find its way into
the clear. Perhaps the text cited below will serve to show that
the matter thought in the term "reversal" was already at work
in my thinking ten years prior to 1947. The thinking of the
reversal is a change in my thought. But this change is not a
consequence of altering the standpoint, much less of abandoning
the fundamental issue, of Being and Time. The thinking of the
reversal results from the fact that I stayed with the matter-forthought [of] "Being and Time," sc. by inquiring into that perspective which already in Being and Time (p. 39) was designated
as "Time and Being."
• [Translator's note. The original title of this book was From Phenomenology to
Thought, which, when translated into German, became Der Weg von der Phänomenologie zum Seinsdenken. What the writer understood by "Phenomenology" in this
case must be gathered from the entire study that follows (but see especially below,
pp. 624, 63z). Be this as it may, Professor Heidegger's suggestion is a valuable one,
and in view of it the title was changed to its present form just as the book went to
press.]
7 [Translator's note. For the sense of Seyn and its translation by "Beon," see
below, pp. 457, 554. Braucht in the present context might be translated by "needs,"
but we prefer "has want of" for reasons that appear below, pp. 597, 600, 614.]
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Verstehen wir aber die ''Phänomenologie als das Sichzeigenlassen der eigensten Sache des Denkens, dann müßte der Titel
lauten: "Ein Weg durch die Phänomenologie in das Denken des
Seins". Dieser Genitiv sagt dann, daß das Sein als solches (das
Seyn) sich zugleich als jenes zu Denkende zeigt, was ein ihm
entsprechendes Denken braucht.
Mit diesem Hinweis streife ich schon die zweite von Ihnen gestellte Frage. Sie lautet:
"Zugegeben, daß in Ihrem Seinsdenken eine 'Kehre' geschehen ist - wie ist dann diese 'Kehre' geschehen - oder,
anders gefragt, wie ist dieses Geschehen selbst zu denken?"
Ihre Frage läßt sich nur beantworten, wenn zuvor geklärt ist,
was "Kehre" besagt; deutlicher gesprochen, wenn man willens
ist, dem darüber schon Gesagten entsprechend nachzudenken,
statt fortgesetzt grundlose Behauptungen in Umlauf zu bringen.
Öffentlich - literarisch habe ich zuerst im "Humanismusbrief"
von der Kehre gesprochen (1947, S. 71 ff.; Sonderausgabe S. 17).
Nun unterstellt man: also hat sich in Heideggers Denken seit
1947 eine "Umkehr" oder gar seit 1945 eine "Bekehrung" vollzogen. Man läßt die Überlegung bei sich gar nicht zu, daß ein
Durchdenken eines so entscheidenden Sachverhalts viele Jahre
benötigt, um ins Klare zu kommen. Der im folgenden angeführte
Text mag belegen, daß der unter dem Namen "Kehre" gedachte
Sachverhalt mein Denken schon ein Jahrzehnt vor 1947 bewegte.
Das Denken der Kehre ist eine Wendung in meinem Denken.
Aber diese Wendung erfolgt nicht auf grund einer Änderung des
Standpunktes oder gar der Preisgabe der Fragestellung in "Sein
und Zeit". Das Denken der Kehre ergibt sich daraus, daß ich
bei der zu denkenden Sache "Sein und Zeit" geblieben bin, d. h.
nach der Hinsicht gefragt habe, die schon in "Sein und Zeit"
(S. 39) unter dem Titel "Zeit und Sein" angezeigt wurde.
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The reversal is above all not an operation of interrogative
thought; it is inherent in the very matter designated by the
headings: "Being and Time," "Time and Being." For this
reason, the passage cited from the "Letter on Humanism" reads:
"Here the Whole is reversed." "The Whole": this means the
matter [involved] in "Being and Time," "Time and Being." The
reversal is in play within the matter itself. Neither did I invent it
nor does it affect merely my thought. Up to now I know of no
attempt to reflect on this matter and analyse it critically. Instead
of the groundless, endless prattle about the "reversal," it would
be more advisable and fruitful if people would simply engage
themselves in the matter mentioned. Refusal to do so obliges
one ipso facto to demonstrate that the Being-question developed
in Being and Time is unjustified, superfluous and impossible.
Any criticism of Being and Time starting in this fashion, however,
must obviously first be set straight.
One need only observe the simple fact that in Being and Time
the problem is set up outside the sphere of subjectivism - that
the entire anthropological problematic is kept at a distance,
that the normative issue is emphatically and solely the experience
of There-being with a constant eye to the Being-question - for
it to become strikingly clear that the "Being" into which Being
and Time inquired can not long remain something that the human
subject posits.8 It is rather Being, stamped as Presence by its
time-character, [that] makes the approach to There-being. As
a result, even in the initial steps of the Being-question in Being
and Time thought is called upon to undergo a change whose
movement cor-responds with the reversal.
And yet, the basic question of Being and Time is not in any
sense abandoned by reason of the reversal. Accordingly, the
prefatory note to the seventh unrevised edition of Being and
Time (1957) contains the remark: [This] "way still remains even
today a necessary one, if the question about Being is to stir our
There-being." Contrary [to what is generally supposed], the
question of Being and Time is decisively ful-filled in the thinking
of the reversal. He alone can ful-fill who has a vision of fullness.9
• [Translator's note. For the translation of Dasein by "There-being," see below,
p. 34, note 17.]
• [Translator's note. The translation offered here is at best a reasonable facsimile
of the ergdnzen-Game correlation in the German. Someone has suggested: " . . . is
decisively whol-ified. He alone can whol-ify who has a view of the whole
" Very
Heidegger, but not very English I]
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Die Kehre ist in erster Linie nicht ein Vorgang im fragenden
Denken; sie gehört in den durch die Titel "Sein und Zeit 1 ', "Zeit
und Sein" genannten Sachverhalt selbst. Darum heißt es im "Humanismusbrief" an der angeführten Stelle: "Hier kehrt sich das
G a n z e um". "Das Ganze"-dies sagt: der Sachverhalt von "Sein
und Zeit", von "Zeit und Sein". Die Kehre spielt im Sachverhalt
selbst. Sie ist weder von mir erfunden, noch betrifft sie nur mein
Denken. Bis heute wurde mir kein Versuch bekannt, der diesem
Sachverhalt nachgedacht und ihn kritisch erörtert hat. Statt des
boden- und endlosen Geredes über die "Kehre" wäre es ratsamer
und fruchtbar, sich erst einmal auf den genannten Sachverhalt
einzulassen. Will man dies nicht, dann ist man auch daran gehalten, nachzuweisen, daß die in "Sein und Zeit" entfaltete
Seinsfrage unberechtigt, überflüssig und unmöglich sei. Einer
in dieser Weise ansetzenden Kritik von "Sein und Zeit" müßte
man offenbar erst auf die Sprünge helfen.
Wer bereit ist, den einfachen Sachverhalt zu sehen, daß in
"Sein und Zeit" der Ansatz des Fragens aus dem Bezirk der
Subjektivität abgebaut, daß jede anthropologische Fragestellung
ferngehalten, vielmehr einzig die Erfahrung des Da-seins
aus dem ständigen Vorblick auf die Seinsfrage maßgebend ist,
der wird zugleich einsehen, daß das in "Sein und Zeit" erfragte
"Sein" keine Setzung des menschlichen Subjekts bleiben kann.
Vielmehr geht das Sein als das aus seinem Zeit-Charakter geprägte An-wesen das Da-sein an. Demzufolge ist schon im Ansatz der Seinsfrage in "Sein und Zeit" auch das Denken auf
eine Wendung angesprochen, die seinen Gang der Kehre entsprechen läßt. Dadurch wird jedoch die Fragestellung in "Sein
und Zeit" keineswegs preisgegeben. Demgemäß steht in der Vorbemerkung zur siebenten unveränderten Auflage von "Sein und
Zeit" (1957) der Satz:
Der "Weg bleibt indessen auch heute noch ein notwendiger,
wenn die Frage nach dem Sein unser Dasein bewegen soll".
Dagegen wird im Denken der Kehre die Fragestellung von "Sein
und Zeit" auf eine entscheidende Weise er-gänzt. Ergänzen kann
nur, wer das Ganze erblickt. Diese Ergänzung erbringt auch erst
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This fulfillment likewise furnishes for the first time an adequate
characterisation of There-being, sc. of the essence of man [as]
thought in terms of the truth of Being as such (cf. Being and Time
§ 66). Accordingly, the first draft of the lecture course for the
winter semester of 1937-38, which tries to analyse the necessity
of the question of truth in the perspective of the question of
Being, reads in part:
Over and over again we must insist: In the question of truth as posed
here, what is at stake is not only an alteration in the traditional con»
ception of truth, nor a complement of its current (re)presentation; what
is at stake is a transformation in man's Being itself. This transformation
is not demanded by new psychological or biological insights. Man here is
not the object of any anthropology whatever. Man comes into question
here in the deepest and broadest, in the genuinely fundamental, perspective : man in his relation to Being - sc. in the reversal: Beon and its
truth in relation to man.
The "coming-to-pass" of the reversal which you ask about "is"
Beon as such. It can only be thought out of the reversal. There
is no special kind of coming-to-pass that is proper to this
[process]. Rather, the reversal between Being and Time, between
Time and Being, is determined by the way Being is granted,
Time is granted. I tried to say a word about this "is granted"
in the lecture "Time and Being" which you heard yourself here
[in Freiburg] on January 30,1962. 10
If instead of "Time" we substitute: the lighting-up of the
self-concealing [that is proper to] the process of coming-topresence, then Being is determined by the scope- of Time. This
comes about, however, only insofar as the lighting-process of
self-concealment assumes unto its want a thought that corresponds to it.
[The process of] presenc-ing (Being) is inherent in the lightingup of self-concealment (Time). [The] lighting-up of self-concealment (Time) brings forth the process of presenc-ing (Being).
It is [due] neither [to] the merit of my questioning nor [to
some] arbitrary decision of my thought that this reciprocal
bearing reposes in a [mutual] ap-propriation and is called e-vent
1 0 [Translator's note. Awkward though it appears, this translation of Es gibt
offers distinct advantages over the more natural "there is," for reasons that appear
in the lecture to which Professor Heidegger alludes.]
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die zureichende Bestimmung des Da-seins, d. h. des von der
Wahrheit des Seins als solchen her gedachten Wesens des Menschen (vgl. "Sein und Zeit", §66). Demgemäß lautet ein Text
des ersten Entwurfs der Vorlesung für das Wintersemester
1937/38, die versucht, die Notwendigkeit der Wahrheitsfrage
im Hinblick auf die Seinsfrage zu erörtern:
Immer wieder ist einzuschärfen: In der hier gestellten Wahrheitsfrage
gilt es nicht nur eine Abänderung des bisherigen Begriffes der Wahrheit,
nicht eine Ergänzung der geläufigen Vorstellung, es gilt eine Verwandlung des Menschseins selbst. Diese Verwandlung ist nicht durch neue
psychologische oder biologische Einsichten gefordert. Der Mensch ist
hier nicht Gegenstand irgendeiner Anthropologie. Der Mensch steht
hier zur Frage in der tiefsten und weitesten, der eigentlich grundhaften
Hinsicht: Der Mensch in seinem Bezug zum Sein - d. h. in der Kehre:
Das Seyn und dessen Wahrheit im Bezug zum Menschen.
Das "Geschehen" der Kehre, wonach Sie fragen, "ist" das
Seyn als solches. Es läßt sich nur aus der Kehre denken. Dieser
eignet keine besondere Art von Geschehen. Vielmehr bestimmt
sich die Kehre zwischen Sein und Zeit, zwischen Zeit und Sein
aus dem, wie Es Sein, wie Es Zeit gibt. Über dieses "Es gibt"
versuchte ich in dem Vortrag "Zeit und Sein", den Sie selbst
hier am 30. Januar 1962 gehört haben, einiges zu sagen.
Setzen wir statt "Zeit": Lichtung des Sichverbergens von
Anwesen, dann bestimmt sich Sein aus dem Entwurfbereich
von Zeit. Dies ergibt sich jedoch nur insofern, als die Lichtung
des Sichverbergens ein ihm entsprechendes Denken in seinen
Brauch nimmt.
Anwesen (Sein) gehört in die Lichtung des Sichverbergens
(Zeit). Lichtung des Sichverbergens (Zeit) erbringt Anwesen
(Sein).
Es ist weder das Verdienst meines Fragens noch der Machtspruch meines Denkens, daß dieses Gehören und Erbringen im
Er-eignen beruht und Ereignis heißt (vgl. "Identität und Diffe-
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(cf. Identity and Difference, p. 3off.). 11 The fact that what we
thoughtlessly enough call "truth" the Greeks called 'A-ArjOeiaas well, indeed, in poetical and non-philosophical as in philosophical language - is not [a result of] their [own] invention and
caprice. It is the richest endowment of their language, in which
that-which-comes-to-presence as such attained non-concealment
and - concealment. Without an eye for the granting of such a
gift to man, without a sense for the e-mitting of such an
e-mittence, one will no more comprehend what is said about the
mittence of Being than the man born blind can ever experience
what light and color are. 12
The distinction you make between Heidegger I and II is
justified only on the condition that this is kept constantly in
mind: only by way of what [Heidegger] I has thought does one
gain access to what is to-be-thought by [Heidegger] II. But the
thought of [Heidegger] I becomes possible only if it is contained
in [Heidegger] II.
Meanwhile, every formulation is open to misunderstanding.
In proportion to the intrinsically manifold matter of Being and
Time, all words which give it utterance (like reversal, forgottenness and mittence) are always ambiguous. Only a [commensurately] manifold thought succeeds in uttering the heart of this
matter in a way that cor-responds with it.
This manifold thought requires, however, not a new language
but a transformed relationship to the essenc[-ing] of the old
one.
My wish for your work - for which you alone bear the responsibility - is this: may it help set in motion the manifold thinking
of the simple business of thought, which, by reason of its very
simplicity, abounds in hidden plenitude.
Freiburg im Breisgau, early April, 1962
MARTIN

HEIDEGGER

1 1 [Translator's note. For the translation of Ereignis b y " e - v e n t , " see below, p.
614, note 50.]
1 2 [Translator's note. For the translation of Erblicken by " h a v e an eye for," see
below, pp. 613-614. For Schicken and Seinsgeschick as " e - m i t t i n g " and " m i t t e n c e , "
see below, p. 435.]
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renz", S. 30 ff.). Daß für die Griechen das, was wir gedankenlos
genug "Wahrheit" nennen, A-ATJ&SKX heißt, und zwar in der
dichterischen und in der nicht philosophischen ebenso wie in
der philosophischen Sprache, ist nicht ihre Erfindung und Willkür. Es ist die höchste Mitgift für ihre Sprache, in der das Anwesende als ein solches zur Unverborgenheit und - Verbergung
gelangte. Wer für das Erblicken des Gebens einer solchen Gabe
an den Menschen, für das Schicken eines so Geschickten keinen
Sinn hat, wird die Rede vom Seinsgeschick nie verstehen, so
wenig wie der von Natur Blinde je erfahren kann, was Licht und
Farbe sind.
Ihre Unterscheidung zwischen "Heidegger I " und "Heidegger
II" ist allein unter der Bedingung berechtigt, daß stets beachtet
wird: Nur von dem unter I Gedachten her wird zunächst das
unter II zu Denkende zugänglich. Aber I wird nur möglich,
wenn es in II enthalten ist.
Indes bleibt alles Formelhafte mißverständlich. Gemäß dem
in sich mehrfältigen Sachverhalt von Sein und Zeit bleiben auch
alle ihn sagenden Worte wie Kehre, Vergessenheit und Geschick
mehrdeutig. Nur ein mehrfältiges Denken gelangt in das entsprechende Sagen der Sache jenes Sachverhalts.
Dieses mehrfältige Denken verlangt' zwar keine neue Sprache,
aber ein gewandeltes Verhältnis zum Wesen der alten.
Mein Wunsch ist, Ihr Werk, für das Sie allein die Verantwortung tragen, möge helfen, das mehrfältige Denken der einfachen
und deshalb die Fülle bergenden Sache des Denkens in Gang zu
bringen.

Freiburg i. Br. Anfang April 1962
MARTIN HEIDEGGER

P R E F A C E T O T H E U.S. E D I T I O N 1

After forty years of scholarship that has carefully pawed over
the data on which the research effort reported in this book was
based, and after the gradual publication, in somewhat parallel
sequence, of a major portion of Heidegger's Collected Works (the
Gesamptausgabe) that contained prodigious amounts of material
relevant to this research but inaccessible to the writer when it
was undertaken, any serious effort to "revise" the original text
in preparation for its U.S. publication in a more studentfriendly form than the original is, as a practical endeavor, simply
not feasible. One would have to start all over again. What does
seem feasible, however, as a way of introducing the text to a
new generation of readers, is to briefly discuss a single theme,
characteristic of (and central to) the book's entire argument,
that may suggest the sense and continuing relevance of the
work as a whole.
It will be clear to anyone familiar with Heidegger scholarship
over these years that the apparent difference between the philosophical style of an early Heidegger (for example, the author
of Being and Time), which in the following study I labeled "Heidegger I," and that of a much later period, which I designated
roughly as "Heidegger II," became a bone of contention among
Heidegger's interpreters and provoked more sound and fury
^1 T h e substance of this essay first appeared as "From Phenomenology Through
Thought to a Festschrift. A Response," Heidegger Studies 13 (1997)117-28.
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than it perhaps deserved. 2 T h e debate itself has long since, like
any storm, spun itself out, yet it remains part of the Heidegger
story in the United States and deserves at least a historical note.
It seems worthwhile for the contemporary reader to understand
how this distinction came about in order to assess what value it
may or may not retain today, long after it was first proposed.
Under the circumstances, I hope the reader will be indulgent
with the inevitably autobiographical tone of the following account.
When I first arrived in Freiburg in the early fall of 1955, in
order to follow Heidegger's announced lecture course on The
Principle of Reason,3 I had the extraordinary good fortune to
share lodgings with an Italian student, Virgilio Fagone, who was
finishing his dissertation on Heidegger for the Gregorian University (Rome) under the direction of a German professor with
a special interest in Heidegger, J.-B. Lötz (a contemporary and
friend of the eminent theologian Karl Rahner, both of them former students of Heidegger in the turbulent thirties). Fagone
was a small, ebullient man who loved life, loved philosophy (especially ä la Heidegger), and loved to talk. As a personality, he
was bubbling champagne. He was also an exceptionally gifted
man, whose lucid mind and solid erudition had earned him
(through the mediation of Professor Max Müller—former student become personal friend of Heidegger) an invitation to participate in Heidegger's by-invitation-only seminar on Hegel's
Logic that ran concomitantly with the public lecture course and
is known to the reading public by the presentation with which
Heidegger himself concluded it, " T h e Onto-theo-logical Constitution of Metaphysics." 4
For my own part, I was the total innocent. I was beginning
graduate studies in order, eventually, to teach metaphysics, and
I knew that Heidegger was a contemporary who had something
to say about it. I had been accepted at the Higher Institute of
Philosophy (Louvain) and had made some preliminary contact
- William J. Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, preface by Martin Heidegger. 3ri1 ed. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974),
* Martin Heidegger, The Principle of Reason, trans. R. Lilly (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1991).
4 Martin Heidegger, " T h e Onto-theo-logical Constitution of Metaphysics" in Identity and Difference, trans. J. Stambaugh, 2ml ed. (New York: Harper & Row. 1974).
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with the Heidegger specialist there, Alphonse De Waelhens, 5
who had tentatively agreed to supervise my work. Beyond that,
I knew practically nothing. Fagone mistook my interest for
knowledge and would return from his seminar sessions with
Heidegger burning with eagerness to pour out all he had heard
on my attentive but uncomprehending ears. In particular, he
kept stressing (for reasons I did not yet bnderstand) the coherence between what Heidegger was then doing with Hegel's
Logic and what he had attempted in Being and Tinted T h e secret? Whispered with raised eyebrows and a roll of the eyes,
some mysterious alchemy called "the Kehre." All those who
thought that with Being and Time Heidegger had reached some
kind of dead end were simply oblivious to the wonderfully
transformative power of the Kehre.
Slowly, I realized that D e Waelhens, dean of the French
commentators on Being and Time and Doktorvater-designate of
my thesis-to-be, was precisely one of these unenlightened. Recalling my initial conversations with him, I remembered his
saying how he felt that the original project of Being and Time, so
full of promise, had simply gone bankrupt, and that Heidegger,
in frustration and disappointment, had turned to some kind of
poetizing—sorry substitute for one so gifted for rigorous philosophical analysis as he. Clearly, there were at least two ways of
understanding the meaning of the later Heidegger or, at least,
two ways of conceiving the relationship between the early and
the later periods: as escape or as fulfillment. In this sense, the
question of " t w o " Heideggers was, from the beginning (in
l
955\ a given—the use of " I " and " I I " was simply the most
practical shorthand device I could think of to refer to them in
note-taking. T h e task would be to find some way of examining
the relationship between them.
But how? Here, too, Fagone had a suggestion, though it tumbled out one evening inadvertently, ä propos of something completely other: "Foundational thinking (Das wesentliche Denken)\
Now there's an interesting idea! How does it relate to the phe5

Alphonse De Waelhens, La Philosophie de Martin Heidegger (Louvain, Belgium: n.p.,

194O.

6 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Stambough (Albany: State University
of New York Press, 1996).
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nomenology of Being and Time?" T h e idea stuck. I spent the semester casting about for a suitable dissertation topic and
considered many, but in the end this seemed the most promising
of all. Before the term was over, I revved up enough courage
(naive brashness?) to approach the Lion himself in his den during
one of the scheduled "office hours" that followed each public
lecture. Would the tracing of the notion of the "thinking of
Being" be a suitable dissertation topic? A firm
" was all the
answer I needed, and the decision was made.
De Waelhens was appalled. "Are you serious? Do you really
want to work on that?" he asked. Dismayed by his reaction but
bolstered by Heidegger's approval, I had the sinking feeling that
this might be bite-the-bullet time and, with deep breath and anxious gulp, muttered, "Yes." He sighed deeply, shrugged his
shoulders, and shook his head in disbelief as if to say, "You must
be out of your mind"—but did not refuse to provide supervision.
It turned out to be an ideal match. De Waelhens deeply disliked
the later Heidegger (had Heidegger's Nazi experience influenced his attitude?), but he took his professional obligation seriously: he read what I wrote carefully and incisively; his criticism
was forthright, often expressed with wry, half-smile humor ("un
pen de distance, quand « " ) ; and he remained committed to the
task long after the direction of the work pointed toward a conclusion that clearly would challenge his own deeply held views. Best
of all, he helped me understand the burden of freedom and
showed by very concrete example what it meant to "let [someone] be."
Course work in Louvain finished, research resumed in earnest back in Freiburg. When I had worked through the texts of
the early period up to (and including) " O n the Essence of
Truth" (1930-43), in which the phrase "the thinking of Being"
first appeared in the published work and the shift of focus from
Dasein to Being that characterized (as far as I could see) the later
period was first clearly discernible, 7 I was tired of being a
schoolboy and wanted to wrap up the doctorate so as to be able
to return home to go to work. Subsequent research, I thought,
D

•

e11' 2

" T ° n t h e Essence of Truth," trans. J. Sallis, in Bask Writings, ed.
ed. (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1993), 111-38, 135.
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could be left to the postdoctoral years. De Waelhens advised
against that plan. "Your work is solid enough, but you have
dealt with texts that others, too, have interpreted. Now that you
have both a method and a momentum in using it, you are in a
position to interpret texts that others have not yet worked
through. If you finish what you have started and work through
the rest of his recently published texts, this could become a real
contribution that would be of help to everybody." And so, with
some reluctance, I continued. I was aware, of course, that there
were a number of unpublished manuscripts around that could
be very illuminating, and I began to collect them, or at least to
photograph them. But in that pre-Xerox era this was a cumbersome and time-consuming task that yielded unreliable (ultimately, unusable) results. So I decided to make a virtue of
necessity and limit my research to the published texts for which
Heidegger himself could be held responsible.8
Working conditions in Freiburg were congenial. What began
as a small reading group grew into a circle of friends, one of
whom, Michael Theunissen, would later become an eminent
member of Germany's academic philosophical scene. On the
professorial level, Eugen Fink, Bernard Welte, and Max Müller were all accessible; but it was Müller, to whom I was first
introduced by Fagone, who quickly became teacher, mentor,
and friend. Insight came slowly. Texts such as Introduction to
Metaphysics (1935) 9 and some of the interpretations of Hölderlin (for example, "Andenken1943)10
clearly belonged to the
later period yet just as clearly contained configurations that
conformed to patterns of Being and Time. With the "Letter on
Humanism" (1947) 11 the issue of the Kehre was explicitly introduced, and the shift from the thought patterns of the early
8 Even this presented problems. Recall, for example, the unannounced and unexplained shift in the text of the first edition (1943) of the " E p i l o g u e " to What Is Metaphysics? which read, "being indeed comes-to-presence without beings" (my emphasis),
to the second edition of the same text (1949), which read, "Being ^^rcomes-to-presence without beings" (my emphasis). This demanded some hermeneutic acrobatics,
after all (cf. Richardson, Heidegger; 562-65).
9
Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. R. Mannheim (New I laven:
Yale University Press, 1959).
1 0 Martin Heidegger, Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtungen (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1944), 75-143.
1 1 Martin Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," trans. F. A. Gapuzzi and J. G. Gray,
in Basic Writings, ed. Krell, 231.
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Heidegger to those of the later period were given a local habitation and a name. It was here that he confirmed the interpretation that I had proposed for the essay " O n the Essence of
Truth/' It was particularly reassuring to find the following
text:
The lecture "On the Essence of Truth" . .. provides a certain insight into the
thinking of the turn from "Being and T i m e " to "Time and Being." This turn
is not a change of standpoint from Being and Time, but in it the thinking that
was sought first arrives at the location of that dimension out of which Being
and Time is experienced, that is to say, experienced from the fundamental
experience of the oblivion of Being. 1 ^

After meditating on this text, I fell upon the idea (actually,
to be more precise, it fell upon me as I tumbled out of bed
one morning when I was back in Louvain to consult with De
Waelhens) that the later period could be thought of as an attempt to retrieve (Wiederholung) the unsaid of the earlier period—what was not and could not be said in the mindset of
Being and Time. That would settle the question about " t w o "
Heideggers: the hypothesis of the later "retrieving" the earlier would account for unity/continuity of the two in a single
enterprise yet also explain the difference of focus and style
between them that gave D e Waelhens and company such dyspepsia. Hooray!
But this did not do much for the question of thinking and its
possible relationship to the phenomenology of Being and Time.
T h e most direct address to the question occurs in the vozlv eivai
correlation as analyzed in the Introduction to Metaphysics
(1935), 13 in which thinking is conceived essentially as an active
acceptance of Being. T h e notion comes full circle in What Is
Called Thinking? (1952), in which the same fundamental structure is discernible in another text of Parmenides as correlation
between AIYELV-voetv and eöv-£f^£vai. 14 Here the sense is that
thinking means to let-lie-forth (kzyew) and accept-the-care-of
(voeiv) beings in their Being (eov-8[ifi£vai)—a reading that focuses more sharply than the former text on the ontological difIbid., 243.
Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 115-96.
u
Martin Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking.? trans. K. Wieck and J. G. Gray (Nrew
York: Harper and Row, 1954), 163-244.
12
13

PRKFACK

TO THK

I'.S. . E D I T I O N

XXXI

ference as such between Being and beings. In another context
of the same work, thinking {Denken) is considered on one hand
as (dynamic) structure, that is, "re-cord" (Gedächtnis), and on
the other hand as process, that is, " t h a n k i n g " (Danken). In
short, the nature of thinking is for Dasein, whose own Being
consists in its openness to Being, to acquiesce in an accepting
gesture of gratitude to Being as it reveals itself through Dasein
in finite fashion. But this corresponds exactly to what in Being
and Time was the gesture of resoluteness (.Entschlossenheit), that
supreme moment in the phenomenology of Dasein when it
lets itself be (manifest as) what it is in all its finitude. This
much seemed clear to me after studying What Is Called Thinking? (1952), but I kept looking in the subsequent works for
some kind of smoking gun evidence for this transformation
that no one could deny. I was about to give up when, finally,
Conversation on a Country Path about Thinking (1944-46) appeared in 1959, offering the following text: " T h u s , the essence of thought, i.e., release unto [Being], would be
resoluteness unto truth in its presencing" (Dann wäre das
Wesen des Denkens, nämlich die Gelassenheit zur Gegnet, die Entschlossenheit zur wesenden Wahrheit).15 Eureka! T h e r e was the
smoking gun. T h e time had come for the real test: to present
these findings to Heidegger himself and face up to his critical
assessment of them.
In requesting an interview, I included a letter of recommendation from Max Müller, which I am certain had much to do
with the response, and a twenty-five-page summary of my argument. When Heidegger pulled the summary out of a folder,
I was shocked to see that every page (apparently) had been
stroked, counterstroked, circled, and daggered to death with
red ink. Obviously, he had read my text carefully, but the only
two negative comments he offered were both minor, only one
of which I recall now: I had misused the word "subjectivity"
with regard to Leibniz. T h e proper term in the case of Leibniz
is not Subjektivität but Subjektität. Amen! Otherwise, Heideg1 5 Martin Heidegger, "Conversation on a Country Path about T h i n k i n g , " Discourse
OH Thinking, trans. J. Anderson and E. H. Freund (New York: Harper Torch books, 1966),
58-90, 81.
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ger seemed to accept the whole package. We spent the rest of
the time (which included coffee and cookies served by Frau
Heidegger) talking about many other things than my text as
such.
T h e following day, on the way to the University, I bumped
into Müller's assistant, who asked me how the visit had gone. I
told him that from my point of view I thought it had gone pretty
well but that I had not yet had time to absorb it. He then told
me that, following the interview, Heidegger had talked to Müller by phone to say, in effect (as I was given to understand it):
"Who is this guy? So many have gotten me wrong, but here is
someone who has gotten me right—and he's an AMERICAN!
How is that possible?" Müller was justly pleased and could take
credit for his tutelage, mediated so well in the beginning by
Fagone. I was astonished and soon began to have wild
thoughts—like . . . even . . . maybe . . . well, why not go for
b r o k e ? . . . a preface! With Müller's encouragement I asked and
received "in principle" a promise of a preface, provided that I
submit one or two questions that could be addressed directly.
These were carefully honed (after much reflection and consultation with my Heidegger-savvy friends) three years later
when the book was already in print and scheduled for publication. T h e substance of my letter of March i, 1962, was simple
indeed: "You will recall that you were kind enough to offer to
write a preface for my book, From Phenomenology to Thought,
provided I formulate one or two questions that might be directly addressed. T h e questions that seem most relevant to
me are these. . . . In advance, please be sure of my deep gratitude, etc." There was no more immediate context for them
than that.
When Heidegger's preface arrived a month later, I was ecstatic. In the first place, the change he suggested in the title
(from From to Through [Phenomenology to Thought]) was fruitful,
easily made, and engaged his authority in the formulation of
it. Great! More particularly, I was delighted (perhaps too hastily) with what he said about my use of the formulae "Heidegger I " and Heidegger II": " T h e distinction you make
between Heidegger I and II is justified only on the condition
that it is kept constantly in mind: only by way of what [Hei-
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degger] I has thought docs one gain access to what is to-bethought by [Heidegger] IL But the thought of [Heidegger] I
becomes possible only if it is contained in [Heidegger] II." 1 6
I could not conceive of a clearer confirmation than this of the
inferences I had drawn after a long journey through his texts
and articulated in my conclusion to the book—a text, in fact,
that he had never read. This had been composed after our interview in February, 1959 (three years earlier), and had long
since been locked up in print.
Relying on texts that suggested the receptive character of his
thought as early as 1921, I had argued:
From this it becomes clear that, no matter what must be said about the orientation of Heidegger I in SZ (1927), the experience which comes to expression
in Heidegger II (where Being as simultaneous revealment-concealment holds
the primacy over thought) dates at least from 1921, when he was already engaged in what he later calls the historical process of thought-ful dialogue.
What else is there to conclude than that Heidegger II is more original than
Heidegger /, went before him along the way? By the same token we are given
to understand that if Heidegger [takes a turn in his way] in order to become
Heidegger II, the reason is not that the effort went bankrupt but that the
thinker simply left one place in order to gain another along the same way.
"What abides in thought is the w a y . " 1 7

It would be from that other place that Heidegger II could be
said to "retrieve" the unsaid of Heidegger I. Beyond them both
and motivating them both I postulated a more primordial experience still that I called (rightly or wrongly) the "Ur-Heidegger." 18
By this I had in mind the original experience of the Beingquestion as occasioned by his reading of Brentano's thesis on
Aristotle, the event when it all began. For the discovery of the
Being-question was also the discovery of its forgottenness. Heidegger says as much when he first spoke publicly of the Kehre
in the "Letter on Humanism": "This turning is not a change
of standpoint of Being and Time, but in it the thinking that was
sought first arrives at the location of that dimension out of
which Being and Time is experienced from the fundamental experience of the oblivion of Being." 1 9 Clearly, it was the Being16

Martin Heidegger, preface to Richardson, in Richardson, Heidegger, p. xxii.

17

Ibid., 632.

^ Ibid., 633.
1 9 Martin Heidegger, ''Letter on Humanism," in Bask Writings. ed. Krell, 232-33-
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question in its forgottenness that energized his reach for the
unreachable star to the very end.
In our conversation, he expressed himself on the matter with
a nuance slightly different from what, as far as I know, he says
elsewhere. My recollection is that he put it this way: "After discovering the Being question as a question in Aristotle, I read
Aristotle (and others) assiduously to find an answer to it, but
found none. Simultaneously with the Being-question, then, was
the experience of its forgottenness. Nonetheless, Aristotle and
all the others used the word 4 is,' hence had some understanding
of what it means even though they had failed to pose the question of what 4 Is' (Sein) as such means. If one were to pursue this
question, one would have to begin by investigating that lived
(but unnoticed) understanding of 'is' that is in Aristotle and, for
that matter, in all of us (Dasein). T h e best instrument available
for such a task obviously was phenomenology. So. . . ." It was
with the expectation that he would repeat this sequence in
writing that I formulated the first question for him to address in
the preface. In fact, he chose not to do so. I was very aware of
all this, however, in formulating my conclusion and made the
best case I could for an "Ur-Heidegger" with the data available
for citation. In any case, Heidegger's remarks about "Heidegger I/II" I took to be a clear and totally unanticipated confirmation of my own conception of the relation between them as
stated in the conclusion, and I was very happy about it. I
thought about adding a note to the translation of the preface,
pointing out its correlation with my conclusion, but rejected the
idea as too obvious, hence an indiscreet overkill that would
annoy more than it would enlighten the attentive reader. What
a mistake!
Let this say, then, that from beginning to end, from D e Waelhens (who read with a hermeneutic of suspicion every fragment, piece by piece), through all sorts of lesser (but highly
exigent) folk, through major critics (for example, Max Müller,
Henri Birault, and Emmanuel Levinas), to Heidegger himself,
no one—but no one!—ever raised the slightest objection to my
use of the I/II formula—instinctive, highly convenient shorthand that gradually insinuated itself into the formal text. T h e
difference between Heidegger I and II (in style, tone, and
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focus) was (to me, working with the texts available 1955-60) a
given; the unity and continuity between them, I believed, had
been carefully demonstrated. It was not until the book was
published and I returned home to try to find some way into the
philosophical community that the Grand Illusion was shattered
and the pernicious Scandal of this distinction was finally laid
bare for all the world to see.
But I noticed that the reviews usually cited nothing more
than my introduction; and without plowing through them all
over again, I have no memory of anyone who ever addressed
the I/II issue as finally crystallized in the conclusion at all—still
less in direct confrontation with Heidegger's comments in the
preface. Yet for me, the conclusion, not the introduction, was
the culmination of the study. Even so astute a reader as Reiner
Schürmann, for example, in rejecting this terminology, cites
Heidegger's comments as "reservations." 20 As indicated above,
I found them to be in no way "reservations" about the terminology but the clearest possible confirmation of its validity.
What element of "reserve" was in them I felt I had anticipated
and taken account of in the conclusion. Significantly, Schürmann gives his reference to page 22 of my book (introduction),
not to pages 632-33 (conclusion). T h e "most unkindest cut of
all," however, came one evening at a Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy smoker when one well-known,
well-published, pipe-smoking Heideggerian came up to me,
feeling totally isolated, and said in kind, avuncular fashion: "All
these people are bad-mouthing you for your two-Heidegger
thing. I want you to know that I, at least, am on your side. I,
too, believe that there really are two Heideggers." Puff, puff,
puff!
None of this should be taken to suggest that I would claim
that there is no other way to understand Heidegger's development than the one I proposed. Schürmann's conception of
things, for example, must be respected as a compelling one;
and the more we know about Heidegger's previously unpublished work, the more closely we can follow every twist and
20 Reiner Schürmann, Heidegger. On Being and Acting: From Principles to Anarchy, trans.
C.-M. Gross (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 17 and n. 43.
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turn in his zig-zag way through the prodigious twenties, the
more nuance we must supply to the notion of Kehre as such.
As for my own proposal—the essentials of which are that
there was a Kehre (by Heidegger's own testimony) and that
there was, therefore, a prc-Kehre (what I took to be Heidegger
I—typified by Being and Time) and a post-Kehre (what I took
to be Heidegger II—typified, say, by Time and Being)—I
would still defend its cogency as a plausible hypothesis for
appreciating the whole of the Heidegger phenomenon taken
in the sum.
When I speak of the need to nuance the understanding of
Kehre in the light of the current availability of Heidegger's
previously unpublished work, I have in mind such a text as
his Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning) (1936-1938),21
which, published in 1989, was obviously inaccessible when
my own work was done. There we got a closer look at the several moments of the turn from I to II, in which the "analytic
of Dasein" is retained even as the perspective of "fundamental ontology" is abandoned, precisely through the kehrige
Bezug des Seyns, that is, "the turning-relation-in Being itself"
as this becomes apparent through the thinking of Ereignis.
Contributions to Philosophy, for example, helps us to understand why and how such essential ingredients as "projection"
and "thrownness" in the existential analysis of Dasein (Heidegger I) remain equally essential to the thinking of ereignis
(Heidegger II), precisely in its need for these very same characteristics of Dasein in order that it may come to pass at all.
Given such clarifications as this that have become common
coin among Heideggerians over forty years of scholarship, is
there still need for so pedestrian a distinction as that between
Heidegger I and II? Whatever its history, does it serve any
longer a useful purpose?
There is no doubt that Beiträge zur Philosophie (Mom Ereignis), as interpreted by him, adds welcome precision to what I
propose in my conclusion, but in no way, as far as I can see,
does it gainsay what is said there. Given the history of my
- 1 Martin I leidegger, Cnntributinns to Philosophy (From Enowning), trans. P. Kmad and
K. Vlaly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999).
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own involvement with the problem, a judicious answer to this
question must be left to others, but, with reserve for better
judgment, I would argue that the distinction is, indeed, still a
useful one, at the very least for heuristic purposes. Contributions to Philosophy, for all its power (it is touted as Heidegger's
"second major work" after Being and Time), is hardly the most
lucid of his writings; and some find in it, remarkable though
it is, good reason to understand why he chose not to publish
it. At best, it is an extremely difficult text that makes heavy
demands upon the most sophisticated Heideggerians, hardly
bread for the proletariat for whom the I/II distinction was invented. It is hard to imagine what the plodding scholar would
have made of Contributions to Philosophy in 1938, that is, without the subsequent works up to and including Time and Being
(1962) 22 to illuminate it. It is not even clear what Heidegger
made of it himself. Certainly, there would have been no preface to offer us the perspective of our hindsight. Just as Heidegger's own journey of self-discovery was long and arduous,
so it is hardly inappropriate that the journey of those who try
to follow him over difficult terrain be marked by dark ravines
and valleys that may wisely be left for subsequent exploration
in order that the primary journey may be finished at all. If it
is not too pretentious, I would like to make my own in this
regard the spirit of Heidegger's brief prologue to the ninth
edition of Sein und Zeit, in which he remarks: " T h e way [this
study follows] still remains even today a necessary one if the
question about Being is to stir our Dasein." 2 3 Stressing the
point in our interview (1959), he insisted: " I would write
Being and Time all over again now, if it were still necessary to
do so." It is in this sense, then, that I do think the I/II distinction remains useful—no more than that, perhaps, but heuristically useful—at least for the proletariat, heavily burdened as
we are by the poverty {Armut) of thought that, when all is said
and done, makes beggars of us all.
And De Waelhens? He encouraged the enterprise, praised
2 2 Martin Heidegger, " T i m e and Being," in On Time and Being, trans. J. Stambaugh
(New York: Harper and Row, 1972).
2 3 Martin Heidegger, Sein und
neunte Auflage (liibingen, Germany: Niemeyer,
i960), p.v.
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what he could find good in it, and supported it to the very end.
But he was never for a moment convinced—he went to his
grave happy in his disbelief. 24 He was a fine man, a true philosopher, and a great mentor. May he rest in peace!
W I L L I A M J. RICHARDSON,

Ph.D.

September 2002

ZA What his real feelings were would appear only long after the book had appeared
and he was given his day in court. Invited by the editor of International Philosophical
Quarterly to write a review essay of my work, under the rubric of "Contemporary Currents" (Alphonse D e Waelhens, "Reflections on Heidegger's Development. A propos
a Recent Book," International Philosophical Quarterly 5 119651:497-502), he treated the
book with great respect but then made his own position clear. T h e tenor of his position
may be divined from his concluding paragraph: "With Heidegger, thought, in the sense
of What Is Called Thinkingcomes
down to projecting a fundamental experience without place, without home, without partners unable to be situated, unable (when all is
said and done) even to be uttered, and with regard to which all the discernible modalities of human existence are only deviated productions. T h e r e is no true thought outside of that experience, no true experience of Being outside of that one. And of this
experience itself, one cannot say since all language is borrowed from it—whether it is
Being, the revelation of Being in man, or the contribution of man to Being. All these
expressions pose all over again the very questions that they elucidate. T h i s 'dubious
s t r u g g l e ' in which everything is at stake cannot fail to remind us of a certain phrase of
Hegel aimed at the nocturnal character of Schelling's Absolute, and which we will not
have the irreverence to cite, for after all we must leave to the genius of a Hegel the
cruelty of Hegelian irony." T h e reference, obviously, is to Hegel's characterization of
Schelling's Absolute as the "night in which all cows are black." Cf. G. W. F. Hegel,
Phänomenologie des Geistes (Hamburg: Meiner, 1952), 19, cited ibid., 5Q2n.2i.
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WRITER'S

PREFACE

If anyone takes the Introduction of this book as his first
plunge into Heidegger, he will find the water rather cold. These
pages do not pretend to be a propaedeutic to this difficult
thinker. They attempt rather to formulate in as concise a
statement as possible the essentials of his entire problematic.
The statement is coherent but compressed. Its density may make
it (for the uninitiated) obscure. The Introduction was the last
part of this work to be written - perhaps it is the last part to be
read. At any rate, the neophyte would be well advised to start
with Chapter I.
And yet a few prefatory remarks are in order. That the time
has come for a study of the problem of thought in Heidegger
seems clear, for none of the interpreters has given the matter
the treatment it deserves. Henri Birault's lucid article in 1950
promised a full-length analysis to follow, but unfortunately it
never appeared.1 J. B. Lotz's review of the problem in Heidegger's recent publications makes no pretense of being a complete
study, 2 and Heinrich Ott's fine book on the bearing of foundational thought upon theology leaves room for a purely philosophical treatment that examines thought precisely inasmuch
as it evolves out of the early Heidegger.8
1 Henri Birault, "Existence et v6rit£ d'apr&s Heidegger/ 1 Revue de Mitaphysique
et de Morale, L (1950), pp. 35-87.
1 Johann B. Lötz, S. J., "Denken und Sein nach den jüngsten Veröffentlichungen
von M. Heidegger," Scholastik, X X X I I I (1958), pp. 81-97.
» Heinrich Ott, Denken und Sein, Der Weg Martin Heideggers nnd der Weg der
Theologie (ZoUikon: Evangelischer Verlag, 1959).
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Methodologically, the research began with a general orientation in Heidegger's thought through the secondary literature
of the most authoritative interpreters, then proceeded to make
a close textual analysis of all of the author's published work
according to the order, not in which these works were published,
but in which they were written. The result was a typewritten
manuscript of more than IIOO pages, which, however abundant
in detail, were tediously repetitious. Yet the method of following
the author's order of composition proved so illuminating that
it seemed unwise to discard it in favor of a mere synthesis of the
results. In editing the original manuscript, then, we took as a
working principle simply to avoid unnecessary repetition, and
restricted synoptic treatment to two chapters of a more general
nature: Introduction and Conclusion.
The study itself we divide along the simplest lines possible:
Part I treats the early Heidegger; Part II deals with the socalled "reversal" in manner and method of the early Heidegger;
Part III examines the later Heidegger. As for the rest, the effort
to eliminate repetition forces us sometimes to collate texts that
come from different periods, but we have done the best we can
to keep the different moments of the development in their proper
place.
The original research continued until "Hegel and the Greeks"
(i960),4 but in the present redaction we stop with What E-vokes
Thought? (1952).5 The reason is not that Heidegger has said
nothing of importance about the problem since 1952, but for
our purposes we reach with the university lectures of that year
the point of diminishing returns. For the years between 1952 and
i960, we have sifted out what properly concerns us and fitted
it into the analysis wherever it could be accommodated best.
The author's massive work on Nietzsche,6 giving in two
volumes the full text of a series of university lectures delivered
at Freiburg between 1936 and 1940 together with certain essays
that date from 1940-1946, appeared (1961) after these re4 "Hegel und die Griechen," Die Gegenwart der Griechen im neueren Denken, Festschrift für Hans-Georg Gadamer zum 60. Geburtstag (Tübingen: Mohr [Siebeck],
i960), pp. 4-3-57- This is the text of a lecture delivered July 26, 1958, and should be
considered prior to "Der Weg zur Sprache," Unterwegs zur Sprache (Pfullingen: Neske,
1959), PP- 239-268. (Hereafter: US).
* Was heißt Denken? (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1954). (Hereafter: WD).
• Nietische (Pfullingen: Neske, 1961), Vols. I, II. (Hereafter: N).

WRITER'S

PREFACE

XLIII

searches were concluded. It was upon these same texts that Heidegger's other Nietzsche interpretations,7 which were published
earlier and hitherto had served as the basis of our own analysis,
were based. This new publication, then, imposed a reconsideration of Heidegger's Nietzsche-interpretation but effected no
essential alteration in the writer's understanding of it. Minor
revisions have been made, however, for the sake of completeness.
Scope and style of the exposition have been determined by
the writer's desire to do something scientifically sound, yet in a
language intelligible to discerning students of the Englishspeaking world who approach Heidegger with some philosophical background but no specialized familiarity with his manner
or his milieu. This imposes the following canons: to supply
certain explanations that specialists would find superfluous; to
sacrifice all embellishing subtleties for the sake of clarity and
conciseness; to keep clearly in view the basic perspectives by
frequent repetitions of the argument.
Heidegger's language, of course, presents a special problem
of translation. We have tried, however, to avoid neologism.
Except in one or two cases, the translations pretend to be
nothing more than approximations, and readers who can suggest
still closer approximations would render the writer a service in
doing so. Even orthography is a problem, since the German
uses capitals for all nouns without discrimination. On principle,
we have decided to reserve capitalization for Being itself and for
words that stand in its place. One exception: we capitalize
There-being (Dasein) as one way of suggesting the unique relationship to Being that for Heidegger this word comports.
As far as the "critical attitude" is concerned, we are trying to
understand Heidegger's notion of thought and nothing else. In
analysing his interpretation of specific phenomena or of other
thinkers we make no attempt whatsoever to judge whether the
interpretation is satisfying or not. We try simply to let Heidegger be and thus throw light on himself.8 What critical position
we ourselves take we reserve for the closing pages.
7 Principally: "Nietzsches Wort: Gott ist tot," Holzwege (Frankfurt: Klostermann.
1950) pp. 193-247 (Hereafter: HW); and WD, pp. 1-78.
8 This same endeavor likewise accounts for the fact that we let Heidegger speak
for himself as much as possible. We restrict the citation of commentators to those
instances where we are obliged to acknowledge a debt or where this is necessary f o r
the progress of the argument.
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The writer feels that he should apologize for the impression of
pedantry that the abundance of footnotes may give. Originally
textual references were intended to explain to the director of the
research and recall to the writer why he said what he said. We
have eliminated many of them, to be sure, and combined others,
but because of the dreadful difficulty in reading Heidegger
(many a patriotic German has despaired), we felt that anyone
desirous of facing for himself the rigors of the original might
welcome here and there a few friendly spots of blood that would
show him how someone else made his way over the rocks.
The reader will notice very soon that the entire work suffers
from chronic hyphenitis, and pur-ists may find it an-noy-ing.
With little heed for the canons of syllabification, this purely
mechanical device sometimes transposes the German original
(v.g. ek-sistence), sometimes is the writer's own invention to
express by several words what in German is a single idea (v.g.
Anwesen: coming-to-presence), sometimes calls attention to an
unfamiliar meaning for a familiar word (v.g. re-collection). It is
really not very often, then, that we do it out of sheer mal-ice.
One final word. The altogether central place of foundational
thought in Heidegger's endeavor forces us to treat in one way or
another almost all of his principal themes. There is one problem,
however, that we resolutely avoid: the problem of God. This is
not because there is nothing to say about God in Heidegger's
thinking. On the contrary, it is because there is too much to say
for it to be said merely by indirection. Besides, any study of this
problem presupposes, if it is going to be serious, the very analysis
that we are attempting here. We reserve the matter, then, for
another day, and content ourselves for the present with the
modest task of watching a thinker follow his star.
And now, the pleasant task of acknowledging, at least, the
debts that one can never really pay. Accumulated over many
years, they are in fact beyond number, and we must be content
here with mentioning only the very heaviest of them. The writer
wishes to express his profound gratitude:
to Professor MARTIN HEIDEGGER for the criticism, encouragement and help so graciously given, and especially for the honor
he does the writer in contributing to this book its preface;
to Right Reverend Monsignor Louis D E RAEYMAEKER, Presi-
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dent, and to the entire professorial corps of the Higher Institute
of Philosophy, Louvain, who by both precept and example
during the writer's student years inspired him with the ideals
that, however unattainable, served as model for these pages;
to Professor ALBERT DONDEYNE, of this same Institute, for
his critical suggestions, and especially for the lecture course on
"Heidegger and the Problem of Finitude" (1956), which helped
the writer at a critical time to see more clearly the essentials of
this difficult problematic;
to Reverend HERMANN L. V A N BREDA, O . F . M . , Director of
the Husserl Archives, Louvain, who from the very beginning
made accessible to the writer the immense resources of this
world center of phenomenological research;
to Professor MAX MÜLLER (Munich), who not only by his
teaching helped form significantly the writers philosophical attitudes but first made possible his personal contact with Professor
Heidegger;
to Professor EUGEN FINK (Freiburg) and Professor BERNARD
W E L T E (Freiburg), who directly and indirectly both in lecture and
seminar helped the writer to a deeper understanding of the contemporary German mind;
to the BOLLINGEN FOUNDATION for the fellowship award
that made it possible to bring this study to a conclusion;
and in the last place, because in the first place, to Professor
ALPHONSE D E WAELHENS, of the Higher Institute of Philosophy,
Louvain, Director of this investigation from the beginning, who,
although placing his own vast erudition and critical penetration
entirely at the writer's disposition, encouraged nonetheless a
most complete liberty in the research, and thus Tcnew how to be
at all times and in the very best of ways the ideal pedagogue.
August 15, 1962

Louvain
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The third edition of this work contains no substantial revisions.
Certain typographical errors have been corrected and the bibliography of Heidegger's works (including English translations) updated, but otherwise the text and supplementary apparatus have
remained unchanged.
August 15, 1973.

New York City
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INTRODUCTION

Abendgang auf der Reichenau
Seewärts fliesst ein silbern Leuchten
zu fernen dunkeln Ufern fort,
und in den sommermüden, abendfeuchten
Gärten sinkt wie ein verhalten Liebeswort
die Nacht.
Und zwischen mondenweissen Giebeln
verfängt sich noch ein letzter Vogelruf
vom alten Turmdach her und was der lichte Sommertag mir schuf
ruht früchteschwer aus Ewigkeiten
eine sinnjenseitige Fracht mir in der grauen Wüste
einer grossen Einfalt.

Eventide an Reichenau
Over the waters flows a silvern glimmer
Forth to distant, darkened shores.
And in the summer-weary, dew-damp gardens
Falls, like a lover's word withheld,
The night.
From moon-white gabled prison
Neath the ancient tower's roof
A bird sings one last song.
And the yield to me of shining summer day
Rests like heavy fruit From long eternities
A burden beyond sense For me in the gray desert
Of a great Simplicity.
MARTIN HEIDEGGER,

1917

There is a long and winding way that leads from Reichenau to
Todtnauberg. It is Martin Heidegger's way. Past the moor and
through the fields it wends its way over the hills, only to wander now
this way, now that, along uncharted forest trails. Yet for all its
meandering,

moves in a single direction, it is but a single way.

purpose of these pages is to trace in some measure that way in
order to raise the question if others may walk it too.1

A.

THE

PROBLEM

OF

BEING

J. The Grounding of Metaphysics
From the very beginning, Heidegger's exclusive preoccupation, hence the unique sense of his way, has been to lay a
foundation for metaphysics. By his own account, it all began on
a summer day in 1907 when, as an eighteen-year-old gymnasiast in Constance, he received from Dr. Conrad Gröber, later
archbishop of Freiburg (1932-48) but at that time pastor of
Trinity Church in Constance, a book that was only gathering
dust on Dr. Gröber's shelf. It was Franz Brentano's dissertation,
On the Manifold Sense of Being according to Aristotle (1862), and
it served not only to open Heidegger's eyes to the problem of
1 Reichenau: a small island in the western arm of Lake Constance, where a
Benedictine abbey, founded by Pirmin (724), was an important center of Christian
culture in mediaeval Europe. Todtnauberg: Heidegger's Black Forest retreat. The
poem, "Abendgang auf der Reichenau," composed during the summer vacation of
1916, appears in Das Bodenseebuch, 1917 (Constance, 1917), p. 152. Writer's translation.
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Being but to introduce him into the philosophical world of the
Greeks. In recalling the fact now, he likes to cite Hölderlin's line
(in "Rhine Hymn"): "As you began, so will you remain/1 2
More precisely, the problem of Being arose as soon as Heidegger
began to meditate with Brentano the meaning of the word' 'being''
(8v) for Aristotle. Here he became fascinated by "is," the little
word that applies to everything - that enjoys an inconceivable
polyvalence (makes world to be world and man to be man),
without detriment to the marvelous unity of itself.3 Yet what
of this unity? This must be Being itself, that which renders
possible all "is." Well, then, what about Being? What meaning
does it have? If it is true, as Aristotle says, that the function of
metaphysics is to ask "what are beings as beings?" (TC TO 6V ^
6v), then, on the supposition that Being gives beings their "is,"
should we not first ask about Being itself? 4 Such was the beginning of the way. Our only task is to watch its progression.
Aristotle's question was, to be sure, a "metaphysical" question.
Whatever the post-Aristotelian origin of this word in the libraries of Rhodes, clearly the question about beings as beings was
a "passing beyond" beings to that which makes them be, their
"being-ness" (ouaLoc).5 Hence even if Aristotle called such an
interrogation "first philosophy," we see with what justice may
be attributed to the word "metaphysics" itself an interpretation
that has become common currency since Simplicius in the fifth
century: a "going beyond" ([xera) the "physical" (TO cpuonxa).
This ''going beyond" the Latins would call transcendere, so that
metaphysics always comports in one way or another the process
a "Wie du anfiengst, wirst du bleiben / ' cited in Unterwegs zur Sprache (Pfullingen:
Neske, 1959), p. 93. (Hereafter: US). See Franz Brentano, Von der mannigfachen
Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1862).
8 The fascination abides. As in 1929 {Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, 2nd
ed. [Frankfurt: Klostermann, 195z], p. 205 [hereafter: KM]), so in 1952 {Was heisst
Denken? [Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1954], pp. 107, 137 [hereafter: WD]), the author returns again and again to the strange magic. N.B. We translate Heidegger's Seiende
(that-which-is) as "being" and Sein (that by which it is) as "Being."
4 In 1935, Heidegger meditates the sense of the Greek word for Being (elvou).
After examining first its grammar (pp. 42-54), then its etymology (pp. 54-55), he
finds the results meager enough, then resorts once more to meditating "is" (p. 68),
concluding that the primal form of etvai must be neither the substantive nor infinitive, but the third person singular, sc. "is" itself (p. 70). (Einführung in die Metaphysik [Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1953], pp. 40-70 [hereafter: EM]).
B The question bifurcates immediately into the question of what beings are and
thai they are, hence the question about essence and existence.
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of transcendence.6 The <puaixa must be understood as xa cpuarei
6vra (beings which "are" by reason of cpiiatg), where yuciq must
not be taken to mean what we would call "physical" nature but
must be understood in the sense that this word had for the preSocratic thinkers, as that by which all things emerge into
presence as what they are, sc. Being itself.7 Briefly: metaphysics
means the transcendence of beings to their Being in such a way
that beings are thereby considered as beings.
If metaphysics be understood thus, however, is Aristotle, in
finding the formula, thereby its genuine founder? No, metaphysics as we understand it here emerged initially, Heidegger
claims, with Plato, when he made the distinction between the
beings of experience as a world of shadows and the Being of
these beings as a world of Ideas. In the metaphor of the cave
{Politeia VII, 514 a, 2 to 517 a, 7), for example, he speaks of
"going beyond" the shadows and "over to" the Ideas (516 c, 3).8
For all practical purposes, then, the sense of metaphysics, if not
the formula, is here clearly disengaged.
Yet with this all is not said. For if it is clear that metaphysics
thinks beings as beings, it must be equally clear that they appear
as what they are only by reason of some strange light that
renders them un-concealed (unverborgen) before, to and in the
metaphysical gaze. Furthermore, this light as such, in rendering
beings un-concealed, remains itself concealed (verborgen) within
them, for it is itself not a being but merely the light by which
they shine forth. 9 What is this light, the concealed source of nona See Zur Seinsfrage (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1956), pp. 18, 36-37. (Hereafter:
SF). Cf. N, I, p. 454.
7 Heidegger claims that this sense of <pu<ji£ may still be found even in Aristotle
{Metaphysics I V , 1, 1003 a 27). Moreover, he maintains that, given this sense of cpuai^,
all metaphysics, whether it conceive Being as Pure Act, as Absolute Concept or as
WiU-un to-Power, remains essentially a "physics." This gives rise to an ambiguity on
which the author later capitalizes. If all metaphysics is a "physics" because it considers
beings as beings (in their
then to go beyond metaphysics in order to consider
Being (here: <p6aiq) itself is to attempt a meta-"physics" of a higher sort. It is to this
type of meta-"physics" that Heidegger himself would introduce his readers, because
it means "overcoming" or "founding" metaphysics in the Aristotelian sense. This ambiguity, deliberately embraced, gives rise to the title of the lecture series of 1935
(see EM, pp. 14-15).
8 IXET* beeTva . . . EL? TCCUTOC. (Piatons Lehre von der Wahrheit, 2nd ed. Überlieferung und Auftrag, Band 5 [Bern: Francke, 1954], p. 48 [hereafter: PW]).
• Was ist Metaphysik? 7th ed. (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1955), p. 7- (Hereafter:
WM). See also Über den "Humanismus" (in PW, pp. 53-119), pp. 76-77. (Hereafter:
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concealment? This is the question that metaphysics has never
posed. But it is a question that must be posed, and, indeed, for
the sake of metaphysics itself, since it is only by reason of this
light that metaphysics can go about its task. The lightingprocess by which beings are illumined as beings - this is what
Heidegger understands by Being.
Let us pause for a moment and savor this. "Being, indeed what is Being?" writes the author in the famous formula of 1947:
" . . . [It] is not God, nor [some] ground of the world. Being is broader
than all beings - and yet is nearer to man than all beings, whether they
be rocks, animals, works of art, machines, angels or God. Being is what
is nearest [to man]. Yet [this] near-ness remains farthest removed from
him. . . . " 10
Being is not a being, because it is that which enables beings
to be (present) to man and men to each other. It is nearest
to man, because it makes him to be what he is and enables him
to enter into comportment with other beings. Yet it is farthest
removed from him because it is not a being with which he,
structured as he is to deal directly with only beings, can comport himself.
From the point of view of beings, Being encompasses them all,
just as a domain of open-ness encompasses what is found within
it. This domain is not, of course, "space" but rather that
dimension out of which even space and time themselves come-topresence. Being is the domain of open-ness, because it is the
lighting-process by which beings are lighted-up. 11 If these beings
be "subjects" or "objects," then the light itself is neither one
nor the other but "between" them both, enabling the encounter
10 "Doch das Sein - was ist das Sein? . . . Das 'Sein* - das ist nicht Gott und nicht
ein Weltgrund. Das Sein ist weiter denn alles Seiende und ist gleichwohl dem Menschen
näher als jedes Seiende, sei dies ein Fels, ein Tier, ein Kunstwerk, eine Maschine, sei
es ein Engel oder Gott. Das Sein ist das Nächste. Doch die Nähe bleibt dem Menschen
am weitesten. . . . " (HB, p. 76).
1 1 This process-character of Being accounts for the fact that the important word
Wesen has for Heidegger a verbal sense. See: Vom Wesen der Wahrheit, 3rd ed.
(Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1954), pp. 25, 26. (Hereafter: W W ) . Vorträge und Aufsätze
(Pfullingen: Neske, 1954)» P- 38. (Hereafter: VA). W D , p. 143. T o underline the process-character we have been tempted to translate Sein b y the infinitive: To-be. We
have opted for the more normal form, however: because Heidegger himself usually
uses the definite article das, when b y omitting it he would have drawn attention to
the verbal character of Sein; because Being is better accomodated to the exigencies
of readable English than To-be; because the ambiguity that inevitably results m a y
not be altogether a bad thing.
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to come about. 12 It is from Being, then, that metaphysics derives all its vigor as from its proper element.13
The author makes much of the metaphor suggested by Descartes in his letter to Picot, according to which all philosophy is
as a tree whose roots are metaphysics, whose trunk is physics
and whose branches are all the other sciences.1* But what, Heidegger asks, is the ground in which metaphysics is rooted? The
unequivocal answer: Being. Being can be called, then, the
ground in which metaphysics, as the root of the philosophy tree,
is held fast and nourished. To interrogate the ground of metaphysics, we must pose the "grounds-question, the question
about the sense of Being. 15 Now the "sense" {Sinn) of anything
for Heidegger is the non-concealment by which it appears as
itself. Non-concealment, however, is the literal meaning of
a-XiQ0eta, sc. "truth." " . . . 'Sense of Being1 and 'truth of Being'
[are] but one." 1 6 So it happens, then, that the ground-question
of metaphysics becomes the interrogation of Being in the light
of itself, Being in its truth.
The Being-question must, indeed, be posed, but it is not the
task of metaphysics as such, concerned only with beings as
beings, to pose it. To be sure, metaphysics talks about Being,
but only in the sense of the total ensemble of beings, or of beingness, with all of the ambiguity which, as we shall see, this
implies. The fact is, however, that metaphysics cannot pose
such a question. As long as its gaze is fixed upon beings, it profits
from the light of Being by meditating these beings-as-they12 HB, pp. 77 (Lichtung), 101 (Zwischen). May we say that Being thus conceived
"is" ? If so, then only Being "is"; beings, properly speaking, "are" not. The essential
is to recognize the difference. (See HB, p. 80). In 1957, Heidegger will accept the
formula "Being is,1* provided that "is" be understood transitively. See Identität und
Differenz (Pfullingen: Neske, 1957), p- 62. (Hereafter: ID).
" WM, p. 8.
1 4 WM, p. 7 and passim.
1 5 The "ground"-question (Grundfrage) is to be distinguished from the "guidesquestion (Leitfrage), the question about 6v f; 6v. See: EM, p. 15; N,I, pp. 79-81;
454-462- N.B. Parenthetical German words in notes are for purposes of identification only. Hence we cite the original form without alteration.
1 6 " . . . 'Sinn von Sein' und 'Wahrheit des Seins» sagen das Selbe.'* (WM, p. 18).
See: HB, p. 84; WM, p. 44; Holzwege, 2nd ed. (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1952), P- 245(Hereafter: HW). Cf. Sein und Zeit, 6th ed. (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1949). P(Hereafter: SZ). Note that we follow the sixth edition of 1949- In the numerous
reprintings, sometimes the type has been re-set, causing minor variations in pagination. It seems impossible to forestall all possibility of confusion for readers who use
different printings.
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appear, ( " . . . metaphysics always presents beings (ov) in that
[dimension] which as beings (fj 8v) they themselves have manifested. . . . " ) , 1 7 but cannot meditate the light itself, simply because the light does not appear by itself as a being but only in
the beings it enlightens ( " . . . metaphysics, however, never pays
heed to precisely that [dimension] of 6v which, to the extent
that 5v becomes un-concealed, is by that very fact concealed"). 18
There is no way, then, that metaphysics can get Being, the
lighting-process as such, in focus. That is why " . . . metaphysics
as such is excluded from the experience of Being by reason of its
very essence. . . . " 1 9
As Heidegger goes about meditating the process of a-XTjöeia,
this strange paradox (hidden from the metaphysician) that
Being contracts into the beings it makes manifest and hides by
the very fact that it reveals, never loses its fascination for him.
He interrogates Being precisely inasmuch as it is hidden always
in 8v (yet different from 6v), for it is "upon the hidden [dimension]
of ov that metaphysics remains grounded. . . . " 2 0 We find
striking confirmation of this in the inaugural lecture at Freiburg
(1929), when, in posing the question that gives the lecture its
title, "What is Metaphysics?," he meditates the sense of Nonbeing {Nichts). The hiddenness of Being (in beings) is, then, for
Heidegger as essential a part of his experience as Being itself. 21
What we call here the "hiddenness" of Being (in beings) may
be understood in terms of a "not" that contracts Being in beings
and at the same time differentiates it from them. Since the
function of Being is simply to en-light-en beings, then this contracting "not" is intrinsic to its very nature. For want of a
better word, let us call the "not"-character of Being "negativity." Then the manifestive power that shines forth in beings
1 7 " . . . denn sie stellt das Seiende (6v) stets nur in dem vor, was sich als Seiendes
(fl 6v) schon von diesem her gezeigt hat. . . . " (WM, p. 20). Cf. p. 8.
1Ä " . . . Die "Metaphysik achtet jedoch dessen nie, was sich in eben diesem 8v,
insofern es unverborgen wurde, auch schon verborgen hat." (WM, p. 20). Note that
in speaking here of two "dimensions" in beings, we have all that is necessary to help
us understand the distinction between "ontic" and "ontological" as it appears in SZ.
1 9 " . . . Als Metaphysik ist sie von der Erfahrung des Seins durch ihr eigenes Wesen
aasgeschlossen
" (WM, p. 20).
M "Auf dieses Verborgene im 6v bleibt die Metaphysik gegründet, ...*' (WM,
P- 20).
« Cf. N, I, p. 460.
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as beings we may call "positivity." 22 Once we comprehend this
fusion of positivity and negativity into the unity of a single
process, we begin to grasp what Heidegger understands by Being
as the process of truth. For truth, understood in the radical
sense of a-Xvjöeia, is literally non-(a-)concealment (Xy^). 23 Being
as the process of non-concealment is that which permits beings
to become non-concealed (positivity), although the process is
so permeated by "not" that Being itself remains concealed
(negativity). To think Being in its truth, then, is to think it in
terms of both positivity and negativity at once.
In the simplest of terms: Heidegger's whole effort is to interrogate the positive-negative process of a-X*j6eia, insofar as it
gives rise to metaphysics. The full import of this can be appreciated, however, only when we watch him at work. He meditates,
for example, the formula T[ TO 8V fj 5v and endeavors thereby to
disengage the interior structure of metaphysics. Now the formula, he insists, is essentially ambiguous. To be sure, "beings as
beings" means the whole ensemble (xoc66Xov) of beings, considered in terms of that which makes them "be," sc. their beingness (ouala). The being-ness of the ensemble of beings, however,
may be understood in at least two ways: it may mean the
common denominator of all beings ($v xa06Xov, xoiviv), hence
Being, as we say, "in general"; or it may mean some ultimate
"ground" which lets the ensemble of beings be, where this is
understood in the sense of some being, supreme among the rest
(5v xa66Xou dbcpdwrov), and, because supreme, often called "divine" (Beiov). Insofar as the task of metaphysics is to make
affirmations (X&YOC;) about beings (6vroq) meditated in this way,
it is of its very nature onto-logy. When this word emerges in the
seventeenth century, however, it is usually reserved for metaphysics in the first sense, sc. the interrogation of Being-in-general,
whereas metaphysics in the second sense, the interrogation of a
supreme Being (however this be conceived), is properly speaking
a theo-logy, or, as we might better say, a theio-logy. The term
t a The terminology as such is not Heidegger's, although we shall find a certain
warrant for it in SZ. We are inclined to think of positivity and negativity here (if
images of this kind do not do more harm than good) as two complementary components in a single movement, as in the composition of forces. In any case, the words
must not be taken in any dialectical sense.
a s V.g. See WW, p. 15.
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"transcendence" shares the same ambiguity. It can mean the
passage from beings to Being-in-general, from beings to the
Supreme Being, or even the Supreme Being itself.24 What is
capital, however, is to note that, since the formula 5v ft 8v itself
is ambiguous, metaphysics necessarily compasses both these
modalities, its innermost structure is onto-theo-logical.25
2. The Ontological Difference
But the problem lies deeper still. Why is it, after all, that ov
fj ov gives rise to the confusion in the first place? The reason,
we are told, lies in the nature of 8v itself. Grammatically, it is a
participle and as such may be used either as a noun (v.g. can a
human being live on the moon?) or as an adjective with a verbal
sense (v.g. being curious, we want to know). More precisely: 8v,
when taken as a noun, means that which is, sc. a being (Seiendes);
taken as a verbal adjective (seiend), it designates that process
by which a being (as noun) "is," sc. its Being (Sein).26 The word
itself, then, comporting both senses, is intrinsically ambivalent,
and it is because ov itself can mean either Being, or beings, or
both, that the interrogation of 8v 5v can evolve as a meditation
on either Being-in-general (onto-logy) or on the ultimate ground
(theo-logy).27 In other words, the onto-theo-logical structure of
metaphysics is rooted ultimately in the intrinsic ambivalence
of ov.
It would be a grave mistake, however, to think that this
ambivalence of ov is something peculiar to Aristotle. The fact is
that it characterizes the entire history of Greek thought. The
primitive form of 6v, Heidegger claims, is most probably sov, as
the word is found, for example in Homer (v.g. Iliad, I, 70), or
24 SF, p. 18. Thus in Kantian terms one would speak of metaphysics in the first
sense as a reflection upon the "transcendental," and in the second sense upon
"transcendent Transcendence," See HW, p. 318.
25 WM, pp. 19-20. ID ID, p. 51, the author recalls the formula of WM (1929), p38, which says that metaphysics meditates beings-as-such (therefore Being-in-general)
and in their totality (Being as Supreme Being). We follow here the prologue added
to fifth edition of WM (1949). The sense is the same. Cf. KM, p. 17.
26 HW, pp. 161-162, 317.
27 Heidegger claims that the word participium meant precisely "taking part" in
two senses, sc. of noun and verb, at once. The point, however, is less cogent in English
than in German, for we reserve the word "participle" to the verbal adjective, calling
the verbal noun a "gerund." See WD, p. 133.
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even in Parmenides and Heraclitus. The e- would indicate the
stem so- (hence £<mv, est, ist, is), in whose dynamic power the
participle shares in double fashion.28 What is more, in Parmenides and Heraclitus, eov can mean, in addition to the ambivalence we have mentioned already, the ultimate and unique
process that we know as one-in-many ("Ev-IIavTa). That is why
the author, in a much later expose (1957) of the onto-theo-logical
structure of metaphysics, feels free to meditate the ambivalence
of Öv under the guise of Heraclitus' "Ev, which in turn is identified with Aoyos, conceived as the process of grounding beings.29
"Ev, the grounding process, is correlative with IlavTa, the ensemble of beings that are grounded, and the correlation is so
intimate that one correlate cannot "be" without the other: "Ev
can no more serve as ground unless Ildcvra be grounded than
Ilavra can be grounded without "Ev. This intimate correlation
between "Ev and ndcvra, intrinsic to the Heraclitean Aoyos,
corresponds precisely to the duality of Being and beings that we
call the "ambivalence" of Sv.30 What is more, out of the ambivalence in Aoyo? arises even for Heraclitus the same ambiguity
that we find later in the structure of metaphysics: "Ev is unifying one in the sense of the absolutely primary and universal;
"Ev is that unifying one in the sense of that being, supreme among
the Ilavra (for Heraclitus: Zeus), which grounds the rest because
it is in some way or other the "fullness" of "Ev in the first sense.31
Coming again to Plato, we can see that the distinction between
sensible and supra-sensible, sc. between physical and metaphysical worlds, derives from the same ambivalence. In this
respect it is instructive to recall that this ambivalence is expressed when we call 8v a participium. For the old grammarians,
this meant that the word "participates" in two meanings at
once, that of a noun and that of a verb. The conception of "participation," however, is not a grammatical but a philosophical
one. The Latin grammarians took it from the Greek grammarians GxeTox*)), who took it, Heidegger claims, from Plato.
For Plato, the word describes the relationship between beings
18

"
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HW, pp. 317-318.
ID, p. 67. Cf. VA, pp. 222, 224.
ID, pp. 5 9 , 62, 66-69. Cf. VA, pp. 218-221.
ID, p. 67. Cf. VA, pp. 222, 224.
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and Being, sc. the Ideas. A table, for example, is what it is because it offers its visage to us as a table. To the extent that an
individual being offers the visage of a table, Plato maintains
that it "participates" (fii0e£ic) in the Idea of table. In other
words, between Being (Idea), the participat-ed, and beings, the
participat-ing, there is a X£opiqx6<;, sc. Being and beings abide in
different "places" focopa), and what bridges the difference between the two "places" is the process of participation. For Heidegger, however, what accounts for the conception of Being and
beings as abiding in two different places is precisely the ambivalence of ßv. It is this that gives rise to ^capi^o^. Participation
presupposes ambivalence.32
Clearly, then, metaphysics is rooted not merely in the ambiguity of the formula 8v fj 8v but more profoundly still in the
ambivalence of 8v itself. It follows that the process of a-X^0eta
must be conceived somehow as the coming-to-pass of ov in this
peculiar duality, and therefore if we are to ground metaphysics,
we have no other choice but to think Being as the process
through which this ambivalence takes place.
But we must go one step further. What is this ambivalence,
after all? Nothing else but the correlation in a single word of
"being" as noun and "being" as verbal adjective, hence of that
which is (manifest) and the process by which it is (manifest), of
beings and Being. Now we could not speak of "ambivalence," of
"duality," or, for that matter, of "correlation" at all, unless we
experienced some difference between the correlates. The ambivalence in 8v, then, names a difference between Being and beings,
and from the very beginning Heidegger has called it the "ontological difference." 3 3 It follows, then, that whenever we have
spoken of the duality of 8v, we could have used the term "ontological difference" just as well. The Being, then, whose sense, sc.
whose truth, Heidegger seeks in order to ground metaphysics is
nothing else than the emergence of the ontological difference,
and conversely, the forgottenness of one is equivalent to forgottenness of the other. " . . . The forgottenness of Being is the
3 3 W D , pp. 134-135, 174-175 taken as a unit. Heidegger italicizes the
vorausgesetzt
(P- 135).
53
Vom Wesen des Grundes, 3rd ed. (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1949), p. 15- (Hereafter: WG).
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forgottenness of the difference between Being and beings." 34
Out of this forgottenness, metaphysics is born. Nor need the
forgottenness be conceived as a deficiency in the metaphysician.
Rather it is inherent to metaphysics as such: "because metaphysics interrogates beings as beings, it remains with beings and
never returns to Being as Being. . . . " 35 As the word is used in
the context of this citation, metaphysics is still conceived as
arising with Plato, and, thus understood, it is in the strictest
sense a going (ICRA T<X <puarixa. That is why it emerges first with
Plato's distinction between sensible and supra-sensible. When
we recall, however, that metaphysics in this sense is no more
than one manner in which the ambivalence of 6v comes-to-pass,
we realize that its roots go deeper than Plato, reach down, as we
have seen already, to the very origins of Greek thought. Hence
if we think . . . the essence of metaphysics in terms of the duality of
[beings and Being], which derives from the self-concealing ambivalence
of äv, then the beginning of metaphysics and the beginning of Western
thought occur together. If, on the other hand, we take the essence of
metaphysics as the distinction between a supra-sensible and a sensible
world, . . . then metaphysics begins with Socrates and Plato. . . . 8 6
In probing the ground of metaphysics, Heidegger meditates its
"essence," sc. that which lets it be what it is, in both these
senses, and since in each case, though in different ways, the
ontological difference goes un-thought, he poses as well the
question as to why it has been forgotten - forgotten, indeed,
necessarily.37
84 " . . . Die Seins Vergessenheit ist die Vergessenheit des Unterschiedes des Seins
zum Seienden." (HW, p. 336). (Writer italicizes here; Heidegger italicizes the whole).
The same point was made in 1929 (KM, p. 2x2), but it comes into sharp focus only
in retrospect.
85 "Weil die Metaphysik das Seiende als das Seiende befragt, bleibt sie beim
Seienden und kehrt sich nicht an das Sein als Sein. . . . " (WM, p. 8). Yet metaphysics
profits from the difference constantly, and the transcendence proper to it must pass
through the difference as such (WD, p. 175).
86 "Denken wir . . . im Hervorkommen des Zwiefachen von Anwesendem und
Anwesen aus der sich verbergenden Zweideutigkeit des 6v das Wesen der Metaphysik,
dann fällt der Beginn der Metaphysik mit dem Beginn des abendländischen Denkens
zusammen. Nimmt man dagegen als das Wesen der Metaphysik die Trennung
zwischen einer übersinnlichen und einer sinnlichen Welt,... dann beginnt die Metaphysik mit Sokrates und P i a t o n . . ( H W , p. 162). Cf. HW, p. 243, where pre-Platonic thought is conceived as a "preparation" (vorbereitet) for metaphysics in the
strict sense. A case in point: the correlation of "Ev-IIdcvra in Heraclitus' A6yo^ (ID,
P- 67; VA, pp. 222, 224).
17
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This proposal to ground metaphysics by interrogating the
sense of Being as the process of d-X7)0eia through which the ontological difference breaks out has been Heidegger's unique preoccupation since the first pages of Being and Time (1927). One
must admit, of course, that the focus on the difference as difference becomes sharper in the later years than we find it in the
beginning, and the evolution in clarity will warrant very special
attention. But the fundamental position is made sufficiently
clear as early as the inaugural address of 1929, when the author
formulates the ground-question with Leibniz' formula: "why
are there beings at all and not much rather Non-being?" 38 For
Leibniz, of course, the formula asks effectively about a Supreme
Being that "grounds" all other beings, is therefore eminently a
metaphysical question. For Heidegger, the question means:
how is it possible that beings (independently of "where" they
might have come from, "who" or "what" may have "caused"
them, as metaphysics understands these terms) can be (manifest) as beings. In other words, it is a question about the comingto-pass of the lighting-process of a-X7)0eicc, which we now understand as the emergence of the ontological difference. What is
more, it is a question about this process as permeated by negativity. Heidegger himself expands the question thus: " . . . How
does it come about that everywhere [about us] beings have the
primacy . . . while that which is not a being, which is thought
of as Non-being in the sense of Being itself, remains forgotten? . . . " 39 The ground-question meditates not only Being
but obliviousness to Being, the forgottenness of the ontological
difference.
One last word: Since metaphysics by reason of its nature
cannot meditate the Being-process which is its ground, then to
ground metaphysics we must pass beyond it. This is the sense
of "overcoming" metaphysics. By overcoming it in this way, do
we vitiate or destroy it ? Of course not. If we leave metaphysics,
it is only to return to the ground from which it draws its vitality.
Heidegger explicitly does not wish to tear the roots of philosophy
.. Warum ist überhaupt Seiendes und nicht vielmehr Nichts?" (WM, p. 42).
" . . . Woher kommt es, dass überall Seiendes den Vorrang hat und jegliches 'ist'
für sich beansprucht, während das, was nicht ein Seiendes ist, das so verstandene
Nichts als das Sein selbst, vergessen b l e i b t ? . . ( W M , p. 23).
88
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out; he will simply dress the ground, till the soil wherein it finds
its strength.40 This effort to lay bare the foundations of ontology
was called in the early years "fundamental ontology," 4i b u t
after 1929 the word disappears completely. In 1949 we are told
why: the word "ontology," even with the epithet "fundamental" to explain it, makes it too easy to understand the
grounding of metaphysics as simply an ontology of a higher sort,
whereas ontology, which is but another name for metaphysics,
must be left behind completely.42 The essential is to realize that
whether we speak of fundamental ontology or the ground of
metaphysics, the sense is identical: we are talking about the
ultimate process out of which metaphysics arises, the essence
(Wesen) of metaphysics. Conversely, to meditate metaphysics
in terms of its essence will mean always to leave it in order to
return to its ground, sc. to think upon the truth of Being.
B.

THE

PROBLEM

OF

THOUGHT

If anyone wishes to assess Heidegger's philosophical effort,
one would think that the best way would be to measure the
success or failure with which he has been able to answer his own
question about the sense, sc. truth, of the Being-process. But
such a project is unfeasible, not only because he has not yet said
his last word about Being, but because it becomes increasingly
clear that for him a last word probably cannot be said, insofar
as the sense of Being lies in the fact that it is eminently questionable. If he has an importance for his contemporaries, then, this
importance must be measured not by the question as answered
but by the question as asked. It is in terms of the very posing of
40 WM, pp. 9-10 (gräbt, pflügt). Rückgang appears in the title of the introduction
to WM (1949) and passim throughout. Note a discrepancy between text (1929) and
introduction (1949): in 1929, it seems possible to ground metaphysics while remaining
interior to it, for the question of Non-being is a "metaphysical" question (WM, pp.
41. 24-27, 38). Similarly in KM, pp. 13-14, we are told that the foundation of metaphysics must not be conceived as a basis that supports it from the outside but as the
projecting of a blueprint (Entwerfen des Bauplans) for metaphysics, as discernible
in the nature of man. It is the "metaphysics of metaphysics" (v.g. KM, p. 208). In
*949. it is clearly necessary to quit metaphysics entirely in order to meditate its
ground. Latent here is the entire transition from the early to the late Heidegger.
4 1 SZ, p. i
3 ; KM, p. 13.
42 WM, p, ax. Thus the word "ontological" has become for Heidegger suspect.
Cf. Gelassenheit (Pfullingen: Neske, 1959), p. 55. (Hereafter: G). In the later years,
even the "ontological difference" becomes simply the difference (Differenz, Unterschied), vg. US, p. 24,
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the question, therefore, that one might seek to assess the originality of his work.
The question about the sense of Being remains through Heidegger's entire work an indefatigable effort to think the Beingprocess. The question, then, about the sense of Heidegger ultimately may reduce itself to this: what does it mean to think?
Such is the question that we wish to pose in these pages: what
does Heidegger mean by the thinking of Being? We propose to
trace the development of this notion in the published work. It
is a notion that becomes thematized only in the later work, so
we shall examine the shift from the problem of fundamental
ontology in the early period to the search for authentic thought
later on, as a metamorphosis that is as much controlled by an
internal unity as it is dictated by an intrinsic necessity. We have,
then, a privileged opportunity to watch the interior dynamics
of the so-called "reversal'' (Kehre) in Heidegger's thought.
In order to know what we have to look for as we begin our
examination of SZ, let us sketch out in very bold lines the
nature of the thought that thinks the Being-process. To begin
with, what shall we call it ? The author himself speaks of it in
many ways, but we settle on one of them for reasons of clarity
and consistency. The thought which interrogates the foundations
(Wesen) of metaphysics we call simply "foundational" thought
(das wesentliche Denken) How is it to be understood?
J, Negatively
We gain best access to the notion of foundational thought, if
we first determine what it is not. The thought that overcomes
metaphysics is not a metaphysical thought. But what is metaphysical thought ? Only a Heidegger-eyed view of metaphysics
in its history can give us an understanding of it. 44
43 Denken is literally an infinitive. Used as a noun (more often in German than in
English), it implies the activity or process of thinking. In English, this is more easily
rendered by the participle than by the infinitive. Hence we translate it usually as
•'thinking," occasionally as "thought," intending this always to mean "thought" in
the active sense, sc. as in the process of accomplishing itself. Wesentliche comports
the full verbal sense of Wesen, which can be appreciated only as we proceed.
44 In the r£sum£ that follows, we condense Part III of our research into the briefest
possible form. Since the analysis is examined later in detail, we omit here all textual
justification. We refer only to such matters as we shall not have the occasion to remark again.
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However oblivious the pre-Socratics may have been to the
ontological difference as Heidegger himself thematizes it, they
had a profound sense of the Being-process, for they conceived
Being as cpuau;. Whatever it is that spontaneously emerges, or
opens-up and unfolds, and, having unfolded, appears in abiding
self-manifestation - this is < p t a t I t is not simply what we call
"nature," which is a being like the rest, sc. only one form of
emergence. Rather it embraces all manner and types of beings:
heaven and earth, gods and men. By reason of <puox^, beings
arise and stand forth as being what they are, sc. they become
con-stant and observable, able-to-be-encountered.
is
emergent-abiding-Power. Whence does it emerge? From concealment. Recent philological research finds a relation between
the stem 90- and the 90c- of 9<xivecr6ai, suggesting that 9601*;
is an emerging-into-light, a shining-forth, an appearing. Hence,
by reason of 960^, a-hqöeia comes-to-pass.45
With Plato, this early Greek conception of 9uau;~aXY)0eia, sc.
truth conceived as non-concealment, undergoes a transformation, for, although on the one hand the Ideas retain the original sense of oc-X^Oeta, insofar as they are conceived fundamentally
as a source of light by reason of which, through participation,
the "beings" of experience shine forth, nevertheless the Ideas
become at the same time something-to-be-seen (elSo^riSetv), and
truth comes gradually to mean the proper viewing of the Ideas,
the conformity (&p06nq<;) between the being that views and the
Ideas (conceived as beings) that are viewed. Here the Ideas are
transformed from a source of light into that-which-is-viewed.
In other words, Being is reduced to a being. The confusion will
mark the entire subsequent history of metaphysics. Token of
the confusion will be the domination henceforth of the conception of truth as conformity and a disregard of the original
sense of truth as non-concealment. Since truth-as-non-concealment is what Heidegger understands by Being, it is easy to
see in what sense he understands metaphysics as the perennial
forgetfulness of Being.
But if metaphysics begins with Plato, it reaches its term in the
subject-ism of Descartes and the entire modern period. With
45
PP. 1X-12 (aulgehenden und verweilenden Waltens), 54,77 (91)-, odctveofou),
47 (4-X^cux).
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the liberation of man unto himself that characterizes the epoch,
Descartes seeks some fundamentum inconcussum v en talis, by
which man himself may become the arbiter of his own truth.
Truth, then, becomes not only conformity but the verification
of this conformity, sc. certitude. This fundamentum will
"underlie" all truths, hence will be the "subject" of truth,
which for Descartes himself is, of course, the cogito-surn. The
fundamentum veritatis becomes the res (subjectum) cogitans,
where cogitatio is to be understood as the present-ing, or proposing, of an object to a subject, in such a way that the presenting or pro-posing subject can itself guarantee its conformity to
the object in a manner analogous to the way in which the subject
guarantees to itself its own existence.46 Since only that is true
which is certifiable, beings are "true" only insofar as they enter
into the subject-object polarity, sc. are either subjects or objects.
Hence the Being of beings becomes that by which they are
subjects (subject-ivity) or objects (object-ivity); their only
presence is found not in their own non-concealment but in the
order of (re)presentation by a subject. With Descartes, then, the
transcendence which characterizes all metaphysics becomes not
a passage unto something specifically non-human, whether an
Idea or God, but rather unto a subjectum which in one way or
another is related to human nature itself. It is, then, less a
"going beyond" the human orbit than an exploring of it. Hence
for the epoch of subject-ism Heidegger suggests that we speak
not of 'transcendence" but of "rescendence." 47
However this may be, the subject for Descartes is an individual
human ego, but Leibniz extends the notion so that it can
apply to every being. For every monad is endowed with the
power of present-ation, sc. perceptio et appetitus. Kant's transcendental philosophy is an attempt to discern the conditions
necessary to render possible the present-ing of objects to the
subject. But the culmination of subject-ism (hence of all meta46 Prcsent-ative thinking reaches its fulfillment in the subject-ism of Descartes
but it is a type of thinking that is intrinsic to metaphysics as such. For in meditating
beings as beings it (re)presents these beings in terms of their being-ness, hence
prescnt-ative thought simply transposes onto the level of thought the process of
transcendence. It has its origin in Plato to the extent that, in transforming Being
into a being (Idea), Plato conceived the being-ness of beings as see-able (clSoq:
ISetv), hence present-able through some type of vision.
47 SF, p. 18 (Reszendenz).
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physics) arrives with Hegel, for it is he who explores the absolute character of the certitude in which Descartes' quest for the
fundamentum inconcussum terminates, sc. the certitude of selfawareness.
Culminated in Hegel, subject-ist metaphysics reaches its ultimate consummation in Nietzschean nihilism. On the one hand,
Nietzsche sees that the old supra-sensible (meta-physical)
values have lost their meaning for nineteenth century Europe,
and, to the extent that he takes God to be the symbol of these
values, God is certainly dead. On the other hand, his own
effort at revaluation remains itself a metaphysics, for the Willunto-Power, posing as it does new values (truth and art), is
eminently a subject-ism. The only change is in the way in
which the present-ative subject is conceived: now it is Universal
Will. Nietzsche fails, then, to overcome metaphysical nihilism.
In fact, he adds to its momentum, for to the extent that his
super-man responds to the exigencies of Being conceived as Willunto-Power, he seeks (and must seek) domination over the earth.
This he achieves principally through scientific progress. Such is
the meaning of the "technicity" which crystallizes for contemporary society the forgetfulness of the Being-dimension in beings,
of the ontological difference. The measure of Nietzsche's failure
is his inability to escape the subject-object polarity. This can
be done only by a type of thinking that can transcend subjectism, meditate the essence of metaphysics by going beyond it to
think that which metaphysics invariably forgets: the sense of
Being itself.
What is said here of metaphysics may be said for the science
of logic as well, for this formulates the rules of present-ative
thought. Like metaphysics, logic, too, is chained to the conception of truth-as-conformity. In similar fashion, Heidegger
interprets the traditional conception of humanism. Interpreting
the essence of man as a rational animal, all traditional humanisms, he claims, either spring from a metaphysics or found one.
Foundational thought, then, is of such a nature that it can
overcome metaphysics, technicity, logic, humanism. It must be
a process that is non-subjective (better: pre-subjective), therefore non-presentative (pre-presentative). By the same token, it
is non-logical (pre-logical), and as long as we remain in the per-

20

INTRODUCTION

spectives of logic and metaphysics, we will be able to think of
Being only as Non-being. If "rational" (ratio) means the same
as "logical" (Xoyo^), then this thought must be called non-rational: not irrational, but pre-rational. As opposed to the tendency
to dominate the objects of thought, the attitude of foundational
thinking will be simply to let beings be, hence render them free
unto themselves.
2. Positively
More positively, foundational thinking tries to meditate Being
as the process of truth, sc. the coming-to-pass of the lightingprocess in beings. What is the fundamental structure of this
thought ? It is brought-to-pass by the nature of man conceived
as ek-sistence, sc. endowed with the prerogative, unique among
beings, of an ecstatic open-ness unto the lighting-process of
a-Xr)0eia. Ek-sistence thus understood may be called the "There"
(Da) of Being, because it is that domain among beings where the
lighting-process takes place. Since the There comes-to-pass in a
being, sc. man, this privileged being is the "There-being," (Dasein),
and, conversely, There-being must be understood always as the
There of Being among beings, nothing more.
To understand thought, then, we must first see more precisely
the relationship between Being and its There. It is, in fact, a
cor-relation. For on the one hand, Being maintains a primacy
over its There, throwing it out and dominating it at all times,
revealing and concealing itself through its There according to
the necessity of its own nature. Yet on the other hand, it needs
its There in order to be itself, sc. the coming-to-pass of nonconcealment, for unless non-concealment comes-to-pass in a
There that is found among beings, it does not come-to-pass at
all. To think Being will be to think the truth of Being in which
There-being is ek-sistent.
Being discloses itself to and in its There, but since it is Being
that holds the primacy, Being is conceived as sending itself unto
its There. We may speak of this self-sending as proceeding from
Being and call it a "self-emitting,'1 or, if we may be permitted a
neologism to designate a completely new concept, a "mittence"
(Geschick) of Being. We may speak of it, too, as terminating in
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There and therefore call it a "com-mitting" or "com-mitment"
(Schicksal) of There to its privileged destiny as the shepherd of
Being. In any case, one thing is certain: intrinsic to the mittence
of Being is a certain negativity, by reason of which Being withdraws even as it bestows itself, conceals itself even in revealment.
The reason is that even though Being reveals itself in revealing
beings, it can never be seized for itself and by itself (since it is
not a being), therefore conceals itself in the very beings to which
it gives rise. To think Being, then, will be to think it as a
mittence, not only in its positivity but in its negativity.
We must go one step further. Since the mittence of Being is
intrinsically negatived, no single mittence exhausts the power
of Being to reveal itself. Hence Being discloses itself to the
nature of man by a plurality of mittences, which we shall call
"inter-mittence" (Ge-schick4e), and it is this that constitutes
history (Geschichte). Foundational thought must think Being-ashistory and therefore is a profoundly historical thought.
All this describes, however, the relation between Being and
its There. What is the precise role of thought in the process? It
brings this relationship to fulfillment. If we consider this fulfillment with reference to Being, thought completes the process
of non-concealment by bringing Being into that form of manifestation that is most proper to the nature of man: language,
through which he says "is." If we consider this fulfillment in
terms of the There, thought is that process by which ek-sistence
assumes, therefore achieves, itself as the There of Being. From
either point of view, the fundamental attitude of thought will be
one of acquiescence to Being, of responding (Entsprechung) to
its appeal (Anspruch), of letting Being be itself.
The structure of this process will take the form of a re-collection (Andenken): the tri-dimensional process by which Being
comes ("future") to the thinker in and through what alreadyhas-been ("past") and is rendered manifest ("present") by the
words that the thinker himself formulates. Such, too, is the
structure of the thought-ful dialogue. Profoundly a temporal
process (future-past-present), foundational thought is by this
very fact historical, sc. thinks Being-as-history in continual advent to thought through its dialogue with the past. Furthermore,
thought thinks not only Being-as-history (inter-mittence), but
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thinks every mittence of Being in its negativity, as well as in its
positivity, endeavoring to comprehend and express not what
another thinker thought/said, but what he did not think/say,
could not think/say, and why he could not think/say it.
But when all is said and done, the function of foundational
thought is to help Being be itself, to dwell in Being as in its element, the way a fish dwells in water. Thought, as the fulfillment
of the There, proceeds from Being and belongs to it, for the
There is thrown-out by Being. On the other hand, thought
attends to Being, inasmuch as by it the There assumes itself as
the guardian of Being. This thought that belongs to Being and
attends to Being is what Heidegger in his later period - let us
call him simply "Heidegger II" - means by the "thinking of
Being" (das Denken des Seins). Briefly: foundational thinking
is the process by which human ek-sistence responds to Being,
not only in its positivity but in its negativity, as the continual
process of truth-as-history. Our first task is to see how all this
finds its roots in the early Heidegger ("Heidegger I"), as he
reveals himself in SZ and the perspectives characteristic of this
work.
Before we conclude this general survey, it is worth-while
calling attention to the fact that an authentic response to the
appeal of Being is precisely what Heidegger understands by
"philosophy." He develops the point in an address to the philosophers of France in 1955.48
The word appeared for the first time, the author claims, in
Heraclitus, and there as an adjective rather than as a noun, describing the man who cptXei T O ( 7 0 9 0 V . <t>iXec is interpreted to
mean "respond," and (1096V to mean " E v - I l a v T a , sc. Being-asXoyo^ C'Ev), insofar as it gathers together beings (IlavTa) unto
themselves and lets them be. During the era of sophistry, both
appeal and response took different forms. Then the mystery of
Being in beings disclosed itself to the true thinker as threatened
by the crass charlatanism of the sophists. In such a situation the
authentic response was to try to salvage Being from this fallen
condition, hence to strive after Being in beings beyond the level
of every-dayness. The fundamental drive was an epo><;. To Aristotle, the Being-to-be-sought disclosed itself as the being-ness
48

Was ist das - die Philosophie?

(Pfullingen: Neske, 1956). (Hereafter: WP).
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of beings, and responding to it he posed the question:
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Now Heidegger's thesis is that what the occidental man traditionally has called "philosophy'' is precisely that striving
after the Being of beings that implies a passage beyond the
sensible (physical) to the supra-sensible and begins with Plato.
We can see, then, that for Western thought philosophy, as we
know it, is identified with metaphysics, so that when Aristotle
comes to define philosophy, the result is the classic definition of
metaphysics: e7uurnr){jLY) T W V Tcpcoxcov A P X &
am&v SecoprjTixY).
Paraphrasing in Heidegger's sense, we take this to mean: philosophy is that endowment in man (emtrryjpq) by which he can
catch and hold in view (OECOP^TIXTJ) beings in that by which they
are as beings (apx&v, aiTiwv). No one will doubt, least of all Heidegger, that this conception of philosophy is a legitimate one.
What makes it so, however, is not that it crystallizes once and
for all the meaning of metaphysics, but that it is an authentic
response by Aristotle to the address of Being to him. The author
insists, however, that the historic formula is only one way of
conceiving the correlation of address-response between Being
and man. It is helpless, for example, to express this correlation
as it came-to-pass in Heraclitus and Parmenides. Why, then,
absolutize it? Being remains after Aristotle, as before, eminently "free" to address itself to man in some other type of
mittence, articulated in some other way. 50 If we, for our part,
remain docile to Being, which in the Aristotelian tradition imparted itself as metaphysics, are we not after all - indeed in a
very original way - still "philosophical"?
V

During the course of Heidegger's development, he uses the
word "philosophy" sometimes in the narrow sense, by which it
is identified with metaphysics, sometimes in the broad sense, as
a response to Being's appeal. In the first case, it shares the same
destiny as metaphysics and must be overcome. In the second,
it is a consummation devoutly to be wished.51 We make no
attempt to retain the problematic beyond calling attention to
W P , pp. 21-22 (Heraclitus), 23-24 (Sophists), 24-25 (Aristotle).
W P , pp. 25-27 (^TUicmfjpiT). . .), 28-29 (freie Folge). The word " f r e e " here has
a polemical connotation, directed against the Hegelian notion according to which
the mittences of Being would be determined by a dialectical necessity. Cf. p. 31.
5 1 V.g. PW, p. 48 (narrow sense); W W , p. 24 (broad sense).
49

50
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it here. Let it suffice to say that in disengaging the sense of
foundational thought, we delineate Heidegger's conception of
philosophy as well. For theTe is only one philosophical question
that interests him, the question about Being and its truth. This
is the "one star" - the only - that remains constant along the
way. 52 It is, one might think, the evening star that must have
caught his eye when, in the gathering darkness of Reichenau,
he watched the light go out of the west.

82 "Auf einen Stern zugehen, nur dieses
"
[Pfullingen: Neske, 1954], p. 7 [Hereafter: ED]).
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des

Denkens

PART I

FROM T H E R E TO BEING

Forever falling night is a known
Star and country to the legion
Of sleepers whose tongue I toll.
Dylan Thomas, "Vision . . . "

CHAPTER

I

BEING AND TIME

I. The Problem of Fundamental Ontology

A.

ANTECEDENTS

When the young philosopher started his advanced studies at
Freiburg after a brilliant Abitur in Constance, Neo-Kantianism
was in full command of the German universities.1 This meant
that only two problems were philosophically acceptable: the
critical problem of knowledge and the critical problem of values.
The Being-problem - and with it all ontology (metaphysics) had long since been dissolved, indeed by Kant himself. Of course
there were reactions against the trend, two in particular, both
strongly influenced by Brentano. One of these reactions was
Husserl's phenomenology, which, despite its "transcendental
idealism," gave nevertheless to "ontology" a place of honor.
The second reaction was the movement of Neo-Scholasticism,
which could claim Brentano as its own, and with him, after the
example of St. Thomas, essayed a return to Aristotle. Both these
tendencies found in Heidegger a sympathetic audience: Neo-Scholasticism helped him find his way in mediaeval and ancient
thought ; phenomenology opened up for him what was contemporary. Traces of the latter are discernible in the habilitation
thesis of 1915; 2 traces of the former in the emphasis, during the
early teaching years, on ancient philosophy as far as Augustine.
Meditating Aristotle in these years, Heidegger probed deeper
the problem of TI TO OV YJ OV. Augustine, however, gave him a
new insight: that man is not a being like other beings but enjoys
1 For the following expose, see Max Müller, " D i e Philosophie Martin Heideggers
im Horizont der Gegenwart," radio talk delivered on Südwestfunk, Sept. 20, 1959»
published Badiscke Zeitung (Freiburg), Sept. 26/27, 1959, p. 72 Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre
des Duns Scotus (Tübingen, 1916).
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a prerogative all his own by reason of which his own Being is not
from the beginning a fait accompli but something that he himself must achieve, a task in which he can default.
During this time, too, Heidegger saw more and more clearly
that the dichotomy between realism and idealism was
thoroughly inadequate. Realism, as a philosophical tendency,
assumes, with an appeal to the example of ancient and mediaeval
thinkers, that the being-ness of beings can be discerned without
further ado in the beings themselves which lie before man as
simple entities (Vorhandene). Idealism, as a philosophical tendency, sees the origin of all being-ness in thought, or consciousness,
which alone supplies a unity for the multiplicity of beings, thereby allowing each individual the sense it has in relation to the
whole ensemble. Heidegger saw that the problem had to be
posed on a different level in terms of an intimate correlation between the Being-process and man, by reason of which the "sense"
of beings was something more than mere entity, yet also more
than the fabrication of consciousness. This would demand, however, an analysis of man in his relationship to Being that would
shatter the realist-idealist dilemma by overcoming the subjectism that lay at its roots.
The need for a study of the ontology of man was underscored
by the researches of Max Scheler, who, starting from Husserl's
phenomenology, insisted that philosophical anthropology must
be the fundamental discipline of all philosophizing. Finally,
there was Wilhelm Dilthey. He had undertaken in effect a
critique of man's "historical" reason after the manner of Kant's
critique of "pure" reason, raising the question as to how the
historical transformation of the world may be the consequence
of transformation in the world-view of man's essentially historical consciousness.
These were the major influences (who can count the minor
ones? - beginning, no doubt, with Kierkegaard) that crystallized
in the remarkable synthesis of SZ (1927). As means of access to
this difficult work, we choose not the book's own introduction,
admirable though it is, but the closing section of the Kantinterpretation (KM), and for more than one reason. Published
subsequently to SZ (1929), it was conceived beforehand (192526) and intended as the first section of SZ, Part II, the first salvo
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in the "destruction" of metaphysics, which as such was never
fired.3 For clarity and conciseness these pages are unsurpassed
by anything in SZ, and it seems perfectly legitimate to let Heidegger introduce Heidegger, as long as both are contemporaneous. This much would justify our approach, but we have a
better reason still. Letting KM guide us through SZ lets us see
how Heidegger's entire effort strikes at the roots of Neo-Kantianism, which had dominated so completely the philosophical world
of his youth. For the whole function of KM is to show that
Kant's purpose in the Critique of Pure Reason is by no means to
construct a theory of knowledge, as the Neo-Kantians assumed,
but precisely to lay the foundation for metaphysics. Hence,
Heidegger's problematic is nothing else than a re-trieve of
Kant's. 4 This helps us to see that, more than anyone else, the
unannounced adversaries throughout SZ are the Neo-Kantians,
and that KM, because so profoundly a complement to SZ, is
therefore the best propaedeutic to it.
B.

KANT

AND

FUNDAMENTAL

ONTOLOGY

For Kant, metaphysics in the proper sense is the metaphysica
specialis of the tradition which preceded him (theology, cosmology, psychology), but the laying of the groundwork for such
a metaphysics quickly becomes the problem of grounding a
metaphysica generalis, sc. ontology. The reason is simple: a
knowledge (ontic) of those beings with which metaphysica specialis is concerned would be impossible (and this the example of
3 KM, p. 7. W e utilize chiefly the fourth section, entitled " T h e Founding of Metaphysics in a Re-trieve" ("Die Grundlegung der Metaphysik in einer Wiederholung*'),
pp. 185-222.
4 K M , pp. 25 ("Erkenntnistheorie"), 1 3 , 1 5 (Fundamentalontologie), 216 (Wiederholung). " R e - t r i e v e " for the author has a very precise sense which appears in the
analysis of the temporality of There-being. For the present, let us accept without
comment the description offered in K M , p. 185: " B y the retrieve of a fundamental
problem we understand the disclosure of those original possibilities of the problem
which up to the present have lain hidden. B y the elaboration of these possibilities,
the problem itself is transformed and thus for the first time is conserved in its proper
content. T o preserve a problem, however, means to liberate and preserve that interior
force that renders this problem in its innermost essence possible as a problem."
("Unter der Wiederholung eines Grundproblems verstehen wir die Erschliessung
seiner ursprünglichen, bislang verborgenen Möglichkeiten, durch deren Ausarbeitung
es verwandelt und so erst in seinem Problemgehalt bewahrt wird. Ein Problem bewahren heißt aber, es in denjenigen inneren Kräften frei und wach halten, die es als
Problem im Grunde seines Wesens ermöglichen/')

75

FROM

THERE

TO

BEING

scientific research makes clear), unless the metaphysician already possessed some previous comprehension of the structure
of those beings (ontological knowledge). This, according to Heidegger, is the proper sense of the famous "Copernican revolution/'
sc. that ontic knowledge is rendered possible only by an ontological comprehension that precedes it and resides in the very
structure of the knower. 5
How Kant's effort to thus lay the groundwork for ontology
becomes a Critique of Pure Reason will appear, if one recalls that
"pure reason" is Kant's term to describe that capacity by which
man knows according to a priori principles. The ontological
knowledge which he wishes to explain, however, must be of such
a type. As a knowledge, it would consist in judgements (Kant
does not dispute here the Leibniz-Wolff tradition), and, indeed,
synthetic judgements, since it would be a knowledge of beings
other than the knower and must achieve the union of knower
and known (synthesis). Yet because these judgements are ontological (pre-ontic), they are prior to all experience (a priori). The
grounding of ontological knowledge, then, will involve the study
of synthetic a priori judgements (principles), and, more radically, it will involve the delimiting and delineating (therefore
"critique") of the essence of that power in man which forms
them (pure reason). Fundamental ontology for Kant had to be
a Critique of Pure Reason .6
Such a critique is essentially an analysis of transcendence, sc.
the transcendence of the human mind. Insofar as this ontological comprehension of a being precedes the ontic cognition
of this being, rendering this cognition possible, it is such an
orientation of the knower towards the known that it constructs
not only the term of this orientation but the horizon itself within
which this being can be experienced in the empirical synthesis.
Such is the a priori synthesis of ontological knowledge: the
passage of pure reason beyond itself to the beings-to-be-known
in such a way as to comprehend the Being that makes them
what they are prior to any experience of them. The examination
of the conditions which render such transcendence possible will
* KM, p. 20. For the distinction between "ontic" and "ontological," see Introduction, note 18, apropos of WM, p. 20.
0 KM, pp. 22-23.
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be itself "transcendental," Kant's fundamental ontology a
transcendental philosophy.7
Now what characterizes the transcendence of the human
reason is precisely its humanity, sc. its finitude. Hence the human
reason, because finite, cannot create the object of its knowledge.
If human knowledge is composed both of immediate intuition
(Anschauung) and a universalizing judgement (Denken), both
of these are profoundly finite: the intuition is essentially receptive; the universalizing judgement attains only mediately
an object that it can represent only as universal (Diskursivität).
Intrinsically limited within themselves, both of these elements
are all the more limited by reason of their dependence upon one
another in order to constitute the complete act of knowledge.
Human knowledge (and human reason), then, are completely
finite, non-creative. Consequently the problem of transcendence
for Kant is this: how can finite (non-creative) reason, essentially
dependent upon the presentation of an object for its act of
knowledge, nevertheless so transcend itself that it comprehends
the Being of its object prior to any experience of this object?
Briefly: how is the ontological synthesis possible ? 8
Heidegger's task is to re-trieve this problematic by probing
deeper into its origins (1ursprünglicher). With Kant - and this is
decisive for SZ - he maintains that fundamental ontology must
investigate what Kant calls the "natural propensity" (Naturanlage) of man for metaphysics.9 He concedes, then, the justice
with which Kant adds to the three basic questions which give
rise to the traditional disciplines of special metaphysics (what
can I know? [cosmology], what must I do? [psychology], for
what may I hope ? [theology]) a fourth: what is man ? But this
involves more than an anthropology, even a philosophical one,
for it must explain the very ontological structure of man which
is the source of the propensity to pose the first three questions,
and still more to pose the fourth.10 Briefly: it involves a fundamental ontology. Notice, however, that Heidegger shifts the
emphasis from an investigation of man's reason (Kant) to an
investigation of man in his totality.
7

10

KM, pp. 24-25.
KM, p. 42. Sec pp. 32 (Rezeptivität), 35 (Diskursivität).
K M , p. 13.
K M , pp. 187,

193-197.
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Heidegger endorses, too, and this is capital, Kant's insistence
upon the finitude of man. The very questions that give rise to
(special) metaphysics betoken the finitude of the being that
poses them: to ask "what can I . . . ?" is to ask "what can I
not?," hence to betray an essential limitation; to ask "what
should I . . . ?" implies not only a "what should I not?" (therefore negativity) but also an intrinsic incompleteness; to ask
"what may I ? " implies hope, therefore expectancy, therefore
indigence. Each of the questions, then, and still more their
ensemble, reveals the basic finitude of the one who by these
questions gives rise to metaphysics. Furthermore, what interests
the questioner is the finitude itself, not in the hope of being able
to dissolve it, but simply in order to verify it, that he may
comport himself accordingly. So it is that finitude is not simply
a mere accident of the human reason but characterizes this
reason in its depths, sc. reason's finitude consists in a way-ofbeing-finite (Verendlichung) in its concern for itself as an essentially limited power-to-be ("Sorge" um das Endlich-seinkönnen). Hence, one may say that the human reason is not
finite because it poses the first three questions, but rather it
poses these questions (and gives rise to metaphysics) because it
is finite, so finite that it is concerned about its own finitude.11
The questions which give rise to metaphysics, then, are not
only related to man's finitude but spring from it and from man's
concern about it. If one is to lay the groundwork for metaphysics, one must first pose the question: what is the interior
ground of the finitude of man ? It is the special function of the
Kant-interpretation to bring to light the necessity of such a
question.12 But this is not all. The task of fundamental ontology
does not consist merely in posing the question about» the finitude
of man's Being but must ask how it happens that this finitude
is the source of the metaphysical questions, and therefore what
is the relationship between human finitude and the origin of
metaphysics. Now the origin of metaphysics is the Beingprocess as the coming-to-pass of the ontological difference. The
task of fundamental ontology here becomes more sharply de1 1 KM, pp. 195-196. Clearly the author, in using the word "reason" (Vernunft),
intends the entire man (Endlich-sein-können). Note intimate correlation between
finitude and "concern" (Sorge).
11

K M , pp. 197-19«.
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fined: to bring to light the intrinsic correlation between the
Being-process, sc. Being as such, and the radical finitude of
man. 13
Reducing the matter to its simplest terms, then, we may put
it this way. Fundamental ontology attempts to lay the foundation for ontology. The research is controlled by a double polarity: on the one hand, to found metaphysics one must interrogate the Being-process; on the other, the very posing of the
question betrays the finitude of the questioner. To succeed,
then, fundamental ontology must explain the dynamism which
unites these two poles, hence not only pose the Being-question
but explain why it is raised by man precisely as finite. The status
questionis: For Kant, what are the conditions which render
possible the ontological synthesis (transcendence) of finite
reason? For Heidegger, what is the relation between the radical
finitude of man and the comprehension of Being as such?
C.

HEIDEGGER

AND

FUNDAMENTAL

ONTOLOGY

Let us begin with an initial fact: even before posing the
question, man has some comprehension of Being. No matter
how dark or obscure Being itself may be to him, still in his most
casual intercourse with other beings, they are sufficiently open
to him that he may experience that they are, concern himself
about what they are and how they are, decide about the truth
of them, etc. He comprehends, somehow, what makes them
what they are, sc. their Being. Again, every sentence that he
utters contains an "is." His exclamations (v.g. "Fire!") suppose
the "is." His very moods reveal to him that he himself "is" in
such and such a way. He must comprehend, then, no matter
how obscurely, what "is" means, else all this would have no
sense.
This radical comprehending of Being, however, even if undeniable, is not for that reason seized by any clear concept. It is
pre-conceptual and for the most part undetermined, therefore
inevitably vague. If one maintain that all knowledge is conceptual, then though beings may be known, the Being by which
they are what they are (and which man comprehends) remains
19

KM, pp. 200-204.
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unknown. Finally, this pre-conceptual comprehending of Being
is unquestioning, for the Being that thus yields itself is so obvious
that it calls no attention to itself, raises no questions, appears as
if it were not. Vague, undefined, unquestioning, the comprehension of Being is nonetheless an irreducible fact, which the
research accepts in order to begin. 14
As a matter of fact, it is this pre-conceptual comprehension
of Being, though itself unquestioning, that renders the Beingquestion possible. For to question is to search, and every search
is polarized by its term. One could not ask, then, what Being
means, unless one comprehended somehow the answer. The task
of pursuing the Being-question, then, reduces itself to this:
what is the essence of the comprehension of Being rooted so
deeply in man ? 1 5
It is this comprehension of Being that for Heidegger most
profoundly characterizes man.
. . Man is a being who is immersed among beings in such a way that the beings that he is
not, as well as the bemg that he is himself, have already become
constantly manifest to him. . . . " - manifest, that is, in their
Being. 16 Such a conception of man is momentous. Above all, it
explains why Heidegger prefers to designate the questioner of
Being by a term which suggests this unique privilege that distinguishes it from all other beings, sc. its comprehension of Being
as such: the "There-being." 17 Henceforth we shall use this
*4 For the t w o preceding paragraphs, see KM, pp. 204-205; SZ, p. 5. The insistence
is still the same in 1952 (WD, p. 107). N. B. Wherever such precision is necessary, we
translate Verstehen as "comprehending" to underline the verbal sense, and (Seiws)
Verständnis as "comprehension (of Being)." Ordinarily, however, we use both words
indiscriminately.
1 5 SZ, pp. 5, 7; KM, p. 204. We have chosen to translate Verstehen by "comprehension" because: the normal meaning of "comprehension" corresponds to
the normal meaning of verstehen, sc. " t o understand." Vet the etymology
permits it to suggest the Heideggerean sense: -prehendere ("to grasp, seize")
suggests the seizure of Being, both in its anticipation (precedent structure) and in its
coming-to-pass (construction); cum- ("with"), sr. with itself, suggests that the Being
of this being is such that it seizes Being.
1 6 " . . . Der Mensch ist ein Seiendes, das inmitten von Seiendem ist, so zwar, daß
ihm dabei das Seiende, das er nicht ist, und das .Seiende, das er selbst ist, zumal immer
schon offenbar geworden ist. .
(KM, p. 205).
1 7 See SZ, p.'12. Thus wc translate Dasein.
Henri Hirault ("Kxistence et verite
d'apr&s Heidegger," Revue de Mäaphysique et de Morale L V I (1951), p- 38, »ote 1)
suggests "presence" for good reasons, but we prefer to transliterate the German:
because the English "There" more easily than the Frcnch la may suggest simple
presence of a being (v.g. there is a book on my desk), hencc need not (here does not)
suggest merely place in space, or at least no more so than does the German Da (sec SZ,
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term exclusively, reserving for later the explicit question as to
the precise relationship between There-being and man.
We are in a position now to understand some of the characteristics which Heidegger ascribes to There-being in virtue of
the comprehension of Being as such which characterizes, or
rather constitutes, its very ontological structure. The comprehension is not simply a theoretical knowledge but a manner of
being in such a way as to comprehend Being. As a radical comprehension of Being, There-being's own Being, sc. that by which it
is what it is, is to be concerned about Being. Hence the relationship to Being (the comprehending) constitutes the very
ontological structure of There-being. Further, this comprehension of Being embraces not only its own Being but the Being
of all other beings as well. Hence, as a being it is not just one
more mere entity among many others, but it enjoys a primacy
among the rest: " . . . the ontic excellence of There-being lies in
the fact that it is ontological." 1 8 Furthermore, " . . . this manner
of man's Being we call existence. It is only on the basis of a
comprehension of Being that existence is possible." 1 9 Existence
for Heidegger, then, means to be in that relationship to Being
which we have called "comprehending." Only this! It is comprehension which constitutes the inner possibility of existence so
that in turn existence constitutes the interior possibility (Wesen)
of There-being.20
Now human existence, thus understood, Heidegger also calls
"transcendence." For us the word is disconcerting, because we
have seen already that it is profoundly metaphysical in its
implications. But we were viewing the matter in retrospect. In
the period with which we are dealing now (1927), the author had
nothing else but metaphysical words to work with in grounding
p. 132); because it suggests the intimacy between Dasein and Sein more obviously than
"presence"; because the very awkwardness of the term jars the reader into continued
awareness that the problem is purely ontological, never anthropological; because
"presence" and its cognates seem better reserved to translate Sein as Anwesen.
1 8 " . . . Die ontische Auszeichnung des Daseins liegt darin, daß es ontologisch
•st." (SZ, p. 12). Heidegger's italics. See SZ, p. 13 and KM, p. 206.
1 1 " . . . Diese Seinsart des Menschen nennen wir Existenz. Nur auf dem Grunde
des Seinverständnisses ist Existenz möglich." (KM, p. 205).
20 SZ, p. 42. Obviously this notion of existence has a completely different sense
from the existentia of the tradition. For existentia, Heidegger uses Vorhandensein;
we translate in accordance with his intention as "mere entity." Just as obviously,
Wesen here does not mean essentia in the ordinary sense. What it does mean becomes
dearer as we proceed.
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metaphysics.21 How profound a problem this poses we shall see
in time. For the moment, let us be content to see that his use of
the term is legitimate, even if not wholly satisfying. For the
word means, as we have seen, "to pass over." According to the
different senses that are given to the being that achieves the
passage, to that over which the passage is made, to the manner
of passage and to its term, the word may assume any one of the
numberless meanings that successive philosophers have given
it. For Heidegger, the term is analysed most closely when interrogating There-being as the in-the-World-being, where Therebeing, considered as a being, passes beyond beings (even itself)
to the World. But the sense of There-being as transcendence
appears at the very starting point of fundamental ontology,
where we are engaged at present. For There-being is a being
whose structure is such that it comprehends the Being of beings.
By this very fact, There-being passes beyond (therefore transcends) beings to the Being-process as such.
... What is transcended is precisely and uniquely beings themselves, and,
for that matter, every being that can be and become unhidden to the
There-being, hence evenf indeed most of all, that being which exists as
"its self. "22

Thus " . . . with the [transcendence of There-being] comes-topass . . . the [comprehending] of the Being of beings as such . ..
again " . . . transcendence achieves the [comprehending] of the
Being of beings. . . . " 23 Note, however, that transcendence is
the "coming-to-pass" (Geschehen), the "achieving" (Vollziehen)
of ontological comprehending. This comprehending of Being,
then, is not simply a domain that has been captured once and
for all, to be retained henceforth as a permanent possession.
2 1 Latent here is the whole problem of the "reversal" (Kehre) which separates
Heidegger I and I I , and we wish now to savor Heidegger I. See H B , p. 72; US, p. 130.
22 " . . . Was überstiegen wird, ist gerade einzig das Seiende selbst und zwar jegliches Seiende, das dem Dasein unverborgen sein und werden kann, mithin auch und
gerade das Seiende, als welches 'es selbst' existiert." (WG, p. 18). Heidegger's italics.
Pp. 17-21 are all important. How the problem of World becomes more and more
explicitly the problem of Being becomes clearer as we proceed.
n
" . . . Mit [Transzendenz] geschieht der obzwar verborgen und zumeist unbestimmte Entwurf des Seins des Seienden ü b e r h a u p t , . . . " and subsequently " . . .
die Transzendenz den Entwurf des Seins von Seiendem vollzieht. . . . " ( K M , p. 212).
Heidegger's italics. T h e author uses the term Entwurf, which we deliberately avoid
for the present. T h e author himself affirms the identity of Entwerfen and Verstehen:
" . . . Dieses Entwerfen (Verstehen) wird nun
" (KM, p. 212). See also W G , pp.

17-21.
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Much more is it a coming-to-pass that dynamically continues,
therefore an occurrence which is always in the process of being
achieved. The There-being, constituted by ontological comprehension, is essentially not a thing but a happening, and this
happening is transcendence (better: transcending).
Besides this dynamic character of transcendence, remark,
too, its profound finitude. In the first place, the There-being, in
the original situation in which we first discover it as a problem,
dwells in the midst of beings, engaged in continual comportment with them, because they have become manifest to it
in virtue of its radical comprehension of their Being. There-being
is, then, essentially referred (angewiesen) to beings. Essentially
referred to them, hence referentially dependent upon them, it
can never become either by culture or by technicity completely
their master - the first testimony to finitude.24 Again, if Therebeing's referential dependence makes it powerless over other
beings, it is no less powerless with regard to itself. There-being
is not the source of its own Being but rather finds itself as an
already existing fact, sc. immersed in its original situation as a
comprehension of the Being of beings, and its " . . . origin and
destiny are equally obscure. . . / ' 2 5 Heidegger will later describe
these two elements of the original situation, There-being's nonmastery of its own origin and its referential dependence on
other beings, by the single term, "thrown-ness" (Geworfenheit),
which must be understood in a purely ontological sense as
wishing to signify the matter-of-fact character of human finitude.2«
Furthermore, this thrown-ness is not simply a characteristic
of There-being's coming-into-existence, but permeates the
There-being as such, sc. the entire coming-to-pass of its transcending comprehension. Heidegger will describe this abiding
character of thrown-ness by another term, sc. There-being's
"fallen-ness" among beings (Verfallenheit). B y this he means
24 KM, pp. 205-206. Translation of Angewiesenkeit
as "referential dependence' 1
suggested by Walter Biemel, Le concept du monde chez Heidegger (Louvain: Nauwelaerts, i 9 5 0 ) t p . 5 4 .

" . . . das Woher und Wohin bleiben im D u n k e l . . . . " (SZ, p. 134).
KM, pp. 206 (überantwortet), 212; S Z , p. 135. Hence the danger of such attractive translations as " a b a n d o n , " "dereliction," " d e j e c t i o n , " etc. - all are too rich with
antic, anthropological connotations. W e retain " t h r o w n - n e s s " as closest to the original and, perhaps, least misleading.
25

26

83

FROM THERE

TO

BEING

that There-being's comprehending of Being always comes-topass in and through its comportment with beings, for by Being,
after all, is meant simply that by which all beings are. Therebeing, then, although comprehending Being in itself does not
seize Being by itself, sc. as separate from beings. We should
understand, too, that fallen-ness implies a certain ineluctable
drag toward comportment with beings, hence an innate tendency
to forget the Being-process as such. In any case, fallen-ness does
not have here an axiological sense; it is simply another characteristic "of the innermost transcendental finitude of Therebeing." 27
But we may articulate this finitude still further, if we consider the obscurity of the Being that is comprehended. It is so
self-evident that it is unquestionable, comprehended but not
conceived, obvious but nonetheless forgotten.28 It defies those
thought patterns or language structures that are geared to the
conception and expression of any being, because this is exactly
what it is not. Being, as that by which all beings are, is not a
being, nor the collection of beings - it "is" Non-being (das
Nichts). " . . . The Being of beings is, however, comprehensible
only under the condition . . . that There-being, by reason of its
very nature, thrusts itself into Non-being. . . . " And Heidegger
interrupts the sentence to remark: " . . . and herein lies the
profoundest finitude of transcendence. . . . " 29
Because There-being in its comprehending of Being is so
profoundly finite, its prerogative of existence hides within itself
a need of its own, i.e. the need for continued comprehension in
order that it be itself, therefore in order to exist. This internal
indigence of There-being, grounded in finitude, is the innermost
core of its dynamism. Because There-being's comprehension is
finite, its structure compels it to continue to comprehend Being
in order to remain, therefore to be (and to become), itself.30 By
reason of its very Being, then, There-being is still an incomplete seizure of Being, propelled by its own indigence toward an
" . . . der innersten transzendentalen Endlichkeit des Daseins" (KM, p. 213).
K M , pp. 204, 205, 210.
" . . . Das Sein des Seienden ist aber überhaupt nur verstehbar - und darin liegt
die tiefste Endlichkeit der Transzendenz - wenn das Dasein im Grunde seines Wesens
•ich in das Nichts h i n e i n h ä l t . . ( K M , p. 214).
9 0 K M , p. 206. W e use " b e c o m e " in the sense of geschehen and sich
vollziehen,
not in the sense of werden.
17
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unattainable completeness. This is why the author affirms as
one of his first principles: "the 'essence' of this being lies in its
to-be . . w h e r e the "to-" connotes not only the power-to-be
{Seinkönnen) but the compulsion-, or drive-to-be, and the "-be"
implies not only entity but the comprehension of Being. Taken
in its ensemble, "to-be" is synonymous with existence, and the
author adds: "the 'essence' of There-being lies in its existence. ..." 31
Once one understands There-being's already-begun-still-tobe-achieved dynamism, one will find no difficulty with Heidegger's insistence upon the essentially ec-static character of Therebeing (later emphasized by the spelling "ek-sistence"), so
central to his conception of time, history, truth and Being itself.
Likewise we understand in what sense There-being does not
have potentiality (Möglichkeit) but is its own potentiality, its
power- (drive) - to-be.32
It is clear, then, that human transcendence is finite in the
very roots of its Being, and that this finitude, or rather the
indigence which is its consequence, is the interior source of its
dynamism. It should be understood, however, that this dynamism is not just a property of transcendence but the structure
by which it is what it is, sc. its Being. So it is that "existence, as
a manner of Being, is itself finitude, and this [finitude] is possible
only on the basis of the comprehension of Being. . . . " 33 Hence
it becomes clear that the innermost ground of There-being's
finitude is the comprehension of Being itself. This permits us,
however, to answer the first question of fundamental ontology
as to the relationship between the finitude of the questioner and
the comprehension of Being, or, more precisely, to understand
8 1 " D a s 'Wesen* dieses Seienden liegt in seinem Z u - s e i n . . . , " and in the next
paragraph " D a s 'Wesen* des Daseins liegt in seiner E x i s t e n z . . . . " (SZ, p. 42). Heidegger italicizes the latter. Zu-sein, sometimes translated pouvoir-itre (A. De Waelhens, La Philosophie de Martin Heidegger [Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1941], p. 26),
sometimes devoir-Hre (Biemel, Le concept...,
p. 7), should include, it would seem,
both these nuances. One should insist, too, that the devoir be stripped of any moral
connotations and designate a completely ontological thrust, or drive-towards-Being.
We intend "power-to-be" and "drive-towards-Being" as essentially synonymous.
32 "...
ist je seine Möglichkeit. . . . " (SZ, p. 42). For Existenz written as Ek-sistenz,
see v.g. W W , p. 1 5 ; H B , p. 68. W e translate Möglichkeit with "potentiality" as
suggesting better than "possibility" a "concrete" dynamism. "Power-to-be" translates Seinkönnen, but we use drive-toward-Being as legitimate variant. " T h r u s t "
we reserve for Sichhineinhalten.
3 3 "Existenz ist als Seinsart in sich Endlichkeit und als diese nur möglich auf
dem Grunde des Seins Verständnisses
" ( K M , p. 206).
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that it need not be asked: " . . . the comprehension of Being . . .
itself is the innermost essence of finitude. . . . " 3 4
One final word. If eventually we distinguish several different
components in this process of transcending, they are nevertheless all synthetized into a profound unity, the single process of
a There-being whose unique concern is to salvage itself, to (continue to) be. This unity Heidegger calls "concern" (Sorge), a
term which, like "fallen-ness," has for him not an axiological
but only an ontological sense, sc. the "structural unity of the
intrinsically finite transcendence of There-being." 35
The broad lines of Heidegger's problematic are now clear, and
we are almost in a position to examine Being and Time (SZ),
which ambitioned to develop a fundamental ontology such as
is here described, without permitting the luxuriance of its trees
to obscure the unity of the forest. Fundamental ontology, itself
only a preliminary analysis to expose the horizon necessary for
the analysis of the sense of Being itself, will prepare to interrogate the Being that is comprehended by first interrogating the
comprehending itself. The prelude to the question of Being is
the question of There-being.36 We have seen already a rough
draft of Heidegger's answer to such a question: There-being is
transcendence, sc. a being in which the comprehending of Being
comes-to-pass in a radically finite way. If, by pushing further
to discover the sense of such a being, one discovers that the
ultimate foundation which renders it possible is time, then we
add to the first two characteristics of There-being (transcendence,
finitude) a third, sc. temporality. We will have achieved, too,
the program proposed by the author in the imposing title of SZ,
Part I: "The interpretation of There-being in terms of temporality and the explanation of time as the transcendental horizon
54 " . . . Jetzt zeigt sich: wir brauchen gar nicht erst nach einem Bezug des Seinsverständnisses zur Endlichkeit im Menschen zu fragen, es selbst ist das innerste Wesen
der Endlichkeit. . . . " (KM, p. 207). Heidegger's italics.
85 "die strukturale Einheit der in sich endlichen Transzendenz des Daseins" ( K M ,
p. 213). We translate Sorge as " c o n c e r n " because: it is less misleading, perhaps, than
" c a r e " ; it admits of derivatives parallel with German (v.g. besorgen: " t o be concerned
w i t h " ) ; it suggests in English (though without verbal warrant in German) a correlation between Sorge and Dasein: " [ d e m es] in seinem Sein u m dieses Sein selbst g e h t . "
(SZ, p. 12 and passim). W h a t true disciple of the master will begrudge us this modest
comfort ?
M SZ, p. 7.
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of the question of Being." 37 We will also have laid the foundation for metaphysics by achieving a fundamental ontology.
D.

PRENOTES

Before we proceed to the text proper of SZ, let us pause for
several remarks which may serve as transition.
i. Presuppositions
That Heidegger has certain presuppositions as he begins his
task no one will deny - least of all Heidegger. In the first place,
he presupposes that in man there is already a comprehension of
Being. Out of this he develops, as we have seen, the notions of
There-being, existence, transcendence. To the extent that the
analysis of There-being to follow permits him to discern the
sense of There-being's Being, the result of his analysis is itself
based on the original presupposition. Is this not to argue in a
circle? Heidegger sees the difficulty and formulates it himself:
. . the idea of existence and of Being altogether is 'presupposed' and the There-being interpreted 'accordingly' in order that
from this the idea of Being can be gained. . . . " 38 His answer is
to admit the circle but deny any warrant for reproach. He maintains, for example, that the comprehension is presupposed in
that vague, pre-conceptual, self-evident seizure of Being which
he holds to be an irreducible and indisputable fact. It is not,
however, the explicit concept of the sense of Being which Heidegger ambitions as the end of his research. His effort at clarification has nothing to do with a vicious circle in the logical
sense.39
Yet a circle it is, to be sure, if one prescinds from the passage
from vague to precise and considers only the passage from comprehension to comprehension. Such a circle, however, lies in the
nature of the comprehension of Being, and the "circle" expresses
37 "Die Interpretation des Daseins auf die Zeitlichkeit und die Explikation der
Zeit als des transzendentalen Horizontes der Frage nach dem Sein." (SZ, p. 41).
88 " . . . die Idee der Existenz und des Seins überhaupt wird Vorausgesetzt' und
darnach* das Dasein interpretiert, um daraus die Idee des Seins zu gewinnen
"
(SZ, p. 314). See p. 8.

* SZ,

pp.

t-8.
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the a priori structure of There-being itself. The philosopher's
task, then, will not be to deny, to conceal or to break the circle.
On the contrary,
. . . the effort should much rather be to seek to leap into the "circle " in an
original and thorough-going way, in order that from the very beginning
of the analysis of There-being one gain the full view of the circular
character of its Being. . . . 40
Notice that the task involves effort, and this effort involves an
initial "leap" (springen). The necessity of a leap will explain at
once the difficulty of the analysis which follows, and its importance should be emphasized from the start. There is no gradual pedagogy in Heidegger. To fail to make with him the initial
leap into the circular structure of There-being is to render any
Sympathie understanding impossible.
Briefly, then, Heidegger feels that the concept of There-being
as a comprehension of Being is a fact. It warrants no justification
beyond itself; it needs only to be accepted and understood. Is
this to proceed on a presupposition ? So be it! This is a commentary on the nature of philosophy itself.
. . . Philosophy will never want to deny its "presuppositions," though it
may not simply concede them. Rather, philosophy grasps clearly these
presuppositions and, together with the analysis for which they are presupposed, brings the presuppositions themselves to a more penetrating elucidation. . . . 4 1
This much Heidegger explicitly concedes. If, however, we
must presuppose that There-being is endowed with a comprehension of Being, must we not also admit as presupposed what
is comprehended? It would certainly seem so, but the author is
less explicit here. Heidegger presupposes a conception of Being
that not everyone will find as self-evident as he. How are we to
understand it? If Being is that "which determines a being as a
being," sc. that by which a being is what it is, what is the most fundamental characteristic of beings ? 42 The fact that they are re40 " . . .
Die Bemühung muß vielmehr darauf zielen, ursprünglich und ganz in
diesen 'Kreis' zu springen, um sich schon im Ansatz der Daseinsanalyse den vollen
Blick auf das zirkelhafte Sein des Daseins zu sichern. . ( S Z , p. 315). See p. 15341 " . . . Philosophie wird ihre Voraussetzungen' nie abstreiten wollen, aber auch
nicht bloß zugeben dürfen. Sie begreift die Voraussetzungen, und bringt in eins mit
ihnen das, wofür sie Voraussetzungen sind, zu eindringlicherer Entfaltung.../' (SZ,
p. 310).
48 "das, was Seiendes als Seiendes bestimmt" (SZ, p. 6).
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vended (offenbar) to There-being as being what they are. Being,
then, is that by reason of which beings are revealed to Therebeing.
. . . As impenetrable as is the obscurity that enshrouds 'Being' and its
meaning, so certain remains [the fact] that in the entire domain of the
manifestation of beings we continually comprehend some such thing as
Being. .. , 4 3
Furthermore, this revelation of beings is somehow correlative
with There-being's existence, sc. its antecedent comprehension
of Being: "with existence . . . comes-to-pass an irruption in the
totality of beings of such a nature that now for the first time
beings . . . in themselves, sc. as beings, become manifest. . . . " 4 4
Being, therefore, is that by reason of which beings become
manifest - not for their own sake but to and for There-being.
The point is capital. Being for Heidegger is always correlative
with There-being, that by reason of which beings are accessible
to man. Furthermore, from this point of view it becomes easy
to understand why he can say: "above all, only so long as Therebeing is, i.e. the ontic potentiality of the comprehending of
Being, 'is there' Being. . . . " 4 5 Furthermore, if Being is understood as that by reason of which beings are manifest and truth
is essentially the process of non-concealment, then "'there is'
Being - not beings - only insofar as truth is. And truth is only
insofar and as long as There-being is. Being and truth 'are'
simultaneous. . . . " 46 All of this, we say, rests on a supposition.
It is not our task to question this conception at present - in the
strictest sense a preconception - even to ask if it is the only conception of Being that is legitimate for finite man. We wish only
to call attention to the fact that this is a preconception, even if,
48 " . . . Denn so undurchdringlich das Dunkel ist, das über dem 'Sein' und seiner
Bedeutung lagert, so gewiß bleibt, daß wir jederzeit und im ganzen Feld der Offenbarkeit des Seienden dergleichen wie Sein verstehen,..." (KM, pp. 204-205). Writer's
italics.
44 "Mit
der Existenz des Menschen geschieht ein Einbruch in das Ganze des
Seienden dergestalt, daß jetzt erst das Seiende . . . als Seiendes offenbar wird...."
(KM, p. 206). Heidegger's italics. For a more comprehensive treatment of Heidegger's
philosophy as an "ontology of encounter," see Albert Dondeyne, "La difference
ontologique chez M. Heidegger," Revue Philosopkique de Louvain LVI (1958), 35-62,
251-293. N.B. pp. 43 ff.
48 "Allerdings nur solange Dasein ist, d.h. die ontische Möglichkeit von Seinsverständnis, 'gibt es' Sein...." (SZ, p. 212). Heidegger's italics.
44 "Sein - nicht Seiendes - 'gibt es' nur, sofern Wahrheit ist. Und sie is/ nur,
sofern und solange Dasein ist. Sein und Wahrheit 'sind' gleichursprünglich..(SZ,
P« 230). Heidegger's italics.
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for someone whose approach is phenomenological, an inevitable one.47
2. There-being
What is the initial conception of There-being ? We have seen
how There-being is conceived as a comprehension of Being that
is radically finite. It is, then, a completely ontological (not
anthropological) phenomenon, whatever may be its relation to
man. Whatever is to be said of it will be a consequence of this
ontological character. Existence, thus understood, is conceived
as an ''irruption" (Einbruch) into the totality of beings, by reason
of which these beings as beings become manifest. "On the basis
of [his] comprehension of Being, man is the There through whose
48
Being the manifestive irruption among beings takes place. ..
In other words, There-being is the There of Being among beings
- it lets beings be (manifest), thereby rendering all encounter
with them possible. It follows, then, that, correlative to the
referential dependence of There-being on beings, there is a
dependence of beings on There-being that they be (manifest).
In letting beings be (manifest), however, There-being obviously
does not "create" them but only dis-covers (ent-decken) them as
what they are. What about beings before There-being discovers
them? The question cannot be asked, as long as one restricts
oneself to the focus of sheer phenomenology. In any case, this
mutual dependence between beings and There-being is in fact
only an explicitation of what we said before about Being as a
correlate of There-being.49
If it is by the irruption among beings of existence that these
beings become manifest, then there is no difficulty in understanding how There-being "lets" these beings be (seinlassen), In
letting them be manifest, it "liberates" them from concealment,
47 " . . . Le principe primordial de la philosophie de Husserl - encore qu'il soit plus
sou vent implicitement suppose qu'explicit ement exprim£ - c'est celui qu*Stre fest
avoir un sens; l'etre vrai est Tfctre pour' un sujet
" (Quentin Lauer, PhinomSnologie de Husserl [Paris: Presses Universitäres de France, 1955], p. 4). Though Therebeing is not a "subject" in the Husserlean sense but transcendence, the similarity of attitude between Husserl and Heidegger on this point is beyond question.
48 "Auf dem Grunde des Seinsverständnisses ist der Mensch das Da, mit dessen
Sein der eröffnende Einbruch in das Seiende geschieht,. . . " (KM, p. 206).
49 SZ, pp. 219-221.
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hence renders them free. We are prepared for Heidegger's notion
of liberty, at first so disconcerting. Liberty is liberation, sc.
letting-be, hence not primarily an "act of the will" but a purely
ontological process of the same order as, in fact identical with,
There-being as transcendence.50
But what is the precise relationship between There-being and
man ? To be sure, the relationship is intimate. The entire problematic of fundamental ontology arises out of an attempt to explain the
ontological structure of man which renders possible his natural
penchant for metaphysics. We have seen how There-being is a
comprehending of Being which is intrinsically finite, and which
is the source of unity between the Being-question and the finitude of man who poses it. If fundamental ontology is not an
anthropology, it is and remains an interrogation of There-being
insofar as this is the ontological structure of man in his intrinsic
finitude. It will be easy, then, to see why There-being is spoken
of so often as the equivalent of man.51 It is perfectly understandable, too, why t^ie author insists so strongly that Therebeing is always "mine," to the extent that he will designate
"mine-ness" as the second (after existence) fundamental characteristic of There-being.52
But it could be exceedingly misleading to reduce this intimacy between There-being and man to the simple identification
of There-being and the individual, still more to consider the
ontological dimension as a property of man, more precisely of
his intellect. Rather, the There-being is the ontological structure
of man, ontologically prior (ursprünglicher) to man, and it is the
finitude of There^being as an intrinsically finite comprehension
of Being that is the ground of the finitude of man: " . . . more
original than man is the finitude of There-being in him." 5 3
Hence the There-being, rather than a mere synonym for man,
is essentially a coming-to-pasfc. that takes place in man. Of
course, this poses problems. If There-being takes place in man,
what is the precise relation between the two ? For that matter,
what man are we talking about? There is an obscurity, then,
KM, p. 206; WW, pp. 14-17; WG, pp. 46-50, passim.
KM, pp. 13, 205-206.
" SZ, pp. 42-43.
M " . . . Ursprünglicher als der Mensch ist die Endlichkeit des Daseins in ihm."
(KM, p. 207). Heidegger italicizes whole.
60
81
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not only concerning the relationship between There-being and
Being but concerning the relationship between There-being and
man - all the more, then, between Being and man. If one retains
a purely ontological (vs. anthropological) interpretation of
There-being, one can see that Jean Beaufret's question becomes
plausible, even inevitable: "How give a sense to the word
'humanism'?" 54
3. Method: Phenomenology
We have seen that the task of fundamental ontology is to
discern the Being of There-being. Given the fact that Being is
that by which beings (There-being) manifest themselves as
what they are and how they are, then how else will fundamental
ontology discern the Being of There-being than by letting it
manifest itself for what it is?
Such, says Heidegger, is the genuine task of phenomenology:
Xsyeiv TOC <PATV6JJLEVA, where Xcyetv has the sense of SYJXOUV ("to
make clear"), or more precisely cbuocpouvsCTOai (sc. "to permit
something to appear of itself, make itself seen"), and cpawo^ieva
means "that which shows itself as it is." Hence phenomenology
means A7TOCPA(VEA6AI TOC ^AIVOJIEVA, sc. "to permit that which of
its own accord manifests itself to reveal itself as it is." 55
But what precisely is it within a being which "of its own
accord manifests itself" that phenomenology lets be revealed?
. . . Obviously that which first of all and for the most part does not show
itself, that which alongside of what first of all and for the most part does
show itself is concealed, yet at the same time is something that essentially
belongs to what first of all and for the most part shows itself, in such a
way, indeed, as to constitute its sense and ground.56
In other words, phenomenology lets-be-seen the Being of beings.
Now to let-be-seen, sc. to investigate thematically, the Being of
beings is the classical function of ontology. It is clear, then, why
Heidegger claims that " . . . ontology is possible only as phenomeHB, p. 56.
See SZ, pp. 28-34.
66 " . . . Offenbar solches, was sich zunächst und zumeist gerade nicht zeigt, was
gegenüber dem, was sich zunächst und zumeist zeigt, verborgen ist, aber zugleich
etwas ist, was wesenhaft zu dem, was sich zunächst und zumeist zeigt, gehört, so
zwar, daß es seinen Sinn und Grund ausmacht." (SZ, p. 35). Heidegger's italics.
M
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nology. . . . " and reciprocally that phenomenology is effectively
ontology.57
In the present case, the phenomenon with which we are concerned is There-being itself. The task is to let-be-seen the Being
of There-being - Being that is concealed, or that was once revealed and has slipped back into oblivion, or that is revealed
but in a distorted fashion so that There-being seems-to-be what
it is not - briefly, Being that in one way or another is negatived.
And it is precisely inasmuch as Being, because negatived, is not
seen that phenomenology is so necessary.58
To permit the There-being, then, to reveal of its own accord
what it is and how it is (as ontological comprehension, existence,
finite transcendence), Heidegger will submit it to a phenomenological analysis and thus lay the Being cf There-being out
(Auslegung) in full view. Such a "laying-out," sc. interpretation
of There-being, Heidegger also calls "hermeneutic," but the full
import of this fact will not appear for some time.59 For the
moment, let us be content with remarking that There-being is
in the strictest sense a s^Z/-interpretation, sc. something that
There-being must achieve in, for and as its self.
It would be hard to exaggerate the importance of Heidegger's
conception of phenomenology for the evolution of foundational
thought. Clearly it is not simply one method arbitrarily chosen
from among others equally possible. It is imposed by his conception of the Being-process itself as that which renders beings
manifest in a negatived way. If phenomenology is the method
chosen for the meditation upon There-being which is to prepare
a way to interrogate the sense of Being itself, this means that
it is the way that the Heidegger of 1927 goes about the thinking
of Being.
4. Starting point: Everydayness
Given the fact that we are to make a phenomenological analysis of the There-being in man, under what circumstances will we
begin? Recall the terms of the problem: There-being is an in" . . . OntologH- ist nur als Phänomenologie möglich
italicizes whole. Sec p 37
68 SZ, pp. 35-36.
SZ, pp. 37-38. See p. 312 (Selbstauslcgung).

" (SZ, p. 35). Heidegger
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trinsicaUy finite comprehending of Being. One of the consequences of this finitude is the fact that There-being takes its
prerogative so completely for granted that it forgets the prerogative and thus forgets its self. Let the analysis of finite transcendence, then, start with There-being in that condition where
it is most victim to its finitude: thrown-down among beings and
immersed in them, There-being's unique prerogative lies lost in
forgotten-ness. This is its every-day condition. Let it be called
'' every-day-ness'' (A lltäglichkeit).
By everydayness, Heidegger wishes to designate that condition in which There-being first of all and for the most part
finds itself in its day-in-day-out contact with beings. "First of
all" indicates the manner in which There-being is initially disclosed to itself by reason of its coexistence with others, in the
comings and goings, the constant superficial exchanges which
constitute daily intercourse. "For the most part" indicates the
manner in which There-being usually, though not always,
shows itself for every man. It is consummate ordinariness.60
In this ordinariness, There-being's great prerogative lies forgotten. The phenomenological analysis of everydayness is not
concerned, of course, with describing how a man handles his
knife and fork, but how underneath all commerce between
There-being and other beings, there lies the coming-to-pass of
transcendence. Let this transcendence be designated by a term
more congruous with the context of everydayness: let it be
called "to-be-in-the-World" (In-der-Welt-sein) . 61 The term does
not change its nature: it remains the coming-to-pass of Beingcomprehension, sc. existence, by which the There-being is what
it is. Henceforth, There-being, (finite) transcendence and to-bein-the-World are synonymous. But in the multiple engagement of
everydayness, this transcendence is obscured. Such is the forgottenness that follows upon finitude.
Finitude! The propensity to forgetfulness, then, is as inevitable and as abiding as everydayness itself. It cannot be dissolved. It can only be overcome. It is the task of fundamental
ontology to overcome it, to tear There-being away from the
SZ, pp. 370 (Alltäglichkeit), 43 (Durchschnittlichkeit).
KM, p. 2x2. This explains why the author, after an introduction that thematized There-being as Being-comprehension and existence, takes it to be self-evident
that There-being's nature is to-be-in-the- World. See SZ, pp. 52 ff.
60
61
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forgottenness of its authentic self. Hence the principal act of
fundamental ontology is "re-collection'' (WiederErinnerung)
which, to be genuine, must "collect" within itself all over again
("re-") in the innermost springs of its possibility that which is
recalled.62 In the present case this will mean that the entire
analysis will be controlled by its fundamental ontological
purpose: to discern in everydayness the ontological structure
of finite transcendence, whose ultimate sense is time.
5. Terminology
a. E X I S T E N T I A L vs. E X I S T E N T I E L L - We are examining
the ontological structure of There-being, whose essence lies in
existence. Let the analysis be called, then, "existentiAL." But
the term must be understood. Since existence for Heidegger is
that structure by which There-being, thrown among beings,
comprehends their Being, only that is existentiAL which pertains to There-being's comprehension of the Being-structure of
beings, hence to the primordial constitution of There-being
itself.63 The term pertains to existence in its ontological dimension.
It is to be distinguished carefully from what is called "existentiELL." For existence, as a finite comprehension, is thrown
among beings and remains always fallen among them with the
need of achieving transcendence only through comportment
with beings. Hence, if by reason of its Being-comprehension
There-being exists in an ontological dimension, then by reason
of its finitude it exists simultaneously in an ontic dimension as
well, sc. in continual engagement with beings, whether this
engagement be imposed upon There-being by circumstances,
the result of unconscious adaptation to milieu, or the result of
a free choice. This dimension of existence and all that pertains
62 KM, p. 2ii. It is impossible to retain author's play on words:
Wieder-erinnerung,
Erinnerung, Erinnerte, verinnerlichen. We have tried to be faithful to the sense by
playing with "recollect." This anticipates the notion of Andenken,
68 SZ, p. 12 and KM, p. 207. Existential
is used by Heidegger: as an adjective, v. g.
to describe the (phenomenological) analysis which he is undertaking (v. g. SZ, p. 13);
as a noun, to designate an essential component of the structure of There-being as
existence. In this sense it is opposed to Kategorie: a structural determination of
beings other than There-beii\g (v.g. SZ, p. 44).
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to it is called "existentiELL," and is synonymous with "ontic." 64
It is worth while insisting on the fact that although existential
and existentiell in There-being are distinct, they are not separate. They are different dimensions of a unique and profoundly
unified phenomenon: finite transcendence. The function of the
existential analysis as a re-collection of forgotten transcendence
will be to discern the existential dimension which structures
existentiell everydayness. It must respect the unity of the phenomenon that it analyses. The existential analysis must be
rooted in the existentiell, sc. unless it discerns the existential
within the existentiell, it remains groundless.65 One begins to
see more clearly what the phenomenology of There-being as a
process of transcendence will imply. It must be itself brought
to achievement in some existentiell (ontic) comportment through
which There-being re-collects the existential dimension of its
self.
b. A U T H E N T I C I T Y A N D I N A U T H E N T I C I T Y - The author
never defines explicitly what he means by "authenticity," but
he offers the following ingredients for a definition: There-being
is its own potentiality; as its own potentiality, it can "choose"
itself in its own Being, i.e. "assume" itself; it can also "lose"
itself, or rest in only an apparent assumption of itself. If Therebeing achieves itself, it is authentic (eigentlich); if it fails to
achieve itself, it is inauthentic (iuneigentlich). Hence both authenticity and inauthenticity are fundamental modes of Being
(Seinsmodi) and have their basis in the fact that There-being, as
existential, is a to-be-achieved-There.66
At this point, how much do we know about the self of which
there is question of choosing or not choosing? As its own potentiality, it is a being so structured that it is to-be, sc. it is an
already-begun-still-to-be-achieved-process of transcending beings
to Being. This process is the very essence of the There-being, its
existence. As such it distinguishes There-being from all other
SZ, pp. 12-13. Normal English would probably use the spelling "existentiel."
The distinction is so important, however, that it must somehow be emphasized.
Hence wje have the choice of writing it either as "existentiEL" or as "existentiell"
(italics are already over-worked). We choose the latter as the lesser of two barbarisms.
• 6 SZ, pp. 13 (verwurzelt), 312 (bodenlos), 315. For a lucid expose of the unity of
existential-existential! (ontic-ontological), see Biexnel, Le concept...,
pp. 88-91.
•• SZ, pp. 42-43.
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beings. But this existence, as its process-character already indicates, is profoundly finite, sc. thrown-and-fallen-among beings;
its structure is characterized by two dimensions, simultaneous
and inseparable: ontic-existentiell and ontologico-existential.
But the ontological dimension (and this is another mark of its
finitude) in ordinary everydayness lies in forgottenness. To
"choose" such a self - what else is it than to re-collect the
unique prerogative which in all the poverty of its finitude
constitutes the primacy of this being among all others ? Such a
choosing achieves There-being for what it is. For There-being, to
fail to re-collect its prerogative of comprehension is to lose itself
by letting its unique prerogative he in forgottenness, by restricting its interest to the merely ontic-existentiell.67
Yet this achieving or not-achieving of the authentic Therebeing is a ''choosing," hence is accomplished by some spontaneous orientation that lies within the competence of There-being
to elect or fail to elect. There is here, then, a decision, a deliberate engagement, a willing to be faithful to itself which, though
of course structured by Being and admitting of existential interpretation, lies nonetheless in the ontic dimension of Therebeing and is one of its existentiell possibilities. Eventually this
choice will receive the designation "re-solve" (Entschlossenheit)**
We come now at long last to the text of SZ. We have no intention of offering a complete summary of the book as such, for
our purpose is only to discern the first traces of what later
emerges as foundational thought. If even so limited a focus
forces us to examine most of the major themes, the examination
is admittedly selective. From the beginning, we know that
There-being is finite transcendence whose ultimate meaning is
time. We let these two points polarize our resume, reserving for
special treatment in a separate section two remarks of a more
general nature which are of special importance for us.
67 Heidegger in this context assumes that the only type of inauthenticity of Thereheing is that which forgets its own ontological dimension. Would not There-being be
equally inauthentic, if it forgot its ontic dimension and lost itself in a pure mysticism
or mythicism of Being? See M. Heidegger, De I*Essence de la ViriU, trans. Alphonse
De Waelhens et Walter Biemel (Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1948), p. 16.
68 s z » PP- 42, 287-288. Most of the early interpreters took the fact that a choice is
necessary for There-being in order to achieve authenticity to be an illicit transfer of
the problem to the moral order. (See A. De Waelhens, La Philosophie..p.
31,
note 1). Reviewing the problem in the broader horizon that Heidegger II supplies,
we see now that such an interpretation is unwarranted.
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WORLD

There-being is the coming-to-pass of finite transcendence,
which under everyday circumstances is first discernible as a
being whose nature is to-be-in-the-World. In analysing it, we
follow the author's order b y first attempting to disengage the
sense of the World into which There-being transcends and subsequently the sense of what it means to be "in" such a World. We
cannot begin, however, without anticipating the second part of
the analysis. When we say that There-being is "in" the World,
"in" here has by no means a purely spatial sense, for example
as water is "in" a glass, but rather the sense of to be "at home"
or "to sojourn" in, to be entrusted with a privileged "familiarity" with the World-about. Again, it is to be immersed
somehow in the World (Sein bei) into which There-being has
entered and with which it has intercourse. This immersion in the
World is obviously more than mere juxtaposition of There-being
and World, as if they were two entities placed alongside of each
other but mutually inaccessible. It is a profound intimacy of
There-being with the World, by reason of which other beings
that are within the World may be "encountered," sc. reveal
themselves for what they are when they come in contact with
There-being.69 This contact, however, is not in the order of
"knowledge" in the usual sense of the term, but of the nature
of a having-to-do-with these things and a dealing with them
that is found simply in daily intercourse. In this sense, the
familiarity with beings is nothing "theoretic," if this be understood as mere contemplation, but a thoroughly concrete dealing
with them. 70
The author enumerates four senses in which the term "World"
may be taken: I. as the totality of beings that are encountered
by There-being within the World; 2. as the Being of this totality
of beings other than There-being; 3. as a complex which is not
opposed to There-being, wherein There-being itself "lives";
4. as the Being (Weltlichkeit) of this "wherein." It is the third
•• SZ, pp. 54-55™ SZ, pp. 67» 69.
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of these senses that Heidegger intends when he speaks of the
World in which There-being is and which he will seek to analyse.
To understand World in this way is to take it in an ontic sense,
sc. as the Wherein of an ontic engagement with beings which
renders this engagement possible. For the same reason, World
has an existentiell meaning. This sense is pre-ontological, sc.
(here) pre-thematic, hence prior to any reflective distinction
between ontic and ontological, therefore in the initial stage of
everydayness. It is the World of There-being's matter-of-fact
situation, sc. of its "facticity." It is the task of this part of the
analysis to make this World thematic and discern what it is
that constitutes the World as World. 71
The first fact of the phenomenological analysis of the Worldabout (Umwelt) is that it is filled with beings other than Therebeing. With allusion to the Greek sense ofTCpayjxaTaas that of
which one makes use (repawn;) in one's daily preoccupation, the
author chooses to describe them as instruments (Zeuge) or tools,
thereby indicating an inherent usefulness in them by reason of
which they are intrinsically adapted to a certain purposeful
pattern which characterizes the preoccupation itself. They are
beings that are ready-at-hand (Zuhandenes) for There-being's
intercourse with the World-about. To discern the Being of these
instruments will be to discover what makes them to be instruments, hence their instrumental-ness, or what constitutes them
as capable of revealing themselves as ready-at-hand.72
Let us examine more closely the Being of these instruments
with which There-being is preoccupied. Every instrument is
essentially "for the purpose of" (um zu) doing something, sc.
purposeful (v.g. the pen for writing), and this purposefulness
has within its very structure a reference (Verweisung) to that
for which it serves a purpose. Referred beyond itself to a taskSZ, pp. 64-65.
SZ, pp. 68-69. Clearly to be distinguished from these being-instruments are
those beings which are not instruments, sc. those "beings" which for one reason or
another have been torn from the purposeful pattern of There-being's daily commerce.
These beings are no less "real" than the instruments, but, deprived of their functional
relationship within the dynamic pattern of There-being's daily commerce, their Being
is of a different sort from that of the instruments. To distinguish the two, non-instrumental beings will be called "mere entities" (Vorhandene). At this point the author
refuses to use the word "things" (Dinge), for the word implies certain preconceptions
about the structure of things. What he means by this we learn in HW, pp. 12-20.
In 1950, the matter no longer presents a problem (VA, pp. 163-181).
71

72

FROM THERE

54

TO

BEING

to-be-accomplished, the instrument (v.g. pen), in company with
other instruments (v.g. paper, ink, desk, etc.), resides in a
pattern of references which constitutes the instrument as
purposeful, therefore as an instrument. It is the task-to-beachieved which constitutes the unity of this pattern, and the
task itself becomes an instrument inserted into a still broader
pattern which constitutes the total unity of preoccupation
(Besorgen).1*
The ontological structure of the instrument, then, is characterized by its reference beyond itself by reason of its insertion
into a total purposeful pattern. This pattern, or complex, of
references, always latent and taken for granted by the very fact
of preoccupation, becomes apparent the moment that the
pattern is disturbed, as occurs, for example, if an instrument,
when broken, becomes useless. The very fact of disturbance,
however, indicates that the total pattern itself was always
somehow in view, even if taken for granted. This totality which
was always in view is what Heidegger understands by World. 74
Every instrument, then, is encountered within the World
which renders possible its purposefulness, and, conversely,
every instrument has an ontological relation to the World. So
it is that once an instrument has been discovered, the World
itself, by a certain ontological priority, already has been discovered, even if not yet thematized.75 This totality, within which
instruments are encountered and which is the ultimate term of
their reference, is not foreign to There-being but intimately
associated with its ontological structure. Recall that the instruments we are analysing are those with which There-being is
engaged in its daily pre-occupation with the World-about and
under the control of There-being's view-of-the-World-about
(Umsicht). The World is profoundly There-being's World.
More precisely: We have already seen that the ontological
structure of the instrument is characterized by its reference
beyond itself. Its very Being, therefore, consists in its beingdestined (.Bewandtnis), sc. its ontological structure includes a
double character: a being that is destined and a being whereunto
78

74

SZ, pp. 68, 70.

SZ, pp. 74-75'
« SZ, p. 83.
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it is destined.76 That whereunto the instrument is destined will
depend, of course, upon the pattern into which it is inserted
(Bewandtnisganzheit), and this pattern will in turn be inserted
into a larger one. For example, the hammer will have its immediate destination in a hammering, the hammering in a nailing,
the nailing in the building of a house. But the process does not
continue indefinitely. The house is destined for There-being.
There-being is the term of all destinations - and this, not because
of a banal "ego-centricity" of its own (a purely ontic conception
of There-being), but because of its ontological structure, sc. the
Being of instruments is to-be-destined to another, but the Being
of There-being is to be concerned with its own Being and cannot
therefore be referred beyond itself.77
We have said that when There-being discovers an instrument,
it does so in virtue of its view of an already pre-discovered whole
which we have called the World. Now let us ask: what is the
nature of this pre-discovery ? The whole which lights up for
There-being on the occasion of a disturbance of the order of the
whole is not itself an instrument, much less a simple entity
(Vorhandenes), but rather a "There" ("Da") which precedes all
affirmation or contemplation. The whole which lights up is not
even accessible to the view-of-the-World-about, insofar as the
latter always focuses on the totality of beings with which Therebeing is preoccupied, yet it is prior to this view-of-the-Worldabout and for such a view that the "There" is already disclosed.78
Hence, the "There" in question is not in the ontic dimension
of beings at all, since it "precedes" both the being-instrument
(for it is the total pattern which renders the instrument purposeful) and There-being's view-of-the-World-about (for which the
"There" is already disclosed). Furthermore, the "There" is not
thematic but remains undisclosed as long as the pattern is not
disturbed, and it is precisely in this unthematic form that it
constitutes the Being of the instrument in everyday intercourse.
Since it is already pre-disclosed to the preoccupied There-being,
SZ, p. 84 (mit . .. bei).
SZ, p. 123.
78 SZ, p. 75. In the following discussion we reserve the word "disclosed" to translate erschlossen, a term that always pertains to There-being, and "dis-covered," or,
when occasion permits, ' 4 u n - c o v e r e d t o translate entdeckt, sc. a term that pertains
always to beings other than There-being.
78

77
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this "There," the World, is that "within" which There-being,
if considered as itself a being, already was and to which, in any
explicit (thematic) approach, it can only return.79 The World,
then, is a non-ontic, non-thematic, pre-disclosed "There" wherein There-being encounters the purposeful beings with which it
is preoccupied in its everyday commerce with the World-about.
The World is a Wherein. This is not to be understood spatially
but as a horizon within which an instrument is encountered by
There-being. Hence it is a Wherein in which both There-being
and instruments reside. For the instrument, the World is a
matrix of relations (Bezugszusammenhang) into which the instrument is inserted (whereunto it is referred), which renders possible
the instrument's purposefulness, hence constitutes it in its
Being. But the unity of this matrix is There-being itself, since
There-being is the ultimate whereunto of all references (Worumwillen). There-being, then, comprehends the matrix insofar as
it comprehends itself, and is referred to the matrix in the same
way that it is referred to itself in the radical comprehension of
its own Being. So it is that the horizon of There-being's own
self-comprehension is likewise the ultimate term of reference of
an instrument, and its disclosure is ontologically prior to any
ontic encounter with an instrument. One sees, then, in what
sense the Being of the World is an existential component of
There-being as finite transcendence.80
It is with this matrix of relations, which constitutes the
World, within which There-being comprehends both itself and
other beings, that There-being enjoys a radical familiarity. In
fact, this familiarity with the World constitutes There-being's
radical comprehension of Being (Seinsvdrständnis). Are we to
infer that familiarity with the matrix and the comprehension of
Being are but one? Certainly the author's thought is moving in
that direction, for There-being's comprehension of its own
Being is at once its comprehension of the World; but the identification is not yet as explicit as eventually it will become.81
Let us examine more closely this matrix of relationships
which There-being comprehends in a disclosed-ness that is prior
SZ, p. 76 (zurückkommen).
*• SZ, pp. 86, 88.
8 1 SZ, pp. 85-86.
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to every encounter with other beings. The relational character
of the relations within the matrix will be said "to give meaning"
(be-deuteri), sc. it is the relations which constitute the purposefulness of the instruments. The entire matrix of these relations
will be called "Meaningfulness" (Bedeutsamkeit), and it is this
which constitutes the structure of the World with which Therebeing, as to-be-in-the-World, already enjoys familiarity. But
There-being's familiarity with Total Meaningfulness does more
than enable There-being to comprehend itself. It enables Therebeing to comprehend other beings (instruments) with which it
is engaged, and therefore makes it possible for them to be discovered as instruments, possible for them to announce themselves for what they are in themselves (an sich). So it is that the
ontological dimension of There-being, sc. its radical comprehension of Meaningfulness, renders possible the discovery of
purposeful patterns in There-being's ontic engagement.82
More precisely: The dis-covery of a purposeful being as purposeful implies that There-being in its encounter lets the instrument
be destined toward its purpose (Bewenden-lassen). This occurs
on two levels: ontic, sc. the individual instrument is permitted
to be according to the suchness of its individual particularity,
v.g. as a hammer or a chisel; ontological, sc. the instrument,
considered simply as a being (Seiendes), is permitted to be. This
ontological letting-fo is prior to the ontic, for an instrument
(v.g. hammer) must first be before it can be a hammer. It is a
liberation (Freigabe) of the instrument in its Being, for it permits the instrument to be, not in the sense, of course, that it
creates or produces the instrument, but simply that it renders
possible its discoverability, thus permits it to be encountered.
Now this pre-ontic letting-be of the instrument as a being is a
condition of the possibility of the encounter with the instrument
as such and such a being (v.g. hammer). It is just such a preontic letting-be which is the result of There-being's intimacy
with Total Meaningfulness.83
Let it be noted, however, that There-being exists in both
dimensions simultaneously. The ontological dimension, though
structurally prior to the ontic, is not disclosed until after some
« SZ, p. 87.
«3 SZ, pp. 84-85.
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instrumental complex has been discovered on the ontic level.
Conversely, insofar as There-being is, sc. exists in its ontological
dimension, it is already orientated toward a "World" of beings
in its ontic dimension. The orientation toward, and therefore
referential dependence upon, an ontic "World" belongs to the
very Being of There-being. Both the World of There-being's
ontological dimension which is disclosed, and the "World" of
its ontic dimension which is discovered, are revealed together.84
What, then, are we finally to understand by the World into
which There-being transcends? It is the existential dimension
of There-being by reason of which is pre-disclosed the matrix of
relations which constitute Total Meaningfulness, within which
There-being may encounter beings under the guise of purposeful
instruments. But if it is an existential component of There-being,
may we still say that There-being "transcends" to it? Yes,
provided we understand the terminus a quo of the transcendence
as the ontic dimension of There-being, the terminus ai quern
(World) its ontological dimension. We may say that There-being
is transcendence, sc. transcending, simply because " . . . t h e
ontic excellence of There-being consists in the fact that it is
ontological." 85
B.

IN-BEING

We have just seen how World is disclosed in There-being prior
(ontologically, not temporally) to any ontic engagement of
There-being with other beings. This disclosedness of the World
pertains to the very Being of There-being. In fact, the term
"There" expresses this disclosedness of the World. The "There"
of Being and the disclosedness of the World are but one.
Translate this into terms of the metaphor of light. The tradition has spoken of the lumen naturale in man. This is an effort
to express by what Heidegger considers an image of the ontic
order what is in fact the ontological structure of There-being,
84 SZ, pp. 87, 2i2. Note importance of what is said here for the whole problem
of realism (p. 202, ff.).
85 " . . . Die ontische Auszeichnung des Daseins liegt darin, daß es ontologisch ist."
(SZ, p. 12). Heidegger's italics. The term "transcendence" is not thematized in SZ,
but that the interpretation given is perfectly legitimate is clear from WG, pp. 17-21,
34-35, 41-43-
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sc. that it is in such a way as to be There.86 To say that Therebeing is "lit-up" (erleuchtet) means that, insofar as it is to-be-inthe-World, There-being is illumined not by some other being but
rather is itself the lighting-process {Lichtung). This luminosity
of the There (disclosedness of the World) is not something added
to There-being but it is its innermost constitution. Without it,
There-being would simply not be what it is. " . . . There-being
is its [own] disclosedness." 87 This identity of the disclosedness
of the World and the There (luminosity) of There-being is precisely what constitutes There-being's in-being in the World.88
Furthermore, this disclosedness of the World is at the same
time the disclosedness of Being. Hence the constitutional luminosity of There-being is not only the in-being of There-being in
the World but its radical comprehension of Being as well.89
Heidegger's task now will be to examine in detail the constituent elements of the There of There-being. We must insert
an important prefix, however, which we can only mention
without development. There-being is not an isolated being,
existing in complete separation from all other There-beings. It
is in-the-World with other There-beings. It is by reason of this
with-being, too, that There-being is what it is. For the same
reason, the World is always a with-World, sc. There-being is tobe-in-1 he-World-with-ot hers. And since this with-being is constitutive of There-being, then in There-being's comprehension of
its own Being lies the comprehension of others too.90
I. Comprehension
Let us begin with a component of disclosedness for which we
have received already a certain propaedeutic: the compre8® SZ, pp. 133. When Heidegger calls lumen naturale an ontic image, we can discern in inchoative form the entire polemic against subjective thinking. He does not
deny, rather he endorses the image, but since in the tradition this refers to a characteristic of the human intellect, it implies for him an opposition between a beingsubject (intellectus) and a being-object {intclligibilc), hence remains in the order of
beings, sc. is ontic. His entire effort is to try to transcend this opposition by conceiving There-being in a completely ontological dimension as a being whose Being
is to be the luminosity of the World.
87 " . . . Das Dasein ist seine Erschlossenheit." (SZ, p. 133). Heidegger italicizes
whole.
88
89
90

SZ, p. 143.
SZ, pp. 147, i2, 14-15 taken together.
SZ, pp. 118, 123.
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hending (Verstehen) that constitutes There-being and differentiates it from all other beings.91 By reason of this comprehending, the Being of beings (itself included) becomes accessible
to There-being. This is possible, however, only insofar as comprehending is of the nature of a project (Entwurf). To "project"
means to "throw forward." In German, the word is commonly
used in the transferred sense which implies that what is thrown
forward is already somehow possessed by the one who throws
it forward; by this pre-possession, the structure of the project-ed
precedes itself in the project-or; this preceding structure of the
project-ed in project-or is an anticipation; the anticipation is
the bringing-to-pass of this precedent structure as precedent.
Thus far goes the natural understanding of "project."
For Heidegger, the meaning of project is apparently clear
enough to dispense him from the necessity of an explanation.
Let us try to determine how he understands it from his use of it.
The clearest indication of the sense in which he accepts the term
is to be found in a citation from Kant. In explaining the development of the Kantian problematic, Heidegger indicates how Kant
wished to transpose into terms of metaphysics the discovery of
the physical scientists that " . . . the reason discovers only what
her own projects educe. . . . " 92 The projects of reason for Kant
in this case are the structure (s) which anticipate what will be
discerned in the object, and determine the basic concepts and
fundamental principles of the various sciences. Heidegger, in
indicating Kant's application of this observation to the problem
of metaphysics, expresses Kant's thought process in terms more
properly his own: " . . . Accordingly, what renders comportment
91 In S Z , Heidegger begins with Befindlichkeit
(pp. 134-140), but in K M (p. 212)
places Verstehen first. Both are "equally original" (gleichursprünglich). The KM
order is to t h e writer more clear. For the German Entwurf, " p r o j e c t " seems a respectable translation. Derived from werfen ("throw") and ent- ( " f o r t h , " " f r o m , " " o u t , "
" a w a y " ) , i t is used less often in the literal than in a transferred sense: to sketch,
trace out, p l a n , draw up a document, design, invent (a plot), draft (a document),
frame (a bill), etc. Project: -ject comes from jacere ("throw") and pro-, originally
ablative n e u t e r of prius-a-um, but used as preposition to signify (literally) " b e f o r e "
in spatial sense, or "in front o f " in answer to questions of " w h e r e ? " or " w h i t h e r ? "
Hence, in E n g l i s h " p r o j e c t " retains a literal meaning ( " t o throw an object forward,"
v. g. light r a y s ) as well as a transferred sense ( " t o contrive" [a scheme], " t o externalize and r e g a r d as outside of oneself" [v. g. sensation, image, desire, etc.]).
92 " . . . die Vernunft nur das einsieht, was sie selbst nach ihrem Entwürfe hervorb r i n g t , . . . " (Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, ed. R a y m u n d Schmidt
Hamburg: Meiner, 1952] B X I I I ) .
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with beings (ontic knowledge) possible, is an antecedent comprehending of the Being-structure, [sc.] ontological knowledge." 93
We have here the Heideggerean formula "antecedent comprehending" correlated with the Kantian use of "project" to signify
that structure of the reason (Heidegger speaking for Kant) in
virtue of which the reason is so constituted that in comportment
with beings their Being-structure is discerned. We have, then,
a first sense for "project"; as a structure that ontologically
precedes the comportment, this project is already a pre-possession, an anticipatory seizure of that being-to-be-encountered.94
There is a second sense which Heidegger adds: " . . . the explicit achievement of the projecting must . . . necessarily be a
construction." 95 The construction, however, is not arbitrary
but is determined previously and assured. We understand this
to mean: prior to the encounter, There-being is so constituted
as to seize by anticipation the structure of the being-to-beencountered ; during the encounter, the seizure which was
anticipated is explicitly achieved according to the pre-determined plan as dictated by the primordial constitution of
There-being. The achievement, then, is the actual process of
discerning, the laying-in-the-open of the structure of the beingencountered, so that by the encounter the structure is "built."
In this sense, there is a construction. To "project," then, taken
in its totality, means: to seize by anticipation the structure of
a being-still-to-be-encountered; to bring-to-pass the seizure of
this structure in the coming-to-pass of the encounter.
It is with this double sense of "project" that Heidegger describes fundamental ontology itself as the project of the inner
88 " . . . Was demnach das Verhalten zu Seiendem (ontische Erkenntnis) ermöglicht, ist das vorgängige Verstehen der Seins Verfassung, die ontologische Erkenntnis."
(KM, p. 20).
84 Of course there is no question of a banal idealism here. Since Heidegger has
appealed to the lumen naturale of the tradition to explain the luminosity of the
There, one is justified, to confirm his argument, in having recourse to this tradition,
without intending any simple concordism. In the Schools, for example, the faculties
have each their formal objects, sc. are so structured as to perceive in objects only
that which corresponds to the formal object. In particular, the intellect is endowed
with certain habitus naturales, dispositiones
innatae, by reason of which it is capable
(therefore has the potentiality) of understanding Being, the first principles of metaphysics, of the moral order, etc.
96 " . . . der ausdrückliche Vollzug des Entwerfens, und gar der im ontologischen
Begreifen, notwendig Konstruktion 3ein." (KM, p. 210).
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possibility of metaphysics.96 This inner possibility, we know
now, is the coming-to-pass of finite transcendence, which in
turn " . . . achieves the project of the Being of beings. To project
thus [is] to comprehend. . . . " 97 With this orientation from KM,
the cryptic treatment of comprehending in SZ as one of the
existential components of the There will be less enigmatic.
Precisely what does There-being comprehend? KM answers:
the Being of beings; but SZ works toward this conclusion phenomenologically. Let us begin with an ordinary sense of "comprehend," v.g. "to know." To "know" is frequently used to signify
"to be able to handle or deal with" (etwas können), v.g. to
"know" a language, jiu-jitsu, stocks and bonds, etc. Comprehending in the existential analysis retains this nuance of potentiality-for. For what? For "Being, in the sense of existing,"
hence for its own Being.98 There-being's power-to-be (Seinkönnen) consists in the fact that existence, by which Beingstructures become manifest, has already begun but is still
dynamically propelled toward the achieving of its self. It is a
drive-toward-Being.99 Of course, since There-being exists in
two dimensions, ontic-existentiell as well as ontologico-existential, the existential power-to-be of which there is question
here will be articulated in all the existentiell potentialities
(Möglichkeiten) ,100
Now such a comprehending as the power-to-be of There-being
is clearly a project, for it is the power to discern Being-structures
(including its own) in the still-to-be-continued encounter with
beings. As a power-to-discem, it is an antecedent seizure of
KM, p. 14.
" . . . den Entwurf des Seins von Seiendem vollzieht. Dieses Entwerfen (Verstehen). . .
(KM, p. 212).
98 SZ, p. 143 (das Sein als Existieren). Obviously this comprehending power-toexist (Möglichsein) of There-being is far removed from any of the traditional senses of
"possibility": either as a logical potency (intrinsic non-repugnance of notes) or as
a "real" potency in the sense of the capacity of a mere entity (Vorhandenes) to
receive further modifications which it does not yet (noch nicht) possess.
99 If, by an impossible supposition, one could consider There-being (existentiell
and existential) as a mere entity, one could say that it is always "more" than it actually (tatsächlich) is. Yet never more than it factually (faktisch) is, for facticity
connotes that which distinguishes There-being from any mere entity, sc. its existence, with all the dynamic propulsion towards Being that this implies. See SZ, p. 1451 0 0 It is thus that we understand Heidegger's use of the singular and plural of
Möglichkeit. We are taking the singular to refer to the ontological dimension and
plural to refer to the ontic.
96
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these Being-structures. As an antecedent seizure, it is a project
of these Being-structures in the sense of an anticipation.
Comprehension, then, as a component of the luminosity of
There, is a project. In the perspectives of SZ, what is projected?
Firstly, There-being itself as the ultimate whereunto of all
referential patterns. From another point of view, however, one
may say that There-being in its comprehending also projects
the World. For by World now we understand the complex of
relations which we call "Total Meaningfulness." This, however,
finds its basis in the ultimate Whereunto. Thus the project of
comprehending extends to the total phenomenon of to-be-inthe-World, so that in the comprehending of World, in-being
will likewise be understood, and, vice versa, the comprehending
of existence as such is always a comprehending of the World.101
More fundamentally still, Being itself is disclosed:
. . . In the fact t h a t There-being has projected its own Being as the ultim a t e whereunto and [the Being of the World] as T o t a l Meaningfulness
lies the disclosedness of Being altogether, . . . 1 0 2

Briefly: comprehending projects the entire transcendence of
There-being.
Before we conclude, it will be instructive to mention another
formula that the author uses to express the projective character
of comprehension, sc. the metaphor of "seeing" or "viewing"
(Sicht). "Comprehending, characterized as project, constitutes
in the existential dimension what we call the seeing of Therebeing. . . . " 1 0 3 Obviously, there is no question here of understanding the seeing as a sense perception, nor even as an intellectual apprehension. Rather it corresponds to the luminosity
which we have seen to characterize the disclosedness of the
There. Since the tradition of philosophy from the very beginning
has been orientated toward explaining the approach to beings
and to Being as "to see," Heidegger will accept the metaphor
insofar as its sense is broad enough to signify any approach to
the Being of beings whatever. Hence all of the traditional formula SZ, pp. 143, 146, 152.
1 0 3 " . . . In der Entworfenheit seines Seins auf das Woruxnwillen in eins mit der auf
die Bedeutsamkeit (Welt) liegt Erschlossenheit von Sein überhaupt
" (SZ, p.

147).

103 «Das Verstehen macht in seinem Entwurfcharakter existenzial das aus, was
wir die Sicht des Daseins nennen
" (SZ, p. 146). Heidegger's italics. Hence the
existential basis of Um-sicht, Durchsichtigkeit, etc.
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lae for "seeing" beings, such as Kant's "intuition" and Husserl's
"intuition of essences," are for Heidegger derivative forms of the
promordial seeing which is the existential comprehension of
Being. 104
2. Disposition
The everyday There-being is a fact. We are simply trying to
analyse this fact. Before it begins to analyse itself, or even to
pose the Being-question, There-being finds itself - whether expressly or not - already there, luminous. This already-havingfound-itself-there-ness (Befindlichkeit) of There-being is not
simply a datum which its own luminosity reveals, but itself is
one component of this luminosity.
More precisely, what is disclosed by this already-havingfound-itself-there-ness of There-being ? The author discerns
three data. The first datum is the fact that There-being is as it
is. Here distinguish the fact of There-being and its how.105 Both its
origin and destiny remain obscure, but this much is clear: the
irreducible fact that There-being already is, facticity. Already
is! hence is not itself the author but the recipient of this facticity. It has been given to There-being to be as it is. Furthermore, as well as the sheer fact of There-being's existence, there
is disclosed, too, something about the nature of this existence,
sc. that its facticity is not the matter-of-fact-ness of a mere
entity. Rather, There-being, by reason of its very structure, is
opened up upon Being in such a way that its own Being is not a
fait accompli but a task still-to-be-achieved (zu sein). It has been
given to There-being to bei Both of these aspects (already a
fact, Being to-be-achieved) are to be understood when Heidegger unifies them into the single concept of the "thrown-ness"
(Geworfenheit) of There-being.106
The second datum that is disclosed by the already-havingfound-itself-there-ness of There-being is that the There is a disclosedness not only of There-being's Being as existence, but also,
and with absolute simultaneity, of the World, for There-being's
104

sz, p. i 47 .
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SZ, pp. 134—135.
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existence is to-be-in-the-Wor/i. Hence it is the totality of a tobe-in-the-World that is here disclosed. The third datum disclosed
is that the There-being is essentially referred (Angewiesenheit)
to the World. That component of the disclosedness in the ontological dimension which renders possible the approach to Therebeing by other beings in the ontic dimension is precisely the
basic reference to the World which constitutes There-being as
to-be-in-the-World. This component is precisely the Worldopen-ness of There-being.107
Yet if all this is disclosed in the already-having-found-itselfthere-ness of There-being, what is the nature of this finding?
Certainly it is not a type of knowing (Erkennen), for the finding
has a depth and richness which the processes of knowing are
incapable of grasping. Rather it is an "awareness" of the affective order which in the ontic dimension may be described as
"mood" (Stimmung), or "attunement" (Gestimmtsein), completely spontaneous and unreflective, that renders apparent to
There-being not so much what it is but how it is, and thus brings
There-being before its own Being as a There.108 But if in the
ontic dimension this "finding" takes the form of moods, how
describe the ontological dimension which has been designated
as a component of the disclosedness of the There? One must
avoid such terms as "affection" or "feeling" as already clothed
with ontic connotations.109 Let us call it the "ontological disposition." This connotes a certain affectivity (v.g. "he is in a good
disposition this morning"), and at the same time, if analysed in
its etymology (j>onere,positum: "to place," "having been placed")
might suggest the thrown-ness of There. The qualification
"ontological" will emphasize the fact that disposition is a
structural component of the There. In any case, the formula
SZ, p. 137.
SZ, pp. 134-136.
1 0 9 SZ, p. 138. If we can strip "sentiment" of all ontic nuance, then a translation
such as "sentiment of the original situation" is very suggestive. (See A. De Waelhens,
La Philosophie...,
p. 82). We prefer, however, a briefer formula. The one we have
chosen has been suggested by W. Biemel [Le concept..p.
90, ff.), who translates as
disposition affective. Biemel, however, uses the term to translate Stimmung as well, so
that when he must distinguish between the ontological (Befindlichkeit) and the ontic
{Stimmung), he is forced to invent dispositional^ to suggest the structural aspect of
disposition. To avoid this difficulty, we reserve "disposition" to signify the ontological dimension and " m o o d " (Stimmung) to signify the ontic dimension of Therebeing's affectivity.
108
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will be taken to express the more precise but somewhat musclebound expression: the already-having-found-itself-affectivelythere-ness of There-being.
3- Logos
The third component of disclosedness is less emphasized in
SZ than it will become in the later Heidegger, when it will play
an essential role in the evolution of foundational thought.
Equally fundamental as comprehension and disposition, it is
that existential component of There-being by reason of which
the latter is capable of bringing to expression that which it
comprehends.
How shall we designate this existential? Heidegger's term is
Rede, which in purely formal translation would mean "speech,"
"language," "discourse." But in this case, the word does not
mean "language-as-spoken" but that ontological constituent
of There-being which renders spoken language possible.110 One
could in justice render it by "articulateness," sc. There-being's
constitutional capacity to articulate itself, and call spoken
language {Sprache) the "articulation" itself. We would prefer
to render it still otherwise. It is with Rede that Heidegger translates the Greek Xiyo^.111 Good English usage permits simple transliteration of the Greek. Since the word X6yo<; assumes ever increasing importance through the whole evolution of Heidegger,
let us use "logos" from the beginning so that we may see the
later development in its initial stages.
We know already that Heidegger understands the Greek Xoyo;
to mean originally a process of making-manifest or letting-beseen. If a third existential component of There-being be called
"logos," the reason must be that it lets "something" be seen.
What is this "something"? The author himself is very obscure
in this, the least satisfying section, perhaps, in all SZ. The reason
is that he himself is still very much in the dark at this point and
is groping for some way to express an experience that still defies
115

SZ, pp.

X6O-I6I.

SZ, pp. 32, 165. Translation of Rede as "logos'* suggested by Joseph Möller,
Existentialphilosophie
und Katholische Theologie (Baden Baden: Verlag für Kunst
und Wissenschaft, 1952), p. 57.
111
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formulation.112 But we must make the best of what elements
SZ offers, and we propose to understand him as follows.
(Finite) comprehension projects the World, sc. the complex
of relations that constitutes Total Meaningfulness. The relations
are so intimately joined one to another that we may speak of
Total Meaningfulness as a "jointed" (and in that radical sense
an "articulative") whole. There-being always exists in a given
concrete situation, hence Total Meaningfulness, as also its articulative-ness (das Artikulierbare), must always be explicitated
according to the demands of the situation, sc. concrete
"meanings" (Bedeutungen) must be disengaged.113 The process
of explicitating There-being's antecedent comprehension of
Total Meaningfulness (World) Heidegger calls "interpretation"
(Auslegung) which, as we have seen, he in turn designates as
"hermeneutic." Now correlative with this process of explicitating
the original project is the process by which There-being brings
the articulative-ness of Total Meaningfulness to concrete articula-tion in some form of human expression. That element in
There-being's structure by reason of which it brings the articulative-ness of the World to concrete expression in articula-tion
is what we call articulate-ness and what we understand Heidegger to mean by the existential component of logos. Through the
articulate-ness, sc. logos, of There-being, " . . . Total Meaningfulness . . . comes into words. . . . " 1 1 4 We distinguish, then: articulative-ness, the World as Total Meaningfulness projected by
the existential component of comprehension; articulate-ness,
the power of articulat-ing Total Meaningfulness by letting-beseen meanings in existentiell situations, sc. the existential component of logos; articula-tion, the concrete expression, sc.
language (Sprache).
But is this not a little too facile? Perhaps. What is the precise
relation, after all, between comprehension of World (Being) and
logos? Let us admit the obscurity and move on, noting only the
fact that both must be conceived as equally original, therefore
US, p. 93.
It is in terms of such "meanings" (Bedeutungen), disengaged from the articulative whole, that we must approach the problem of what Heidegger means by the
"sense" (Sinn) of beings.
1 1 4 " . . . Das Bedeutungsganze der Verständlichkeit kommt zu Wort..(SZ,
p.
161). Heidegger's italics. We base this interpretation on pp. i6o-?6x but admittedly go
beyond the text in precising the terms: articulative-ness, articulate-ness, articula-tion.
118
113
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mutually complementary, in There-being. The difficulty is
locked up inside the conception of "hermeneutic interpretation
which the author certainly experiences but cannot formulate
as yet. 115
Understanding logos, as an existential, to mean the power-tolet-be-seen what comprehension projects, we can understand
how Heidegger can propose as two possible modes of logos:
keeping silence (Schweigen), for this, too, can be revealing; and
attend-ing (Hören).11* The latter is more important, as the subsequent development will show. It will suffice for the moment to
mention two types of attend-ing.
The first type of attend-ing consists in listening to others
(Hören auf). Recall that for Heidegger There-being is never solitary, but to its Being pertains a with-being, sc. with other
There-beings, in such a way that the Being of others helps to
constitute the Being of There-being. It is this with-being that
is the existential dimension of all existentiell dealings with
others. Without it, all dialogue, all community would be impossible. This with-being, since it pertains to the Being of Therebeing, is disclosed in the primordial luminosity of the There
which illumines its self as well as the World. Hence, the disclosedness of the World comes-to-pass in There-being-withothers. Logos, too, as the power-to-let-be-seen what is comprehended, will be characterized by the essentially communal
character of the comprehending. It is a letting-be-seen that
essentially comes-to-pass together-with-others, and it is thus
that it is ontologically always a communication (Mitteilung),
even though in the ontic dimension of a particular individual
comportment there may be no one around to see. It is for the
same reason that, when, by attend-ing to others, There-being
lets-be-seen the project which it shares with others, this attend-ing is a mode of logos. " . . . Attend-ing-to . . . is the existential open-ness to others of There-being as a with-being
"117
We see here, then, the existential-analytical foundation of so
1 1 6 See SZ, pp. 148-160, where the author explains hermeneutic interpretation
and the emergence of concrete expression (Aussage). An account of the argument is a
luxury we cannot afford here.
1 1 6 SZ, pp. 161, 163 (Hören), 164 (Schweigen).
1 1 1 " . . . Das Hören auf . . . ist das existenziale Offensein des Daseins als Mitsein
für den Anderen
" (SZ, p. 163}.
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central a theme in foundational thinking as dialogue (Gespräch)
in the many forms that this will take.
The second type of attend-ing of which there is question here
takes place when There-being attends to its self. There is a
letting-be-manifest of There-being which comes to pass as if it
were listening to the voice of a friend hidden within its depths
and telling it of its own most proper self. Such an attend-ing as
this is an openness-to, a letting-be-seen, a logos. It
. . constitutes, indeed, the primordial and authentic open-ness of Therebeing for its own most proper power-to-be. . .
"8 How this
will develop as an attend-ing to the call of conscience in achieving
the totality of finite transcendence we shall see shortly.
We conclude this discussion of the three existential components (comprehension, disposition and logos) by insisting on
the fact that they are all equally original in There-being and that
the principal task now is to bring to light their essential unity. 119
But the author himself never explains how this unity is to be
conceived. We are left once more to our own resources and, with
the necessary reserves, propose the following hypothesis.
There-being as the disclosedness of the World, sc. as the
process of transcendence, is a profoundly finite unity. What
role does comprehension play in this unified process? It projects
the World as Total Meaningfulness. This is the disclosure of.
something eminently positive. To be sure, the project is itself a
finite project, but the role it plays in disclosure is apparently
not to disclose finite transcendence precisely as finite but as
transcendence. What role does disposition play? It discloses
There-being's thrown-ness and also its referential dependence
on beings encountered in the World. We shall soon see that
under the guise of anxiety it discloses the World in terms of
Non-being. What disposition discloses, then, seems to be a
crushing testimony to There-being's finitude. It would seem,
then, that if in the unified process of disclosure comprehension
discloses There-being precisely as transcendence, disposition discloses it precisely as finite. Hence, both are necessarily comple1 1 8 " . . . Das Hören konstituiert sogar die primäre und eigentliche Offenheit des
Daseins für sein eigenstes Seinkönnen, als Hören der Stimme des Freundes, den jedes
Dasein bei sich trägt
" (SZ, p. 163.)
1 1 8 SZ, pp. 142, 161 (gleichursprünglich). KM, p. 212 (wesenhafte Einheit . . .
aufzuhellen).
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mentary. According to this hypothesis, the röle of logos would
be simply to let the process of disclosure, both in its transcendence
and in its finitude, be seen.120
Fallen-ness
We have insisted often enough on the finitude of transcendence. Evidence of this finitude thus far: thrown-ness, taken
in the large sense as including, together with thrown-ness in the
strict sense (non-mastery of own origin, dynamic incompleteness),
also the referential dependence on other beings. This finitude,
however, does not simply characterize the beginnings of Therebeing but permeates the entire process of transcendence. Considered as an abiding characteristic, this finitude, as we have
seen, is also called "fallen-ness." Before proceeding to examine
the unity of There-being, Heidegger pauses to underline the
abiding finitude of fallen-ness. We thus regain the perspective
of the starting point: the everydayness of There-being lost in a
forgotten-ness of its self. 121
By fallen-ness, Heidegger does not imply a negative value in
There-being. He means simply that There-being is "first of all
and for the most part" preoccupied with the "World" of its
ontic experience, sc. that totality of beings opposed to itself with
which it is continually engaged. And inevitably so. For it is bidimensional, ontic as well as ontological: it is only through an
existentiell engagement that the existential prerogative can
come-to-pass. If, however, There-being is so absorbed in the
ontic as to be oblivious to the ontological (Being), it has forgotten the very prerogative that constitutes its uniqueness; it
has "fallen from," "taken flight from" its authentic self, it is
lost in inauthenticity (Uneigentlichkeit).122 Such is the condition
of There-being "first of all and for the most part" in the intercourse of every day.
ISO y/ e note for the sake of completeness a single text which presages the eventual
importance of poetry for Heidegger, but it is not precise enough to warrant treatment here: " . . . Die Mitteilung der existenzialen Möglichkeiten der Befindlichkeit,
d. h. das Erschließen von Existenz, kann eigenes Ziel der 'dichtenden' Rede werden."
(SZ, p. 162). The Text is precise enough only to tantalize.
KM, pp. 212-213 (durchherrscht). Sz', p. 166 (Alltäglichkeit).
SZ, pp. 175-176, 184.
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The author analyses this condition in detail. Its basic characteristic is that There-being, forgetting its ontological primacy,
becomes simply one of the crowd - it loses itself in what we may
refer to as "people" (Ma«). 123 There-being talks the way
"people" talk (loquacity), gawks at things - not in order to
comprehend but simply for the sake of gawking - the way
"people" do (curiosity), comprehends things not according to
their inmost structure but the way "people" generally do (ambiguity). 124 Yet "people" is not a universal subject. Rather it is a
manner of being of There-being that has been caught in the
vortex of onticity. 125 "People" is There-being's inauthentic self.
Yet how can There-being be delivered from its ontic entanglement? To achieve authenticity, There-being need not
withdraw from the ontic; it need only recall the ontological. This
would suffice to permit There-being to re-collect its self.
"... Authentic existence is not something that hovers over
everydayness in its fallen condition, but in the existential sense
is simply a modified fashion of apprehending it." 126 How this
will come-to-pass, how There-being can be faithful both to its
transcendence and to its finitude - this can be explained only
when we understand how the various elements of the structure
of There-being are woven into a unified totality. Let this be the
next step.
c.

THE

UNIFIED

TOTALITY

OF

FINITE

TRANSCENDENCE

i. Unity
A unified totality! Let us consider There-being first in its
unity, then in its totality, noting how finitude permeates both.
To begin with, recall that There-being, as still-to-be-achieved,
1 2 8 SZ, pp. 126-130. "People" seems to be the closest equivalent of Man, for
colloquial English has nothing so flexible as the French on. Werner Brock ("Introduction," Existence and Being by Martin Heidegger [Chicago: Regnery, 1949],
p. 45) translates "one," explaining it as one-like-many. Correct, but too formal.
Other possibilities: " e v e r y b o d y , " " t h e y . "
1 2 4 SZ, pp. 167-170 (Gerede); 170-173 (Neugier); i73-*75
(Zweideutigkeit).
1 2 6 SZ, p. 178 (Wirbel). The word should connote for us a certain " d r a g " toward
in authenticity, innate in There-being b y reason of its finitude.
1 2 8 " . . . Umgekehrt ist die eigentliche Existenz nichts, was über der verfallenden
Alltäglichkeit schwebt, sondern existenzial nur ein modifiziertes Ergreifen dieser."
(SZ, p. 179). Heidegger's italics.
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is constantly in need of Being in order to be itself. To alleviate
this need is for There-being its unique concern. A unique concern
is unifying. It integrates into a one-ness the multiple elements
of a self whose Being is such that it is concerned about its own
Being. Let this "structural unity of intrinsically finite transcendence," this "transcendental unity of finitude" be called . . .
"concern"! 127 We must inspect, then, the structure of concern.
Furthermore, since our method is phenomenological, this
structural unity of There-being must be discerned in some analysable phenomenon. What phenomenon shall it be? " . . . Is
there a comprehensive disposition in There-being in which Therebeing [in its unity] is in some exceptional fashion disclosed to
its self?" 128 The author replies: yes, in anxiety (Angst).
Anxiety is to be distinguished from fear. Both are forms of
the ontological disposition of There-being by which its situation
is affectively disclosed. Fear, however, is always the shrinking
from something (or someone), sc. from some being that is found
within the World, always of a clearly determined nature, imminent, injurious, inescapable. Distinguish here that which a
There-being is afraid of (wovor), afraid for (worum) and the
process of fearing itself. 129 For example, a little boy (or a big
boy) in the dentist's office: he is afraid of the drill (a determined
being), for himself in a process of fearing.
Anxiety differs from fear principally in the first of these three
elements. That about which There-being is anxious is not any
being within the World at all, nor is it injurious in any determined
or determinable way, nor is it "here" nor "there" nor "anywhere." It is no-being and no-where.130 It is about Non-being
that There-being is anxious. And yet this Non-being is not an
absolute nothing. It is grounded in a "something." What is the
nature of this "something"? Heidegger answers: "the World
as such." 131 That is to say, in the phenomenon of anxiety, which
1 2 7 "die strukturale Einheit der in sich endlichen Transzendenz des Daseins"
(KM, p. 213); "der transzendentalen Einheit der Endlichkeit" (KM, p. 214).
128 **. .. Gibt es eine verstehende Befindlichkeit im Dasein, in der es ihm selbst
in ausgezeichneter Weise erschlossen ist?" (SZ, p. 182). See pp. x84-19°129 SZ, pp. 140-141, 185.
180 SZ, p. 186.
1 8 1 " . . . das Wovor der Angst ist die Welt als solche
" (SZ, p. 187)- Heidegger
italicizes whole.
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may occur, to be sure, only briefly and on rare occasions,132 the
manifold beings which preoccupy There-being in the dissipation
of everyday fallen-ness slip away into insignificance, and there
is disclosed to There-being, not conceptually but by affective
disposition, the dark horizon wherein beings and There-being
meet and which is the existential dimension of There-being.
To be anxious, however, implies not only anxiety-about but
anxiety-for. For what or whom is There-being anxious? Its self.
Yet just as There-being is not anxious about any being in particular but about the complete indetermination of the World as
such, so it is not anxious for itself as modified by any existentiell
potentiality in particular, but rather as it is when stripped of
all modifications and association with others, left to the empty
individuality of a being whose only characteristic is to-be-in-theWorld. There-being is anxious for its self, then, insofar as it is the
disclosedness, luminosity of the World, hence in its own dynamic
drive-toward-Being. By reason of this drive-toward-Being,
There-being is its own potentiality, a potentiality, indeed - and
the uneasy disquiet of anxiety is the proof of it - for its own
authenticity. 133
Now the phenomenon in its completeness is the welding of
anxiety-about and anxiety-for into the unity of a single process.
There-being is anxious about its self as (to-be-in-)the-World; it
is anxious for its self as to-be-in(-the-World). There-being is
anxious-about and anxious-for the same identical self. The phenomenon of anxiety brings There-being before its self as to-bein-1 he-World, sc. as the coming-to-pass of transcendence. Hence,
anxiety is the comprehensive disposition by which There-being
in its unity is disclosed to its self.134
The unity is a synthesis of three elements, all disclosed by
anxiety taken in its completeness. I. Anxiety discloses Therebeing as to-be-in-the-World, a being already constituted as concerned with Being. Better, it is a drive-toward-Being, sc. essentially an inexhaustible potentiality to transcend beings unto
Being. As such it is always in advance of itself, if "self" be understood in the sense of a mere entity. From the viewpoint of authenSZ, p. 190. Cf. WM, pp. 31, 37-38.
SZ, pp. 187-188.
184 SZ, p. 188. It should be kept in mind that the analysis here has no anthropological, but only an ontological, significance. See KM, p. 214,
132
133
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ticity, of course, one would not say that There-being is in advance of its self but that the self is its own potentiality. But our
language is geared to the every-day World of fallen-ness, so let
us designate the essentially potential character of There-being
as "anticipation" (Sich-vorweg-sein), understanding it to signify
the ecstatic nature of existence. 135 2. Anxiety discloses Therebeing in its thrown-ness into the World. It is a process which is
not its own source, which is already-begun (schon-sein-in) and
still-to-be-achieved. This is its facticity. In other words, " . . . existentiality is always determined by facticity." 1 3 6 3. Finally,
anxiety discloses There-being in its referential dependence on
the World (Sein-bei-der-Welt) and, indeed, as caught by the drag
of the ontic (fallen-ness). For it is to a There-being lulled into
the complacency of everydayness that anxiety brings disquiet
and through the consequent uneasiness suggests that the
dwelling places of the ontic are not There-being's true abode
(Unheimlichkeit) ,137
Consequently, anxiety, as a single concrete experience of
There-being, has disclosed the Being of There-being. We fashion
it into a single awkward formula by saying that There-being is
"an anticipatory drive-towards-Being, thrown-down-as-still-tobe-achieved-(in-the-World), and fallen among the beings (it
encounters within the World)." 138
2. Totality
We are trying to comprehend finite transcendence in its unified totality in order that we may understand how There-being,
even though lost inevitably in everydayness, may nevertheless
re-collect its self. In concern, we examined this process in its
unity. Now we consider its totality.
For to speak of unity is not necessarily to speak of totality.
To be sure, in concern something is said, even if negatively, of
There-being's beginning: it is thrown, sc. it is not the author of
its self, it has been given over (überantwortet) to itself to be. As
a process-still-to-be-achieved, There-being apparently has a notSZ, pp. 191-192, 193.
" . . . Existenzialität ist wesenhaft durch Faktizität bestimmt." (SZ, p. 192).
1 3 7 SZ, pp. 188, 192.
188 "Sich-vorweg-schon-sein-in-(der-Welt-) als Sein-bei
(innerweltlich begegnendem Seienden)" (SZ, p. 192).
188
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yet that must still come-to-pass, but nothing has been said yet
about the end of the process. It is only when we add to the
analysis of concern an examination of its term, sc. that point
beyond which it does not exist (Nicht-mehr-da-sein), that we
shall have laid bare the process as a Whole and have revealed the
completeness of its finitude. Heidegger examines the process of
There-being in its term by his existential analysis of death. 139
For There-being ends (who will deny it ?) in death. What, then,
is the authentic sense of death which is There-being's end ? One
would be tempted, perhaps, to say that in death There-being is
simply at-its-end, understanding end to mean "perfection/1
"cessation," "disappearance" or the like, but this would be to
interpret There-being as a mere entity and therefore misinterpret it completely.140 'What characterizes There-being is existence, sc. the ecstatic drive-toward-Being by reason of which
it is its own potentiality. It already is what it can-be, hence
what it not-yet-is, sc. its end. Since the potentiality of Therebeing includes already interior to itself in existential fashion its
end, then the death of There-being must be described not as a
being-at-its-end (Zu-Ende-sein) but as the Being-unto-end (Sein
zum Ende) of There-being, indicating thereby that the end always
penetrates the whole existence. So it is that " . . . death is a
manner of Being which There-being assumes just as soon as it
e x i s t s . . . / ' 1 4 1 for Being-unto-end and Being-unto-death (Sein
zum Tode) are but one.
Death, then, as Being-unto-end of There-being, is inscribed
within that potentiality which There-being in its existential
dimension is. "... Death, as the end of There-being, is in the
1 8 9 SZ, pp. 233-234, 236, 259. We are concerned with the problem of death, insofar
as this is the term of finite transcendence as to-be-in-the-World, in the context of
fundamental ontology. Hence, any considerations such as: the biological sense of
death, the possibility of life after death, how death came into the world etc. are all
for Heidegger, if they have any sense at all, beside the point. See SZ, pp. 246-248.
Here more than ever we must make the effort to realize that Heidegger is interested
not in an anthropological but an ontological interpretation of death, albeit discerned
phenomenologically in terms of the existentiell.
140 SZ, pp. 244-245 (Vollendung, Aufhören, Verschwinden).
1 4 1 " . . . DerTod ist eine Weise zu sein, die das Dasein übernimmt, sobald es ist. . .
(SZ, p. 245). Heidegger compares the immanence of the end (death) in There-being to
the immanence of maturity in the unripe fruit, sc. it already ss its not-yet-ripeness.
The difference: ripeness implies the perfection of the fruit; the end (death) does not
necessarily imply the perfection of There-being. See SZ, pp. «43-244.
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Being of There-being unto its end." 142 We have every right to
translate das Ende here as "limit." Hence, Being-unto-death in
There-being means for Heidegger that the limit is not simply
the term of the process but permeates every part of it and
makes the potentiality, which There-being is, limited through
and through - thoroughly and irretrievably finite.
It is when we consider death, however, in the ontic dimension
as one potentiality of There-being among countless others, that
death enjoys a certain pre-eminence. " . . . Death is the most
proper, exclusive and ultimate potentiality [of Thereb e i n g ] . . . . " : 1 4 3 "most proper," because There-being's own,
substitution is impossible (every There-being must die for its
self); "exclusive," because There-being not only dies for its self
but by its self, stripped of all relationship to others, isolated
completely; "ultimate," because it cannot be surpassed, inasmuch as beyond death there is no-more-There-being (Nichtmekr-da-sein), no more potentiality. " . . . Death is the potentiality for the absolute im-potence of There-being. .. , " 1 4 4 It is
the potentiality of There-being for a negation of itself, hence
for a non-being (Nichts), a negativity (Nichtigkeit) intrinsic to
the Being of There-being itself. 145 It is the ultimate seal of
There-being's finitude.
Obviously, There-being in its fallen condition is oblivious to
the authentic sense of death, sc. that its self is a concern that is
ineluctably unto an end, finite. How is it to come to such an
appreciation? This poses the entire problem of authenticity.
Now that we have considered the process of There-being in its
unity (concern) and totality (Being-unto-end), we are in a
position to pose the question: how does authenticity come-topass?

1 4 2 " . . . Der Tod ist als Ende des Daseins im Sein dieses Seienden zu seinem Ende."
(SZ, p. 259). Heidegger's italics.
143 " . . . So enthüllt sich der Tod als die eigenste, unbezügliche,
unüberholbare
Möglichkeit
" (SZ, p. 250). Heidegger's italics. "Proper" here is to be understood
in the sense of proprius.
144 " . . . Der Tod ist die Möglichkeit der schlechthinnigen Daseinsunmöglichkeit.
. . . " (SZ, p. 250). For an excellent phenomenological analysis of the death of others,
death of self and impossibility of substitution, see SZ, p. 237-241.
145 SZ, p. 306.
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3. Authenticity
a. E X I S T E N T I A L - Heidegger considers the problem of
authenticity on two levels. As a re-collection, it is an ontic comportment of There-being, hence an existentiell potentiality. As
existentiell, this potentiality is structured by an existential
dimension that renders it possible. The author considers first
the ontological dimension of authenticity in terms of the death
problematic as "authentic Being-unto-death." This done, he
considers authenticity as an existentiell potentiality by an
analysis of conscience, guilt and re-solve. The intimate correlation of these procedures will appear in the notion of an "advancing" re-solve. We try to trace the essentials.
We examine first the ontological dimension of authenticity,
insofar as this can be done without reference to the ontic comportment of which it is the structure. If one will, we are proceeding by constructing an hypothesis, based upon the data
supplied by what precedes, without considering how this hypothesis is to be verified (bezeugten).1** Therefore: if the Being
of There-being is concern, and if this concern is essentially untoan-end, sc. finite, then how would be achieved in authentic
fashion the coming-to-pass of There-being? In answering the
question, the author proceeds by discussing the authentic nature
of each of the constituents of concern: comprehension, disposition, fallen-ness.
What would be existential comprehension, if it were to be
completely authentic? Would it not be to comprehend (project)
the potentiality of There-being as the potentiality that it is?
This would be to reveal There-being not as an actualization of
its own potentiality but this potentiality itself as such, in all its
wealth and in all its poverty, sc. as "the potentiality of immeasurable impotence" that marks its finitude.147
More precisely, if There-being were to comprehend itself
authentically, it would reveal by its project its own potentiality
in what is most properly, exclusively and definitively characteristic of this potentiality: its immanent ending. To comprehend itself according to the potentiality which is most properly
SZ, pp. 266-267.
Möglichkeit der maßlosen Unmöglichkeit" (SZ, p. 262). Heidegger italicizes.
See p. 26z.
147

4'die
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its own will be the first condition of all "propriety" (Eigentlichkeit) in There-being, sc. all authenticity. This potentiality is
There-being's end (death), and if There-being in the process of
concern comprehends itself as immanently ending, this comprehension would reveal to There-being its de facto aberration in the
ontic, tearing it away from the forgotten-ness of its self. Thus an
authentic comprehension of the most proper potentiality of
There-being would reveal in concern not only itself (comprehension) but fallen-ness as well. 148
To comprehend its immanent ending as not only properly its
own but exclusively so is for There-being to comprehend that
the achieving of its authenticity is its own exclusive task, to be
brought-to-pass by its self alone, without the complicity of the
"World," or the collaboration of other There-beings. " . . . Therebeing can only then be authentically its self when through its self
it renders this possible. . . . " 1 4 9
Finally, that potentiality which is most proper and exclusive
to There-being is also an ultimate, definitive potentiality. In
authentic comprehension of its self, then, There-being would
comprehend that the " . . . ultimate potentiality of its existence
is to relinquish its self. . . . " 1 5 0 The There-being would reveal to
its self its potentiality for non-potentiality. If There-being comprehended that this is what it is, it would no longer flee from the
defin'tiveness of this end (death) but would accept it as constitutive f its finitude and t h u s " . . . render its self free for it. . . . " 1 6 1
This process of becoming free for its own end (death), for its
own ineradicable finitude, would liberate There-being from its
ontic perdition, to be sure, but the fundamental sense of such a
gesture is and remains an acquiescence to finitude. " . . . Free
for that potentiality which is properly its own, determined by
its limit, i.e. comprehended as limited. . . . , " 1 5 2 There-being
would be ready to accept "existence in its finitude." 1 5 3
SZ, pp. 263, 266.
" . . . Dasein kann nur dann eigentlich es selbst sein, wenn es sich von ihm selbst
her dazu e r m ö g l i c h t . . . ( S Z , p. 263). Heidegger's italics.
160 " . . . als äußerste Möglichkeit der Existenz bevorsteht, sich selbst aufzugeben
" (SZ, p. 264).
1 S 1 " . . . gibt sich frei für sie
" (SZ, p. 264). Heidegger's italics.
168 "...
Frei für die eigensten, vom Ende her bestimmten, d.h. als endliche verstandenen Möglichkeiten,..." (SZ, p. 264). Heidegger's italics.
16a
Existenz in ihre Endlichkeit" (SZ, p. 384).
148
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Yet in our efforts to determine the conditions necessary for
the achievement of authenticity in concern, we have spoken
only of two of its constituent elements: comprehension and (by
indirection) fallen -ness. What of that other component of disclosedness which is integrated into concern, sc. the ontological
disposition ? What type of ontological disposition would characterize the achievement of authenticity? Heidegger's answer:
anxiety.
We have already distinguished the about-which and the forwhich of anxiety, and added that in the process of concern the
about-which is Non-being and the for-which is There-being as
drive-towards-Being. In achieving authenticity, the Non-being
(Nichts) to occasion There-being's anxiety would be the Nonbeing of its own finitude. In other words: There-being is certain
of its own immanent ending, for this is disclosed to it in the
authentic comprehension of its self. Yet at the same time, the
death of There-being is always undetermined, for it does not
come-to-pass at a "when" that is determinately "known" but
is always immanent to a potentiality that is immanently ending.
Constantly immanent, There-being's end (death) is an abiding
menace. It is in the presence of this abiding menace that Therebeing experiences the uneasiness which we call anxiety before
its own internal limitation. " . . . In [anxiety] There-being finds
itself before the Non-being of the potential impotence of its
existence. . . . " 154 The for-which of There-being's anxiety would
again be its own potentiality, but determined in the present case
by its own inescapable finitude. Taken in its totality, the process
of anxiety would disclose by the way of affectivity the authentic
nature of There-being as concern-unto-end, as finite. That is
why " . . . Being-unto-death is essentially anxiety. . . . " 165
All of this Heidegger puts into a famous formula, but in
reading it one must keep clearly in mind the expressly existential
purpose of the research and the existential sense that Heidegger
has given to each of its terms:
. . . Advancing [in potentiality] reveals to There-being its submersion in
"people" and brings it primarily, without the support of the "World"
164 " . . . In ihr befindet sich das Dasein vor dem Nichts der möglichen Unmöglichkeit seiner Existenz
" (SZ, p. 266). Heidegger's italics.
148
.. Das Sein zum Tode ist wesenhaft Angst
" (SZ, p. 266).
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and other There-beings, before the potentiality to be its self. This self,
however, delivered from the illusions of "people/' is a passionate, selfassured, anxiety-tempered freedom unto death. 156

b. E X I S T E N T I E L L - That which we have just described is
what would be the ontological structure of authentic existence,
if There-being in its concern were to achieve its self properly.
Under what existentiell circumstances, however, will this cometo-pass? Heidegger's answer: when There-being listens to the
voice of conscience.157 How, then, is the phenomenon of
conscience to be understood ?
Certainly there is no question here of analysing a faculty of
the soul (understanding, will, feeling, etc.), or any of the popular
interpretations of the term. Nor are we interested in conscience
in the moral sense, although as a matter of fact the structure in
question renders a moral conscience possible. For Heidegger, the
existential conscience is that which in the state of everydayness
gives There-being to "understand" what it is and thus calls it to
authenticity. Insofar as it "gives to understand" it "lets-beseen," and therefore the call of conscience is a mode of logos. In
this call to authenticity, who is it that is called ? There-being in
its everydayness, lost in ontic dissipation. And whereunto?
Unto its authentic self, sc. unto its own proper potentiality. And
the call comes not with cry or sound - but in stillness and silence
out of There-being's interior wellspring.158
More precisely, however, who is it that calls? One cannot
simply say "There-being," for in that case, how would Therebeing as called differ from There-being as calling? Besides, the
call of conscience is not subject to the whims and moods of
There-being, hence it is marked by a certain imperiousness,
almost an altereity, which, however, does not come from another There-being but out of There-being's own depths.159 How
1 5 6 " . . . Das Vorlaufen enthüllt dem Dasein die Verlorenheit in das Man-selbst
und bringt es vor die Möglichkeit, auf die besorgende Fürsorge primär ungestützt,
es selbst zu sein, selbst aber m der leidenschaftlichen, von den Illusionen des Mau
gelösten, faktischen, ihrer selbst gewissen und sich ängstenden Freiheit zum Tode."
(SZ, p. 266). Heidegger italicizes. Never was he more a prisoner of the language of
metaphysics that he was trying to ground than here. If most of the early critics gave
an existentiell interpretation to SZ, was it completely their fault?
157 SZ, pp. 267-268.
158 SZ, pp. 271, 289-295 (die existenziale Interpretation des Gewissens), 272-273
(Ruf).
158 SZ, p. 275.
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is the apparent altereity of the caller to be understood ? Heidegger answers by recalling the analysis of anxiety. As an ontological disposition, it discloses to There-being both the Nonbeing of the World and its own drive-towards-Being, hence the
faLct that There-being in the ontic preoccupation of everydayness
is somehow an expatriate. The "World" of everydayness is not
its true abode. It is There-being as expatriate, claims Heidegger,
that calls the inauthentic There-being to its self: " . . . [the one
who calls] is There-being in its state of expatriation; the original,
thrown-forth to-be-in-the-World as home-less; the naked 'that'
in the Non-being of the World. . . . " 160 What wonder, then,
that to There-being lost in everydayness the call to return to the
homeland seems like the voice of a stranger ?
With this we achieve a certain clarity as to the structure of the
existential conscience. Who is the called? There-being, victim
of the consequences of fallen-ness. Whereunto is There-being
called? To There-being as authentic existence, sc. as the anticipatory drive-towards-Being by which it is its own potentiality.
Who is it that calls ? There-being in its sheer thrown-ness as disclosed by the disposition of anxiety. But existence, facticity
and fallen-ness are exactly the constituents of concern, so that
now " . . . conscience manifests itself as the call of concern. . . . " 1 6 1
Thus it is that the third of the existential components of the
disclosedness of the There, sc. logos, is incorporated now into
concern as the call of conscience. Through conscience, the unity
of There-being becomes complete.
But we must go further. What is it that this call of conscience
"gives [There-being] to understand" ? Experience and philosophy
are unanimous: somehow or other There-being's "guilt" (Schuld).
In determining the existential sense of guilt, the author analyses
various senses that the word can have and concludes that the
common denominator would be the notion of "lack" or
"absence" of what can and should be. In this sense, there can be
no guilt in There-being, which already is what it can-be, sc. it is
its own potentiality. However, more radically still there lies
1 6 0 " . . . Er ist das Dasein in seiner Unheimlichkeit, das ursprüngliche geworfene
In-der-Welt-sein als Un-zuhause, das nackte 'Daß' im Nichts der Welt
" (SZ, pp.
276-277).
161 " . . .
Das Gewissen offenbart sich als Ruf der S o r g e : . . ( S Z , p. 277)- Heidegger italicizes.
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within the idea of guilt somehow or other a "not" (Nicht), sc. a
limitation. Furthermore, in some cases, guilt implies the ground
for a "not" (lack) in another, as when a crime has been perpetrated. Heidegger fastens the existential notion of guilt, then,
thus: " . . . to be the ground for Being that is determined by a
not, i.e. to be the ground of a negativity. . . . " 162 If in There-being
there is the "ground for a negativity," sc. limitation, There-being
is in the existential sense guilty.
How often have we seen that There-being is determined by
a negativity. There-being is thrown, sc. it is not the origin of its
self, and it never overcomes its primitive helplessness. If its
essence is to exist, sc. if existence is the ground of the potentiality
that it is, then this existence as permanently thrown is permeated by the "not" of its origin. It never is and never becomes
master of itself but must continually take-over (Übernahme) its
self. If there is a "not" in its origin, then there is a "not" in its
achievement. Furthermore, if existence as its own ground is
permeated with negativity, so too is existence as project. All
project will also be tainted by a "not," for the project, too, is
thrown.
. . . This not belongs to the existential sense of thrown-ness. Being [its
own] ground, [There-being] is itself the negativity of itself. Negativity
. . . means a not that constitutes the Being of There-being [in virtue of]
163
its thrown-ness.
And it is this radical negativity, penetrating There-being to its
depths, which renders it possible to fall into the negativity which
constitutes inauthenticity. What more need be said to prove
t h a t " . . . There-being as such is guilty. . . . " ? 1 6 4 The guilt consists
in its finitude.
The "structural unity of the intrinsically finite transcendence
of There-being" (concern) consequently includes within it a
logos (conscience) that by a word uttered in silence gives the
everyday There-being to understand its finitude and at once
invites it to achieve its authentic self. The achievement of au1 , 2 " . . . Grundsein für ein durch ein Nicht bestimmtes Sein - d.h. Grundsein einer
Nichtigkeit...,"
(SZ, p. 283). Heidegger's italics. See pp. 281-283.
161 " . . .
Dieses Nicht gehört zum existenzialen Sinn der Geworfenheit. Grundseiend ist es selbst eine Nichtigkeit seiner selbst. Nichtigkeit bedeutet keineswegs
Nichtvorhandensein, Nichtbestehen, sondern meint ein Nicht, das dieses Sein des
Daseins, seine Geworfenheit, konstituiert
" (SZ, p. 284). Heidegger's italics.
" 4 " . . . Das Dasein ist als solches schuldig, . . . " (SZ, p. 285). Heidegger italicizes.

BEING

AND

TIME

83

thenticity for There-being is not, of course, a suppression of its
finitude. On the contrary. It consists simply in accepting its self
for what it is: a drive-towards-Being that is constitutionally
limited. For There-being to accept itself as such is to let itself
be called, to become free for the call, to attend to the voice
which tells it of its finitude. It is this "readiness to be called"
that constitutes There-being's choice of self.165
And in this choice is achieved authenticity. Such a choice
Heidegger will henceforth designate as "re-solve" (Entschlossenheit). But is it really a new phenomenon? It would be more
exact to call it a special mode of disclosedness of There-being.1««
It implies, after all, a comprehension, a disposition and a logos:
comprehension, because by re-solve There-being comprehends
itself as a drive-towards-Being that is thrown-forth-and-still-tobe-achieved; disposition, because by re-solve There-being becomes willing to accept the disposition corresponding to such a
comprehension, sc. anxiety, that uneasiness born of There-being's
discovery of its own expatriate condition; logos, because in resolve There-being attends in silence to a voice that speaks without
sound, and the attend-ing itself is a mode of logos that draws
out of the superficial loquacity of everydayness a deep resounding
word.
This modality can be called "new" only insofar as it comesto-pass as an existentiell comportment of There-being, which
lies somehow in There-being's power to choose or not to choose.
And even in the choosing, There-being is not delivered from the
referential dependence upon beings but only enjoys a transparency to itself as itself in its situation: a being plunged into
a determined context of potentialities (some bequeathed, some
imposed, some chosen) through which, nevertheless, it brings
to pass that transcendence unto Being which is proper to its
self. 167
c. E X I S T E N T I A L A N D E X I S T I E N T I E L L - What is authenticity for There-being? We have been given two answers:
to advance (Vorlaufen) in the comprehension of its own most
1 , 8 SZ, pp. 287-288 (Bereitschaft für das Angerufen werdenkönnen, Sichvorrufenlassen, Freiwerden, etc.).
1,6
SZ, pp. 295-297.
l 7
« SZ, p. 299.

IOO

FROM

THERE

TO

BEING

proper, exclusive, definitive potentiality, sc. its end (death); to
let itself be called to a comprehension of its self in all negativity.
Is there a discrepancy between the two ?
Let us think the notion of re-solve through "to the end." Here,
There-being by an existentiell comportment assumes its self in
all of its negativity as long as it ist sc. up to its very end. But the
end of There-being in the existential sense is always immanent
within it: There-being is Being-unto-end. So it is that re-solve
becomes completely itself when it comprehends There-being as
Being-unto-end. Re-solve, then, as an existentiell potentiality,
includes within itself the existential dimension of Being-untoend. There-being's guilt consists in the fact that its Being is
permeated by negativity, sc. limitation. There-being's death,
considered in the existential sense, consists in the immanent
potentiality for non-potentiality, sc. in the "absolute negativity of There-being." 1 6 8 Both formulae bespeak an essential
Non-Being (Nichts) in There-being that is disclosed in anxiety.
.. The Non-Being which anxiety discloses reveals the negativity which characterizes There-being in the ground [of its Being]
which is itself as thrown-ness unto death." 169 Re-solve, that,
ready to accept this anxiety, chooses to assume itself in all its
negativity, becomes inevitably "freedom unto death," for death
is the seal of its ineluctable finitude.
If there are two formulae for authenticity, then not only is
there no discrepancy between them but the two are correlative,
insofar as they express the same phenomenon in two dimensions:
in the existentiell dimension, authenticity consists in Therebeing's choice to achieve itself in its situation; this is structured
in the existential dimension by the comprehension of its self as
concern that is immanently unto-an-end. Briefly: There-being
comes to its achievement in authenticity, insofar as it permits
a strange uneasiness that steals upon it from time to time to
estrange it from the ontic distractions that fill its every day,
chooses to hearken to a voice that comes from within itself to
tell it that it can transcend these beings unto Being but can
never transcend its finitude.
SZ, p. 306 (schlecht hin n ige Nichtigkeit des Daseins).
" . . . Das Nichts, davor die Angst bringt, enthüllt die Nichtigkeit, die das
D;sein in seinem Grunde bestimmt, der selbst ist als Geworfenheit in den Tod/'
(SZ, p. 308). Heidegger's italics.
168
169
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TRANSCENDENCE

I. Temporality
We are endeavoring to construct a fundamental ontology by
discerning the ontological structure that renders possible the
natural propensity in every man to metaphysicize. Thus far we
have seen that this structure is the process of concern. But it is
only a partial answer, for one still may ask: what is the radical
sense of concern ? Only when this question is answered will the
analysis be complete.
Let us indicate more clearly what Heidegger understands by
the "sense" of a being. It is the comprehensibility (Verstehbarkeit) of this being, not as grasped by an explicit concept and
thematically understood, but as illumined by There-being,
which in its fundamental project comprehends this being as
that which it is, sc. in the Being-structure which makes the being
to be what it is. Briefly: the sense of any being is its Being,
insofar as this is comprehended by There-being. The question
we are posing, then, is this: if the Being of There-being is concern,
what is the Being - sc. the ultimate ground of possibility - of
concern? Heidegger answers: temporality (Zeitlichkeit).110
We reach here the most original element of Heidegger's
thought, and with it we begin to understand the title of the first
part of SZ: "The interpretation of There-being in terms of
temporality and the explanation of time as the transcendental
horizon of the question of Being." For if we can determine the
sense of Being as such only by first discerning the sense of the
Being of There-being, whose ultimate sense, however, is time,
then time becomes the horizon of the question of Being itself,
and the further problem of grounding metaphysics becomes not
so much the problem of Being (Sein) nor of time (Zeit) but of the
relation between them.
For Heidegger, this correlation of Being and time is not an
invention of his own but is seized vaguely and indeterminately
in that pre-conceptual comprehension of Being out of which
arises all metaphysics. Indices of this comprehension of Being
in the perspective of time may be culled from the philosophers
170

SZ, pp. 323-325. See p. 151.
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of antiquity. By way of example: how else explain the fact that
the Svrcos ov, sc. that being which is a being to the highest degree
possible, is the ael 6v, where ael implies a permanence and stability in time? Similarly ousia andrcapouerfa.Again, would not
T6 TI 7]V elvat, taken according to the letter, imply a dimension
of time? The task, then, for fundamental ontology is to thematize this correlation of Being and time that appears in our
spontaneous comprehension of Being and endeavor to see its
relationship to the problem of finite transcendence, so that
" . . . temporality becomes visible as the transcendental structure
of There-being as such." 1 7 1
For the popular mind, time is an indefinite series of "nows,"
where the "future" consists in the "nows" that have not yet
come but some day will be, the "past" consists of the "nows"
that once were but no longer are, and the "present" is the "now"
which at the moment "is." This conception, to be sure, has its
justification, which the author will not deny, but such is not the
temporality of There-being. For There-being is not a mere entity,
as such an interpretation would suppose, but, as transcendence,
it is in the midst of other beings essentially an anticipatory drivetowards-Being by reason of which it is its own potentiality, sc.
it already is what it can-be. Such a structure, when comprehended in its authenticity, implies a future, a past and a present,
but of a sort that is proper to There-being alone.
As drive-towards-Being, There-being is constantly coming to
Being, sc. to its self. This coming of There-being to its self, and
therefore of Being to There-being, is There-being's "coming,"
sc. its future (Zukunft). By reason of this coming (future), Therebeing comes to its self - but to a self that already is as havingbeen-thrown. The self that already is-as-having-been is Therebeing's past (Gewesenheit). Note the reciprocity between future
and past: There-being's coming is to a self that already is-ashaving-been to such an extent that its coming is a type of return;
on the other hand, There-being is what it has been only as long
as the future continues to come. How conceive the present?
Remember that There-being exists in two dimensions: ontic and
171
. . Daß im Da-sein als solchem die Zeitlichkeit als transzendentale Urstruktur sichtbar wird." (KM, p. 218). See KM, pp. 216-217. In the introduction to WM
(1949), time is called the "first name" (Vorname) of Being (WM, p. 17).
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ontological. It is engaged in commerce with other beings whose
Being it comprehends. By reason of the authentic comprehension
of its own transcendence, There-being renders possible the encounter with these beings as beings. It renders them present.
This rendering-present of beings is the authentic present (Gegenwart) of There-being.
So it is that, in the structure of There-being's transcendence,
existence consists in the coming (future) of Being to a self that
already is (past), rendering manifest the Being of beings with
which it is concerned (present). Such is the authentic situation
of There-being which re-solve discloses. " . . . This . . . unified
phenomenon we call temporality. . . . " 1 7 2 And it is only insofar
as There-being in its very Being is characterized by such a
temporality that authentic existence is rendered possible. It is
for this reason that " . . . temporality reveals itself as the sense
of authentic concern." 1 7 3
More precisely, concern consists in existentiality (the anticipatory drive-toward-Being), facticity (already-thrown-forthand-still-to-be-achieved), fallen-ness (referentially dependent
on and dragged toward other beings). All of these elements are
rendered possible by There-being's temporality: The anticipatory drive-toward-Being is grounded in the continued coming
of There-being to its self, so that the "primary sense [of existentiality] is the future." 1 7 4 On the other hand, the primary
existential sense of facticity lies in There-being's past, for the
"already" character of thrown-ness is rendered possible only
insofar as There-being has-been. And it is " . . . only because
concern is grounded in [There-being's] past [that] There-being
can exist as the thrown-forth being that it is. . . . " 1 7 5 Finally,
fallen-ness, too, has its sense in the present insofar as an au172 " . . .
Dies dergestalt als gewesend-gegenwärtigende Zukunft einheitliche
Phänomen nennen wir die Zeitlichkeit...."
(SZ, p. 326). See p. 325. Heidegger's
italics.
173 " . . .
Zeitlichkeit enthüllt sich als der Sinn der eigentlichen Sorge." (SZ, p.
326). Heidegger italicizes whole.
174 " . . .
Ihr primärer Sinn ist die Z u k u n f t . " (SZ, p. 327). Heidegger italicizes.
1 7 5 " . . . Nur weil Sorge in der Gewesenheit gründet, kann das Dasein als das geworfene Seiende, das es ist, e x i s t i e r e n . . . . " (SZ, p. 328}. The author distinguishes
clearly two types of " p a s t " : " P a s t " is that which has been and still is (Gewesenheit).
This is the existential sense of the past, sc. a past that xs-as-having-been (ich bin gewesen). Another sense of " p a s t " is that which has gone by (Vergangenheit), sc. that
which was once but no longer is. Hence the "former," "previous." Such is the past
of mere entities.
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thentic There-being presents, sc. renders possible the encounter
with, the beings of its ontic experience as beings. This renderingpresent of beings is interior to the coining of Being (future) to the
self that is (past). The present, then, is included in future and
past, whose reciprocity constitutes the unity of temporality.
Temporality is not a being so much as a process which temporalizes, its constituent moments not three parts so much as three
different directions in which this process comes-to-pass: a direction toward Being (existence), a direction of return toward
what-is-as-having-been (facticity), a direction out toward other
beings (fallen-ness). Temporality is, then, by reason of these
directions in which it comes-to-pass, essentially "outside itself/'
the exaTocTtxov. Each of these directions will be called an "ecstasis" of temporality, and temporality itself " . . . is not first of all
a being that goes out of itself, but its essence is the [process of]
temporalizing in the unity of the ecstases. . . . " 176
This unity of three ecstases in temporality, then, renders
possible the unity of concern. Concern, however, is the structural
unity of transcendence, sc. There-being as to-be-in-the-World.
With the There of There-being the World also is disclosed. Now
if the ultimate sense of concern is temporality, the World, too,
must find its ultimate explanation in terms of time. Precisely
how? Let us return for a moment to the notion of "ecstasis" as
a direction of There-being. Direction implies a term, or horizon,
toward which it is orientated. Each ecstasis (direction) of temporality, then, has its proper horizon and the unity of the ecstases
a unified horizon. The unified horizon of the triple ecstasis of
temporality is what Heidegger understands by the temporal
sense of the World: " . . . The existential-temporal condition of
possibility of the World lies in the fact that temporality, as an
ecstatic unity, has such a thing as a horizon. . . . " 177
The unity of three ecstases does not exclude, of course, a
differentiation among them. This in turn permits us to note a
certain ontological priority in the ecstasis of coming (future)
1 7 6 " . . . Sie ist nicht vordem ein Seiendes, das erst aus sich heraustritt, sondern
ihr Wesen ist Zeitigung in der Einheit der Ekstasen...." (SZ, p. 329). Heidegger's
italics.
1 7 7 " . . . Die existenzial-zeitliche Bedingung der Möglichkeit der Welt liegt darin,
daß die Zeitlichkeit als ekstatische Einheit so etwas wie einen Horizont hat. . . . "
(SZ, p. 365). Heidegger italicizes whole.
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over the other two, for it is the coming which precedes the self
that is and renders other beings present in their Being.
It is for this reason above all that temporality is essentially
finite. For the ecstasis of coming (future) renders possible that
constituent of concern which we have called the anticipatory
drive-towards-Being. This potentiality, however, is essentially
unto-an-end. " . . . It does not have an end at which it merely
ceases [to be], but it exists [as always] ending. . . . " 1 7 8 Consequently, the authentic future which primarily characterizes the
temporality which renders possible this potentiality " . . . r e veals itself, then, as itself finite. . . . " 1 7 9 And if this essential
finitude, sc. negativity, characterizes the temporality of Therebeing, must we not conclude that it permeates the World as its
horizon ?
At this, point, Heidegger proposes to repeat the entire existential analysis in the perspective of the newly thematized
notion of temporality. 180 Specifically, this will mean a reinterpretation of everydayness which will emphasize the temporal
dimension of the various aspects of the inauthenticity in which
There-being "first of all and for the most part" finds itself. We
may be dispensed from following the author through most of
these analyses but must pause for a remark of special importance.
Authentic comprehension is rendered possible by the ecstasis
of the future, sc. There-being as anticipatory drive-towardsBeing is continually coming to its self. Insofar as it comes to its
self, There-being in its own potentiality continually takes-over
its self (1Übernehmen), sc. assumes the self that already is. It
"fetches" (-holt) its self all over again (wieder-), and this refetching, or "re-trieve" (Wiederholung), is the achieving of Therebeing's authentic past, sc. of the self which already is-as-havingbeen. 181 On the contrary, if this re-trieve of the authentic self
176 " . . . Es hat nicht ein Ende, an dem es nur aufhört, sondern existiert
endlich.
. . . " (SZ, p. 329). Heidegger's italics.
179 " . . . enthüllt sich damit selbst als endliche
" (SZ, pp. 329-330). Heidegger's
italics.
»0 SZ, pp. 331-350.
181 SZ, pp. 336-339. "Re-trieve," derived from the French retrouver, seems more
faithful to the sense of Wiederholung than the possibly misleading "repetition,"
from the Latin repetere. The authentic past is for Heidegger not so much a "seeking"
as a "finding" again.
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does not come-to-pass, the result is an inauthentic past, characterized by the forgottenness of the true self. The implications of
this will appear as soon as we have considered the problem of
the historicity of There-being.
2. Historicity
Since There-being is ultimately a temporal being, it is essentially historical as well. 182 The analysis of the historicity (Geschichtlichkeit) of There-being, then, is no more than an explication and further elaboration of what is already implied in
the study of temporality. Our task will be simply to reexamine
the process of temporalizing and explain in what sense it constitutes There-being as historical. "Historical," however, connotes
in one way or another a reference to the past. 183 Our explicitation
of temporality as historicity, then, must elaborate more carefully
the full meaning of the self to which There-being comes as a
past which is a history.184
In re-solve, There-being comes to the self that is-as-havingbeen. Essentially a comprehending, this advance toward self is
not simply a theoretical speculation but a return toward self in
all the facticity of its There. This return is the assuming by
There-being of its self which already is as having-been-thrownamong-beings and as referentially dependent upon them. This self,
so determined, that There-being thus assumes is an authentic
"heritage" (Erbe).ls5 To assume is to "handover" (überliefern)
this heritage. The more authentically There-being in re-solve
consents to be what it is in all its finitude, the more profoundly
this heritage becomes its own in a "freely chosen discovery of
1 8 2 SZ, p. 376. In the following analyses, we translate: geschichtlich as "historical,"
Geschichtlichkeit as "historicity," Geschichte, as " h i s t o r y , " and Historie as "scientific
history" or " h i s t o r y as a science."
1 8 3 SZ, pp. 378-379, 381. Heidegger gives four senses that the popular mind gives
to " h i s t o r y " : that which refers to the past as such; that which has its origin in the
past and still is; the totality of beings which "in t i m e " change (vs. nature); whatever
is handed down b y tradition.
1 8 4 SZ, pp. 381, 387. For the author, the term "historical" is applied primarily to
There-being and only secondarily to those other non-There-beings which the historical
There-being uncovers within the world (p. 381). Hencc, a mediaeval castle is "historical" principally because of the There-being that no longer exists (p. 380), sc.
dagewesenes. Such beings are designated "World-historical" (Weltgeschichtliche)
(pp. 381, 388-389) in order to distinguish them from what is properly historical.
SZ, pp. 382-383-
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the potentiality of its existence" that is always immanently
ending.186 It is thus that There-being re-collects its self amid
the multiplicity of ontic distractions and achieves an existential
simplicity which Heidegger calls There-being's "fortune"
(Schicksal).187 The term merely transposes into terms of history
what is meant by re-solve.
In fortune, There-being hands over to its self its own heritage,
sc. the matter-of-fact drive-towards-Being that it already is. Its
comprehension of this heritage could remain implicit without
compromising its authenticity, but if it is made explicit, then
There-being expressly "finds" its potentiality "all over again,"
sc. re-trieves this potentiality. " . . . The re-trieve is the explicit
handing over [of the heritage], sc. There-being's return to potentialities that already have been explicitated. . . . " 188 This
re-trieve is not simply a bringing back of an event that has definitively gone by. Much rather is it a returning (erwidern) of a
potentiality that already has been exploited and is in the Therebeing that has-been.189
But it is not this re-trieve of its own potentiality that makes
There-being historical. On the contrary, it is only because
There-being, as temporal, is already historical that by retrieving its self it can assume its own history. Furthermore,
even though There-being's historicity, as its temporality, has
its origin in the future (There-being's coming to its self), still
the fact that this implies a retrieving of the potentiality and the
assumption of a heritage explains why an authentic interpretation of history must give a preponderance to the past. In
illuminating this past, however, the retrieve, as the explicit
handing over to its self of (part of) its heritage, plays a privileged
role. " . . . The re-trieve makes manifest for the first time to
There-being its own history. . . . " 190
SZ, p. 384 (das wählende Finden der Möglichkeit seiner Existenz).
SZ, p. 384. This translation of Schicksal is only provisional. Later we shall
translate as "commitment/' but this belongs to the context of Heidegger II, when
the corresponding Geschick has a sense which it does not have in SZ. The translation
"fortune" rests upon the Latin fortuna. We wish to avoid the lugubrious overtones
of "fate," and suggest by legitimate ambiguity that There-being's "fortune" lies in
the heritage it freely chooses.
188 "...
Die Wiederholung ist die ausdrückliche Überlieferung, das heißt der Rückgang in Möglichkeiten des dagewesenen Daseins
" (SZ, p. 385). Heidegger's italics.
«« SZ, p. 386.
190 " . . . Die Wiederholung macht dem Dasein seine eigene Geschichte erst offenbar.
. . . " (SZ, p. 386).
186
187
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What we have said so far pertains to There-being as an individual. Such a perspective, however, is necessarily incomplete,
for There-being is not just an isolated unit; its ontological
structure includes a with-being with others. Hence the comingto-pass, structured by historicity, is achieved with other Therebeings, all of which constitute a community or a people. This
coming-to-pass-with-other-There-beings as a community Heidegger calls "common fortune" (Geschick).191 Furthermore, the
historical There-being can not achieve its own individual authenticity apart from the community. The heritage which Therebeing assumes in authenticity, then, is not simply its individual
history but somehow the heritage of the entire people with which
it is. The process of re-trieve will include the renewal of potentialities of Being that concern all There-beings, and thus (an aspect
of) the history of the entire folk is made manifest. It is the
achieving of itself " . . . in and with its own 'generation' that
constitutes the full authentic coming-to-pass of There-being." 192
If these indications suggest more problems than they solve, the
reason is that the analysis of with-being in SZ remains truncated.
Their importance for the later Heidegger, however, should not
be underestimated, as will appear in the development which
follows.
Let us conclude all this with one word more about re-trieve.
We find several senses in which the term (Wiederholung) is
used: in a very general sense, where it scarcely differs from
"handing over the self to the self"; in a more precise sense where
it means the explicit handing-over by a There-being considered
either as isolated or as a member of its generation; in a sense
where the historian endeavors to re-trieve a potentiality-forBeing of a There-being that is gone, with such success that the
full force of Being comes upon him as if out of his own future. 193
We gain a clearer understanding of what Heidegger means by
re-trieve, however, if we consider how he puts it to work.
1 9 1 SZ, p. 384. Use of Geschick here gives us a point of comparison when we meet
the word in Heidegger II.
198 " . . . Das schicksalhafte Geschick des Daseins in und mit seiner 'Generation'
macht das volle, eigentliche Geschehen des Daseins aus." (SZ, pp. 384-385). See p.
386.
XM SZ, pp. 339 (übernehmen), 385-386 (ausdrückliche Überlieferung), 395 ("Kraft"
des Möglichen).

BEING

AND

TIME

93

The entire analysis of SZ, for example, is an attempt to retrieve the sense of Being by examining the antecedent comprehension of Being in There-being in an effort to discover the
source of its possibility. It is not simply a re-iteration of the
problem but a re-working of it, the developing of it as a problem.
By the re-trieving of a fundamental problem we understand the disclosure of its original potentialities that long have lain hidden. By the
elaboration of the potentialities, the problem is transformed and thus
for the first time in its intrinsic content is conserved. To conserve a
problem, however, means to retain free and awake all those interior
forces that render this problem in its fundamental essence possible.194
Such, indeed, was the effort of SZ. Such, too, is the purpose of
the Kant-interpretation, sc. to re-trieve in K R V the problem
of grounding metaphysics. 195 If a re-trieve, such as we find it in
KM, appears to do violence to the original, the reason is that,
more than a reiteration, it is a restoration and re-development
of the entire problematic in all of its original freshness. It is a
"thought-ful dialogue between thinkers." 1 9 6 But with this
phrase we jump more than twenty years of development in Heidegger up to 1950 and the preface to the second edition of KM.
Let it suffice to indicate that what appears as "thought-ful
dialogue" in the Heidegger of 1950 finds its roots in the existential analysis as re-trieve, by which the Being of There-being
becomes explicitly open with regard to the past to such an extent
that the full'force of Being strikes There-being as if coming out
of the future.

Ill.

General Remarks
A.

TRUTH

Before bringing to a close our discussion of SZ, two remarks
of a general nature will help us to see more clearly those per194 "Unter der Wiederholung eines Grundproblems verstehen wir die Erschließung
seiner ursprünglichen, bislang verborgenen Möglichkeiten, durch deren Ausarbeitung
es verwandelt und so erst in seinem Problemgehalt bewahrt wird. Ein Problem
bewahren heißt aber, es in denjenigen inneren Kräften frei und wach halten, die
es als Problem im Grund seines Wesens ermöglichen." (KM, p. 185). See KM, p. 216
and SZ, p. 3.
196 KM, pp. 15, 184. Since KM was intended as the first section of SZ II, which
ambitioned a "destruction" of metaphysics, we see that this meant only an effort at
retrieve. This is made explicit in SF (1955), p. 36. Cf. N, II, p. 4*5l M KM, pp. 5-6 (denkendes Gespräch zwischen Denkenden).
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spectives in the work that have a bearing on foundational
thought. The first remark concerns truth, and we content ourselves with only summary treatment, for the problem will soon
be thematized for itself. We wish simply to indicate how the
problem arises out of the existential analysis of There-being.
The process by which There-being transcends beings to Being
is also a coming-to-pass of truth. This will become clear, however, only insofar as we succeed in comprehending the relationship between Being and truth. That the relationship is
close appears in the fact that philosophy from the earliest days
has associated truth and Being, as, for example, Parmenides and
Aristotle testify. 197 Yet how should the relationship be described? How precisely is truth rooted in Being?
The traditional concept of truth gives us no satisfying answers.
This, of course, is not to deny its validity, but simply to say that
it presupposes a more fundamental truth from which it springs
as its source. For since Aristotle, according to Heidegger, philosophers have understood "truth" to mean a concordance between two mere entities (Vorhandene): intellectus et res. In
logical truth, this concordance is expressed in the judgement,
which therefore is the proper "place" of truth. 198 The question
we must ask, however, is: what is the full sense of this concordance ?
All concordance is relation between one being and another,
and, in the case of logical truth, this relation is of such a nature
that the judgement so expresses that which is judged as it in
itself is. What, however, is the guarantee of this "so . . . as" relationship of conformity? Is it not the discovery that what is
judged reveals itself as it is judged to be? Conformity of
judgement to judged, then, implies a self-revelation of the known
which the judgement discovers. A judgement is true, then, because it discovers the known in itself; it lets a being be seen in
its discoveredness. Truth lies in discovering.199
If truth lies in discovering, that which is most fundamentally
true is There-being itself, for "with existence . . . beings . . . in

SZ, pp. 212-213.
«8 SZ, p. 214 ("Ort").
SZ, p. 218.
197
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themselves, sc. as beings become manifest. . . . " 200 As for beings
other than There-being, they are true only in a secondary
sense.201 There-being is essentially a discovering because it is
transcendence. As transcendence, it is, phenomenologically
speaking, to-be-in-the-World, and its in-being consists in the
luminosity of There by reason of which the World is disclosed.
The disclosedness of the World, however, is what renders
possible the discovery of beings (instruments) which are encountered within the World. " . . . With and through [disclosedness], discovery is [made possible]. Consequently it is
only with the disclosedness of There-being that the original
phenomenon of truth is attained. . . . " 202
The consequences of this are enormous. To identify the disclosedness of There-being with the original phenomenon of transcendence is to transpose into terms of truth the entire analysis
of concern (structural unity of disclosedness), which, therefore,
is as much the coming-to-pass of truth as of finite transcendence.
The process of original truth, then, will be characterized by the
positivity of concern, inasmuch as this is transcendence. The
author expresses this by saying " . . . There-being is 'in the
truth' . . . , " 203 sc. in virtue of its anticipatory drive-towardsBeing, There-being is ontologically constituted as a projection
of the Being of beings.
But the process of truth will be characterized by the negativity
of concern as well. This negativity, we have seen, is its radical
finitude: the anticipatory drive-towards-Being is thrown-down
and fallen among beings upon which it referentially depends.
The result of this fallen-ness is that There-being "first of all and
for the most part" comprehends itself in terms of the "World"
of its ontic intercourse. Consequently, every projection of a
BOO "Mit der Existenz des Menschen . . . das Seiende . . . an ihm selbst, d.h. als
Seiendes offenbar wird. . .." (KM, p. 206). Heidegger's italics. See SZ, p. 220. The
transition from Satzwahrheit to Wahrheit des Daseins is more carefully articulated in
WW. Note, too, that the author's perspective is limited here to what he will call
"ontic" truth, the pre-predicative open-ness of beings (WG, p. 12), and does not pose
the question of another revelation more original still, the "revealment of Being"
(die Enthülltheit des Seins) (WG, p. 13).
201 SZ, pp. 220-221.
802 "...
Mit und durch sie ist Entdecktheit, daher wird erst mit der Erschlossenheit des Daseins das ursprünglichste Phänomen der Wahrheit erreicht
" (SZ, pp.
220-221). Heidegger's italics. Heidegger claims an ally in Aristotle (SZ, p. 226).
808 "...
Dasein ist 'in der Wahrheit'
" (SZf p. 221). Heidegger's italics.
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potentiality of There-being is, because of this finitude, perpetually out of focus. Every apprehension (etgreifen) is a misapprehension (vergreifen). Beings are discovered, to be sure, but
inadequately so, and slip back immediately into their previous
hidden-ness. To uncover (entdecken) is simultaneously to coverup (verdecken). To disclose (erschliessen) is at once to close-over
(verschliessen). This condition of inescapable, undulant obscurity Heidegger calls "un-truth." " . . . There-being, because
essentially falling [among beings], is, by reason of its constitution, in the 'un-truth\ . . 2 0 4 But the term should not be
understood to connote an ontic evaluation of There-being, nor
merely a characteristic of inauthentic everydayness. It is an
ontological characteristic that is the ineluctable consequence of
the fact that There-being's prerogative carries the seal of negativity. " . . . T h e full existential-ontological sense of the expression There-being is in the truth' says simultaneously
'There-being is in the un-truth'. . . . " 205 because transcendence
is finite.
The entire process of concern as the unity of disclosedness,
then, must be understood as the coming-to-pass of truth. If the
eminent mode of disclosedness is achieved in that free choice of
There-being to accept itself as a finite transcendence, which we
have called re-solve, then re-solve is the eminent mode of truth
- and eminently permeated by the negativity of truth, sc. untruth. For if, by re-solve, There-being accepts itself in all its
negativity, then it accepts itself as negatived truth. "... [Concern]
is simultaneously in truth and un-truth. This applies in the most
'authentic' sense to re-solve as authentic truth. [Re-solve] authentically makes this non-truth . . . its very own . . .," 206 sc.
accepts the inescapable finitude of existence.
Other consequences will follow upon the identification of
original truth with the disclosedness of There-being. Heidegger
204 " . . . Das Dasein ist, weil wesenhaft verfallend, seiner Seinsverfassung nach
in der 4 Unwahrheit'. .
(SZ, p. 222). Heidegger italicizes whole. Cf. p. 144 (ergreiftvergreift).
205 " . . .
Der volle existenzial-ontologische Sinn des Satzes: "Dasein ist in der
Wahrheit' sagt gleichurspriinglich mit: 'Dasein ist in der U n w a h r h e i t ' . . . . " (SZ,
p. 222).
206 " . . . Erschlossen in seinem 'Da', hält es sich gleichursprüngüch in der Wahrheit
und Unwahrheit. Das gilt 'eigentlich' gerade von der Entschlossenheit als der
eigentlichen Wahrheit. Sie eignet sich die Unwahrheit eigentlich zu
" (SZ, p. 298299}. See p. 297.
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concludes: " . . . There is' truth only insofar, and as long, as
There-being is. . . 207 Newton's laws, for example, were not
"true" before Newton discovered them. Nor were they for that
matter "false." They were simply undiscovered, and it was the
discovery by Newton that made them, in the existential sense,
true. This does not mean that the beings thus discovered had no
entity before the discovery, but only that the discovery made
them accessible to a There-being in their Being. What, then, of
"eternal truths"? One would have the right to speak of them,
according to Heidegger, only if one could first prove that for all
eternity There-being was and will be.208 Given the radical finitude of There-being (Being-unto-end), this is manifestly absurd.
However, to identify disclosedness and truth - is it not to
make all truth relative to There-being? About this Heidegger
leaves no doubt. But is not this the crudest kind of subjectivism?
Certainly it is - if There-being be a subject. .. .
B.

SUBJECTIVISM

There-being is not a "subject." There-being is transcendence!
To be sure, it is always a "human There-being." So close is the
correlation between There-being and man that the second of its
fundamental characteristics is its mine-ness, sc. it belongs to
someone who says "ego." But the first of its fundamental characteristics is existence, hence this ego is existential as well as existentiell. Our task in the existential analysis is to discern the
existential dimension of ego.209
The ego is a "self." As long as we remain on the ontic level,
this self appears as a principle of stable unity that abides amid
the change and multiplicity of experience. It is that which lies
at the basis of these experiences: it is referred to these experiences
and they to it. It is that which "lies under" the experiences: the
u7roxei(jievov, sub-jectum, subject. The traditional ontologies interpreted the Being of such a subject in terms of substance, which
207 " . . . Wahrheit «gibt es' nur, sofern und solange Dasein ist
" (SZ, p. 226).
Heidegger italicizes whole.
208 SZ, p. 227. Many of the critics have accused Heidegger of relativism. His conception is no more a relativism in the ordinary sense than it is a subjectivism (see
below). Yet it is not an absolutism either. The problem can be seen fully only later
when we discuss the "rigor" of foundational thought.
20® SZ, pp. II
4> 318.
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meant that they conceived the ego-subject as a mere entity. 210
In this, Kant differed not at all from Descartes. For both, the
ego was a conscious subject, whose entity as such was essentially
no different from the entity of other substances. So it was that
for Kant the term "existence" was applied indiscriminately to
consciousness and to things. The ego-subject was in relation (of
opposition) with its object as entity is in relation with another
entity. 211
But this is a purely ontic interpretation of the ego. The fact
is - and the existential analysis has proven it - that the human
There-being is not a mere entity like any other but enjoys a
prerogative that distinguishes it from all other beings, sc. its
comprehension of Being. " . . . The ontic excellence of Therebeing lies in the fact that it is ontological." 2 1 2 To interpret
There-being as an entity like any other is to forget that its essence
is existence.
To analyse this existence phenomenologically has been the
task of SZ. Specifically, the laborious analysis of There-being as
to-be-in-the-World exposed the nature of its transcendence. It is
this transcendence, which (ontologically) precedes all ontic
contact with beings, that renders the ontic encounter possible.
Take, for example, one type of ontic encounter which traditionally is interpreted in the terms of a relation between
subject and object, sc. knowledge (Erkennen). When we examine
the ontological conditions of knowledge, we discover that they
include a pre-cognitional intimacy of There-being with beings,
a dwelling among them and dealing with them, out of which
emerges the relationship of knowledge as a derivative and necessarily deficient mode.
. . . The process of knowing does not produce the initial "commerce" of
the [knowing] subject with a World, nor does it arise out of the influence
of the World upon a subject. This process is a mode of There-being that
218
has its foundation in to-be-in-the-World
in transcendence.
SZ, pp, 46, 89-90, 1x4.
SZ, pp. 203. See p. 42. Cf. WM, p. 14.
• i a " . . . Die ontische Auszeichnung des Daseins liegt darin, daß es ontologisch
ist." (SZ, p. 12). Heidegger's italics.
. , w . " " • • D a s Erkennen schafft aber weder allererst ein •commercium' des Subjekts
mit einer Welt, noch entsteht dieses aus einer Einwirkung der Welt auf ein Subjekt.
Erkennen ist ein im In-der-Welt-sein fundierter Modus des D a s e i n s . . ( S Z , pp.
62-63). Heidegger's italics. See pp. 60-63.
810
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As to-be-in-the-World, There-being is not simply a mere
entity, and for this reason, as long as we retain clearly in mind
its double dimension, can not be conceived as a subject opposed
to an object (v.g. the "World"). Nothing is closer to the center
of Heidegger's intuition than this. He repeats it in SZ almost
ad nauseam. The following is only a sample:
. .. [The "subjective" a priori of to-be-in-the-World] . . . has nothing to
do with a preliminary determination that is limited to a World-less
subject.214
. . . In-being is completely different from . . . a simultaneous opposition
of two entities, subject and object. . . . 2 1 8
Anxiety, in disclosing There-being as a distinct individual, does
not reveal it as an " . . . isolated subject-thing in the harmless
void of a World-less occurrence, . . . " but brings There-being
. . . before its World as World and thereby its self before its self as to-bein-the-World.216
The anticipatory drive-towards - Being does not signify any such
thing as an isolated tendency in a World-less "subject," but characterizes the to-be-in-the-WorId. . . . 2 1 7
. . . The bracketing of the totality of [instrumental] references . . . with
that which is There-being's concern does not signify the welding together of
one entity, a "World" of objects, with [another entity, sc.] a subject. . . . 2 1 8
. . . One does not "presuppose" too much for the ontology of There-being
but too little, if one "goes out" of a World-less ego in order to fashion for
it an object and a relationship (without ontological foundation) to this
object. . ..2™
2 1 4 " . . . Das Apriori def Ausgerichtetheit auf rechts und links gründet jedoch im
'subjektiven' Apriori des In-der-Welt-seins, das mit einer vorgängig auf ein weltloses
Subjekt beschränkten Bestimmtheit nichts zu tun hat." (SZ, p. ixo).
8lÄ " . . . Auch zeigte sich, daß das In-Sein alles andere ist als ein nur betrachtendes
oder handelndes Gegenüberstehen, d.h. Zusammenvorhandensein eines Subjekts
und eines O b j e k t s . . ( S Z , p. 176).
210 " . . .
Dieser existenziale 'Solipsismus' versetzt aber so wenig ein isoliertes
Subjektding in die harmlose Leere eines weltlosen Vorkommens, daß er das Dasein
gerade in einem extremen Sinne vor seine Welt als Welt und damit es selbst vor
sich selbst als In-der-Welt-sein bringt." (SZ, p. 188).
2 1 7 " . . . Das Sich-vorweg-sein bedeutet nicht so etwas wie eine isolierte Tendenz in
einem weltlosen 'Subjekt', sondern charakterisiert das In-der-Welt-sein
" (SZ,
p. 192).
818 " . . . Die Verklammerung des Verweisungsganzen, der mannigfaltigen Bezüge
des 'Um-zu', mit dem, worum es dem Dasein geht, bedeutet kein Zusammenschweißen
einer vorhandenen 'Welt' von Objekten mit einem Subjekt
" (SZ, p. 192).
119
.. Nicht zu viel, sondern xu wenig wird für die Ontologie des Daseins 'vorausgesetzt', wenn man von einem weltlosen Ich 'ausgeht', um ihm dann ein Objekt
und eine ontologisch grundlose Beziehung zu diesem zu verschaffen...." (SZ, p.
3*5-3i6). Heidegger's italics.
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If disclosedness, then, is not the position of an object by a
subject but the luminosity of transcendence, it will follow that
the discovery of an instrument is not an imposition of a signification as if " . . . a merely entitative World-stuff were in this
fashion 'subjectively colored'. . . . " 220 For the same reason, the
complex of relations which constitutes Total Meaningfulness is
" . . . not a network of forms which is superimposed upon a
matter by a subject that has no World. . . . " 221
As a consequence, when the author says that the "sense" of a
being is an existential characteristic of There-being, this, too,
must not be interpreted subjectively. It is because of Therebeing's constitutive familiarity with Total Meaningfulness that
There-being discovers the purposefulness of an inner-worldly
being. The being which is thus discovered by the Being of Therebeing " . . . has come to be comprehended - we say, it has
sense. . . . " 222 What is comprehended, strictly speaking, is not
the sense but the being itself as comprehensible. Sense is that
which " . . . in the comprehending disclosure is capable of being
articulated . . . " 223 by logos and therefore is the foundation
for words and speech. But neither sense nor words nor speech
is rooted in a being that is a mere subject. They are radicated
in transcendence. Briefly: to say that truth is essentially relative to There-being is not to make it subjective but simply to
affirm There-being's transcendence.
If the human There-being is not a subject, may it legitimately
be called a "self" ? Certainly, provided that one understand that
self and subject are not synonymous. The traditional concept
of a subject characterizes not the selfhood of the ego as a self,
but the identity and stability of a being that is always a mere
entity. Who is it, after all, that really says "ego" in the human
There-being? Is it not the entire phenomenon, existentiell and
existential? "In saying T,' There-being expresses itself as to-be220 " . . . als würde zunächst ein an sich vorhandener Weltstoff in dieser Weise
'subjektiv* gefärbt
" (SZ, p. 71).
221 "Die Bedeutsamkeitsbezüge, welche die Struktur der Welt bestimmen, sind
daher kein Netzwerk von Formen, das von einem weltlosen Subjekt einem Material
übergestülpt wird
" (SZ, p. 366).
222 " . . . Wenn innerweltliches Seiendes mit dem Sein des Daseins entdeckt, d.h.
zu Verständnis gekommen ist, sagen wir, es hat Sinn
" (SZ, p. 151). Heidegger's
italics.
223 " . . . Was im verstehenden Erschließen artikulierbar ist, nennen wir Sinn
M
(SZ, p. 151). See pp. 87, 161.
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in-the-World. . . . " 224 In everydayness, however, There-being
comprehends itself first of all and for the most part in terms of
its ontic preoccupations, forgetting the ontological dimension.
This is an inauthentic self. The self achieves authenticity by
re-solve, sc. in There-being's free choice to accept itself as finite
transcendence. The genuine sense of self, then, is not the stable
identity of a subject but the unity of concern.225 Taken in its
totality, There-being is not a subject, but it is a self - a nonsubjective, rather trans-subjective, or even pre-subjective self,
sc. transcendence.
This self, however, even in the moment of its authenticity,
always remains existentiell as well as existential. This is why
we may legitimately speak of it as a "subject," provided we
understand that this terminology is limited to the ontic level
and does not include the ontological perspective which constitutes the genuine primacy of There-being.226 But such a manner
of speaking has nothing to do with subjectivism, if this term be
understood to designate an interpretation that restricts itself
to the purely ontic dimension of There-being as a subject.
" . . . If 'subject' be conceived ontologically as existing Therebeing, whose Being is grounded in temporality, . . . " then the
term "subjective" has the same sense as "transcendent" and,
in this sense, the World, too, is "subjective." " . . . But then
this 'subjective' World, insofar as it is temporal-transcendent,
is more 'objective' than any possible 'object'." 227
Transcendence, then, is more subjective than any subject and
more objective than any object. There-being is not a subject in
relation to an object but it is this relation itself, sc. that which
is "between" subject and object. This "between" is not derived
from, and therefore subsequent to, the juxtaposition of subject
and object, but is prior to the emergence of this relation,
rendering it possible. The problem of transcendence, consequently, is not to explain how a subject goes out of itself in
*** "Im Ich-sagen spricht sich das Dasein als In-der-Welt-sein aus
" (SZ, p.
321. Heidegger italicizes whole. See p. 320.
818 SZ, pp. 321-323.
m
V.g. SZ, pp. n o , I i i , 227, 229, 382.
817 "Wenn das 'Subjekt* ontologisch als existierendes Dasein begriffen wird,
dessen Sein in der Zeitlichkeit gründet, dann muß gesagt werden: Welt ist 'subjektiv*. Diese 'subjektive' Welt aber ist dann als zeitlich-transzendente 'objektiver' als
jedes mögliche 'Objekt*.»» (SZ, p. 366).
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order to establish contact with an object, where object, understood as the totality of objects, is identified with the world,but
how it comes-to-pass that There-being as to-be-in-the-World
encounters other beings and then, once having discovered them,
constitutes them as objects. 228
One consequence of the pre-subjective character of Therebeing as to-be-in-the-World is worthy of special note: the
"critical" (erkenntnistheoretische) problem, so gravely posed by
the Neo-Kantians, dissolves. By critical problem we understand
the following: how does a knowing subject in the process of
knowledge get out of its own interiority in order to establish
contact with an object (or the "World") exterior to itself and
held to be real? According to the solution of the problem, philosophical systems have been classified as "realist" or "idealist-"
If the problem dissolves, then the complete apparatus of the
realism-idealism dichotomy disappears.229
The entire problem, however, supposes that the knowing
subject is merely an entity enclosed within itself that must go
outside of itself in order to encounter another entity, or the
totality of entities (the "real World"), in an act of knowledge.
What, after all, is "reality" but the Being of inner-worldly
beings (res) conceived as mere entities? But this passage from
"inside" to "outside" is precisely what transcendence denies.
There-being is always "outside" in intimate contact with beings
because it is to-be-in-the-World. At the same time, this "outside" as to-be-in-the-World constitutes the "inside" of Therebeing, for such is the nature of the self. To pose the question
about a passage from an " inside" to an "outside" is to have
failed to comprehend the first datum of the existential analysis:
There-being is to-be-in-the-World.
The question whether or not there is a World at all, and whether or not
its Being can be proven, is for a There-being that poses it as a to-be-in-theWorld - and who else poses it? - without sense. .. . 2 3 0
228 SZ, pp. 132, 366. Heidegger discusses frequently the emergence of the subjectobject relation out of original transcendence, but we are forced to omit detailed discussion. See pp. 59-62, 148-160, 223-225. For the existential structure of the scientific attitude, see pp. 356-364.
229 SZ, pp. 202-208.
230
Frage, ob überhaupt eine Welt sei, und ob deren Sein bewiesen werden
könne, ist als Frage, die das Dasein als In-der-Welt-seiu stellt - und wer anders sollte
sie stellen? - ohne Sinn. . . . " (SZ, p. 202). Heidegger's italics. See pp. 209 (Realität:
res), 203, 205 (Skandal der Philosophie).
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The "scandal" of philosophy, which for Kant was the fact that
no compelling proof for the "existence of things outside us" had
hitherto been proposed, is for Heidegger the fact that such a
proof is expected and sought.
. Neither realist nor idealist, There-being, as existence, is
characterized by theses that are proper to both these tendencies.
With realism, the existential analysis affirms the "reality" of
inner-worldly beings other than There-being; with idealism, the
principle that Being cannot be explained by beings but only
through what idealism calls consciousness but which Heidegger
calls the comprehension of Being. The existential analysis, however, allies itself with neither tendency. It differs from realism
insofar as it denies the necessity and possibility of proving the
reality of the "World." It differs from idealism insofar as this
fails to pose the question about the Being of consciousness
itself. 231

Resume
We have made our laborious way through SZ. Let us climb
upon high ground and see how far we have come. We propose
to trace the development of the notion of foundational thought.
How much of this concept have we seen so far? Very little
indeed. The term "to think" occurs but rarely in SZ and then
only in a classical sense that does not call attention to itself. Yet
all that we have seen has not been waste. Piecing it together in
retrospect, we may state the matter thus:
Heidegger's purpose is to lay the groundwork for metaphysics
by seeking to discern that ontological structure of man which
is the source of his natural tendency to metaphysicize. Since
metaphysics deals with Being structures and the metaphysician
is intrinsically finite, the problem becomes an effort to explain
the relation between Being and finitude. Solution: the comprehension of Being as such is intrinsically finite. The function of
SZ is to discern phenomenologically this finite comprehension
of Being and reveal its ultimate sense. This finite comprehension
is the transcendence of beings to Being, not an entity enclosed
SZ, p. 207.
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within itself but essentially an open-ness towards Being which is
a process that comes-to-pass. Phenomenologically speaking, this
process of transcendence is to-be-in-the-World, where -World
is the horizon, projected by There-being, within which Therebeing "dwells" and encounters other beings, and to-be-in-means
the point, or moment, when this World becomes luminous, insofar
as There-being, in virtue of existence (comprehension), renders
manifest the Being of beings. So intimate is this correlation between the World (Being) and the There-being, which is its illumination, that only insofar as There-being is "is there" Being.
This luminosity of the World is constituted by a finite component of positivity (comprehension), which discloses Therebeing precisely as transcendence, and a component of negativity
(disposition), which discloses this transcendence precisely as
finite. Both are rendered capable of coming to expression by a
third component, logos. Considered in its unity, the coming-topass of the luminosity of the World is concern; considered in its
totality, it is concern-unto-end, sc. immanently ending, therefore intrinsically and insuperably finite. If There-being is "first
of all and for the most part" lost amid its ontic preoccupations
and forgetful of its prerogative of luminosity, this is but another
mark of its finitude. One function of logos is to remind Therebeing of what it is and thus call it to the re-collection of its self.
When There-being chooses to hearken to this voiceless admonition in the phenomenon of re-solve, it becomes transparent to
its self in its situation and thus achieves its authenticity as the
finite luminosity of the World. The coming-to-pass of luminosity
(transcendence) is grounded in the fact that There-being continually comes (future) to the self that already is (past) and thus
renders present (present) beings in their Being. What renders
transcendence possible, then, is time; the process itself, because
temporal, is historical. There-being's achievement of the authentic self will include an effort to render manifest (i.e. luminous)
its past by the re-trieve of potentialities for Being that already
have been exploited.
This coming-to-pass of luminosity is also the process of truth.
Re-solve, as the achievement of authenticity, is the eminent
mode of truth, though conditioned, of course, by the finitude
and historicity of the process itself. And this finite, historical
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attend-ing to logos by which truth is achieved in its most eminent form remains a being that is not a subject which must
transcend itself toward "World"-as-object, but which is a nonsubjective, trans-subjective, pre-subjective self.
What then of foundational thought? All that we can say
about it now is what we infer from watching Heidegger at work.
He makes a phenomenological analysis of There-being. To be
sure, it is a phenomenology of a special sort, for in discerning the
sense of There-being, There-being itself is engaged. Hence, if we
consider in all its purity this hermeneutic interpretation by
There-being of its self, we may say that phenomenology comes
to its fullness when There-being achieves its authenticity. The
phenomenology of SZ, then, culminates in the moment of resolve. This does not tell us very much, one will say, but for the
present we cannot go any farther.

CHAPTER

II

K A N T A N D T H E P R O B L E M OF

METAPHYSICS

If the closing section of KM is the best propaedeutic to SZ,
the rest of the book is the most authoritative interpretation of
the major work. We wish now to examine it as such, and for
several reasons. To begin with, since the author sees his own
effort as merely a re-trieve of Kant's fundamental problematic,
sc. the grounding of metaphysics, we find in KM the basic conception of There-being, which was elaborated phenomenologically in SZ, articulated in the more familiar context of
Kant's thought according to a language that is more classical
and (for most of us) more intelligible. This permits us not only
to understand better what Heidegger is trying to say but also
to see how we might incorporate his intuitions into other more
traditional forms. We feel that this in itself justifies the length
of the r6sum£, which hitherto has not appeared in English.
A second reason for the extensive treatment of KM lies in the
fact that it is the classic type of what Heidegger I (1929) calls
"re-trieve" and what Heidegger II (1950) calls "dialogue," one
of the principal modes of foundational thought. 1 Conceived and
executed by Heidegger in the height of his powers, the interpretation lets us see his method in sharpest focus and find in it at
the same time both its weakness and its strength. Unless we
watch him go through the process at least once, we might be
tempted to think that the "rigor" (Strenge) of which he will
speak later is either platitude or sham. "Yes, yes, of course,"
1

KM, p. 8. Cf. p. 185.
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one might very well say, "but what does it mean in the concrete ?"
This is what it means in the concrete:

I. Kant and Finite Transcendence
Kant's attempt to lay the foundation for metaphysics became, as we have seen, an effort to determine the nature of the
ontological synthesis of the human mind, sc. that pre-ontic
comprehension of Being-structure which renders it possible for
a finite reason to know the beings of experience.2 As a type of
knowledge, the ontological synthesis is primarily an intuition
(Anschauung) - this characterizes all knowledge, even the divine
- where intuition is understood to mean the immediate presentation of the individual being itself that is to be known.3 Yet in
the case of the human mind, intuition alone does not suffice for
an act of knowledge. A being is properly said to be known only
when the knower can make it intelligible (in what it is and how
it is) to himself and others. Hence, it must be determined to be
such and such. This process of determining (Bestimmen) the intuitively presented being is itself a presenting of this being in
what it is "in general" - not in the sense that its universal
character as such becomes thematic, but simply in the sense
that, with the universal character in view, the knower adverts
to the individual and determines it accordingly. This universalizing representation, which comes to the service of the singular
intuition, is more presentative than the latter, in the sense that
it seizes several individuals at once, and in virtue of this seizure is a
concept that "avails for many." Kant calls this universalized
presentation "presenting in concepts," so that it becomes a
"presentation [concept] of a presentation [intuition]." This
presentative determination of the being-to-be-known is a
judgement, and it is brought-to-pass by that power of judging
which Kant calls the "understanding" (Verstand). The process
of universalizing presentation is what Kant understands by
"thought" (Denken).*
2

KM, pp. 20, 22.
KM, pp. 2 8 - 3 1 .
KM. pp. 30, 33—34. One is justified in translating verständlich as "intelligible"
here where in SZ one would have to say "comprehensible." In KM, there is question
only of the comportment between beings and man's intelligence (Vernunft).
3

4
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The process of human knowledge, then, involves the intimate
correlation of (singular) intuition and (universalizing) thought.
But it is of cardinal importance to realize (and Heidegger insists
upon it) that the primacy in the process of knowing belongs to
intuition: thought plays a subordinate role - it is a means to
intuition. Profoundly diverse (as singular is diverse from universal), intuition and thought must nevertheless share a common
bond which renders their correlation possible. This common
denominator is the fact that both are a presentation (VorStellung).5 A presentation, however, at least as it is understood here,
is more than simply an act which indicates or announces another being. In this case, the act is accompanied by the consciousness of the knower, hence the knower is aware of the presented
being as presented, with the result that the presentation of
which there is question here is " . . . the self-orientation [of the
knower] toward a being that is proposed to him in the act itself
of presentation. . . . " 6 The act of knowing, then, composed as it
is of two forms of presentation (intuition and thought) is itself
a presentation of the being-to-be-known, and the purpose of
Heidegger's research is to determine what conditions render
possible the correlation (synthesis) of the two types of presentation in man (intuition and thought) in the unified process of
presentation called "knowledge."
But we have not yet all the data of the problem. The task is
to explain the act of human knowledge not merely as knowledge,
but as human, sc. finite. In what does the finitude of human
knowledge consist? Stated negatively, this means that the
knower does not create the object known. More positively, let
us consider the finitude of the two principal components of
knowledge. Intuition as finite is referred to its object as already
* KM, pp. 2 9 - 3 0 . How best translate Vorstellung? The German would admit
either "presentation" or "representation." Neither one satisfies all contexts. Kant
himself suggests "representation" (KRV, A 320, B 376), but this risks being interpreted as Signum quod, and this is certainly not his intention. Besides, "presentation"
is less incongruous with regard to the knowledge of an infinite Knower. We incline
toward the latter and wil] use the former only where the context favors it, writing it
(re)presentation. Later (1942-43), Heidegger suggests the nuance: re-presentation
connotes presentation (by the subject) to the subject (HW, p. 121).
6 " . . . Wird nun gar im Vorstellen von etwas durch etwas nicht nur das Vorstellen, sondern das in diesem Vorstellen Vorgestellte als ein solches vorgestellt, d.h.
'bewußt', dann ist solches Vorstellen ein Sichbeziehen auf das, was im Vorstellen als
solchem sich d a r s t e l l t . . ( K M , p. 29). Henceforth we translate sichbeziehen auf
as "orientation," understanding always "self-orientation."
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existing prior to the act of intuition.7 It must be affected by the
object; it must permit the object to give itself to the intuiting
knower. " . . . The characteristic of the finitude of intuition lies
consequently in its receptivity. . . . " 8 It will follow that the
human knower must be equipped with those instruments that
render it possible for him to be affected by the objects-to-beknown, sc. the senses. Hence, it is not true to say that human
intuition is finite because it takes place through a structure of
sensation, but rather that it has a structure of sensation because
it is finite. " . . . The essence of sensate-ness consists in the finitude of intuition. . . . " 9
But if the intuition-constituent of knowledge is finite, the
thought-constituent is even more so. In the first place, thought
(universalizing judgements) attains its object only through the
mediation of intuition to which it is itself subordinate, if the
process of knowledge is considered as a whole. Furthermore, the
representation that takes place in thought implies a certain
detour, sc. a view toward that universal character by reason of
which several individuals may be presented by a concept. The
need to universalize (Diskursivität) pertains to the very essence
of the understanding and is the surest sign of its finitude. At the
same time, one must concede that this universalizing character
of the understanding is marked by a productive power that the
purely receptive intuition cannot claim. Not, of course, that the
universalizing judgement creates the universality of its object:
the content of universality is fashioned out of the data of inKM, p. 32 (intuitus
derivatives).
" . . . Der Charakter der Endlichkeit der Anschauung liegt demnach in der
Rezeptivität
" (KM, p. 32). In WG (p. 27), Heidegger adds an illuminating remark, more valuable for us in what it indicates about himself than about Kant. In
the Christian era prior to Kant, the finitude of beings, Heidegger claims, was conceived always (ontic fashion) in terms of the fact that they are created by God.
Kant, however, introduces a new notion of finitude: beings are finite in terms of the
fact that they are the possible object of finite knowledge, one that must permit these
beings to offer themselves (receptivity).
• " . . . Das Wesen der Sinnlichkeit besteht in der Endlichkeit der Anschauung.
• . . " (KM, p. 32). Literally, Sinn means "sense"; "sinnlich" means "sensible,"
"sensual" or "sensitive"; Sinnlichkeit would be the abstract noun(s) derived from
these three respective translations. All of these words are heavily laden with overtones
in English which render them undesirable in translation. For the Heideggerean Kant,
the essential is to understand that the senses are instruments of reception; receptivity is a consequence (and token) of finitude. To suggest this, we introduce a term
uncommon in English, which has, however, its warrant: "sens-ate," to translate
sinnlich, and "sensate-ness" to translate Sinnlichkeit.
7

8
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tuition. What is produced by the understanding is the manner
in which this content is rendered a unity that is valid for more
than one individual. Such is the manner of representation that
is proper to thought and the characteristic way in which it
contributes to the total process of knowledge. This productive
power of the understanding has been designated, though not
perhaps very happily, by the term "spontaneity." 10
Human knowledge, then, is composed simultaneously of both
singular intuition and generalizing thought, and in both these
components, still more in their synthesis, is profoundly finite.
Heidegger now approaches the problem of finitude from an
entirely different (though not unrelated) point of view: not, as
heretofore, under the aspect of the structure of the knowing
process, but under the aspect of that which can be known.
What can a finite knower know ? If it be granted that a fundamental consequence of finitude is the receptive character of intuition, then the finite knower can know only a being that reveals
itself as a being-that-appears (Erscheinendes).11 It is that which
we commonly call the "object" (Gegenstand) of human knowledge,
sc. that being which stands over and opposed to the knower,
toward which the knower is ordered, and which the knower, in
undergoing its influence, permits to reveal itself and thus appear. This is what the finite knower knows, then: beings-as-theyappear, sc. beings-that-are-opposed-to-him (objects).12
The important point here, however, is that all this pertains
only to finite knowledge. Neither the term "being-as-it-appears"
nor "object" has any meaning if the knower is non-finite (infi10 KM, p. 35. The foregoing analysis seems to correspond to what the mediaeval
thinkers meant by calling the universal idea ens rationis cum fundamento in re.
1 1 Translation problem: how best translate Erscheinung,
Schein,
phenomena,
noumenon, etc., preserving on the one hand a respect for the complexity of the problematic as seen by the classic commentators and on the other a rigid fidelity to
Heidegger's interpretation? Insisting that we are following Heidegger's reading of
Kant, we translate: Erscheinendes, Erscheinung as the "being-(to-be-known)-as-itappears" (to a finite knower), understanding this in the sense explained SZ, p. 28
(das Sich-an-ihm-selbst-zeigende); Schein as "being-as-it-seems-to-be" (cf. SZ, p.
28:
. . dass Seiendes sich als das zeigt, was an ihm selbst nicht ist. In diesem Sichzeigen 'sieht1 das Seiende 'so aus wie...'.").
1 1 "Object," from the Latin objectum, means literally "that which is thrown in the
way of" and does not retain completely the nuances of the German Gegenstand,
sc. "that which stands over and opposed to" (a knower). (See SG, pp. 139-140). If
we want a one-word translation, there seems no alternative to "object." To avoid
confusion, we must content ourselves with the circumlocution: "the being-(to-beknown-) opposed (-to the knower)."
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nite). For both imply an opposition, a distance between knower
and known which the notion of infinity excludes. The intuition
of the infinite knower, then, does not receive the self-revelation
of the being-to-be-known that thereby stands in opposition to
this knower, but rather this infinite intuition itself gives rise to
the being-to-be-known, lets it come into being, creates it. The
being-that-is-known, then, is manifest to the infinite knower as
such and in itself (an sich), not as opposed to this knower but as
taking-its-origin in Him (Entstand).13
It is in such a perspective as this that the author interprets
the famous distinction between "the thing in itself" (Ding an
sich) and its "appearance" (Erscheinung).
. .. The double characteristic of a being as a "thing in itself1' and as
"appearance*' corresponds to the two-fold manner in which this being
can stand in relationship to infinite and finite knowledge: the being as
taking its origin and the same being as an object.14
One and the same being! " . . . The thing-in-itself is not another
object but another [kind of] relationship (respectus) of a presentation to one and the same object15
If, then, Kant speaks
of the "thing-in-itself" as "behind the appearance," the sense is
this: finite knowledge not only permits the object to manifest
itself, but simultaneously and necessarily (because finite) conceals it, too, and this so profoundly, that the "thing-in-itself" is
not only seized imperfectly but as such is essentially inaccessible.
What is "behind the appearance," then, is the same being as the
being-as-it-appears. But because the being-as-it-appears presents
itself only as an object, " . . . it fundamentally does not permit
itself, the same being, to be seen as taking-its-origin. . . . " 1 8
Again, to say that the human knower can know only a "mere
appearance" is not in any way to impugn the actuality of the
being in question but simply to deny with insistence that a
KM, p. 36.
" . . . Die doppelte Charakteristik des Seienden als 'Ding an sich* und als
'Erscheinung* entspricht der zweifachen Art, gemäß der es zum unendlichen und
endlichen Erkennen in Beziehung stehen kann: das Seiende im Entstand und dasselbe Seiende als Gegenstand." (KM, p. 37).
1 5 " . . . Das Ding an sich ist nicht ein anderes Objekt, sondern eine andere Beziehung (respectus) der Vorstellung auf dasselbe Objekt." (Kants Opus postumum,
dargestellt und beurteilt v. E. Adickes. 1920. S. 653 (0551), cited with Heidegger's
italics, KM, p. 37).
1 6 " . . . Aber weil [die Erscheinung] das Seiende nur im Gegenstand gibt, läßt sie
es, dasselbe, grundsätzlich nicht als Ent-stand sehen
" (KM, p. 38).
13

14
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being grasped by a finite knower can ever be known in an infinite way. In this same perspective, we can understand the
double sense in which a being-to-be-known is said to be "outside"
of us: as being-in-itself, it is outside of us insofar as that which
can be known only by an infinite Knower is as such inaccessible
to a finite knower; in the sense of being-as-it-appears, it is
outside of us in the same sense that the being-to-be-known is not
the finite knower himself, although the knower has an access to
this being. It is indeed this access of a finite knower to the
objects of his knowledge, or rather the conditions that render
this access possible, which are the theme of our (sc. both Heidegger's and Kant's) research.
Perhaps all this will seem an excess of detail, but it serves a
purpose. This will appear, if we be permitted to interrupt the
analysis to make two remarks. The first concerns the general
sense of the problem. Springing out of the radical finitude of the
knower, the problem supposes that the beings which are known
are not and cannot be the result of his own creative activity.
" . . . Our There-being is a finite one - existing already in the
midst of beings and ordered to them. . . . " 17 Whatever must be
said about the constructive character of ontological knowledge,
it is never creative of the beings-to-be-known themselves.
" . . . Our knowing is not ontically creative, it cannot of its own
power produce the being that lies before it. . . . " 18 The whole
problem is the accessibility of these beings to a knower in his
finitude. If beings-as-they-appear and beings-as-opposed (objects)
mean fundamentally the same thing, the reason is that they are
variant formulae for: beings-other-than-and-accessible-to-thefinite-knower. That structure in the knower which renders it
possible for these beings other than himself to be accessible (to
reveal themselves) to him will simultaneously render it possible
for the beings to appear, and, indeed, as objects. It will let them
take up their stand as opposed to the knower, hence it will
objectivate them (<Gegenstehenlassen); indeed, it will constitute
that which makes them to be objects, their objectiveness (Gegen17 " . . . weil unser Dasein ein endliches ist - inmitten des schon Seienden existierend, an dieses ausgeliefert - . . . " (KM, p. 32). Heideggerean formulation for
Kantian thesis.
18 " . . .
Unser Erkennen ist nicht ontisch schöpferisch, es vermag das Seiende
nicht aus sich heraus vor sich hinzustellen
" (KM, p. 71).
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ständlichkeit). But it will not create them. If the actual access
of knower-to-known be called "experience" (Erfahrung), then
we can see a preliminary sense that may be given the famous
formula: " . . . that which renders possible experience as such is
simultaneously that which renders possible the objects of experience, . . . " 19 sc. what renders access to beings possible (therefore accessibility) is that which renders it possible for these beings
to reveal themselves as objects. But such a formula takes us far
beyond our present depth. Indeed, it expresses "the most
inwardly unified structure of transcendence. . . . " 20
The second remark concerns transcendence: " . . . that which
makes a being in itself accessible to a finite [knower]. . . . " 2 1
The problem of accessibility, then, is the problem of transcendence. The term as such is not Kantian but finds its justification in Kant's use of "transcendental": " . . . I call that
knowledge transcendental which concerns itself in general not
so much with objects as with our manner of knowing objects, insofar as this must be a priori possible. . . . " 22 Transcendence here,
then, is not simply the passage of knower (subject) to known
(object), as if it were simply an ontic comportment between two
beings, but that structure of the knower by reason of which
such a comportment is possible. Transcendence and ontological
knowledge are identical: " . . . ontological knowledge is nothing
else but the original institution of transcendence. . . . " 23 Consequently, to approach the problem of ontological knowledge
through the pure synthesis (of pure intuition and pure thought)
18 " . . . die Bedingungen der Möglichkeit
der Erfahrung überhaupt sind zugleich
Bedingungen der Möglichkeit der Gegenstände der Erfahrung,..(KRV,
A 158, B
197). Kant's italics. See KM, p. i n .
20 " . . . der Ausdruck der ursprünglichsten phänomenologischen Erkenntnis der
innersten einheitlichen Struktur der Transzendenz
" (KM, pp. 111-X12).
21 " . . . Transzendenz macht einem endlichen Wesen das Seiende an ihm selbst
zugänglich
" (KM, p. xxi).
82 " . . .
Ich nenne alle Erkenntnis transzendental, die sich nicht sowohl mit
Gegenständen, sondern mit unserer Erkenntnisart von Gegenständen, insofern diese
a priori möglich sein soll, überhaupt beschäftigt
" (KRV, B 25). Kant's italics.
See KM, p. 24. Kant also uses the term transzendent (vs. immanent), usually in a
pejorative way to designate a type of knowledge (Begriffe und Grundsätze) that
would pass beyond experience to something incapable of being experienced (Unerfahrbares), therefore to something completely supra-sensible, v.g. God. It is impossible to the pure reason, not however to the practical reason. See R. Eisler, Kant
Lexikon (Berlin: E. S. Mittler und Sohn, 1930), p. 557.
18 " . . . Wenn aber die ontologisohe Erkenntnis nichts anderes ist als die ursprüngliche Bildung der Transzendenz,..." (KM, p. 107).
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is to face the problem of transcendence, sc. the rendering accessible to the knower of beings-to-be-known. And vice versa,
the problem of accessibility cannot be solved without explaining
the pure synthesis. To solve one of the problems is to solve both.
Both may be reduced to a single one: the nature of what SZ
called the pre-ontic comprehension of Being. 24
Before following Heidegger through Kant's solution of the
problem, let us see here in closer detail what the problem implies. For a clear, concise statement of it, one would be hard
pressed to improve on the author's own formulation:
A finite knowing essence can enter into comportment with a being other
than itself which it has not created, only when this already existing being
is in itself such that it can come to the encounter. However, in order that
such a being as it is can come to an encounter [with a knower], it must
be "known" already by an antecedent knowledge simply as a being, sc.
with regard to its Being-structure. . . . A finite [knower] needs [a] fundamental power of orientation which permits this being to stand over in
opposition to it. In this original orientation, the finite [knower] extends
before himself an open domain within which something can "correspond"
to him. To dwell from the beginning in such a domain, to institute it in
its origin, is nothing else than the transcendence which characterizes all
finite comportment with beings. . . . 2 5
Transcendence, then, is fundamentally the construction in its
very origins by the finite knower of an open domain within
which other beings can be encountered. At other times, it is
called a "horizon of objectiveness," or of "objects," sc. within
which beings may reveal themselves as objects, which must be
from the very beginning open. 26
But a horizon of objectiveness as such implies that this anteKM, pp. 24, 128. See p. 70.
"Ein endlich erkennendes Wesen vermag sich zum Seienden, das es selbst nicht
ist und das es auch nicht geschaffen hat, nur dann zu verhalten, wenn dieses schon
vorhandene Seiende von sich aus begegnen kann. Um jedoch als das Seiende, das es
ist, begegnen zu können, muß es im vorhinein schon überhaupt als Seiendes, d.h.
hinsichtlich seiner Seins Verfassung, 'erkannt' sein. . . . Endliches Wesen bedarf dieses
Grundvermögens einer entgegenstehenlassenden Zuwendung-zu. . . . In dieser ursprünglichen Zuwendung hält sich das endliche Wesen überhaupt erst einen Spielraum
vor, innerhalb dessen ihm etwas 'korrespondieren* kann. Sich im vorhinein in solchem
Spielraum halten, ihn ursprünglich bilden, ist nichts anderes als die Transzendenz, die
alles endliche Verhalten zu Seiendem auszeichnet
" (KM, pp. 69-70).
26 V.g. KM, pp. 82 (Horizont von Gegenständlichkeit), 128 ( . . . der Gegenstände),
xxo (im vorhinein offen).
24
25
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cedently open domain within which knower and known meet,
for all that it is constituted by the knower, is marked by a certain
character of other-ness, as if it were an area of opposed-ness
(Dawider) which offers itself to the knower. As such it is somehow
or other discernible, offering the knower an a priori view of itself
in its total unity. Transcendence is " . . . not only the relation
of going-toward . .. but the correlative relation of returning
to . . ., and this constitutes opposed-ness. . . 2 7 If we are to
explain transcendence, then, we must account not only for its
active character (spontaneity) by which the horizon is pro-posed
by the knower, but also for its passive character, by reason of
which the horizon is op-posed, thus rendering it possible for beings
to reveal themselves as op-posed, sc. as objects. If spontaneity
is what characterizes pure thought and receptivity pure intuition, then we have some intimation, even before we enter into
the analysis proper, of how transcendence as the pure horizon
will be structured somehow by the pure synthesis of both which
is ontological knowledge.
It is worth noting, too, that the structure of transcendence in
KM is never considered a being enclosed within itself and already achieved, but always an occurrence-that-takes-place, a
process that is being instituted, built or constructed (bilden),
indeed that institutes itself. It is essentially a coming-to-pass
(Geschehen).29 Finally, let us insist again that the entire problem
of transcendence arises simply because of the finitude of the
knower. Transcendence is essentially finite - indeed " . . . transcendence is . . . finitude itself. . . . " 29
We take this much to be clear: finite knowledge is composed
of receptive intuition and universalizing (spontaneous) thought
- both indispensable but with intuition enjoying a certain
primacy. What will interest us most is not this duality in the
knowing process but its unity, sc. these elements are so intimately correlated that the correlation cannot be explained by
a mere succession of thought to intuition or a juxtaposition of
1 7 " . . . das Gegenstehenlassen von solchem, was nicht nur eine Relation des Hinzu-auf . . . f sondern eine Korrelation des Zurück-zu-in . . . ist und so das Dawider
bildet
" (KM, p. 175). See pp. 72, 76 (Dawider), 86 (Angebotcharakter), 121
(Anblick).
t 8 V. g. KM, pp. 70 (bilden), 86 (Sich-bilden in seinem innersten Geschehen).
18 " . . .
Nun ist aber die Transzendenz gleichsam die Endlichkeit selbst
"
(KM, p. 87).
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the two powers in man that account for them, sc. sensate-ness
and understanding. What explains this correlation ("synthesis")
must give rise to these two elements in their interdependence.
So it is that Heidegger calls sensate-ness (Sinnlichkeit) and
understanding (Verstand) two "stems" springing from a common
root.30 Our problem, then: what is the nature of this common
root?
A.

ONTOLOGICAL

KNOWLEDGE'.

THE

COMPONENTS

J. Pure Intuition
B y intuition is meant the immediate encounter with a singular.
This encounter is, on the part of the knower, a presentation. As
pure, the presentation is prior to all experience, hence it is the
permitting-of-the-encounter that antecedes (ontologically) actual
contact. The two types of pure intuition for Kant are, of course,
space and time. As finite, each of these is receptive. In order to
receive that which it intuits prior to any contact with the beingsto-be-known, the pure intuition must give that which is intuited
to itself. 31 It is because the pure intuition gives to itself that
which it intuits, hence intuitively receives, that the pure intuition can be both receptive and pure. Through this function of
donation to self there is fashioned by the pure intuition a view
(Anblick) of either space or time. 32 This view is received by the
intuition itself, but the reception is the very thing that constitutes the donation.33 Hence the pure intuition is an affecting of
itself, sc. self-affection. Heidegger states the matter clearly with
regard to time:
Time is pure intuition only insofar as of its own accord it constructs in
advance the view of a succession and proposes this view as such to itself
as that which it constitutes [yet] receives. This pure intuiting is engaged
KM, pp. 40-41.
KM, p. 49.
32 KM, pp. 98, 102, 88-89 (Blick, Anblick). In his treatment of schematism, Heidegger distinguishes two possible uses of Anblick: as the view offered by a determined being insofar as it is in its existing condition manifest (v.g. "the landscape
offers a fine view"); as view in a more general sense, whereby it is not determined
whether that which offers itself as a view is a being or not. It is in this second sense
that the author uses it here. See KM, pp. 88-89, and below concerning schematism.
« KM, p. 130.
80
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with the intuited which it constitutes, and, indeed, without the help of
experience. Time in its very essence is the pure affection of itself. .. . S4
This donation-to-self of a pure view may be called "creative/'
if one will, but the word is poorly chosen. Kant uses the word
"original" and Heidegger accepts it, interpreting it in the radical
sense of "letting-spring-forth." Each of the pure intuitions is
original, then, because it lets-spring-forth a view. 35 Now this
view that pure intuition fashions for itself is profoundly unified.
It is in its own way a whole, yet not an empty one. Its parts are
always but constrictions of itself, sc. the whole is completely in
all its parts. The intuition which discerns the view (in fashioning
it) is consequently itself unifying. It is for this reason that Kant
speaks very justly of pure intuition as "synopsis." 36
More precisely, however, how are we to characterize this unifying unity, intuited in the pre-experiential intuiting, which the
two pure intuitions, space and time, give to themselves? Certainly it is not a being (object), for this is presented only in the complete act of knowledge, of which the pure intuitions are only a
part. On the other hand, it is not purely nothing, even if these
intuitions be called "forms by which to intuit." 37 Something,
then, is intuited, which is not, however, an object. Heidegger's
explanation: what is intuited is the intuiting itself.
. . . Pure intuition, then, as the antecedent constitution of a non-thematic and, in the Kantian sense, non-objective view, is precisely what
renders it possible for the empirical intuition of spatio-temporal things
to take place within its horizon, without the need of previously intuiting
space and time by ^n explicit apprehension of these complexes.38
Before we move on, we should note that between the two
types of pure intuition, time enjoys a distinct priority over space;
for in all presentations the act of presenting is always a modifi34 "Die Zeit ist nur so reine Anschauung, dass sie von sich aus den Anblick des
Nacheinander vorbildet und diesen als solchen auf sich als das bildende Hinnehmen
lu-hält. Diese reine Anschauung geht mit dem in ihr gebildeten Angeschauten sich
selbst an, und zwar ohne Beihilfe der Erfahrung. Die Zeit ist ihrem Wesen nach
reine Affektion ihrer selbst
" (KM, pp. 171-172).
36 KM, pp. 47 ("schöpferisch"), 65 (entspringen lassen).
36 KM, pp. 48, 131 (Einheit), 61, 131 (Synopsis).
87 KM, pp. 130, 132 (Form der Anschauung). See p. 49.
38 " . . . Als vorgängiges Bilden eines reinen unthematischen und im Kantischen
Sinne ungegenständlichen Anblickes ermöglicht die reine Anschauung gerade, daß
das in ihrem Horizont sich bewegende empirische Anschauen der räumlich-zeitlichen
Dinge nicht erst den Raum und die Zeit anzuschauen braucht im Sinne einer diese
Mannigfaltigkeiten erst feststellenden Erfassung." (KM, p. 133).
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cation of the interior sense, which takes its place in the succession
of moments we call "time/' Because of this greater universality,
time must be more fundamental to ontological knowledge than
space. That is why the author, in his analysis of pure intuition,
feels justified in restricting himself almost entirely to the intuition, time.
2. Pure Thought
What constitutes thought in its purity ? We have seen already
that thought determines an intuited individual with reference
to a characteristic which avails for many. More precisely, what
is the nature of this universalizing process? Fundamentally, this
process is the antecedent discerning by the understanding of the
unity which more than one individual possesses in common and
as it is possessed in common. This fundamental act of universalization Kant calls "reflection" (implying not only a comparison
of the several individuals with the unity discerned but a disregarding of the differences that they bear to this unity). The
result is a concept (Begriff), which, then, is always universal.
As to the content of such concepts, there is no problem when
the concept is empirical, for then it would be derived from the
intuition of beings-as-they-appear. But we are concerned with
non-empirical (pure) concepts, which Kant calls "notions." In
this case, deprived of all empirical content (since prior to experience), the concept is simply a function of unification. But in
order that a function of the understanding have the power to
unify, the process of reflection, by which this function is constituted, must itself be an antecedent presentation of that unity
which guides the concept in its task of unification. The content
of the pure concepts, then, is these unities antecedently presented in the essential structure of the understanding itself,
which render all further unifying functions possible. They are
not, then, the result of reflection but enter into its very constitution and are called "concepts which reflect." 39 These unifying
functions of the understanding are also called by Kant "rules"
(Regel). Insofar as they are pure, the rules themselves constitute
(and, indeed, antecedently) that which is ordered by these rules.
39

KM, pp. 55-56.
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Yet such rules are not presented as if they were beings in themselves which are consciously grasped, but rather, combining
functions that they are, they are presented as combining, sc. in
their combinative character as such. The total complexity of
these unities (rules, notions) forms that system of predicates
which permit the knower to know (judge) the Being of beings
(therefore ''ontological" predicates), designated in the tradition
as the "categories/' 40
What we have just said about pure thought has focused chiefly
on the pure concepts as concepts. Now a word about the understanding, sc. the power in which they are found. These unifying
functions, or categories, belong to the very structure of the
understanding. Indeed, if it is the very essence of the understanding to seize the being-to-be-known in conceptual fashion,
then the categories, as the systematic complex of pure concepts,
must constitute the structure of the understanding in its pure
state. The understanding, then, is a closed totality that contains
within itself a manifold of ways (the categories) by which the
data presented to it may be unified. If we consider the pure
concepts as rules, then we may say that the understanding is the
"power of rules," sc. the power " . . . to pro-pose to itself by
antecedent presentation those unities which control every possible type of presentative unification. . . . " 4 1
That the understanding with its manifold functions is itself
a unified whole will be more apparent if we consider for a
moment the role of consciousness in thought. We are concerned
with the processes of knowledge, or rather with the conditions
required for these processes. Now every act of knowledge is, as
such, conscious. Restricting ourselves for the moment to a consideration of the thought-component of that knowledge, we may
say that if the pure concept as such is the consciousness of a
unity, 42 then since every conscious act supposes someone who
is conscious, every pure concept implies a consciousness of self
(,Selbstbewußtsein). As a result, the presentation of the unities
(categories) in pure thought has necessarily the character of an
KM, pp. 141, 56, 65-66.
" 'Vermögen der Regeln* beißt aber: im vorhinein vorstellend sich die Einheiten
vorhalten, die aller möglichen vorstellenden Einigung die Führung geben...."
(KM, p. 137). See pp. 55-56, 73« KM, p. 72.
40
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"I think." Furthermore, this consciousness, which is aware
simultaneously of itself and of the unifying functions (categories) of pure thought, is capable, even when these rules are not
actually exercising their function, of becoming aware of them
as functioning. Consciousness is not simply an act, then, but a
power in the knower that is "transcendental apperception."
" . . . T h e pure understanding in its original pro-positing of
unity operates as transcendental apperception." 43
Heidegger presupposes that Kant's notion of transcendental
apperception is known to his reader. For the sake of clarity,
however, and in the interest of the analysis to follow, we resume
the essentials of the Kantian doctrine. By apperception, Kant
understands consciousness. As empirical, it is that awareness
which accompanies each individual act of the knower and is as
transitory as these acts themselves. Transcendental apperception,
however, is that pure (pre-experiential), constantly identical
awareness of self that, as an abiding "I think," accompanies and
conditions all presentations and all concepts, for it is this that
discloses them to be mine. Its principal characteristic is its stable
unity, its one-and-the-same-ness (stehende und bleibende), which
is designated therefore the "transcendental unity of apperception." 44 Without it, knowledge would be impossible, for
there would be no common center to which all of the data that
compose experience can be referred and by which they can be
synthetized into the organized presentation which an act of
knowledge implies. Apperception, then, in its unity is itself a
power of the knower which in its synthesizing function is a condition of the possibility of knowledge itself. From the viewpoint
of the object, the transcendental unity may be called "objective"
in the sense that, by reason of it, all the manifold that is offered
by intuition is unified into a concept of the object. 45 From the
viewpoint of the knower, if the understanding is the power of
constructing concepts, then the unity of transcendental apperception, in supplying the ultimate unification in consciousness
of the multiple unifying functions (pure concepts, notions, categories, rules) of the understanding, is "the pure synthesis of the
48 4 1 . . . Der reine Verstand handelt in seinem ursprünglichen Sich-vorhalten von
Einheit als transzendentale Apperzeption." (KM, p. 77).
** KRV, B 132, 1 3 9 .
« KRV, B 139.
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understanding/' the ground of possibility of the categories.46
This transcendental unity of consciousness as self-consciousness
is the awareness of an ultimate thinking unity, sc. an ego, which,
because it is a condition of the possibility of knowledge, should
be called transcendental.
3. Necessity of Pure Synthesis
We have seen the components of knowledge in their preexperiential state. But our problem is neither pure intuition,
nor pure thought, nor their concomitant duality as such. Our
task, in discovering the nature of finite ontological knowledge
which grounds metaphysics, is to understand their correlation.
For one of the indices of the finitude of all knowledge is the
interdependence of these two elements, and this interdependence
betokens some sort of union between them. To explain knowledge
we must analyse this unity. If the knowledge under investigation
is ontological, the unity in question is a unity of pure intuition
and pure thought, hence itself a pure (apriori) union, sc. "synthesis." This presentation which we call the "pure synthesis" is not
simply a brute coupling of intuition and thought but a rich
totality, which simultaneously as intuition and as thought
achieves the harmonious cooperation between the two. This
totality is a structural unity that discloses itself only in the
obscure complexity of its functioning. If we are to understand
it, we must analyse it in this functioning and thus discover the
synthesis in the source that gives rise to it. The source which
gives rise to this synthesis for Kant is the imagination (Einbildungskraft), which, insofar as it is considered prior to all experience (pure), is designated as "transcendental." 47 Our task now
is to examine it in detail.
B.

ONTOLOGICAL

KNOWLEDGE:

THE

SYNTHESIS

i. Meaning of the Transcendental Imagination
The decisive factor in Heidegger's Kant-interpretation is his
« KRV, B 139-140.
47
KM, pp. 63-64, 78.
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analysis of the transcendental imagination. The acceptance or
rejection of his reading depends on this, and this alone. It is
capital, however, to note that this interpretation is based on the
first edition of K R V (1781), not on the second (1787), for reasons
that will appear subsequently.48
What the term "transcendental imagination" means may be
understood best, perhaps, if we examine separately what is suggested by the various ingredients of the term in its German form:
transzendentale Einbildungskraft. Firstly, it is a power (Kraft)
within the knower (not simply an act), and an indispensable
one. It is that by which the knower is capable of, therefore "can"
achieve, the pure synthesis. If we recall that this synthesis
takes place in man, then we can understand why Kant calls it
a "power of the soul," provided we take "soul" in the broad,
anthropological sense as roughly equivalent to man in the supramaterial dimension, and do not restrict this imagination to a
"faculty" of the soul in the conventional meaning of that term,
an interpretation that Heidegger in Kant's name expressly
rejects.49 As a matter of fact, we can notice in this distinction
how Heidegger reserves for the transcendental imagination from
the very beginning a dignity all its own, which, when once precised, will enable us to determine " . . . in what sense 'soul' and
'spirit' may be used, and to what extent these concepts correspond in an original way to the ontologico-metaphysical essence
of man. . . . " 50 Not a faculty, then, this power which is the
transcendental imagination in man is all the more basic for that.
Since it renders possible the synthesis of pure intuition and pure
thought, it is a founding-, or a ''grounding-power," of ontological
knowledge, sc. of transcendence. Hence Kant remarks: "We have,
therefore, a pure imagination as a grounding-power of the human
soul, which lies as the ground for all a priori knowledge. . . . " 5 1
48 KM, pp. 146-156. Heidegger indicates that it was the second edition that
chiefly influenced the German idealists (KM, p. 179). Whether or not this was true
for all the idealists is not important. What is important is to note that any comparison
between Heidegger and the idealists (Hegel in particular) must take full cognizance
of the perspectives suggested here.
4® KM, pp. 124 (Vermögen), 118 (Seelenvermögen), 128 (Grundkraft).
60 " . . . in welchem Sinne von 'Seele' und 'Gemüt* gesprochen werden darf, inwieweit diese Begriffe das ontologisch-metaphysische Wesen des Menschen ursprünglich
treffen." (KM, p. 129).
5 1 "Wir haben also eine reine Einbildungskraft, als ein Grundvermögen der
menschlichen Seele, das aller Erkenntnis a priori zum Grunde liegt...." (KRV,
A 124).
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If we ask how this grounding-power functions, we turn the
focus from the suffix -kraft to the stem -bildungderived from
bilden, itself the verbalization of das Bild ("image," "figure,"
"picture," "portrait," "effigy," "idea," "representation," "illustration," etc.). Bilden, then, will be that act or process by which
any of these types of Bild is wrought in a being, hence it means
to "form," "fashion," "shape," "compose," "organize," "improve," "cultivate," "train," "discipline," etc. The French
translators reduce these variants to three basic senses: "to
construct," "to give a form," "to create an image" - remarking
very justly that Heidegger plays continually on these three
different meanings.52 Common to all three of these senses is the
notion of "setting up," or "establishing," which is the authentic
sense of "to institute." Let us translate Bildung as "institution,"
intending this to mean "construct," "form" or "give an image,"
according to context.
The transcendental imagination, then, is a grounding-power
in the sense of a power to institute. Functioning as the structural
unity between pure intuition and pure thought, the transcendental imagination fits both of them together, institutes a center
(die bildende Mitte) where both these components meet, serving
as their common root, or, by another metaphor, as the common
source which permits them to spring forth. Furthermore, since
the unifying (synthetizing) function of the transcendental imagination is its unique task, then in instituting the structural
unity between intuition and thought, the transcendental imagination also institutes itself. This is simply another way of
saying that the transcendental imagination is not an accomplished fact but a process that takes place, a coming-to-pass
that is continual.53
The pure imagination, then, is a basic, grounding-power, a
power to institute. More precisely, what is instituted? Heidegger's answer is clear and unequivocal: transcendence! Hence,
for him, the name "transcendental." " . . . Insofar as it institutes
52 M. Heidegger, Kant et le probUme de la metaphysique,
intr. et trad, par A. De
Waelhens et W. Biemel (Paris: Gallimard, 1953), p. 148, note 2. We choose "institution" in preference to "constitution," because the latter, for phenomenology, connotes rather intelligence than imagination.
53 KM, pp. 98 (Fügung), 127-146 (Wurzel), 129 (Entspringenlassen), 86 (Sichbilden der Transzendenz).
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transcendence, it is justly called the transcendental imagination/' 54 This appears all the more clearly, if we reflect on
what is meant by the "pure synthesis," sc. the placing-together
(syn-thesis) into an organic unity of the syn-opsis of pure intuition and the syn-thesis of the pure concepts of the understanding.
It is this pure commingling that institutes ontological knowledge,
sc. that pre-experiential fusion of intuition and thought by
reason of which the knower possesses an antecedent comprehension of Being-structures of beings-to-be-known, insofar as
there opens up for him a horizon of objectiveness within which
beings can reveal themselves as opposed to the knower and thus
become known.55 Briefly, the transcendental imagination is the
power of instituting ontological knowledge in the finite knower,
hence the center where transcendence comes-to-pass.
2. Ontological Knowing
a.

DISCOVERY

OF

THE

TRANSCENDENTAL

IMAGI-

- What we have said of the transcendental imagination is, to be sure, by way of summary, and represents in some
respects the acquisition of Heidegger's analysis rather than its
initial data. His argument for such an interpretation has two
moments: the analysis of the "transcendental deduction of the
categories," where the role of the pure imagination is first discovered; the analysis of "schematism," where it is examined in
operation. We shall try to sketch briefly the main theses of the
argument, abstracting as much as possible from detail.
The term "deduction" for Kant has not a logical sense but a
legal one. In a lawsuit, one distinguishes easily the facts of the
case (quid facti) from the legal principle involved (quid juris).
The legal argument as such is not simply an interpretation of
the facts but a justification of this interpretation, an attempt
to establish a specified right or authorization based upon the
law itself. Such an argument in Kant's time was called "deduction," and this is the metaphor suggested by his use of the
term in KRV. In the transcendental deduction of the categories,
NATION

6 4 41 . . . Sofern sie die Transzendenz bildet, heißt sie mit Recht die transzendentale Einbildungskraft." (KM, p. 123). See p. 109. Obviously the Heideggerean sense
of transcendence is here imputed to Kant. See p. 124.
5 5 K M , pp. 131, 81-82.
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we are proceeding as if in a court of law, attempting to establish
an "authorization" (or "title") of the categories (pure concepts,
notions, rules) to "justify" their "legal" claim.56
Precisely what pretensions of the categories does Kant wish
to justify? The claim that they present "objective reality." But
we must beware here of an easy misunderstanding. For Kant,
the term "reality" (Realität) did not mean "actuality" (Wirklichkeit), but rather the "whatness" of beings, and responds
therefore more properly to the traditional notion of "essence"
than of "existence." 57 To ask by what right we may legitimately
claim that the categories present objective reality is to pose the
question:
. . . To what extent can the content (reality) that is presented in the pure
concepts be a determination of that [being] which stands over in opposition to finite knowledge, sc. of that being [which serves] as an object ? . . . 5 8
In other words, can we justify the categories of Being as antecedent seizures of the Being-structure of beings-to-be-known?
We can see immediately that the question embraces more than
the pure concepts described above in precision from their relation to pure intuition. Its scope includes the entire structure
of the pure synthesis, for we cannot speak of beings-to-beknown-as-objects at all unless there be intuition as well as
thought, sc. categories. To justify the objective reality of the
categories, then, we must explain the unity (therefore interdependence) between intuition and thought, hence the structure
of ontological knowledge (transcendence) itself.59
Kant proposes two possible paths to follow in order to elucidate the structural unity between intuition and thought: the
first "descending," sc. beginning with thought and examining
its relational dependence on intuition (KRV, A 116-120); the
second "ascending," starting with intuition and delineating its
necessary orientation towards thought (KRV, A 120-128). If we
follow both paths, we must necessarily pass in each case through
that center which unites the two extremes.60
"

KM, pp. 82-83.
KM, p. 84. For "actuality," Kant uses Dasein and Existenz.
M " . . . inwiefern kann der in den reinen Begriffen vorgestellte Sachgehalt (Realität) eine Bestimmung dessen sein, was der endlichen Erkenntnis entgegensteht,
d. h. des Seienden als eines Gegenstandes (Objektes)? . . ( K M , p. 84).
" KM, pp. 74-75KM, p. 76.
57
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In the "descending" method, we start with transcendental
apperception. This presupposes a point of fusion between the
pure concepts (categories) and pure intuition. As the unity of
consciousness of an abiding " I think," transcendental apperception polarizes the data of intuition and the unifying functions
of the understanding in such a way as to present a unity in
which the processes of both intuition and thought are woven
into one. If we recall now that transcendental apperception was
originally considered as proper to the understanding alone ("the
pure synthesis of the understanding"), we see immediately that
this function is impossible without concomitant polarization of
intuition as well. Apperception (hence the categories) is somehow
referentially dependent on intuition.
What is the nature of such a presented unity in the case of
pre-experiential knowledge? Certainly it is not a being, much
less the totality of beings in the sense of a totum simui, for the
finite knower does not create the being(s)-to-be-known. Rather
the presented unity is waiting for an encounter with some beingto-be-known. Let us say that what transcendental apperception
presents is an " . . . essential tendency toward the unification of
what has not yet been unified. . . . " 6 1 What transcendental
apperception presents, then, is a unity whose very nature is to
unify. Now in order for transcendental apperception to present
a un fving unity, it must have caught previously a glimpse of
unity, jt synthesis, that somehow or other will serve as the
model for its own unifying process. According to Kant, such a
synthesis, sc. fusion of intuition and thought to serve as guide,
must b e ' 'presupposed'' by, or at least' 'included'' within, transcendental apperception in order for it to function at all.
This point of fusion is the transcendental imagination. Heidegger cites here the following text of Kant :
. . . Consequently, the principle of the necessary unity of the pure (productive) synthesis of the imagination is before [vor] apperception the
ground of possibility of all knowledge, especially of experience,82
and argues that the authentic sense of vor here, like the
91 " . . . Diese Einheit trägt als nicht-on tische die wesensmäßige Tendenz auf ein
Einigen des je noch nicht Geeinigten in sich
" (KM, p. 77).
aa " . . . Also ist das Prinzipium der notwendigen Einheit der reinen (produktiven)
Synthesis der Einbildungskraft vor der Apperzeption der Grund der Möglichkeit
aller Erkenntnis, besonders der Erfahrung." (KRV, A 118).
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Latin coram, means literally "before" in the sense of "in the
presence of" or "before the eyes of." Hence, the synthesis of the
transcendental imagination would serve as the pattern for the
polarizing function of the transcendental apperception.
The second (ascending) method of transcendental deduction
begins on the sense level. We know that the senses offer the
knower their data only in a manifold, disorganized fashion. Before the being-to-be-known can be experienced as such, these
data must be bound together into connectedness. However, in
order for the being that is arriving at the condition of being
known to be encountered as connected together into a stable
whole, the knower must antecedently have seized the sense of
"connecting." To present antecedently to experience the meaning of "connecting" is effectively to constitute in presentative
fashion relations as such. Now this power of constituting relations (binding power of the knower) is not the pure intuitions
of space and time, but the transcendental imagination, conditioned in its function, of course, by the universal intuition,
time. 63 Furthermore, in this process the transcendental imagination is ordered beyond itself, for the combining power is of
such a nature that it belongs itself to a stable, abiding self which
is the ego of the transcendental apperception.
We have, therefore, a pure imagination, as a grounding-power of the
human soul, which lies as the base of all a priori knowledge. Through
this we bring on the one hand the manifold of intuition into connection
and on the other this connected manifold into union with the condition
of the highly necessary unity of pure apperception. .. , 6 4
Briefly: " . . . the transcendental imagination unifies at once the
pure intuition itself, and this with pure apperception." 6 5
Whether we start the analysis with the categories as unified
in apperception or with sense manifold offered by pure intuition,
we pass inevitably through a center where categories and intuition meet and are instituted as one. This center, prior to all
KM, p. 80.
"Wir haben also eine reine Einbildungskraft, als ein Grundvermögen der
menschlichen Seele, das aller Erkenntnis a priori zum Grunde liegt. Vermittelst
deren bringen wir das Mannigfaltige der Anschauung einerseits, und mit der Bedingung der notwendigen Einheit der reinen Apperzeption andererseits in Verbindung.
. . . " (KRV, A 124), cited with Heidegger's interpolations, KM, p. 81.
85 " . . .
die transzendentale Einbildungskraft einmal die reine Anschauung in
sich selbst und diese mit der reinen Apperzeption einigt." (KM, p. 81, note zi8).
63
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experience (because transcendental), is what institutes the
horizon of objectiveness, or domain of encounter, wherein other
beings can arrive at an encounter with the finite knower. It is
this horizon that we call transcendence.
b. A N A L Y S I S : S C H E M A T I S M - Our task now is to probe
more deeply into this process by which ontological knowledge
is instituted. This Heidegger does by his analysis of the
"schematism of the pure concepts of the understanding." When
we recall how the author conceives KRV to be an effort to lay
the groundwork for metaphysics by an analysis of the conditions
of ontological knowledge (transcendence), and then realize that
the power by which transcendence is instituted in the finite
knower is revealed in its interior operation by a study of schematism, we can understand why Heidegger calls this chapter the
"kernel" of Kant's entire book.66
Kant himself introduces the chapter on schematism by posing
his problem as one of "subsumption." 67 In the language of
traditional logic, "subsumption" is understood to mean the use
of concepts, sc. either, from the viewpoint of the knower, the
application of concepts to objects, or, from the viewpoint of the
objects, the bringing of these objects "under" concepts. In the
present case, where his theme is the pure concepts of the understanding, Kant is concerned obviously with the first of these
forms. The question is this: how are the pure concepts (categories) applied, or put to use?
For the application of the categories (pure concepts) is not as
simple as that of empirical concepts. The content of the empirical concepts, after all, is derived from experience. To reapply this concept to the objects of experience, then, presents
no problem: concept and object are homogeneous. The content
of the pure concepts, however, is not derived from experience
and " . . . i n comparison with empirical (indeed all sensate)
intuitions, they are completely heterogeneous. . . . " 68 If circu•• KM, p. 86 (Kernstück).
• 7 KRV, A 137-138, B X76-I77.
1 1 "Nun sind aber reine Verstandesbegriffe, in Vergleichung mit empirischen (ja
überhaupt sinnlichen) Anschauungen, ganz u n g l e i c h a r t i g , . . ( K R V , A 137, B 176).
Kant illustrates: " . . . The empirical concept of a plate has a homogeneity with the
geometric concept of a circle, insofar as the rotundity that is thought in the latter
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larity, for example, can be verified by intuiting a dinner plate,
causality cannot. How are pure concepts applied ? Such a question
interrogates not only their application but their very essence,
their constitution. And since the categories are the fundamental
concepts of the knower, we touch here the structure of concepts
as such. 69
It will be clear that our problem here is not especially different
from the problem of transcendental deduction, sc. how to justify
the objective reality of the categories. Here, as there, we investigate the structure of that antecedent comprehension of Beingstructure through the categories which we call ontological
knowledge (transcendence). Here, as there, we proceed by examining the conditions which render possible the pure synthesis
between these categories and pure intuition. The focus on the
schemata enables us simply to explicitate further the operation
of the transcendental imagination in this function. Let Kant
himself state the matter:
Now it is clear that there must be a third element [besides category and
that to which it is applied], which is homogeneous on the one hand with
the category and on the other with the sensible apparition, and renders
possible the application oi the former to the latter. This intermediary
presentation must be pure (without any empirical element), yet on the
one hand intellectual and on the other hand sensaU. Such an intermediary
i s t h e transcendental

schema.™

We must see now more in detail what this transcendental schema
is and how it is constituted by the intermediary power of the
pure imagination.
We are now at the heart of the matter and must proceed
slowly. The skeleton of the argument is a sequence of four propositions:
can be intuited in the former." ( " . . . So hat der empirische Begriff eines Tellers mit
dem reinen geometrischen eines Zirkels Gleichartigkeit, indem die Rundung, die
in dem ersteren gedacht wird, sich im letzteren anschauen läßt." [KRV, A 137, B
176, following Vaihingens reading]. Kant's italics).
•• KM, pp. 103-104.
70 4'Nun ist klar, daß es ein Drittes geben müsse, was einerseits mit der Kategorie,
andererseits mit der Erscheinung in Gleichartigkeit stehen muß, und die Anwendung
der ersteren auf die letzte möglich macht. Diese vermittelnde Vorstellung muß rein
(ohne alles Empirische) und doch einerseits intellectueU, andererseits sinnlich sein.
Eine solche ist das transzendentale Schema(KRV,
A 138, B 177). Kant's italics.
We translate Erscheinung here as "sensible apparition," for clearly Kant is referring
to the intuitive element in knowledge, and we have reserved "being-as-it-appears'1
for Erscheinung when it means (as generally for Kant) the entire act of knowledge.
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i. All concepts must be rendered sensate by means of a schema.
That concepts, if they are to be put to use, must be rendered
sensate derives from their referential dependence on intuition in
order that they can apply to an object, hence have a "meaning."
The reason is that it is by intuition, sc. by the modification of
the knower's sensate nature, that an object is offered as a beingto-be-known.71 To render a concept sensate, then, means to
transpose a unifying function of the understanding into a seizure
of the being-to-be-known that is intuitive at the same time that
it is conceptual.72 It is precisely this fusion of intuition and
concept that is accomplished by a schema. It is the schema that
renders it possible for a concept to have "objective reality," for
the intuition to receive a universalizing determination, hence
for the being-to-be-known to offer a view of itself, to reveal its
visage to the knower. In this sense, it is the sensating of the
concept through the schema that (in rendering possible the view
of the object) may be said to fashion this view, sc. to constitute
that visage which offers itself to the knower and thus stands
over against him as opposed.73 This is the sense of the formula
"to let a thing stand opposed" (Gegenstehenlassen),
What we have said here pertains to all concepts indiscriminately, therefore to pure concepts (categories) as well as to
empirical. Kant himself underlines the point: " . . . therefore the
categories without schemata are only functions of the understanding [destined for the formation of] concepts but do not
present any object. . . . " 74
ii. As seen in empirical concepts, a schema is the presentation
of the rule by which a concept performs its function of unification.
We have examined already in cursory fashion the nature of the
concepts as universalizing functions of the understanding, whose
task is to present a unity which may be applied to more than
one individual, as applicable to this plurality, therefore in its
unity. We also called these universalizing functions "rules." We
W K R V , A X39, B 178.
KM, p. 88« French translators (p. 150) suggest transposition sensible for VersinnUckung. We prefer to retain a tangle word, though the result is perhaps not very happy.
T* KM, pp. 86-88.
74
. . Also sind die Kategorien, ohne Schemata, nur Funktionen des Verstandes
XXL Begriffen, stellen aber keinen Gegenstand vor
" (KRV, A 147, B 187).
71
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must examine now more closely the process by which these rules
are put to work.
We can proceed best by way of an example that Heidegger
himself suggests. Across the street is a house. I know it to be a
house, for it is presented to me by an act of knowledge. By
reason of this presentation, the house offers me a view of itself
as an individual existing object encountered in my experience,
but more than that, it offers a view of what a house (any house)
looks like. This does not mean, of course, that the house has no
individuality, but only that in addition to its own individuality
the house as presented offers a view of what a house can look
like, sc. the "how" of any house at all. It opens up for me a
sphere (Umkreis) of possible houses. To be sure, one of these
possibilities has been actualized by the house that I see, but it
need not have been so.
What interests us is this sphere of possibilities itself. What
constitutes this sphere? Is it not the fact that my act of knowing,
in presenting this house, prescribes and traces out for me how
something must appear, if it is to offer me the view of a house
at all? And that prescription, or rule-for-a-house (Regel), is not
simply a catalogue of "characteristics" that are to be found in a
house, but rather the drawing up of a full sketch (Auszeichnen)
of the totality of what is meant by such a thing as a "house."
This sketch gives me a pre-view (Vorblick) of a house as such,
and by reason of it the being which I encounter can manifest
itself as a house, sc. offer me the view of some house in particular.78
It is this prescription, in the sense of a full sketch of a possible
plurality, that is meant by a "rule." But notice that the sketch
itself is already a view of the beings-to-be-known. More exactly,
the rule (prescription) implies not only a ruling (sketching) but
a ruled (sketched). That which is ruled (sketched) is in its own
way a view, sc. something viewed. It is only when the rule is
presented as de facto regulating (i.e. regulating a that-which-isregulated) that it can be presented as a rule at all. But the rule,
we have seen, is the concept; that-which-is-ruled is the view of
the possible object that intuition may present. A view is fashioned
for the concept in its universalizing function, and unless this
74

K M , pp. 9 0 - 9 X .
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view be fashioned, then the concept as ruled does not exercise
its unifying function at all. It is this necessary fashioning of a
view (sketch) for a concept operating as a rule that constitutes
the fusion of intuition and concept. Here the concept is rendered
sensate. Thus Heidegger:
. . . It is only in presenting the manner in which the rule regulates a
design for the view of a possible [object] that the unity of the concept can
be presented in its unifying function, sc. as valid for more than one. If a
concept, in general, is that which serves as a rule, then conceptual presentation means the antecedent donation of a rule for the possible fashioning
of a view in such a way as to be [itself] the designing of this view. By
reason of its very structure, then, such a presentation is necessarily
ordered toward a possible view and is consequently in itself a special
kind of sensating.76
Note, however, that the view of which we are speaking here
is as such neither the immediate (empirical) intuition of an
actual singular object (for it connotes a genuine plurality), nor
a view of the concept itself in its unity. The view we are speaking
of is not thematized at all. It is that precise point of fusion
where the unity of the rule (concept) is discerned in its unifying
function:
. . . The rule is presented in the "how" of its functioning as a rule, sc. in
the manner in which, when regulating a given manifestation, it inscribes
itself in the view through which the manifestation occurs. . . . 7 7
Now the presentation of the rule in its function as a rule is
what Kant means by a schema. By reason of the schema, the
unity of a concept is referred to the plurality of possibilities
which it unifies, without being restricted to any one. Kant's
own example:
. . . The concept of a dog signifies a rule according to which my imagination can design the general form of a four-footed animal, without being
confined to any particular form whatever which is offered to me in ex76 " . . . Nur im Vorstellen der Weise, in der die Regel das Hineinzeichnen in einen
möglichen Anblick regelt, kann überhaupt die Einheit des Begriffes als einigende,
vielgültige, vorgestellt werden. Wenn der Begriff überhaupt das ist, was zur Regel
dient, dann heißt begriffliches Vorstellen das Vorgeben der Regel einer möglichen
Anblickbeschaffung in der Weise ihrer Regelung. Solches Vorstellen ist dann struktural notwendig auf einen möglichen Anblick bezogen und daher in sich eine eigene
Art der Versinnlichung." (KM, p. 91).
77 " . . . Die Regel wird vorgestellt im Wie ihres Regeins, d.h. in dem, wie sie
sich, die Darstellung regelnd, in den darstellenden Anblick hineindiktiert..

(KM, p. 92).
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perience, or, for t h a t matter, to a n y possible image which in a given case
I can construe. . . . 7 8

Such a schema, then, is "on the one hand intellectual and on the
other hand sensate."
Hi. For the pure concepts (categories), however, the schemata
are "transcendental time-determinationsIn
the case of the
categories, we have to do with unifying functions in their pure,
condition, structurally prior to all empirical contact with beingsto-be-known. If they are rules, then in their functioning they
regulate a to-be-ruled. This to-be-ruled must be in its own way
a view, yet, if we are to guard the purity of the whole process, a
pure view, itself fashioned prior to experience with beings-to-beknown. Such a view as this would be that which is offered by
the functioning of a pure intuition. The pure (universal) intuition, however, hence the pure view, is time, which for Kant is
the continuous succession of nows (Jetztfolge). Through the
transcendental schemata, the categories must be fused with
time and thus made sens-ate.79
These schemata of the categories must have, then, their own
special character. As schemata for concepts of the pure understanding, each schema presents a unity, and, indeed, in its
function as regulating a possible view. As schemata for the pure
concepts, however, the view-to-be-regulated is time. Time, however, different from empirical intuitions (such as dog, house,
etc.), does not offer a plurality of possibilities but is itself a
simple, unique unity. If, then, the various categories each find
in time their pure sensating view, then the unity of time must
admit at least a plurality of modes by which it can serve as the
pure view for the various types of categoiy. It is the task of the
schemata to mediate the unicity of time and plurality of the
categories. " . . . The schemata of the notions . . . articulate the
unique possibility of a pure view [sc. time] into a multiplicity of

78
' • • Der Begriff vom Hunde bedeutet eine Regel, nacb welcher meine Einbildungskraft die Gestalt eines vierfüßigen Tieres allegemein verzeichnen kann,
ohne auf irgendeine einzige besondere Gestalt, die mir die Erfahrung darbietet,
oder auch ein jedes mögliche Bild, was ich in concreto darstellen kann, eingeschränkt
zn s e i n . . ( K R V , A X 4 2 , B 1 8 0 ) .
" KM, p. 9 9 .
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views. . . . " 80 In that sense, transcendental schemata "determine"
time, sc. they are "transcendental time-determinations," and
since all schemata are constituted by the imagination (schematism), they are its "transcendental product." 81
iv. The transcendental schemata constitute the pure horizon of
objectiveness called transcendence. It is by reason of the transcendental schemata that the pure concepts are fused with intuition
prior to experience and thus satisfy Kant's requirement:
. . . Pure concepts a priori, besides the function of the understanding in
the category, must contain formal conditions of sensate-ness . . . which
contain the general a priori conditions under which the categories themselves may be applied to any object whatsoever. . . . 8 2
It is the transcendental schemata, then, that render possible
the application of the ontological predicates to all possible
objects. Hence it is they that bring-to-pass the pre-experiential
orientation of the finite knower toward beings-to-be-known
that renders it possible for these beings - not simply one, nor a
few, nor a class, but "any being whatsoever" - to reveal themselves as objects offering a view of themselves to be known. They
constitute, then, the horizon of objective-ness which we have
called "transcendence," and this because they constitute the
pure synthesis of thought (categories) and intuition (time), sc.
ontological knowledge.
The point is capital! To have a concept of an object is to
present it in its general nature, or, as we often say, "universality."
If the categories as such, however, are not homogeneous with
empirical concepts and hence require schemata of a special sort,
then their "universality" is not simply of a higher degree than
that of the ordinary universal concepts, as if they were simply
a supreme genus in the ontic sense. The "universality," better
"generality," of the categories must be of a different kind. How,
80 " . . .
Die Schemata der Notionen geben sich durch das Sichhineinregeln in
die Zeit als reinen Anblick aus dieser her ihr Bild und artikulieren so die einzige reine
Anblicksmöglichkeit zu einer Mannigfaltigkeit reiner Bilder. . .
(KM, p. 99).
81 KRV, A 138, B 177 (transzendentale Zeitbestimmungen), A 142, B 181 (transzendentales Produkt der Einbildungskraft). See KM, p. 99.
82 1 4 . . . reine Begriffe a priori, außer der Funktion des Verstandes in der Kategorie,
noch formale Bedingungen der Sinnlichkeit (namentlich des inneren Sinnes) a priori
enthalten müssen, welche die allgemeine Bedingung enthalten, unter der die Kategorie allein auf irgendeinen Gegenstand angewandt werden kann. . . . " (KRV, A 139140, B 179).
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then, characterize the generality of these ontological, sc. metaphysical, concepts? Such a question, however, asks no less than
this: what does "general" mean when we call ontology "general
metaphysics"? Such a question seeks to discover the ground of
metaphysics. Hence, " . . . the problem of the schematism of the
pure concepts of the understanding is the question of the innermost essence of ontological knowledge," sc. the structure of
transcendence, the ground of metaphysics.83
j. The Ontological Known
In the analysis of schematism, we were concerned more with
the structure of ontological knowing. Now let us see more in
detail the ontological known. What is known in transcendence
is instituted by transcendence. Yet transcendence is finite, indeed " . . . transcendence is . . . finitude itself . . . , " 84 therefore
radically incapable of creating the beings that it knows. Hence
that which is "known" in ontological knowledge as a result of
institution by transcendence is not and cannot be a being at all.
Rather it is Non-being - not, however, absolutely nothing.®5
Heidegger explains this Non-being by interpreting two
passages where Kant speaks of the ontologically known as " X . "
In interpreting the first passage, the author supplies a clarity
which the original does not possess: the being-as-it-appears reveals itself as opposed to the knower, and it is this which the
empirical intuition gives. But the being-as-it-appears is the
"object" of another presentation, for since it is not the thing-initself, sc. the being as it springs from its origin in a creative intuition, it reveals itself only in and for an orientation towards itself
that is receptive. This antecedent orientation is likewise a presen88 " . . .
Das Problem des Schematismus der reinen Verstandesbegriffe ist die
Frage nach dem innersten Wesen der ontologischen Erkenntnis." (KM, p. 105). The
difficulty of the matter is obvious, as the long controversies over conversion to the
phantasm in the formation of universal concepts indicate. In all of Kant, schematism
is one of the most difficult issues, and even Herr Beck could not make bead or tail of
it. Kant in last years (1797): "überhaupt ist der Schematismus einer der schwierigsten Punkte. Selbst Hr. Beck kann sich nicht darein finden. - Ich halte dies Capitel
für eines der wichtigsten/' (Kants handschrifUicher Nachlaß, Band V, Nr. 6359,
cited KM, p. 106).
** " . . . Nun ist aber die Transzendenz gleichsam die Endlichkeit selbst
"
(KM, p. 87).
8fi KM, p. 71 (Nichts vs. nihil absolutum), 113.
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tation that must have its own "object," better its "whereunto."
What is presented in this case, though, is objectiveness as such,
which serves as the horizon within which the being-as-it-appears
can appear. The term of this antecedent orientation, however,
cannot be intuited by the empirical intuition, yet certainly it is
not absolutely nothing. Kant calls it ' 'non-empirical (he could
say as well "transcendental") object, which he designates as
" X . " 86
The second text speaks of the " X " explicitly as a "transcendental object," as the object of intuition as such, which can be
described only as the "correlate of the unity of [transcendental]
apperception," sc. consciousness.87 But it is not known in itself;
indeed, given the finite condition of the knower, it cannot be
known as such, for it is simply not a being like other beings - it
is Non-being. It is a "pure horizon," but somehow a discernible
domain of opposedness, the necessary condition for an encounter
with a being as opposed. " . . . Only if the process of enabling a
being to reveal itself as opposed is a thrust into Non-being. . . . "
is the encounter with beings, that takes place, indeed, within
Non-being, possible.88 Not a being, the pure horizon is necessarily un-thematic. And if by "knowledge" we understand a
comportment between two beings, then Non-being, as pure
horizon and necessarily unthematic, cannot be "known," and
ontological knowledge is not "knowledge" at all. Its only proper
name is "transcendence." 89
C.

ONTOLOGICAL

KNOWLEDGE:

ITS

ULTIMATE

MEANING

j. Transcendental Imagination as Common Root
What renders ontological knowledge possible and therefore
grounds metaphysics is, for Heidegger's Kant, the process of
finite transcendence. We have now to see that for Kant, too, its
ultimate meaning is time.
But before probing the relation between transcendental im•• K R V , A 1 0 9 .

K M , pp.

X 1 3 - H 4 .

KRV, A 2 5 0 .
1 1 M . . . Nur wenn das Gegenstehenlassen von . . . ein Sichhineinhalten in das
Nichts ist, . . . " (KM, p. 71).
w
KM, pp. 1x3-1x5, 139.
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agination and time, we must first see the imagination's relation
to the two basic powers in man, reason and sensation. If the
pure imagination is the center of transcendence, we must study
its role precisely as center. Heidegger takes as his starting point
the apparently inconsistent juxtaposition of two series of texts
in Kant: one of these enumerates the transcendental imagination
among the three essential elements of the ontological synthesis
(along with the pure intuition and pure concepts of apperception), or as one of the three basic powers in man; the other
insists that there are only two "stems" of knowledge (sensateness and understanding). The problem is resolved by recalling
that this "instituting power" is at once a passive (receptive) and
a constructive (spontaneous) institution. In this "at once" lies
the genuine essence of its structure. If receptivity means the
same thing as sensate-ness, and spontaneity the same as understanding, then the imagination falls in a unique way between
the two, or better still is the "unknown common root" of the
other two. In other words, we say that the pure imagination
through the schemata constitutes the unity between the two
components of ontological knowledge. But in order to do so, it
must have been antecedently on a par (gewachsen) with both.
This is possible only on the supposition that it is the origin of
both, sc. that it lets both of them spring forth. In considering
the transcendental imagination as "root," we consider ontological knowledge (therefore transcendence) in its very origin.90
a. I N T U I T I O N - In what sense is pure imagination the root
of pure intuition? When we discussed the latter, we saw that as
finite intuition it must receive what it intuits, yet as pure (preexperiential), it must give the intuited to itself. Furthermore,
what is intuited is a unity, hence the intuition-that-gives-toitself must be unifying. Heidegger argues that such a passiveactive function must find its root in a power, or center, which
is of its very nature institutive, and, indeed, synthetic (unifying).
But the totality of pure intuition does not possess the unity of
universality that characterizes concepts, hence cannot find its
roots in the understanding. Its source can only be the pure imagination - all the more since it is this which is the origin of
99
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everything "synthetic" in the first place. The transcendental
imagination is the root of pure intuition because it supplies the
ultimate basis for the "syn"-character of the synopsis.91
b. P U R E R E A S O N - We can see how the understanding
finds its root in pure imagination if we recall what was said, in
the descending method of transcendental deduction and in the
discussion of schematism, concerning the referential dependence
of the transcendental unity of apperception upon the synthesis
of the pure imagination. The transcendental apperception is
polarized into the unified conscious ego of "I think (substance,
cause, etc.)," which is the pure understanding. This unity is not
instituted simply by the mutual affinity of the categories but
by the absorption of the categories into the presentation by a
conscious ego of a still more profound unity of a common horizon. It is in the presentation of this common horizon that
consists the orientation of the conscious ego toward the beingto-be-known. But what constitutes the horizon? It is the pure
imagination, by reason of the schemata, that gives to the categories their objective reality, hence makes the horizon instituted
by the orientation to be properly speaking a horizon of objectiveness. It is the schematism of the pure imagination, then,
that enables the understanding to perform its polarizing function,
to be itself, and hence serves as ground of the understanding, its
root.
From another point of view, transcendental apperception, in
polarizing the categories, presents a unifying unity. But in order
to do this it must have had previously a glimpse of unity which
serves as guide in the polarizing function. This previously discerned unity which controls the polarizing function is the unity
of the pure synthesis in the transcendental imagination through
schematism. The only way to explain why the pure understanding has this antecedent glimpse is by saying that it has its
source in this unity. 92
But the transcendental imagination is root not only of the
pure understanding but also of the pure reason (reiner Vernunft),
81

KM>
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KM>

PP. X3X, 134.
PP- 137^138. It is in this sense that the writer understands the passage
which suggests the priority of self (sc. the institution of transcendence) to consciousness (transcendental apperception) which we shall examine soon.
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understood here in the strict sense as the power of ideas, sc. the
power of presenting the rules of the understanding in various
modes of totality. However, the rules of the understanding
bring-to-pass that regulating function only through the schemata
of the imagination, and are therefore relationally dependent on
them. Since the ideas organize these rules into different modes
of totality, then the ideas, and the power which forms them, are
no less dependent on the pure imagination than are the categories. If the transcendental imagination is the ground of the
understanding, it is the ground of the pure reason as well.93
c. P R A C T I C A L R E A S O N - The pure imagination is more
than root of intuition and theoretical reason. Heidegger goes on
to say that it is root as well of man's "practical reason," the
power of human freedom. Before doing so, however, he notes
that the theoretical reason itself possesses a type of freedom,
provided one understand freedom in the Kantian sense as a
"submission to a self-imposed necessity." 94 The "necessity"
here is the objectiveness, or opposedness, of the horizon which
is offered to the theoretical reason, or imposed upon it, as
the view fashioned by pure intuition. It is self-imposed, because
the pure intuition, fashioning this view, springs from the same
source (sc. the transcendental imagination) as the pure reason,
hence is ultimately one with it. The pure reason submits to this
self-imposed "necessity," because it is thus that it achieves its
self-orientation toward the beings-to-be-known. Hence, the
theoretical reason " . . . is not free because it has the characteristic of spontaneity but because this spontaneity is receptive, sc.
because it is the transcendental imagination." 95
Coming to the practical reason, Heidegger argues that this,
too, is rooted in the pure imagination, because it must stem from
a root that is simultaneously spontaneous and receptive. To
93 KM, p. 141. All this considers the pure reason in the strict sense (Vermögen der
Ideen), but to catch the full force of the argument, it should be extended to the
pure reason in its broad sense, which includes both understanding and the power
of the ideas, designating thus the complete power of higher knowledge in man. It
is such an illation as this, not indicated in the text, which explains the title of
this particular section, "No. 29. Die transzendentale Einbildungskraft und die
theoretische Vernunft."
94 KM, p. 142 (sich stellen unter eine selbstgegebene Notwendigkeit).
95 " . . . Der Verstand und die Vernunft sind nicht deshalb frei, weil sie den Charakter der Spontaneität haben, sondern weil diese Spontaneität eine rezeptive
Spontaneität, d.h. transzendentale Einbildungskraft ist." (KM, p. 142).
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understand this, we must review briefly the main theses of
Kant's analysis of the practical reason. To begin with, the
practical reason is not to be understood as a different power in
man than the theoretic reason but is rather the practical use of
the pure reason as such in the sphere of the moral activity of
man. The theoretic use of the pure reason is that by which the
knower presents what is; the practical use is that by which he
presents what should be {Sollen). Considered as pure, reason in
its practical function presents what "should be" a priori to all
experience, this "should be" being the universally binding moral
law as enunciated in the categorical imperative. Yet because we
are dealing with the reason in its structure prior to experience,
reason itself must constitute the law, so that reason becomes
its own lawgiver. The fact that the reason is its own lawgiver
makes it autonomous, and in this autonomy lies its freedom.
Morality consists in submission to the self-imposed law out of
respect (Achtung) for it and the duty it imposes.96
In structure, then, the practical use of pure reason is analogous to the theoretical use. To the horizon of objectiveness of
the theoretical reason corresponds here the moral law, or necessity (categorical imperative), which is op-posed to, more
exactly im-posed upon, the moral person. Corresponding to the
self-orientation of the theoretical reason, we have here a submission to the law through respect. It is respect for the moral
law that makes manifest the law and renders it possible for the
law to impose itself. Yet this respect remains submission to the
law and it is in surrender to the law that is achieved the freedom
and dignity of the self as a moral person.97
Both law and submission are one, then, as unified as the moral
self they compose. Yet such a unity comprises both receptivity
and spontaneity: "the submissive surrender to . . . is pure receptivity, the free imposition of the law upon oneself is pure
spontaneity. . . . " 98 It can only be explained if it stems from a
•• V.g. KRV, B X X V (praktischen Gebrauch), B 661 (sein soll); Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, hg. Karl Vorländer, 9. Aufl. (Hamburg: Meiner, 1959), (hereafter:
KPV), I.T., I.B., LH., no. 7 (Sittengesetz), no. 8 (Freiheit); Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, hg. Karl Vorlander, 3. Aufl. (Hamburg: Meiner, 1957), II. Abs.
(Autonomie des Willens); KPV, I.T., I.B., 3. H. (Achtung, Pflicht).
KM, pp. X44-X45.
M "Die sich unterwerfende unmittelbare Hingabe an . . . ist die reine Rezeptivität, das freie Sich-vorgeben des Gesetzes aber ist die reine Spontaneität; . . . " (KM, p.
146).
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root that is both spontaneous and receptive, sc. the transcendental imagination. We conclude: the transcendental imagination is the common root from which stem both pure intuition
and pure reason, practical as well as theoretical. In a word, it is
the center of the entire man.
2. Transcendental Imagination and Original Time
Having established that the transcendental imagination is the
center of all that properly characterizes man, Heidegger investigates more closely its relation to one of the components of the
pure synthesis, sc. the pure intuition of time. If one accepts his
interpretation of the pure imagination as origin of time, he wishes
to show how radically this must be understood. The transcendental imagination is not simply the origin of time, understood
as a pure intuition, but is itself original t i m e . "
The argument starts with time understood as a pure intuition,
sc. where the intuiting gives to itself the intuited, and where the
intuited is the pure succession of "nows." As we saw, however, this
intuited succession is not seized as an object, but what is intuited is the intuiting itself in its function as originally instituting the succession in the manner of a donation to itself.
. . . Time as pure intuition means neither the intuited of a pure intuiting
only, nor only an intuiting which is wanting an "object." Time as pure
intuition is the unique process of an intuiting which institutes the intuited. ...100
It is because of this self-instituting character, as we saw, that
time finds its root in the center of institution in man, sc. the
transcendental imagination.
Now this succession cannot be grasped as succession simply
by the grasping of a single "now." In fact, the present "now,"
considered apart from the succession, sc. out of a relationship
to a "now" that is to follow and a "now" that already was, is
meaningless. Hence, even to grasp the present "now" as present,
the intuition must look forward to the not-yet (therefore preview) and back to the have-been "nows" (re-view), sc. institute
•» KM, p. 160.
" . . . Zeit als reine Anschauung heißt weder nur das im reinen Anschauen Angeschaute, noch nur das Anschauen, dem der 'Gegenstand' fehlt. Die Zeit als reine
Anschauung ist in einem das bildende Anschauen seines A n g e s c h a u t e n . . ( K M , p.
159)- Heidegger's italics.
xo °
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a horizon of "nows." 1 0 1 If the transcendental imagination is
the source of time as a self-instituting intuition, it must be the
origin of the entire horizon as such, sc. it must be itself original
time. How is this to be understood?
The author proceeds now to examine certain passages in Kant
which give warrant for us to claim that time (as described above
in its purity) is intrinsic to the transcendental imagination. The
general lines of his argument will be these: There are three types
of empirical syntheses which suggest the three dimensions of
time: a. the synthesis of apprehension in intuition suggests the
present; b. the synthesis of reproduction in (empirical) imagination suggests recall, sc. orientation toward the past; c. the
synthesis of recognition in concepts of the understanding
suggests anticipation, sc. orientation towards the future. These
three types of synthesis in empirical knowledge presuppose a
corresponding synthesis in pure knowledge that renders them
possible. Yet pure knowledge is the ontological synthesis that
comes-to-pass in the transcendental imagination. Hence, the
transcendental imagination itself must possess this triple orientation toward present, past and future, and therefore it must be
time in its very origin. We now examine this triple orientation
at closer range.
a.

PURE

SYNTHESIS

AS

PURE

APPREHENSION

-

B y

apprehension, Kant understands the bringing together into a
unity, of the manifold data offered by the several senses. This
unifying, however, is impossible unless there be an intuition of
time which distinguishes the different "nows." For unless the
knower can say "now and now and now," he cannot say "now
this, now that, now both together," and therefore would not be
able, in the amorphous welter of sense impressions, to distinguish unities at all. For the "now" itself is unifying, since
whatever is seized in any given "now" (Augenblick) is necessarily
unified. Apprehension unifies the manifold that is present here
and "now/'
But an empirical synthesis presupposes a pure apprehending
synthesis, sc. the pure reception, hence the pure giving to oneself,
of such a thing as "now" - the present as such. Now if the
191

KM»

P- 138. "Pre-view, re-view" suggested by French translators, p. 37.
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synthesizing function of empirical apprehension is grounded in
the (empirical) imagination - and such is the case, says Kant
expressly - then the apprehending synthesis in its purity, sc.
that which institutes the "now" (the present) antecedently to
experience, must be a mode of the imagination in its purity. It
is the transcendental imagination, then, that is the origin of the
present as such. 102
b.

PURE

SYNTHESIS

AS

PURE

REPRODUCTION

-

B y

reproduction, Kant understands that process by which the
knower can render present to himself a being that was once
known, but which no longer reveals itself to the knower here and
"now." It is the presentation of a being "now" as having been
known "before." On the empirical level, such a process supposes
that the knower can bring-forth-(back)-again (re-pro-ductio)
the being that has been known before, in such a way as to identify
it with the being that is known now, hence a synthesis. It is
worth remarking that such a reproductive (better, perhaps,
"retentive") synthesis is necessary even for apprehension, sc. in
order that the elements of the manifold be retained long enough
to be brought into the unity of "now."
Passing to the a priori level, we must say that the conditions
which render such a synthesis possible are that the knower can
retain the being that has been known before as having been
known before, and consequently that he distinguishes between
"before" and "now":
. . . Therefore in order that the empirical synthesis in the mode of a reproduction be possible, one must be able from the very beginning, before
any experience, to bring back again the "now"-that-has-been as such and
unite it with the "now" that actually is. . . . 1 0 8
This, too, is a synthesis - but a pure one, one that establishes
antecedently the horizon of the previous as such and keeps this
horizon open. " . . . The pure synthesis in the mode of reproduction constitutes the past [having-been-ness] as such. . . . " 1 0 4
KM, pp. 163-164.
" . . . Damit also empirische Synthesis im Modus der Reproduktion möglich
wird, muß im vorhinein schon das Nicht-mehr-jetzt als tin solches vor aller Erfahrung
wieder bei-gebracht und mit dem jeweiligen Jetzt geeinigt werden können
"
(KM, p. 165). We resume here KM, pp. 1 6 4 - 2 6 6 .
104 " . . . Die reine Synthesis im Modus der Reproduktion bildet die Gewesenheit
als s o l c h e . . ( K M , p. 1 6 3 ) .
10t
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If the empirical synthesis of reproduction is brought-to-pass
by the empirical imagination, the pure synthesis must be the
work of the imagination in its purity, sc. as transcendental.
Moreover, this process of constituting the pre-experiential
synthesis of the "now"-that-has-been and the "now"-that-is
fuses the horizon of the past with the horizon of the present into
a structural unity. " . . . In this original unity of the two modes
[of synthesis], [the transcendental imagination] can be, then, the
origin of time (as unity of present and past). . . . " 1 0 5 .
c.

PURE

SYNTHESIS

AS

PURE

RECOGNITION

-

B y

recognition here, Kant means that process by reason of which
the knower discovers that the being which reveals itself in two
presentations, or modes of presentation (v.g. reproduction and
apprehension), is one and the same. Hence, it is a discoveiy of
identity, an identification. On the empirical level, let us suppose
the simultaneous synthesis of reproduction and apprehension.
This double process is not haphazard but controlled, sc. regulated
by a unity that is seized antecedently and whose function is
precisely to control the coming-together of these two syntheses
and guarantee that they present one and the same identical
being-to-be-known. This antecedent regulating unity is a rule,
sc. that unifying function which we have called the concept, the
presentation of a unity, which in its identity is applicable to
many. First to have grasped this regulating unity by anticipation and then to discover the other syntheses as achieving
their union in and through it - this is to recognize identity: it is a
synthesis of recognition.
Such an empirical synthesis supposes as a condition of its
possibility a synthesis of identification that precedes all experience. Preceding all experience of beings, it can only open up
the dimension of antecedent seizure as such; thus it is " . . . the
original institution of anticipation, sc. the future. . . . " 1 0 6 Since
it comes-to-pass through the regulating function of the concepts
as rules, which are the schemata, the "transcendental product"
105 " . . . In dieser ursprünglichen Einheit der beiden Modi kann sie dann aber auch
der Ursprung der Zeit (als Einheit von Gegenwart und Gewesenheit) sein
"
(KM, p. i66).
108 " . . . Ihr Erkunden ist als reines das ursprüngliche Bilden dieses Vorhalten, d.h.
der Zukunft
" (KM, p. 169). We are resuming KM, pp. 167-171-
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of the pure imagination, this institution of the future is the task
of the transcendental imagination. The transcendental imagination, then, instituting future as well as present and past, is
"original time." 107
d.

TIME

AS

ORIGIN

OF

TRANSCENDENTAL

IMAGI-

- The transcendental imagination is "original time"
because, as we see, it is the root of time. Heidegger goes further.
We have an equal right, he seems to say, to speak of time as the
root of the transcendental imagination. His reason is that it is
time which enables the pure imagination to perform its task of
bringing about the ontological synthesis, sc. transcendence. For
ontological knowledge is the perfect fusion of three component
factors: pure intuition, pure thought and pure imagination. Now
to each of these factors corresponds a synthesis, which, taken by
itself, institutes one of the three dimensions of time: to intuition
corresponds the synthesis of apprehension, which, taken in its
purity, institutes the horizon of time-present; to imagination
corresponds the synthesis of reproduction (for it is the presenting
of an object without the presence of the object) which, taken in
its purity, institutes the horizon of time-past; to thought corresponds the synthesis of recognition, which, taken in its purity,
institutes the horizon of time-future. There are not three horizons of time, however, but one horizon with the triple dimension
of past-present-future. The unity of these three syntheses, taken
in their purity, is the unity of time itself in the very process of
tim-ing (Zeitigung). It is the unity of time, then, that renders
possible the unification of these three modes of the pure synthesis, hence the three component factors of ontological knowledge.
For:
NATION

. . . It is only because these modes of the pure synthesis in the triple unification of time are in origin one and the same [process], that they contain
in themselves likewise the possibility of unifying in a common origin the
three elements of pure knowledge. .. . 108
107 KM, p. 170 {ursprüngliche Zeit). Furthermore, since synthesis of identification
renders possible, hence in a sense precedes, the syntheses of reproduction and apprehension, though it is never independent of them, one has a right to say that time
"temporalizes" itself out of the future. (See p. 170). Clear resonance of SZ1
108 " . . .
Nur weil diese Modi der reinen Synthesis in der dreifach-einigen Zeit
ursprünglich einig sind, liegt in ihnen auch die Möglichkeit der ursprünglichen
Einigung der drei Elemente der reinen Erkenntnis
" (KM, p. 178).
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And if the transcendental imagination is justly called the
"center" in which this pure synthesis comes-to-pass, the reason
can be only that it is rooted itself in the ultimate unity of time.
" . . . It is only the fact that it is rooted in time that enables
the transcendental imagination as such to be the root of transcendence." 109
Let us concede immediately that the point here is difficult.
The analysis of the triple synthesis led us to accept the transcendental imagination as origin, sc. ultimate source, of the three
dimensions of time. Now it is time itself which ontologically
precedes the transcendental imagination and renders possible,
by its own unity, the unifying power of the latter. Is there an
inconsistency here? Or is there merely something un-said? At
any rate, for the present we see in what way Heidegger finds in
Kant the main thesis of SZ: that which renders metaphysics
(ontological knowledge) possible is the process of finite transcendence, whose ultimate meaning is time.

II. General Remarks
We come now to certain general remarks which will let us see
more clearly, perhaps, the implications of all that precedes in
terms of foundational thought. In beginning, we advert once
more to the fact that Heidegger bases his interpretation of Kant
on the first edition of K R V , not the second. The reason is that
it is only in the first edition that the pure imagination plays this
radical rdle as the center of transcendence. In the second edition,
on the contrary, transcendence is a function of the understanding
alone. 110
Of course, Heidegger must explain the change. It was, he
claims, because Kant saw darkly the consequences to which his
radicalism would drive him, and retreated before them as one
recoils before an abyss (Abgrund) whose obscure depths are
unknown. Such consequences were, for example, these: from
the theoretical aspect, the traditional primacy of reason and
logic in man would be made subordinate to a power (the pure
1 0 9 " . . . Diese Verwurzelung in der Zeit ist es allein, kraft deren die transzendentale Einbildungskraft Überhaupt die Wurzel der Transzendenz sein kann." (KM,
P. 178).
1 1 0 KM, pp. 146-150.
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imagination) which always had been considered inferior to
reason because essentially sensate; from the practical point of
view, the origin of the moral order, personality, etc. would have
to be ascribed to the transcendental imagination rather than to
the pure Teason, which, as pure spontaneity, should be considered in the proper sense free. 111
A.

BEING

j. Being as Horizon
In our discussion of the ontologically known, we saw that the
pure horizon of objectiveness, within which beings appear and
by reason of which they can reveal themselves for what they are,
is more, certainly, than absolutely nothing, yet cannot be called
a being like the rest. It must be characterized as Non-being.
More positively, what can we say? It is important to note that
Heidegger clearly makes Non-being, in the sense of the pure
horizon, equivalent with Being - not World, as the phenomenology of SZ demanded, but Being. More than once he calls the
coming-to-pass of transcendence, by which the pure horizon is
instituted, "the comprehension of Being." The institution of
transcendence, then, is nothing more than the opening-up of the
horizon " . . . in which the Being of beings becomes antecedently
d i s c e r n i b l e . . 1 1 2 for the horizon itself offers to the knower
"antecedent opposedness." 1 1 3
How understand this antecedence of the Being-horizon?
Certainly it is not a temporal but an ontological one, sc. the
horizon of Being antecedes the encounter that takes place within
it, as condition antecedes the conditioned. It is in this sense that
the transcendental imagination, in constituting the horizon of
Being, is not dependent upon the fact that the being-to-beknown be present. Rather, through the (ontologically) prior
construction of the pure schemata, the transcendental imagination constitutes the view of an abiding Presence (Anwesenheit)
as such, that renders it possible for the beings-to-be-known to
1 1 1 KM, pp. 152-153. All the critics found the explanation ingenious. Not all were
thoroughly convinced.
.. in dem das Sein des Seienden vor gängig erblickbar wird...." (KM, p .
x*5)- See pp. 24, 7o, « 8 (Seinsverständnis).
l l * KM, p. 7a (Widers tändigkeit).
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manifest themselves as present.11* It is in this horizon of Presence
that they can arrive for the encounter. From another point of
view, this antecedent Presence that we call the horizon of Being
may be understood, if we recall that Kant calls it the "correlate
of the unity of transcendental apperception" (consciousness),
understood as a unity which awaits the being whose appearing
it makes possible. Constituted by the pure union of the synopsis
of the pure intuition (time) and the synthesizing functions of the
categories, this unity that is presented by the polarizing function
of the transcendental apperception, sc. the horizon of Being,
contains within itself the tendency to unify that which has not
been brought to an interior oneness as yet, sc. the being-whichis-to-appear (be known) as it will appear. 115
Yet this manner of speaking should not lead us to understand
the horizon as "temporally" prior to beings, for this would be
to forget that it is essentially the transcendental condition of the
appearing of beings, and it is as such that it must play its röle.
To understand it as "temporally" prior to this appearing would
give it an independence which it does not possess and, in the last
analysis, would make it a being like the rest. As Kant himself remarks, ontological knowledge has only an "empirical use." 1 1 6
It is only when we comprehend the horizon of transcendence as
both the unifying dynamism of sheer Presence and as Non-being
that we understand it properly.
If we try to underline those characteristics of Being that are
most important for us, we may say in the first place that Being
is un-thematic. The horizon is never seized for itself and
presented as if it were a being, for that is precisely what it is not.
It may be discerned only as the condition of possibility of an
encounter between man and other beings, hence cannot be
thematized for itself as objectivized in any way. Furthermore,
Being is temporal, for it is sheer Presence. The temporality of
Being is implicit, as well, when the author insists that the horizon of objectiveness, because finite, includes time as an essential component. It may be inferred, too, from the analysis of
1 1 4 KM, pp. 118-119, 122. The word Anwesenheit is significant, for it is principally
a j Anwesen that Being is thematized in Heidegger II. The conception appears already, as a matter of fact, in SZ, v.g. pp. 25-26.
x " KM, p. 77.
1 1 8 KM, 115 ("empirischen Gebrauch").
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the transcendental imagination as original time, whether we
take the imagination as the root of time or time as the root of the
transcendental imagination. But most of all, Being, as the
horizon of finite transcendence, is intrinsically finite. The point
deserves elaboration.
Recall that for Kant the problem is to determine what renders
possible man's knowledge of a being which reveals itself as an
object of experience. Such a problematic supposes necessarily
the finitude of the knower, for only to a finite knower can a
being be opposed (at a distance) as an object; an infinite Knower
would intuit it not as an object but in its origin in the creative
intuition. Now as we saw, Heidegger makes this distinction between the being as an object of finite intuition and the being as
created term of infinite intuition equivalent to the distinction
between the being-as-it-appears and the being-as-it-is-in-itself.
Heidegger's interest in Kant, however, focuses on beings-as-theyappear and he asks simply how it is that they can appear. The
answer, of course, is the transcendence of the knower. What is
notable here is that if Kant is interested in the sphere of beingsin-themselves (Ding-an-sich) which are "transcendent" to pure
reason, Heidegger is not. Some will say that he should be, but the
fact is, he is not.
For Heidegger, the being-as-it-appears is the being-in-itself
insofar as it is seized imperfectly (therefore concealed as well
as revealed) by a finite There-being. 117 In the context of the
analysis of the World, a being-in-itself (an sick) is a being
comprehended in its ontological dimension, sc. as an instrument
inserted into the complex of relations which constitute the
World. 118 In both cases, the being-in-itself is accessible to the
finite There-being. Heidegger needs no excursus through the
postulates of practical reason, then, to put him in contact with
the domain of beings-as-they-are. There-being is already in
commerce with them, because it is to-be-in-the-World. Heidegger's whole problem, then, is concerned with explaining the
1 1 7 Compare SZ, p. 30 and KM, p. 38. In both cases, concealment is intrinsic to
the revelation. In SZ, this concealment is conceived as proceeding from the being*
to-be-known, in KM as from the knower. Since the being reveals itself only when the
knower knows, there is really no discrepancy.
l l i SZ, pp. 74-76. From our present perspective, we detect here clearly the polemic vs. the Neo-Kantians.
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accessibility of beings-as-they-are-in-themselves-but-revealingthemselves-in-finite-fashion-as-obj ects to There-being (understood in KM as the human knower). Whether this be explained
by the comprehension (project) of Being, as in SZ, or by the
pure horizon of transcendence, as in KM, the solution is essentially the same. What renders beings accessible to finite
There-being is Being, to which There-being in turn has access
because it is transcendence.
With this in mind, we can understand, at least in terms of the
problematic as it has developed thus far, why Heidegger is not
concerned with where beings "come from" in the ontic sense,
whether from God or from some nameless origin of the World
(Weltgrund), etc. He is interested only in their accessibility, sc.
in what he understands as their Being. How radically he bars
himself from all access to what Kant would call a "transcendent"
domain appears when we recall that the power in man which
enables Kant to pass to this domain, sc. the practical reason
with its postulates, is, according to Heidegger, rooted in, therefore subordinate to, the transcendental imagination, the power
whose function is to institute Being as a sheer horizon of transcendence, sc. of accessibility and nothing more.
Finally, this perspective enables us to understand certain
formulae used elswhere, which at first reading seem enigmatic.
For example, in SZ the function of There-being is to let beings
"be"; yet this is not a creation by There-being; rather it lets
beings already endowed with entity (je schon "Seiendes") come
to an encounter with There-being by reason of There-being's
discovery of their instrumentality (Zuhandenheit). Again, "a
being is independently of experience, knowledge and conception
by which it is disclosed, discovered, determined. But Being 'is'
only in the comprehension [of There-being]. . . . " 1 1 9 These texts,
read in conjunction with the repeated insistence in KM that the
finite knower, because finite, does not create the being-to-beknown but does institute the horizon of their accessibility, become far more intelligible.
l l t "Seiendes ist unabhängig von Erfahrung, Kenntnis und Erfassen, wodurch
es erschlossen, entdeckt und bestimmt wird. Sein aber 'ist' nur im Verstehen des
Seienden, zu dessen Sein so etwas wie Seinsverständnis gehört
" (SZ p. 183). See
SZ, p. 212; WG, p. 39, note 59, and p. 47. The same principle is applied, of course, to
truth (SZ, pp. 230, 227).
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2. Being and Truth
The intimate relationship between Being and truth we already discovered in SZ. In KM, the problem of truth is touched
only obliquely. If we must wait for WG and WW before the
problem is posed in all its force, the occasional remarks of KM
are in their own way revealing nonetheless. To begin with, Heidegger takes it as self-evident that all genuine knowledge is true
knowledge. As a consequence, he calls the process of knowledge
the "veritative synthesis" - synthesis because all knowledge is
a union of knower and known, veritative because, by reason of
this union, the being-to-be-known becomes manifest, sc. true,
simply because it reveals itself as it is. The veritative synthesis
comes-to-pass in the synthesis of intuition and thought, for
it is here that knowledge, hence experience, comes-to-pass.
Knowledge is true, then, because it renders (beings-to-be-known)
manifest.120 Clearly Heidegger's conception of truth here as
rendering-manifest presupposes the analysis made in SZ, by
which truth as conformity is shown to be derived from a more
fundamental truth, sc. truth-as-discovery, manifestation.
If truth is intrinsic to knowledge as such, then to the different
types of knowledge correspond different types of truth. We distinguished in the beginning ontic knowledge (of beings) from
ontological knowledge (of Being-structure, sc. of Being). We must
distinguish, then, ontic truth, sc. manifestation of beings, from
ontological truth, "the unveiledness of the Being-structure of
beings," or simply of Being itself. 121 Hence, the entire interpretation of Kant, with its examination of the " . . . interior possibility of a priori synthetic knowledge [is] a question about the
essence of the truth of ontological transcendence. . . . " 122 The laborious effort to explain how the categories possess their validity
was fundamentally the question about the pre-experiential
manifestation of the Being of beings in the essential unity of
ontological knowledge which constitutes this transcendence.123
120 KM, pp. 26,110 (nur wahre Erkenntnis ist Erkenntnis), 34 (die wahr-[offenbar-]
machende, veritative Synthesis).
X21 KM, p. 22 (die Enthülltheit der Seins Verfassung des Seienden). Cf. WG, p. 1312a "Wenn zum Wesen einer Erkenntnis ihre Wahrheit gehört, dann ist das transzendentale Problem der inneren Möglichkeit der a priori synthetischen Erkenntnis
die Frage nach dem Wesen der Wahrheit der ontologischen Transzendenz
"
(KM, p. 26).
1 1 8 KM, p. 84.
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Once it is established that this transcendence is nothing else than
opening-up and keeping open the horizon within which the
Being of beings-to-be-known is discernible prior to empirical
contact with these beings, so that it becomes possible for the
knower to seize their Being-structure when contact actually
occurs, then transcendence does not "have" truth but " . . . is
truth in its very origin. . . . " 124
But if transcendence is truth in its origin, sc. original truth,
we must not forget that transcendence is finite, and that the finitude of truth is un-truth. What must be said now of un-truth ?
Heidegger recognizes the validity of the question and calls it
"one of the most central problems of finitude," but one which
cannot be approached yet because we do not have the apparatus
to handle it. 125 He does make one illuminating remark, however.
When speaking of what Kant means by the phrase "behind the
appearance," he explains it by saying simply that human
knowledge is finite and as such must inevitably "conceal" (verbirgt) its object. 126 "Conceal," here, is used in implied opposition
to the idea of the revelatory power of the cognitive process. In
other words, the finite knower, because finite, is permeated
with negativity: he is radically incapable of knowing another
being exhaustively, sc. in the very origin of its being out of the
creative intuition of an infinite Intelligence. The finite act of
knowledge, then, does not exhaust the knowability of the
known. If it may be called a "revelation," then it is simultaneously a non-revelation (concealment), and finite truth is permeated by un-truth.
B.

THERE-BEING

It is perfectly obvious that the center of transcendence, which
in KM goes by the name of the transcendental imagination, is
what in SZ is designated as There-being. The analysis of the
former, then, permits us to gain a fresh look at the latter.

" . . . dann ist die Transzendenz die ursprüngliche Wahrheit
" (KM, p. 115).
i m KM, p. 2 2 8 (eines der zentralsten Probleme der Endlichkeit).
KM, p. 3 8 .
114

1M
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j. There-being as Project
In SZ, we saw that There-being's intrinsic comprehension of
Being is to be interpreted in terms of a project of Being, whose
anticipatory character plays an essential role in the subsequent
analysis. In KM, the pure imagination emerged more as a power
which brings about the pure synthesis, a center in which transcendence is instituted. The use of the term "project" (Entwurf)
is relatively rare here, but when it does occur, there is no doubt
that the institution of the horizon of transcendence may and
should be considered as project. The transcendental imagination,
for example, is a "freely constructing and projecting" power
which, in the sense that we have explained, receives what it
projects and submits to it. 127 What is projected? We know already that it is the horizon of objectiveness, but Heidegger is
still more precise:
. . . The transcendental imagination projects by an antecedent institution
the totality of possibilities of which it has a "prospect," in order that thus
it may propose the horizon within which the knowing self - and this is
not aD - comports itself. . . . 1 2 8
The institution of transcendence, then, here as in SZ, is the
projecting not only of the horizon of Being but of the potentialities of the self.
2. There-being as Center of Man
We saw, but did not develop, the fact that the transcendental
imagination is the center of the entire man. Let us reflect on
what this implies. The transcendental imagination, as that
center in man where transcendence comes-to-pass, is the source
that gives rise to the structure which renders possible his sensate, theoretical and moral life, sc. all that characterizes him as
a man. Giving rise to these three dimensions, it is their fundament, their ground, hence ontologically precedes them all and
enjoys over them a certain primacy. Granting that the pure
lÄ7 KM, p. 139 (frei bildenden und entwerfenden), 141 (Hinnehmens von Sichgebendem}.
l u
" . . . Die transzendentale Einbildungskraft entwirft bildend im vorhinein das
Ganze der Möglichkeiten, in das sie 'hinaussieht', um sich dadurch den Horizont vorzuhalten, innerhalb dessen das erkennende Selbst, und nicht nur dieses, handelt
"
(KM, p. 142).
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imagination is equivalent to There-being, we can understand
how There-being can be profoundly "human" without being
identified in unqualified fashion with man as such. 129
By the same token, we can see that if we define There-being
as "existence," this characterizes man on a different and deeper
level than that whereon the word existentia in the tradition
found its meaning, sc. as opposed (whether really or rationally)
to essence. Would it not be possible, then, that the entire
problematic of Heidegger, placed as it is on a different level,
might leave intact the traditional questions concerning essenceexistence, substance-accident, etc., and, if it succeeds, simply
serve to lay the indispensable ground(work) for them?
j. There-being as Subject
We saw in SZ the insistence which Heidegger lays on the fact
that There-being is not to be understood as a subject, although
it is unquestionably a self - a pre-subjective self that precedes
the dichotomy of subject and object and renders this dichotomy
possible - sc. it is transcendence. Now we can see how this is
articulated in a Kantian context.
For the transcendental imagination is more than a mere
subject of knowledge. Its task is to institute the horizon within
which two beings, knower and to-be-known, can encounter each
other and become opposed as subject-object. It renders the
subject-object relation possible. This horizon, for all its intrinsic
unity, may be considered from two different points of view. On
the one hand, it is a self-orientation of the knowing subject
toward the being-to-be-known-as-object. This is the "subjective" aspect. In this sense, the horizon renders it possible for
the knowing subject to be a subject, sc. constitutes the "subjectivity of the subject." On the other hand, however, the horizon, as the domain of objectiveness, renders it possible for the
being-to-be-known to reveal itself as opposed to the knower, sc.
to be an object. This is the "objective" aspect: the horizon
constitutes the "objectivity of the object." 130
1 W Even at this point {1929), long before HB (1947), we can see that a Sartrean
interpretation of There-being is a distortion.
180 KM, pp. 151, 157 (Subjektivität des Subjektes), 150 (Objektivität der Objekte).
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The horizon of transcendence instituted by the transcendental
imagination, then, enables simultaneously the subject to be
subject and the object to be object. It constitutes them as what
they are, in their Being, if Being be understood as accessibility
of one to the other. Transcendence, enabling as it does subject
and object to be what they are, lies "between" them both, ontologically antecedes them both, and renders it possible for the
relation between them (their encounter) to come about. The
transcendental imagination cannot be called a "subject," because it is the center of transcendence.
Yet if the pure imagination is not a subject, this does not
mean that it is any less the center of the self. On the contrary,
what most radically characterizes the self of a finite knower as
finite is primarily not his subjectivity but his transcendence. The
transcendental imagination, then, in rendering possible transcendence, institutes the essence of the finite self. 131
It is the virtue of KM to offer us some light on the relationship
between transcendence, which characterizes the knower as a
self, and the consciousness which characterizes him as a subject.
The indications in SZ were cursory: there, too, in a Kantian
context, Heidegger offered a brief sketch of the nature of
transcendental apperception as a "transcendental subject," the
" I think . . . " accompanying every act of synthesis, and suggested how this consciousness was conceived as lying at the base
of all presentations, therefore as their subject. As a result, the
subject is "consciousness in itself" ("Bewußtsein an sich"), sc.
it is not itself presented, but is the formal structure of presentation as such. His criticism is that Kant interprets this conscious
subject as if it were a mere entity, whose Being is understood
simply as the reality of the res cogitans,132
In KM, the relation between self (transcendence) and subject
(consciousness) is articulated in terms of the relation between
transcendental imagination (center of transcendence) and
transcendental apperception (transcendental unity of consciousness), expressed by the ego ("I think substance . . . etc."). Heidegger admits with Kant, as he had done for that matter in SZ,
that the ego as unity of consciousness cannot be separated from
131
wa

KM, p. 143. See pp. 145-146 for the problem in terms of practical reason.
SZ, pp. 319-320.
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the processes it accompanies. Its essence lies therefore in "pure
self-consciousness." We have already seen: how this transcendental apperception is the understanding in its purity; how, in
the transcendental deduction, it referentially depends upon the
synthesis which comes-to-pass in the transcendental imagination;
how this dependence is so profound that " . . . the understanding,
as pure apperception, has the 'ground of its possibility' in [the
transcendental imagination]. . . . " 1 3 3 Now we have one significant passage where Heidegger explicates the dependence of
consciousness (therefore subjectivity) upon transcendence (therefore selfhood). Let us cite it in full:
. . . In [the] presentative self-orientation-toward . . . [a being-to-beknown], the "self" is carried along in the orientation. In such an orientation as this, sc. wherein a "self" is "exteriorized," the "ego" of this
"self" is necessarily manifest. It is in this way that the "I present . . . "
"accompanies" every presentation. . . . The "ego" "goes along with" the
pure self-orientation. Insofar as this "ego" is what it is only in this "I
think," the essence of pure thought, as well as of the ego, lies in "pure
self-consciousness." This "consciousness" of the self, however, can be
illumined only by the Being of the self, not vice versa, sc. where the Being
of the self is illumined by "consciousness" or even made superfluous by
it. ™
What may we infer from this passage? We are dealing with
the horizon of transcendence under its subjective aspect, as the
self-orientation-toward . . . of the knower, sc. toward the beingto-be-known. The orientation of the self as such establishes, by
reason of the transcendental imagination, the domain of encounter with beings-to-be-known, sc. the horizon of objectiveness.
At this point, we are dealing with the knower in the dimension
of transcendence. Strictly speaking, then, it is the orientation
that institutes the transcendence which characterizes the self
1 9 9 " . . . Der Verstand hat ab reine Apperzeption den 'Grund seiner Möglichkeit1
in einem 'Vermögen', das 'in eine Unendlichkeit von selbstgemachten Vorstellungen
und Begriffen hinaussieht'
" (KM, pp. 141-142).
1 9 4 " . . . In solchem vorstellenden Sich-zuwenden-zu... wird das 'Sich' gleichsam
in d a s Zuwenden-zu . . . hinausgenommen. In solchem Zuwenden-zu . . . , bzw. in
d e m mit ihm 'geäußerten' 'Sich1, ist notwendig das 'Ich' dieses 'Sich' offenbar. In
solcher Weise 'begleitet' das 'ich stelle vor' alles Vorstellen. Nicht aber handelt es
sich 12m einen nebenbei vollzogenen Akt des auf das Denken selbst gerichteten
Wissens. Das 'Ich' 'geht' im reinen Sich-Zuwenden 'mit'. Insofern es selbst nur ist,
w a s es ist, in diesem 'ich denke', liegt das Wesen des reinen Denkens sowohl wie das
des Ich im 'reinen Selbstbewußtsein'. Dieses 'Bewußtsein' des Selbst aber kann nur
aus d e m Sein des Selbst, nicht umgekehrt dieses aus jenem aufgehellt, bzw. durch
jenes sogar überflüssig gemacht werden." ( K M , pp. 137-138).
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in its finitude. But obviously there can be no orientation without
that which is orientated, and in this sense the orientation carries
the "itself" ("Sich") along with it. Now as the self is carried
along in the orientation, the ego of this self becomes manifest
and "in this way the 'I present' 'accompanies' all presentation."
Here, then, we are dealing with the dimension of consciousness
by reason of which the knower is designated as a subject. It is
capital to note, however, that consciousness (therefore subjectivity) is, ontologically speaking, subsequent to the orientation (therefore transcendence) of the self which consciousness
makes manifest. What is primary is the self, not as subject but
as transcendence. That is why consciousness, ontologically
subsequent, must be explained by that which is ontologically
prior, sc. the Being of the self which consciousness manifests.
To reverse the procedure - and here we may detect an undeniable, if unexpressed, polemic against the idealists - is to distort
the whole problematic.
With this much to help us, we can understand, if we recall
how Heidegger in SZ tried to explore the Being-structure of the
self as transcendence (to-be-in-the-World), the significance of
such a remark as the following: "In saying T / There-being
brings itself to expression as to-be-in-the-World. . . . " 1 3 5 We
can understand, too, how Heidegger can claim that Kant, in
failing to explore the self in terms of its transcendence, interpreted it, when all is said and done, as a mere entity. Finally,
we can understand in what sense his own effort to interpret
K R V in terms of what is left un-said, yet somehow lies hidden
in Kant's pronouncements, leads him to ground the unity of
consciousness (therefore the specific character of subjectivity),
not only in the transcendental imagination (instituting the self
in its transcendence), but more radically still in the unity of time,
where the pure imagination itself has its source.186 It is not so
important for our purposes to follow him through the details of
his argument here.137 Much more significant is the general
us » I m ich-sagen spricht sich das Dasein als In-der-Welt-sein
" (SZ, p. 321).
Heidegger italicizes whole.
186 KM, pp. 172-173, 178.
1 , 7 Perhaps the most striking part of the analysis comes when, having established
that the receptivity that characterizes a finite subject as finite is rendered possible
°nly by the pure receptivity (Selbst-affektion) of time as a component of transcendence (pp.
171-174). Heidegger proceeds to show that Kant characterized both time
and consciousness by the same predicates, "stehende und bleibendeM (pp. 174-177)-
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direction of his thought: the self as a subject, sc. rendered manifest by the transcendental unity of consciousness, is ontologically subsequent to and rendered possible by the self as transcendence, whose ultimate meaning is time.
c.

THOUGHT

In SZ, Heidegger went about discerning the sense of Being
by means of phenomenological analysis. In KM, he thinks the
Being-process by re-trieving a potentiality for Being that has
been exploited already, sc. Kant's essay at grounding metaphysics. The task is not simply to re-iterate the problem but to
re-work it, to develop it as a problem, retaining "free and awake
all those interior forces that render this problem in its fundamental essence possible." In the present case, this process of
re-trieve means something more than a mere exposition of what
Kant said. Rather, it means bringing to light what he did not
say, could not say, yet nevertheless laid before our eyes as unsaid
in the formulae that he actually used:
. . . AU this, however, Kant himself was no longer able to say. For that
matter, what must become decisive [for us] in every type of philosophical
knowledge is not what is expressed in explicit formulae, but what is laid
before our eyes as still unsaid through the formulae that are used.138
But does not such an interpretation do violence to the original
text? Of course it does! No one sees this more clearly or concedes
it more readily than Heidegger. "Obviously in order to wring
from what the words say that which they want to say, every
interpretation inevitably must do violence. . . . " 1 3 9 The point
is made in the original text of KM. The author repeats it in another form twenty years later, justifying it only on the grounds
that such are the demands of a "thought-ful dialogue" between
thinkers. Briefly, it is essential to the method of re-trieve.
But this necessary violence is not sheer arbitrariness. It must
be subject to the discipline of a controlling idea. Only the power
U s " . . . Dieses aber vermochte Kant selbst nicht mehr zu sagen, wie denn überhaupt in jeder philosophischen Erkenntnis nicht das entscheidend werden muß, was
sie in den ausgesprochenen Sätzen sagt, sondern was sie als noch Ungesagtes durch
das Gesagte vor Augen legt." (KM, p. 182).
S M "Um freilich dem, was die Worte sagen, dasjenige abzuringen, was sie sagen
wollen, muß jede Interpretation notwendig Gewalt brauchen
" (KM, p. 183).
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of this idea can warrant the apparently presumptuous effort of
surrendering oneself to the inner movement of a philosophical
work in order to bring to expression that which was not and
could not be said in the original. And through its capacity, thus
proven, to do precisely this, the controlling idea reveals itself
more and more in its inherent power.140
Let us make the point once and for all, for the matter will
recur. If, in evaluating the author's efforts, one accuses Heidegger
of doing violence to "that which is said" (das Gesagte), he misses
the point completely. He fails to grasp the whole sense of Heidegger's effort at re-trieve, which is to say what an author did
not say, could not say, but somehow made manifest. The only
legitimate approach is to precise and evaluate the fundamental
idea which commands this violence and gives it in a profound
way its sense, sc. Heidegger's conception of Being itself.

Resume
We take our bearings again. In our search to lay bare the
foundations of metaphysics, phenomenology (SZ) showed us
that the structure in man which enables him to metaphysicize
is the process of finite transcendence, whose ultimate meaning
is time. As an historical process, There-being achieves authenticity with regard to its past by re-trieving potentialities for
Being that already have been exploited. One such potentiality
is Kant's effort to ground metaphysics, and in KM Heidegger
attempts to re-trieve it. What in SZ was called the "comprehension of Being" is in KM the "ontological synthesis" and
"transcendence," sc. the pre-ontic seizure of Being-structure
that renders it possible for beings to be encountered.
As synthesis, transcendence is not only fusion of knower and
known but, in the knower, of intuition and thought. As pre-ontic,
sc. prior to sense experience ("pure"), it is the union of pure
intuition (space and time) and the categories of the understanding, accomplished through the schemata of the transcendental imagination, which therefore is the center in man which
institutes the horizon of transcendence. In this horizon: knower
has access to known, because ontological knowledge is the anteno KM, p. 183.
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cedent orientation of knower towards beings-to-be-known, enabling him to be a subject; known has access to knower, because
the horizon enables the being-to-be-known to appear as itself,
hence to be an object. Constituting, then, both the subjectivity
(Being) of the subject and objectivity (Being) of the object, it is
itself neither subject nor object but the domain of accessibility
of one to the other. It is pure transcendence.
The horizon of transcendence is not a being; for the finite
knower, because finite, cannot institute (create) the beings it
knows. Therefore it is Non-being, or, more positively, pure
Presence and ontological truth - in any case, ineluctably finite.
As for the center of transcendence (the pure imagination), it is
certainly a self, but, because (ontologically) prior to the subjectobject relationship, it is a non-subjective, pre-subjective self,
whose unity derives from the tri-dimensional unity of time.
Briefly: for (Heidegger's) Kant as well as for Heidegger, the
structure in man which enables him to metaphysicize is the
process of finite transcendence, whose ultimate meaning is time.
And yet, all is not well. I. Granting that re-trieve necessarily
comports violence in wringing the un-said from the said, how
are we to discern this controlling idea that gives it warrant, so
that we may be sure we are submitting to a discipline and are
not prey to mere arbitrariness ? 2. Granting the fact that Heidegger here has thought Being by re-trieving Kant's problematic,
in what sense is it a re-trieve of There-being's past? What is the
relation between Heidegger's There-being and Kant's? If it is
the "same" There-being in both, then what is the relation between the individual thinker and There-being? What "is" an
individual? What "is" There-being? What "is" thought?
At this point, these questions are not intended in any sense
as a critique. They are meant merely to sharpen our vision as we
proceed.

CHAPTER

T H E

E S S E N C E

III

OF

G R O U N D

I. The Argument
The Essence of Ground (1929) is one of the hardest diamonds
in all of Heidegger's ample treasury.1 Appearing two years after
SZ, it offers, together with WM, the first public explications of
the major work. That Heidegger chose to publish a meditation
on what constitutes the essence of ground should not surprise us.
In KM, we saw how, faithful to the program of grounding metaphysics as delineated in SZ, the author analysed the transcendental imagination as the "ground upon which the inner possibility of . . . general metaphysics is instituted," simply because
it is the center where transcendence comes-to-pass. It is certainly
plausible, then, that he articulate further the relation between
transcendence and ground in language and perspective more
properly his own.
It seems superfluous to include here a study of the word
"ground" in SZ, for Heidegger's use of the word there does not
call attention to itself, and an investigation of this kind would
not advance us very much. Only two uses of the word seem to
be particularly suggestive: the conception of guilt, which, as
"ground of negativity," is applied to There-being inasmuch as
There-being's own ground (Being) is permeated by negativity;
the word "founding" (Begründen), which Heidegger uses
sometimes with quotation marks to suggest a meaning foreign
to his own (v.g. when used with regard to scientific research),
1 Vom
Wesen des Grundes, 3rd ed. (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1949).
(Hereafter: WG). New printing (1955) in larger type (text unchanged) brings text to
54 PP- instead of 50 pp. For the correlated pagination of both editions, see "Index
of Texts Cited."
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sometimes without, to suggest the elaboration of the antecedent
project of Being-structure which lies beneath the level of scientific investigation.2 The real affinity between WG and SZ, however, lies in the conception of transcendence as to-be-in-theWorld. We come at once, then, to the text.
The author begins with a salute to Aristotle, recalling that the
problem of ground arises for him under two forms: as apxh and
as diTiov. There are three forms of ipxh (that by which a being is,
or becomes, or is known), which Heidegger interprets as the
ground for its what-ness, its that-ness and its truth (Wahr-sein).
On the other hand, there are four types of ground in the sense of
aCxiov, or "cause." The relation between these two general classifications of ground remains obscure, still more the common
denominator of all these forms taken as one. In a general way,
then, we may say that for Aristotle ground is that which enables
us to answer the question: "why?" 3
The problem of ground reappears with Leibniz' formulation
of the "principle of ground" (Satz vom Grund), or, as we translate in English directly from the Latin, the "principle of sufficient reason." It is here that Heidegger begins his own analysis,
dividing the essay into three parts:
I. The Problem of Ground. Here he shows that the problem is
essentially one of truth, and, since it is the transcendence of
There-being that is primary truth, one of transcendence.
II. Transcendence as Domain for the Question about the Essence
of Ground. This includes a positive explanation of transcendence
and a historical survey (re-trieve?) of the notion of the World,
which is that whereunto There-being transcends. Special emphasis is given to Kant.
III. The Essence of Ground. This is an analysis of ground in
the perspective of transcendence. Since this is the decisive part
of our study, we resume Part I hastily, pass over Part II as already sufficiently handled for our purpose, and come as quickly
as possible to Part III.

* SZ, pp. 283 (Grandsein), 362 ("Begründung/* Begründung).
* WG, p. 7.
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TRANSCENDENCE

The function of Part I is to situate the problem of ground
clearly in the context of the author's own thought, according to
which, access to the meaning of Being is had in a being (Therebeing) whose nature is to transcend beings to Being. The bridge
between the problem of ground and the transcendence of Therebeing is the existential notion of truth.
The reduction of the problem of ground to the problem of
truth is quickly accomplished. To be sure, the principle of ground
(sufficient reason) tells us nothing about the nature of ground,
but it can serve as a starting point for the analysis,4 if we recall
that for Leibniz this principle was based on what he considered
to be the nature of truth. For him, truth is found primarily in
the judgement, sc. in an identity of an S and P, where P is contained in (therefore identical with) the S. Every truth can be
demonstrated, then, by an analysis of S, and the derivation of
P from S in a proposition constitutes the sufficient reason of its
truth, sc. the answer to: "why ?" The reason why the principle of
ground (sufficient reason) is valid is that if it were not, then
there would be a proposition, presumably true, whose P could
not be derived analytically from S, therefore necessarily untrue.
Contradiction!
Heidegger now argues: a proposition is true only if it is conformed to that which it expresses and on the ground of which
the proposition is said to be true. Truth as conformity pre-supposes another type of truth. It does not make its object accessible
but pre-supposes its accessibility, sc. that the being-to-be-judged
is already manifest, and it is by reason of this manifestation, sc.
ontic truth, that the proposition may be called true or untrue.
The truth of judgements, then, is grounded in ontic truth.6
Yet even ontic truth is not absolutely primary, for it reveals
itself only in the ontic comportment of There-being with other
beings (because it is ontic). In order for beings to manifest themselves for what they are in an ontic comportment, There-being
must have an antecedent comprehension of their Being-structure,
sc. the Being of these beings. " . . . The unveiled-ness of Being
4 A position reversed in 1955, with no more discrepancy than exists between
Heidegger I and Heidegger II. See SG, pp. 75, 84-86.
WG, pp. xo-12.
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[in comprehension by There-being] first renders possible the
manifestation of b e i n g s . 6 and this unveiled-ness is the
truth of Being, sc. ontological truth. Ontological truth renders
possible (therefore grounds) ontic truth, which in turn is the
ground for the truth of judgements on which the principle of
ground (sufficient reason), as Leibniz formulated it, is based
(grounded). The problem of ground, then, is transposed into the
problem of truth.
Now the problem of truth is essentially the problem of transcendence. For ontic truth (the manifestation of beings in their
Being) is rendered possible by ontological truth (the unveiledness of the Being of beings). These two types of truth presuppose,
then, the distinction between Being and beings (the ontological
difference), but how is such a distinction possible except by
reason of a being, immersed among the rest, so constituted that,
ontological as well as ontic, it can comprehend, sc. disclose or
project, the Being of beings, including itself, and thus pass beyond beings to their Being? This, however, is the prerogative
of There-being, for There-being is transcendence. If we are to
understand ground, we must explore the nature of transcendence.
B.

FROM

TRANSCENDENCE

TO

GROUND

I, The Process of Ground: its Components
The task of Part III of the meditation is to explain in what
sense transcendence can be called the essence of ground. The
relationship between transcendence and ground Heidegger calls
the "process of grounding," or the "coming-to-pass of ground"
(das Gründen). This unified process has three components whose
characteristics we have seen already in the essential, but which
receive now new designations, better adapted to sustain metaphorically the interpretation of transcendence as ground:
"laying-claim" (Stiften), "taking-possession" [Boden nehmen),
"founding" (Begründen)? The terms are not, of course, selfevident and must be explained. For the moment, let us remark
* " . . . Enthülltheit des Seins ermöglicht erst Offenbarkeit von Seiendem. . . . "
(WG, p. 13). Heidegger italicizes whole.
7 WG, p. 41. For the sake of clarity, we omit all allusion to freedom in the general
analysis of the argument, reserving to it a general remark all its own.
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simply that each plays its own particular r61e, and, still sustaining the metaphor, we may speak of the three components as
being scattered, or strewn-out (streuen), as ground. But they are
coordinated into the unity of a single process, which consequently should be called the "threefold strewing of ground." 8
a. L A Y I N G - C L A I M A N D T A K I N G - P O S S E S S I O N - The first
component of the process by which ground comes-to-pass we
have called "laying claim," but this is simply a new formula for
what is already familiar to us, the project of the World: the
passage of There-being beyond beings to Being, the establishing
of its ontological dimension, that which we have called the positive moment of transcendence.9
But transcendence is finite. We have seen that this finitude
consists primarily in There-being's facticity, suggesting both
its referential dependence on other beings and its that-ness, and
is disclosed by the ontological disposition. Hence, in WG the
same themes, when they return, are quite familiar. The project
of World is brought-to-pass by a being immersed among other
beings, among which it finds itself and beyond which it must
pass in the process of transcendence. That which is transcended
(here: beings) belongs as essentially to the transcendence as
that whereunto the transcendence is made (here: Being), for we
must never forget that the Being of which there is question is
always the Being of beings.10 This immersion among beings
means that There-being is captivated (eingenommen) by beings,
reverberates profoundly in attunement with them (durchstimmt),
and this precisely in transcending them. 11 This state of captivation is what we formerly called the referential dependence of
There-being on beings and explains the other important phrase
to the effect that There-being is just as essentially an ontic as
an ontological phenomenon. Furthermore, the fact that Therebeing is so orientated towards beings is not of its own choosing,
and There-being is powerless to change this condition, for it is
8 WG, pp. 46-47 (dreifache Streuung des Gründens). If the term "strewing" seems
awkward to the English reader, let him find what comfort he can in knowing that it is
just as awkward in German. In this case, at least, the translation seems to be philologically, philosophically and psychologically exact.
• W G , pp. 41-42.
» W G , pp. 14-15.
1 1 WG, p. 42. For another statement of the sense of attunement, see WW, p. x8.
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precisely unto such a state of dependence that There-being has
been thrown. 12 The dual implication of captivation by beings
(thrown-ness and referential dependence), when considered in
the context of the coming-to-pass of ground, is designated by
Heidegger as "taking-possession" or the "winning" of ground.
The figure needs explanation. The positive component of
transcendence is the project of World (Being), because it is
positive and does not of itself connote any restriction of the
possibilities it projects. This does not mean, of course, that the
project in its purity is "infinite," for what is projected is not
"infinite" but the complex of Total Meaningfulness which is a
profoundly finite World. When we consider the project as untrammeled positivity, however, we think of it as the disclosure
of the countless potentialities that There-being could have, if all
of the situations latent in the matrix of the World were realized.
But all of these situations are not - and cannot be - realized.
There-being, in its finitude, exists always in one situation that
necessarily excludes all others. If we may consider the project
in precision from this contraction, in its positivity therefore, we
may say that it "exceeds" (überschwingt), or "over-reaches,"
itself, for the contraction must inevitably come. Yet in this
untrammeled positivity, it scans the horizon of the World and,
like Alexander, lays-claim to it all. It is in this sense that we
understand the process of grounding in its positive moment to
be essentially a "laying-claim." 1 3
But in the process of grounding as it actually takes place, this
wide-ranging project is contracted into a given situation into
which There-being is thrown, where it is captivated by beings
that are all about and with which it must deal. Through this
contraction, certain possibilities that could have been Therebeing's are as a matter of fact withdrawn, and There-being is
left in that situation wherein it actually finds itself, sc. limited
by its own facticity. It is through this withdrawal (Entzug) of
the unrestricted possibilities which could have been, that Therebeing enters into the possession of the restricted possibilities that
are its own to assume, thus winning the ground of its actual
WG, p. 50.
WG, p. 43, The contraction reduces the sphere of There-being's possibilities to
those which it has chosen for itself, or which are imposed upon it or result from adaptation to milieu, etc. See SZ, p. 12.
18
18
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matter-of-fact existence. It is in this sense, then, that Therebeing takes possession of a very restricted sphere of the possibilities to which its positivity had laid claim.
The component of positivity is that which projects the World;
the component of negativity is that which contracts this project
to the matter-of-fact situation. What is important, however, is
the fact that the two are complementary, mutually dependent,
simultaneous, unified. It is only in the withdrawal of the possibilities that could have been but are not There-being's that the
project becomes "actual." In other words, There-being can be
"actual" only if it is finite:
. . . That in any given case the over-reaching project of the World becomes the power of possession only by a withdrawal [of possibilities] is
by this very fact a transcendental document of the finitude of the [transcendence] of There-being. . . . 1 4
b. T R A N S C E N D E N T A L F O U N D I N G - But we have not yet
considered the grounding-process in its totality. This process
implies more than simply the passage beyond beings to Being,
together with the thrown-ness among beings upon which Therebeing referentially depends and beyond which it passes. Up to
this point, There-being's reference to beings is of a very general
type, characterizing its thrown-ness as such. With this, nothing
yet is said about the comportment with beings that makes up
There-being's everyday commerce and into which, because of
its structure as negatived project, it may now enter. There must
be, then, a third component in transcendence as ground. The
first component, project, renders possible the antecedent comprehension of the Being of beings but cannot explain completely
this comprehension, inasmuch as, taken in its purity, it is not
itself a relation between There-being and beings.™ On the other
14 " . . . Daß der jeweils überschwingende Weltentwurf nur im Entzug mächtig
und Besitz wird, ist zugleich ein transzendentales Dokument der Endlichheit der
Freiheit des Daseins. . . . " (WG, p. 43). Heidegger's italics.
18 In affirming that the project of World renders possible the comprehension of
Being, Heidegger interposes the remark, "was hier nicht gezeigt werden kann" (WG,
p. 44)- It is not self-evident, then, that the World is equivalent to Being, hence an
explanation is necessary. Nevertheless the equivalence is genuine, and certain remarks
in SZ and KM have hinted already as much. The equivalence is never explicitly
thematized, but we shall soon see that the term "Being" replaces the term "World,"
and sometimes in Heidegger II the substitution is reversed (v.g. VA, p. 178). For us,
the important point is to notice that with the shift in terminology there is no shift
in problematic.
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hand, the second component, captivation, supplies a referential
dependence on beings in general but is not itself existentiell
comportment with any one being or with any given complex of
them. The function of the third component will be, then, to
render possible this comportment as such, sc. to enable Therebeing to enter into commerce with beings by making them
manifest in themselves and as themselves. Briefly, the third
component of transcendence as ground renders possible ontic
truth. It must be given a designation all its own. Heidegger calls
it by a term we translate as "founding." 16 It is the last of the
components essential to the coming-to-pass of ground.
With regard to this third component of the grounding-process,
sc. the founding of beings, there are several important observations to make:
i. Ontic and Ontological Truth ~ Founding is concerned with
There-being's comportment with beings, to be sure, but it would
be a mistake to think that we have ascended to the purely ontic
level. The founding of beings, as we have described it, renders
possible ontic truth (the manifestation of beings in their Being),
but for that reason it is more than merely ontic truth. Insofar
as we are dealing completely with the ontological dimension of
There-being, the level of transcendence, the founding we speak
of is a "transcendental founding." It renders possible ontic truth
because it unveils the Being and Being-structure of beings, but
such an unveiling is precisely what is meant by ontological
t r u t h : " . . . in [the comprehension of Being], transcendence is, as
such, a founding. Because in this comprehension Being and
Being-structure become unveiled, transcendental founding is
called ontological truth." 1 7
Transcendental founding, then, lies at the "base" of all ontic
comportment, permeating this comportment continually, and,
by reason of its effulgence, enables beings to become manifest
as beings, sc. in their Being. On the ontic level, however, every
1 1 WG, p. 44. Tb« prefix be- in German often gives verbs an active, transitive
sense of "to give, render," etc. Here the sense seems to be "to give ground" to beings
in the sense of unveiling this ground, sc. ontic truth.
1 9 " . . . In ihm ist die Transzendenz als solche begründend. Weil darin Sein und
Seinsverfassung enthüllt werden, heißt das transzendentale Begründen die ontologische Wahrheit:* (WG, p. 43). Heidegger's italics.
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type of illuminating comportment, whether it be the disclosure
of There-being itself or the discovery of beings other than Therebeing, must be in its own way a "founding." By this is meant
that it must give an account of itself, sc. present its credentials
(sich ausweisen). It is in the process of justifying beings in the
ontic dimension of There-being that the question of "cause" or
"purpose" arises. The problem of causality, according to Heidegger, poses itself, then, on the ontic level, and although this
does not exclude the ontological dimension but rather supposes
it, we can see in what way Heidegger feels justified in making
his criticism of Aristotle's initial presentation of the four causes
as types of ground:
. . . It is the characteristic of the first exposition of the "four causes" that
thereby there is not yet made the fundamental distinction between transcendental grounding and the specific ontic causes. . . . 1 8
In any case, let us retain that for Heidegger, the third component of transcendence as the grounding-process of There-being
is transcendental founding, which as ontological truth renders
possible all manifestation of beings in their Being, sc. ontic truth.
ii. The Question: "Why?" - It is the transcendental founding,
sc. ontological truth, that ultimately renders possible the
question: "why?," the answer to which is what men spontaneously mean by "ground." For all questions can be reduced ultimately to three basic types of "why?": why is a being so and
not otherwise? why is it this rather than another? why is it
something at all and not nothing? (the ground-question). In
each case, There-being, in order to pose the question at all, must
have an antecedent comprehension of the how and the what of
beings, of Being and of Non-being itself. " . . . It is this comprehension of Being that first renders possible the 'why?' . . . " 1 9
This means, however, that this antecedent comprehension, which
we have seen to be the same as ontological truth, contains within
itself the first and last answer to all questioning, and in this
sense antecedent comprehension is the first - and last - founding
of all beings.
l f " . . . denn es ist das Eigentümliche der ersten Herausstellung der 'vier Gründe',
daß dabei noch nicht grundsätzlich zwischen den transzendentalen Gründen u n d
den spezifisch ontischen Ursachen unterschieden w i r d
" (WG, p. 46).
lt
. . Dieses Seinsverständnis ermöglicht erst das W a r u m . . . . " (WG, p. 45)-
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It is worth adding that in its transcendental origin, the
" w h y ? " arises, according to Heidegger, out of the tension between the component of positivity and the component of negativity.
. . . In the project of World, there is given an excess of potentiality, and
it is in view of this, together with the fact that [There-being] is permeated
by surrounding beings (actuality) which the ontological disposition [discloses], that the "why?" arises.20
Furthermore, since positive and negative components necessarily complement each other, the arising of "why?" is a
transcendental necessity, sc. a necessary element of transcendence. The significance for us is simply to see that when
dealing with the transcendental origin of " w h y ? " (and the
comprehension of Being-structure that it implies), we are
groping to understand, however clumsily, the outbreak of the
ontological difference itself. And we have here, besides, another
testimony to the finitude of transcendence.
m . The Triplex Unity - If the coming-to-pass of ground is a
profoundly unified process, if its positive and negative components complement each other and transcendental founding
necessarily complements them both, then the last of the three
components is equally as original as the other two, arises simultaneously with them both. In analysing this unified correlation
of three distinct components, then, we have discerned the
essence of ground. " . . . The essence of ground is the triplex
strewing of the grounding process that arises in transcendence:
the project of the World, the captivation by beings and the
ontological founding of beings." 2 1
iv. Logos - In SZ, the three components of transcendence as
the disclosedness of the World were enumerated as comprehension, disposition and logos. In WG, there is explicit mention
only of project and disposition. However, the third component
1 0 " . . . Im Weltentwurf ist ein Überschwung von Möglichem gegeben, im Hinblick worauf und im Durchwaltetsein von dem in der Befindlichkeit umdrängenden
Seienden (Wirklichen) das Warum entspringt." (WG, pp. 44-45).
1 1 " . . . Das Wesen des Grundes ist die transzendental entspringende dreifache
Streuung des Gründens in Weltentwurf, Eingenommenheit im Seienden und ontologische Begründung des Seienden.'* (WG, pp. 46-47). Heidegger italicizes whole.
Cf. p. 4 5 (gleichursprünglich).
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of transcendence as the coming-to-pass of ground, sc. transcendental founding, is a component that is equally original with the
other two, and its function is to make possible the manifestation of
beings because by its effulgence it lets-be-seen the Being-structure
of beings.22 Does the founding-process here correspond to logos?
There is nothing of an explicit nature to warrant such an
identification. If the author had intended it, certainly he could
have suggested it without distorting (or prolonging) his analysis.
Hence we should conclude, perhaps, that the omission was deliberate and renounce any effort to force him to say what he
chose not to say. On the other hand, if we do not see an intrinsic
correlation between transcendental founding and logos, is there
not a serious lacuna in WG which is difficult to reconcile not
only with the closeness of the author's reasoning in this essay
but also with the clear and intimate coherence between the
present text and SZ ?
Let us leave the matter open and note only: that the analysis
of logos as an existential of There-being is perhaps the most
obscure and least satisfying section of SZ; that the reason for
this quite possibly is that the full sense of logos has not yet
crystallized for the author; that WG, because of its brevity, is
restricted to a few bold strokes on the canvas, and a more
detailed elaboration of the concept of transcendental founding
would very probably have brought the author to grips with
the problem of explicitation, sense, meaning, etc. - in a word the
whole apparatus of hermeneutic interpretation; that an identification of founding and logos would permit us to see how logos
articulates the negatived comprehension of Being (World), insofar as it would provide a relation in There-being between the
project and beings-to-be-encountered; that such an identification would give to logos a still un-thematized but central röle
in the evolution of the problem of Being as the problem of truth;
that this central röle of logos, discerned as early as this, would
explain why an effort to think the truth of Being will involve
more and more a meditation on the nature of language, the
articulation of logos.23
WG, pp. 44-45.
What is said here was elaborated exclusively on the basis of a textual analysis
of WG and SZ, pp. 160-161, i6r. Subsequent publication of a private conversation
(I953~54) seems to confirm the hypothesis beyond any serious doubt, and even to
suggest the reason why Heidegger was reluctant to make the explicitation himself
(US, p. 93).
83

28
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2. The Process of Ground: its Finitude
Thus far, we have seen in some detail how Heidegger understands ground in terms of transcendence, both intrinsically
united in the coming-to-pass of truth. But since transcendence
is radically finite, so too must be ground (therefore truth). This
is worth emphasis.
That the problem of finitude cannot be avoided is clear from
the very fact that we are attempting a philosophical, hence
properly human, explanation of the essence of ground. This
means, however, that we must take into consideration the nonessence of ground, sc. the essence as permeated by a "not," as
negatived, as finite.24 We saw above how the project of the
World must be negatived by the withdrawal of possibilities that
it could-have-been-but-is-not before it can be "actual," and
called this a "transcendental document" of finitude, since it is
here that we can see how transcendence as ground is radically
permeated by a "not." But we may go further. Not only is the
project of World negatived through captivation, but transcendental founding, which complements them both, is also negatived,
finite. On the ontic level, therefore, There-being, founding individuals by letting them give an account of themselves, is
quite capable of covering-up their "ground," or distorting it. 25
If transcendental founding brings-to-pass ontological truth,
then as negatived it must bring-about ontological un-truth,
which renders possible the ontic un-truth that we saw in SZ.
The essence of ground, then, is profoundly negatived, implies
a "not," comports with itself non-essence, and this simply because it springs from a transcendence that is finite: " . . . ground
has its non-essence, because it arises out of finite [transcendence]. . . . " 26 Profoundly modified by "not," ground has
not only its non-essence but is also non-ground (A b-grund).
" . . . As such a ground, however, [transcendence] is the nonground of There-being. . . . " 27 And if we are to explain the
WG, p. 8.
» WG, p. 45.
M " . . . Der Grund hat sein Un-wesen, weil er der endlichen Freiheit entspringt.
. . . " (WG, p. 49).
87 " . . .
Als dieser Grund aber ist die Freiheit dfer Ab-grund des Daseins. . . . "
(WG, p. 4 9 ) . Heidegger's italics. Like Geschick, A b-grund will undergo an evolution
in Heidegger II.
24
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essence of the finitude of There-being, it is to this conception of
transcendence as the non-ground that we must have recourse,
before we begin to talk about the "nature" of man or to describe
the effects of this finitude in his activity, or even, as far as Heidegger is concerned, to ask about his ontic origin.
5. The Process of Ground: its Temporality
We have one more step to make. In SZ, we saw that the ultimate origin of concern, "the structural unity of finite transcendence," is time. What is the role of time in the coming-topass of ground? Heidegger expressly avoids a thematic treatment
of the question, yet suggests clearly enough its importance.28
His most explicit remark comes where the question is posed as
to what explains the fact that the three components of the
grounding-process, for all the profound differences between
them, can nevertheless be called by the same name of "ground."
There is, to be sure, an identity of sorts, he admits, for all three
components: " . . . each in its own way arises out of concern . . .
which itself in turn is possible only as temporality." 29 We are
brought before the very same perspective, then, as in SZ.
For our present purposes, we may be content simply to indicate this fact. Its importance lies in helping us to see that here
again, as in both SZ and KM, we are brought in the end before a
question mark: what is the nature of time? And this is to be
understood not as simply another question that ought to be
asked but as the only question which really matters, for in asking
it we are posing the Being-question itself. The Being-question,
then, remains primary. All other analyses up to now are of a
preparatory nature, and have as their purpose to open up "the
transcendental horizon of the question of Being." When we are
told that the temporal aspect of transcendence in WG is deliberately omitted, we infer that the Being-question remains paramount but cannot be constrained within the present limits. The
question itself, however, is apparently more imperious than
ever.30 At any rate, for the present we are still seeking access to
*8 WG, pp. 42 (note 60), 47.
89 4 1 . . . je in ihrer Weise der Sorge der Beständigkeit und des
Bestandes-entspringen,
die selbst wiederum nur als Zeitlichkeit möglich ist." (WG, p. 47). See p. 42. Heidegger's italics.
80 WG, pp. 42 (note 6o)) 47.
t
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the question, and in the analysis of ground which leads us to a
meditation on truth, that access has turned out to be once more
the coming-to-pass of finite transcendence, whose ultimate
meaning is time.

II. General Remarks
A.

BEING

AND

TRUTH

The preceding analysis speaks for itself to say that Heidegger's
principal preoccupation in WG, as already noted, is basically the
problem of Being, and, indeed, Being in the sense of unveiledness, sc. truth. 31 Insofar as the present meditation is a terse condensation of the main theses of SZ, we can see again how profoundly
the problem of truth lies at the center of the first work. And the
author finds justification for the general orientation of his
problem in the example of the early Greek thinkers: " . . . The
earliest questioning about the essence of ground proved to be
entwined with the task of clarifying the essence of Being and
truth."82 Conversely, we see why his declared intention of
seeking the meaning of Being leads him to devote a separate
essay to the study of ground.
Does WG advance in any way our search for an answer to the
Being-question? There is no need to cull texts which re-state
what we already know, but we find one nuance worth noting:
the av iior's insistence that Being is always the Being of beings.
Even antecedent comprehension is never a seizure of Being as
swcA.38 However, even if inseparable, Being and beings are
nevertheless different:
. . . Ontic and ontological t r u t h a l w a y s pertain t o different [dimensions]:
beings in their Being and the Being of beings. T h e y belong essentially
together on the ground of their relationship t o the difference between
Being and beings (the ontological difference). . . . 8 4

So far, so good.
1 1 See WG, p. 39 (note 59), where Heidegger insists that the Being-question, is
primary througout SZ and, by inference, WG.
1 1 "Und einzig deshalb erweist sich schon das früheste Fragen nach dem Wesen
des Grundes als verschlungen mit der Aufgabe einer Erhellung des Wesens von Sein
und Wahrheit(WG,
p. 47). Heidegger's italics.
n
WG, p. 14-15 (Sein von Seiendem), 13 (Erfassen des Seins als solchen).
• 4 " . . . On tische und ontologische Wahrheit betreffen je verschieden [:] Seiendes
in seinem Sein und Sein von Seiendem
" (WG, pp. 14-15). Heidegger's italics.
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Now we are told that " . . . the essence of truth, necessarily
bi-furcated in this [double dimension], is only possible in the
first place with the out-break of the ontological difference. . . . " 35
This, too, presents no great difficulty, especially if we recall that,
when all is said and done, truth and Being for Heidegger are
one. The important point comes when we are told that the ontological difference comes about only by reason of the power of
There-being to differentiate between Being and beings. It is
this that is meant by There-being's transcendence. We see immediately the poverty of the word "transcendence" itself, which
is, after all, a metaphysical word. Soon Heidegger will drop it
completely. Moreover, notice: that the "term" of There-being's
transcendence is not Being understood as the being-ness of
beings, but Being understood as the emergence of the difference
between Being and beings; that this difference emerges with
There-being's transcendence ( " . . . we name this ground of the
ontological difference . . . the transcendence of There-being"); 36
that there might be textual ground, even in 1929, for suspecting
that the ontological difference as such has somehow a primacy
over There-being: " . . . t h e power to differentiate, through
which the ontological difference becomes a fact, must have
struck the roots of its own potentiality in the ground of Therebeing's essence. . . . " 37 Reading this text, as we do, in the light
of Heidegger II, it is all too easy to force the evidence. But even
if in all rigor we cannot claim here an anticipation of Heidegger
II, the text remains curious, nonetheless. This much is worth
noting.
One last revealing remark comes when, having analysed
ground, the author returns to consider the principle of ground
(sufficient reason), from which he took his start. He argues thus:
the principle of ground is a principle that has its application
with regard to beings, sc. "every being has its ground"; the
reason is that Being itself has the transcendental character of
85 " . . .
Das dergestalt notwendig on tisch-ontologisch gegabelte Wesen von
Wahrheit überhaupt ist nur möglich in eins mit dem Aufbrechen dieses Unterschiedes. ...» (WG, p. 15}.
16 " . . .
Diesen Grund der ontologischen Differenz nennen wir vorgreifend die
Transzendent des Daseins." (WG, p. 15). Heidegger's italics.
t ? " . . . dann muß das Unterscheidenkönnen, in dem die ontologische Differenz
faktisch wird, die Wurzel seiner eigenen Möglichkeit im Grunde des Wesens des
M (WG, p. 15). Heidegger's italics.
Daseins geschlagen haben
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"ground," inasmuch as, when antecedently comprehended, it
founds beings, sc. by its effulgence renders possible their truth;
but this is possible only because Being occurs in and through
and with the transcendence of There-being, which is, in the
primary sense, the process of grounding. " . . . Ground belongs
to the essence of Being because there is Being (not beings) only
in transcendence as the World-projecting, dispositional comingto-pass of ground." 38
B. T H E R E - B E I N G A N D

THOUGHT

Here, as in SZ, the author takes special pains to insist that
There-being as transcendence is not a subject in the sense of
that which is opposed to an object, v.g. the "World," as two
beings on the ontic level. Transcendence is the ontological dimension of There-being. If one insists on calling There-being a
"subject," then transcendence is the essence of this subject, sc.
the ground-structure of "subjectivity," that which makes the
subject to be a subject, its Being. Here, then, " . . . to be a subject
means to be a being in and as transcendence. . . . " 3ft The author's
meaning is clear. In meditating transcendence, we have achieved
the Being-level of There-being which first renders possible the
subject-object dichotomy. Let us admit, however, that his formula
"ground-structure of subjectivity" is disconcerting. We can
notice how his language is victimized by the very subject-ism
he is trying to overcome. The situation will soon change, and it
is useful for us to see him in transition.
There is, too, the faintest suggestion of a possible type of
thinking that is non-subjective (therefore foundational) because
it is non-objective. It is significant to note this, though we must
not give the matter an importance that it does not yet have for
the author himself. When speaking of the pre-predicative nature
of ontic truth, that grounds the truth of judgements, he remarks that " . . . the rendering manifest [of beings] never has
M " . . . Zum Wesen des Seins aber gehört Grund, weil es Sein (nicht Seiendes)
nur gibt in der Transzendenz als dem weltentwerfend befindlichen Gründen."
(WG, p. 47).
*• " . . . Subjekt sein heißt: in und als Transzendenz Seiendes sein...." (WG, p.
18). Heidegger's italics.
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primarily the character of a mere presentation (intuition)
" 40
Primarily it is rendering the being accessible to There-being,
whether this be by a disclosure, as in the case of There-being, or
by a discovery, as in the case of beings other than There-being.
Secondarily, of course, this rendering-accessible evolves into a
subject-object relation, but this is only a derivation from the
initial encounter. Now to assume that the rendering-accessible
were a presentation of the being-that-is-encountered, even if
this presentation were considered to be an intuition, would be
to classify this being already as an object opposed to a Therebeing considered as subject - a conception that vitiates from
the beginning the genuine sense of rendering-accessible.
Of course, it is understandable, Heidegger goes on to say, how
such a conception could arise, if one assume unquestioningly
that truth is found primarily, therefore properly, in the
judgement, sc. in a conjunction of two presentations. In such a
context, then, pre-predicative truth could easily be conceived as
a presentation that is not yet conjoined with another to form a
judgement, but it is a presentation nonetheless. The crux of the
matter is, though, that even such a disclosure as this by Therebeing to There-being of the being-that-is-encountered necessarily presupposes that the being itself is already manifest to
There-being. It is this manifestation (or accessibility) of beings
prior to objectivizing presentation and rendering such a presentation possible that Heidegger calls ontic truth. When all is
said and done, the entire polemic against presentative thought
which we are about to see unfold is based on the fact that, even
though it be natural to man, it forgets this pre-presentative
openness.
Now it is this pre-presentational (ontic) truth of beings and
the transcendental condition of its possibility (ontological truth)
that is the focus of Heidegger's attention in WG, for the whole
essay is an attempt to meditate the coming-to-pass of ground
that renders possible not only judgement-truth but all presentation, therefore objectivation, as well. Do we have the right to
say, then, that the whole essay is an effort, perhaps not yet fully
40 " . . . für alle vorprädikative Offenbarkeit gilt, daß das Offenbarmachen primär
nie den Charakter eines bloßen Vorstellens (Anschauens) h a t , . . . " (WG, p. 12).
Heidegger's italics.
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self-conscious, at the non-presentative, foundational thinking
of the truth of Being-structure, sc. of Being?
For the sake of completeness, and in order to contrast against
the background of contemporary phenomenology Heidegger's
effort to overcome subjectivism and subjective thinking through
the notion of a pre-subjective self, one should include a brief
word here about how he situates the question of intentionality
in his problematic.
The indications are few but they are clear. Heidegger calls
"intentional" all comportment of There-being with beings. Intentionality, for him, is possible only on the ground of transcendence, as ontic comportment is "grounded" in the ontological structure which renders it possible. Intentionality, then,
is not identical with transcendence, much less the origin of it.
The transcendence which renders this comportment possible is
the project of the World, negatived by captivation by beings,
out of which arises the transcendental founding of beings.
Transcendental founding is explicitated on the ontic level by the
bringing-to-pass of ontic truth through the existentiell comportment of There-being, and this is the level of intentionality. 41
We can see here sketched in brief outline how Heidegger
himself would proceed to supplement his remarks (1927, the
year in which SZ appeared, two years before WG) concerning
Husserl's article on "Phenomenology" for the Encyclopedia
Britannica. For Husserl, making no distinction among the ways
by which different beings "are," all beings experienced in the
world, including the philosophizing ego, were conceived to be
what Heidegger would call "mere entities." When Husserl makes
the epochs of the world and its facticity, the "facticial" (matterof-fact) character of the ego is likewise "bracketed," and he
must resort to a "transcendental ego," somehow separated from
facticity, to account for the "constitution" of beings.42 Heidegger, as we saw, insists upon a differentiation in the way beings
"are/' distinguishing between mere entities, instruments, and
There-being whose essence is existence, sc. transcendence. The
« WG, pp. 15, 444 1 See Walter Biemel "Husserls Encyclopedia
Britannica Artikel und Heideggers
f
Anmerkungen dazu," Tijdschrift voor Philosophie, XII (1950), 246-280, n. b. pp. 274280, especially p. 280.
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one and the same There-being is "transcendental" as well as
"matter-of-fact," simply because its "ontic excellence lies in the
fact that it is ontological," sc. it is existential (in Husserl's
language, a "constituting self") and existentiell (for Husserl
"matter-of-fact," for Heidegger "matter-of-fact"-"intentional")
at once. With this in mind, one finds that Heidegger's remark to
Husserl is lucidly clear: " . . . The Being-structure of the human
There-being . . . conceals within itself the potentiality for
transcendental constitution. Transcendental constitution is
a central potentiality of the existence of the matter-of-fact
self. . . . The question about the Being-structure of the constituting self is not to be side-stepped. . . . " 43
What the Being-structure of There-being is we have seen already in close enough detail to suit our purposes. In analysing
finite transcendence, Heidegger is trying to understand that
which renders all intentionality possible by explaining the
structure of that being which is simultaneously ontic (therefore
intentional) and ontological (therefore "transcendentally constituting"). This structure is essentially the process of transcendence that comes-to-pass in the profoundly unified fashion
that is concern.
C.

TRANSCENDENCE

AND

FREEDOM

J. Freedom in WG
What will strike the casual reader as the most audacious
novelty of WG, perhaps, is the author's apparently arbitrary
identification of transcendence and freedom. It is here that the
problem of freedom, so essential to an understanding of WW and
all that follows from it, first becomes thematized. We begin by
collecting the data offered in WG. The first statement of the
4 3 4 4 ... Es gilt zu zeigen, daß die Seinsart des menschlichen Daseins . . . in sich
die Möglichkeit der transzendentalen Konstitution birgt. Die transzendentale Konstitution ist eine zentrale Möglichkeit der Existenz des faktischen Selbst

Die Frage nach der Seinsart des Konstituierenden ist nicht zu umgehen." {ibid.t
p . 274). Biemel adds (p. 276, note 8) that the formula "constituting self" is used by
Heidegger out of deference to Husserl. Otherwise he avoids it, " . . . weil Heidegger
die Konstitut ions ptoblematik als ein idealistisches Residuum ansieht, das Überwunden werden muß."
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matter is, perhaps, the most decisive. It comes at the beginning
of Section III of the text, where the author begins to analyse
transcendence in terms of ground. Recall that in the analysis
of the World There-being was described as "the ultimate whereunto" of reference for beings-as-instruments, because, insofar
as it is so constituted as to be concerned with its own Being, it
cannot be referred beyond itself, but exists in such a way as to be
its own whereunto (umwillen seiner) M The reason is that Therebeing's unique prerogative is to be a comprehension of Being,
since its existence is fundamentally transcendence.
Now to arrive at the concept of freedom, Heidegger stresses,
in a play on words impossible to retain in simple English translation, the "willing" that is implied in this umwillen of Therebeing, sc. in being its own whereunto. Now such a "willing" obviously cannot be an "act of the will," understood as a type of
comportment of There-being (like forming concepts, judging,
etc.), for we are dealing with a far deeper level of There-being,
where such comportment is first made possible. Yet a "will-ing"
it is, that comes-to-pass in and as transcendence. It is this
"will-ing" by which There-being comes-to-pass as its own whereunto that Heidegger calls freedom. " . . . The transcendence to
the World is freedom itself. . . . " 4 5
The author is aware that his thesis may surprise his readers,
and defends it immediately by saying that his conception indicates the essence of freedom in its origin better than does the
more normal description of freedom as "spontaneity," sc. a type
of causality. "Spontaneity," he argues, understood in the sense
of "beginning by oneself," indicates only a negative characteristic of freedom, sc. that there is no cause of a given phenomenon
that is ulterior to the self. This presupposes, however, that the
ontological structure of the self has been explained in such a
way as to account for a possible phenomenon of "by oneself";
that the same explanation of selfhood describe the dynamic, or
process-character, of the self so as to account for the fact that
it can be a "beginning." His own thesis, he seems to say, satisfies
WG, p. 3 4 .
« " . . . Der Überstieg zur Welt ist die Freiheit s e l b s t . . . ( W G , p. 40). Is it more
than a play on words ? The question should be posed, but its answer involves a whole
problematic that cannot detain us now.
44
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these two demands. The ontological structure of the self is the
ecstatic nature of existence; it is essentially not a substance
enclosed within itself but a process which comes-to-pass as finite
transcendence. " . . . The self-hood of the self that already lies at
the basis of all spontaneity is, however, transcendence. . . . " 46
Transcendence, then, is the origin of freedom in the sense of
spontaneity, it is freedom in its very origin.
If freedom as spontaneity be understood as a cause, then this,
like other causes, is thought according to a certain determined
concept of ground, or is at least a "kind" of ground. Freedom in
its origin as transcendence, however, is not a special "kind" of
ground but the grounding process itself. " . . . Freedom is
freedom unto ground." 47 With this principle to guide us, almost
all subsequent references to freedom in the essay offer a sense.
For example: the process of grounding, sc. transcendence, is
"the original relationship between freedom and ground"; 48 the
fact that the project of the World can become "actual" only if
it is negatived is a transcendental document of the finitude of
the freedom of There-being, and the author goes on to ask if we
may discern here the finite essence of freedom as such; freedom
unto ground is freedom in the manner of the triplex strewing
of ground, its grounding unity, because transcendence (therefore
freedom), as the coming-to-pass of ground, is the ultimate justification of the principle of ground (sufficient reason), - freedom
is the "origin of the principle of ground," "the ground of ground";
grounding has its non-essence because it springs from finite
freedom, and, as such a ground, freedom is the non-ground of
There-being; finally, because There-being is transcendence, its
freedom is limited, sc. it does not include mastery over its own
that-ness - it is profoundly and irredeemably a being that is
thrown.49
All of these texts orchestrate the same theme, sc. freedom and
48 " . . . Die Selbstheit des aller Spontaneität schon zugrundeliegenden Selbst liegt
aber in der Transzendenz
" (WG, p. 4 1 ) . Heidegger italicizes whole.
47 " . . .
Freiheit ist Freiheit zum Grunde." (WG, p. 41)- Heidegger italicizes
whole.
48 "Die ursprüngliche Beziehung der Freiheit zu Grund nennen wir das Gründen.
• . ( W G , p. 41). Heidegger's italics.
40 WG, pp. 43 (Endlichkeit der Freiheit), 4 6 (Freiheit in dieser dreifachen Weise),
4 8 (Ursprung des Satzes vom Grunde), 4 9 (Grund des Grundes, gründende Einheit,
endlichen Freiheit entspringt, Freiheit der Ab-grund), 50 (freies . . . geworfen).
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transcendence are but one. There is only one instance which
suggests a less radical sense of freedom. After explaining transcendental founding and the possible articulation of it on the ontic
level by letting individual beings give an account of themselves,
Heidegger adds:
. . . To what extent the giving-an-account [of any being] will be pushed,
and whether or not this accounting is understood as an authentic founding
[of this being], sc. as the unveiling of its transcendental possibility, all
this in any given case is left to the freedom of There-being. . . . 5 0
The implication here seems to be that the (ontic) process of
founding individual beings is somehow under There-being's
control, a charge which There-being can refuse, or at least can
bring about negligently, failing to advert to the authentic ontological (Being-) structure of this being, its "transcendental possibility." Briefly, it is within the scope of There-being's power to
choose. Is this simply a lapse on the author's part ? Or must we
nuance still more his conception of freedom? Is there any special
significance to attach here to the word "authentic"? We must
go further.
2. Freedom in KM
First a word about KM, for there is a sentence in WG which
carries a distinct resonance of the Kant interpretation. The remark concerns the conception of freedom as transcendence. In
first stating his position after affirming that freedom is essentially the project by There-being of its own whereunto, Heidegger adds:
. . . It is in this transcending holding-up-to-one's-self [one's own] whereunto that There-being comes-to-pass in man in such a way that in the
essence of his existence he imposes obligation upon himself, i.e. he can
be a free self. . . . 8 1
On the one hand, this is perfectly in context with what we have
seen in WG. If the essence of the self is transcendence and tran60 " . . . Diesem Ursprung der Begründung und damit auch der Ausweisung zufolge bleibt es im Dasein jeweils der Freiheit überlassen, wie weit die Ausweisung
getrieben wird und ob sie sich gar zur eigentlichen Begründung, d. h. Enthüllung
ihrer transzendentalen Möglichkeit versteht
" (WG, pp. 45-46).
61 " . . . In diesem transzendierenden Sichentgegenhalten des Umwillen geschieht
das Dasein im Menschen, so daß er im Wesen seiner Existenz auf sich verpflichtet,
d. h. ein freies Selbst sein kann
" (WG, p. 40).
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scendence is freedom, then the self can be free insofar as it transcends. What is striking, however, is that the weight of the
sentence seems to rest not on freedom as transcendence but on
freedom as the imposition of necessity upon oneself. This, however, is not specifically a Heideggerean but a Kantian formula.
And the author underlined it in KM. Taking Kant's interpretation of freedom as the submission to a self-imposed necessity,
he applied it to both the theoretical and the practical reason. In
both cases, submission to self-imposed necessity through the
synthesis of the transcendental imagination, center of transcendence, constitutes in a genuine sense the essence of the
finite self. If one wished to prove a Kantian influence on Heidegger in the designation of transcendence as freedom, one would
certainly have some textual warrant.
These are the only explicit uses of the word "freedom" in KM,
but the author uses certain derivatives, and these, too, are instructive. We consider the two most important of them: 52
a. T o L A Y - F R E E - This term (Freilegung) is used always in
connection with laying the ground(work) for metaphysics. To
determine that which renders metaphysics possible in man is to
lay free the ground of its essence. For Kant himself, according
to Heidegger, this meant an "analysis," not in a sense of atomizing the pure reason, but in the sense of "loosening it up" and
of "laying free the seeds of ontology," sc. those conditions that
render it possible.53 In this way, the Kantian analysis was an
effort to let-be-seen "the genesis of the essence of the finite pure
reason out of its own proper ground." 54 This effort to "lay free"
the ultimate origin of ontology brings metaphysics back to its
ground and foundation. Concretely, this process became a
laying-free of the pure synthesis that was simultaneously an
unveiling of transcendence.55
In this congeries, it seems legitimate to observe the following:
The laying-free is brought about by the philosopher in his re5 2 Other derivatives, coherent with analysis but not especially significant: Freizügigkeit (KM, pp. 119-120); freies Bilden (KM, pp. 122, 139).
58 KM, pp. 14 (Wesensgrundes), 45 (auflockerndes Freilegen der Keime).
M " . . . Analytik wird so zum Sehenlassen der Genesis des Wesens der endlichen
reinen Vernunft aus ihrem eigenen Grunde." (KM, p. 45).
58 KM, pp. 45, 129 (Grund, Boden), 123 (Enthüllung).
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flection. If we transpose this into the language of WG, one might
say that the laying-free is brought about by a There-being that,
as transcendence, is its own radical freedom. There-being, in
laying-free metaphysics (a being) in the origin of its possibility,
is letting it give an account of itself and thus is founding it. The
lay-ing free, then, is a laying of ground(work), because it is a
founding of metaphysics. The laying-free of ground is a lettingbe-seen and an unveiling of the origin of possibility, sc. Beingstructure of the being in question (metaphysics). The whole of
KM, then, is this effort to lay-free a being (metaphysics) as revealed (to-be-seen) in its Being (ground). The source of its own
possibility lies in the fact that the meditating philosopher, as
There-being, is freedom . . . "unto ground."
b. T o M A I N T A I N - F R E E - The foregoing exposition gives
a fresh sense to Heidegger's definition of re-trieve of a groundproblem in laying the ground(work) for metaphysics: "to maintain free and awake the inner forces [of a problem], which, in the
ground of its essence, enable it to be a problem," sc. to be what
it is. Note here that: that is maintained "free" which is rendered
manifest in the ultimate source of its Being; one way of renderingfree is by re-trieve.
3. Freedom in SZ
Let us come now to SZ, where the stem "free" plays a more
important r61e than in KM, giving us a clearer, if more complicated, sense. We shall review its use in the various derivations
and try to disengage what is common to them all. 56
a. L A Y I N G - F R E E - We begin with a term just seen in KM,
where it signified to "let-be-seen" the origin of possibility, or
ground, of metaphysics. Heidegger is faithful to this usage all
through SZ, using it always to describe his own effort to develop
a fundamental ontology. The whole phenomenological analysis
of There-being is an effort to "lay free the horizon for an inM In making this investigation, the writer culled as many uses of the words for
"freedom" as he could find and then sifted them, after the manner of the exegetes.
In reporting the research, it seems sufficient to suggest one use of each meaning. We
content ourselves with that, for what we are doing is not exegesis.
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terpretation of the sense of Being itself," 57 by laying-free the
existential, sc. ontological, structure of There-being, and, indeed,
in the ultimate source of its unity, time.58 Heidegger's mind is
clear in this case, but how explain this tenacity to the word
"free" when the same sense could be expressed apparently by
some such neutral word as "explain," "expose," etc.? A hint as
to the answer appears in the suggestive remark apropos of a
certain "violence" intrinsic to the existential phenomenological
method, to the effect that the laying-free of There-being's Being
involves a necessary "wresting it away" from the hiddenness
which holds it captive.59 In laying a being free, there is a profound "liberation."
This liberation can be explained if, recalling that all of SZ is
a phenomenological analysis of There-being, we keep in mind
the special sense that the author gives to the notion of phenomenology, sc. to permit that which of its own accord manifests
itself to reveal itself as it is. Phenomenology, however, would
not be necessary, unless that which is said to manifest itself were
not apparent to the every-day There-being, and, in contrast to
that which first of all and for the most part preoccupies us, were
hidden from our gaze. Here, then, what lies hidden " . . . essentially
belongs to that which shows itself first of all and for the most
part, in such a way as to constitute its sense and ground/' and
it is precisely the task of phenomenology to let come-to-view
this hidden sense and ground of the phenomenon, sc. its Being. 60
This, after all, is the radical sense of >iyetv, to lift a being out of
its hidden-ness and let it be seen in its un-hiddenness, to discover
it as it is. Such discovery can only come-to-pass through the
process of discovering, which is the primary sense of truth. 61 The
reason, then, that There-being can bring-to-pass any kind of
phenomenological description, and therefore lay-free its own
ontological structure, is that There-being, as disclosedness (therefore as transcendence), is original truth. But the coming-to-pass
57 "als Freilegung des Horizontes für eine Interpretation des Sinnes von Sein
überhaupt" (SZ, p. 15).
SZ, pp. x8o (existenzialen Verfassung freigelegt), 303 (Freilegung der Zeitlichkeit).

P- 3 " (abgerungen).
" . . . aber zugleich etwas ist, was wesenhaft zu dem, was sich zunächst und
zumeist zeigt, gehört, so zwar, daß es seinen Sinn und Grund ausmacht." (SZ, p. 33).
Writer's italics.
9 1 SZ, pp. 33 (>iyttv), 2x8 (entdeckendsein).
M
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of this discovery (disclosedness) involves, the author admits,
violence. The truth of individual beings must be "wrested" (abgerungen) from them, sc. they must be "torn away from" the
hiddenness that holds them prisoner. We must "rob" them
from obscurity. After all, what else can be the sense of the
alpha-privative in a-XTjfreia? 62
b. R E N D E R I N G - F R E E - More frequent still than "layingfree" is the expression "giving free" (Freigabe) in the sense of
"giving freedom to" or "rendering free/' The principal difference from laying-free presumably consists in the fact that the
former expression seems reserved for the most part to a context
that considers the existential analysis itself as an effort at fundamental ontology, the latter to phenomena that are considered
within the horizon of the research, principally in the analysis of
the World.
It is the pre-disclosed World, itself, that, prior to all ontic
contact with beings, renders them free to their Being. More
precisely, when There-being discovers a purposeful being as
purposeful, sc. inserted into the pattern of references which gives
it its meaning, There-being lets this being be destined towards
its purpose. This occurs in the ontic dimension, insofar as Therebeing permits the being to exercise its own particularity (v.g.
lets it be a hammer), but in the ontological dimension, insofar as
There-being lets the instrument be (be a hammer). Since the
being that is thus discovered must be before it can be a hammer,
the ontological letting-be antecedes the ontic.
c. T o B E ( B E C O M E ) F R E E F O R - The term "free," however, is applied to There-being itself, and here the matter is more
delicate. We must be content to indicate the general lines, for
usage is not always rigid. In fact, there is in the term "free for"
a decided ambiguity.
The first sense in which There-being is said to be "free for . . . "
appears when the author analyses anxiety as a form of disposition which, by means of a strange uneasiness that troubles
There-being's everyday complacency with the ontic, discloses
to There-being that it is a drive-toward-Being (transcendence),
«2 SZ, pp. 311, 222 (d-X^&Eta).
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a potentiality for its own authenticity. Now this disclosure
manifests There-being as constitutionally "free," sc. "transcendent." As drive-toward-Being, this constitutional to-be-free
of There-being contains within itself a dynamism that propels it
toward achieving itself as transcendence, a propensity, so to
speak, for authenticity. But the constitutional to-be-free is not
authenticity - as such it is only the potentiality, sc. openness,
for authenticity or its negation.63 But this potentiality lies
within the power of There-being to fulfill and the fulfillment is
itself a coming-to-pass of freedom that can only be described as
a choice. Taking to-be-free in the sense of drive-towards-Being,
we must distinguish it from the freedom in the sense of choice,
by which the self is chosen (authenticity) or not (inauthenticity).
This gives us the key to the statement that anxiety manifests in
There-being its own drive-toward-Being, sc. its " . . . to-be-free
for the freedom of choosing and seizing its self. . . . " 64
There is another sense, however, in which There-being is said
to be "free for" something. Hence the ambiguity. In this case,
it is in the state of authenticity that There-being is "free."
Recall the essentials of authenticity. In its everyday condition,
There-being, absorbed by its preoccupation with beings, has
forgotten its ontological prerogative. Authenticity consists in
re-collecting this prerogative and choosing to be what it is:
finite transcendence. The coming-to-pass of authenticity has
two dimensions: ontological and ontic. Its ontological structure
would be a comprehension by There-being of its own potentiality in what is most properly, exclusively and definitively
characteristic of this potentiality: its immanent ending (death),
the ultimate seal of its finitude. Such a condition was called
"advancing in potentiality." In the ontic dimension, authenticity comes-to-pass by an existentiell choosing to hearken to
the voice of conscience that tells of its guilt, sc. finitude - a
choice we call resolve. The coming-to-pass of authenticity, seen
in its bi-dimensional unity, is then "advancing re-solve." We
83 SZ, pp. 188 (propensio in . . . ) , 191 (Eigentlichkeit und Uneigentlichkeit als
Möglichkeiten).
64 "Die Angst offenbart im Dasein das Sein zum eigensten Seinkönnen, d. h. das
Freisein für die Freiheit des Sich-selbst-wählens und -ergreifens
" (SZ, p. 188).
Heidegger's italics-
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assume that all this is familiar and wish only to underline the
röle of freedom in this bi-dimensional process.
i. Authenticity: Existential - The term "free for" occurs with
regard to the existential dimension of authenticity when Therebeing, advancing in its own most characteristic potentiality, is
said to render itself "free for" the definitive character of death
as its own immanent ending. Here the sense of "free" seems to
be openness toward death in the sense of an acquiescence to
itself as Being-unto-end. There is no flight into distraction, but
There-being's acceptance of its finitude, i.e. a permitting of
death, as the supreme form of finitude, to have its own way
with There-being. There-being thus lets-its - self-be as finite. Such
an attitude is a liberation, for it frees There-being from its perdition in the ontic.65 This liberation, however, retains the
tonality that characterized both "laying free" and "rendering
free," sc. it is fundamentally an un-veiling. For if authenticity
in its existential dimension is an advancing by There-being in
the potentiality which characterizes it (sc. as finite), this advancing is a continual unveiling of the potentiality as potentiality-unto-end, hence makes this potentiality as such free. Free
from what? From its perdition in onticity. There-being is torn
away from its everydayness. " . . . In the advancing unveiling
of this power-to-be, [then J There-being discloses its self to its self
with regard to its ultimate potentiality [sc. death]. . . . " 66
We retain: that in the ontological dimension of authenticity,
for There-being to be free means that its Being-unto-end is
unveiled; that this Being-unto-end must be accepted as it is
unveiled; that There-being is thus liberated from everydayness.
All these elements find expression in the throaty cry proclaiming
the acceptance of unveiled finitude as "freedom unto death." 67
«. Authenticity: Existentiell - And now we come to the ontic
dimension. Re-solve is fundamentally a choice that could be
refused, hence we approach here more closely the classical notion
SZ, p. 264 (Freiwerden für . . . befreit von Verlorenheit).
Im vorlaufenden Enthüllen dieses Seinkönnens erschließt sich das Dasein
ihm selbst hinsichtlich seiner äußersten Möglichkeit. . . ( S Z , pp. 262-263). See pp.
262 (macht sie als solche frei), 263 (entrissen).
SZ, p. 266.
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of freedom. The choice consists in choosing to be what conscience
lets There-being see that it is, sc. finite - more precisely, negatived ground (transcendence). What is chosen is not conscience
itself (this is impossible) but what conscience reveals to Therebeing, sc. its guilt. For There-being to choose, then, is for it to
render itself free for this guilt, or to acquiesce to it, to say
"amen" to the finitude of its transcendence. It is by this choice
that the self authentically is achieved, that There-being liberates itself from everydayness by (freely) willing to retract its
former surrender to the ontic.68
This choosing that is re-solve is profoundly an act of freedom.
It re-solves the potentiality for authenticity that is posed by
There-being's discovery that its essence is to-be-free. Re-collecting its self, There-being hereby freely chooses to-be-free, its
own (finite) transcendence, for its finite freedom genuinely "is"
only when the choice has been made to assume the self that has
been thrown-down-as-still-to-be-achieved. There-being renders
itself free now for its own World, and its own self-in-the-World
as it is in all facticity. It lets-its-self-be as it is in its matter-offact situation, thus achieving transparency to itself in this
situation.69
Transposed into terms of temporality, this letting-itself-be in
re-solve is the fortune (Schicksal) of There-being, whereby
There-being, free for its own death, sc. open unto and acquiescing to its self as immanently ending, hands its self over to its
self as a potentiality, sc. a to-be-free, that is not only bequeathed
to it (therefore imposed upon it) but which is freely accepted. It
is in this process of handing-over self to self through re-solve
that re-trieve of a potentiality-that-has-been is possible, for the
choice that is re-solve makes There-being free for that which is
to be re-trieved. Notice here, however, that the freedom of
There-being's choice extends only to acquiescing or not acquiescing to its finite to-be-free, sc. to being authentic or inauthentic, not to the fact that it be. 70
M SZ,
pp. 287-288 (Gewissen-haben-wollen), 295 (Eigentlichkeit), 268 (Nachholen einer Wahl).
w SZ, pp. 384 ("ist" im Gewählt-haben), 294 (Möglichkeit zu handeln), 299-300
(Situation), 307 (durchsichtig), 384 (hellsichtig).
70 SZ, pp. 384-385 (Schicksal), 228 (Geworfenheit). WG, p. 50 (Daß).
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To claim that all these texts to which we have referred give
us an exactly uniform meaning of the word "free" and its variations is to overlook the subtleties of nuance which Heidegger's
prodigious control of his language permits, and perhaps to force
the evidence. No matter. It suffices for our purposes to underline
the general tendencies, for we are, after all, still working in the
oblique. Let us retain that in the coming-to-pass of re-solve,
There-being is free: because it becomes transparent to itself in
its situation; because this transparency simultaneously delivers
it from its bondage to the merely ontic; because this resolution
is achieved by a free choice which acquiesces to the finitude
of its self, whose essence is to-be-free (transcendence). Let us
add, by way of recall, that if primary truth is disclosedness,
then re-solve, which is the authentic mode of disclosedness, is
the most original form of truth, and the different types of
freedom that are involved in the coming-to-pass of re-solve will
be, each in its own way, various modalities of truth.
When, in the coming-to-pass of re-solve, the central r61e is
played by a choice, one wonders naturally if, when all is said
and done, this is not simply what the tradition calls an "act of
the will," of liberum arbitrium. One must admit, of course,
certain very clear similarities. For one thing, the choice of
authenticity, like an "act of the will," can be refused or, once
having been made, subsequently retracted. It is a process that
comes-to-pass on occasion and must be repeated to remain
effective. Hence, it has a very definite "act" character. Again,
if one were to explain the phenomenon in terms of traditional
psychology, one would be forced to have recourse to a "faculty
of choice" and to use the terminology of "will." These similarities
should not lead us, however, to forget the profoundly unique
character of existential choice. An "act of the will" is always
directed toward some being; here, that which is chosen is not
a "being" but the transcendence of There-being beyond beings
(including itself) to the Being-process itself, sc. its own constitutional to-be-free. Furthermore, we saw that an "act of the
will" as "spontaneous" has its beginning in the already constituted self from which it proceeds; here the choice achieves the
self in its ontological authenticity. In other words, existential
resolution "wills" There-being's openness to Being and thus the
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freedom of There-being's self in its source and its possibility, sc.
its Being. To call it, then, an "act of the will" would be dangerously misleading.
4. Synopsis
Let us now try to disengage a common denominator for the
word "freedom" that will serve as a basis for interpreting any
later references to the problem. That may be called "free" in the
most fundamental sense which has been wrested and torn away
from the initial hiddenness which obscures it - whether this be
the covered-up-ness of beings other than There-being that are
un-covered by being rendered-free, or There-being's own forgottenness of its proper self, from which it is liberated by its
own disclosedness. What is liberated from hiddenness is therefore un-hidden, and what is un-hidden is true (a-Xrj&ewt). One
may say, then, though the formula is not Heidegger's, that the
essence of freedom is truth. If truth (therefore freedom) is fundamentally un-hiddenness, and the most original phenomenon of
truth lies in There-being as disclosedness of the World (Being),
then the original phenomenon of freedom is the disclosedness of
There-being, sc. transcendence. " — The transcendence unto
the World is freedom itself. . . . " 7 1 That which is free in the
primary sense is There-being itself; that which is free in the
secondary sense is what, by reason of the luminosity of Therebeing, is uncovered as' the being that it is (in its Being), sc, beings
other than There-being. Beings are rendered free by letting
them emerge from obscurity, by letting them be (manifest) as
they are. This is the proper function of phenomenology, as Heidegger conceives it. If we pose the problem in terms of knowledge,
as Kant did, then letting-beings-be means letting-them-beobjects. The entire KM, then, is an interpretation of how Kant
explains the nature of freedom as an effort to ground metaphysics, an effort which Heidegger, for his part, re-trieves.
In the case of There-being itself, to let-be means to let its self
be as the self that it is, to achieve in and as its self the phenomenology of its self. This self is not substance but process that
comes-to-pass as transcendence beyond beings to Being (World)
71 f<...

Der Überstieg zur Welt ist die Freiheit selbst...." (WG, p. 40).
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- a process that is finite. The supreme seal of finitude is the
fact that it is Being-unto-death. To let its self be, then, is to let
its self be both as transcendent and as finite (guilty). To let its
self be its self is to liberate its self from its ontic perdition, to
re-collect that its ontic excellence is to be ontological, to achieve
the self in its authenticity. But There-being, that thus lets-itsself-be, is, when all is said and done, the ontological structure
of man (je meines), which has within itself the power to choose.
There-being must choose to let its self be, to-be-free. Furthermore, it chooses its self in its situation and therefore in choosing
its self lets other beings be, too. It is in this way that letting other
beings be, sc. letting them give an account of themselves in
transcendental founding, is also subject to the conditions of
There-being's choice of its own authenticity.72 This choice of self
in its situation is the supreme mode of There-being's freedom
because the most eminent form of truth. It is the consummation
of phenomenology.
One last word. If to render beings free is to let them be as true
(un-hidden), then the effort to discern the sense of Being must
involve meditation on both freedom and truth. Conversely,
meditation on freedom and truth must be the normal drift of an
effort to comprehend the meaning of Being.

Resume
We pause to take our breath again. WG crystallizes the principal theses of SZ in terms of the nature of ground. The unenunciated thesis is that we gain access to the sense of Being by meditating the sense of ground, for both are but one in the comingto-pass of a-X7)&eia. The existential structure of There-being
(comprehension, disposition, logos) is orchestrated here in terms
of laying-claim, taking-possession and founding, but the conception, as far as one can see, is identical. The three components
are unified into a profoundly finite process called "the triplex
strewing of ground" (concern), whose ultimate meaning is
time.78 But the meaning of aboriginal time? Here we have only
a question mark that will haunt us to the end.
7a
7•

WG, p. 46. Cf. SZ, p* 366.
WG, p. 47.
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The principal newness of the essay consists in identifying the
process of transcendence with the coming-to-pass of freedom.
Meditating upon this notion makes it clear that there is a profound singleness of perspective that unites WG, KM and SZ,
which is not principally the problematic of the World, or even
specifically of transcendence, but of transcendence to World as
freedom and as truth; that the explicitation which WG brings,
two years after the publication of the major work, is to make
clear that the dynamism of Heidegger's thought at this time
finds its natural pole in a problematic that was always essential
to the argument of SZ (in fact, prescribed its method) but was
all too easily forgotten in the welter of detailed analyses, sc.
that the question about the Being-process must be pursued in
terms of freedom and truth.

CHAPTER

IV

W H A T IS M E T A P H Y S I C S ?

The year 1929 saw, besides the publication of KM and WG,
Heidegger's accession to the chair of philosophy at the University
of Freiburg, left vacant by Husserl's retirement, a new distinction that furnished the occasion on July 24 for the inaugural
lecture, "What is Metaphysics?'' (WM).1 Here Heidegger crystallizes once more the essential elements of the thought so carefully
elaborated in SZ, with the result that in a genuine sense we may
say that WM offers no doctrine of importance that is new. And yet
there is a profound difference of perspective from that of SZ,
which must be noted and emphatically stressed, if we are to
discern the evolution that already has begun.
What most especially characterizes WM is the question of
Non-being (Niehls). To be sure, the problem had its place both
in SZ and KM, but never before has it been thematized and
made the unifying principle of an entire reflection as now.2 In
the context of SZ, Non-being emerged as that which is not any
being within the "World" but rather the World itself in all its
indetermination. Non-being is not, then, total nothing but indeed a "something/' sc. the World as World. 8 In KM, on the
other hand, Non-being is discerned as the "transcendental
object/' sc. not "absolutely nothing" but a pure horizon within
1 In order to retain the proper chronological perspective, we consider here only
the text of the discourse itself, treating the Epilogue (2943) and Introduction (1949)
in the context of the period in which they were written.
Ä Only obliquely in W G (p. 45).
• SZ, p. 187. Note recurrence of phrase 11 Non-being [which is] the World" (Nichts
der Welt), v. g. pp. «>6-377» and passim.

W H A T IS

METAPHYSICS?

195

which beings-to-be-known-as-obj ects are always encountered.
Likewise, There-being as transcendence is essentially a passage
unto, or thrust into, Non-being, disclosed to There-being through
the ontological disposition of anxiety.4
We find ourselves, then, completely at home with all that is
most proper to the essay. It would be a mistake to look for great
novelties. Let us content ourselves with a brief review of the
argument that will sketchily indicate certain new precisions in
the analysis. Then we shall offer some general remarks which
may serve to suggest how, despite the familiar terminology, a
new course nevertheless has been set. It should appear from this
that WM, even if in more disguised fashion than WW, is clearly
a work of transition.

I. The Argument
The author proceeds in three separate steps which we shall
summarize: A. The Posing of a Metaphysical Question. B. The
Elaboration of the Question. C. The Answering of the Question.
A.

THE

POSING

OF A M E T A P H Y S I C A L

QUESTION

The question Heidegger wishes to pose is simply this: "what
about Non-being?" 5 Addressing, as he does, the members of the
University faculties whose common preoccupation, almost without exception, is, in one way or another, scientific research or
scholarship, he must win their sympathy by suggesting at least
the relevance of such a question to science and scientists.
The author concedes immediately that the question taken at
its face value solicits no interest from the scientist, even repels
him. Naturally! For the scientist examines beings - and nothing
else; his research is guided by beings - and nothing besides; for
he finds himself in the midst of beings - and nothing more. But
it is significant, it seems, that in order to speak of what properly
concerns him, he speaks of it in terms of something else, sc.
4 KM, pp. 7x (nicht das nihil absoluium),
1x4 (reiner Horizont), 71, ax4 (Sichhineinhalten in das Nichts), 2 1 4 (Angst).
* " . . . Wie steht es um das Nichts?" (WM, p. 27). How profoundly the whole
theme of the essay was influenced by the fact that the audience was composed largely
Of scientists we are told in X955 (SF, pp. 37-39)-
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"nothing." What about this "nothing," then, sc. this no-thing,
this Non-being? 6 Surely the question is worthy of a scientist's
interest.
B.

THE

ELABORATION

OF T H E

QUESTION

The substance of this section deals with determining how one
goes about answering the question: what about Non-being? For
one cannot simply ask what (or how) "is" Non-being, expecting
the answer: Non-being "is" such-and-such (a typically scientific
approach), for both question and answer would assume Nonbeing to be something which "is," sc. a being. Contradiction!
Yet such would be the spontaneous tendency of our normal
thought processes, for to think is to think about something, sc.
a being. If we restrict ourselves to the logical thought processes
of the understanding, then we cannot answer the question: what
about Non-being?, for the result is a contradiction that the
(logical) principle of contradiction forbids.7
The question of Non-being, then, doomed to logical contradiction, seems impossible. But perhaps the impossibility is only
a formal one, for the question as a matter of fact has been posed,
and this implies that somehow or other Non-being has been encountered already. How? By Non-being, we understand "the
negation of the totality of beings," and to encounter it, we must
encounter somehow not so much this totality as its negation.8
At this point, Heidegger resorts briefly to the phenomenological technique of SZ. The totality of beings, he claims, is
manifest to us in such phenomena as the thorough indifference
of profound boredom, or joy in the presence of the beloved, each
of them a mode of ontological disposition. The disposition that
discloses this totality in its negation, however, is, as we saw in
SZ, anxiety. For in this phenomenon, There-being is rendered
• WM, pp. 24-26. English here is not as flexible as the German. Heidegger can
slide from the colloquial nichts in the sense of "nothing" to the highly specialized
Nichts in the sense of Non-being merely by capitalizing the N, a transition all the
more easy, if we recall that the text is composed to be heard rather than read. We
might achieve the same effect by translating Nichts always as No-thing, but have renounced such a choice so as: to avoid translating Seiendes (in Nicht*Seiende?) as
"thing"; to suggest as much as possible the relationship between Non-being and
Be:ng.
7 WM, pp. 27-29.
* WM, p. 29 (Verneinung der Allheit des Seienden).
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anxious not about some given being or other (as happens in the
case of fear) nor even about beings-in-their-totality, but all beings
seem to slip away from There-being's grasp. "Anxiety renders
manifest Non-being." 9
C.

THE

ANSWER

TO THE

QUESTION

The point of the third section of the lecture is to offer some
positive comment on the nature of Non-being as disclosed in the
phenomenon of anxiety, and this from at least three separate
points of view. No claim is made for the completeness of the
answer.
J. Non-being and Beings
Non-being becomes manifest in and through anxiety. Nonbeing is not revealed as if it were something "alongside of"
beings-in-their-totality; nor does anxiety somehow annihilate
the total ensemble in order that then Non-being may remain as
residue. On the contrary, Non-being is revealed in anxiety "together" with the totality of beings.10 How does this happen?
In the phenomenon of anxiety, there is in There-being a certain
withdrawal before beings-in-the-ensemble that is by no means
a flight from them but rather a spellbound tranquillity in their
presence. Now this awestruck withdrawal seems to be imposed
on There-being. Furthermore, it does not draw attention to itself
but rather repels from itself, referring There-being to the totality-of-beings, which at that very moment seems to be slipping
away. It is thus that beings-in-the-ensemble impress Therebeing with all of their startling strangeness as being other other, that is, than Non-being. Here is born There-being's
wonder at the marvelous fact that beings "are." 1 1 And in the
" . . . effulgent night of Non-being [disclosed by] anxiety, there
occurs for the first time the original open-ness of beings as such:
that they are beings and not Non-being. . . . " 1 2 It is by reason
• "Die Angst offenbart das Nichts." (WM, p. 3a).
1 0 WM, p. 33 (in eins mit).
1 1 WM, pp.
3 4 > 4x.
1 1 "In der hellen Nacht des Nichts der Angst ersteht erst die ursprüngliche Offenheit des Seienden als eines solchen: daß es Seiendes ist - und nicht Nichts
"
(WM, p. 34).
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of the original manifestation of Non-being to There-being, then,
that There-being at once passes beyond beings (transcendence
to Being and thrust into Non-being are but one) and can enter
into comportment with beings. Briefly, " . . . Non-being is that
which renders possible the manifestation of beings as such for
the human There-being. . . . " 1 3 We have here the key to an
obscure remark in KM which serves at this point not only to
illuminate KM but also to explain the present section of WM:
. . . Only when [the process of] letting arise [a horizon of] opposedness is
a thrust into Non-being, can a presentation, instead of Non-being and
within it, permit what is not Non-being, sc. such a thing as a being, to
arrive at an encounter, provided such a being as a matter of fact empirically reveals itself. . . . 1 4
2. Non-being and its Disclosure
The second theme in the author's analysis of Non-being is
less important for us. It evolves as an answer to a difficulty: if
only a thrust into Non-being (transcendence) renders possible
comportment between There-being and other beings, then this
thrust must be an abiding characteristic of There-being. Yet
Non-being is disclosed originally by anxiety, which is only an
occasional, even rare, phenomenon, sc. not-abiding. How explain
this inconsistency? 1 5
Heidegger admits, of course, the irregularity of the anxiety
phenomenon for a There-being lost in the superficiality of
everydayness. But that does not mean that anxiety is not
found in an abiding way in There-being; it means only that
anxiety is "first of all and for the most part" suppressed.
" . . . Anxiety is there. It is only sleeping. . . . " 1 6 The slightest
stimulus can awaken it at any time.
Besides, if anxiety is the most original phenomenon which
discloses Non-being, sc. that phenomenon closest to the origins
1 9 " . . . Das Nichts ist die Ermöglichung der Offenbarkeit des Seienden als eines
solchen für das menschliche Dasein
" (WM, p. 35).
1 4 " . . . Nur wenn das Gegenstehenlassen von . . . ein Sichhineinhalten in das
Nichts ist, kann das Vorstellen anstatt des Nichts und innerhalb seiner ein nicht
Nichts, d. h. so etwas wie Seiendes begegnen lassen, falls solches sich gerade empirisch
zeigt
" (KM, p. 7z). Werner Brock's analysis of this phenomenon is admirable.
See M. Heidegger, Existence and Being, pp. 229-232.
» WM, p. 35.
" " . . . Die Angst ist da. Sie schlaft n u r . . . ( W M , p. 37).
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of There-being, it is not the only one. "Logical" negation (Verneinung), certainly an abiding characteristic of our normal
thought processes, betokens some comprehension of Non-being.
For it implies a pre-view of a "not" that can become manifest
only if its origin, sc. Non-being in its very essence (das Nickten
des Nichts), is itself freed from its hidden-ness.17 Nor is logical
negation the only evidence of a revelation of Non-being that
belongs to the essence of There-being. There are other types of
negativing comportment: v.g. opposition, abhorrence, refusal,
prohibition, renunciation - all in their own way indicating the
revelation of Non-being to There-being.18
3. Non-being and the Problem of Metaphysics
Heidegger closes his lecture by returning to his starting point,
attempting at once to show the relevance of the problem of Nonbeing to metaphysics itself and to the scientists and scholars
whom he addresses. The question of Non-being embraces the
whole of metaphysics, chiefly because Non-being is not simply
an undetermined "opposite" to beings, but reveals itself as
somehow pertaining to the Being of beings inasmuch as it enables a being to reveal itself as such, sc. to manifest the fact that
it "is." It is in this sense that Heidegger justifies the formula:
ex nihilo omne ens qua ens fit, sc. it is by reason of Non-being
that the totality of beings comes to itself.19
The question of Non-being embraces, too, the Being of the
enquiring There-being itself. For in the present situation the
enquiring There-being is characterized most profoundly by its
scientific effort. Non-being has its importance for science, however, because it is only inasmuch as Non-being is manifest that
beings are accessible and can become the object of a research
that discloses the truth both of nature and of history.20
The question about Non-being, then, is a genuinely metaphysical one. Indeed, the passage beyond beings which a thrust
into Non-being implies is metaphysics itself, and since such a
1 7 WM, p. 36. The term Verborgenheit here is of capital importance, as our subsequent study will reveal in more detail.
1 8 WM, p. 37 (Entgegenhandeln, Verabscheuen, Versagen, Verbieten, Entbehren).
» WM, pp. 39-40.
™ WM, pp. 40-41.
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thrust belongs to the essence of There-being (for it is transcendence), metaphysics is a coming-to-pass in the ground of
There-being itself. To have investigated the problem of Nonbeing, then, is to have approached the problem of metaphysics
from the inside, in all of its vibrant dynamism. The question
"What is Metaphysics?" is not answered, however, in any more
formal fashion than this. If one restricts oneself to the original
text itself, one might infer that metaphysics, then, is simply
letting come-to-pass with all possible luminosity the transcendence of There-being, There-being's surrender to Non-being,
so that it may pose once more the ground-question of all metaphysics: " . . . why are there beings at all, and not much rather
Non-being?" 21

II. General Remarks
A.

NON-BEING,

BEING

AND

TRUTH

It becomes swiftly apparent in the present essay - no matter
what has been written about Heidegger's nihilism, and independently of all his own self-interpretations - that he understands Being and Non-being to be one.22 We are well prepared
for such a correlation. Anxiety, which in WM discloses Nonbeing, in SZ discloses the World, and we have seen already how
the World of SZ gradually merges into the notion of Being.
Furthermore, in KM the horizon of objectiveness designated as
Non-being admits of a positive description in terms of Being
itself. All this is to be assumed as the context in which the
present reflection is elaborated. We are interested for the moment
in what the text itself offers us.
The decisive passage in this regard occurs in the third section
of the lecture, where Heidegger describes the function of Nonbeing in the manifestation of beings. Non-being repels attention
from itself and directs There-being's gaze, so to speak, to beings
in their totality, which are thereby discovered again with a fresh
appreciation for the fact that they are beings and not Non-being.
It is Non-being, then, that renders possible the manifestation of
u
M

" . . . Warum ist Oberhaupt Seiendes und nicht vielmehr Nichts?" (WM, p. 42).
C i WM, pp. 45-47, 22-23; SF, pp. 36-40; US, pp. x08-109.
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beings as beings. This, however, is precisely the function of
Being itself. " . . . In the Being of beings comes-to-pass Nonbeing in its very essence." 23 " . . . Non-being . . . reveals itself
as belonging to the Being of beings." 24
The argument becomes more cogent when, recalling that the
Being-process and a-X^S-eta are one, we see what röle Non-being
plays in the coming-to-pass of non-concealment. To be sure, the
problem of truth does not appear as such in WM, and yet, despite its night-like obscurity, Non-being has a luminosity all its
own, so that we may speak of the "revelation" of Non-being as
well as the release of Non-being from its primal hiddenness,
therefore its non-hiddenness. Furthermore, it is only because
Non-being is manifest that the truth with which science is concerned, sc. of nature and of history, becomes accessible to the
scientist.25
At this point, Heidegger adds a short but significant paragraph, whose importance could easily escape us. It is because
Non-being has been made manifest to There-being, he says, that
there can come over There-being a new sense of the strangeness
of beings and an appreciation of how wondrous it is that they
"are." Thus it is the revelation of Non-being that lies at the
basis of all wonder (Verwunderung), and, therefore, of every
"why?" Heidegger's immediate conclusion, then, is to re-affirm
the importance of the revelation of Non-being for a scientist as
the ultimate origin of the "why?" that guides the research which
seeks to interrogate and found the beings that come under his
examination. The parallel with WG is clear. There, the transcendental origin of " w h y ? " is ontological truth, sc. the revealedness of Being. Here it is the revealed-ness of Non-being. What
else is there to conclude than that Non-being, inasmuch as it becomes manifest, is ontological truth? 26
Finally, it is in the thrust of There-being into Non-being, sc.
" . . . Im Sein des Seienden geschieht das Nichten des Nichts." (WM, p. 35).
" . . . Das Nichts bleibt nicht das unbestimmte Gegenüber für das Seiende,
sondern es enthüllt sich als zugehörig zum Sein des Seienden." (WM, p. 39). One
could argue, too, from the fact that: in terms of There-being, the formulae "thrust
into Non-being" and "transcendence" are taken to be equivalent (WM, pp. 35, 38,
41); the question of Being and the question of N on-being have same scope - both
encompass whole of metaphysics (WM, p. 40).
1 5 WM, pp. 34 (hellen Nacht: cf. Helle des Seinsverständnisses, WG, p. 45); 3537, 41 (Offenbarkeit des Nichts), 36 (Verborgenheit), 40-41 (Wissenschaft).
M WM, p. x. Cf. WG, p. 45.
4
M

t4
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its transcendence unto Being, that the truth of metaphysics
resides. In making this last point, Heidegger adds that because
There-being is a ground of metaphysics that is characterized by
negativity (abgründiger Grund), the deepest kind of error dwells
exceedingly nigh.27 It is the first mention of the problem of
error. In itself, the remark is undeveloped and remains enigmatic
in the context, but we interpret it thus: Taking the phrase
"groundless ground" to mean that There-being is a ground that
includes a non-ground, sc. negativity (finitude), then the truth
of metaphysics which dwells in There-being as ground includes
also non-truth, and non-truth (for it is thus that we understand
"error") resides as truth's nearest neighbor. The point does not
pertain to the central argument of WM and will make more sense
in the context of WW. It is worth mentioning here only to show
the drift of the author's thinking (1929) toward WW (1930).
Let us, conclude, then, that with the revelation of Non-being
is disclosed ontological truth, and an effort to answer the question
about Non-being is an endeavor, however finite, to meditate
Being in its truth.
B. N O N - B E I N G A N D T H E F O U N D I N G O F M E T A P H Y S I C S
That Heidegger's selection of the theme of Non-being for his
inaugural address was directed by a prior concern for the problem
of metaphysics itself is self-evident. It is significant, though,
that the question about Non-being (Being) is conceived as an
eminently metaphysical question, as if one could reach the ground
of metaphysics from the inside.28 This is understandable enough,
when we realize that the problem is still thought in terms of
Heidegger I, who has gone about the question of Being by posing
the question of There-being, that structure in man which renders
metaphysics possible. He is still endeavoring to develop the
"metaphysics of metaphysics," but the emphasis will soon
change.29
The difference will have become long since apparent by the
time the prologue appears (1949)^0 insist upon the necessity of
» WM, p. 4 1 .
WM, pp. 38-41- See Max Müller, Existenxpkilosopkie im geistigen Leben der
Gegenwart, 2nd ed. (Heidelberg: Kerle, 1958), p. 55 (note x).
WM, p. 4 1 ; KM, pp. 13-14, 208.
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going outside metaphysics, sc. beyond it into its ground, by
interrogating the Being-process conceived as the coming-to-pass
of the ontological difference. Is there really a discrepancy?
Certainly the notion of "overcoming" will be new. But limiting
ourselves to the text at hand, we discover that even here the
author is probing the difference between Being and beings. The
first indication of this can be found in the important passage of
the third section which describes the function of Non-being in
rendering manifest beings as beings. Non-being repels attention
from itself and directs There-being's gaze towards beings. Beings,
on the other hand, are revealed by reason of the effulgence of
Non-being, as that which is not Non-being. How comprehend this
mysterious reticence which is mutual to both Non-being and
beings, each revealed by reason of what it is not? This "not" which
separates beings and Non-being is difference, sc. the ontological
difference. And it is precisely here, it would seem, that the full
weight of the question mark falls.
Again, let us go to the conclusion of the lecture. Here, as often,
Heidegger ends with a pregnant phrase: " . . . T h e groundquestion of metaphysics is [one that] Non-being itself forces
[upon us]: why are there beings at all and not much rather Nonbeing?" 80 It is not the first time we have met this question, for
it was proposed in WG as one of the fundamental modes of
"why?" and, indeed, was underlined by the author himself, as if
to indicate its primacy among the rest. Nor do we meet it for the
last time now. Indeed it will assume a growing importance in the
author's thought and become the theme of his university lectures
in 1936, published subsequently as EM.31 It seems self-evident
that the question for Heidegger must have a completely different
sense than for Leibniz. For the latter, the question concerns
beings and is tantamount to asking "where do beings come
from?," sc. what is the origin of beings in what Heidegger calls
the "ontic" sense. Heidegger is not interested in beings - does not
the thematizing of Non-being make it sufficiently clear? Nor is
he interested in the being-ness of beings, if this be conceived (as
in metaphysics) either as the abstraction of Being-in-general or
80 " . . . die Grundfrage der Metaphysik, die das Nichts selbst erzwingt: Warum
ist überhaupt Seiendes und nicht vielmehr Nichts?" (WM, p. 42).
81 WG, p. 45; EM, pp. 1, 24-25-
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as some ontic ground of beings. He is interested - and the
question itself is sufficient evidence - in what it means for beings
to emerge out of Non-being, hence to be differentiated from Nonbeing. He is interested in the ontological difference.
One final word. It is Non-being itself that "forces" the question
upon us. Does not this mean that Non-being exercises a priority
of sorts in the posing of the question ? How explain this priority
according to Heidegger I, where Non-being, Being, World are
all the project of There-being itself? Or do we have here a presage
of Heidegger II ?
C. N O N - B E I N G A N D F O U N D A T I O N A L

THOUGHT

As yet there is no mention of foundational thought, but if the
effort to think Non-being (Being) does not yet have a name of
its own, we can discern the essentials of it all the more surely,
perhaps, simply because it has not yet become thematized.
J . Negatively
Negatively speaking, we know that Non-being is not an object.
For an object is a being (-opposed-to-a-subject), and that is
precisely what Non-being is not. The thinking of Non-being,
then, is necessarily non-objective, just as the There-being which
thinks is non-subjective, sc. it is a self that is essentially a thrust
into Non-being (transcendence).
It is this non-objective character of Non-being that precipitates Heidegger's first open polemic against the dominion of
"logic" over metaphysics in the philosophical tradition. There
had been, to be sure, certain intimations of this in SZ in consequence of his analysis of the word X6yos, as well as in KM, where,
however, it is easier to sense an attitude than to delineate a
fixed position.32 Here in WM, however, the lines of battle are
clearly drawn.
Heidegger's criticism rests basically on the fact that "logic"
is necessarily concerned only with beings, " . . . for thinking is
ctc*
•• See v. g. SZ, pp. 3*-34> 44. 158-160,165, 2x9; K M , pp. 107,136.
See, too, the suggestive remark i n W G , p. 20 (note zo). The quotation marks
for "logic** have a special significance that w i l l appear later. Meantime, see W M ,
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essentially thinking about something. . . . " 33 Since Non-being
is not a being, it cannot be encompassed by "logic." To wish to
consider it by purely "logical" thought processes is to doom
oneself from the first moment to contradiction, for it is to make
Non-being a being, sc. an object of "logical" thought. His entire
analysis attempts to show that Non-being is nevertheless
somehow accessible to There-being and plays an essential r61e in
metaphysics. Thus we are to conclude that "logic" does not have
the last word in metaphysics, which must, when all is said and
done, be grounded in an experience which is pre-, or at least
praeter-, "logical." 34
As a case in point, Heidegger takes the example of negation,
sc. of a "logical" judgement of the understanding which denies
a P about an S, therefore affirms a "not." If one were to try to
preserve the dominion of "logic" over the present problematic,
one could perhaps say that Non-being is simply the ("logical")
denial of the totality of beings by an act of the understanding
which says "Non-being." 35 But that is just the point at issue,
he says. It is not a "logical" negation that is the origin of Nonbeing; rather the reverse is true, for unless There-being had a
previous comprehension of Non-being, it could not form a negative judgement, sc. it could not affirm a "not" at all. " . . . The
not can become manifest, however, only when its origin, Nonbeing in its very essence, and, therefore, Non-being itself, is delivered from hidden-ness . . . , " sc. revealed in truth.36 The disclosure, or revelation of Non-being, then, is prior to all "logical"
negation, and, as a consequence, to all of "logic" itself. And if
we are to answer the question of Non-being (Being), the purely
rational approach to metaphysics must surrender to a more
original type of interrogation than "logic" can provide.37

" . . . Denn das Denken, das wesenhaft immer Denken von etwas i s t , . . . "
(WM, p. 28).
84 WM, pp. 30 (Grunderfahrung), 36-37 (ursprünglicheren Fragens);
" WM, p. 28.
•• " . . . Das Nicht kann aber nur offenbar werden, wenn sein Ursprung, das
Nichten des Nichts überhaupt und damit das Nichts selbst, der Verborgenheit entnommen ist
" (WM, p. 36).
« WM, pp. 36-37.
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2. Positively
What may be said more positively about the manner of this
"more original interrogation"? Little enough, perhaps. If the
whole essay be taken as an effort to think Being (Non-being),
then we can see concretely that the ontological disposition
somehow plays an important röle in the process. More important,
however, are certain indices, insignificant perhaps in themselves,
which point toward a shift in perspective accomplished clearly
a year later in WW (1930). Philosophy and metaphysics are one,
and both come-to-pass in the process of transcendence called
"existence." In order to found either one, There-being in its existence must yield, through a unique type of surrender, to beingsin-their-1otality, and, by achieving a liberty from all of its ontic
idols, abandon itself completely to Non-being. In practice, this
will take the form of posing the question about the ontological
difference.88

RSsume
In WM, we find the same old preoccupation as heretofore, to
lay bare the ground of metaphysics, this time articulated for
scientists, whose day-in-day-out concern is the investigation of
beings. If they are to be led to make the experience of Being, it
can only be under the guise of Non-being, discovered through the
experience of anxiety. But an effort to think Being in this way
must repudiate the claims of "logic" to exclusive mastery over
the laws of thought, for "logic" deals only with beings and can
have no jurisdiction over Non-being as such. We must essay,
therefore, a pre-logical thought, which achieves freedom from
slavery to the ontic by a total surrender to Non-being in interrogating the ontological difference.
What is new in all this? We might mention certain traces that
suggest how the conception of surrender of There-being may
imply a certain primacy of Non-being over thought. But perhaps
the most significant fact is that Non-being becomes thematic at
all. All the interpreters admit a profound concordance between
WM and SZ, but is there not a profound difference as well?
M

W M , p. 4s.
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Granting that SZ set down as its purpose the posing of the Beingquestion, the fact remains that the entire analysis was devoted
to examining phenomenologically that being which gives access
to Being, sc. There-being as transcendence (to-be-in-the-World).
The entire work, for all its profundity, never gets beyond this
preparatory stage. Likewise, KM is concerned almost exclusively
with the problem of transcendence. And must we not say the
same for WG ?
In all of the first three works, then, the focus of attention is
upon There-being. What we notice in WM is that the focus is no
longer primarily on There-being as transcendence but has shifted
for the most part to that unto which There-being transcends, sc.
to Being (Non-being). The shift occurs gracefully, without
calling attention to itself, but its importance is none the less
noteworthy for that. From now on, Heidegger's attention will
be absorbed more and more by the problem of Being as such, so
that with the closing passages of WW a year later (1930) the
transition to a Being-centered problematic will be apparent. It
is important to note here, however, ihat the shift is perfectly
coherent with the intentions of the earlier work and in a genuine
sense is born out of fidelity to it.
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If circumstances lead me, I will find
Where truth is hid, though it were hid indeed
Within the centre.
William Shakespeare,

Hamlet

CHAPTER

I

ON T H E E S S E N C E OF T R U T H

We come now to a decisive point in Heidegger's development.
The effort to ground metaphysics (fundamental ontology) began
as a search to illuminate the intrinsic correlation between the
Being-process as such and the finitude of the being that comprehends it, sc. There-being. The first step (SZ) was to analyse
There-being phenomenologically in order to find in the pre-ontic
comprehension of Being some means of discerning the sense of
Being. Subsequently the author has become more and more
preoccupied with Being itself, but chiefly in terms of the problem
of truth, since the sense of Being is its truth. The growing importance of the problematic of truth is discernible in all of the
works that followed SZ and culminates now in the essay "On
the Essence of Truth," where Heidegger thematizes the problem,
retaining as intrinsic to it the problem of finitude, sc. the negativity of truth which he calls "un-truth."
Although published late (1943), the text dates initially from
1930.1 The author admits to several subsequent revisions, which,
however, left the point of departure, fundamental position and
basic structure of the original work unchanged.2 Taking him at
1 Vom Wesen der Wahrheit, 3rd ed. (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1954). (Hereafter
WW). The text was delivered in lectures at Bremen, Marburg and Freiburg (1930),
as well as Dresden (1932). ist ed., 1943; 2nd ed., containing new first paragraph inserted at beginning of concluding note, 1949. This paragraph is not found either in
the French translation (De Vessence de la vlriti, tr. and introd. A. De Waelhens and
W. Biemel [Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1948]), or in the English translation (4,On the
Essence of Truth," tr. R.F.C. Hull and A. Crick in Existence and Being, introd. by
W. Brock, pp. 317-351).
2 From closing note of first edition, omitted in second, to be found both in French
(p. 105) and English (p. 351) translations.
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his word, we assume that the text represents his thought as of
1930, and, although the matter would be very illuminating,
must leave to historians the task of disengaging what alterations
were made when.
We are relatively well prepared for the study we are about
to undertake and do not approach it in a vacuum. We know:
that the truth of conformity (between judgement and judged)
supposes a still more fundamental truth that resides in the beingto-be-judged and enables us to discern whether or not the
judgement is conformed to it; that this truth of the being-to-bejudged is basically an un-hidden-ness, or open-ness, of that
being to the knower; that beings become un-hidden to a finite
knower because this knower has a comprehension of their Beingstructure antecedent to his encounter with them; that this
antecedent comprehension may be conceived as an open horizon,
or domain of encounter, or the World (or, for that matter, Nonbeing), within which beings and There-being meet; that this
sphere of open-ness is instituted by the transcendence of the
finite There-being; that the transcendence of finite There-being
is ontological truth, which, since it renders possible the encounter
that occurs in There-being's comportment with other beings,
enables the beings-to-be-judged to become manifest (ontic
truth); that this transcendence liberates the beings which it
encounters from the obscurity that initially enshrouds them by
letting them be (manifest), hence must be called freedom; that
this transcendence (freedom) is the primary sense of truth; that
this transcendence is profoundly finite, therefore negatived, so
that truth comports non-truth; that one consequence of the
negativity of There-being as transcendence (freedom, truth) is
that it is prone to become absorbed in its preoccupation with the
beings that measure the truth of its judgements, and forget its
true self; that it re-collects its self in re-solve, which thus becomes
the eminent mode of truth.
All of these notions return now in the essay we are about to
read, explicitated and developed, to be sure, but it is important
to see that none of them are new in WW. Is there something new
added here which we have not seen before ? This is precisely the
point that must engage our attention now.
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I. The Argument
A.
THE

CONVENTIONAL

CHAPTER

1:

INTERPRETATION

OF

TRUTH

The author, in his introduction, sets down as his purpose to
determine what it is that characterizes every type of "truth" as
truth, but in the course of the exposition explains more clearly
that by "essence" he understands the "ground of inner possibility." 3
The reflection begins with an analysis of the conventional
notion of truth - not without a resonance of the phenomenological style of SZ. The author concludes quickly enough, for
the point is obvious, that in the tradition of Western thought,
the essence of truth lies in conformity of judgement and judged
(adaequatio intellectus et ret). There is, of course, an ontological
truth, where res conforms to intellectum, but more commonly we
speak of logical truth, sc. where intellectus conforms to rem, and
the proper place of truth is said to be the intellect's act of
judgement. In either case, the measure of truth lies in the exactitude or correctness (Richtigkeit) of this conformity, and nontruth will be simply non-conformity, or incorrectness.4
This traditional notion has a genuine value that is not to be
denied, but the further question arises: what conditions are
required in order to render possible this conformity? For it is
here, after all, that the essence of truth must reside.
B.
THE

CHAPTERS

GROUND

OF

2 AND

3:

CONFORMITY

As soon as the author undertakes to explain the inner possibility of conformity, the analysis becomes minute and, because
of the compression of the style, difficult to follow. The basic lines,
however, are simple enough. We are already familiar with Heidegger's thesis that the truth of judgements (therefore predicative) supposes a pre-predicative truth. Here in WW, Heidegger
re-crystallizes all this.
» WW, pp. 5 (jede "Wahrheit" als Wahrheit), 13 (Grund der inneren Möglichkeit).
* WW, pp. 6~ 9 .
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There is an open horizon within which the "true" judgement
comes-to-expression (Aussage), sc, the being-that-judges (Therebeing) forms its judgement after having encountered the to-bejudged 5 "in the Open." 6 In giving expression to its judgement,
There-being completes the act of knowledge by which it has been
made possible for the to-be-known to reveal itself as opposed to
There-being. The expressed judgement, then, presents the to-beknown, sc. lets the to-be-known take up its position as the object
of There-being's knowledge. The Open in which There-being has
encountered the to-be-known that now is the object of its
knowledge may itself be considered to be a horizon of object iveness, or an open domain, that is opposed to There-being, which
the to-be-known must somehow traverse (durchmessen) in order
for it to appear to There-being and thus become the object of its
knowledge.
But the open-ness of the Open is not constituted by the fact
that the to-be-known appears to There-being by traversing it.
On the contrary, the Open must be conceived as a matrix of
relationships (Verhältnis) which constitute the sphere of potentialities of There-being, one of which potentialities is exploited
when an actual contact takes place. This is the sense of the metaphor that the encounter takes place in the Open. This contact
takes place when There-being enters into comportment with a
to-be-judged (-known). What characterizes comportment is the
fact that, while standing in the Open, it refers itself to somethingthat-is-open (das Offenbare), precisely inasmuch as it is open.
What we here designate as "something-which-is-open" was experienced in the earliest phase of Western thought, according
to Heidegger, as "that-which-comes-to-presence" ("das Anwesende") before There-being, and was afterwards called "thatwhich-z's," sc. a being. Notice here how intimately for Heidegger
that-which-is (a being) is correlated with that-which-is-open,

5 At the risk of some awkwardness of expression, we avoid using the word "being*'
for the moment in order that we may savor better its Heideggerean sense.
6 WW, p. ir. Translation is literally exact but also idiomatic. English speaks of a
concert or play being "in the open" (French: en plein air), and of relations between
persons as being "in the open1' when there is nothing to be ashamed of or to conceal.
We reserve the word "Open" now to translate what in KM was Horizont or Spiel'
raum and in SZ Welt.
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both to be distinguished from the Open as such.7 It will be an
easy step to say in a moment that what renders-open is that
which lets-fo.
All comportment, then, is a standing open towards thatwhich-is-open, sc. towards beings. It takes place in countless
ways throughout the vast horizon of the Open. Only because
such a comportment as this precedes all judgement does it become possible for judgements to express what beings are and
how they are. And when the expression does take place, the being,
laid open in comportment, must become the measure of the correctness of the judgement that is expressed. It is only because
of the open-character of the judgement that the truth of the
judgement, in the sense of correctness, becomes possible. Truth,
then, does not rest primarily in the judgement but somewhere
prior to it. Does it reside in the open character of comportment
as such? Before we can affirm this, we must probe further into
the ground which renders such comportment possible.8
The answer to such a question, sketched first in bold lines, is
this: what renders such comportment possible is that Therebeing is so completely open, sc. free, toward the Open as to
accept any open being it may encounter within the Open for
what it is, sc. to permit this being to be itself as open and
thus constrain or direct There-being in the formation of its
judgements by serving as measure, norm or rule for these
judgements. This open-ness of There-being toward the Open
and that-which-is-open we call "freedom." Thus freedom, the
ultimate ground of possibility of truth-as-correctness, must now
be called the essence of truth, so that we are forced to examine
once more in this context the nature of freedom itself.9
c.

CHAPTER

4:

THE

ESSENCE

OF

FREEDOM

Recall, to begin with, the results of our previous research:
that is "free" in the most fundamental sense which has been
7 We are trying to suggest that what distinguishes that-which-is-open
(das
Offenbare) from the Open (das Offene) is precisely the fact tkat-it-is. This is the same
difference as between being and Being.
8 The entire r6sum6 here is an attempt to paraphrase as simply as possible pp.
11-12 of the text.
• WW, p. 12.
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liberated from concealment, and, since non-concealment is
d-XTf)frsiot, what is free is true. Primarily true, and therefore primarily free, is There-being itself. True and free in the secondary
sense are all beings that by reason of There-being's disclosedness
are discovered or made manifest. To render beings free is to
let-them-be-manifest as being what they "are." We are going
to hear now a new orchestration of these same themes. There
are two aspects of freedom which interest us in this chapter:
freedom in terms of the beings-that-are-encountered; freedom
in terms of There-being itself.
j. The Freedom of Beings-encountered
" . . . Freedom unveils itself here as the letting-be of beings." 10
Recalling the above correlation between "being" and "thatwhich-is-open," we can see that to let-be is not something negative, as if it were simply a disregard of beings or an indifference
to them. On the contrary, it is a letting-be that is a "lettingoneself-in-on" beings, as we speak of being "let in on" a secret.
Here, the "secret" of the being-that-is-open is precisely that
which previously was veiled (sc. what it is and how it is), but
which now is un-veiled (Entborgenheit) by the fact that the being
has been let-be (revealed). By letting-itself-in-on the secret of
what (and how) beings "are," There-being does not lose itself in
them but rather withdraws before them in respectful reticence,
permitting them to control as a directive norm its judgements
about them. 11
2. The Freedom of There-being
That which renders it possible, however, for There-being to
let-itself-in-on the beings it meets is the fact that by its very
constitution There-being " . . . lets-itself-in-on the Open and its
open-ness, within which all beings abide and comport them10 " . . . Freiheit enthüllt sich jetzt als das Seinlassen von Seiendem." (WW, p. 14).
11 WW, pp. 14-15- As we have already seen, comprehension of Being-structure
includes a comprehension of what, how and that a being is. The first two are explications of the "that" of beings. In WM (v. g. p. 34), the "that" was emphasized,
now the first two. Later the third will be stressed again as implying the former two.
It is worth-while noting that there is a constancy of thought, and difference only of
emphasis.
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selves. . . . " 1 2 This process by which There-being lets-itself-in-on
the Open is ec-static by its very nature, sc. by reason of it Therebeing stands outside of itself in the direction of the Open, is exposed (aussetzend), or, as we may say, simply open toward the
Open. This is what is meant by the ek-sistence of There-being.
It is profoundly a transcendence, for here There-being goes beyond that-which-is-open to the Open itself, sc. to that by reason
of which the opened-up-being is open. On the one hand, Therebeing in this constitutional freedom is committed to attain the
Open only in and through that-which-is-open as such.
" . . . Freedom is before all else . . . the condition of having-beenlet-in-on the unveiling of beings as s u c h . . . . " sc. on that-whichis-open inasmuch as it is open.13 On the other hand, There-being
does pass beyond these beings unto the Open, and, indeed, by
reason of its self, for the "There" of There-being, which in SZ was
called the "disclosedness," hence the "luminosity" (one could
simply say "opened-up-ness"), of the World, is here called the
very "open-ness of the Open" itself.14
Now what we are calling here "the Open" is what is meant by
"the Non-concealed" (das Unverborgene), that which in the early
days of Western thought was designated as a-X7)&eioc, sc. truth.
That-which-is-open, then, is that which is true, or, more simply,
that-which-is (a being). Hence it is that " . . . truth is that unveiling of beings through which an open-ness comes to
presence...," 1 5 and this because There-being is ek-sistence,
sc. freedom. Hence, " . . . truth in its essence is freedom. . . . " 16
Briefly: the essence of truth is freedom, sc. the un-veiling of
beings in their what and their how; the essence of freedom is
ek-sistence, sc. ex-posure unto the Open. In a single formula:
the essence of truth is the opening-up of that-which-is-open by
1 2 f i . . . sich einlassen auf das Offene und dessen Offenheit, in die jegliches Seiende
hereinsteht, das jene gleichsam mit sich bringt
" (WW, p. 14).
1 3 1 1 . . . Die Freiheit ist alldem (der 'negativen' und 'positiven' Freiheit) zuvor die
Eingelassenheit in die Entbergung des Seienden als eines solchen
" (WW, p. 15).
Writer's italics.
14 WW, pp. 15 (die Offenheit des Offenen). The term "transcendence" does not
appear in text. The analysis here is based on WW, pp. 14-15, but it is clearly the
writer's interpretation, not just a paraphrase.
1 5 " . . . die Wahrheit ist die Entbergung des Seienden, durch die eine Offenheit
west....» (WW, p. 16).
1 6 "Weil jedoch die Wahrheit im Wesen Freiheit i s t , . . . " (WW, p. 17).
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reason of open-ness to the Open which comes-to-pass as eksistence, sc. There-being.
D.

CHAPTER

5*. T H E

PROBLEM

OF

NON-TRUTH

The essence of truth has been examined. What, now, of nontruth ? If the essence of truth is not correctness, then the essence
of non-truth (is it better to say the "non-essence of truth"?) is
certainly not in-correctness. Since the essence of truth lies in
freedom, sc. ek-sistence, must not the negativity of truth, sc.
non-truth, somehow be grounded in the negativity that infiltrates freedom? If so, then non-truth must permeate truth as
profoundly as negativity permeates freedom (ek-sistence, transcendence). But how is such negativity to be understood? It is to
this aspect of the problem that the author will devote the rest
of his essay. 17
But, curiously enough, he begins with a chapter entitled "The
Essence of Truth" (curiously, because the whole essay, after all,
deals with the "Essence of Truth"). The reason is not immediately apparent, for in it he prepares further the analysis of the
non-essence of truth (the essence of non-truth). Would this be
a plausible explanation? Heidegger assumes that truth in its
essence necessarily comports negativity, hence in interrogating
non-truth he interrogates the essence of truth as well.
There are two points of importance to be noted in Chapter 5.
They concern: the un-veiling, or re-vealing {Entbergung) t of
beings-in-the-ensemble; the veiling, or concealing (Verbergung),
of beings-in-the ensemble.
J. The Revealing of Beings-in-the-ensemble
We have already seen how There-being enters into comportment with that-which-is-open, revealing it in what (and
how) it is. This occurs in virtue of the ek-sistence of There-being.
But the luminosity of There-being's ek-sistence is not restricted
to any single comportment with which at a given moment it
may be preoccupied. After all, ek-sistence is that prerogative
17 Except for the chapter of conclusion (Chapter 8). The problem itself is posed in
concluding paragraph of Chapter 4, p. 17.
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by which There-being, thrown among beings, irrupts in their
midst as that which renders manifest all beings, including itself.
In every particular comportment, then, there is a certain resonance, or attunement (Gestimmtheit), by reason of which the
whole ensemble becomes manifest. We recognize here, of course,
the ontological disposition, disclosing, as it does, There-being's
essential reference to the World, which, if considered in the ontic
dimension, may be called There-being's orientation towards
beings-in-the-ensemble.18
2. The Concealing of Beings-in-the-ensemble
But this resonance is only an intimation. The total ensemble
itself remains vague. In fact, the more completely There-being
is engrossed in any particular comportment, the more the
ensemble appears incalculable, unseizable, undetermined, indeterminable and, for that reason, all the more easily forgotten.
As a result, one might say (the metaphor is not Heidegger's)
that the glare of the particular obscures the whole. More exactly:
in the very comportment by which There-being re-veals a particular thing, sc. lets it be (manifest), There-being leaves unrevealed, therefore obscures or conceals, beings-in-the-ensemble.
Hence, " . . . to let-be [revealed] of its very nature is simultaneously to conceal. In the ek-sistent freedom of There-being takes
place the concealing of beings-in-the-ensemble, [i.e.] concealment is." 19
Notice: that to conceal is to fail to reveal, sc. to non-reveal,
hence may be conceived as a negative component of the revealing process; that this negativity takes place in the comingto-pass of ek-sistent freedom itself, to such an extent that we
is WW, p. 18. There are certain privileged types of disposition that disclose the
ensemble with special clarity (WM, p. 31), but here there is question of any disposition
whatever that intimates There-being's orientation toward the "World" of beings
with which it is not engaged in the encounter of the moment.
19 " . . . Das Seinlassen ist in sich zugleich ein Verbergen. In der ek-sistenten
Freiheit des Da-seins ereignet sich die Verbergung des Seienden im Ganzen, ist die
Verborgenheit." (WW, p. 19). Heidegger's italics. We have here (1930) the first instance which calls attention to itself of sich ereignen. Spontaneously we would translate as "comes-to-pass," but, since hitherto we have used this to translate Geschehen,
we use the new term "takes-place," implying "e-vent.M Eventually, the phrase will
be reserved for Being itself, but this anticipates a later stage of the evolution we are
watching unfold. For the present, sich ereignen seems equivalent to the Geschehen of
There-being.
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may say that in this process concealment itself is, sc. concealment (negativity) is intrinsic to revealment; that if truth is
revealment, then concealment must be non-truth. This whole
section, then, is an approach to the problem of non-truth.
E.

CHAPTER

6:

NON-TRUTH

AS

CONCEALMENT

Chapters 6 and 7 are extremely difficult. To find an evident
clarity in them is perhaps to impose it, and such, no doubt, is
the risk of all interpretation. We must run the risk. We restrict
ourselves to the bare essentials and try to discern the general
orientation, leaving exegesis to exegetes.
The point at issue, at least, is clear: given the essence of truth
as the letting-be of beings, how explain the non-essence of truth,
sc. non-truth, insofar as it is intrinsic to truth? The titles of the
two chapters, "Non-truth as Concealment" and "Non-truth as
Errance" (die Irre), indicate that they are two different replies
to the same question, or, better perhaps, a single reply under
two different aspects. The two chapters, then, are profoundly
unified, and we must understand them in their unity if we are
to understand them at all.
The stylistic difficulties of the text are complicated by the
presence of two theses which the author, at least at this point,
does not enunciate: the problem of non-truth is intimately associated with the problem of finitude which negativity implies; 2 a
the ultimate origin of truth is not There-being but something
more fundamental still in which There-being itself abides and
which somehow comes-to-pass in There-being. The latter is a
major change from the perspective of SZ, and we are going to
examine now in more detail the subtle chemistry that effects it.
It is a point of supreme moment, for we are on the verge of Heidegger II. Stated even crudely as has been done here, the thesis
already gives us a fresh meaning for the old formulae of SZ:
There-being is "in the truth"; There-being is "in the non-truth."
Coming now to Chapter 6 proper, we polarize our remarks
around the two following points: mystery; forgetfulness of the
mystery.
20 This is a point of interpretation, of course, which already has been affirmed and
must be justified, if not by citation, at least by the coherence of the exposition.
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j. Mystery
Since the essence of truth is revealment, the non-essence of
truth is non-revealment, therefore concealment. ( " . . . If, then,
truth be considered as revealment, concealment is non-revealment and consequently non-truth, which is not only authentic but most proper to the essence of truth. . . . " ) 21 Now
since only that can be revealed which hitherto has been concealed, concealment is prior - not "temporally" but ontologically - to revelation. In other words, the letting-be (manifest)
that we have called revealment must take place within a horizon, sc. against a background, of obscurity that we are now
calling concealment. Concealment, then, is prior to the freedom
which comes-to-pass through a particular comportment between
There-being and an individual being.
Furthermore, this comportment itself not only leaves concealed the remainder of beings-in-their-totality but itself enters
into a special relationship with the concealing of what is concealed. This relationship to the concealment of the total ensemble
of beings is of such a nature that the concealing itself remains
concealed. We may speak, then, of a concealing of concealment,
sc. what is concealed in There-being's liberating comportment
is not only beings-in-their-totality but the fact that the ensemble
is concealed and the import of this fact. This concealing of the
concealed Heidegger calls "the mystery" {das Geheimnis) - the
unique and primordial obscurity that enshrouds not individual
beings severally but the entire There-being of man.
Hence the "first fruit" (erstlich) of concealment appears in the
mode of concealment itself. It is this primal mystery that is nontruth in the most authentic sense. " . . . The authentic nonessence of truth is the mystery. . . . " 22 And it dominates (durchwaltet) There-being, inasmuch as There-being is what it is, sc.
ek-sistence. " . . . There-being preserves, as long as it ek-sists,
the first and broadest non-revelation, the authentic non21 " . . . Die Verborgenheit ist dann, von der Wahrheit als Entborgenheit her gedacht, die Un-entborgenheit und somit die dem Wahrheitswesen eigenste und eigentliche Un-wahrheit
" (WW, p. 19). On this whole difficult passage, see introduction
to French translation, pp. 43-48.
22 " . . .
Das eigentliche Un-wesen der Wahrheit ist das Geheimnis
" (WW,
p. 20).
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truth. . . . " 23 How else can this be explained except in terms of
the fact that a "not" permeates There-being down to its very
depths, sc. that it is negatived (finite)? We return here effectively to the formula, "There-being is in the non-truth."
To be noted here is the priority (älter) of non-truth (concealment) to truth (revealment) and consequently a tendency,
not yet explicit, to attribute a certain alterity to the mystery
which dominates the There-being of man. At the same time,
there is still implied a dependence of the mystery on There-being.
What, then, is the relation between There-being and the
mystery? And what does it mean to call non-truth "prior" to
truth?
2. Forgetfulness of the Mystery
The mystery, however, easily evanesces for a There-being lost
in the superficiality of everydayness. To be sure, There-being
lets-be those beings with which it has to do, but often enough
becomes absorbed in them, fascinated by its ability to make
negotiable instruments of them for its daily traffic and to control
them at will. Even if designedly it broadens the scope of its
preoccupation, still the new sphere of interest is determined by
its own ontic intentions and needs. In effect, however, this is to
refuse to let the mystery hold sway over the very There-being
which nonetheless, it dominates. In a word, the mystery slips
into forgottenness.24
But a mystery that is forgotten is not thereby dissolved. It
abides by a presence of its own. It abandons man to his imprisonment in the ontic: he is allowed to fashion his "World"
out of the intentions and needs which happen to be the most
immediate, supplementing these with his own ambitions and
designs. There-being comes to take such things as this to be the
norm by which it measures itself (v.g. the ontic truth of its
judgements), forgetting the ensemble of beings-in-the-totality,
neglecting to reflect upon the ground which renders possible
such measuring, sc. the essence of the measure. To do so would
23 " . . . Das Da-sein verwahrt, sofern es ek-sistiert, die erste und weiteste Unentborgenheit, die eigentliche Un-wahrheit. . ( W W , p. 20).
24 WW, p. 20 (Nicht-waltenlassen der Verbergung des Verborgenen).
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be to re-collect the mystery which pervades all. If There-being's
power to transcend beings unto Being is called ek-sistence, then
its propensity to adhere ontically to beings, once the mystery
has been forgotten, may be called "in-sistence." Hence, in the
condition we have just described, "...There-being not only
ek-sists but at the same time in-sists. . . . " 25 But the mystery
remains nonetheless, working its influence on the in-sistent eksistence. It is forgotten, however, and as such has become the
"non-essential" essence of truth. Note that to mystery is
attributed once more an alterity to There-being that seems to
imply a spontaneity, even an initiative of its own: " . . . insofar
as the mystery repudiates itself in and for forgottenness, it leaves
historical man . . . to his own resources. . . . " 26 Again: " . . . the
mystery holds sway even in in-sistent ek-sistence. . . . " 27
F.

CHAPTER 7:

NON-TRUTH

AS

ERRANCE

The present chapter continues the thought-sequence of the
preceding; that is why we must consider both as forming a
unity. The mystery (concealment of concealment) is commonly
forgotten, we are told, in the everyday state of ek-sistent insistence. Now we examine in closer detail this forgottenness of
the mystery and give it a name all its own, sc. "errance" (die
Irre).
. . . The concealing of the concealed ensemble of beings [sc. the mystery]
holds sway in the revelation of a particular being at any given moment,
[but] this revelation becomes errance insofar as it is a forgottenness of
[the mystery].28
But why call it "errance"? To find a sense in the term, one
must understand the phenomenon which it tries to express. Let
us look for a moment at ek-sistence as it comes-to-pass in ordinary everydayness. By reason of its in-sistence, There-being
25 " . . . das Dasein nicht nur ek-sistiert, sondern zugleich
in-sistiert,..(WW,
p. 21). Heidegger's italics.
26
.. Indem das Geheimnis sich in der Vergessenheit und für sie versagt, läßt
es den geschichtlichen Menschen in seinem Gangbaren bei seinen Gemachten stehen.
.. . M (WW, p. 21). Writer's italics
27 " . . . Auch in der insistenten Existenz waltet das G e h e i m n i s , . . ( W W , p. 21)'
Writer's italics.
28 " . . . Die Verbergung des verborgenen Seienden im Ganzen waltet in der Enthergung des jeweiligen Seienden, die als Vergessenheit der Verbergung zur Irre wird."
(WW, p. 22).
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adheres to the beings which through ek-sistent freedom it reveals, and this very fact turns There-being away from the
mystery, towards which, nonetheless, it has a constitutional
orientation. The result is that There-being wanders from one
being to another in a state of confusion, driven about hither and
thither, looking for a satisfaction that no being can give,
searching for a repose that no being, torn from the roots of ultimate meaning in mystery, can offer. This congenital wandering
about of There-being in a condition that its equally congenital
orientation towards mystery belies - this is what is meant by
"errance." 20 If mystery is non-truth, so, too, is errance, and all
of Chapter 7 deals with it as such.
The condition of errance is not occasional or accidental to
There-being but intrinsic to its very structure: " . . . errance belongs to the inner constitution of There-being .. . , " 3 0 " . . . an
essential component of its open-ness. .. . " 3 1 One may expect,
then, to find its analogue in SZ, which undertook to analyse this
structure.
The structural errance of There-being will be the ground of all
error to which There-being falls prey. "Error" in this case, however, means more than just a single mistake; it signifies the
whole entangled complex of ways and means by which Therebeing in its wandering can go astray. After all, every open comportment, insofar as it bears a relation to the total ensemble of
beings (therefore to the mystery), will have its own way of
wandering about in forgetfulness of the mystery.32 The kingdom
89 In English this term is an artifact with the following warrant: The primary
sense of the Latin errate is "to wander," the secondary sense "to go astray," or "to
err," in the sense of "to wander from the right path." This double sense is retained
in the French errer. In English, the two senses are retained in the adjectival form,
"errant": the first sense ("to wander") being used to describe persons who wander
about searching for adventure (v. g. "knights errant"); the second sense signifying
"deviating from the true or correct," "erring." The noun form, "errance," is not
justified by normal English usage, but we introduce it ourselves (following the example of the French translators, pp. 96 ff.), intending to suggest both nuances of
"wandering about" and of "going astray" ("erring"), the former the fundament of
the latter. This seems to be faithful to the author's intentions and to avoid as much
as possible the simplist interpretations that would spontaneously arise by translating
as "error." (Cf. note to English translation in Existence and Being...,
p. 398, note
26). The cognate words we translate thus: Irren as "to wander astray," "to fall into
errance"; Irrtum as "error"; beirren as "to lead astray."

" . . . die Irre gehört zur inneren Verfassung des Da-seins, . . . " (WW, p. 22).
" . . . fügt wesentlich mit die Offenheit des Daseins
" (WW, p. 22).
aa w w , pp. 22 (Sich-vertun, Sich-versehen, Sich-verrechnen, Sich-verlaufen,
.Sich- versteigen).
80
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of error extends from such phenomena as a single mistake, oversight or mis-calculation up to the aberrations and excesses in
matters of supreme moment. What one ordinarily calls "error,"
sc. the incorrectness of a judgement or falsity of knowledge, is
only one way - for that matter, the most superficial way - in
which There-being goes astray.
All of these different ways of vitiating truth have their original
abode, as we have said, in the errance which is intrinsic to Therebeing. Errance may be conceived as itself an open area wherein
every modality by which truth is corrupted or contaminated
may have free play. It is for this reason that if mystery itself may
be called non-truth, then errance is a still more profound negation of truth. Let it be called by a stronger name. Call it not
"non-truth" but "anti-truth"; "errance is the essential antiessence of the originating essence of truth. . . . " 33
Furthermore, the errance in which man walks is marked by a
certain spontaneity all its own. " . . . Errance dominates man,
insofar as it leads him astray. . . . " 34 It "oppresses" man and by
this oppression attains a certain domination over the mystery,
insofar as it keeps the mystery a victim of forgottenness. Thus
There-being must submit to what seems to be a double alterity:
the oppression by errance and at the same time the domination
of the mystery. The result is a tension in There-being in the form
of a distress arising out of the constraint imposed upon it from
this double source: errance on the one hand, mystery on the
other. There-being oscillates endlessly between the two.35 The
non-truth which we call "errance" and the non-truth which we
call "mystery" combine, and both together, forming as they do
the complete non-essence of truth, help to constitute the full
essence of truth itself, sc. that essence which includes within
itself its own most proper non-essence, therefore negativity.
" . . . The concealing of concealment [sc. mystery] and errance
3 3 "Die Irre ist das wesentliche Gegenwesen z u m anfänglichen Wesen der Wahrheit
" (WW, p. 22). W e are translating anfängliche by "originating" to distinguish it from ursprüngliche ("originär'). The former has a much stronger implication
of activity, or spontaneity, than the latter. Alternate translations: "initiating,"
"taking the initiative."
3 4 " . . . Die Irre durchherrscht den Menschen, indem sie ihn b e i r r t . . . . " ( W W , p.
22). Writer's italics.
35 W W , p. 23 (Bedrängnis, Not der Nötigung).
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belong to the essence of truth, insofar as it takes the initiative. . . . " 36
What is important here, though, is not so much to see that
errance and mystery are incorporated into truth itself, but to
see that the alterity that has been assigned to the two former
is now attributed to truth. Hence truth itself assumes a spontaneity with regard to There-being: " . . . the full essence of truth,
which includes within itself its own most proper non-essence,
retains There-being . . . in distress. . . . " 37 It is truth itself now
that is somehow prior even to the freedom which we saw to be
the essence of truth as correctness, for this freedom itself derives
from originating truth:
. . . Freedom conceived in terms of the insistent ek-sistence of Therebeing is the essence of truth (in the sense of the correctness of a presentation) only because freedom itself derives from originating truth. . . . 3 8

But however intrinsic errance may be to There-being's
structure, and therefore however congenital its tendency to
wander in onticity, it remains possible for There-being to resist
being led astray, sc. " . . . to the extent that it experiences
errance itself for what it is and no longer overlooks the mystery
of There-being." 39 More precisely, when There-being comprehends errance as such, it recognizes it to be but the reverse side
of its own forgetfulness of the mystery, and this is ipso facto to
re-collect the mystery. By this re-collection, There-being is already under way towards a surrender to domination by the
mystery through authentic re-solve in its regard. This yielding
to the mystery comes-to-pass in a manner analogous to that by
which There-being, through its freedom, lets-be the beings it
encounters in open comportment. As we saw, it is at that
moment that the total ensemble of beings becomes concealed
and in the concealing of this concealment the mystery (together
86 4 1 . . . Die Verbergung des Verborgenen und die Irre gehören in das anfängliche
Wesen der Wahrheit
" (WW, p. 23).
87 " . . . Das volle, sein eigenstes Unwesen einschließende Wesen der Wahrheit
hält das Dasein mit dieser ständigen Wende des Hin und Her in die Not
" (WW,
P- 23)88 " . . . Die Freiheit, aus der in-sis ten ten Ek-sistenz des Daseins begriffen, ist
das Wesen der Wahrheit (im Sinne der Richtigkeit des Vor-stellens) nur deshalb,
weil die Freiheit selbst dem anfänglichen Wesen der Wahrheit, dem Walten des
Geheimnisses in der Irre, entstammt
" (WW, p. 23).
89 " . . . indem er die Irre selbst erfährt und sich nicht versieht am Geheimnis des
Da-seins." (WW, p. 23).
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with errance) holds sway. To recognize errance for what it is
and thus become open toward the mystery, There-being's task
is to let-be (manifest) not the individual beings of a particular
comportment but the total ensemble of beings as such. This
happens in the proper sense, however, only on condition that
from time to time There-being assumes of its own accord the
originating essence of the total ensemble.40
This yielding to the mystery in re-solve, that comes-to-pass
when There-being recognizes errance for what it is, does not
destroy the mystery, of course. On the contrary, it permits
There-being to meditate the mystery for itself and thus pose the
supreme question about what beings as such in their totality
"are." Such an interrogation "thinks" (denkt) the question about
the Being of beings. " . . . The thinking of Being, whence such a
question originally stems, is conceived since Plato as 'philosophy/ receiving later the title 'metaphysics'." 4 1
G.
THE

QUESTION

CHAPTER

OF T R U T H

8:
AND

PHILOSOPHY

The function of the essay is to analyse the essence of truth. In
order that the analysis be complete, it must explain, too, the
non-essence of truth, sc. the essence of non-truth. It is with
these two aspects of a single problem that we have been occupied
up to the present: Chapters 1-4 discussed truth, Chapters 5-7
non-truth. It remains now only to conclude the study by situating it with regard to the whole of philosophy. This is the
function of Chapter 8. The essentials may be sketched quickly.
The nub of the matter has been stressed already. For Therebeing, in its chronic condition of errance, to open itself up to the
mystery in re-solve is effectively to pose a question about the
truth of beings-as-such-(therefore in their Being)-in-the-ensemble.
It is this, according to Heidegger, which has been the task of
philosophy since Plato. Of its very nature, then, philosophy
40 What this means in the concrete we have some idea in Der Feldweg (Frankfurt:
Klostermann, 1953)« (Hereafter: FW). See also G, pp. 25-26.
4 1 " . . . Das Denken des Seins, dem solches Fragen anfänglich entstammt, begreift
sich seit Piaton als 'Philosophie* und erhält später den Titel 'Metaphysik'." (WW,
P- 23).
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strives to think the Being of beings, where "Being" signifies
beings-as-such-in-their-totality, and "to think" means simply
for There-being to let-be (manifest) this ensemble.42
So it is that the whole investigation has gradually led us from
what might have appeared to be a peripheral problem, sc. the
essence of truth (taken first in the sense of correctness) to the
very center of philosophy, whose whole function is to pose the
question about the truth of Being (as understood above). For
having once established the essence of truth-as-conformity to
lie in the freedom of There-being, which lets-be (manifest) the
beings it encounters, we then passed to a study of non-truth.
Here we saw that both modes of non-truth (mystery and errance)
possess a certain alterity from There-being which renders possible a spontaneous initiative (albeit still very vaguely defined)
in There-being's regard. Since both modes of non-truth constitute together the "complete" non-essence of truth which is (and
must be) intrinsic to truth, then truth, too, is characterized by
this same alterity and spontaneity, which give it a certain ontological (though not necessarily "temporal") primacy over Therebeing. This truth, including within itself its own non-truth
(mystery, errance) is the truth of beings-as-such-in-theirensemble, sc. the truth of Being. Being, however, is that by
reason of which beings "are" what (and how) they "are." Now
that by reason of which beings "are" what they "are" we call
their "essence," or (to avoid the impulse to conceive of "essence"
as something general or abstract) their "essenc-ing," where this
term now has a fully verbal sense. "To be," then, means "to
essence," sc. "to come-to-an-essence," or, more idiomatically,
"to come-to-dL-presence/' Such, Heidegger claims, is the sense of
the old German word Wesen, and such an understanding of it
enables the author to say that his research has forced us to ask
ourselves " . . . whether or not the question about the essence of
truth must not be at the same time, indeed before all else, the
question about the truth of Essence . . 4 3 where "Essence"
W W , pp. 24-25.
" . . . ob die Frage nach dem Wesen der Wahrheit nicht zugleich und zuerst
M ( W W , p. 25). We translate
die Frage nach der Wahrheit des Wesens sein muß
Wesen, when used to refer to Being as Presence, by "coming-to-presence," or simply
" p r e s e n t i n g . " For fuller treatment of Wesen in verbal sense, see W D , p. 143 and V A ,
42
43

p. 38.
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in the second position has the verbal sense of essenc-ing, comingto-a-presence, Being. It is on this note that the essay comes to
a close.

II. General Remarks
A.

HEIDEGGER

I AND

II

I. Structure of the Essay
We wish now to assess the significance of this essay in the
developing of the notion of foundational thought. Let us begin
by remarking how very carefully conceived is the structure of the
whole. Heidegger introduces his reflection by projecting it
against a background of the prejudices of "ordinary common
sense," and brings it to a conclusion by alluding again to these
prejudices and defending not only his meditation but philosophy
itself against them.44 One has the impression at the close, then,
of having come full circle with the author and that the reflection
itself constitutes its own defense.
But the thought process of W W is actually more of a spiral
than a circle. Recall briefly the sequence. We begin by considering the essence of truth in its positivity. The conventional
notion of the essence of truth is conformity. But what renders
conformity possible (Ch. 1)? The pre-predicative open comportment with the being-to-be-known. What renders this possible (Ch. 2)? Freedom! What, then, is the essence of freedom
(Ch. 3) ? The revelation of beings by reason of ek-sistence (Ch. 4).
With this much established, we consider the essence of truth in
its negativity. The revelation of particular beings by freedom is
simultaneously the concealment, therefore the non-revelation,
of beings-in-the-ensemble. This concealment is already a nonessence of truth (Ch. 5). Furthermore, concealment conceals itself, and the concealing of concealment is the authentic nonessence of truth. This is the mystery (Ch. 6). But the mystery is
often forgotten, leaving There-being to wander about among
beings that have become meaningless because their genuine sense
(buried in mystery) lies in oblivion. This is errance, another
44

WW, pp. 5-6, a 4
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modality of the non-essence of truth (Ch. 7). Conclusion: the
essence of truth, which includes its own non-essence, is the truth
of beings-as-such-in-their-totality, sc. Being, which since Plato
has been the proper field of interrogation of philosophy (Ch. 8).
We have every right, therefore, to talk of a "sequence" of
thought, for each chapter follows upon the preceding. But each
successive step poses the problem on a new and deeper level, so
that we can not say that the sequence is a strictly logical one.
Non-logical (but not illogical), the thought process nevertheless
has an organic unity, for it is itself the experience of the phenomenon it seeks to discern. We can sense, though the full import of
the remark may for the moment escape us, with what justice
Heidegger can say in a note added later (1943) to the text:
. . . The successive steps of the interrogation are in themselves a way of
thinking which, instead of offering presentations and concepts, experiences itself and puts itself to the proof as the transformation of a relation
to Being.45
2. WW and the Early Heidegger
By the early Heidegger (Heidegger I) we understand principally the Heidegger of SZ as interpreted by himself in KM and
explicitated in the minor works of 1929. The principal task of
SZ, as we saw, was to analyse There-being, the coming-to-pass
of transcendence, which is fundamentally the coming-to-pass of
truth. It is only plausible, then, that an analysis of the essence
of truth (WW) will contain certain clear echoes of the analysis
of that process by which it comes-to-pass (SZ). We wish now to
gather together these elements of the present essay which clearly
concord with the major work, in order that we may see all the
more clearly in what way both works differ. The principal characteristics of There-being are these: it is transcendence, which is
finite, whose ultimate meaning is time. Each of these elements
plays its role in the essay under discussion.
a. T R A N S C E N D E N C E A N D T R U T H - By transcendence,
we understand the passage beyond beings to Being. It implies
45 " . . . Die Schrittfolge des Fragens ist in sich der Weg eines Denkens, das, statt
Vorstellungen und Begriffe zu liefern, sich als Wandlung des Bezugs zum Sein erfährt
und erprobt." (WW, p. 27).
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two dimensions: that of Being and that of beings (ontological
and ontic). In Chapter 4, we saw that the essence of truth is the
opening-up of that-which-is-open by reason of an open-ness to
the Open which comes-to-pass as ek-sistence (There-being). It is
this open-ness to the Open which is transcendence. Now the
Open itself is what SZ called the World, the matrix of relationships (Total Meaningfulness) which constitutes the horizon of There-being's potentialities - itself not a being but that
within which There-being and other beings meet when one of
these potential relations comes-to-pass as an encounter. In KM,
the Open was called ontological knowledge, the horizon of objectiveness - the condition of encounter between beings, but itself expressly not a being and admitting only an "empirical use."
There is nothing new, then, in the notion of WW that the matrix
of relationships (the Open) unto which There-being transcends
is not a being in its own right but comes-to-pass in a given comportment, of which, nevertheless, it is the indispensable ontological condition and ground.46
We may draw two inferences from this. In the first place, if
the matrix of relations (Verhältnis) never "is" except in particular
comportment, we are prepared for the thesis that Being never
"is" except in and as beings, and we are thus brought once more
face to face with the ontological difference. Secondly, if the
matrix never "is" except as the condition of possibility of Therebeing's comportment with particular beings, then we can understand how There-being, despite its prerogative of ek-sistence,
has a congenital tendency to adhere to the beings with which it
has to do, sc. it is in-sistent. " . . . This adhesion has its support
unbeknown to itself in [There-being's open-ness to] the matrix
of relations, with regard to which There-being not only ek-sists but
at the same time in-sists. . . . " 47 In other words, if There-being's
"ontic primacy consists in the fact that it is ontological," one is
tempted to add - though Heidegger does not do so - that its
ontological debility consists in the fact that it is also ontic. At
any rate, the two dimensions are always simultaneous. We have
W W , pp. I I , 20.
" . . . Dieses Beharren hat seine ihm selbst unkennbare Stütze im Verhältnis,
als welches das Dasein nicht nur ek-sistiert, sondern zugleich in-sistiert,. .
(WW,
p. 21). Heidegger's italics.
46

47

232

REVERSAL

here, no doubt, the basis for the subsequent remark that errance
belongs to the interior structure of There-being.
b. F I N I T U D E A N D T R U T H - Anyone for whom W W is
the first taste of Heidegger will find it difficult to understand
why the problem of non-truth should be put on equal footing
with the problem of truth, and why " . . . the analysis of the nonessence of truth is not a subsequent filling up of a lacuna, but
the decisive step in the adequate posing of the question about
the essence of truth. . . . " 48 All the research that we have made
hitherto, however, has shown us how central to Heidegger's intuition is the problem of negativity, sc. finitude. His insistence
here upon the importance of the negativity of truth in WW is
therefore the normal consequence of a constant preoccupation.
In KM, Heidegger saw the necessity of posing the problem of
non-truth as part of the problematic of finitude:
But does not ontological knowledge, . . . as essentially finite, possess, together with its truth, also a corresponding non-truth? As a matter of
fact, yes. The idea of transcendental non-truth contains within itself one
of the most central problems of finitude, which not only has not been
solved but has not so much as been posed, since the basis of such a
problematic must first of all be elaborated. . . . 4 9
If in W W the problem of non-truth receives so much attention,
the reason seems to be that Heidegger is trying to elaborate just
such a basis. At any rate, finitude is as important to WW as to
any of the previous works. The problem of non-truth, then, is
the problem of the finitude of truth. We must try to see this
clearly, for the import is tremendous.
In SZ, Heidegger touched the problem of non-truth briefly but
clearly: the reason why There-being is determined by both truth
and non-truth lies in the Being-structure of There-being, which
is a project in the condition of thrown-ness.50 We may interpret
48 " . . . D i e
Erörterung des Unwesens der Wahrheit ist nicht nachträgliche
Ausfüllung einer Lücke, sondern der entscheidende Schritt in die zureichende Ansetzung der Frage nach dem Wesen der Wahrheit
" (WW, p. r7). Heidegger's italics.
49 "Aber hat nicht die ontologische Erkenntnis, deren Wesensgrund die transzendentale Einbildungskraft sein soll, als wesenhaft endliche in eins mit ihrer Wahrheit
auch eine entsprechende C/nwahrheit? In der Tat, die Idee der transzendentalen
Unwahrheit birgt eines der zentralsten Probleme der Endlichkeit in sich, das nicht
nur nicht gelöst, sondern nicht einmal gestellt ist, weil die Basis für diese Problemstellung allererst erarbeitet werden muß
" (KM, p. 128).
50 SZ pp. 223, 284 (geworfenen Entwurf).
f
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this to mean that There-being is "in the truth" inasmuch as it
is project and "in the non-truth" inasmuch as it is thrownamong-beings-as-still-to-be-achieved, with all that this implies,
sc. profoundly determined by a "not": not the master of its own
origin; not completely indifferent to other beings, but referentially dependent on them; not already a fait accompli, but
still-to-be-achieved. Thrown-ness, then, symbolizes all of the
"not"-ness (negativity) that affects There-being. There-being is
"in the non-truth" because transcendence (truth) is negatived by
"not," it is finite. If this interpretation is valid, one could add
(although in SZ this problematic is formally distinct from that
of thrown-ness) that the deepest type of negativity to affect
There-being is that it is not destined to ek-sist forever, it is Beingunto-end (death). Hence the deepest reason why There-being is
"in the non-truth" is that it is (thrown) Being-unto-death.
This is made still more precise. Thrown-ness, strictly speaking,
suggests a reference to There-being's coming-to-be. The same
indigence, when considered as characteristic of There-being's
abiding condition, is called "fallen-ness." Here, however, Therebeing's referential dependence on other beings receives the further
nuance of an adhesion to them of such a nature that There-being
has the tendency to lose itself among them, become fascinated
by them and thus slip into the superficiality that characterizes
everydayness. In such a condition, There-being has "fallen away"
from its authentic self, for it does not comport itself in a manner
becoming its transcendence. It has forgotten, or never re-collected, its great prerogative, has plunged into the ontic and lost
itself.
This condition is expressly a negativity, a type of being by
which There-being is not authentically itself. " . . . There-being
plunges . . . into the groundlessness and negativity of inauthentic everydayness...;" 5 1 it is tossed about in perpetual commotion, caught in the vortex of onticity. Now if There-being is
"in the non-truth" because of its thrown-ness, how much more
will this be the case when There-being continues to abide in this
5 1 " . . . Das Dasein stürzt aus ihm selbst in es selbst, in die Bodenlosigkeit und
Nichtigkeit der uneigentlichen Alltäglichkeit
" (SZ, p. 178). See KM, pp. 210-211
(Vergessenheit); SZ, pp. 178 (Absturz, Wirbel), 307 {Verlorenheit in das Man), 176
(Nicht-sein).
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fallen condition among beings? rlcnce, " . . . b e c a u s e Therebeing by its very essence is in a fallen condition among beings,
it is, according to its ontological structure, in 'non-truth'. . . . " 5 2
How describe now this condition of non-truth which characterizes fallen-ness? Beings are revealed, to be sure, sc. uncovered, but inadequately so and slip back immediately into
their previous un-revealedness, sc. concealment. Hence, to uncover is simultaneously to cover-up; to dis-close is to close-over.
In KM, we have an illustration of this negativing effect of finitude insofar as it affects the comportment of all 4'knowledge."
. . Finite knowledge as finite necessarily conceals at the same
time [that it makes manifest]. . , . " 5 3 In other words, finite
knowledge reveals its object but not adequately, sc. as only the
creative intuition can know it. Hence, the revelation that takes
place in knowledge is also a non-revelation of that dimension in
the being which surpasses There-being's finite capacity to reveal.
Because of the finitude of the knower, therefore, a "not" permeates the revelation. There is non-revelation, concealment.
But this "not" which pervades every type of letting-be-manifest is interior to the manifestive process itself, hence has as the
ground of its possibility the fact that the manifestive process
takes place. To let-be-manifest and to not-let-be-manifest are
simultaneous and correlative, because There-being itself carries
its "not" within the depths of its Being:
. . . But only insofar as There-being is dis- closed is it also closed-over; and
insofar as [other] beings . . . are dis-covered with There-being, they . . .
are covered-over (concealed) or camouflaged.54
Briefly: There-being is "in the non-truth" because transcendence
is finite.
What we have just said about non-truth as a consequence of
fallen-ness regards There-being principally in its everyday condition of inauthenticity. We know that under certain circum5 2 " . . . Das Dasein ist, weil wesenhaft verfallend, seiner Seinsverfassung nach
in der 'Unwahrheit'
" (SZ, p. 222). Heidegger italicizes whole.
5 3 " . . . daß die endliche Erkenntnis als endliche notwendig zugleich verbirgt, . -(KM, p. 38).
54 " . . . Aber nur sofern Dasein erschlossen ist, ist es auch verschlossen; uud soferu
mit dem Dasein je schon innerweltliches Seiendes entdeckt ist, ist dergleichen
Seiendes als mögliches innerweltlich Begegnendes verdeckt (verborgen) oder verstellt."
(SZ, p. 222).
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stances There-being is brought to comprehend its own bi-dimensional (ontic-ontological) structure and can consent, so to
speak, to the fact that it be so, sc. transcendence permeated by
a "not" (finite). It simply lets-itself-be as it "is," and this lettingbe of itself, sc. this taking-over, or assuming-of-its-own-accord
its self as transcendent but as finite - this is what is called "resolve." Re-solve is the culminating moment of There-being in
its There, and as such it is the culminating moment of truth:
. . . With the phenomenon of re-solve, we have been brought before the
original truth of existence. In re-solve, There-being in its actual, matterof-fact power-to-be is unveiled to itself, and, indeed, in such a way that
it is itself both the unveiling and the unveiled. . . . 5 5
But in this self-endorsed luminosity to itself, the non-truth inherent to There-being does not disappear. On the contrary, it is
only here that There-being makes it its very own, for, comprehending it, There-being accepts it for what it is, sc. the ineluctable consequence of finitude. 56 Briefly: in re-solve, Therebeing, recognizing non-truth as the stamp of negativity upon
its own transcendence, resigns itself to finitude and thus achieves
its authentic self.
With these perspectives fresh in mind, we come again to WW
and see how deeply they affect the thought of the later work.
Even from the purely structural point of view, we can see now
how Chapters 1-4 deal with truth as a problem of transcendence;
Chapters 5-7 with truth as finite. In Chapter 5, we read:
. . . Precisely insofar as the letting-be that takes-place in a particular
comportment lets-be that being with which There-being is engaged
and thereby reveals that being, this letting-be conceals beings-in-the57
ensemble.
The similarity to what we have just seen in SZ is clear. The difference is that in SZ the finite revealing conceals the being itself
which is revealed. Here it is rather the whole ensemble that is
concealed. But note that the total ensemble has a depth of
55 " . . . Entschlossen ist das Dasein ihm selbst in seinem jeweiligen faktischen
Seinkönnen enthüllt, so zwar, daß es selbst dieses Enthüllen und Enthülltsein
ist...."
(SZ, p. 307). Heidegger's italics.
5 6 SZ, p. 299 (eignet sich eigentlich zu).
57 " . . . Gerade indem das Seinlassen im einzelnen Verhalten je das Seiende sein
läßt, zu dem es sich verhält, und es damit entbirgt, verbirgt es das Seiende im Ganzen
" (WW, p. 19).
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meaning here that it did not have in SZ. It becomes clear very
shortly that beings-in-their-totality, at least as they constitute
the mystery, are the ground and essence of beings that are taken
as measure in daily intercourse,58 and are eventually identified
with Being itself.59 In bold lines, then, we may say that the nontruth that we are speaking of here consists in the fact that when
beings are revealed, Being is concealed - a formula that concords
perfectly with the phenomenon of referential-dependence-onbeings-become-fallenness as examined in SZ. The perspectives
of SZ can give, too, a sense to the formula of Chapter 6:
" . . . There-being preserves, so far as it ek-sists, the first and
widest non-revealedness, authentic non-truth . . . , " 60 simply
inasmuch as There-being's ek-sistence, sc. its transcendence, is
itself profoundly modified by "not," sc. its finitude.
But there is a still further negativity of truth, a negativity
which springs from the fact that the primal non-truth, sc. the
mystery which dominates There-being, is itself negatived, in the
sense of being forgotten. The result is that There-being loses its
self among the beings of daily commerce, takes up its abode
among them, adheres to them, makes its "World" out of them,
takes them in all their computable determination to be the
measure of its activity. What else is this than what SZ called
"fallenness" ? 01 Errance is an essential component of Therebeing's open-ness (transcendence) for the same reason that
There-being's disclosedness is simultaneously a closing-over, sc.
because There-being is permeated by "not." Where fallen-ness
was marked by commotion in the vortex, There-being in errance
turns now this way, now that, from one unsatisfying being to
another, as if driven about by superior forces. If in SZ every
manifestive comportment of fallen There-being had its own way
of going askew, so too here every comportment has its own way
of going astray.62 Briefly: it is in the permeation of the manise WW, p. 21. Cf. SZ, p. 64. The point is that Seiende im Ganzen in WW approaches
much more the notion of the World itself than that which is "within the World," as
these terms were understood in SZ.
"

WW, p. 25.
" . . . Das Da-sein verwahrt, sofern es ek-sistiert, die erste und weiteste Unentborgenheit, die eigentliche Un-Wahrheit
" (WW, p. 20).
WW, pp. 20—21. Henri Birault ("Existence et v6rit6 . . p . 71) concurs with
this interpretation but unfortunately does not develop the matter.
M Cf. SZ, p. 178 (Bewegtheit, Wirbel) and WW, p. 22 (Umgetriebenheit, Hin und
Her); SZ, p. 222 (verlegt, verstellt, verdeckt, verschlossen) and WW, p. 22 (Sichvertun, Sich-versehen, Sich-verrechnen, Sich-verlaufen, Sich-versteigen).
60
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festive process by a "not" that errance takes place. " . . . It is
in the simultaneity of revealing and concealing that errance
holds sway. . . . " 63
Both the mystery and the forgetting of the mystery in errance,
which, taken together, form the complete non-essence of truth,
are consequences of the finitude of There-being's transcendence.
Now we know that " . . . the authentic non-essence of truth is
mystery. . . . " 64 May we infer that the ^authentic non-essence
of truth consists in forgetting the mystery and wandering astray
in errance? Heidegger does not say this in so many words.65 At
any rate, we know that: to remain the dupe of fallen-ness
(errance) is to abide in inauthenticity; yet to overcome inauthenticity is not simply to suppress errance, which would be as impossible as to suppress finitude, but simply to recognize it for
what it is and consent that it be so. This consent of There-being
to finitude is an assuming of its self as finite and by that very
fact the achieving of authenticity. Such in SZ was the sense of
re-solve, and in analogous fashion it must be understood here,
too, in WW. There-being refuses to be led astray by errance
when it experiences errance "as itself," sc. recognizes it for what
it is. Thus There-being, despite the seductions of errance, opens
itself (re-solve) for the mystery. This is the culminating moment
of ek-sistence, when There-being acquiesces to the fact that
mystery is filtered through finitude.
c. H I S T O R I C I T Y A N D T R U T H - There-being is ek-sistence
that is finite, whose ultimate meaning is time. The analysis of
time as the source of unity of There-being as concern had an
important place in SZ, but the temporal aspect of truth remains on the periphery of WW. Yet it is there! We must take
note of it, not only to indicate the deep concordance of the
present reflection with SZ but also to prepare the way for a
development that will be very pronounced in the later work.
Recall that There-being, because temporal, is historical, so
that history, in the existential sense, begins when ek-sistence
83 " . . . Im Zugleich der Eutbergung und Verbergung waltet die I r r e . . ( W W ,
P- 23).
64 " . . . Das eigentliche Un-wesen der Wahrheit ist das Geheimnis
" (WW, p.

20).
85 Though perhaps the closing sentence of Chapter 6, p. 21, might give warrant
for such an inference.

238

REVERSAL

begins, sc. when transcendence first comes-to-pass. Transcendence is "primordial history." 66 But when is this? When
There-being first experiences the non-concealment (truth) of
beings by asking what beings are as such. For Western thought,
this took place, Heidegger claims, when the early Greeks asked
this question with regard not to individual beings but to beingsin-their-totality. It was with them, therefore, that history in the
existential sense began.67
We can see, therefore, even if only in obscure fashion, that
there is an intrinsic relation for Heidegger between truth and
history, and consequently that truth will be of its very essence
historical. We can understand, too, why the author permits
himself several oblique references to the historicity of truth,
why errance, too, has its historical aspects,68 and we are prepared, at least, to understand the important role that truth will
play in Heidegger II. For the moment, it suffices to remark that
the historicity of truth is a normal consequence of the historicity
of There-being as delineated in SZ.
j. WW and the Later Heidegger
We have just seen in some detail how closely WW concords
with SZ. The conclusion from this should be that it is clearly the
same man who wrote both. A n d yet, if we claimed WW to b e
merely a restatement in more elaborate form of the truth-analysis in the earlier work, we would have missed its sense completely. There is a profound change, and it is out of this change
that the contemporary Heidegger evolved. WW is, indeed, a
pivotal work.
The characteristics of this change can be stated easily enough.
The purpose of SZ was primarily to pose the Being-question, b u t
in the event it proved to be principally an analysis of the Beingcomprehension of There-being. The focal point, then, was Therebeing, and Being itself was seen in this perspective; Being (the
World) was considered basically as the project of There-being.
In W W , however, the focal point of Heidegger's reflection passes
subtly from There-being to Being itself. What difficulties this
• ft WG, p. 36 (Urgeschichte).
•7 WW, pp. 15-16. The ensemble of beings was experienced under the guise of qpüau;*
w
V.g. WW, pp. 17, 2i, 22 (geschichtlicher Mensch, geschichtliches Menschentum,
etc.).
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shift poses will not be resolved in WW. Perhaps they will not be
resolved at all - that is to be seen! All that concerns us now is to
detect the shift, collating those indices of it that have already
appeared in our analysis of the argument.
There are, to be sure, many obscurities in the text, but let us
build our case on what is clear. Having followed the argument
in its development, we may now prescind from the author's
sequence and arrange the data synthetically as best fits the order
of exposition. Perhaps the simplest method is to formulate a
series of three propositions:
a.

T H E E S S E N C E O F T R U T H IS T H E T R U T H O F

ESSENCE.

In this categorical form, the proposition does not appear in the
original text but is first formulated in the note to the second
edition (1949). Yet even if in the original it is suggested more
reticently ("[The present effort] . . . helps one to reflect upon
whether or not . . . " ) , the author's intention is no less clear, his
thought no less firm, for it crystallizes a development that has
evolved through the entire essay and, shortly before, even came
to tentative expression as the "intertwining of the essence of
truth with the truth of Essence." 69
As to the sense of Essence in the second case, the author does
not say explicitly until 1949 that it is to be taken as a verb, but
there is no difficulty in seeing that this was what was intended
also in 1930. He does say in the original, however, that in the
concept of "Essence" (Wesen) philosophy thinks Being,
" . . . which we have been accustomed for a long time to consider
only as beings-[as-such]-in-their-totality." 70 Now to the concept
of beings-as-such-in-their-totality corresponds what the early
Greeks meant by <p\)ai<;, sc. not any particular sphere of beings
but the whole ensemble, " . . . and, indeed, in the sense of the
process of emerging-into-presence. . . . " 7 1 Being in the sense of
Essence, then, means coming-to-presence, and a being, sc. thatwhich-is, or that-which-is-open, is that-which-comes-to-apresence. What is notable here is not so much the correlation of
69 Cf. W W , p. 26 (das Wesen der Wahrheit ist die Wahrheit des Wesens) with
p. 25 (verhilft . . . ob) and p. 23 (Verflechtung des Wesens der Wahrheit mit der
Wahrheit des Wesens).
70 " . . . was wir das Sein nennen und seit langem nur als das Seiende im Ganzen
zu bedenken gewohnt sind/' (WW, p. 25).
7 1 " . . . und zwar in der Bedeutung des aufgehenden Anwesens. . ( W W , p. 16)See p. 11 (das "Anwesende").
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Being with the process of coming-to-presence but rather the fact
that Heidegger attributes to Being now an active character that
a pure horizon does not possess. " . . . The question about the
truth of Essence understands Essence verbally. . . . " 72 Being is
a coming-to-presence; it holds sway; it is an emerging-intopresence that is an "origin," that takes the initiative with which
philosophy in the West began.73
b.

THE

FULL

ESSENCE

OF T R U T H

CONTAINS

WITHIN

The negativity, however,
which characterizes the essence of truth when attention is
focused upon There-being remains equally intrinsic to the phenomenon when the focus shifts to the truth of Essence (Being).
" . . . The full essence of truth includes [its] non-essence and before all else holds sway as concealment. . . . " 74
It is because Being as originating truth is essentially negatived
that it holds sway as mystery and errance, for these are what
constitute its negativity. Consequently " . . . the concealing of
concealment [sc. the mystery] and errance belong to the originating essence of t r u t h . . . , " 75 and, indeed, so radically that this
originating essence of truth itself may be called the "domination
of the mystery in errance," "the self-concealing One-and-Only,"
soliciting, so to speak, the forgetfulness of itself. This errance is
so inscribed in Being as a modality of its intrinsic negativity
that, although interior to Being, it opens up as itself a type of
open domain which is Being's anti-essence, where every possible
fashion of contaminating truth has free play. Hence, negativity
is not simply a privation but so penetrates Being as to permeate
every modality of its emergence, negating revelation in the very
process of revealment, guarding this enduring tension between
positivity and negativity as Being's characteristic property. It
is this which constitutes the mystery.76

ITSELF

ITS

OWN

NON-ESSENCE.

72 " . . . Die Frage nach der Wahrheit des Wesens versteht Wosen verbal.
(WW, p. 26}.
73 v . g. W W , pp. 24 (waltet), 14 (ursprünglicheren Wesen), 20, 23, 25 (anfänglich),
16 (das O f f e n e . . . eröffnet).
74 " . . . Weil aber das volle Wesen der Wahrheit das Unwesen einschließt und
allem z u v o r als Verbergung w a l t e t , . . ( W W , p. 24).
75 " . . . Die Verbergung des Verborgenen und die Irre gehören in das anfängliche
Wesen d e r W a h r h e i t . . . . " (WW, p. 23).
76 W W , pp. 23 (das Walten des Geheimnisses in der Irre), 20 (erstlich Verborgene
erscheint), 25 (das sich verbergende Einzige), 22 (beirrt, Gegenwesen, Widerspiel),
19 (nicht CTT£p7)aL$, Eigenste als Eigentum).
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For the moment, let us prescind from whether or not There-being
and man may be identified without qualification, and speak of
them both indiscriminately as that being in which truth-asconformity is found. As we saw, the essence of this truth lies in
the freedom of such a being. What we want to insist on now is
the fact that such freedom does not have its origin in the being
in question, but rather this freedom itself springs from a more
original source:
. . . Freedom is only to that extent the ground of the interior possibility
of correctness insofar as it receives its own essence out of the still more
original Essence of the one-and-only essential truth. . . . 7 7
Hence, man does not so much "possess" ek-sistent freedom as
he is possessed by it, sc. by freedom as flowing from its source
in originating truth. 78
But since the truth of Essence (Being) is permeated by negativity, ek-sistent freedom, too, is inevitably the victim of nontruth. In other words, the non-essence of truth does not arise
subsequently to the simple powerlessness and neglect of Therebeing but rather derives from the primal negativity interior to
its origin, sc. Being itself. One can see clearly at this point how
far we have moved away from the perspective of SZ which saw
non-truth as the inevitable consequence of the finitude of Therebeing. Now the ultimate residence of non-truth is Being itself.
That is why Being in its negativity, sc. as mystery, " . . . the
authentic non-truth, is prior to every manifestation of this or
that being. It is prior to the letting-be [sc. ek-sistent freedom]
itself, , . 7 9 preserving and dominating ek-sistent freedom in
its relation to the mystery.
77 " . . .
die Freiheit ist nur deshalb der Grund der inneren Möglichkeit der
Richtigkeit, weil sie ihr eigenes Wesen aus dem ursprünglicheren Wesen der einzig
wesentlichen Wahrheit e m p f ä n g t . . . . " (WW, p. 14).
78 WW, p. 16. And ek-sistent freedom serves as the ground (be-freit: renders man
free) for "freedom" in the normal sense of power to choose, because it is only by
reason of ek-sistence that are let-be those beings (possible or necessary) which are
the objects of " f r e e " choice.
7 9 " . . . Die Verborgenheit des Seienden im Ganzen, die eigentliche Un-wahrheit,
ist älter als jede Offenbarkeit von diesem und jenem Seienden. Sie ist älter auch als
das Seinlassen selbst, . . . " (WW, p. 19).
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But Being in its negativity includes more than mystery, it
includes errance as well. Hence, errance as well as mystery holds
a mastery over ek-sistent freedom and thereby leads it astray.
So it is that the complete essence of truth, including this double
negativity, retains There-being in its abiding condition of
distress.80
We have been speaking about ek-sistent freedom, referring to
it sometimes as "There-being," sometimes as "man." Are they
to be simply identified? True enough, the relation between
There-being and man is sufficiently intimate that the two may
receive identical predicates (v.g. insistent ek-sistence) and often
seem to be used interchangeably. Yet there is a distinction to be
made between them. There-being is not man as such but that
"place" where the essence of man has its abiding ground, sc. the
ultimate source out of which man comes-to-presence as man.81
It is the origin of man's Being, rendering man free for all his
ontic activity. There-being, then, is a coming-to-pass that is
more fundamental than man himself. That is why Heidegger
can say that There-being "possesses" (besitzt) man, and that
man is "let in on" or "released-unto" (eingelassen) There-being.82
All of this leaves us, however, with two questions that the
text itself does not answer, one concerning man, the other concerning There-being. In the first place, does Heidegger, when he
speaks of man, mean the individual man, or humanity at large,
or both ? If both, what is the relation between the two ? On the
one hand, after the essay opens with a reflection upon the
essence of truth as found in the individual human intellect (correctness), one is inclined to understand "man" as the individual,
though in that which characterizes him universally as a man.
On the other hand, Heidegger often makes man equivalent to
humanity. What is the relationship, then, between man and
humanity? And when he calls man "historical," what history
does he mean? When he speaks of "rare and simple decisions of
history," which " . . . arise out of the manner in which the origi-

80 WW, pp. 22 (durchherrscht, beirrt), 23 (hält in Not).
81 WW, p. 14 (verborgenen Wesensgrundes).
82 WW, pp. 16 (befreit, besitzt), 22 (eingelassen). Cf. discussion of "release" in
G (1944-45), pp. 29-73.
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nal Essence of truth comes-to-presence,"83 whence proceed
these decisions ?
With regard to There-being, what, more precisely, is the relationship between Being and There-being ? Even after we have
made the shift to the new perspective where Being enjoys the
primacy in the latter part of the essay, there are moments when
There-being still seems to take the initiative. " . . . In the eksistent freedom of There-being takes place the concealing of
beings-in-their-totality, [sc.] concealment is." 84 Furthermore,
although the mystery as such "dominates the There-being of
man," and ek-sistent freedom stems from the "originating
Essence of truth," nevertheless it is There-being that " . . . conserves, insofar as it ek-sists, the first and broadest non-revealedness, authentic non-truth...." so that the mystery itself
is called "There-being's mystery." 85
4. The Problem of the Two Heideggers
W W is the breakthrough. Here (1930), Heidegger II emerges
out of Heidegger I. How new is the new? It seems impossible to
deny that there is something new. The shift of focus from Therebeing to Being is more than a change in terminology; it is a
genuine transformation of thought. 86 The only question is
whether or not this change is consonant with SZ, or whether it
is a new approach forced upon Heidegger because of the
bankruptcy of the old.
We do not as yet have sufficient data about Heidegger II to
permit us to pass serious judgement on the matter, but we can
cull the evidence to date. We find certain indices in the earlier
work, which, if they do not announce, are at least coherent with,
the shift. To begin with, we have the title itself of SZ to remind
us that the existential analysis was never intended as anything
more than a preparation to interrogate Being itself within the
83 " . . . Aus der Weise, wie das ursprüngliche Wesen der Wahrheit west, entspringen die seltenen und einfachen Entscheidungen der Geschichte." (WW, p. 17).
84 " . . . In der ek-sistenten Freiheit des Da-seins ereignet sich die Verbergung des
Seienden im Ganzen, ist die Verborgenheit." (WW, p. 19). Heidegger's italics.
85 " . . . Das Dasein verwahrt, sofern es ek-sistiert, die erste und weiteste Unentborgenheit, die eigentliche Un-wahrheit. Das eigentliche Un-wesen der Wahrheit
ist das Geheimnis
" (WW, p. 20). See p. 21 (Geheimnis des Daseins).
86 WW, p. 14 (Wandlung des Denkens). Cf. p. 27.
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''transcendental horizon" of time. Accordingly, the third section
of the first part (which never appeared) planned to reverse the
title of SZ to "Time and Being." Does not the reversal of title
make it at least thinkable that the perspective might have to be
reversed, too?
As the analysis proceeds, we find that even though Being is
conceived as a project of There-being, the insistence is equally
great upon its thrown-ness, and this leaves room, certainly,
for the conception of Being as an "alterity" that exercises a
primacy over There-being. And when in KM the analysis of the
transcendental imagination brings us to a point where we see it
as the origin of time, what happens? It disappears into a Source
more profound than itself, therefore prior to itself, sc. the unity
of an aboriginal Time. Even WG leaves one with the impression
that if the problem of time (and, presumably, its priority to the
grounding-process) is excluded from the analysis, the reason is
only that the problem is too big for the compass of that little
work and abides in it everywhere as a to-be-thought.87
If we restrict our attention to the two minor works (WG, WM),
we notice that, released from the exigencies of analysing Therebeing as to-be-in-the-World, the meditation finds its center of
gravity more and more in the problem of truth (therefore Being)
as such. This is particularly noticeable in WM. There the Nonbeing analysis, for all its profound accordance with SZ, nevertheless introduces a new element, sc. Non-being "forces" the
question about the ontological difference on There-being and
therefore must be credited with a certain primacy over it. The
whole problem of founding metaphysics, too, at least as it takes
its point of departure from Kant, is profoundly radicated in the
finitude and negativity of man. Truth, too, is negatived. Given
the undeniable drift toward meditating truth for itself, is it surprising that Heidegger poses the question about the negativity
of truth in itself? It is precisely at this point that it becomes clear
(at least as we follow the thought process of WW) how concealment precedes revealment, hence how the process of truth
must be conceived as (ontologically) prior to There-being. Is not
this coherent with Heidegger I - and the whole of Heidegger II ?
In all this, we do not wish to imply that everything is very
91

WG, pp. 47, 42 (note 6o).
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obvious and therefore easily discerned, or that we ourselves would
be perceptive enough to detect the new direction as clearly as
we do now, if this were 1930. But it is not 1930. Given the direction that we know Heidegger to have taken since then, we
maintain only that it seems possible, with W W as the point of
reference, to see in these indices a certain warrant to say that
Heidegger I and Heidegger II, for all their difference, are one.
B.

THE

NATURE

OF

BEING

The notion of Being in W W may be quickly delineated. There
seems to be, in fact, a notable ambiguity. Being is most often
conceived as beings-as-such-in-the-totality, hence the Being of
beings taken as an ensemble. Insofar as this is negatived by
compound concealment, it is called "mystery." 88 But Being is
also vaguely but unmistakably conceived as more than (or less
than - in any case, different from) beings-as-such-in-theensemble. It is in this sense that it is called Essence, with the
connotation of an emerging-into-presence. This, too, is negatived, and therefore it may be designated easily as "mystery,"
even if the explicitation is not yet made:
. . . For the initiated, in any case, the "non-" of the originating non-essence
of truth as non-truth points to the still unexplored domain of the truth
of Being (not, in the first place, of beings).8*
In this sense, Being is the One-and-Only which conceals itself.
" . . . This self-concealing One-and-Only . . . is what . . . we call
Being and for a long time have been accustomed to consider
only as beings-in-their-totality." 90 The insinuation, however,
is clear that Being must be considered as something other than
beings-in-their-totality and therefore is to be meditated for itself. Here the essay ends.
Is there a discrepancy? Waiving for the moment any question
as to Heidegger's whole conception of Being, we may say that
8B WW, pp. 23, 25 (Sein des Seienden), 19-20 (Geheimnis).
89 " . . . Für den Wissenden allerdings deutet das 'Un-' des anfänglichen Unwesens der Wahrheit als der Un-wahrheit in den noch nicht erfahrenen Bereich der
Wahrheit des Seins (nicht erst des Seienden)." (WW, p. 20).
00 " . . . das sich verbergende Einzige der einmaligen Geschichte der Entbergung
des 'Sinnes' dessen, was wir das Sein nennen und seit langem nur als das Seiende im
Ganzen zu bedenken gewohnt sind." (WW, p. 25).
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at this point he is completely consistent with himself. Being for
him is always the Being of beings, but it comes-to-pass in them
after the manner of an e-vent, which we find suggested here by
the verbal sense of Essence. We need only to read this in the
context of ID to appreciate the coherence between the two. 91
C.

THE

CONCEPTION

OF

THOUGHT

I. The Nature of Thought
Our principal task is to trace the evolution of foundational
thought as the thinking of Being, and up to the present the
notion has not appeared formally as such. Like the primacy of
Being over There-being, however, this concept, so characteristic
of the later Heidegger, appears in W W explicitly for the first
time in two brief but significant passages.92 We treat them in
turn.
In the first case, the Being which is thought is understood in
the sense of beings-as-such-in-their-totality. " . . . This interrogation [about what beings-as-such-in-totality are] thinks . . . the
question about the Being of beings. . . . " 93 From the citation
and the passage which precedes it, we may infer: To think Being
means to interrogate beings-as-such-in-their-totality. And yet,
intrinsic to the ensemble of beings-as-such is its own negativity,
sc. the non-revealedness which constitutes mystery and, when
this is forgotten, errance. To think Being, therefore, is to think
the ensemble as negatived, hence to re-collect the mystery by
recognizing errance for what it is, gaining thus "a prospect of the
mystery out of [the depths of] errance." 94 To think (interrogate)
the whole negatived ensemble of beings is simply to let-it-be
(manifest), sc. to let it unveil itself as itself, to accept it for what
it is, to surrender to its dominating power, to make it one's own
by opening up to it completely.95 Such a type of thought occurs
ID, pp. io, 28-29, 59» 62-63.
There is a third use of the term Denken, p. 1 4 (einer Wandlung des Denkens),
but it is not sufficiently pronounced to warrant special attention.
83 " . . . Dieses Fragen denkt die wesentlich beirrende und daher in ihrer Mehrdeutigkeit noch nicht gemeisterte Frage nach dem Sein des S e i e n d e n . . ( W W , p.
23). Heidegger's italics.
94 WW, p. 23 (Der Ausblick in das Geheimnis aus der Irre).
9& WW, pp. 20 (Nicht-waltenlassen), 23 (übernommen).
91
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only from time to time, sc. at those precious moments of complete
release and surrender which have been called re-solve. It becomes clear, then: that the thinking of Being takes place in the
moment of re-solve; that whereas in SZ re-solve is the culminating moment in the coming-to-pass of There-being when it
accepts itself, in WW re-solve occurs when There-being accepts
the negatived ensemble of beings-as-such (as itself, sc. in its
Being and as negatived); that common to both is the basic intuition : There-being must accept in a moment of re-solve the fact
that the truth of Being is filtered through negativity (finitude).
The difference: only one of focus. In SZ, it fell on There-being;
now it falls on Being.
The second text to which we refer follows immediately upon
the first but is separated from it by a chapter division. The
identical formula, "the thinking of Being/' in both cases serves
as transition between the main body of the text (terminated in
Chapter 7) and the chapter of conclusion (Chapter 8). One would
expect the same formula to retain an identical meaning in both
instances, but is this really the case? The text reads:
In the thinking of Being, that liberation of man unto ek-sistence which, is
the foundation of history comes into word; this word [however] is not in
the first place the "expression" of an opinion, but the well-conserved articulativeness of the truth of beings-in-their-totality. How many there are
who have an ear for such a word is of no account. Whoever it is that can
hear [it], he it is that decides man's place in history. .. . 96
In the former text, thinking was considered as having its origin
in There-being, sc. it consisted in that supreme moment of eksistence called "re-solve." If we were to retain the same sense
here, we would have to take "the liberation of man for eksistence" as the equivalent of re-solve, a very awkward interpretation indeed: for "liberation" implies an activity (Befreiung),
which in turn suggests an alterity that is little congruous with
re-solve understood as the self-achievement of There-being; and
ek-sistence here seems to be the term of the liberating process,
9 6 "Im Denken des Seins kommt die geschichtegründende Befreiung des Menschen
zur Ek-sistenz ins Wort, das nicht erst der 'Ausdruck' einer Meinung, sondern je
schon das gutverwahrte Gefüge der Wahrheit des Seienden im Ganzen ist. Wieviele
für dieses Wort das Ohr haben, zählt nicht. Wer Jene sind, die hören können, entscheidet über den Standort des Menschen in der Geschichte
" (WW, p. 24).
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whereas re-solve is always conceived as the achieving of eksistence itself.97 We must probe further.
Let us simply try to explicitate the affirmations contained in
this complex statement:
a. Man is liberated unto ek-sistence. We know that man and
There-being are not unqualifiedly identical, that There-being,
as ek-sistence, is the ground of man's essence and in that sense
possesses man. We know, too, that what characterizes eksistence is freedom: There-being is ek-sistent freedom. Now to
"liberate" man is to introduce him into this privileged condition
of ek-sistent freedom, to endow him with the prerogative of eksistence (transcendence). The "liberation of man unto ek-sistence"
is the process by which There-being emerges-into-presence.
Furthermore, if There-being receives its own essence out of the
still more original emerging-into-presence of truth itself,98 then
by "liberation of man unto ek-sistence" we understand the process
by which There-being emerges out of a more original Source,
which, as we have seen, is Being in the sense of emergent truth.
b. This emerging of There-being into presence as ek-sistence is
the founding of history, because it is here that transcendence,
primordial history, first comes-to-pass.
c. There-being's coming-to-presence comes into word. Here we
have apparently a new element in Heidegger's analysis, sc.
"word," or rather ''coming-to-word/' How is it possible for
There-being's emergence to take the form of word? For the
moment, there is little to help us. Do we have a reappearance in
a new form of the logos problematic of SZ ? Yet there is clearly
a difference, for just as re-solve, so, too, logos implies a Therebeing already present in the mode of a being. The present text,
however, if our reading is accurate, deals with There-being not
as a being-already-present but precisely in that ontologically
prior moment when this being comes out of Being into presence.
• 7 If one pressed the matter, we could admit a very broad interpretation of
"liberation" (Befreiung) that would minimize the implications of alterity and take
it in the sense of There-being "liberating" itself in the sense of becoming-free (Freiwerden) for the call of conscience (v. g. SZ, p. 287). This would give an acceptable
sense to the opening sentence of Chapter 8, but such an interpretation, as far as we
can see, is without precedent in SZ, differs clearly from the sense of befreit on p. x6
and concords poorly with the priority of word over hearing in sentences 2 and 3.
M WW, pp. 14,23.
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This would be the moment when the ontological difference
breaks out, and it is this which comes into word.
d. The word of which we are speaking is certainly not the "expression" of an opinion, formulated in the thought processes of
some knowing subject. It is much rather the articulativeness of
the truth of Being, where articulativeness must be taken in the
radical sense of a complex structure fitted together by joints
(Gefüge), and Being is tobe understood as beings-in-the-ensemble
(SZ spoke of 'Total Meaningfulness"). Therefore the emergence
of There-being out of Being comes into a word that is grounded
in the articulative structure of the truth of beings-in-theensemble (Being).
e. It is conceivable that this word, though uttered, may not be
attended to by individuals. In order to hear this word, individual
man must "have an ear for it." But without such attentiveness,
the word is simply not heard. How many there are who do attend to the word of Being need not concern us. Remark simply
that the word as uttered must be ontologically prior to individual
men, who may or may not attend to it.
f. Yet it is attention to this word that decides man's place in
history. There are some privileged individuals, to be sure, who
attend to the word of Being. It is they who give a special character to the general mass of men and determine what place they
have in history. However this be interpreted, the essential seems
to be that attentiveness to the word of Being has a specifically
historical dimension.
g. The coming-into-word is achieved through the thinking of
Being. The question now is: who or what is the author (let us
say rather "source") of this thinking? It cannot be individual
men, for the word is uttered (ontologically) prior to the men who
attend to it. Nor can it be There-being as such, it would seem,
for what is formed into word (according to our hypothesis) is
There-being's cowwwg-into-presence as such. Have we not reason
to suppose, then, that the source of thinking must be Being itself, and that the phrase "of Being" ("the thinking of Being") is
perhaps a "subjective" as well as an "objective" genitive? The
suggestion is not preposterous, for the entire essay culminated
in the transfer whereby Being itself becomes the primary focus
of attention, since it is the ultimate Source out of which ek-
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sistent freedom (There-being) springs. To take Being as the
Source of thought would be, then, to speak of thought in terms
of its origin. The word (of the truth) of Being would be uttered
by Being in thought.
Even if our interpretation is valid, there remain tremendous
obscurities. How explain in detail the correlation between Beingtruth-thinking-word? How explain precisely the origin of
language and the historical relation between language and
thought? What is the relationship between individuals who
attend to Being and the rest of men? By what right is such a
coming-to-pass called "thought"? What is the intrinsic relation
between thought conceived as having its origin in Being and
conceived as the achievement of There-being in re-solve ?
2. The Properties of Thought
a. P R E - S U B J E C T I V E - WW offers us no answer to any of
these questions. Let us see what it does tell us about thought.
However we understand the process, clearly Heidegger does not
conceive it to be simply an operation of the knowing subject by
which it "thinks" about, or upon, that-which-is-opposed to it,
sc. an object. The entire analysis began by an effort to determine the essence of truth conceived as a subject-object relationship, sc. of conformity between subject-judging and objectjudged. We saw: that the essence of such truth lies in ek-sistent
freedom, which is ontologically prior to the subject-object comportment; that this in turn springs from the still more original
truth of Being itself. We are engaged on a level far deeper than
that on which the subject-object dichotomy makes any sense.
It is the level of mutual presence between Being and Therebeing, the level of that original open-ness which renders it possible for two beings, one of them There-being, to address each
other as subject-object, the level of non-, rather pre-, subjectivity.
Now Heidegger's insistence upon the non-subjective character
of the thinking of Being in WW, if only implicit, is unmistakeable. It is discernible under two forms: in the implied polemic
against the domination of "common sense" in the thinking of
Being and in the analysis of the forgotten-ness of mystery.
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i. Polemic vs. "Common Sense ' - After speaking of thought
as that process in which There-being's emerging-into-presence
comes-into-word, Heidegger continues :
. . . At the very same moment in the history of the world, however, when
philosophy takes its beginning, there begins as well for the first time the
99
pronounced domination of the ordinary understanding (sophistry).
This occurs by way of contrast ("however") to the thinking of
which Heidegger has just spoken. It is a domination that perdures
even to our own day under the form of "ordinary common
sense." The whole essay from beginning to end is an attempt to
overcome the simplism of ordinary common sense that seeks
only what is "self-evident" and is both deaf and blind to what
philosophy holds to be essential: 100 to think Being itself, and,
indeed, in its negativity.
More precisely, how does this domination of common sense
manifest itself ? Principally by a refusal to question the beings
that common sense finds so obvious, accepting these beings of
daily commerce at their face value and resenting the probing of
philosophy into their hidden ground as an attack upon itself.
What is this, however, if not to live on the assumption that the
power of ordinary intelligence is sufficient to penetrate the core
of beings and read there by its own light all of their hidden
meaning? This is the fundamental impulse of a knowing subject
to master the objects of its knowledge. 101
Philosophy (the thinking of Being), on the other hand, has a
completely different style, simply because it does interrogate
(Fragen) these beings, and, indeed, in their ground, for it refuses
to limit itself to their limitations and lets-be beings-as-such-intheir-totality, sc. Being with all its negativity. In a word, philosophy overcomes the subjective thinking of common sense
because it probes the mystery of beings.
ii. Forgottenness of the Mystery - We have seen that thought,
insofar as it is conceived as identical with the re-solve of There99 " . . . In demselben Weltaugenblick jedoch, den der Anfang der Philosophie
erfüllt, beginnt auch erst die ausgeprägte Herrschaft des gemeinen Verstandes (die
Sophistik)." (WW, p. 24). Heidegger's italics.
100 w w , pp. 5-6, 24.
101 W W , pp. 24, 6.
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being, is the interrogation of Being with its negativity, which by
mutual complement, constitute the "full essence of truth." 1 0 2
By recognizing errance for what it is, thought overcomes the
forgetfulness to which it has been prey and thereby re-collects
the mystery.
Now what characterizes There-being in its forgetting of the
mystery (errance) ? Precisely the tendency to limit its interest
to beings in their calculable determinations. It rests content for
the most part with individual beings as it finds them, never goes
beyond them to their unfat homed depths. And in dealing with
these beings, what There-being seeks above all is to put them
to use, to control them, fashioning out of them a whole "World"
of its own, taking them at their face value as the measure of its
activity without reflecting upon what ultimate ground renders
both measure and measurement possible. To look for an "ultimate
ground" of beings and of the relationships between them simply
has no appeal for There-being, and even when it does try to
broaden the scope of its interests, the new vision, too, is determined by There-being's own intentions and needs, its own
purposes and plans, which remain as before the standard of all
utility. Such, as we have seen, is the condition of errance. The
mystery of beings is gradually dissolved as There-being more
and more exclusively takes itself for a subject, in reference to
which all other beings have their meaning, sc. by which they are
measured. Note that we have here a detailed delineation of what
later receives the name of "technicity" (Technik). Briefly: Therebeing forgets the mystery of Being (is prey to errance) in direct
proportion as it thinks of itself as a subject, sc. falls victim to
subjective thinking. 103 To re-collect the mystery, we infer, Therebeing must overcome subjective thought. This will take place
when There-being recognizes its thinking as subjective, errance
for what it is, sc. as the forgetting of the mystery.
One final word. The essay as a whole does more than grope
for the meaning of pre-subjective thought; it is as such an effort
(though not yet explicitated) to achieve it. If we return for a
102 WW, p. 23 (Das volle Wesen der Wahrheit).
10S WW, pp. 20-2I.
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moment to Heidegger's retrospective assessment (1943) of the
original meditation, recalling that in the language of the later
period presentations and concepts are taken to be characteristic
of subjective thought, then the closing remark of the author's
concluding note has a new and deeper resonance:
. . . The successive steps of the interrogation are in themselves the way of
a thought which, instead of offering presentations and concepts, experiences and probes itself as the transformation of a relation to Being.104
b. I N T E R R O G A T I V E - The thinking of Being has primarily
an interrogative form. To re-collect the mystery in the midst of
errance is " . . . to pose a question in the sense of the only question
[worth posing]: what beings-as-such-in-their-totality are. Such
an interrogation thinks . . . the question about the Being of
beings. . . 1 0 5 This is to think-by-question. It is with such a
qu.^tion as this that the early thinkers for the first time experienced truth, and history began. It is just such a question,
too, that ordinary common sense rejects as an attack upon itself, preferring instead the unquestionableness of everyday
commerce. Must we not infer, then, that in order to think Being,
the first step is simply to pose the only question worth posing,
the Being-question itself? 1 0 6
Such a mode of thinking will not try to dominate what it
questions. When all is said and done, it is fundamentally an
attend-ing (Hören). As such, it is at once both gentle and rigorous. Its gentleness consists in a tranquil release, in docility (die
Gelassenheit) toward the dominating mystery; its rigor consists
in the re-solve that does not destroy the mystery but does force
it into the Open of its own truth, sc. lets it come-to-presence as
mystery. This rigorous docility and docile rigor is what characterizes foundational thought. 107 Remember: we are still on the
thought level of 1930.
164 " . . . Die Schrittfolge des Fragens ist in sich der Weg eines Denkens, das,
statt Vorstellungen und Begriffe zu liefern, sich als Wandlung des Bezugs zum Sein
erfährt und erprobt." (WW, p. 27).
105 " . . . ist das Fragen im Sinne der einzigen Frage, was das Seiende als solches
im Ganzen sei. Dieses Fragen denkt die wesentlich beirrende und daher in ihrer
Mehrdeutigkeit noch nicht gemeisterte Frage nach dem Sein des Seienden...."
(WW, p. 23). Heidegger's italics.
10«
pp 2 4 {Erfragen)p 25 (das denkende Fragen), 1 5 - 1 6 (der erste Denker),
24 (Fraglosigkeit).
107 WW, p. 24 (milden Strenge, strengen Milde).
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Resume
The essence of truth as conformity lies in ek-sistent freedom
as the pre-predicative disclosure of the Open in which judge and
that-which-is-judged may meet. But ek-sistent freedom, in turn,
resides in the originating truth of this Open itself which comports
its own negativity (mystery, errance). This negatived Open we
call Being (Essence): the essence of truth is the truth of Essence.
Thought is conceived on the one hand as proceeding from Therebeing in re-solve, on the other from Being itself when the ontological difference comes to word. How (if) the two may be reconciled, we have as yet no idea at all.
How far have we come? Heidegger I becomes Heidegger II,
and . . . the thinking of Being . . . at last!

CHAPTER

II

T H E S E L F - A S S E R T I O N OF T H E G E R M A N
UNIVERSITY

The formal address, entitled 'The Self-assertion of the German
University," that Heidegger delivered when he became rector
of the University of Freiburg in May, 1933, has achieved a renown beyond its philosophical deserts.1 We restrict our attention
to its philosophical deserts. The theme is ordinary enough. The
new rector urges his students and professorial staff to assume
their responsibility before the nation in the service of science,
explaining what is meant by science and how this service is to
be performed. What concerns us is the notion of science as conceived in 1933.2
A.

BEING

For science in this discourse is not understood in the modern
sense but is taken to be identical with philosophy itself. They
have a common origin, sc. the outbreak of Greek philosophy,
when Western man rises up in the midst of beings-in-theensemble, interrogating them, grasping them as the beings that
they are. It is the moment of There-being's primal wonderment
before the total ensemble of beings, which, despite a certain reve1

Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität (Breslau: Korn, 1933). (Hereafter:

SU).
2 As to the "how" of the service, Heidegger suggests three ways: service by labor,
service under arms, service through knowledge. Some find a philosophical parallel
(therefore warrant) for this in Plato; others take it for a complete capitulation to the
Nazis, who had come to power the previous January. We leave the matter to historians. In any case, no one denies that after the stern lessons of the intervening years
these pages make unpleasant reading.
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lation, remain couched in concealment that leaves them always
uncertain, always questionable - buried in primordial obscurity.3
This is the moment when science takes its origin. It comes-topass, to be sure, as a process of There-being, but There-being
must remain docile to a power that is already prior to it. The
author makes his own an expression of Aeschylus' Prometheus,
which he interprets to mean that all knowledge of things must
surrender to the overwhelming power of fortune (Schicksal),
whose might is prior to There-being.4 It is in virtue of this power
of fortune that beings themselves open up before a receptive
There-being in their inexhaustible immutability. Science comesto-pass in There-being's surrender to fortune's dominating might
- might that pervades not only the beings that There-being meets
but There-being itself, might that has power of disposition over
There-being. This all-pervading power contains within itself its
own negativity, for the concealment of the total ensemble of
beings-as-such is an enduring s^//-concealment of the totality.
Taken in its dynamic complexity, the entire process may be
called the essenc-ing of Being. 5
B.

THOUGHT

But despite the primal spontaneity of Being, it is as an
achievement of (in) There-being that science comes-to-pass. How
describe the process? To begin with, we must avoid conceiving
it as an act - or series of acts - of knowledge, whereby a knowingsubject is opposed to an object-known and the knowledge gained
serves the purposes of the knower. Rather it is an attitude which
There-being assumes, characterized by a fundamental open-ness,
or ex-position, toward the primal concealment, whereby Therebeing submits to the dispositions of fortune in a moment of resolve, thereby letting the Being of beings-in-their-totality cometo-presence, and, indeed, in its negativity (Verborgene). Science
is a complete surrender, then, to the dominating power of fortune,
and as such it is an occurrence which comes-to-pass in the very
SU, pp. 8, i2.
SU, p. 9. We retain the translation for Schicksal that we used in SZ, leaving
open the question as to whether or not there ib a rhange in meaning. Very soon the
word in this context will be Geschick.
5 S U , pp. 9 - n , 13.
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ground of There-being's Being as the supreme moment of Therebeing's dynamic engagement with other beings. It is this dynamic engagement that Heidegger conceives to be what the
Greeks fundamentally meant by evspyeta, sc. "to-be-at-work
(-with-beings)." He considers the attitude itself to be the genuine
sense of freoopslv. It corresponds, too, to what he described in
WW as the thinking of Being.6
What can be said now of the thinking of Being as we discern
it in this address? First of all, it is interrogative. It is a yearning
to draw near to beings as such, to abide among them and feel the
pressure of their presence.7 It is fundamentally a "meditative
interrogation," sc. it ponders the question about what beings as
beings "are." Such an interrogation as this is not simply a
question that precedes an answer, which alone, in turn, is considered an act of knowledge, but the " . . . questioning itself becomes the highest form of knowing. . . , " 8 unlocking in beings
that by reason of which they come-to-presence, sc. their Being.
Such an interrogation as this is an extreme simplification of
view, shattering the departmentalization of science into separate disciplines, restoring this pluralized effort to the unity of a
single pursuit, sc. the interrogation of the unique, ineluctable
Source out of which all beings spring. This Source remains
questionable, however, precisely insomuch as it remains hidden,
undeterminable by exact and certain knowledge, sc. mystery.
Thought, too, is historical. The thinking of Being is an attempt to recapture the grandeur of that initial wonderment
before Being with which science (philosophy) took its origin.
But the origin of science (philosophy) is not to be identified
simply with that moment of ontic history that took place 2500
years ago, when it had its inception in Greece. In this sense it is
over and done with, and cannot come again.9 On the contrary,
this origin abides, it still is. " . . . It does not lie behind us as that9 SU, pp. 11, 13 (Kenntnisse), 10 (Standhalten), 12 (Ausgesetztseins [cf. WW, p.
15]), 11 (uns fügen, Verfügung), 13 (Entschlossenheit zum Wesen des Seins), 12 (Verborgene, Ungewisse), 9-10 (4>ea>pta,
7 SU, pp. 9-10 (Bedrängnis).
8 " . . . das Fragen wird selbst die höchste Gestalt des Wissens
" (SU, p. 12).
• What Heidegger here calls längst Gewesene we understand in the sense of "beginning" (Beginn), as distinguished from "origin" (Anfang): origin means emergence
as such out of the primal source; beginning refers to the ontic moment when this
took place.
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which-has-been long ago, but stands before us
" as that which
is still-to-come, for There-being to gather unto itself once more,
sc. re-trieve. 1 0 Recalling the sense of ''re-trieve" and the role it
played in the historicity of There-being as described in SZ, we
may say now, it would seem, that in the present context, to
think Being is simply to re-trieve science (philosophy) in its
origins.
Finally, the thinking of Being is correlated with language, for
it is in virtue of his power of speech that man rises up to interrogate the Being of beings.11 Just how and why this should be so
must remain for the present obscure. The author pursues the
matter no further.

Resume
Being in the essay is conceived as a fortune whose might dominates There-being, not only in its positivity but in its negativity,
sc. in its abiding self-concealment that makes it mysterious and
worthy of question. To think this Being-worthy-of-question
(das Fragwürdige) is simply to question it. The interrogation of
the Being of beings, however, is not the act of some knowing
subject for which Being is an object, but the moment of supreme
achievement in There-being's total engagement with beings,
when the primal ex-position of There-being by the process of
re-solve surrenders to the dominating might of fortune and thus
retrieves science in its origins. It is somehow correlated with the
problem of language. Why?
The philosophical deserts of the essay: it is of clear but decidedly minor importance.

1 0 " . . . Der A n f a n g ist noch. Er liegt nicht hinter uns als das längst Gewesene,
sondern er steht vor uns
" (SU, p. n ) . Heidegger's italics. Cf. wieder einzuholen
{ibid.) and Wiederholung (SZ).
n SU, p. 8 (kraft seiner Sprache).

CHAPTER

III

INTRODUCTION TO METAPHYSICS

If in WW Heidegger becomes Heidegger II, it is in the lecture
course of 1935, entitled "Introduction to Metaphysics/' that
the main lines of the new position are firmly drawn. Here, amid
changing terminology and a burgeoning problematic, the author
remains faithful to his initial intention to ground metaphysics
by posing the question of Being. For the question, "why are
there beings at all and not much rather Non-being?," the groundquestion of metaphysics, presupposes, in asking about the ontological difference, a preliminary question about the sense of
Being. It is with this that he is still engaged.1
The text is especially important for us, because here the
problem of thought is made thematic for the first time. We see,
too, how and why language assumes for Heidegger so important
a place in posing the question (therefore in the thinking) of Being.
And yet, the work was comparatively unknown to the early
commentators, becoming available to the general public only in
1953. Reading it now from our present perspective, we can appreciate with what justice Heidegger could protest, in a letter to
Jean Wahl (1937), that the anthropological interpretations given
to the early work gravely misrepresented (with or without
warrant) his own intentions.2
EM, pp. 1, 24-25.
Letter cited in De Waelhens, La Philosophie..p.
3, note x. Heidegger himself
(1953) explains that of all the lecture courses he planned to publish, he chose this
as the first simply because it would explain better than the rest the transition from
SZ to the later publications, sc. from Heidegger I to Heidegger II. See "Letter to the
Editor," Die Zeit (Hamburg), Sept. 24, 1953, p. 18.
1
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We should say first a word about the title — but only a word.
We have seen already in what sense Heidegger conceives all traditional metaphysics, which investigates beings as such, as a
type of "physics/' He wishes to go beyond even metaphysical
physics, to interrogate the Being-process as different from
beings. It is to a meta-physics in this sense that he wants to
introduce his hearers.3
The study begins with an analysis of the grammar and etymology of the word "Being," interesting enough in its way, but,
when all is said and done, it does not take us very far.4 He then
takes another approach and examines Being in terms of certain
modalities which, formally speaking, seem to b e distinct from it.
We come easily, for example, by such phrases as "Being and
Becoming" (Sein und Werden), "Being and Seeming" (Sein und
Schein), "Being and Thought" (Sein und Denken), "Being and
Obligation" (Sein und Sollen), and imply thereby that the second
member of the phrase is distinct from the first, even if not separate from it, indeed if only another form of Being itself. The
correlations are not arbitrary, in fact they are intrinsically dependent one on the other, controlled by a t y p e of necessity, in
some way not yet discernible, integrated into the truth of the
coming-to-presence of Being itself.5
There follows, then, a series of four sections, in which each of
the correlative pairs is examined in detail. The major part of the
analysis goes to the correlation of Being and thought, which is
precisely what interests us most. We rearrange the data thus
provided, as best suits the order of our exposition. With these few
remarks to serve as orientation, let us come at once to the heart
of the matter.

EM, pp. 14-15, 71.
EM, pp. 42-56.
5 EM, pp. 73-74 (Sein-Werden), 75-88 (Sein-Schein), 8 8 - 1 4 9 (Sein-Denken), i49~
152 (Sein-Sollen).
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/. General Remarks
A.

NATURE

OF

BEING

X. Being as cpucr^
We know already that Being for the early Greeks was cpuai^:
emergent-abiding-presence. By reason of cpuort^, beings become
un-concealed, hence <pucri<; is equivalent to d-X-q&ewc. Now as
emergent-abiding-presence, 9001;; is also overwhelming Power
(Walten), the inscrutable unity of motion and rest which for
Heraclitus was the aboriginal Discord (rcoXspio^). It is the essential character of this Power that it hold sway in and through
the total ensemble of beings-as-such. That is why we may call
it simply "the Over-powering" (das Überwältigende) .6
To consolidate this general interpretation of cpucri^, it will be
helpful to consider immediately two other terms which for the
early Greeks, according to Heidegger, were closely allied to it:
a. Aoyos - The first of these is Xoyo^. Heidegger examines the
use of the term as it appears in the classical fragments of Heraclitus. Despite the frequent translation as "word" or "speech,"
the fundamental meaning of Xoyo? is rather "gathering" (as one
gathers wood), or "bringing together" into a unity that, by
reason of Xoyo<;, abides. There is here, too, a connotation of order
or arrangement, for a "collection" is not simply a piling together
of the members of the collection into a disorganized heap;
rather it is a layipg of the members side by side according to
some sort of pattern.7
In terms of our problem, Xoyo? is that by reason of which beings
are gathered together and held fast, so that they may stand on
their own as beings. In examining the last two fragments of
Heraclitus, Heidegger finds that the term connotes both the
activity of gathering-together and the term of this activity, sc.
collectedness; then he formulates the sense of X6yos as the
" . . . gathered-togetherness [of beings] that in [their] very origin
constantly gathers [them] together and dominates [them]
6

EM, p. 1 1 5 .
EM, p. 95, It is this side-by-side character that gives rise to the sense of Xöyo$
as "relation." See EM, pp. 97-103.
7
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through and through." 8 As such it is simply the Being of these
beings, so that we may now say that what characterizes a being
is that it be gathered together in itself and contain itself in this
collectedness. It is "a gathered-together coming-to-presence":
cpucTiq and Xoyo^ are one.9
Ouais and X6yo<; are identical, even when «piicn.*; is conceived
as Discord. For Discord is not dispersion. On the contrary, it is a
contentious, sc. dynamic, unity, and the cohesive principle is
Xoyo^: " . . . IloXe^o^ and Xoyos are one . . . 1 0 Xoyo<; preserving
the contentious elements of Discord in their correlative opposition, permeating them all, bringing Discord to its highest degree
of tension.
Because of this intimate correlation with cpucru;, which in turn
is that by which non-concealment (a-Xyj&eta) comes-to-pass,
Xoyo<;, too, (or rather Xeyeiv) has the sense of opening-up and
rendering manifest, revealing. We can see immediately how for
Heidegger the problem of Xoyo^ becomes inseparable not only
from the question of Being but henceforth from the problem of
truth as well. 11
b. AIXT) - Analogous to Xoyo<; in its identity with <ptiai<; is
Six7), which assumes an importance in Heidegger's analysis of
the first choral ode of Sophocles' Antigone. He translates it as
"organization," or "arrangement," and wishes to suggest a
whole host of nuances: a manner of disposition [Fug), the articulativeness of the whole ensemble of beings (Gefüge), the process
of organizing (Fügung) in the sense of the direction imposed by
the Over-powering in the process of holding-sway, the articulative whole (Gefüge) which itself organizes (arranges) beings
and forces these beings to dovetail (Einfügung), adapting themselves (Sich-fügen) to each other and to the articulated ensemble.12
Do we have anything essentially new here? It seems not. Once
we understand Xoyoc; to mean the gathering-together into an
8 " . . . d i e ständig in sich waltende ursprünglich sammelnde Gesammeltheit."
(EM, p. 98).
• EM, p. 100 (gesammelt Anwesen).
10
.. EMXejiOt; und X6yo5 sind dasselbe." (EM, p. 47)- See p. 102.
1 1 EM, p. 130.
1 2 EM, pp. 123, 127. One would prefer to translate Fug as "disposition," but the
word has been reserved already to translate Befindlichkeit. It is used here simply as
an alternative translation in a context where the intended sense is clear. For the rest,
we retain "organization" or "arrangement."
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ordered collectedness, then this gathering must be an arranging
which likewise terminates in an arrangement that is an articulate whole, and we can see in all of the proposed nuances a dual
sense for "organization" that parallels the collecting-collectedness
dichotomy of Xoyo;: organizing (Fügung) and that-which-isorganized (Gefüge). Hence, " . . . Being, <pu<ri as the dominating
Power, is original collectedness: Xoyo<;; [and likewise it] is organisation that organizes: 81x73." 13
2. Being and Seeming-to-be
We cannot understand Being as tpu<yi<;, however, unless we see
it in its relation, rather correlation, with what one would be
inclined to think is its very opposite, sc. "appearing" or
"seeming" (Schein), for what "appears" or "seems-to-be"
somehow suggests something different from what "is."
Heidegger begins by examining the use of "appear" in common
speech and discovers three fundamental senses: "appearing," in
the sense of "shining-forth" (v.g. "the sun is shining, sc. appears
through the clouds"); "appearing," in the sense of "self-revelation" (v.g. "Being-as-it-appears," discussed in KM); "appearing," in the sense of "creating a false impression" (Anschein)
(v.g. "the sun appears, sc. seems, to revolve about the earth"). 14
These three senses are obviously not unconnected. The most
fundamental sense of all is the second, so that the essence of
"appearing" consists in a being's "shining-forth" as what it is,
sc. in stretching-out, or in taking its stand, or in showing, or in
presenting itself before us. Now we have already seen that this
is the very meaning of Being in the sense of <pu<ris, sc. the comingto-pass of non-concealment. Insofar as Being is truth, it is an
appearing. Appearing pertains to the very essence of Being. 15
1 3 " . . . Das Sein, die qjüais, ist als Walten ursprüngliche Gesammeltheit: X6yo?,
ist fügender Fug: 81x7)." (EM, p. 123).
1 4 Because English (at least the writer's) is not as. flexible as German (at least the
author's), we are fixing on the following terminology: we reserve "appearing" and
"shining-forth" to translate Schein in the most fundamental sense by which it is
identified with <puai<;, and "seeming-to-be" to translate it in the third sense noted
above. On the one hand, "seems" implies the element of non-truth that is necessary
for this context; on the other, it is a quite desirable translation for $OXEG>, which the
author is trying to suggest. The problem, then: what is the relation between Being
and seeming-to-be?
1 5 EM, pp. 76-78
(Erscheinen, Vorliegen, Ausstehen, Sich-zeigen, Sich-dars teilen).
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But we must go further. If by reason of its Being a being appears, then of itself it offers its visage, sc. a view (Anblick) of itself, to whoever or whatever "sees" or "views" it. But the
"seeing" ("viewing") can be unfaithful to what the being itself
offers as to-be-viewed, with the result that the view covers-up
and conceals rather than reveals that which offers its visage to
be viewed. This is "appearing" in the sense of a "mere'"appearance, and what we have chosen to translate as "seeming-tobe." To be sure, there is always some warrant for the seemingto-be, because the being-as-it-seems-to-be does appear. But this
appearing is always such that by its very essence it remains
necessarily and permanently possible that it be misconstrued.16
But it is not enough to affirm this possibility simply as a possibility. Heidegger goes further. There is a dynamism within the
being-that-reveals-itself-for-what-it-is to reveal itself as what it
is not, sc. as a being-that-seems-to-be. Furthermore, this
seeming-to-be is of such a nature that it conceals the fact that it
is only a seeming and creates the impression rather that it is the
Being of the being in question. It is because of this compound
concealment that seeming-to-be is said to "deceive/' and the
realm within which this takes place is what Heidegger calls
"errance."
There are several observations to make about all this. In the
first place, one has the impression that there is a jump
somewhere. The author began by saying that, because beings
reveal themselves to some other being (There-being, of course),
it is possible for There-being's view of them to be inadequate.
Fair enough. But this implies (does it not?) that the reason for
any given failure would be some deficiency in the There-being
that views. When we advance into the matter further, however,
we discover that the ground of this failure lies not only in Therebeing, if there at all, but in beings themselves, sc. in the fact
that their self-revelation is at once and necessarily a self-concealment, indeed of such a nature that the concealment itself is
concealed and this concealed concealment masquerades as the
Being of beings. But why? This is supposed to be an intrinsic
consequence of Being as 9UCTI<;, SO that Being and seeming-to-be
™

E M , p.

79-
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are inextricably intertwined.17 Yet how does it follow simply
from the fact that Being is that by reason of which beings reveal
themselves? One suspects another premise here that is as important as it is unannounced.
We can discern it perhaps when we see how Heidegger interprets Fragment 123 of Heraclitus: "Being inclines to conceal
itself" (cpüau; xpu7rf£<7&ai tpLXei). Precisely because Being is an
emerging from concealment, there can be no emerging unless
there be concomitantly a concealment whence it comes. This is
true not only for the primal obscurity that precedes emergence,
but also for the process of self-revelation itself. Concealment
impregnates it at every moment and in every way, in order for
it to be what it is. Unless there is a veil, there can be no unveiling, re-vealing. This irremovable veil is the congenital concealment that permeates every self-disclosure, and concealment
" . . . lies in the essence of Being, of self-revelation as such. . . . " 18
This is partly an answer, to be sure, and concords nicely with
what we have seen already in WW about the precedence of nontruth to truth. Yet something more should be said, for why does
Heidegger not consider the possibility of some being of untrammeled luminosity, without shadow of darkness or concealment of any kind - transparent self-disclosure as such? The
answer apparently is that such a being would not come within
the compass of his problem, for he is concerned only with beings
that are finite, and it is finitude that comports obscurity.
For a being is that which comes to stand on its own in abiding
fashion by revealing itself in the light of truth. To take up a
stand thus is to define the limits (therefore comports the finitude) of that being. Now this "finit-izing" of a being is not a
constriction from without. Still less is it a deficiency in the being
by reason of some detrimental defect. On the contrary, it is the
being's restricting of itself to its own confines, its self-containment, hence the Being of the being by which it is what it is
in distinction from what is not a being. For a being to come to
stand on its own, then, means for it to establish a frontier for
itself. It is the sense of "'frontier'' that the Greeks gave to the
word "end" (TEXO?), so that this "end" meant not simply the
17 EM, pp. 87, 146.
1 8 u . . . liegt im Wesen des Seins, des Erscheinenden als solchen

" (EM, p. 87).
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point at which the being ceases to be, but the ending (Endung)
of the being in the sense of coming-to-perfection (Vollendung).
So it is that the limit and end are not that point at which a being
ceases but where it begins to be. It is from this point of view that
one catches the import of that term which for Aristotle expresses
Being in the noblest form: svTsXexeta> sc - self-containment (selfconserving) within one's confines. 19
The point is clear: Being is that by which beings stand on
their own in the light of truth; to take a stand is to be self-contained within one's limits, sc. to be limited. All emergence into
non-concealment, therefore, is finite, sc. limited by continued
concealment, and this in virtue of Being itself, by reason of which
emergence takes place. The fundamental reason why <pucu<;
necessarily conceals itself in revealing itself, and therefore why
Being is inextricably intertwined with seeming-to-be, is that the
Being in question is finite.
B. T H E

NATURE

OF

THERE-BEING

Being, then, is emergent-abiding-Power that always hides itself in seeming-to-be, because it is intrinsically finite in its manifestation. Now if Being is to emerge out of concealment, sc. make
an appearance, so that non-concealment (truth) comes-to-pass,
then there must be some "place" (Stätte) where this happens,
some breach in the darkness, some sudden irruption, or in-cident
(Zwischenfall) where Being opens-up in light. This "place,"
where truth takes-"place," is precisely what Heidegger understands as the "There" of Being, and insofar as it is, sc. is itself
a being, it is called with all justice "There-being." 20
It is our intention now to precise in more detail what the
present analysis tells us about the There-being. The argument
is tortuously elaborated in a series of interrelated text-analyses
that are interspersed with reiterations, allusions and digressions.
We shall follow an order of convenience and try to sift out what
1 9 EM, p. 46. Another use of Grenze suggests an interesting observation. What
gives a being its Grenze is what gives it its "possible determination" (mögliche Bestimmtheit). (EM, p. 122). The scholastics made much of the distinction between
mere "limitation," which connotes negativity, and "determination," which was
something eminently positive in the sense of "perfection."
80 EM, pp. 124-125 (Stätte, Bresche, Zwischenfall), 156 (Statte, Da-sein).
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best suits our purposes by formulating, as we have done before,
a series of propositions:
j. The There is necessary for the sake of Being.
That the There is a necessity may be inferred from what we
have just said. Here we need only insist on the fact that the
necessity is dictated by the nature of Being itself. It is the Overpowering that "needs" (Not), sc. is "in want of" (braucht), the
sphere of open-ness,21 that necessitates being-gathered-together
in some place of disclosure, that forces the in-cidence of There.
Why this should be so is a question that is posed parenthetically
but not answered. One is left to infer that such is the nature of
Being, and that ends the matter.
Now it is only one step further to say that, if the There is a
necessity of Being, then it takes place for the sake of Being, in
order that emergent-abiding-Power may come to presence as
itself, sc. as the apparition of truth (dc-XTj&ewt). Here we may see
in what sense Being, although it cannot come to presence without There-being, nevertheless maintains a certain primacy over
it, dominating it through and through. Likewise we understand
how There-being properly finds its self only insofar as it finds its
self in the midst of the Over-powering, sc. the Being of beingsin-the-ensemble. Finally, we have, too, a sense in which Being
may be said to throw-down (wirft) There-being into the condition in which it finds its self.22
2. In the There of Being comes-to-pass the primordial struggle
into truth.
The nature of There-being is elaborated principally in that
section where the author endeavors to make the distinction between Being and thought. Now what modern philosophy calls
"thought/' the science of which is "logic," is generally taken to
correspond to the Greek notions of vostv and Xsysiv. Such an
EM, pp. 124, 134-135, 146 (Not), 124 (braucht), 132 (Woher nötigt die Not?).
See EM, pp. 106 (Umwillen des Seins), 120 (Durchwaltende), 120 {fand sich
selbst), 115 (Seiende im Ganzen: Überwältigende), 125 (Sein selbst wirft). With the
notion of self-finding compare the SZ conception of transparency to self in authenticity.
21

22
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interpretation, Heidegger claims, disregards the original sense
of these terms, sc. the sense they had for the Greeks when philosophy took its origin. Let us return, then, to the origins of
Western thought and determine, if we can, how the Greeks
understood these two terms.
The author first examines Xoyo^, as found in Heraclitus, then
voelv, as used by Parmenides, endeavoring to show the fundamental concordance of the two. It is to explain the Parmenidean
conception of There-being that Heidegger introduces the lengthy
textual study of the first choral ode of Sophocles' Antigone. The
chapter concludes with an explanation of the de-volution of the
original conception of Tiysiv-voslv into what is now the commonly
accepted interpretation of the nature of thought.23 Let us try
to disengage the essentials.
a. P R E S U P P O S E D : A B O R I G I N A L D I S C O R D - Heidegger's
meditation on Heraclitus seems to have had an especially strong
influence upon him, for the conception of 7toXe{xo<;, sc. some elemental conflict out of which beings emerge-into-presence (appear), permeates his thinking at this time.24 What is the nature
of this conflict? In the lecture entitled "The Origin of a Work
of Art/' delivered in November of the same year (1935), the
author explicitates by saying that the primordial struggle is the
contention between positivity (revealment) and negativity (concealment) in the coming-to-pass of non-concealment (a-X^eia).25
At any rate, most of the terminology in EM is derived from this
dominant image. For example, Being itself must be overcome,
subdued - subdued, indeed, by There-being, whose task is to do
violence to the Over-powering. By reason of this struggle is made
manifest the previously concealed Being of what appears as a
being, a struggle that involves at the same time a battle against
the power of mere seeming-to-be. By a strange paradox, still to
be explained, the supreme triumph of the There over Being is to
be no longer There.26
28 EM, pp. 97-103 (Xdyos), 104-110, 126-128 (voetv), 112-126 (Sophokles), 13?148 (Abfall).
24 EM, pp. 47-48, a remarkably succinct statement of Heidegger's fundamental
thesis. The image returns in 1955 (SF, p. 43)2 * HW, pp. 43, 49 (Urstreit).
86 EM, pp. 120 (bewältigen, bändigen), 115 (gewait-tätig inmitten des Überwältigenden), 122 (Erkämpfen), n 6 , 146 (Macht des Scheins und Kampf mit ihm),
136 (Nicht-dasein höchste Sieg).
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The conflict-character of Heidegger's conception of There appears rather strikingly in his initial explanation of voetv. The term
for Parmenides, he claims, means primarily "to accept" or "to
receive" (Vernehmen). This can be taken in a double sense: to
accept the self-manifestation of some being-that-appears; to
accept the word of some witness with regard to a being and in
view of this testimony determine something about how the being
is. Both senses are combined in "accept" as we are to understand
it here: the acceptance of a being's self-revelation (connotation
of passivity) and the taking of a position with regard to it (connotation of activity). It is in explaining the second nuance that
Heidegger resorts to a military figure. When soldiers take a position in order to contain the enemy, their intention is to "receive" the enemy in such a way as at least to bring him to a
standstill, if nothing more. Noetv here, then, means to draw up
a position of resistance to the Over-powering in such a way that
a being-which-appears is brought to a standstill.27 We understand this in the above sense of giving a being its con-stancy, of
enabling it to stand forth on its own as being (manifest for) what
it is. With this, however, we are at the heart of the problem.
b.

"TO-ACCEPT"

AND

"TO-BE":

CORRELATIVE

-

Hei-

degger elaborates his conception of There by meditating the
Parmenidean gnome (Fragment 5): TO yap QCOTO VOSLV sartv TE
xai elvat. He rejects, of course, the common translation,
"thinking and Being are one and the same," insisting that Being
is essentially yuan; (emergence into non-concealment), that VOSLV,
as we have just seen, is essentially to accept or contain a being
by helping it stand on its own as a being, that TO OCÜTO here

27 Vernehmen has many nuances, is often translated "perceive" and evolves into
Vernunft ("reason"). To insist on the active element in voetv, Heidegger sometimes
translates it as vornehmen (v. g. HW, pp. 162, 180 and WD, p. 124). In English,
"receive" and "accept" are sufficiently flexible to be useable. To translate vornehmen,
we might invent "pro-cept" but prefer to avoid the neologism, settling for "ac-cept"
(ad-capere): "to receive with consenting mind," "to approve," "to assent, acquiesce
to," "to receive as true," etc. This concords nicely with aufnehmen and In-Achtnehmen (WD, p. 124). To sustain the military metaphor in EM, we use "contain,"
"bring to containment," "concentrate." For "accept" with the connotation of
"release" (Gelassenheit), cf. "the peasants sat outside their houses in the twilight
accepting the night air." (H. Belloc, The Path to Rome, Image books [New York:
Doubled ay and Co.], p. 26).
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means not sameness but cor-relation. His task is to examine the
correlation.28
To do so, he undertakes the Antigone analysis, the keystone
of which is the designation of man (we retain the term ' Therebeing") as TO SSIVOTATOV, "the strangest of all beings" (das Unheimlichste)?* Aetvov has a two-fold meaning, Heidegger claims:
it says "awesome" or "aw-ful" (das Furchtbare), sc. "filling
with awe." In this sense, it pertains to the Over-powering
(Being), which inspires anxiety and reticence, sc. "awe" (Scheu).
Secondly, Seivov says "awesome" in the sense of "filled with
awe." Here it pertains to that being which is open unto this aweinspiring Power and takes up a position with regard to it in such
a way as to gather it into open-ness. This taking of a position is
a resistance, contentious in character; it brings force to bear; it
does violence to the Over-powering.
When Sophocles calls There-being the "most awesome," sc.
the strangest, of all beings, then, we are to understand this for a
double reason: because, by its very essence, There-being is in
the midst of the total ensemble of beings and exposed unto
Being, the awe-inspiring Over-powering mentioned above; because it does violence to the Over-powering by gathering it together into a place of open-ness. And this prerogative is unique
in There-being. Briefly: There-being is the strangest of all beings
because " . . . in the midst of the Over-powering it brings force
to be& upon it. . . . " 30
All three pairs of strophe-antistrophe in the choral ode articulate, each in its own way, this contention between the Overpowering and its There. In the first, the focus is on those beings
which are completely external to There-being and surround it,
v.g. the sea, the earth, the animal kingdom. In the second, the
focus shifts to those beings which bear direct relation to Therebeing (v.g. language, comprehending, working or building,
M " . . . dasselbe aber ist das Denken und das Sein
" (EM, p. 104). See p. 106
(Einerleiheit vs. Zusammengehörigkeit).
a® EM, p. X14. Translation recommended by etymology (OF: estrange, fr. Lat.
extraneus ["external," "foreign"], fr. extra ["on the outside"], which suggests nicht
einheimisch and permits such overtones as "awesome," "aw-ful" (sc. filled, or filling,
with "awe"), which concord nicely with the nuances of Angst (p. 114) and Scheu (p.
115) that are detectable here. Alternate translations: un-common, extra-ordinary.
Neither one, however, comports the same air of mystery as "strange."
EM, p. 1x5 (gew alt-tätig inmitten des Überwältigenden).
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commerce with others, etc.). In both cases, the Over-powering
holds sway over the There and is forced into manifestation by
reason of the There. The difference is that, in the first type of
being, the Over-powering is conceived as simply surrounding
There-being, but in the second, it has the sense of permeating it
as that which There-being, since it is the kind of being it is, must
itself assume in its own right.31
But what is essential to note is: that the function of the force
which the There brings to bear consists in rendering-open these
beings as such, sc. as being what they are as sea, as earth, as
animal, etc.; that the beings of the first type mentioned above
(earth, sea, animals) are disclosed by reason of the beings of the
second type (language, comprehension, working, etc.), for the
latter are the " . . . subduing and ordering of the Power by
reason of which, insofar as [There-being] penetrates them, beings
disclose themselves as such . . . 3 2 that this disclosure of beings
is a power that There-being itself must master, sc. assume, if,
through the force that it brings to bear in the midst of beings,
it is to be completely itself.
The concluding strophe expresses again the same contention
between Being and its There but in a new terminology. Here the
Over-powering is SLXT) and that which forces it into open-ness,
TEXV7). We have already considered the former; our problem here
is the latter. What does TSXV7) mean? Heidegger describes it as
not only a seeing-beyond (Hinaussehen) but a being beyond
(Hinaussein) what lies at hand as a mere entity, setting it to
work as a being, indeed setting Being itself to work in this being
and as this being. So it is that TSXV*) opens up the Being of beings
by its victorious struggle against the concealment that previously enshrouded it, hence renders it possible for Being to shine
forth in beings (that-which-appears), enabling them to take
their stand as being what they are. Heidegger translates t e x ^
as "to know" (Wissen)
The Over-powering (SLXYJ) and that
which forces it to shine forth in beings (TEX^O) are in a state of
EM, p. 119 (zu übernehmen).
ein Bändigen und Fügen der Gewalten, kraft deren das Seiende sich alsein solches erschließt, indem der Mensch in dieses einrückt
" (EM, p. 120).
83 EM, p. 122. See VA, pp. 160 (identified with Hervorbringen, "to bring forth"),
21 (Weise des dtXTf&eueiv). An affinity of Wissen here with Verstehen of SZ is unmistakable. Cf. Wissen and -fcecoptoc (SU, pp. 9-11 and VA, pp. 52-53).
31

82 4 1 ...
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continual tension with one another in the sense that TS^VY)
"breaks out" against the Over-powering, which in turn dominates TS^VT). It is this mutual interchange that is.
Now it is this mutual interchange (Wechselbezug) which constitutes the correlation between to-be and to-accept ( c o n t a i n ) . 3 4
For by stvai is meant <pu<ru;, emergent-abiding-Power, and by
voelv is meant that concentration by which this Power is forced
into emergence (from concealment). They are correlative, for it
is by reason of voelv that this emergent-Power can be itself, sc.
can emerge by shining-forth in beings-that-appear; on the other
hand, it is by reason of this Power that the There can be its self,
for dominating the There through and through, it enables voetv
to be what it is. It is in the dynamic tension between these two
contentious factors that truth comes-to-pass.35
J. Characteristics of There: Transcendence, Finitude, Temporality.
We have just considered the function of the There of Being;
we wish now to enumerate its principal characteristics as suggested by the present text. To facilitate the exposition, we shall
polarize it around those characteristics which in SZ we saw to
be fundamental to There-being: transcendence, finitude, temporality.
a. T R A N S C E N D E N C E - On this point we need add little
more to what has been said already concerning the function of
There-being. For by transcendence Heidegger understands the
passage beyond beings to Being, sc. the manifestation of beings
as beings, therefore the disclosure of the Being of beings. How
better describe the process of containment (voelv) ? For it is a
seeing-beyond and a being-beyond the mere entities that lie at
hand, opening them up in their Being and keeping them open.
The total ensemble of beings, then, discloses itself as such
simply because the There (-being) penetrates them, abides in
their midst. This is possible, insofar as the There, belonging by
its very nature to Being, is exposed to Being.
It is because of this indigenous exposure to Being that the
«« EM, p. 126 (Wechselbezug).
»8 EM, pp. 136 (im Sein einbehält), 127 (Geschehen der Unverborgenheit).
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There (-being) is called the "strangest" of beings, sc. because it
is estranged from the other beings with which it dwells. It is
simply not "at home" among them. Its true abode is beyond
them. It transgresses the ordinary boundaries which first of all
and for the most part surround it, " . . . and, indeed, precisely
in the direction of the awesome, in the sense of the Overpowering," sc. of Being.36 There-being's only proper function in
dealing with beings is to break through them so as to break out
in them the same overwhelming Power that dominates itself
(Being). In an individual case, this happens when There-being
projects for the first time the Being of a being hitherto unrevealed, sc. a being that has not yet come-to-presence as manifest.
When this takes place, then, beings are disclosed for what they
are, and, for that matter, Being as well. For in this process the
total ensemble of beings as such is opened-up, and this openingup is the coming-to-pass of truth.37
It should be remarked that in all this the term "transcendence"
has disappeared completely.38 Yet how else can we conceive it ?
And how better summarize it than with the author's own formula
which describes his conception of There-being at the beginning
of the way:
. . . [There-being is] a being in the midst of beings in such a w a y t h a t t h e
beings which [it] is not as well as the beings which [it] self is have already
always been manifest t o it. This manner of Being . . . we call existence. . . .
W i t h man's existence . . . comes-to-pass an irruption in the total ensemble
of beings of such a nature t h a t for the first time beings in themselves, sc. as
beings, become manifest. . . . 3 9

b. F I N I T U D E - In all of our previous studies we have insisted on the importance for Heidegger of the problem of fini36 * ' . . . und zwar gerade in der Richtung auf das Unheimliche im Sinne des Überwältigenden." (EM, p. 116). See EM, pp. 122 (Eröffnen und Offenhalten), 120
{einrückt), 115 (in das Sein gehört), 116 (nicht einheimisch, cf. SZ, pp. 188-189).
37 EM, pp. 125 (hereinbrechen), 110 (Neues [noch nicht Anwesendes] entwirft),
127 (Geschehen der Unverborgenheit).
38 Presumably for the same reason that the formula "fundamental ontology"
disappears (WM, p. 21).
39 " . . . Der Mensch ist ein Seiendes, das inmitten von Seiendem ist, so zwar, daß
ihm dabei das Seiende, das er nicht ist, und das Seiende, das er selbst ist, zumal
immer schon offenbar geworden ist. Diese Seinsart des Menschen nennen wir Existenz. . . .

Mit der Existenz des Menschen geschieht ein Einbruch in das Ganze des Seienden
dergestalt, daß jetzt erst das Seiende ...als
Seiendes offenbar wird
" (KM, pp.
205-206). Heidegger's italics.
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tude, and in SZ we saw how the phenomenological analysis
offered certain indices of the principal ways in which the finitude of There-being manifests itself: There-being is thrown
among beings and referentially dependent on them; it has a
dynamic tendency to lose itself among these beings (fallen-ness);
as a process it must inevitably come to an end which is death.
All three of these aspects of There-being's finitude return in
EM with a striking correspondence to the first work.
i. Thrown-ness - That the There-being is thrown-forth, sc.
not master of its own origin, will be clear from what we have
said of it already as a necessity dictated by the nature of Being
itself. Being "throws" (wirft), or "sets forth" its own There. It
is for this reason that Being can never abandon its primacy over
the There, dominating it in its very depths, preserving the There
in the Being by which it is. That is why the There, for all that by
its very structure it brings force to bear upon, sc. does violence
to, the Over-powering, can never succeed in mastering it completely. 40 When all is said and done, the Over-powering overpowers even its own There. We have here clearly in other formulae what the major work called "thrown-ness." What distinguishes this present analysis from the earlier one is the primacy of Being over its There.
Perhaps this is the best time for an important parenthesis.
There is thrown, to be sure, but we must remember that it is a
thrown There, sc. disclosure of Being (ek-sistence). Now it is this
disclosing of Being accomplished in the There by reason of the
Being which permeates it that one may call project, for it is in
illuminating the Being of beings that There-being " . . . projects
something new (that which has not yet come-to-presence [as a
being]). . . . " 4 1 The There enjoys the prerogative of luminosity
because it is the There of Being, which penetrates it to its very
depths, making it what it is; yet the There does not dispose of
this prerogative, as if it were its source, simply because it is itself thrown.
EM, pp. 125 (wirft), 124 (gesetzt), 136 (umwaltet, durchwaltet), 133 (nie zu
bewältigen).
4 1 " . . . ein Neues (noch nicht Anwesendes) e n t w i r f t , . . ( E M , p. no). Note importance of the formula 44thrown-forth project" (geworfener Entwurf) in SZ (1927).
pp. 223, 284; WM (1949)» P- x8; and HB (X947), p. 84.
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it. Fallen-ness - The There is the most awesome and strange
of beings because, open to Being, it is constitutionally es-tranged
from the beings amid which it dwells, sc. which "first of all and
for the most part" are its habitual milieu. And yet, how often
it fails to get beyond this milieu and appreciate Being, thinking
"beings are only beings and nothing further/1 taking what it
most easily can put its hands on, sc. beings, as that which by its
nature it is meant to grasp, sc. Being. This condition of immersion among beings is the natural habitat of the There, where
Being itself lies hidden, and the seeming-to-be of all that is habitual, ordinary and vapid remains in command.42 Is not this
what SZ spoke of as "everydayness" ?
This spontaneous absorption with the beings about it is the
inevitable condition of There, for it not only enjoys a privileged
access to them, but it can never escape dealing with them. Not,
indeed, as if There-being were fenced in by some external barrier,
but in the sense that by its very nature the There is:
. . . continuaUy t h r o w n - b a c k into t h e paths-of-access [to beings] t h a t it
itself has made, insofar as it becomes stuck in them, c a u g h t fast in [its
own] beaten track, and in this c a p t i v i t y draws around itself the circle of
its world, becoming [so] entangled in seeming-to-be [that it] shuts itself
out from Being. . . . 4 8

Now this inability to escape the captivity, rather captivation,
of beings that comes upon the There, whose nature is to be open
to Being, is a "de-cadence'1 (Verderb).**The affinity with Therebeing's fallen-ness, as delineated in SZ, is clear. Yet it is equally
clear that there is a new emphasis here. For de-cadence is not
simply the result of some individual failure of There-being to
reveal Being; in fact it is not grounded in the There as such at
all. Rather this de-cadence itself "holds sway" and is grounded
in the mutual opposition between the Over-powering and that

42 EM, pp. xx6 (zunächst und zumeist), 100 (Handgreiflichste für Z u-begreifende),
129 (Gewöhnlichen).
43 " . . . Die Ausweglosigkeit besteht vielmehr darin, daß er stets auf die von ihm
selbst gebahnten Wege zurückgeworfen wird, indem er sich auf seinen Bahnen festfährt, sich im Gebahnten verfängt, sich in dieser Verfängnis den Kreis seiner Welt
fcieht, sich im Schein verstrickt und sich so vom Sein aussperrt...." (EM, p. 121).
See p. 1x6.
44 EM, p. 116. We translate "de-cadence" so as to suggest, if possible, affinity
between Verderb and Verfallen. Alternative: deterioration. See pp. 123-* 124.
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which forces it into manifestation. The author adds here, as if
in explanation:
. . . T h e violence t h a t is brought t o bear upon the over-powering might
of Being must be dashed t o pieces upon it, if Being is t o hold s w a y . . .
[as itself, sc.] . . . as <pvai<;, emergent Power. 4 5

The structural de-cadence of There-being is rooted in the same
necessity that dictates its ultimate disintegration (zerbrechen).
But how and why? Let us leave the obscurity for a moment and
remark simply that here, as before, the chief difference from the
problem of fallen-ness in SZ lies in the primacy of de-cadence
over the There.
iii. Being-unto-death - In the existential analysis of death,
we saw how the end (death) of There-being penetrates it
thoroughly so that from its first moment There-being always is
immanently ending. This is the eminent form of There-being's
finitude. The same theme returns here. The There is without
escape from beings, to be sure, but the supreme form of its captivity is death, for this " . . . ends beyond all measure all ending,
limits beyond measure all limits. .. , " 4 6 And the inescapability
of death does not affect There-being for the first time when it is
on the point of dying, but constantly and by reason of its very
essence. " . . . Insofar as [There-being] is, [it] stands before the
ineluctability of death. . . 4 7
Stated in this way, the remark seems natural enough and perhaps need not call special attention to itself. However, let us
consider a similar remark made later, when discussing the inevitable necessity of There-being's being dashed to pieces by the
Over-powering, which we have mentioned already:
. . . There-being does not have this potentiality as an e m p t y escape b u t
it is this potentiality, insofar as it is; . . . as There-being, it must, for all
its violence, be dashed t o pieces all the same b y Being. 4 8
48 " . . . Die Gewalttätigkeit gegen die Übergewalt des Seins muß an dieser zerbrechen, wenn das Sein als das waltet, als was es west, als cpucn^, aufgehendes Walten."
(EM, p. 124). Heidegger's italics.
46 " . . . Er über-endet alle Vollendung, er über-grenzt alle Grenzen...." (EM,
p. 121).
47 " . . . Sofern der Mensch ist, steht er in der Ausweglosigkeit des Todes...."
(EM, p. 121). Heidegger's italics.
48 " . . . Das Dasein hat diese Möglichkeit nicht als leeren Ausweg, sondern es ist
diese Möglichkeit, sofern es ist; denn als Dasein muß es in aller Gewalt-tat am Sein
doch zerbrechen." (EM, p. 135). Heidegger's italics.
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We infer that the immanence of death and the immanent necessity of being dashed to pieces represent for the author in
different formulae one and the same characteristic of There.
Now what is significant here is that the necessity of the There's
ultimate violent disintegration is dictated not so much by the
nature of the There as by the nature of Being:
. . . The violence that is brought to bear upon the over-powering might
of Being must be dashed to pieces upon it, if Being is to hold sway . . . [as
itself, sc.] . . . as cpuau;, emerging Power.4®

We interpret this to mean: Being is emergent Power; but
emergence as such implies concealment out of which, or within
which, it takes place, so that this concealment (non-emergence,
negativity, finitude) is intrinsic to the process, not only in its
inception but in its duration; when the emergence comes-to-pass
in a "place" of disclosure, therefore takes-"place" in a There,
this, too, must be permeated by negativity (finitude) and therefore comes to an end which permeates it at every moment from
the very beginning; this always immanent ending may be characterized as death (when There is considered in a more anthropological context), or as being dashed to pieces (if the context remain "ontological," where Being is considered as dynamic
Power), and language varies accordingly. Briefly: the There is
potentiality-unto-death (unto violent disintegration), because
Being's emergence unto truth, which takes place in it and
through it, is ineluctably finite. What distinguishes this conception of death from that of SZ is simply the explicit primacy
of Being over its There.
Let us now try to think together the different aspects of
There-being's finitude. The initial premise again is that Being
needs a There as a place of disclosure in order for it to come-topresence as itself, sc. as emergent Power. Being, of course, can
never abdicate its dominion over the There, and reciprocally the
There is irredeemably finite, for it is a place where Being emerges
into truth, therefore where shadows are as essential as light. To
be sure, the There does violence to Being, forcing it into openness, but this violence never comes-to-pass in such a way as to
49 " . . . Die Gewalt-tätigkeit gegen die Übergewalt des Seins muß an dieser zerbrechen, wenn das Sein als das waltet, als was es west, als 9Ü01C, aufgehendes Walten."
(EM, p. 124). Heidegger's italics.
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master Being completely, dispelling all shadows of concealment.
Now it is this disproportion between the all-overpowering Being
and its finite disclosure in There that ultimately grounds the
de-cadence of There. Plunged into the midst of beings as capable
of disclosing Being, yet radically impotent to master this Being
which overwhelms it, the There, by the force that it brings to
bear:
. . . which originally makes the paths of access [to beings], engenders in
itself its o w n non-essence . . . which per se is powerless t o escape beings,
and this so profoundly t h a t [There-being] closes t o itself the p a t h of
meditation u p o n seeming-to-be, within which it is itself caught up. 5 0

Finally, it is the ultimate consummation of this disproportion
between Being and its finite disclosure in There that the There
comes to an end and breaks apart. This ultimate dissolution belongs to the very nature of the There of Being: " . . . Therebeing . . . means: to be set forth as the breach in which the overwhelming power of Being breaks into appearance, in order that
this breach itself be shattered on Being." 5 1
We can see, then, that what characterizes the finitude of
There (thrown-ness, de-cadence, dissolution) is grounded in the
inevitably finite character of the emergence of Being into truth.
It is subject, then, to the same law which dictates that Being
necessarily conceal itself in revealing itself, sc. that Being be
inextricably intertwined with seeming-to-be: all emergence is
finite. The full import of this will appear as we proceed. For the
moment, notice: we can see already why the forgottenness of
Being will be able to be attributed sometimes to the withdrawal
of Being, sometimes to the de-cadence of There-being, yet without inconsistency, for both express under different aspects the
same phenomenon: the finitude of Being's emergence. We can
understand more clearly, too, what Heidegger means by
errance. It is the realm that is opened up in the intertwining of
Being and seeming-to-be in the coming-to-pass of truth, therefore
50 " . . . Die Gewalt-tätigkeit, die ursprünglich die Bahnen schafft, erzeugt in
sich das eigene Unwesen der Vielwendigkeit, die in sich Ausweglosigkeit ist und das
so sehr, daß sie sich selbst von dem Weg der Besinnung über den Schein aussperrt,
worin sie sich selber umtreibt." (EM, p. 121).
5 1 " . . . Da-sein des geschichtlichen Menschen heißt: Gesetzt-sein als die Bresche,
in die die Übergewalt des Seins erscheinend hereinbricht, damit diese Bresche
selbst am Sein zerbricht." (EM, p. 124).
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simply the emergent power of Being as finite. If it be said to be
intrinsic to the structure of There-being, the reason is that Being
as finite emergence dominates its There through and through.
And the There must suffer the consequences of this finitude,
v.g.: the fact that Being yields itself only in its non-essence, sc.
in negatived fashion, to the There; the fact that the There is
tossed about hither and thither in this tension between Being
and its negation, sc. by Being in all its finitude,52
c. T E M P O R A L I T Y - The question of time as such enters
only obliquely into the argument of EM, yet it is everywhere
present: 53
. . . The mutual interchange [between B e i n g and There] is. I t is, only
insofar as the most awesome of beings [sc. the There] comes-to-pass,
insofar as [the There] as history comes-to-presence. 5 4

History itself is first opened up, therefore begins, when the There
forces Being into open-ness, so that it is as history that Being
first emerges into presence in and through its There.55
4. To be the There of Being is the essence of man.
Up to now, we have spoken only of the There of , Being and of
the There-being, without calling it man. The reason should be
clear enough: we wish to avoid as much as possible an anthropological conception of this phenomenon, growing gradually into
what for Heidegger is a meta-physical interpretation of what is
most profoundly proper to man.56 We must see, however, how
Heidegger conceives here the relation between the two.
That the correlation is intimate is again quite clear, for the
author speaks innumerable times of the "human There-being"
and the "There-being of man," sometimes even simply of "man,"
when the context warrants 'There-being/' as we for the most
EM, pp. 83 (Irre), 120 (Unwesen), 123 (hin und her, cf. WW, pp. 22, 23).
V. g. EM, pp. 64, 157.
54 " . . . Das wechselweise Gegenüber ist. Es ist nur, insofern das Unheimlichste,
das Menschsein, geschieht, indem der Mensch als Geschichte west." (EM, p. 123).
See p. 130. Heidegger's italics.
55 EM, pp. 130 (So ist Geschichte), 125 (Als Geschichte), 153-154 (Grundgeschehnis, geschichtliches Dasein).
56 EM, p. 107.
52

53
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part have translated it. The most explicit formulation of this
comes in the concluding summary: " . . . man is the There whose
nature is to be open. . . . " 57 Yet once more it would be excessive
to identify There-being and man without reserve. For to be There
is not simply a property that man possesses but rather a comingto-pass that possesses him, in which he appears and enters into
history (comes-to-be), wherein he finds himself and which
grounds his essence. That is why man may be said to "stand" in
There-being and thereby, as we can see in the case of Parmenides
and Heraclitus, to stand in the Being of beings, for it is in the
There that the Being of beings is disclosed.58 What distinguishes
man, then, is his relation to Being. More exactly, " . . . the
essence of man manifests itself here as that relation which first
opens up Being to man. . . . " 59 and can be characterized only
in terms of Being as it comes to manifestation in its There. This
relation to Being is what we have seen already as the seizure of
Being which constitutes man's ontological structure, sc. Iiis
comprehension of Being, by reason of which in the midst of
beings he comprehends, sc. discloses, their Being and can enter
into commerce with them as beings. It is his transcendence (eksistence) " . . . by reason of which beings disclose themselves as
such, insofar as man penetrates into them. . . . " 60
It becomes clear, then, that the distinctive feature of man is
the uniqueness of his appurtenance to Being: a profoundly Greek
conception, Heidegger claims, of man. When philosophy comes
to define man as "rational animal," it is already a sign of decline.
When all is said and done, this definition is a zoological one. Man
is animal like the rest, but better than all others because equipped
with the faculty of reason. The originating sense of X6yos, however, is not "reason" but "gathering-together into collectedness"
the emergent power of Being. The proper definition of man,
then, understands cpuau; as
äv&pa)7rov £x<ov, sc. " . . . Being,
97 " . . . Der Mensch ist das in sich offene Da
" (EM, p. 156).
** EM, pp. xo8 (zum Sein kommt), 120 (er fand sich), 134. (Menschsein gründet),
64 (in Dasein steht), 104 (stehen im Sein des Seienden), xxof 256 (sich ihm eröffnet).
1 9 " . . . Das Menschen«**«» zeigt sich hier als der Bezug, der dem Menschen erst
das Sein eröffnet
" (EM, p. 130). Heidegger's italics. Of course, we understand
wesen here verbally.
" . . . kraft deren das Seiende sich als ein solches erschließt, indem der Mensch
in dieses einrückt
" (EM, p. 120). See EM, pp. 106 (Eigenheit), 63-65 (Verstehen),
34 (sich verhält).
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the over-powering process of appearing, makes necessary [a
place where it is] gathered together, [a place] which possesses
within it the Being of man [and thereby] grounds it." 6 1
But if it is this appurtenance to Being which grounds the
essence of man, how are we to conceive his self-hood? It must
be understood in the same terms. " . . . The self-hood of man
means this: his task is to transform into history the Being which
opens itself up to him and thus bring himself to stand [on his
own as a being]. . . . " 62 In other words, self-hood consists in
achieving transcendence, whose ultimate meaning is time, therefore history. Now the Being which opens itself to man is not
simply his own Being but the Being of beings as such. This is
underlined in a remark inserted into the text dating from its
final redaction (1953), where in language reminiscent of SZ he
describes the There as " . . . concern for the Being that is ecstatically disclosed in this concern - for the Being of beings as such,
not simply of the human being. . . . " 63 There-being is constituted as itself, therefore as a self, simply by this structural relation to Being as such (Bezug zum Sein).
What of the individual ego? or, for that matter, of the community of men? (for several times the author suggests that
There-being belongs to a whole people). We are told quite clearly
that the self-hood of the There is not primarily an "I," any more
than it is a "we" (community), and, in explaining (1953) the
"mine-ness" of SZ, Heidegger says that it is not be understood
as if restricted to an individual.64 Who, then, is There? Is it
some third estate that is neither singular nor plural? Or is Heidegger simply insisting on the fact that the ground of man's
essence is prior to all consciousness, whether it says " I " or
"we"? No explicit answer is forthcoming in EM. We must be
61 " . . . <pu<yu; — X6f<>c Äv6pü)7rov &x<av: das Sein, das überwältigende Erscheinen,
ernötigt die Sammlung, die das Menschsein (acc.) innehat und gründet." (EM, p.
Z34)> See pp. zo6 (Zugehörigkeit), xx6 (griechische Definition), xo8 (zoologische), 129
(Sichsammeln).
t s " . . . Die Selbstheit des Menschen besagt dieses: das Sein, das sich ihm eröffnet,
hat er in der Geschichte zu verwandeln und sich darin zum Stand zu bringen...."
(EM, p. ixo).
68 " . . . Dasein aber heißt: Sorge des in ihr ekstatisch erschlossenen Seins des
Seienden als solchen, nicht nur des menschlichen Seins
" (EM, p. 22).
M EM, pp. 33, and passim (Dasein eines wissenden Volkes), xxo (Einzelner), 22
(je meines). Cf. a similar remark in the Nietzsche course of X937, N, I, pp. 273-376.
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patient. But the question is not gratuitous, for we must know
who it is that is to think Being.
We must content ourselves for the present with what is
certain, sc. that the There is the coming-to-pass of truth that is
to be achieved in man and by him. His concern for the Being of
beings is such that he is to transform it into history by assuming
it of his own accord.65 But what precisely does it mean for man
to assume his There, or for the There to assume Being? How is
it brought about ? By original thought!
C.

NATURE

OF

THOUGHT

Up to now, in examining the relation between Being and
thought, we have focused our attention on voelv, interpreting it
to mean that process of receptive containment by reason of
which qptSat^ is forced into the Open in a place of disclosure. In
a word, it is the coming-to-pass of the There of Being, of the
There-being, which grounds the essence of man, which it is his
task to assume (übernehmen) and thereby bring to full, if finite,
achievement. It is the achieving of There-being, then, which is
the coming-to-pass of thought (voslv). We wish now to explore
the implications of this, determining first of all, however, in
what way Xeyetv corresponds to voetv; we conclude the section with
an enumeration of the methods by which such thought can be
brought-to-pass.
I. Thought as Xoyog
In the discussion of Being, we have seen already how \6yo<; is
to be interpreted as a gathering-together, implying both collecting and collected-ness. The author identifies it purely and
simply with <puox<;. So intimately are the two intertwined that
the question arises as to how they could be separated, so that
'koyoc; could be conceived as distinct from and opposed to <pucri<;.
The differentiation, he concludes, must be as original as the
identity.66
The solution appears when Xoyo<; is identified with voetv, which,
85
88

EM, pp. 34, 84, 119, 130, 132, 133, etc. (Übernahme).
EM, p. 103.
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recall, is necessary for the sake of Being, in order that it be able
to emerge from concealment. Even for Parmenides, for whom
Xoyot; plays far less significant a role than for Heraclitus, Xeyeiv
" . . . is named along with voeiv as a coming-to-pass of the same
character. . . . " 67 It signifies, therefore, that " . . . force that is
brought to bear upon Being by reason of which Being in its
gathered-ness is gathered-together. . 8 8 Now to gather-together means to bring into some type of unity what was scattered.
What is considered scattered in this case is the dispersion of the
in-constant and the confounding wiles of seeming-to-be. To
gather Being together, then, is to bring beings into constancy
and let them stand forth as beings, sc. as what they are and not
merely what they seem to be. This is the function of Xoyo^, as
also of voetv. If they are to be distinguished at all, then we are to
see Xoyoc as the more primary of the two, giving to voetv its cohesive power. However that may be, it is this function that
grounds the essence of man, constituting him as fundamentally
es-tranged from all the beings confounded with seeming-to-be
that make up his everyday world.69 So it is, then, that " . . . the
Being of man is in its very essence . . . Xoyoc, the [process of]
gathering-together and receptively concentrating the Being of
beings. . . 7 0 As the collect-or of Being, " . . . he assumes and
brings to its achievement [his] stewardship over the dominating
might of the Over-powering/1 a task which consists in openingup a domain of non-concealment for beings by forcing Being
into disclosure, thus permitting it to be itself. 71
2. XoyoQ as De-cision
To gather-together Being into disclosure means to illuminate
Being, sc. what beings are amid what they merely seem-to-be.
67 " . . . Mit der Vernehmung ist das X^yetv genannt als Geschehnis desselben
Charakters. .
(EM, p. 129).
68 " . . . muß in eins mit der Vernehmung jene (menschliche) Gewalt-tat meinen,
kraft deren das Sein in seiner Gesammeltheit gesammelt wird....*' (EM, p. 129).
Writer's italics.
69 EM, p. 129. Cf. SZ, p. 36, on function of phenomenology.
70 " . . . Das Menschsein ist nach seinem geschichtlichen, Geschichte eröffnenden
Wesen Logos, Sammlung und Vernehmung des Seins des Seienden:..." (EM, p.
131). Heidegger's italics.
7 1 " . . . E r übernimmt und vollbringt die Verwaltung des Waltcns des Überwältigenden." (EM, p. 132). See pp. 145 (Eröffnens der Unverborgenheit), 135 (für
dieses).
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The coming-topass of truth comports with it inevitably this
struggle vs. seeming-to-be. It is by this struggle that the aboriginal Discord is sustained in history as history.72 The struggle
consists fundamentally in distinguishing Being amid seemingto-be, hence in making a scission (Scheidung) between them. It
is, then, "de-cision" (.Entscheidung).73 How exactly describe it?
Let us distinguish three components by resorting to the figure
that the author takes from Parmenides (Fragments 4, 6) of three
paths that the thinker must follow: the path unto Being, the
path unto Non-being (Nichtsein), the path unto seeming-to-be.
a. P A T H U N T O B E I N G - Heidegger does not explain this
beyond saying: that it is the way unto non-concealment; that
it cannot be by-passed.74 We interpret this to mean that this
path represents the radical relation to Being that constitutes
tiie There, sc. makes the process of There-being to be what it is,
the coming-to-pass of truth. It is unavoidable, simply because
it is the ground of man's essence, and even if it be forgotten,
nevertheless it is this alone that enables man to enter into comportment with beings as beings in the first place.
b. P A T H U N T O N O N - B E I N G - This path, as Heidegger
reads Parmenides, is inaccessible but must be recognized as inaccessible, and, indeed, precisely because it does lead to Nonbeing.76 We interpret this to mean: Non-being is inaccessible to
the ordinary processes of thought as they function in science, for
these are always concerned with beings, sc. with precisely what
Non-being is not; Non-being can be discerned, however, by
There-being and meditated in itself as inaccessible to logical
thought because it is Non-being; the true thinker, therefore,
must make the poignant experience of Non-being.76
EM, pp. iz6, 146 (Kampf, Erstreitung), 47 (getragen), 135 (Als Geschichte).
EM, pp. 84-88, 128.
7« EM, p. 84.
7 1 EM, p. 85. The reading Nichtsein is slightly disconcerting, but the immediate
context which identifies it with Nichts and a parallel passage (EM, p. 18) which
takes Nichts clearly in the sense that it had in WM (Nicht-Seiendes) make the
author's intention clear. That he writes Nichtsein might be explained by the fact
that when he conceives Being as 9601^, he is clearly conceiving it as the Being of
beings. What does not come-to-presence (Nicht-Seiendes) is therefore
Nichtsein.
7 * EM, pp. 19-20 {unwissenschaftlich}, x8 (nicht Erkenntnis des Seienden), 2x4115 (Angst, Scheu), 86 (Schrecken).
71
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c. P A T H U N T O S E E M I N G - T O - B E - This path is, indeed,
accessible to man, so much so that he may lose himself on it
completely; his task is to recognize it for what it is, sc. to realize
that seeming-to-be is a correlative of Being.77 We interpret this
to mean: Being, as the process of emerging into non-concealment
in its There, is insuperably finite, therefore negatived, therefore
a non-emerging, or concealment, at the same time that it is a
revelation; this law of concealment affects different beings differently - the beings with which There-being deals (so that they
are hidden as much as they are manifested and therefore seemto-be what they are not) and There-being itself (whose special
prerogative is first of all and for the most part hidden from itself
in its everydayness, so that There-being seems to be what it is
not, a being no different from the rest) - but it is the same law
of concealment, sc. of finitude, that pervades both; it is this law
of finitude that accounts for seeming-to-be, and it is because
Being as emergent Power is finite that seeming-to-be is a necessary correlative of Being; to experience seeming-to-be as such
is to recognize this correlation of Being and seeming-to-be as
necessary and inevitable, sc. to comprehend Being as finite; the
true man of thought must achieve this comprehension, " . . . in
order that amid seeming-to-be and despite [it], Being may be
revealed"; 78 the thinker, then, is he who " . . . has assumed the
way of seeming-to-be as an abiding necessity [of Being]." 79
This, then, is de-cision (.Entscheidung), not a judgement or
arbitrary choice that man may make, " . . . but a scission in the
forementioned complex of Being, non-concealment, seeming-tobe and Non-being." 80 Let us note at once that it was de-cision
of this nature that the early Greeks understood to be the process
of thinking. " . . . The opening-up and fashioning of these three
paths is the process of thinking at the beginning of philosophy. . . . " si
EM, pp. 85-86 (zugehörig).
" . . . damit im Schein und gegen den Schein das Sein sich enthülle." (EM, p. 86).
79 " . . . der jedoch den dritten Weg, den des Scheins, als ständige Not übernommen hat." (EM, p. 86).
80 " ( . . . sondern eine Scheidung im genannten Zusammen von Sein, Unverborgenheit, Schein und Nichtsein)." (EM, p. 84).
81 " . . . Das Eröffnen und Bahnen der drei Wege ist das Denken im Anfang der
Philosophie
" (EM, p. 84).
77

78
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More precisely, how does de-cision come about? Not without
some violence, to be sure. There-being must be delivered from
the entanglement of everydayness, dislodged from its normal
habitat amid what is most close and most ordinary, wrested
from the habitual compulsion of its preoccupation with beings.
Briefly: it must be liberated from the consequences of congenital
de-cadence. This does not mean, of course, that the There is
delivered from all commerce with beings, but only that it recognizes its self for what it is; its normal habitat with beings is disclosed as such. Simultaneously, the Over-powering is disclosed
as such; the whole ensemble of beings as such is opened-up; nonconcealment comes-to-pass by reason of that awesomely-strange
process of There.82
Yet for all the luminosity that de-cision brings-to-pass, it remains itself finite, bound by the inexorable law of seeming-tobe. The There simply cannot overpower the Over-powering; it
cannot force Being to manifest itself exhaustively; the place of
disclosure remains "closed-up" by its finitude, sc. permeated
through and through by concealment. And There-being achieves
the ultimate refinement of de-cision when it comprehends its
own Being as finite. If this calls for a certain courage, the truth
is that it is There-being's supreme acknowledgement of what it
is. It simply says "amen" to the overwhelming might of the
Over-powering, not because of any sense of inferiority but
simply because There-being accedes to the fact that this is the
manner in which the Being of beings is disclosed.83
There is one portentous consequence to this, however. For
There-being to consent to its own finitude is to consent to the
negation of itself, yielding to the necessity of ceasing to be the
There of Being. This potentiality of ceasing to be the There of
Being does not face There-being for the first time at the moment
of its dissolution, but There-being is this potentiality from the
very first moment, because ultimate dissolution is simply the
consummation of finitude. The There as a coming-to-pass is
simultaneously a coming-to-end; in terms of man, whose essence
There-being grounds, it is Being-unto-death, and the reason is
9 * EM, pp. 128-129 {Ausrucken, abgerungen), 130 (Freiheit der Übernahme),
127 (Unheimlichkeit).
M EM, pp. 135 (Anerkennung), 125 (Ja zum Überwältigenden).
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that " . . . There-being . . . must . . . be broken to pieces on
Being," because There is irredeemably finite.84 To comprehend
this and to consent to it is the crowning moment of There-being's
luminosity, the transparence to itself of a There whose whole
essence is to be in contention with Being. "The supreme triumph
over Being is to cease to be There. . . . " 85
3. De-cision as Re-solve
Such, then, is de-cision. It is for There-being, in complete
transparency to itself, to consent to be what it is: the There of
Being which is consummately finite. But is not this exactly what
SZ called the achievement of authenticity as brought to pass by
re-solve ? De-cision and re-solve are one!
To re-solve is to will; it is to choose authenticity; it is for
There-being to let itself be its self; it is to become free for the
exigencies of what it is; it is to will its own congenital freedom
by which it is There and to will it as finite; it is There-being's
willingness to be open-unto-Being to the very limit of its power.
.. Who wills, . . . he is re-solved. . . . " 86 To forestall any
misconception, Heidegger adds to the original text (1935) an
editorial remark (1953): " . . . the essence of re-solve lies in the
non-concealment of the human There-being for the illumination
of Being . . . , " 87 hence in There-being's acceptance of its relation
to Being already characterized as freedom, letting-be.
But in the concrete, how does There-being go about this
willing of its own .(finite) open-ness to Being? By willing (not
merely wishing) to know (Wissen-wollen). Knowing for Heidegger,
however, has as radical a sense as thinking. We have met already
this term in discussing his interpretation of T^XYTJ, which he
translates as "knowing." It means the power of setting-to-work
(disclosing) the Being of beings, of standing within the revelation of beings.88 If re-solve is There-being's willing of its own
84 " . . . Das Dasein . . . muß in aller Gewalt-tat am Sein doch zerbrechen." (EM,
P> 135).
86 "Nicht-dasein ist der höchste Sieg über das S e i n . . ( E M , p. 136).
86 " . . . Wer will, . . . der ist entschlossen
" (EM, p. 16). Heidegger's italics.
87 " . . . Aber das Wesen der Ent-schlossenheit liegt in der Ent-borgenheit des
menschlichen Daseins für die Lichtung des Seins. . . . " (EM, p. 16). Heidegger's
italics.
88 EM, pp. X22 (T^XV))» 1 6 (in d e r Wahrheit stehen können).
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(finite) open-ness to Being, then it is a willing to stand within
the revelation of the Being of beings; it is willing-to-know (Wissen-wolien). To will-to-know, however, is to question. " . . . To
question is the forementioned willing-to-know: re-solve unto the
power of standing within the revelation of beings. . . . " 89 Resolve is accomplished, then, by asking a question. But what
question? At this point, we move into another problem, which
concerns itself not so much with the nature of thinking as with
its method.
4. Methods of Thinking
a. I N T E R R O G A T I O N - De-cision, re-solve and, therefore,
thought are brought about by the posing of a question. It can
arise under different circumstances, but it is always the same.
It is the question which gives warrant to the entire book: "why
are there beings at all and not much rather Non-being?" This
is the first of all questions - not, to be sure, in time but in importance (the broadest, deepest, most original question of all) so comprehensive that it even questions itself, sc. why (ask)
"why?" (for the question itself is a being). For Heidegger, the
posing of the question is the proper function of philosophy.90
Now upon analysis, this question really asks why it is that a
being is rather than that it not be at all, hence the fundamental meaning is: what about the Being of beings? Such a
question forces us into the Open, sc. opens-up and maintains
open the total ensemble of beings as such, sc. in their Being, indeed even in their instability that wavers between what they
are and what they are not (Nichtsein und Sein). By questioning,
There-being's comprehension of Being is delivered from its fallen
condition of everydayness, sc. from the consequences of its finitude, the chief of which lies in having forgotten Being.91
The question, however, is an eminently historical one, for "the
posing of this question and its de-cision . . . are the essence of
" . . . Fragen ist das oben erläuterte Wissen-wollen: die Ent-schlossenheit zum
Stehenkönnen in der Offenbarkeit des Seienden...." (EM, p. 17).
90 EM, pp. 1 (verborgenen Macht), 2-5 (Rang), 4 (Warum das Warum [cf. WM,
p. 41]), 10 (Philosophieren).
9 1 EM, pp. 23 (Schwanken), 63 (Verborgenheit).
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history." 92 It is only when Being opens itself up through
this question that history comes-to-pass. This will be evident
when we recall that history, as time itself (of which it is but an
explicitation), is the coming of Being (future) to a self that already-is-as-having-been (past), thus rendering present (present)
as beings the beings with which it deals. Now the posing of the
Being-question is this very process:
. . . for it opens up the coming-to-pass of the human There-being in its
essential relationship, sc. to beings-as-such-in-the-ensemble, according
to its uninterrogated potentialities, [sc.] those which are still comingto-be. . . .

[We interpret: The Being-question brings into the Open eksistent There-being's open-ness to the Being of beings with which
it continues to deal, and therefore whose Being continues to be
disclosed, sc. to come (future) to There-being through the continual interrogation.]
. . . Thereby [the interrogation] immediately conjoins
again with its own origin that still-is-as-having-been, . . .

[There-being]

[We interpret: The origin of the There, of philosophy and of
history took place with There-being's initial de-cision in the
form of an interrogation of the Being of beings; it is by reason
of this beginning that There-being is what it is, therefore is what
it has been, therefore is as having begun to interrogate beings;
to pose the question now is to assume itself as what it has been,
as what it is-as-having-been (the past); this is the genuine sense
of the assuming of the self in order to achieve the self as what it
is, sc. the There of Being.]
. . . and thus makes more incisive and more grave its [comprehension of
Being in the] present.93

[We interpret: It is because There-being guards its open-ness
to Being (future) by continually assuming the open-ness to
92 "Das Fragen dieser Frage und ihre Entscheidung ist geschichtlich, nicht nur
überhaupt, sondern das Wesen der Geschichte." (EM, p. 107). See pp. 33, 109.
93 "Unser Fragen der metaphysischen Grundfrage ist geschichtlich, weil es das
Geschehen des menschlichen Paseins in seinen wesentlichen Bezügen, d. h. zum Seienden als solchem im Ganzen, nach ungefragten Möglichkeiten, Zu-künften eröffnet
und damit zugleich in seinen gewesenen Anfang zurückbindet und es so in seiner
Gegenwart verschärft und erschwert
" (EM, p. 34). For the full sense of "grave,"
sc. where There-being gives to beings their full "weight'1 or "gravity" (Gewicht),
their Being, see EM, p. 9.
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Being which has made it what it is (past) that its comprehension
of the Being of beings with which it deals (present) is all the
more luminous.]
Evidently, the Being-question is an historical one in the
deepest possible sense. It will be clear, too, that in this process
of assuming the self, the return of There-being to its own origin
plays a central role. This is exactly what is meant by the process
of re-trieve. "To ask: how about Being?, this means nothing less
than to re-trieve the origin of our historico-spiritual There-being
in order to transform it into another origin. . . . " 94 This is, indeed, possible, not insofar as we simply re-iterate what we know
already about Being, but " . . . insofar as the origin originates
all over again more originally [than before], and, indeed, with
all the bewilderment, obscurity and insecurity that genuine
origination comports. . . . " 95 It is just such a "more original"
beginning that Heidegger himself seeks. This explains why the
major part of the present work attempts to make again with a
new profundity the experience of Parmenides, Heraclitus, and,
for a reason we shall see soon, Sophocles. It is all re-trieve: historical interrogation, de-cision, re-solve, thought.
The words "more originally" should be underlined. The
meaning is that re-trieve seeks to get closer to the source from
which the first beginning arose, sc. the concealment of Being.
Only insofar as There-being continually seeks new light on the
Being of beings, can it conserve its beginning - mute testimony
to its own ecstatic nature. This has an important consequence:
it suggests again why every interpretation, whether of a philosopher, a poet, or even of a word, must do violence to the original.
It must throw light on what is "no longer present in words" and
yet somehow or other uttered. This is simply to repeat in different context what was said about There-being itself: it does
violence to the Over-powering and forces it into open-ness, so
that what was unexpressed, or even un-thought, in the initial

94 "Fragen: Wie steht es um das Sein? - das besagt nichts Geringeres als den
Anfang unseres geschiehUich-geistigen Daseins wieder-holen, um ihn in den anderen
Anfang zu v e r w a n d e l n . . ( E M , p. 29). Heidegger's italics.
9 5 " . . . sondern indem der Anfang ursprünglicher wiederangefangen wird und zwar
mit all dem Befremdlichen, Dunklen, Ungesicherten, das ein wahrhafter Anfang bei
sich führt
" (EM, pp. 29-30). Heidegger's italics. See pp. 96, 111.
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text (and therefore did not appear) is brought to light by retrieve.98
Of course, re-trieve, like There-being itself, is subject to the
consequences of finitude, just as every origin (the self-disclosure
of Being) contains within itself its own end (Sichverbergen).
Hence the necessity of continually renewed re-trieve. This, too,
is the fundamental reason why the question about the essence
of man, sc. about the process of There-being, inseparable from
the Being-question itself, never can be answered. It is and remains essentially a question.
So it is that the fundamental way in which There-being brings
about de-cision (re-solve), which is, after all, the achievement of
the self, is by posing indefatigably the Being-question. For resolve is willing-to-know, and the "passion for knowing" lies in
questioning. That is why the author may say that the Therebeing comes to itself and is a self only insofar as it poses the
Being-question, and why the Being-question is " . . . a hidden
ground of our historical There-being. . . . " 97 Yet even here we
must not forget that the spontaneity that opens itself in question
does not find its ultimate ground in There-being. The primacy
belongs uniquely and exclusively to Being. " . . . Only where
Being opens itself up through questioning does history come-topass, and with it that Being of man by reason of which he ventures
to enter into contention with beings as such." 98 It is Being,
then, not There-being, that is the grounding process. It is
" . . . above all on this ground that historical There-being is conserved in the midst of the total ensemble of beings that is
opened-up." 99
b. A N A L Y S I S OF L A N G U A G E - Clearly for Heidegger the
fundamental method of thinking is to question, sc. to question
M EM, pp. h i , 145-146 (Verborgenheit, sich verbirgt), 124 (doch gesagt), 47
(Ungesagte, Un-gedacht), 145-146 (bewahren), 107, 109 (a*® Antwort).
• 7 " . . . ein verborgener Grund unseres geschichtlichen Daseins
" (EM, p. 71).
See pp. 122 (Leidenschaft des Wissens), 1x0 (zu ihm selbst).
8
• "Nur wo das Sein sich im Fragen eröffnet, geschieht Geschichte und damit
jenes Sein des Menschen, kraft dessen er sich in die Auseinandersetzung mit dem
Seienden als einem solchen wagt." (EM, p. 109). Heidegger's italics. See pp. 9-10
(Philosophie mit uns anfängt).
89 " . . . Sein ist das Grundgeschehnis, auf dessen Grunde überhaupt erst geschichtliches Dasein inmitten des eröffneten Seienden im Ganzen gewährt ist."
(EM, pp. 153-154). Writer's italics.
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the meaning of Being. All other "methods" are but variations
of the same theme. We wish now to mention one modality which
will play an important role in the subsequent Heidegger, even
though reductively but a form of questioning: the analysis of
language. That there is a profound relationship between the
interrogation of Being and the origin of language will appear
from an oblique remark in the opening chapter to the effect that
the posing of the Being-question is a serious effort "to bring
Being into word/' 1 0 0 How is this to be understood?
Recall that the term XoyoQ, though conventionally translated
"word" or "speech," is for Heidegger "collection" or "gatheringtogether." The author's problem is to show how Xoyo<;-"collection" is transformed into Xoyog-"speech." Discussing Xoyo<;collection, we distinguished gathered-together-ness, sc. Being,
and the process-of-gathering, sc. There-being as acceptive containment (VOSLV) that forces Being into disclosure. Now this
process of the There, which as Xoyo<; discloses the Being of a being,
expresses that being (in its Being) as a word. " A word, the
forming of a name . . . [establishes] in its Being a being that is
opening itself up and preserves it in this open-ness, constriction
and constancy. . . . " 1 0 1 The giving of a name (Nennen), then, is
not something subsequent to the discovery of a being and
therefore a purely arbitrary procedure which fashions a "conventional sign," but is itself formed in and as the very process
of discovery. " . . . In original utterance, the Being of a being,
in [all] its original collectedness, is opened-up . . . " 1 0 2 Note that
the original word that expresses a being, sc. its name, not only
is integral to the process of discovery but preserves the being
in its discovered open-ness. " . . . In words, in language, things
become and are. . . . " 1 0 3
So profoundly are the emergence of Being and the origin of
language identified that, under the impossible supposition that
EM, p. 31 (zum Wort zu bringen).
"Das Wort, das Nennen stellt das sich eröffnende Seiende aus dem unmittelbaren überwältigenden Andrang in sein Sein zurück und bewahrt es in dieser Offenheit, Umgrenzung und Ständigkeit
" (EM, p. 131).
102 " . . . Im ursprünglichen Sagen wird das Sein des Seienden im Gefüge seiner
Gesammeltheit e r ö f f n e t . . ( E M , p. 131).
108 " . . . Im Wort, in der Sprache werden und sind erst die D i n g e . . ( E M , p.
11). See WD, p. 85. We translate the various Heideggerean terms thus: Sagen as
"uttering," "utterance"; Sprache as "language"; Rede as "speech"; Gerede as
"loquacity"; Nennen as "to give (form) a name (word)."
100
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Being had no meaning and There-being had no comprehension
of it, the result would not simply be one less word in our language
but no language at all. For words and language name beings as
beings in what they are, and unless Being had a meaning that
opened itself up in and through language, it would be impossible
for language to achieve its task. Likewise, unless There-being
comprehended beings as beings and therefore their Being, it
would be impossible for There-being to address beings or discuss
them at all. The converse is also true: unless There-being had the
power of speech, all beings as beings would remain closed to it. 104
Language takes its origin, then, along with the irruption of
There-being, for in this irruption language is simply Being
itself formed into word. It follows that in the rise of language, as
in the emergence of the There itself, Being retains its primacy.
Language, as the Over-powering itself, is a might within which
the There finds itself, that dominates the There through and
through and must be subdued by it. 105
It follows, too, that language will be subject to the same law
of finitude, sc. of seeming-to-be, as Being and its There. From
the point of view of Being, the dominating power of aboriginal
Language is disclosed to There-being only in its non-essence, sc.
in a coming-to-presence (-wesen) that is profoundly negatived
(Un-) by finitude, i.e. the concealment of itself as dominating.
The result is that language will seem to be at the disposition of
There-being, when actually the reverse is true. There-being will
seem to have invented language by itself, when the fact is that
it has discovered itself only in and with language, for language
transfuses There-being. From the point of view of There-being:
the language of There-being is only a finite containment of the
Over-powering; original utterance is contaminated by negativity
that covers Being up at the same time that it dis-covers it, and
therefore is irresistibly drawn to the inauthentic condition of
mere loquacity. There-being's task is to walk the path of
seeming-to-be and, by de-cision in its use of language, to find its
way to authenticity.106
EM, pp. 62-63.
EM, pp. 131 (Wortwerden des Seins), 120 (erfand sich).
106 EM, pp. 120 (Durchwaltende), 67 (Sagen des Seins), 132 (Gerede), 132-133
(Ent-scheiden).
104

105
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But the speech (Rede) of There-being in everyday living can
come to the truth that is proper to it only when talking and
listening are orientated toward the X6yo; out of which, as the
gathered-ness of Being, language first springs. " . . . Xoyo; is the
determinative criterion of the essence of speech . . . " 107 This
orientation is called, in connection with the interpretation of
Heraclitus, "attending" to Xoyo<;.
Heraclitus, the author claims, distinguishes between "attending" (Hören) 108 and a mere "listening" (blossen Hören, Herumhören) to words. Genuine attending has nothing to do with
the listening or talking of ordinary everydayness but signifies
. . docility toward that which is Xoyos: the gathered-togetherness of beings themselves, . . 1 0 9 Talking and listening are
authentic only when there has been an antecedent attending to
Being; and it is only when Being has disclosed itself that verbal
sounds become a word. If anyone cannot grasp Being, he is
" . . . incapable of enabling his own There-being to take its stand
in the Being of beings . . . , " 1 1 0 sc. cannot authentically achieve
itself as the There. Only those who can do so are really masters
of the word. These are the poets and the thinkers. 111
The essential here is: X6yo<; (Being) is a coming-into-the-Open
that can and must be attended to; it is only by attending to,
therefore docility toward, X6yo; that the There-being can be
authentically itself as the There of Being (X6yo<;); it is only this
docility to X6yo<; that grounds the authentic use of words; the
true poets and the true thinkers achieve this docility. Note in
passing that in this conception of attending to X6yo<; through
107 " . . . Darum wird der Logos die maßgebende Wesensbestimmung der Rede.
. . ( E M , p. 141).
1 9 9 We translate thus because of the nuances in English which suit the fundamental intention welL T o begin with, the etymology (Lat. ad-Undere, "to stretch forward")
suggests the ec-static nature of the phenomenon. Possible English senses of the
intransitive use: " t o apply the mind," "to pay attention/' "to listen*' (v. g. "attend
to these directions"); "to apply oneself' (v. g. "attend to business"); "to take charge
of, or look after" (v. g. "I'll attend to it"); "to be ready for service, to wait" (v. g.
"to attend upon the committee"). All of these nuances suit our purpose admirably
and are perfectly congruous with the concept of man as the "shepherd" of Being
(Hirt des Seins).
108 " . . . Folge leisten gegenüber dem, was der X6yo? ist: die Gesammeltheit des
Seienden selbst..(EM,
p. 99). Heidegger's italics.
1 1 0 " . . . Sie vermögen ihr Dasein nicht zum Stehen zu bringen im Sein des Seienden...." (EM, p. xox). Ibid. (Wortlaut).
U 1 EM, pp. 13z, 141 (Verwahrt).
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talking-listening, we have all the elements of what will appear
later as "dialogue" (Gespräch).
There are two major consequences to draw from what we see
here about the origin of language. In the first place, since
language comes-to-presence along with the disclosure of beings
and preserves in itself this disclosure, then There-being, by
properly discerning the original sense of words, may interrogate
Being itself, sc. that which renders possible all disclosure. This
Heidegger does in EM by examining the sense of " i s " ; 1 1 2 this
will become more and more characteristic of his method as he
unfolds after 1935. We should keep clear from the very beginning: that there is never a question of engaging in mere philology for its own sake from the "scientific" point of view; that
the process is an effort to re-trieve the primal freshness of
language "more originally" than before; that therefore a certain
violence is necessary in the interpretation of the meaning of
words in order that it be an interpretation, sc. a de-cision (resolve) that brings language from the ineluctable concealment of
everyday de-cadence.113 Secondly, if language in its essence is
the coming-of-Being-into-words, There-being's primal orchestration of these words enjoys a privileged affinity with Being.
This orchestration Heidegger calls a "primordial poetizing" (ZJrdichtung), whereby a whole people captures Being in song. This
is the wellspring of poetry. It is the first great utterances of
poetry that give a language its initial cast. For the Greeks, this
original experience of Being in language came-to-pass through
the poetry of Homer. 114
We shall not pause here to remark the reappearance in this
context of a familiar problem: what is the relation between
Homer (presumably an individual) and the whole Greek people
(a plurality) in the coming-to-pass of the There which first gave
rise to the language of the Greeks? Let us simply note: that
since the language of a genuine poet discloses Being as authentically as the writings (therefore language) of a genuine thinker,
then poetry is as legitimate a domain for the interrogation of
Being as philosophy; that henceforth the poets whom Heideg118

v. g. EM, pp. 67-70.

EM, pp. 124 (wissenschaftliche Interpretation), x20-121 (Gewalt).
" « EM, p. i 3 x .
118
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ger considers authentic (v.g. Pindar, Sophocles, Homer, Hölderlin, etc.) have as much authority for him as the great thinkers
(v.g. Parmenides, Heraclitus, etc.); that this explains why it was
possible for us to glean the data of the foregoing research without distinguishing whether or not they came from poets or philosophers; that we find affirmed here clearly the close affinity
between philosophy and poetry, and the problem from now on
is to see how they are distinguished; that we understand long
before they appear that the interpretations of the poets in general and of Hölderlin in particular pretend no more to be literary
criticism than the etymologies pretend to be scientific philology:
both are profoundly philosophical efforts to re-trieve the aboriginal questioning of the Being of beings with which philosophy
began.

Resume
With EM, Heidegger II has taken full possession. To be sure,
he is as much concerned about grounding metaphysics as ever
(the title itself makes this clear), but if the essential elements of
SZ are still unmistakable (structure of There-being: transcendence, finitude, temporality), the accent is different, for
now Being maintains the primacy over There. To think Being
thus conceived is to bring-to-pass what the early Greeks meant
by X6YOC; and voeiv.
The There is opposed to Being, but is not separated from it in
subject-object fashion. Its function is to gather into concentration the overwhelming power of Being and thus contain (voetv)
its dynamic advance in such a way as to force it into the disclosure through which the non-concealment (truth) of beings
comes-to-pass. The whole process is permeated with negativity,
whether we consider this negativity in terms of Being (as comporting a seeming-to-be) or of There-being (the finite There of
finite Being, sc. Being-unto-death), and, in forcing Being into
disclosure, There-being must let-be (manifest) the negativity as
well. With regard to beings, this will consist in wresting Being
from seeming-to-be; with regard to its self, it means freedomunto-death. That process may be called de-cision, re-solve,
willing-to-know or thought, but the structure is always the
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same: There-being assumes itself as the finite There of finite
Being - Being in its negativity.
But in all this we have been considering thought in its most
authentic form, sc. as it was in its origin when philosophy took
its origin. If philosophy no longer considers it in the same way,
the reason is that thought has been separated from its source
and has fallen into decline. As to how far this decline affects
Western man, perhaps Nietzsche is the best witness. How is the
situation to be ameliorated? " . . . The misunderstanding and
misuse of thought can be overcome only by a thought that is
genuine and original, and nothing else . . . 1 1 5 sc. by a thougnt
that is foundational. We have more here than a succinct
statement of the later section of EM. In these simple theses
Heidegger strikes the fundamental chords that through all of
Heidegger II unfold into full diapason.
We wish now to follow this development. As the same chords
return again and again, one will be tempted to say that it is
always the same old tune. But who will criticize a fugue of Bach
by saying that it is "nothing but the same old tune" ? " . . . Every
thinker thinks but a single thought. . . , " 1 1 6 we are told, and
the difficulty of his task lies in being faithful to this thought, in
finding adequate ways to express it. Some may find unsatisfying
this single thought that possesses Heidegger, but as we watch
him develop through the succeeding years, few will deny the
prodigious virtuosity with which he restates his theme.
The nature of the problem with which we now must deal
warrants a slight change in method in order to avoid tedious
repetitions. We propose to divide Part III of our study into two
sections: the first will deal with Heidegger's critique of thought
in its decline; the second will examine his own effort to re-trieve
a foundational thought. In Section A, we disregard the order of
composition and follow the order dictated by the history we are
meditating. All evidence points to the fact that since SZ there
has been no basic change in Heidegger's conception of the history
of metaphysics, beyond, perhaps, preciseness of expression. In
Section B, we return to the method we have followed thus far.
1 1 6 " . . . Die Mißdeutung
des Denkens und der Mißbrauch des mißdeuteten
Denkens können nur durch ein echtes und ursprüngliches Denken überwunden
werden und dutch nichts anderes. .
(EM, p. 93). Heidegger's italics.
1 1 6 " . . . Jeder Denker denkt nur einen einzigen G e d a n k e n . . . . "
(WD, p. 20).

PART

III

FROM BEING TO T H E R E

Section A
The De-volution of Thought

I sat upon the shore
Fishing, with the arid plain behind me.
T . S. Eliot, "The Waste Land"

CHAPTER

I

PLATO

For Heidegger, the de-volution of Western thought began with
Plato, for it was with him that voelv ceased to have the sense of
containing the advance of over-powering yuaic, and began to
assume the special relation to tSsa, which evolved into what the
tradition would call "reason" (Vernunft).1 We discern the transition best, however, by examining not Plato's use of voelv but
rather the implications of iSea, for it was thus that he understood
the Being which his predecessors had understood as «pueril It
was Plato's conception of Being rather than of thought which
was decisive in the birth of metaphysics. If we recall that <pi<yi<;
(emergent-abiding-Power) was for the pre-Socratics the process
of truth, then the transformation of <pticri<; into tSea may be discerned by examining what Plato understood by truth. This the
author disengages by an essay upon the famous metaphor of the
cave (Politeia VII, 514 a, 2 to 517 a, 7).
A.

TRUTH

AS

NON-CONCEALMENT

i. Metaphor
The details of the story are familiar. Socrates imagines with
Glaukon a situation with four successive moments:
a. World of shadows: A group of men dwell in a cave. Daylight
does not penetrate the long passage leading from the outside
1 Piatons
Lehre von der Wahrheit, mit einem Brief über den "Humanismus,"
and ed. (Bern: Francke, 1954). P- 35- (Hereafter PW).
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entrance and the only light comes from a fire kindled in the cave
itself. But the men themselves cannot see the fire, know nothing
of its existence. They are chained facing the rear wall, with no
freedom of movement even to turn their heads. All that they see
are shadows cast upon the wall by figures of various description
that move to and fro upon a small, wall-like proscenium in front
of the fire but behind the men. Invevitably the cave-dwellers
would take the shadows to be the only beings that are true, sc.
un-concealed.
b. World of fire: If one of the group were freed from his chains
and allowed to look at the forms which had cast the shadows,
the forms would seem so strange that the man would feel at first
that the shadows to which he had been habituated all his life
were more true (un-concealed) than the forms. If forced to look
directly into the fire, the pain of the unaccustomed light would
make him yearn for his shadows again, which would be, after all,
clearer to his feeble vision than a light which blinds.
c. World of sun: Socrates then postulates that a cave-dweller be
led up the long passage to daylight illumined by the sun. It
would take a period of adjustment before he could accept the
beings on earth, illumined by the sun, as genuinely true (un-concealed). It would take still longer - and a gradual pedagogy of
looking at the sun first in reflections (v.g. in water, etc.) - for
him to be able to look upon the sun itself and recognize it as the
source of all that he had experienced in the cave. But once the
adjustment had been made, he would be glad of his liberation
and prefer immeasurably the new experience to life in the cave.
d. World of shadows: Once he returned to the cave, readjustment
would be necessary, for the sudden darkness would leave the
cave-dweller's eyes incapable of seeing anything at all. He would
be a laughing stock to those he had left behind, who would jeer
that he left the cave only to return with worsened eyesight. They
would say it was pointless to go up into daylight and would kill
anyone who tried to free them. 2

2

PW, pp. 6-19 (Greek text and Heidegger's translation).
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2. Interpretation
Plato's own interpretation of the metaphor is clear enough.
The world of shadows is the world of everyday experience, whose
illumination comes from a fire enclosed within the cave itself.
The world of Ideas is the world of essences that are encountered
in daylight, themselves illumined by the sun, the supreme Idea.
The important point, however, and Heidegger insists upon it, is
not so much this parallelism as the passage from one sojourn to
another and the adjustment that is thereby made. This adjustment is what Plato calls 7uatSeta.3
Now Heidegger claims that, according to the first interpretation of the metaphor, uatSeta can be conceived as a schooling
in the nature of non-concealment. For in each of the four
moments of the narrative there is question of an open-ness in
that which comes to presence. In the first stage, that which is
open (un-concealed) to the cave-dweller is the shadows themselves.4 In the second stage, although the light of the fire should
make the parading figures more un-concealed, the fact is that it
so blinds the cave-dweller that the shadows still seem clearer to
him, sc. more un-concealed, than the figures. In any case, that
is more true which is more un-concealed.
We come now to the third stage. The things that are seen in
the light of the sun are the Ideas themselves which constitute
the essences in whose light individual beings manifest themselves as what they are. It is in this self-manifestation that the
beings are un-concealed and accessible. But since it is by reason
of their essences (the Ideas) that this manifestation in beings
takes place, it is the Ideas themselves that must be considered
un-concealed in an eminent way. 5
The Ideas derive their own power of illumination from the
Supreme Idea, which in the present context is expressed by the
sun. How are we to understand the sense of TO &y<x.&6v (Supreme
Idea), rendered ordinarily in easy, but perhaps misleading, translation as "the Good"? For the Greek mind, t6
is that

3 PW, pp. ig-22 (Ideen), 23 fraiScia).
« PW, p. 27.
5 PW, pp. 29-30.
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which is or makes "efficacious." 6 Of course, every Idea performs
this function for those beings of which it is the Idea, but whence
does the Idea itself derive its own efficacy? What is the Idea of
the Ideas? What is it ultimately that " . . . renders it possible for
everything that comes-to-presence to appear in all its visibility . . . " ? 7 It is that power-which-renders-efficacious pure and
simple: TO ayoc&6v.
T o aya&ov is "ultimate" (ireXeuTaia) because in it, ultimate
source of all efficacy, the essence of Idea achieves its fulfillment
and therefore takes its origin. It may be called "Supreme Idea"
simply because it grounds the possibility of all other Ideas, because, too, catching a view of TO aya&ov is for man the most
difficult task of all. Yet in another sense, TO ayoc&6v is everywhere
and always in view, wherever any being whatsoever manifests
itself, for it is the ultimate Source of all luminosity.8 This is the
case, even for those beings that are encountered in the world of
shadows where daylight does not penetrate, for the fire that
projects the shadows on the wall is itself only a shoot (Spross)
of the sun. " . . . Within the cave the sun remains invisible, and
yet even the shadows feed upon its light. . . . " 9 The eminently
un-concealed, then, (the Ideas) are themselves grounded in the
Idea of the Ideas (TO dcy<x$6v), which is the most luminous and
most un-concealed of all. 10
In the fourth stage of the narrative, we have no mention of
non-concealment as such. Here the cave-dweller is back again
in the world of shadows. Heidegger interprets this to mean that
the entire doctrine on truth is to be taken from the cave-story
6 PW, p. 38 (tauglich). Taugen, deriving from the stem dug, with the fundamental
meaning of "capable," "useful," etc., shares common parentage with the current
Tugend and tüchtig. The German stem is closely associated with the Anglo-Saxon
dohtig, which gives us the current English form of "doughty," meaning "able/'
"strong," or "valiant." Purism would insist on "doughty" to translate tauglich,
but the humorous connotation makes it incongruous.
7 " . . . Das, was jede Idee zu einer Idee tauglich macht, platonisch ausgedrückt,
die Idee aller Ideen, besteht deshalb darin, das Erscheinen alles Anwesenden in all
seiner Sichtsamkeit zu ermöglichen
" (PW, p. 38). To avoid the ordinary connotations of "the Good," we leave T6 DCYA&6v in Greek.
8 PW, p. 40. Heidegger translates atxia by Ur-sache, interpreting it as "Source"
(Ursprung) of all things (Sachen) and their thing-ness (Sachheit). The hyphenation
suggests that he intends it to be understood as "ultimate Source," but not (necessarily) as First Cause.
• " . . . Innerhalb der Höhle bleibt die Sonne unsichtbar und doch zehren auch die
Schatten noch von ihrem Licht
" (PW, p. 39).
1 0 PW, p. 38 (9aiv6taTov).
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as an ensemble, and the final stage of confinement in the world
of shadows is as intrinsic to the coming-to-pass of non-concealment as the experience of light. For the dark world of the
cave symbolizes the privation of light, the negation of non-concealment. Non-concealment is negatived by concealment, not
only initially but throughout the entire process. Perhaps we
should say that non-concealment means simply privation of
concealment. Once more we are told that the force of the alphaprivative in d-XY)$eia is that the non-concealed must be wrung
(torn away by an act of robbery) from concealment, which, indeed, may be of many kinds (v.g. any type of occlusion,
elusiveness, dissimulation, dissemblance, obscuration, disarrangement in beings) and always remains referred to, therefore
permeated by, the negativity from which it is liberated. In all
this, Plato remains faithful to the original experience of truth
which the early Greeks had had, sc. that the very essenc-ing of
Being is penetrated by concealment (self-concealment) with the
result that every being is affected by an abiding concealment
both in its presence and in its accessibility.11
We understand Heidegger to mean here that if we take the
four stages of the cave-metaphor as a whole, the essence of truth
does not consist in man's dwelling forever in a world of light, but
rather in his dwelling in a world of darkness, endowed, however,
with an antecedent comprehension of light, so that man is able
to discern the beings that are accessible to him as accessible, and,
indeed, by reason ultimately of the Source of light. According
to such an interpretation, the fourth stage is as essential as the
other three. " . . . That 'privation,' the laborious wresting of the
non-concealed away (from concealment), belongs to the essence
of truth, the fourth step of the 'metaphor' suggests in a manner
all its own. . . . " 1 2

1 1 PW,
pp. 32 (Verschließung, Verwahrung, Verhüllung, Verdeckung, Verschleierung, Verstellung), 33 (auf Verborgenes bezogene).
12 " . . . Daß die 4 Privation', das abringende Erringen des Unverborgenen, zum
Wesen der Wahrheit gehört, dahin gibt die vierte Stufe des 'Gleichnisses* einen
eigenen Wink
" (PW, pp. 32-33).
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B.

x.

Truth

and

TRUTH

AND

CONFORMITY

Idea

All this is very well, and one would think that Heidegger
could accept the whole of it, interpreting TO AYOC&ov as ontological truth (Being) and the Ideas as ontic truth, identifying
them somehow with the beings of daily experience so as to suppress the cleavage in Plato between shadow and Idea, and with
it, presumably, the whole problem of participation. But the
decisive point has not yet been made. This consists in the fact
that what dominates the conception of Plato is not that the Idea
must be conceived as non-concealment (truth), but that nonconcealment is conceived as Idea. 13
It was suggested already in EM that Idea is a form of appearing (Schein). Here the matter is elaborated. Heidegger
makes appeal to the importance of light in the cave-metaphor:
fire, daylight, sunlight, sun. " . . . Everything is concerned with
the shining-forth of that-which-appears and with the renderingpossible of its visibility. . . . " 1 4 The different levels of non-concealment are distinguished only in order to explain what makes
accessible as such that which appears, visible that which manifests itself. This is the function of Idea. " . . . The i8£a is pure
shining-forth in the sense of the expression 'the sun shines'. . . . " 1 5
Hence the essence of Idea lies in appearing and visible-ness, and
it is thus that it accounts for the coming-to-presence of beings
as what they are. Coming-to-presence, however, is precisely what
is meant b y the essenc-ing of Being. That is why for Plato Being
consists properly speaking in what-ness, the quidditas of which
the schoolmen spoke, hence essentia rather than existentia.
What-ness (Idea) is the visible-ness of beings. It renders beings
accessible insofar as it makes them able-to-be-seen. Actual
access, however, is had only by a seeing (tSetv), to which the
accessibility (non-concealment) is therefore intrinsically referred. Here the subtle chemistry is at work. The Idea, offering
w PW, p. 46.
14 " . . . Alles liegt am Scheinen des Erscheinenden und an der Ermöglichung
seiner Sichtbarkeit
" (PW, p. 34).
1 5 " . . . Die I8iet ist das reine Scheinen im Sinne der Rede 'die Sonne scheint*. . . . "
(PW, p. 3 4 ) .
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a view, ordered thereby toward a viewing, is for this viewing
the non-concealment of what is viewed. Thus it happens that
the non-concealed becomes understood as that which is perceived
in the perceiving (Vernehmen) of the Idea, as what is known in
the process of knowing. It is here for the first time that voetv and
vous assume an essential reference to Idea. Henceforth this
reference to the Ideas determines the essence of perceiving and
subsequently the essence of reason (Vernunft). Even the Supreme
Idea, although it is itself the yoke that couples both viewing
and viewed and therefore not only grounds the visibility (luminosity) of the Ideas but grounds the power of vision to respond
to them by perceiving this luminosity, is still Idea, something
seen, something viewed.16 Briefly: non-concealment has become Idea, something seen (tSeiv, zl8oq) by a view.
To be sure, see-ableness is an intrinsic consequence of Beingas-non-concealment, but in Plato, Heidegger argues, this seeableness is more than a consequence, it is the unique sense of
Being. The next step follows immediately. Once the essence of
a being's Being consists in its ISea (its what-ness), then it is the
what-ness of the being that most authentically is. Hence the
ISeot is raised to the level of what alone authentically is (8vrw<; 6v).
The things of experience properly speaking are not, they only
"participate" in that being which is pure what-ness.17
2. Idea and Conformity
Henceforth all comportment with beings is grounded ultimately in vision (ISeiv) of the beings which are Ideas (elS-*)).
Hence it is of supreme importance that the vision be the "right"
one. As the liberated cave-dweller passes from one stage to another, his vision becomes more and more "right," sc. correct.
. . Upon 6p&oTY)<;, the correctness of the viewing, everything
depends. . . . " 18 The viewing takes its sight from that which is
to be viewed, sc. beings insofar as they shine forth by reason of
the Ideas. The result is that the viewing conforms (O^OLCOCT^) to
1 6 PW, pp. 35 (Zugang durch "Sehen"), 35-36 (Joch), 39 (öip&eiaa, erblickt). With
"coming-to-presence" we translate Anwesung, which in turn translates here ouorta
(P- 46).
1 7 EM, pp. 138-139 (Wesenfolge), 140-141 (das Seiendste am Seienden).
18
.. An der
der Richtigkeit des Blickens, liegt alles
" (PW, p. 41)«
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the viewed, and truth becomes not the non-concealment of what
appears but conformity between viewing and viewed.
" . . . Thus springs from the primacy of tSea and ISetv over
d-X-q&eia a transformation of the essence of truth. Truth becomes
opfroTT}^, correctness of perception and expression." 19 And not
only is the essence of truth changed but its proper domain as
well. As non-concealment, truth resides in the being itself. As
correctness of viewing, it becomes a characteristic of human
comportment with beings. If in Plato a certain ambiguity remains, so that "truth" suggests sometimes the non-concealment
of beings, sometimes conformity, sometimes both, this is only
another proof of the subtlety of the transformation. A case in
point is the situation where x6 aya$ov is the Source of possibility
for both the luminosity of the Idea and the power of vision in
man, therefore ground for truth both as non-concealment and
as correctness. Decisive is the fact that here non-concealment is
subordinate to TO AYOC&6v, which is itself Supreme Idea.20
RESUM£

In Plato metaphysics in the traditional sense takes its rise,
for it is he who first conceives of thinking Being as a going
"beyond" the beings of experience to their being-ness, which he
conceives as their what-ness, their see-ableness, their Idea.
Such a conception is possible only because a consequence of
(process of shining-forth) is taken to be the essence of it.
Hence <puat<; itself becomes for him that-which-is-to-be-seen, a
being (EISCX;). Being thus becomes conceived as a being. Likewise
truth, no longer non-concealment, becomes correctness of view,
conformity with the Ideas.

1 9 " . . . So entspringt aus dem Vorrang der L5£<x und des ISeiv vor der dtXrj&etÄ
eine Wandlung des Wesens der Wahrheit. Wahrheit wird zur
zur Richtigkeit des Vernehmens und Aussagens." (PW, p. 42).
PW, p. 41 (unter das Joch).

CHAPTER

II

A R I S T O T L E

Since Being is for Heidegger the process of truth, then the
thinking of Being and its de-volution from the original voetv is
inevitably intertwined with the thinking of truth. We have just
seen how Heidegger understands Plato to have thought the
nature of truth. Knowing that Aristotle has influenced him more
profoundly than any other thinker, we are led to suppose that
he has meditated this problem in the Stagirite at great length.
And yet, he has given us no "Aristotle's Doctrine on Truth."
If we are to understand Heidegger's conception of Aristotle in
this regard, we must piece together into unity many indices, all
of a minor order. If we do this, however, we are fully aware of
how provisional our conclusions must remain.
Perhaps the sharpest formula that the author has given us
comes at the conclusion of a seminar (1940), "On the Essence
and Conception of Oiicri^ [in] Aristotle's Physics B, I." 1 In itself,
the remark is parenthetical and, presumably, not intended for
the members of the seminar. Perhaps it was only a hasty draft,
to be elaborated in one way or another later. Be that as it may,
the remark is more than ordinarily enigmatic, and if we are to
make any sense out of it all, we must first familiarize ourselves
with the principal themes that the seminar had brought to light.
Aristotle's Physics is for Heidegger a work of cardinal importance, not only because it serves as the fundamental book
of subsequent philosophy in the West, but because in its own
1 "Vom Wesen und Begriff der Ouoiq, Aristoteles Physik B I," II Pensiero, III
(*958), pp. 131-156, 265-289. (Hereafter: P). See p. 289.
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way it is the consummation of all previous Greek thought.2 Especially significant, of course, is the conception of <pucri<; itself.
Admittedly, Aristotle's use of the word is not always uniform:
sometimes it is used to designate the being-ness (OVGICL) of beingsin-the-ensemble (Meta. IV, 3): more often the being-ness of one
particular domain of beings, sc. those which have in themselves
the source of their moved-ness (apx*J Kivrjaeax;) (Phys. II, 1,
192 b 14).
The first sense returns later when
is interpreted in terms
of beings-in-the-ensemble, and in this case it is a clear echo of
the earlier conception of <pu<ric, in Heraclitus as Being itself.3 The
second sense, although more restricted in compass, retains none
the less more clearly than the first the genuine sense of the
word in Heraclitus, for whom «pueril is "inclined to conceal itself," sc. it is a coming-to-presence (Anwesung) that is negatived
(Abwesung)* It is to this meaning of cpvaic, that the author devotes his attention in the seminar. Aristotle's understanding of
(picric, then, is clearly a transition between the conception of
the early Greek thinkers and that of subsequent metaphysics.
It is as such that we wish to understand it.
A.

AMBIVALENT

NATURE

O F <&uai<;

J. <&6atc; as apxV xwrfoscog
The seminar culminates in the analysis of the "ambivalent"
nature of 9tS<n<;> and it is this which most concerns us. In a first
delineation, we are told that yuGiq is the ipxh
xfoqffu; in individual beings which have this txpxfiv ev eocurou; (Phys. II, 1, 192
b 13-14). Here: apx*j must be understood as suggesting both
origin and domination over that of which it is ipxh > xtvy]<Ti<; is
not simply "movement" but rather "moved-ness," sc. that by
which the xivotijteva (beings-that-are-moved) are as moved. Hence
it comports not only movement but the repose of that m o v e m e n t
when the movement is gathered up in the end (TSXO<;), sc. residing in this being as having arrived at its end (ev-TeXei-£x£l:
1
pp. 133-134 (verborgene Grundbuch). See pp. 153, 274 (Antiphon).
• P, pp. 288 (Art von ouaiot), 131-133 (Natur).
4 P, pp. 288-289 (xpu7rreo#m ^pLtei). See pp. 284-286 (Anwesung-Abwesung).
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evreXexsta). As a matter of fact, movement continues only until
this point of repose, sc. end, is reached (dreX^), hence repose is
the culmination of movement.5 As for the phrase "in themselves"
(sv saw-rots), this is what distinguishes beings whose ipx^l is
cpu<7i<; from those beings which have the origin of their movement
outside themselves (TOioti^eva). For the beings we are considering, " . . . the self-unfolding emergence is in itself a returning into itself. . . . " 6
The essential in all this is to realize that the moved-ness of
beings-that-are-moved is the manner in which they come-topresence, hence characterizes the being-ness of these beings.7
And since cpuau; is the dp^T) of moved-ness, it is <piicn<; that is this
being-ness (ouata) itself, that by which beings take-their-stand
(wocrraar^) or lie-forth (vmoxeifisvov) in the presence that we call
non-concealment.8
2. &v(TiQ as popfprj
a. (xop97)-öX7) - Aristotle offers a second delineation of tpucn^,
sc. as fjtop<pTj (Phys. II, i , 193 b 18). Correlative with fJ.op<pv), of
course, is ÖX73, both of them complementary components in the
single process of presenc-ing called cpucn;, but (jiopcpyj enjoys a
certain primacy, for it brings the presencing-process to fulfillment more fundamentally than 5X7). Why? Because UXTJ connotes a certain reserve, a not-yet-unfolded character of the
being's emerging-into-presence. Mop97), however, connotes precisely this emergence, for fxop<pY) must be understood as posing
the individual being in its elSo; [Phys. II, i, 193 a 31).
We see here at once Aristotle's continuity with Plato, yet the
radical difference between them. For Plato, the zI8oq is, of
course, a shining-forth that offers its visage to be seen, but is
conceived as somehow coming-to-presence for itself as a being
in the authentic sense and as common (xoivov) to all the individual
8
PP. 137 (ipx?))» x38. I40r 2 7 5 (Bewegtheit, Ruhe), 276 {bmkt/euf), 277
(dcTeX^)® " . . . Das sichentfaltende Aufgehen ist an sioh ein In-sich-zurückgehen;..
(P, p. 143). Cf. p. 266.
7 P. pp. 147-149 (Anwesung). Aristotle explains ouala by frcoxelixevov, which
Heidegger claims, has the same ambiguity as 6v, hence permits interpretation as
Being (here being-ness) or being.
8

P , p p . 1 4 9 , 1 5 6 , 266.
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entities of experience, which entities, therefore, could not be
called "beings" in the authentic sense at all. For Aristotle, however, individuals are authentic beings simply inasmuch as they
take their place (Gestellung) in the radiance of this shining-forth
by reason of which they are what they are. It is fiopcpTj that
places a being in the sphere of radiance, hence poses the being
in the shining-forth-process (elSo?) by which it appears as what
it is. Consequently, if we consider the being-that-shines-forth in
terms of p.op<p7), we see that it is precisely by f*op9r\ that it is
constituted as shining-forth, whereas if we consider it in terms
of ÖX7), the shining-forth must be considered in that moment
when it has not yet taken place. Now since it is by shining-forth
as what it is that the being comes-to-presence, |xop<p7) plays a
more fundamental role in the presencing-process than UXTJ, indeed to such an extent that the presencing-process itself (<pu<n<;)
may be designated by that component, sc. (xoptpiQ, which makes
the being come-to-presence as what it is.9
b.CTT^pTjms- Of course, the presencing is a moved-ness, and
in the context this moved-ness is thought of as generation, sc.
movement that is still under way toward repose in the elSog that
already has begun to shine-forth in the being but has not yet
reached its fullness. At this point another element appears in the
presencing-process, sc. or£p7)ai<;. The Latin translates it as privatio, but by association with negatio ("saying no"), this risks interpretation as simply a type of "saying," hence a judgement
about the process. At all costs, we must understand orep^aic; as
not simply a judgement about the process but an element in the
process itself. The English "privation" permits this sense very
clearly (v.g. "the flood victims suffer great privation"), and we
may retain this translation of the Latin (which Heidegger presumably rejects) to translate the German Beraubung.
What is important for the argument, however, is to understand in what sense GTspTjox^ is a type of eT8o<; (Phys. II, I, 193 b
19-20). As Heidegger sees it, the reason is that every coming-topresence (Anwesung) through ^xopcpr), sc. through placement m
elSo^, involves ipso facto a going-from-presence (Abwesung), as,
• P, pp. 278 (noch zurück- und an sich haltenden), 269 (Gestellung in das Aussehen),
278 (erfüllt mehr).
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for example, the appearing of the fruit necessarily comports the
dis-appearing of the blossoms on the fruit tree. This dis-appearing, interior to the process of appearing through elSoc, is
what Heidegger interprets Aristotle to mean when he says that
privation is "somehow or other" (TKO?) elSoq. We understand
this in the sense that privation is Aristotle's term for describing
the negativity intrinsic to the process of coming-to-presence as
such. This, then, is why ^op<p7j, as the placement of the being in
the radiance of elSoc, is ambivalent: it comports negativity as
well as positivity. And the same must be said, of course, for

3. 0vaig as apy$-fiopqri\
If by way of conclusion we endeavor to think both delineations of cptSau; together, sc. as dcp^*?) xivrjaeox; and as jxopqpr) (in
generation), we discover a profound unity between them that
gives us what for Heidegger is the definitive sense of Aristotle's
<p\S01$: " . . . flop97) is the essence of cpuari; as &pxh> a n d &pxh the
essence of <puai<; as
. . . " 1 1 We understand this to mean
that the origin and dominating force (apx*)) of the moved-ness
of beings whose nature it is to be moved (xivou^eva) consists in
their placement in the radiance which lets them shine forth as
what they are (elSo^). Moreover, the process is intrinsically
"negatived," for every moment of the self-unfolding comports a privation proper to itself.
B.

<I>\Scri<; A N D

TRUTH

All this is very nice, but what has it to do with truth ? Let us
come at once to the closing remark, to which we have referred
already. In all its tortuous convolution, it reads:
Because <pucru; in the sense of the Physics is a type of ouata, and because
otiata itself in its essence derives from the original [sense] of «pucju;, therefore
pertains to Being, and therefore the presencing in the Open
of the t8£a (Plato) and of the el8o? xaxa t6v X6yov (Aristotle) discloses

P. PP- 279, 281, 283 (Y£vecit<;), 284-285 (CTT^PTJCTL?), 286-287 (zwiefach).
" . . . Die [ZOpcpTj ist das Wesen der qjucns als ipxh> un( *
&PX*l
<*as Wesen
der (ptitftq als jxopcprj,..." (P, p. 287).
10
11
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itself as one character of oucrla; therefore for Aristotle the essence of xtvrjarts
as £vreX£xeta and bvlpyzia. becomes [something] visible.12

What we understand Heidegger to mean is this: The "original" sense of <pii<ytc, as we find it in Heraclitus, is that of Beingas-truth, comporting negativity (concealment) as well as positivity (non-concealment). Ouai; in this sense is also called ouala.
With Plato, Being comes to be conceived as eISo<; (a being that
is see-able), when truth-as-non-concealment becomes truth-asconformity. But the original sense of ybau; as non-concealment
perdures in Plato to the extent that the see-ableness of elSoq
consists precisely in its shining-forth, sc. in its radiance as a
domain of open-ness (Offene). In Aristotle, the meaning of sI8o<;
changes, to be sure, in accordance with the new conception of
(iopcpif), but what remains constant in elSos is the notion of a
radiance that can be seen, in which the being is so placed by
{jiop^TQ that the being becomes visible as what it is. 13 Here, too,
then, to the extent that eISo<; is an open-ness in which beings
come-to-presence (appearance), Heraclitus' sense of <puai<;-asnon-concealment persists. Moreover, although Heidegger does
not mention the fact in the remark we are discussing, we can
see how in Aristotle the negativity of this non-concealment also
comes to expression under the guise of privation (a "no-longer-"),
and one wonders, although the author does not explicitate, if
we might not say the same of ÖX73, insofar as it is a "not-yet-."
These, then, would be the Aristotelian forms of the negativity
that for all the Greeks, as Heidegger reads them, permeated the
process of emerging-into-presence.14
In all of this, the essential for us is to see: that in meditating
the notions of cpticri$ and ouaia even in Aristotle, we are still at
grips with the problem of truth-as-non-concealment; that even
though the negativity of the process still has its essential place
ia ««Weil 9^at?ina Sinne der 'Physik' eine Art der ouorCa und weil oucrta im Wesen
selbst entstammt der anfänglich entworfenen cpumg, deshalb gehört zum Sein
dfcXVj&eia, und deshalb enthüllt sich als einen Charakter der oucria die Anwesung ins
Offene der I8£a (Piaton) und des eTSo? xaxa röv X6yov (Aristoteles), deshalb wird für
diesen das Wesen der xiv7jot? als £vre>£xeia u n d ^vipTSW sichtbar(P,
p. 289).
Heidegger's italics.
1 3 P, p. 269. In this respect, the xorra T6V X6fOv is also significant, given Heidegger's
interpretation of X6yoc (pp. 271-272), but this problem returns in the X6yo; analysis
of VA (1944), and we do not attempt to retain it here.
1 4 P, p. 156. Heidegger recalls here that the whole problem of seeming-to-be
(Schein) is the problem of negativity of truth. Cf. p. 251.
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in the problematic under the guise of [xopepTj and aripriauthe
negativity is not attributed to truth as truth. This can be expressed only when we speak of a-XYj&Eia as a s^//-concealing. We
grasp the force of this, if we examine another piece of evidence.
In The Principle of Ground (1955-56), Heidegger returns in a
completely different context to the notion of <pucjtq as negatived
truth. 15 He speaks of Aristotle's conception of Being under the
guise of cpuaiq and of beings as xa y!>azi Övra (Phys. I, i, 184 a 16
ff.). Aristotle distinguishes TOC YJULV cracpecrrepa and TOC aaq^crrepa
Tfi <puaei. The sense is that beings are more manifest to us, Being
[<p\)Gic) more manifest in itself (ra a7rXto^ aacpecrrepa), therefore
less manifest to us. The way of philosophy leads from a comprehension of the former to a comprehension of the latter. As a
result, we never get a view of Being with complete immediacy.
What is decisive is the reason why all this is true: it lies not in
the nature of tptais but in the nature of man. " . . . It lies in the
fact that our eyes are not able without further ado to glimpse
Being, therefore by no means in the fact that Being withdraws. . . . " 16 Now for Heidegger, it is precisely the nature of
<piaiq as a-XTj&eta to withdraw, sc. to conceal itself, and even to
conceal its own concealment (mystery). To the extent that
Aristotle conceives <p\>oi$ as that which makes itself manifest, he
remains faithful to the original sense of this word, but to the
extent that he ignores the law of <ptiat<; by which it conceals itself and conceals its own concealment, sc. the intrinsic negativity of <puat<;, he is oblivious to the genuine meaning of a-Xrj&eLot.
If Aristotle forgets the sense of truth as non-concealment, how
does he conceive it ? To understand this, we must turn our attention from (puGic to X6yo<; and see how this word has been
transformed when it emerges in him. We saw how originally
X6yog, as the gathering-together of beings, opens these beings
up and simultaneously forms into a word the name by which
they are to be called. This is the origin of language, which in turn
preserves in itself the primal open-ness of beings. Now what is
uttered initially in language can be said again and repeated over
and over, so that the original truth (open-ness of beings) can be
Der Satg vom Grund (Pfullingen: Neske, 1957), pp. 112-113. (Hereafter: SG).
" . . . Dies liegt daran, daß unsere Augen nicht ohne weiteres zum Erblicken des
Seins taugen, also keineswegs daran, daß das Sein sich entzieht
" (SG, p. 113).
15

16
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communicated from one speaker to another without any experience of the being itself in question. But there is a risk involved, for the expression-by-repetition can get farther and
farther away from the original open-ness, until it becomes mere
hearsay and loquacity. In this case, the decision about what is
true depends upon distinguishing authentic utterance from mere
hearsay. This means that the place where truth resides is not,
as originally, in the being-that-is-rendered-open, but in the expression. The place of truth has changed from beings to expression; with it the essence of truth has changed once more
from non-concealment to correctness.17
R£SUM£

In all this, the essential is clear. If traces of the Heraclitean
conception of <pu<n<; remain in Aristotle, its a-A^O-eia-character is
forgotten. Through the transformation of X6yoq, truth comes to
reside in the expression, or in the understanding (reason) that
articulates the expression, and consists in the conformity of
judgement (expression; to judged (expressed). If presentative
thought as such does not evolve until Descartes, certainly the
seeds of it are planted in Aristotle.
TRANSITION:

MIDDLE

AGES

Between Aristotle and Descartes, however, there is a long
period of maturation when western thought passes through the
epoch of mediaeval scholasticism. For Heidegger, the most significant characteristic of this period is the recurring question
about the relation between essence, sc. that in beings which
accounts for the fact that they are what they are (their Wassein), and existence, sc. that in beings which accounts simply
for the fact that they are (their Daß-sein). To understand how
Heidegger interprets the significance of this problematic, we
must remain for a moment with his analysis of Plato and
Aristotle.
« EM, pp. 141-142. The term "expression" (Aussage) for Heidegger includes not
only the verbal locution but the judgement that is thereby expressed.
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With Plato, as we saw, Being comes to be conceived as Idea,
sc. as a being. By that very token, an Idea is the only being that
genuinely is (8VTG^ 8V), SO that what a being is and the fact that
it is are hardly to be distinguished. The world of Ideas, then, is
the genuine ("true") world. What of the world of sense experience? It is the non-genuine world, the world of "seeming,"
wherein the phenomena of sense participate in and manifest the
genuineness of the Ideas but in themselves are not genuine
beings. Yet beings of some sort they are, even if non-genuine
ones (fA-}) 6v). Thus it becomes possible to distinguish in such
beings the fact that they are at all, no matter in how non-genuine
a fashion, from what they are through participation in the
Ideas.18
In Aristotle, the dichotomy of what-ness and that-ness emerges
out of an ambiguity in the sense of "being-ness" (ouaia) when
this is understood as evepyeta. We have seen already how in the
case of a being-that-is-moved its being-ness is conceived as the
repose that comes after the movement is gathered up into a
fullness within the being when it has reached the end of its
movement (svre>ixsta). Now a being that has thus achieved a
certain fullness of movement is a "work" (Ipyov). Its being-ness
consists in its coming-to-presence, in its shining-forth in the
radiance of some Idea as a work, in its "work-hood": Sv-^pyeia.
" . . . 'Evepyetqc, evreXexsiqt 8v says the very same thing as EV TG>
elSei elvoci . . . " 1®
The Being of beings (ooatoc) for Aristotle, then, consists in their
ev£pysta. But in the fifth chapter of his tract on the Categories
(V, 2 a 11 f£.) Aristotle distinguishes a double sense according
to which oucrfa can be understood: primarily it is to be taken as
the concrete singular being in all of its individuality (v.g. this
man); secondarily it may be taken to mean that refulgence itself by reason of which singular beings offer their visage to be
seen as what they are (v.g. man as such). The primary sense
connotes beings in terms of their that-ness (existence); the
secondary sense suggests rather the what-ness (essence) of beings.
But in each case the word signifies only a different manner in
» N, II, pp. i 4 - I 5 .
19 " . . . " Evcpyctcf, ivTcXexclqt 8v besagt soviel wie hi Tcji cTScicIvai
p. 405). See pp. 404-405.

" <N, II,
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which the presenc-ing of a genuine being takes place. "That-ness
and what-ness reveal themselves as ways in which [beings] cometo-presence, [but] the basic structure of this [process] is
evspyeia."

20

So far, so good. But when Aristotle's evepyeia is translated into
the Latin actus or actualitas, there is a transformation in the
meaning of it as well. Whereas Aristotle understood the epyov
(whose Being-structure is evepyeia) as that which shines-forth
and offers its visage to be seen, the Latins conceive it as
something which is produced by work, as the term of a doing,
as the result of activity:
. . . T h e essence of a " w o r k " is no longer " w o r k - h o o d " in the sense of the
special process of coming-to-presence in the Free [Domain of the Open],
b u t t h e " a c t u a l i t y " of the actual t h a t is controlled b y the activity of
work. . . . 2 1

The Being of beings, then, becomes conceived as their actuality, and a being can be genuinely a being only insofar as it is
actual. Correlative notions, v.g. potentiality (in fact even the
notion of necessity), would have to be understood in terms of
actuality. At this point, it is easy - even natural - to conceive
actuality as esse actu (existence), and to distinguish it from esse
Potentia understood in the sense of essence.22 Notice, however,
that, whereas for Aristotle, according to Heidegger, essence and
existence had been two different manners in which the Beingprocei (evepyeia) comes-to-pass in beings, now, with the transformation of evepyeia into actus, the Being-process comes to be interpreted in terms simply of existence alone.23
But actuality (actus) implies activity (agere), and Heidegger
finds a close correlation between Being-as-actuality and the
notion of cause. This accounts for the importance of causality
20 "Daß-sein und Was-sein
enthüllen sich als Weisen des Anwesens, dessen
Grandzug die £v£pyeia ist." (N, II, p. 407). To the extent that Aristotle, even in
admitting as legitimate the secondary sense of o&alot, is always concerned with the
concrete singular, he is closer to the origin-al Greek experience {griechischer denkt),
Heidegger claims, than Plato. See p. 409.
81 " . . . Das Wesen des 'Werkes' ist nicht mehr die 'Werkheit' im Sinne des ausgezeichneten Anwesens in das Freie sondern die 'Wirklichkeit* eines Wirklichen, das
im Wirken beherrscht... w i r d . . N , II, p. 412.
22 N, II, pp. 413, 415.
23 It remains true, however, that the translation of ^ p y e t a by existentia could
have been quite legitimate if the latter had been understood more literally according
to certain suggestions that Aristotle gives. See N, II, pp. 411-412» 4*6-417-
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in the mediaeval problematic, he claims, both in terms of man
and in terms of the Uncaused Cause, who is at the same time
Pure Act and Sheer Existence (Ipsum Esse), sc. "Being" itself.24
Now the mediaeval philosopher is, of course, profoundly a man
of faith, and this conception of Being-as-actuality, together
with that of the Supreme Being as the Uncaused Cause of all
finite actual beings, enables him to articulate in metaphysical
language certain elements of doctrine, such as the creation of the
world, that he already has accepted by faith. 25
But as Heidegger reads the evidence, there is still another way
in which religious faith profoundly influenced the mediaeval
mind. This is to be found in the slow metamorphosis of the conception of truth. For mediaeval man not only possesses what he
considers to be the truth but this truth carries with it a certain
guarantee, and guaranteed truth is what is meant by certitude.
The guarantee could be considered both as "supernatural"
and as "natural." From the supernatural point of view, one
could say that Supreme Actuality (Pure Act) has endowed man
with a special kind of actuality, completely gratuitous, which is
supernatural life, and which may be called in a general way
"faith." Now the nature of faith demands that the believer
accept not only the truths of salvation but the guarantee of
these truths, hence certitude with regard to them, from revelation. So it is that, because of the certitude that the faith offers,
the mediaeval thinker gradually begins to think of truth itself
in terms of certitude.26
The second guarantee of truth might be called a "natural"
one. By this Heidegger means that mediaeval man has supreme
confidence in the "natural light" (lumen naturale) which illuminates his mind in thinking about God and the rest of the created
universe. Such confidence, rooted ultimately, of course, in the
acceptance of God as the creating Cause, guarantees to mediaeval
man the reliability of his thinking faculty and thus gives him
24 See N, II, pp. 413-416. For a brief discussion of Suarez' contribution to the
conception of existence in terms of cause, see N, II, pp. 418-419.
25 N, II, p. 414 (Glaubenshaltung). In explaining the importance of cause, Heidegger
suggests a significant continuity between Plato's conception of the Good as Source
fatrta: Ur-Sache) and the Thomistic notion of God, the Uncaused Cause, as Summum
Bottum. Ci. PW, p. 40 and N, II, pp. 413-417.
M See N, II, pp. 425-426.
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that confidence in his possession of the truth that we call certitude.27 In more than one way, then, the notion of certitude
colors the mediaeval conception of truth.
RESUME

During the Middle Ages, Aristotle's evepyetot, which for him
still guarded traces of the original experience of Being as nonconcealment, is translated by the Latin actus or actualitas, sc.
that which is the result of some activity (agere) or work. Thus
the Aristotelian sense of Ivepyeia is completely lost. A genuine
being is that which possesses esse actu, and Being itself comes to
mean primarily existence.
Correlative with this development is an evolution of the
problematic of cause, wherein the Uncaused Cause is conceived
as Pure Actuality, Sheer Existence, Being itself. Such a metaphysics finds strong confirmation in religious faith. Since faith,
too, can not only articulate truth (understood, of course in the
sense of conformity) but guarantee it, mediaeval man begins to
think of this guarantee as characteristic of truth as such and
thus begins to conceive truth in terms of certitude. Enter Descartes.

1 7 Mediaeval scholars may have some questions to ask and perhaps a distinction
or two to make with regard to this rather summary treatment of the scholastic period
as an epoch of Being-as-history (Seinsgeschichte). One thing should be clear, however: that one must be extremely cautious in seeing a correlation between what
Heidegger means by Being and any sense that the scholastics, such as St. Thomas
Aquinas, gave to the term.

CHAPTER III

DESCARTES

A.

THE

ORIGIN

OF

SUBJECT-ISM

With the advent of modern times, the conception of both
thought and Being is profoundly influenced once more by the
conception of truth. 1 Truth for Descartes is more than simply
conformity between knower and known, it is a known conformity,
sc. certitude. The Discourse on Method makes this abundantly
clear. How this triggers a philosophy of subject-ism we can see
best, perhaps, by formulating three propositions.
I. Descartes, by his effort to discover the fundamentum inconcussum veritatis, seeks to determine the absolutely primary subject of
certitude for modern man.
By "modern man," we understand man as he begins to conceive himself with the advent of modern times. What characterizes him most properly, perhaps, is the vindication of his own
liberty, whereby he makes his declaration of independence from
the ties of faith that bound his mediaeval forefathers. The universe becomes for him, by and large, an anthropocentric rather
than a theocentric one, or, as Heidegger expresses it, " . . . he
frees himself unto himself. . . . " 2 This has momentous implications, of course, not least of all for the problem of truth.
1 "Modern times," in turn, are conceived as beginning with Descartes. This, as
we state it, is something of a circle. The problem is far too complicated for us to discuss it here. It is thus that Heidegger conceives the matter, and this is no time to
take issue with him.
* " . . . er sich zu sich selbst befreit
" (HW, p. 8r). Cf. N, II, pp. 131-135,
146-147, 421-426.

322

FROM B E I N G TO T H E R E - T H E D E - V O L U T I O N OF THOUGHT

For mediaeval man, as we saw that Heidegger maintains, received his certitudes, whether the teachings of dogma or the
assurance of eternal life, from the faith. 3 Once he chooses independence in the name of liberty, how is he to replace these
vanished certitudes? It can be only in and through himself.
" . . . This is possible only to the extent that self-liberating man
guarantees for himself the certitude of the knowable. . . . " 4 The
new liberty, then, must be a self-determination that is certain
of itself and by itself. The ground of certitude must be selfcertitude.
What does this imply? It means that man must decide for
himself what for him is knowable, what is knowledge and what
is certitude. It is the proper task of Descartes to elaborate the
metaphysical ground of the new anthropocentric liberty b y
suggesting an answer to this triple question. The ground obviously must be itself certain. What is more, it must bear its own
"credentials," justifying in itself the basic (sup)position that the
freedom in question lies in self-certitude. Finally, it must ground
other certitudes.
Now a certitude that grounds itself and other certitudes is
obviously the fundamentum inconcussum veritatis. What is more
important for us, though, is that it is also the sub-jectum of certitude. For sub-jectum (u7to-xet|/£vov) is that which of itself underlies all modalities of any phenomenon. In this case, fundamentum and sub-jectum are one.0
2. This he accomplishes with cogito ergo sum.
In what sense is the cogito this fundamentum (sub-jectum) inconcussum? In the first place, it is itself certain. Here, at least,
knowing (sc. that "I am") is known to conform to known ("I
* HW, pp. 75,8r. The mediaeval thinkers themselves, as we already have intimated,
might not accept this formula. All would admit that man's certitudes are grounded
in an Absolute, sc. God, who, as a matter of fact, was known through faith, but not
all would admit that these certitudes had to be themselves of supernatural origin.
Heidegger himself seems to have recognized the need for a precision here, for in 1955
he alters the explanation by saying that the mediaeval notion of certitude was the
"de-finition" (Umgrenzung) of a being in what it is, hence tantamount to its "essence."
See WP, p. 4i4 u . . . Das war nur so möglich, daß der sich befreiende Mensch die Gewißheit des
M (HW, p. 99).
Wißbaren selbst verbürgte
* HW, pp. 98-99.
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am"), for both knowing and known are simultaneously present
to each other in and during the act of cogitation.
But the cogito also justifies the (sup)position of the newly declared freedom that certitude is grounded in and by man himself, sc. that it is self-certitude. In the first place, it implies a
decision as to what is human knowing, for knowing, too, is included in the "thinking" of which Descartes speaks. Like
"thinking," knowing too must be a process of pro-posing to itself what is known. " . . . Pro-posing is the pro-gressive, controlling process of objectivising. . . . " 6 Secondly, it implies a
decision as to what is humanly knowable. For the sense of cogitate is expanded to include the whole gamut of man's relationships. The terms of these relationships are op-posed to him
and therefore pro-posed by him, inasmuch as the relation is the
pro-posing. The humanly knowable becomes understood as
whatever could be a term of this pro-posing, therefore any "object." 7 Finally, it implies a decision as to what is certitude. For
it suggests that conformity of knowing to known can be gained
by controlling at once both knower and known, hence by closely
calculating (Rechnen) their correspondence, as, for example, the
correspondence between pro-posing and pro-posed. Certitude,
then, comes to be understood not only as truth that is guaranteed but as truth whose guarantee is an exact calculation.8
How does it happen, now, that the cogito grounds all other
certitudes? Insofar as it is not only a model but a condition for
them! For one cannot think at all, sc. pro-pose an object to oneself unless one know oneself to exist as the self-proposer of what
is pro-posed. This pro-posing of the self to the self by the self,
which we normally call self-awareness or consciousness, is interior to a pro-posing of any kind that can be called "true." 9
That is why the cogito is the fundamentum inconcussum of all
truth and for that very reason the sub-jeetum of all certitude.

6 1 4 . . . Vor-steilen
ist vor-gehende, meisternde Ver-gegen-standlichung...
(HW, p. 100).
7 HW, p. zoo (das im Vorstellen erst entgegen Gestellte, Gegen-ständige). Cf. N,
II, p. 156.
8 HW, p. 100 (Rechnens). Cf. N, II, p. 153.
• N, II, pp. 153-155.
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3. And the preventative sub-ject, as consciousness, determines the
Being of beings.
Now Descartes is certainly not the first to recognize that any
conscious act includes an awareness of the self which performs
it. What is distinctively new with him is the fact that this selfawareness plays a decisive role in determining how the Being
of beings in question, whether the one that pro-poses or the ones
pro-posed, is conceived.10 For the "therefore" in the Cartesian
formula does not signify that a conclusion is being drawn but
serves simply as an expletive. As Heidegger reads it, the formula
means: "I think - and of itself this means [or: and therein consists the fact] that - I am." Thus the Being of the pro-posing
(or present-ative) self is considered precisely in terms of the
function of pro-posing (or present-ing). Correspondingly, since
the beings that the conscious self renders present are a correlate
of this present-ative function, their Being, too, is considered in
the same terms. " . . . The Being of that being which in the very
process of present-ing [objects] to itself certifies [this self] is the
measure of the Being of the [objects] presented, and, indeed, as
such. . . . " i i
We understand, then, how it happens that for Descartes
consciousness becomes the domain within which all beings find
their significance, for consciousness is " . . . the present-ative
collocation of what is objective together with man who does the
present-ing, both in a single compass of present-edness which
man himself sustains. . . . " 1 2 As far as Heidegger is concerned,
the Cartesian formula says effectively that: " . . . the presentative function, which essentially is rendered present to itself [in
self-consciousness], poses Being as present-edness. . . . " 1 3
All beings "are," sc. have a meaning and "present-ness"

« See N, II, p. 155 (Maßstabsrolle).
" " . . . Das Sein des im Vorstellen selbst gesicherten Vorstellenden ist das Maß
für das Sein des Vorgestellten und zwar als eines solchen
" (N, II, p. 164). See
also pp. x6x, 162.
1 3 " . . . Diese ist die vorstellende Zusammenstellung des Gegenständigen mit
dem vorstellenden Menschen im Umkreis der von diesem verwahrten Vorgestelltheit...." (HW, p. X02).
" " . . . Der Satz sagt: das Vor-stellen, das sich selbst wesenhaftvor-gestelltist,
setzt das Sein ab Vor-gestelltheit...." (N, II, p. 162).
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(Präsenz) , 14 only insofar as they have a place within this
compass of present-edness. So it is that every being is such only
insofar as it is magnetized by this subject-object polarity: it is
either an object or that-which-objectifies. This objectifying
relates the being-as-object to the conscious ego, and in this relating the ego recognizes itself, at least implicitly, as lying at
the basis of the relation, sc. as sub-ject. The recognition takes
place in a process of reflection. The reflection, sc. the reflecting
ego, must be taken as the ground for the relation posed, sc. the
(re)presentation of the object. "According to [its very] essence,
representation is grounded in reflection. . . . " 1 5 That is why the
Being of beings is determined in terms of object-ness only with
the new trend toward reflection that begins with Descartes.
Every being, then, is either object of a subject or "sub-ject"
of a subject: in either case it is what it is only in reference to the
self-conscious subject. This subject-reference of all beings whatsoever is henceforth designated "subject-ness" (Subjektität) and
constitutes the objectivity of objects as well as the subjectivity
of subjects, sc. the Being of beings as such. Now "subject-ness"
for Heidegger - and this is important - means something different from "subjectivity" (Subjektivität). The latter word implies
that the present-ative subject is the individual human ego, as
we have seen to be the case with Descartes himself.16 But the
present-ative subject need not necessarily be conceived in this
way. All that subject-ism requires is that the human phenomenon pro-pose to itself the beings with which it deals. How the
human phenomenon is interpreted, whether in terms of an individualism, collectivism, absolutism, etc., is for the present argument a matter of indifference. Strictly speaking, subject-ism in
this radical sense has been latent ever since metaphysics began
when Plato first conceived Being as something-to-be-seen by a
someone-who-sees. With Descartes it only becomes explicit, but
14 Heidegger uses the word Präsenz, as far as we can see, to designate that "presence" which a being has within the compass of the subject-object relationship,
as distinguished from "presence" in his own sense as emergence-into-non-concealment. To avoid confusion, we reserve "presence" for the Heideggerean sense of
Anwesenheit (though sometimes, especially in the Hegel analysis, he uses even this
word very broadly) and translate Präsenz by "present-ness" (that by which a beingas-object is present to a subject). See HW, p. 133.
1 6 "Dem Wesen nach gründet die repraesentatio in der r e f l e x i o . . ( V A , p. 85).
" See N, II, p. 451. Cf. SF, p. 17.
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the explicitation is important enough to give man himself a new
status in metaphysics: he no longer thinks of himself as a
"creature"; now he is a sub-ject. As far as Heidegger is concerned, subject-ism is the decisive characteristic of all modern
philosophy and reaches its consummation in Nietzsche.17
B.

CONSEQUENCES

OF

SUBJECT-ISM

We understand, then, what the author takes to be the entire
difference between mediaeval and modern man. For the former,
all beings were interpreted in terms of their relation to a creating
God, and man himself had only a privileged place among the
rest of creatures. With the rise of subject-ism, however, man
himself - not God - becomes the point of reference in terms of
which beings have sense and meaning. The import of this is farreaching. For example:
J. The "world" becomes a "picture" (Weltbild).
The world is conceived as the ensemble of beings pro-posed to
man-as-subject, which, like a picture, he can behold. Op-posed
to man and pro-posed by him, the world has its sense only with
regard to him, and his task is to conquer it, to reduce it to submission. "The fundamental movement of modern times consists
in conquering the world-as-picture. . . . " 1 8 Beings are submitted
more and more to man's control, made victims of his calculations,
his designs, his cultivation. Scientific research becomes an indispensable form of the general conquest.19 This is the drive of
technicity, whose origin may be found in Descartes.
2. Philosophical anthropology is bom
By "anthropology," Heidegger means that philosophical
analysis " . . . which explains and evaluates the whole ensemble
1 7 N, II, p. 452; HW, pp. 236, 24a. What differentiates the various modern philosophers from Descartes and from each other, according to Heidegger, is simply the
manner of conceiving the subject, whether in terms of monads (Leibniz), the transcendental ego (Kant), the infinite Ego (Fichte), Absolute Spirit (Hegel), Freedom
(Schelling), etc. See HW, pp. toi t 85,91,102.
is "Der Grund Vorgang der Neuzeit ist die Eroberung der Welt als Bild
"
(HW, p. 87). CT HW, p. 82 (Weltbild).
" HW, p. 87 (Berechnung, Planung, Züchtung).
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of beings by taking man as both starting point and center of
reference," sc. as subject.20 It is no accident, then, that "humanism" comes in the wake of the new subject-ism, he claims, for
"humanism" can pretend to be nothing more than the moral
and aesthetic dimensions of anthropology. The eighteenthcentury quest for a Weltanschauung is likewise consequential, for
what else can one expect, once the "world" has become a picture,
than that man should seek a way-of-looking-at-it, sc. a worldview? Coming to the nineteenth century, we find the emphasis
placed upon a philosophy of "Life-force," but the basic pattern is
still the same. A being attains status as a being only to the extent
that it is absorbed in some way or other into man's life, sc. becomes a living-experience. In all this struggle of man to find for
himself a place in the world, he is locked within the circle that
he himself describes, for he continues to conceive of himself as
a sub-ject. And the only weapons at his disposal to win for himself a Weltanschauung that would satisfy serve to confirm him
all the more in the very subject-ism from which he suffers, sc.
his own calculation and endeavor. It is in such a favorable
climate as this that science in the sense of "research" burgeons
and technicity comes to full flower. 21
3. Man begins to seek "values"
When beings become obj ects-of-presentation, their Being becomes mere objectiveness, and Being itself, as the process of
emergent truth, is lost to thought. Man compensates for this by
ascribing "value" to beings in such a way that it is the "value"
that becomes the goal of all intercourse with beings. Soon this
intercourse is understood as "culture," the "values" as "cultural
values," the goal of all human creativity, which, in turn, is
placed at the service of man himself in achieving self-certitude
as a subject. From here, it is not a very far step to reduce
"values" themselves to the level of mere objects, sc. present-ed
20 " . . . die vom Menschen aus und auf den Menschen zu das Seiende im Ganzen
erklärt und abschätzt." (HW, p. 86).
3 1 Obviously, there can be no such thing as an anthropology or a Weltanschauung
that in any proper sense can be called either Greek or Christian (HW, pp. 86-87).
As far as Heidegger is concerned, part of the emptiness of nihilism has been that
Christianity has made itself precisely that (HW, p. 70). See HW, pp. 86 (Er-lebnis),
87, 88 (technicity).
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by man himself as the goals necessary to sustain his own activity
in establishing his place in the world-as-picture. At this point,
they become as feeble and shallow as the mere objectiveness that
they mask.22 Thus begins to toll the death-knell that one day
Nietzsche will hear.
C.

POST-CARTESIAN

SUBJECT-ISM

I. Leibniz
It was only to be expected that Descartes' conception of subjectas-consciousness would be precised according to characteristic
modes of conscious activity, such as perception, appetition, etc.,
and Leibniz soon takes the inevitable step. But he takes another
step as well, for he so expands the notion of subject that it can
apply not only to man but to any being whatsoever in which the
process of pro-posing comes-to-pass. " . . . Since Leibniz, beings
come-to-appearance in such a way that every ens qua ens is a res
cogitans and in this sense a subject. . . . " 23
For Leibniz, every monad is a subject, for it pro-poses to itself in the manner of perceptio and appetitus operations that
constitute the essence of life itself. But it is not necessary that
this be a conscious life in the sense of an individual conscious
ego. Perceptio is understood in a broad, indeed metaphysical,
sense, for it signifies any interiorly spontaneous expression or
representation of the universe, even if this be in the form of a
correspondence with the universe of a purely structural, therefore non-conscious, order. The appetitus, on the other hand, is
the tendency of the monad to pass from one perception to another in the quest of more and more adequate (sc. clear and
distinct) perception of the universe. Both are types of presentation, of pro-posing: perceptio pro-poses, sc. (re)presents, the
universe; appetitus pro-poses the perfection of life toward which
the monad strives. Both are profoundly unified in a single
dynamism. Here we have the Cartesian conception of a pro« HW, p. 94.
" " . . . Das Seiende aber erscheint seit Leibniz dergestalt für das Denken, daß
jedes ens qua ens eine res cogitans und in diesem Sinne Subjekt ist
" (HW, p. 121).
Heidegger's italics. The author's most detailed treatment of Leibniz will be found
in N, II, pp. 436-450.
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posing subject expanded to the whole universe of beings. Remark, too, although we cannot go further into the matter here,
that Leibniz' conception of truth-as-conformity is not independent of his monadology.24
But these remarks see Leibniz in relation to Descartes. Heidegger sees him, too, as having a special affinity with Nietzsche,
for the Nietzschean Becoming (Werden) corresponds, he claims,
to the movements that Leibniz calls in the Monadologie (II) the
changements naturels which permeate ens qua ens, sc. ens percipiens et appetens.2S The precise point of contact between the two
can be seen in the correlation of Will-unto-Power with ens qua
appetens, for in meditating appetition, Leibniz is the first to
discern the Being of beings as essentially a willing, even where
the willing does not reach the level of consciousness in a human
ego. Nietzsche's Becoming can be called "Will," then, because
in its essence it is an appetitus. Every appetitus, however,
presents to itself that for which it is an appetite. If every being
is appetitive, sc. determined by a drive to come forth, to manifest itself and to achieve thus its fullness, then every being proposes, or poses (setzt), for itself that toward which it tends. In
(pro)posing thus, the being "sees" the direction of its progress.
What is seen is an "aspect" (Gesichtspunkt), therefore an object,
of its vision.26 How this will be transposed into Nietzschean
terms we shall see subsequently.
2. Leibniz to Hegel
The evolution from Leibniz to Nietzsche is slow, but its direction can be discerned clearly. With Kant, as we know, metaphysics becomes transcendental philosophy, which in turn
evolves into a theory of knowledge. For since, after Descartes,
the being-ness of beings-to-be-known consists in their objectness, the function of transcendental philosophy is to interrogate
the conditions which render it possible for beings to be objects
See HW, p. 226.
HW, p. 212.
86 HW, pp. 212 (changements naturels), 226 (das Willenswesen des Seins des
Seienden), 211 (Gesichtspunkt). N.B. That toward which the being "tends" need not
(and in Nietzsche's case, at least, should not) be considered as its "purpose." See VA,
pp.88-89.
14

n

330

DESCARTES

for a subject. This is tantamount to investigating the conditions
by which objects can be known, hence a Gecopia of (meditation
upon) knowledge. But "theory of knowledge," or even "metaphysics of knowledge," is a term that easily misleads. " . . . In
truth, [Kant] is concerned with a metaphysics of objects, sc. of
beings-as-object, of objects for a subject." 27
Furthermore, we know that this metaphysics of objects, once
the first critique has thrown light upon the inadequacy of pure
reason to ground it, evolves into a metaphysics of will, sc. of
practical reason. Fichte carries the philosophy of willing still
further than Kant. As for Schelling, whatever his later evolution,
at least in the early years he can write (1809) " . . . in the last
and highest instance, there is absolutely no other Being than
willing. . . . " 28 Hegel is for Heidegger the culminating point of
modern subject-ism, if, that is, we may distinguish between
culmination and consummation (Nietzsche). As a matter of fact,
the one introduces the other. For Hegel, too, the metaphysics
of Absolute Knowing (Wissens) is also a philosophy of Spirit-asWill. But Hegel warrants a chapter all his own.
RESUME

When with Descartes truth becomes certitude, only that is
true which can be verified in a manner analogous to the knowing
sub-ject's certitude of itself, sc. by guaranteeing the conformity
between presentation and presented. All beings have sense,
then, sc. "are," only in terms of the subject-object relationship,
and the Being-process as emergence-into-truth (non-concealment)
is profoundly forgotten.

1 7 " . . . In Wahrheit handelt es sich um die Metaphysik des Gegenstandes, d. h.
des Seienden als des Gegenstandes, des Objekts für ein Subjekt." (VA, p. 75).
** " . . . Es gibt in der letzten und höchsten Instanz gar kein andres Seyn als
Wollen
" (F. W. J. Schellings philosophische Schriften, z. Bd., Landshut 2809,
S. 4x9, cited V A , p. X13). See also V A , pp. 89 (Kant), 1x4 (Fichte), 76 (Hegel) and
WD, pp. 35-36.

CHAPTER

IV

HEGEL

I. The Argument

A.

ABSOLUTE

AWARENESS

Perhaps the simplest access for us to Heidegger's interpretation of the Hegelian Absolute is to reflect for a moment upon
a text uttered by Hegel in one of his lectures on the history of
philosophy (WW XV, 328). After speaking of Bacon and Böhme;
he continues:
N o w we come for the first time properly speaking t o the philosophy
of the new world and begin with Descartes. W i t h h i m w e enter upon a
philosophy t h a t stands on its own feet, a philosophy which knows t h a t
it comes independently from reason, a n d t h a t self-consciousness is an
essential moment of the true. Here w e can s a y t h a t w e are a t home, and,
as sailors after a long v o y a g e upon s t o r m y seas, w e c a n c r y 'land'. . . . I n
this new period, the [fundamental] principle is t h o u g h t , thinking t h a t
proceeds from itself. . . . 1

For Hegel, Descartes' discovery of the subjective constituted
a new beginning for philosophy. We recall from the previous
chapter how Descartes had sought a philosophy which stands
on its own feet, a fundamentum (sub-jeetum) inconcussum (absolutum) veritatis. Yet Descartes never fully explained the absolute character of the certitude (ego-cogito-sum) at which he
1 14Wir kommen eigentlich jetzt erst zur Philosophie der neuen Welt und fangen
diese mit Cartesius an. Mit ihm treten wir eigentlich in eine selbständige Philosophie
ein, welche weiß, daß sie selbständig aus der Vernunft kommt und daß das Selbst*
be wüßt sein wesentliches Moment des Wahren ist. Hier, können wir sagen, sind wir
zu Hause, und können, wie der Schiffer nach langer Umherfahrt auf der ungestümen
See 'Land' rufen; . . . In dieser neuen Periode ist das Prinzip das Denken, das von
sich ausgehende Denken, ...»' (WW XV, 338, cited HW, p. 118). For an admirably
succinct restatement of the entire argument which follows, see "Hegel und die
Griechen," Die Gegenwart der Griechen im neueren Denkent Festschrift für HansGeorg Gadamer zum 60. Geburtstag (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Patfl Siebeck], i960),
pp. 44-48- (Hereafter: HG).
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arrived. " . . . The absoluteness of this absolute [fundamentum]
is neither doubted, nor interrogated, nor even in its essentials
so much as mentioned
" 2 Heir to the mediaeval tradition,
Descartes still took the ego to be a "creature," and he felt compelled to ground the absoluteness of its certitude by going through
what Heidegger calls a "back door," sc. by first proving the
existence of a creating God.3 But was this not effectively to
abrogate the declaration of independence with which he had
begun?
The most that can be said for the Cartesian achievement is
that, having once engaged himself in the search for an absolute
knowing, Descartes succeeded in discovering the type of presentation that admits of absolute knowing, sc. consciousness of the
self. Since truth means certitude, he saw that self-consciousness
plays an essential röle in attaining the true. After him, Kant
explored the nature and limitations of consciousness, but it is
left to Hegel to probe the absoluteness of this knowing, the
Absolute as such. Heidegger sustains the Hegelian metaphor
by saying that, if Descartes sighted new land, Hegel takes full
possession of it. 4
Taking possession of the new land consists in exploring the
absolute character of knowing (Wissen). Yet how are we to
understand the term "absolute"? Heidegger returns to the
word's Latin origin (ab-solvere) to give it the radical sense of
that which has been "loosened," therefore released from another, whose bonds of dependence upon the other are dis-(sc.
ab-)solved. In terms of the Hegelian problematic, from what is
"absolute" Knowing released? From dependence upon objects
in assuring itself of its truth.
The plausibility of such a conception is clear enough, if we
recall the conception of truth that came into philosophy with
Descartes. As long as truth was conformity of knowing to
known, the object played an indispensable role in it, for the
knowing subject depended on its object in order to be true. But
once truth is conceived as certitude, then the focal point of concern becomes the knowing itself which verifies itself to itself
a " . . . Aber die Absolutheit dieses Absoluten wird weder bezweifelt, noch befragt,
noch auch nur in ihrem Wesen genannt...." (HW, p. 139).
8 HW, p. 123 (Hintertür eines Gottesbeweises).
« HW, pp. 118 (Kant), 118, 121 (Besitz).
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and for itself. In order to be true, the knowing depends not only
on its object but on its own assurance of itself. Thereby the
knowing is loosened (ab-solved) from its complete dependence
upon the object in the process of truth. The more we explore the
nature of self-assurance, the more the object, if it remains part
of the process at all, becomes a matter of indifference. To the
extent that knowing is released from dependence on the presentation of objects and becomes more aware of itself as knowing,
the knowing becomes absolute.
We may distinguish three aspects of the process: absolvence,
sc. the general tendency of knowing to release itself from dependence on objects; absolving, sc. this tendency in its dynamism, striving to make the release from objects complete; absolution, the actual freedom from objects that is thus achieved in
the process of knowing. The distinction is Heidegger's, not
Hegel's, and its value is only expository. Heidegger claims
" . . . it is the unity of absolvence (releasing from the relation
[to an object]), absolving (the completeness of this releasing)
and absolution (liberation by reason of this completeness) that
characterizes the absoluteness of the Absolute. . . . " 5 How
successive absolvence in the coming-to-pass of Absolute Knowing
proceeds, beginning with the spontaneous certitude of the sense
order and continuing through sense-perception, understanding
and the unconditioned Self-awareness of Reason (Spirit) this it is the principal function of the Phenomenology of the Spirit
to elucidate.
Such is the genuine sense, according to Heidegger, of the
"absolute" in Knowing, of Knowing as Absolute: the dissolution
of dependence on objects in Knowing's knowing of itself. If we
recall that, for Hegel, Knowing (Wissen) and Being-aware (Bewußtsein) are but one,6 it is perfectly understandable how the
search for Absolute Knowing is elaborated in terms of Beingaware and Being-self-aware.
Before we proceed, however, we must add two explications
to the interpretations of "absolute," not mentioned as such by
the author, but having their warrant in the text. In the first
5 " . . . Die Einheit von Absolvenz (Loslösung aus der Relation), Absolvieren
(Vollständigkeit des Loslösens) und Absolution (Freispruch aus der Vollständigkeit)
kennzeichnen die Absolutheit des Absoluten
" (HW, p. 125).
• HW, p. 133 (Selbe).
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place, Knowing that is absolved from dependence is not conditioned by objects. Whatever conditions are imposed upon it
are imposed by its own nature. Absolute Knowing is therefore
unconditioned; unconditioned Absolute Knowing is absolved
from dependence on objects. Further, there is a sense - and this
is essential to comprehending speculative thought - in which
we must say that it is absolved, sc. prescinds, from the individual
human ego. For what is essential to the process of knowing is
simply knower and known, subject and that which the subject
presents to itself. Knowing subject comes-to-presence as subject
by reason of its relation to an object which comports also a
relation to the subject, for subject presents the object to itself.
Since Leibniz, however, it is possible to conceive this subjectobject-subject relationship as characteristic of the Being of
beings as such, without restricting it to the conscious psychological process of any given human individual. In this sense
(though only in this sense), unconditioned Knowing must be
said to be absolved from dependence upon the individual human
ego. Hence it is an essential way in which Knowing is absolute.
"Unconditioned Self-knowing is, as the subject-ness of the
subject, the absolute-ness of the Absolute. . . . " 7
Let us admit quite readily, however, that this last remark
opens up a problem rather than solves one, for there is a relationship, indeed an essential one, between the Absolute and
human individuals, which will enable us to say that the Absolute
could not shine-forth as itself without them. In fact, it will be
the function of the entire Phenomenology of the Spirit to discern
this relationship. We shall return to the matter presently. For
the moment, however, we must be content with this tentative
description of the nature of Absolute Knowing, of the Absolute
as Knowing, of Knowing as Absolute, insisting again that
unconditioned Self-Knowing is not only the subject-ness of the
Subject but the absolute-ness of the Absolute. "The absoluteness of the Absolute, the absolvent, absolving absolution, is the
effort of self-seizure in unconditioned self-certitude. . . . " 8
7 "Das unbedingte Sichwissen ist als die Subjektität des Subjekts die Absolutheit
des Absoluten
" (HW, p. 122). See pp. 122-122.
8 "Die Absolutheit des Absoluten, die absolvent sich absolvierende Absolution,
ist die Arbeit des Sich begreifens der unbedingten S e l b s t g e w i ß h e i t . . ( H W , p.
127). "Self-seizure" (Sichbegreifen) suggests already the sense in which Hegel will
understand "concept" (Begriff).
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J. Knowing as Presence
To know is to be aware, sc. self-aware. To the extent that
Knowing knows itself, it is a self-knowing, it is to be self-aware,
it is self-awareness. Whether we speak in terms of knowing or of
awareness, the problem is the same. When we say that knowing
and awareness are equivalent, it is more precise, perhaps, to say
that to know is to be (-sein) aware (Bewußt-) in the sense of to
be in the state of having-come-to-know, where the state of
knowing is the condition in which a knowing subject is.
We must understand the meaning of "to know." Heidegger
returns to the Indo-Germanic form of vid to see a correlation between the Latin vidi and the German Wissen which permits him
to interpret the fundamental meaning of Wissen as "to-haveseen." To see, however, is to render-present; what has been seen
is present to the seer because rendered-present by the process of
seeing. In this case the sense of "to see" is broadened out to
include any type of present-ation, so that the knowing of
Hegel, like the thinking (cogitare) of Descartes, embraces any
process by which the subject renders-present to itself, whether
this be of the sensible, rational, volitional or affective order. To
know, then, is to-have-seen, to-have-rendered-present.9
We are concerned, however, with Absolute Knowing (presentation). Who is it in this case that presents? Clearly the Absolute
itself as present-ative Subject. But what is it that is present-ed?
Not any particular object, for we are dealing with Absolute
Knowing, in precision (absolution) from particular objects. What
is present-ed can be only present-edness as such.10 Now present-edness as such is, to be sure, a "presence," but the presence of
what is rendered-present (or re-presented) by, to and for the
Absolute Subject. Being-aware, then, considered as Absolute,
means to be in the state of having rendered present present-edness as such. " . . . Conscientia is a gathering together into
Presence, [but] in the manner of Presence of something represented. . . . M 1 1
•

HW,

p.

133.

HW, p. 134 (im Zustand der Vorgestelltheit).
" . . . Die conscientia ist die Versammlung in die Anwesenheit von der Art der
Präses« des Repräsentierten
" (HW, p. 133).
10
11
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So it is, then, that " . . . present-ation is the fundamental
characteristic of Knowing in the sense of Self-awareness of the
[Absolute] Subject. Presentation is an essential form of Presence
(rcopouaia). . . . " 1 2 In other words, present-ation characterizes
the Being of the Absolute Subject as such, whose Being " . . . is
Presence [if only] in the manner of representation. . . . " 1 3
Awareness, therefore, means gathering together into Presence,
but the Presence of present-edness. For reasons of clarity, we
call this represented Presence "present-ness," but the author
himself is often content to call it by a term proper to himself, sc.
"Presence" (Anwesenheit), and gives it, besides, the Greek term
7capou<Tta. But we must always understand this as the presence
of present-ation.
2. Presence as Shining-forth
From all this follows an important consequence. If the Being
of the Absolute Subject is that of an Absolute Present-ation,
then it is the most elemental characteristic of this Subject to
make manifest (because present-ation is manifest-ation) itself
(because Absolute). Self-manifestation is a coming-to-appearance,
a shining-forth (Erscheinen). " . . . T o shine-forth . . . means:
to come-to-presence in the full effulgence of a representation
that renders itself present. The shining-forth is, properly speaking,
the coming-to-presence itself, the 7capou<n<x of the Absolute. . . . " 1 4
Shining-forth in Absolute Present-ation, then, is the manner in
which Absolute Awareness itself comes-to-presence. The shiningforth is simply the way in which this coming-to-presence
(Twcpoucriot) announces itself. " . . . Awareness as such is in itself
that which comes-to-appearance. . . . " 15 This permits us to say
that since unconditioned Self-knowing (therefore Awareness)
constitutes the subject-ness of the Subject, sc. its Being, then
1 1 " . . . Die Präsentation ist der Grundzug des Wissens im Sinne des Selbstbewußtseins des Subj ekts. Die Präsentation ist eine Wesensweise von Präsenz (Tcocpouota) •
. . . " (HW, p. 122).
1 8 " . . . Sie ist die Präsenz in der Weise der Repräsentation
M (HW, p. 134)'
Heidegger's italics.
1 4 " . . . Das Erscheinen aus diesem Scheinen des Strahls bedeutet: Anwesen im
vollen Glanz der sich- präsentierenden Repräsentation. Das Erscheinen ist das
eigentliche Anwesen selber: die Parusie des Absoluten
" (HW, p. 130).
1 8 " . . . Das Bewußtsein ist als solches in sich das Erscheinende...."
(HW, p.

134).

h e g e l

337

the Being of the Absolute Subject consists in Shining-forth as
such.
j. Shining-forth and naQovaia
Our meditation has taken us from Absolute Knowing to
Awareness as Absolute Present-ation in the guise of a Shiningforth as 7tocpovuioc. To be 7rapouaia and to come-to-presence belong to the very nature of Absolute Awareness. If the stem
oucria be taken to signify the being-ness of Absolute Awareness,
the prefix 7rotp- suggests an essential correlate. For this shiningforth does not take place by itself but "by us," sc. "by the side
of us," therefore by, through and in us, in union with us
(humans). Furthermore, this coming-to-presence in union with
men is necessary to the Absolute. " . . . This coming-to-presence
in conjunction with us (rcapouaia) belongs to the Absolute
in and for itself. . . . " 16 Two remarks are in order:
a. T H E A B S O L U T E A S W I L L - The 7copoua£A (the comingto-presence of the Absolute in conjunction with men) is necessary to the Absolute, and with a necessity of its nature. This
necessity of nature in the Absolute is expressed as "Will," by
which is meant simply the absolute-ness itself of the Absolute,
but considered as dynamic compulsion, taking itself into its
own hands by gathering itself into the fullness of its own nature,
thus achieving the full coming-to-presence of itself. This Will is
absolutely efficacious and the process of execution is an irresistible power that knows no rest until the 7tapou<i(a is completely
achieved. In the simplest terms, the Absolute conceived as Will
is simply the dynamic necessity of the Absolute to be itself,
therefore to achieve the process of Absolute Self-awareness
throughTOxpouata,sc. by shining-forth with and in men. Without
men, the Absolute would be prisoner of its own solitude, unable
to emerge into the truth of itself. 17

u
" . . . Dieses Bei-uns-an-wesen, die Parusie, gehört zum Absoluten an und für
s i c h . . ( H W , p. 120).
1 7 HW, pp. 124, «5» 149. W , 187 (Wille), 187 (Sich-zusammen-nehmen), 175
(anwese), 148 (Walten der Unruhe), 177 (Notwendigkeit), 187-r88 (wäre Einsame).
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b. T H E A B S O L U T E A S A N T E C E D E N C E Absolute
Awareness comes-to-presence in men. This is its 7uapou<j[oc. Hence
the futility of trying to conceive it as "outside" of men, and
human knowing as a means to attain the Absolute, as if the
Absolute were on one side and the human knower on the other.
An "Absolute" that is on "one side," separated from man by an
intermediary, would be no Absolute at all. For as 7tapoua£a, it
is already coming-to-presence in-by-through man. In fact, this
presence-with-man is itself the light which illumines man and
renders it possible for him to discern the Absolute. Human
knowing of the Absolute, on the other hand, means standing
forth in this light, as if knowing were a point where these rays
are returned or re-flected upon themselves, so that this point of
reversion, which is human knowing, finds in the radiance of the
7tapouoioc the source of its own Being. Man's task is not to attain
the Absolute but, already interior to it, simply to elucidate his
relationship to it. 18
To have realized that in order to meditate the Absolute he
must begin in absolute fashion, sc. to the extent of the possible he
must "re-construct" a fundamental structure that already exists
- this is one of Hegel's master strokes.19 But it also accounts
for the special difficulty of Phenomenology of the Spirit for the
ordinary reader, whose "natural" thought processes, orientated
toward objects, do not permit him to thematize the Absolute.
It also explains why Heidegger can claim that the so-called
"Introduction" to the Phenomenology (nos. 1-16) is in fact a
misnomer, simply because there can be no introduction into the
7capou<rioc, which from the very first moment holds sway. Finally,
it explains why any analysis of 7uocpou<ria is necessarily circular
in structure. "What is true is the Whole . . . ; " at every moment
the whole of Hegel's thought is contained in any particular
enunciation of it. 20 The affinity with Heidegger's own conception
of the "hermeneutic circle" is apparent. But it makes exposition
18 HW, p. 123 (in keinem Fall Absolute), 120 (schon die Weise, Strahl des Lichtes),
126-127 (innerhalb der Parusie).
19 HW, pp. 139 (mit Absolutheit beginnt), 189 (schon in Parusie).
20 "Das Wahre ist das G a n z e . . . . " (G. W. Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes,
ed. Hofmeister [Hamburg: Meiner, 1952], p. 21). We know, for example, that when
Hegel comes to formulate the System in its completeness in the Enzyklopädie, Logik
precedes the Phänomenologie, for it is, after all, the more absolute of the two.
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difficult, and we must be content to proceed in concentric
circles.
Let this suffice for a tentative delineation of the nature of the
Hegelian Absolute: it is an Absolute Knowing (Awareness),
whose Being consists in a Shining-forth that must take place
in-by-with-through man, already somehow manifest to him before he begins to thematize it. Our task now is to discern more
precisely the process of thematization.
B.

THE

EXPERIENCE

OF A B S O L U T E

AWARENESS

x. Experience in General Terms
The specific focus of Heidegger's Hegel-analysis is not so
much Absolute Awareness as rather the role of Experience (Erfahrung) in its coming-to-presence-with-man. Because we must
proceed in concentric fashion, let us first state the whole of the
thesis in general terms, so that we may then discern more readily
what is true in the necessarily partial examination of details.
Quite simply, Experience for Hegel is not some act of human
cognition,21 whether of the sensible or of the intellectual order,
but it designates the entire process by which (already) Absolute
Knowing comes to know itself as absolute. Since Knowing is
Awareness and the essence of Awareness is to shine-forth in
conjunction with man, Experience is the process by which
Awareness in its raxpoucria successively absolves itself from
dependence on objects by gradually realizing its own role in the
constitution of these objects, thereby becoming more and more
aware of its Self, sc. Absolute (because completely ab-solved)
Self-awareness.
More precisely, Awareness is always that process by which the
knowing subject presents an object to itself. Now the object (as
such) is present to the subject only by reason of the present-ing
process that proceeds from the subject, but initially, and according to the "natural''' way of looking at things for ordinary
common sense, the knowing subject does not advert to this. The
subject presumes that the object is completely autonomous,
existing in itself (an sich). It is not known as an object, sc. as
21

HW, p. 266 (Erkennens).
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opposed to the subject, for the initial naivete does not permit
even that much sophistication. But the fact is that as an object
it can exist only for present-ative Awareness (für es). What we
have called absolvence consists in the process by which Awareness
becomes aware of this fact, sc. recognizes the cleavage within
itself that permits it to consider the object as "other" than itself, yet nevertheless for itself by reason of a still more profound
unity that combines the two. At this moment the object is
known "in and for itself" (an und für sich).
This is the moment, properly speaking, when absolvence takes
place, for here Awareness absolves itself from dependence upon
the object and comes to know itself better, sc. it becomes more
absolute than before. As the process continues, the absolute-ness
becomes more and more complete. Awareness comes to be aware
of itself as absolute. We can discern a double aspect in absolvence: negative, by which Awareness frees itself from its
initial conception of the true and therefore becomes other than
it was; positive, by which in becoming other than it was it comes
gradually to the realization of itself, sc. Self-awareness.
This process of Self-absolvence is what Hegel means b y Experience. Who has the Experience? Awareness itself, sc. the
Knowing Subject. In the phrase "Experience of Awareness," the
genitive is "subjective" more than it is "objective." If it is "objective," too, the reason is that the Absolute Subject has the
Experience of itself. The genitive is "objective" only because it
is "subjective/' because the Subject in question is Absolute.
Now let us examine all this more in detail.
2. Three Principles of Awareness
Heidegger disengages from the Hegelian text three "principles" that govern the process of absolvence: I. "Awareness is
for itself its own concept." 22 II. "Awareness supplies of itself
its own norm." 28 III. "Awareness puts itself to the test." 24
1 8 M . . . Das Bewußtsein aber ist für sich selbst sein Begriff
M (Hegel, Phänomenologie, p. 69). See HW, p. 148.
M " . . . Das Bewußtsein gibt seinen Maßstab an ihm selbst
" (Hegel, Phänomenologie, p. 71). See HW, p. 155.
** " . . . das Bewußtsein sich selbst prüft
" (Hegel, Phänomenologie, p. 72).
See HW, p. 159.
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These principles polarize the argument nicely, so we examine
them in turn.
a.

PRINCIPLE

I : " A W A R E N E S S IS F O R I T S E L F I T S

OWN

We know already that the absolute-ness of the
Absolute consists in the process by which it seizes itself in unconditioned (Self-) certitude. This process is a Self-seizure that is,
after all, an Absolute Knowing, and Hegel calls it by a term that
is congruous with the entire context that knowing comports,
sc. "concept."
To understand the full import of this we must meditate the
distinction which Hegel himself makes between concept as
(Self-)''seizure" and a "mere concept" ("nur Begriff'). The distinction derives from the difference between concrete and
abstract knowing, but these terms understood in the Hegelian
sense. For Hegel, that is "abstract" which is in any way onesided or incomplete; that knowing is "concrete" which knows
the known completely. Knowing is abstract to the extent that
it is relative, sc. dependent on its object. It is concrete to the
extent that it is absolved from this dependence and knows itself
as constituting the knowability of the object, sc. becomes absolute. Now according to the language of traditional logic, that
type of knowing which seizes its object abstractly (universally)
is called a "concept" (Begriff), Hegel accepts the term, but insists that, to the extent that it remains abstract, the knowing is
relative, sc. it is a "mere concept," hence not yet a completely
authentic seizure of the known because not yet a seizure of it in
all its knowability. When the knowing seizes the known authentically, comprehending it as constituted by the Knowing Subject,
then the knowing is concrete and absolute, simply because it is
an adequate seizure of itself.
It is only at this point that one may say that the knowing
knows the known with "unconditioned certitude," for the certitude consists in the fact that the "what" of the known and the
"how" of the knower are conjoined in the absolute unity of
unconditioned Knowing as such. In any case, the Knower has
an adequate seizure of the known simply because it achieves
unconditioned seizure of itself:

CONCEPT."
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. . . "Seizure" means now: the process by which Awareness shines-forth
unto itself in truth. Its essence consists in unconditioned certitude. In
these terms, an [object-] known is not yet seized when it is merely
presented in a general way [sc. abstractly]. Much rather must the known
in its known-ness be referred back to the corresponding process of
knowing and be presented in relation to [this process] itself. Only thus is
the known [seized] from every side [by] the process of knowing which
has thereby . . . become at once both comprehensive and unconditioned. . . . 2 5

We are in a position now to understand the important distinction between "real" and "natural" Knowing. For Hegel,
that is real which is true (Wahre) and that is true which is certain,
sc. known with certainty. From what we have seen above, it is
clear that the being that is known with certainty is comprehended in that by which it is known, therefore in its being-ness
as a known, sc. as a coming-to-presence (therefore deriving its
Being) in and through the process of Knowing. Knowing is
''real," then, when it knows the known in that by which it is
real, sc. in its reality, its Being:
• . . Real knowing is that knowing which renders present in any given case
and everywhere a being in its being-ness (reality), that which comes-toappearance in that-by-which-it-appears. A knowing of the reality of the
real is for this reason called real knowing. . . . 2 6

We infer, then, that Knowing is real when it is an authentic
seizure (concept) of the known, sc. as such, in its Being.
Opposed to real Knowing is non-real knowing. This does not
mean that it is no knowing at all, but only that it does not know
the real as real (sc. in that by which it is real, as such, in its
Being). It is called "natural" knowing. This knowing "hangs
upon," therefore depends upon (hence relative, non-absolute),
the superficies of the object and does not penetrate clearly to
that dimension in the being by reason of which it is (known),
** " . . . 'Begriff bedeutet jetzt: das Sich-selbst-erscheinen des Bewußtseins in
seiner Wahrheit. Deren Wesen besteht in der unbedingten Gewißheit. Ihr gemäß ist
ein Gewußtes noch nicht begriffen, wenn es nur im allgemeinen vorgestellt wird. Es
muß vielmehr in seinem Gewußtsein auf das zugehörige Wissen zurückbezogen und
in diesem Bezug mit ihm selbst vorgestellt sein. So allein ist das Gewußte allseitig
im Wissen, das hierdurch ein allgemeines Vorstellen (Begreifen) in einem umfassenden
und zugleich unbedingten Sinne geworden ist
" (HW, p. 148). See HW, pp. 136137 ("nur Begriff').
1 6 " . . . Das reale Wissen ist das Wissen, das jeweils und überall das Seiende in
seiner Seiendheit (Realität), das Erscheinende in seinem Erscheinen, vorstellt. Das
Wissen der Realität des Realen heißt darum das reale Wissen
" (HW, p. 136).
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sc. its Being. Such is the knowing of ordinary, everyday living
and thinking. Spontaneously it takes the superficies of the beings
it encounters as the only dimension in them, confidently holds
this to be the "true" being, and any explanation of the being
that is offered is always in terms of this superficies, never of
what is "behind" it. 27
Yet this does not mean that natural knowing has no cognizance of the Being-dimension of beings whatsoever If this were
the case, it could not know beings at all. But it does not advert
to this knowledge. This leaves natural knowing in a condition of
ambiguity: on the one hand it knows Being; on the other hand
it does not know Being because it does not know its own knowing,
sc. itself. It presents Being only in general, hence knows the
objectiveness of the object (the reality of the real, the Being of
the beings-encountered) only abstractly, implicitly, non-absolutely, never as such.28
This situation of ambiguity Heidegger describes in a language
admittedly his own and with all the necessary reserves. Natural
knowing that clings to the superficial dimension of the beings it
meets, taking them for beings and nothing more (in Hegelian
terms, "objects" that are "real" or "actual") - this Heidegger
now calls "ontic" knowing. On the other hand, Knowing that
gathers (Xeyeiv) beings (8v) together in terms of what makes them
to be such, therefore seizes them in their objectiveness, reality
and actuality, sc. as what they are (in their Being) - this is
"ontological" Knowing. When this ontological Knowing is
possessed but not adverted to, it is called pre-ontological.
Awareness in the condition of natural knowing is simultaneously
ontic and pre-ontological.
Now the whole process of absolvence consists in the passage
from the initial condition of natural knowing to the state of real
Knowing, from ontic-preontological to ontological Awareness
(of the objectiveness, reality, actuality — hence Being) of the
known, sc. to the Awareness of itself as absolute. It is in Selfawareness thus achieved that the authentic seizure (concept) of
the known consists. We interpret the first principle of Awareness
to mean, then, that what Awareness grasps, when it seizes the
1 7 HW, pp. 144 (Einseitigkeit), 137 (Meinen), 160, 164 (Dahinter).
™ HW, pp. 136 (achtet nicht), 160 ("als").
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known in its Being, is itself. Two supplementary remarks are in
order.
Firstly, it is clear from all we have seen that Awareness "itself" is neither natural (ontic-preontological) nor read (ontological)
Awareness, nor, for that matter, a coupling of the two. Rather it is
the original unity of both. Furthermore, as the original unity out of
which both natural and real knowing arise, Awareness itself is also
the differentiation between the two. When Awareness shines-forth
as itself, this unity and differentiation appear. " . . . [Awareness
itself] is neither mere natural Awareness in itself, nor mere real
Awareness for itself, but the antecedent and original unity that
is in and for itself. . . . " 29
Secondly, the progress of Awareness as such from the ontic to
the ontological condition is a passage, sc. it must make its way
(Weg) from one to another. Of necessity it means being-underway (Be-weg-ung)> sc. a movement. It is a coming-and-going:
the Being of the known comes-to-light; simultaneously, the
known itself, insofar as in the state of natural knowing it appeared as true, "goes away," sc. is seen in a new light. The
differentiating unity, then, is dynamic. " . . . This coming-andgoing that is unified within itself is the movement by which
Awareness itself is. . . . " 30 This movement is the steady advance
forward toward ever more luminous Self-awareness. But at any
given moment it is always particularized in some form of presentation, the succession of these forms constituting the history of
Awareness, sc. the history of its "formation" by which it slowly
"becomes" itself in truth, sc. Self-awareness. These forms are
successive moments in which Awareness seizes itself. This gives
Heidegger warrant to say that in the first of the three principles
of Awareness ("Awareness is for itself its own [Self-] seizure")
the emphasis falls on "is." The sense is that Awareness achieves
for itself its own shining-forth in itself, and, indeed, in such a
way that in this shining-forth of Self it establishes the domain
wherein that shining-forth takes place which is proper to its own
29 " . . . Dieser ist die Geschichte des Bewußtseins selbst, das weder nur das natürliche Bewußtsein an sich, noch nur das reale Wissen für sich, sondern vordem die
ursprüngliche Einheit beider an und für sich i s t . . . . " (HW, p. 140). See HW, pp.
145, 150, 168-169 (Unterschied, Zwischen).
30 " . . . Dieses in sich einige Kommen und Gehen ist die Bewegung, als welche
das Bewußtsein selbst ist
" (HW, p. 140). Heidegger's italics.
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essence. " . . . T h u s Awareness finds itself in its own (Self-}
seizure." 31
b.

PRINCIPLE

II:

"AWARENESS

SUPPLIES

FOR

IT-

The second "principle" that governs
the process of Absolute Awareness finds its sense in terms of
what we have said already about the absolute-ness of Knowing.
Because the Knowing with which we are dealing is absolute, it
is impossible to speak of human knowing as a "means" by which
we attain the Absolute conceived as an object, a means which,
like any other means, can be examined critically and put to the
test (Prüfen)*2 Absolute Knowing is in some way prior to human
knowing and interior to it. This is the sense of 7rapouaia. But then
the question arises: in what way is human knowing a "way" to
Absolute Knowing as the process by which Awareness comes to
an adequate seizure of itself? Progress of such a type implies
Self-discovery that would be impossible if Knowing were not
put to the test. Even in Absolute Knowing, then, there must be
a testing. But what is its nature? By what standard, or norm,
is it conducted? The second and third principles of Awareness
deal with these questions. Principle II is concerned with the
norm, Principle III with its application.
Let us take the situation of natural, non-reflective Knowing,
where a known which Awareness initially holds to be true comesto-presence through a knowing. If this process is to be put to
the test, then this process of appearing (Erscheinende) must be
examined in terms of that by reason of which it takes place (Erscheinen). When this is accomplished, then the known that is
held to be true appears in its truth, as also, for that matter, does
the Knowing Subject itself.33 AD this takes place, however, only
on the condition that Awareness returns upon itself through a
process of reflection for which the initial duality of knowing and
known becomes itself an object whose truth is to shine-forth by
reason of the reflective discernment.
What is to be measured here ? The original process of knowing
in which the known shines forth. What is the standard by which
SELF

ITS

OWN

NORM."

3 1 " . . . So findet das Bewußtsein sich selbst in seinem Begriff." (HW, p. 148).
See HW, pp. 140 (Bildung), 164 (Werden).
3 2 HW, pp. u g , 126, 150 (Mittel), 127, 151 (Prüfung).
33 HW, p. 158 (Wahre, Wahrheit).
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it is measured? That by reason of which this known does shineforth, hence the Being of the knowing process, the objectiveness
of the object, sc. Awareness itself, whose nature is to shine-forth.
Finally, who is it that does the measuring ? Again, it can be only
Awareness itself through the process of reflection. Hence, the
formula, "Awareness that shines-forth is of itself the to-bemeasured and the measure...," 34 means that: the to-bemeasured is Awareness as ontic knowing; the measure is Awareness as ontological knowing. This duality finds expression
in Principle II: "Awareness supplies of itself its own norm."
The "of itself" (an ihm selbst) here is intentionally ambiguous. It
can mean "to itself," as the above explanation suggests; it can
mean, too, that this condition springs from the very essence of
Awareness as such, for we might infer as much from Principle I,
to the effect that when Awareness makes a genuine seizure of a
known, what it seizes is itself.
c.

PRINCIPLE

III:

"AWARENESS

PUTS

ITSELF

TO

If the to-be-tested is ontic knowing and the
measuring standard is ontological knowing, what is the testing
itself? Nothing else than the process by which Awareness discerns the ontological dimension of ontic knowing. Hence,
Principle III: "Awareness puts itself to the test."
Furthermore, it must be so. Principle III means: "Awareness,
insofar as it is Awareness, is a [Self-] testing. . . . " 35 For it is the
nature of Awareness to present the known to itself. Both known
and Self are different, sc. mutually other. The known is differentiated from the knowing Self by and through the knowing
which simultaneously is, at least implicitly, a Self-knowing. This
differentiating belongs to the very nature of Awareness, whose
own unity makes it from another point of view no differentiating
at all:
THE

TEST."

. . . Awareness is in itself a differentiating w h i c h is none a t all. A s this
difference t h a t is no difference, Awareness is in i t s essence a m b i g u o u s .
T h i s ambiguous condition is the essence of presentation. . . . 3 6
* 4 "Das erscheinende Bewußtsein ist an ihm selbst das zu Messende und der Maßstab
" (HW, p. X57>. See pp. 155-157 (Maß und Gemessenes, an ihm selbst).
** " . . . Das Bewußtsein ist, sofern es Bewußtsein ist, das Prüfen
" (HW, p.
*5ö). Writer's italics. See pp. 152-153.
1 6 " . . . Das Bewußtsein ist in sich ein Unterscheiden, das keines ist. Das Bewußtsein ist als dieser Unterschied, der keiner ist, in seinem Wesen zweideutig.
Dieses Zweideutige ist das Wesen des Vorstellens
" (HW, p. 153).
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This ambiguity (better: bi-dimensionality) of Awareness characterizes it in its essence. This ambiguity can be expressed in other
terms: as the bi-dimensionality characteristic of the very
structure of Awareness, whereby Awareness already is (ontologically) what it not yet is (ontically). In any case, it is of the
nature of Awareness to compare its knowing of the object with
its knowing of itself. Now this continuous comparing is precisely
what we understand by Awareness' "putting itself to the test."
" . . . This comparing is the testing. . . . " 37
In other words, what is compared is ontic knowing (the immediate presentation of some object) with ontological knowing,
the simultaneous present - ation of this object as object, therefore
the Awareness of its objectiveness, or Being. In the moment of
ontic knowing, ontological knowing also comes to pass but is not
adverted to, sc. it is pre-ontological. The comparison that we
now call "testing" consists in the adverting of Awareness to
this pre-ontological comprehension of the Being of its object.
Because Awareness, or more literally To-be-aware (Bewußtsein),
means to be this differentiation between ontic and ontological
knowing, " . . . therefore Awareness of its very nature is a comparing of what is ontically and ontologically presented. As this
comparing, Awareness is [continually] in the process of [Self-]
testing. In itself, its process of present-ing is naturally a process
of putting-itself-to-the-test." 38
By reason of this comparison, ontic knowing is not completely
obliterated, of course, but rather it is now seen in its truth, sc.
in its ontological dimension. Awareness returns upon itself to
discern in itself the original unity of these two dimensions. It
comprehends itself better. Through such a process, Awareness
shines-forth unto itself in itself, illuminating itself as that whose
nature it is to shine-forth, illuminating, too, the manner in which
this shining-forth takes place. Awareness comes-to-presence
unto itself. It is. " . . . Awareness is insofar as it comes to itself
in its truth." 39
" . . . Dieses Vergleichen is/ das P r ü f e n . . ( H W , p. 159). Heidegger's italics.
" . . . deshalb ist das Bewußtsein aus seiner Natur die Vergleichung des ontisch
und ontologisch Vorgestellten. Als die Vergleichung ist es im Prüfen. In sich selbst
ist sein Vorstellen ein natürliches Sich-auf-die-Probe-stellen." (HW, p. 163).
39 " . . . Das Bewußtsein ist, indem es sich in seiner Wahrheit wird." (HW, p.
164). Writer's italics.
87

38
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3. The Nature of Experience
This process of comparison by which Awareness discerns its
own ontological dimension in ontic Knowing - this is for Hegel
" . . . the dialectical movement . . . that is called Experience. . . . " 40
a. E X P E R I E N C E - Experience designates the dynamic
integration of the three principles of Awareness coalescing
in a single movement. " . . . Experience is the manner in
which Awareness, insofar as it is, moves forward toward a seizure
of itself as what it is in truth
" 4 1 It is the process of absolvence. By reason of Experience, that which shines-forth in
ontic Knowing is known in that by reason of which it shines
forth (Erscheinen), sc. in its relation to Awareness itself as bidimensionally present-ative. Hence Experience achieves a double
clarity: the being-presented-as-object (8v) is known as (fj 8v)
what it is in relation to Knowing; Awareness comes to a fuller
comprehension of itself as that whose nature it is to shine forth
in and through this bi-dimensional present-ation. " . . . Through
Experience, Awareness-that-shines-forth comes-to-presence in
its own proper [Being] as that [whose nature it is to] shineforth. . . . " 4 2
Through the shining-forth that takes place in Experience,
Awareness itself comes-to-presence in its own Being, sc. as a
shining-forth in the manner of Knowing. If it is by Experience
that all beings - not only the object-known but the Subjectknowing (Awareness itself) - come to shine-forth in Awareness
as what they are (in their Being), it follows that Experience itself is the Being or being-ness (Seiendheit) of beings. " . . . Experience is a manner of coming-to-presence, sc. of Being, . . . " 4 a
(of the Being proper to Awareness as such). " . . . Everything

40 " . . . Diese dialektische Bewegung
. . . was Erfahrung genannt w i r d . . . "
(Hegel, Phänomenologie, p. 73). See HW, p. 165. Hegel's italics.
41 " . . . Das Erfahren ist die Weise, wie das Bewußtsein, insofern es ist, ausfährt
nach seinem Begriff, als welcher es in Wahrheit ist
" (HW, p. 170).
42 " . . . Durch die Erfahrung west das erscheinende Bewußtsein als das erscheinende in sein eigenes Anwesen bei sich a n . . .
(HW, p. 170). See HW, p. 166 (6v f) Öv).
43 " . . . Das Erfahren ist eine Weise des Anwesens, d.h. des Seins. .
(HW, p170). Heidegger italicizes whole.
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depends upon [our] considering the Experience discussed here
as the Being of Awareness. . . . " 44
b. D I A L E C T I C A L M O V E M E N T - Experience is essentially
a movement, for through Experience Awareness is continually
under way towards the full realization of itself. Hence, for
Awareness, Experience can be conceived as the process of
making-its-way, sc. of expending sufficient effort (auslangend-)
to strive after (-erlangende-) and attain (-Gelangen) Selfawareness.45
Hegel calls the movement "dialectical," with no immediate
explanation. This leaves Heidegger free to offer his own interpretation in terms of the present context. The movement of
Awareness toward Self-awareness is a continual comparison in
and by Awareness between its ontic and ontological dimensions.
This comparison can be conceived, if one will, as a dialogue: the
ontic-preontological appeals to the ontological dimension as an
explanation of itself; the ontological dimension replies by claiming
to be the truth of the ontic. It is this interchange (Sia-) of appeal
and reply (-Xeyea&ai) that is the dialogue of Awareness with itself.
" . . . In this dialogue, Awareness articulates to itself its own
truth. . . . " 46 This is the first sense that can be given to the term
"dialectical."
There is a second sense that extends and includes the first. The
dialogue is not confined to one single moment or restricted to
one form of the movement toward Self-awareness. Rather it
runs through (8ia-) the entire manifold of forms through which
Awareness passes in its advance towards itself. By reason of this
sustained dialogue it gathers itself (-X£yeiv) into its fullness, sc.
into the truth of its own essence. This thorough-going (8ia-)
gathering of itself (-Xeyecr&aO unto itself offers another sense of
"dialectical."
It is these two senses taken in their ensemble that constitute
for Heidegger the full meaning of "dialectical." "Awareness is
Awareness as the dialogue between natural and real Knowing,
44 " . . . Alles liegt daran, die hier genannte Erfahrung als das Sein des Bewußtseins zu denken
" (HW, p. 171).
46 HW, pp. 167 (sich be-wegt), 170 (Erfahren).
46 " . . . In diesem Gespräch spricht das Bewußtsein sich seine Wahrheit z u . . . . "
(HW, p. 169).
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a dialogue that achieves the gathering-together of its own
essence in and through its forms. Insofar as the formation of
Awareness comes-to-pass simultaneously with both the selfcollective dialogue and the self-expressive collecting, the
movement of Awareness is dialectical." 47 Such a conception of
the dialectical character of Awareness is more original and more
comprehensive than the classical interpretations in terms of
thesis-antithesis-synthesis or of endless negativity, for " . . . it
is grounded in the [process by which] Awareness thoroughly
gathers unto Itself the forms of its dialogue [with itself] [in the
advance] toward the absolute [Self-] seizure that is, once its
truth is fully achieved. . . . " 48
It is the very nature of Experience, then, to be dialectical in
this way. " . . . Hegel does not conceive Experience dialectically
but thinks the dialectic out of the essence of Experience. . . . " 49
Experience is a movement that goes forward insofar as it goes
before itself (in the pre-ontological dimension of ontic Knowing),
yet proceeding thus it returns upon itself. " . . . As returning
upon itself, it unfolds itself in this coming-to-presence of
Awareness and, as a coming-to-presence, becomes abiding. The
absolved [and] abiding process of Awareness is the Being of the
Absolute. . . . " 50
4. Experience and Man
Thus far we have been dealing with the Experience of Absolute Knowing as 7uapou<ria, hence as coming-to-presence in conjunction with men, yet somehow prior to human knowing.
How are we to conceive, then, the relationship between
47 "Das Bewußtsein ist Bewußtsein als das Gespräch zwischen dem natürlichen
und dem realen Wissen, welches Gespräch die Versammlung seines Wesens durch
seine Gestalten hindurch vollbringt. Insofern die Bildung des Bewußtseins zugleich
als das sich versammelnde Gespräch und als die sich aussprechende Versammlung
geschieht, ist die Bewegung des Bewußtseins dialektisch." (HW, p. 169). Heidegger's
italics.
48 " . . . Sie gründet auf dem Sich-hindurch-versammeln der Gesprächsgestalten
des Bewußtseins auf den absoluten Begriff, als welcher das Bewußtsein in seiner
vollbrachten Wahrheit ist...." (HW, p. 169). Heidegger's italics.
49 " . . . Hegel begreift nicht die Erfahrung dialektisch, sondern er denkt das
Dialektische aus dem Wesen der E r f a h r u n g . . ( H W , p. 169).
50 " . . . im Zurückkommen sich in das Anwesen des Bewußtseins entfaltet und
als das Anwesen ständig wird. Die absolvierte ständige Anwesenheit des Bewußtseins ist das Sein des A b s o l u t e n . . ( H W , p. 176). Heidegger's italics.
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Experience and man ? The problem is not a simple one, but we
have already met its analogy: we must somehow correlate on one
hand the priority of Absolute Awareness and on the other a
genuine spontaneity in man.
We have already stressed the priority of Absolute Awareness
over man in speaking of the irresistible Will of the Absolute to
shine-forth in him. Now that we have seen how the Being of the
Absolute consists in Experience, we can understand how Will,
Experience and Being are in essence but one, sc. they all designate the coming-to-presence of the Absolute. " . . . It is as Experience that the Absolute's Will to be conjoined to us, sc. to
shine-forth for us as that which is shining-forth, holds sway. .. . " 5 1
But who precisely is this "us"? How does it come-to-pass that
it is "for us" that Absolute Awareness shines-forth?
The "us," sc. "we," are men who are endowed with a view,,
with the abiding condition of having-seen (Gesehen-haben), with
a axe^c into Awareness as such. This congenital affinity with
Awareness can be expressed in terms of the metaphor of light.
If the 7rapou<7ca is a light that shines upon us, then the exetyiz
may be considered as man's taking-a-stand in that light. Furthermore, it is a view that is absolutely primary (Davor) in man,
anteceding all the processes of natural Awareness, discerning that
which lies behind (Dahinter) all such processes.52
What is it that "we" see in the o x e ^ ? Awareness itself, insofar as it constitutes the Being of beings. Exeats discerns
" . . . what and how beings as beings are; . . . [it] has seen antecedently the Being of beings. . . . " and thereby the reality of the
real.53 It is a aidtyic, into the absoluteness of the Absolute. Heidegger describes it indirectly when trying to identify it with
Aristotle's e7curr^p): it is a having-seen that takes place "before""
any single being comes-to-presence, and views Presence itself.54
The antecedent cnce^i? into the whole ontological dimension
of Awareness is not a static thing, however, but dynamic, pro51
.. Als Erfahrung waltet der Wille des Absoluten, bei uns zu sein, d.h. für
uns als das Erscheinende zu erscheinen
" (HW, p. 175). Writer's italics.
52 HW, pp. 120, 140, 164 (steht), 141, 164, 176 (Davor, Dahinter, im vorhinein).
68
. . was und wie das Seiende als das Seiende ist. Die so verstandene Skepsis.
geht sehend dem Sein des Seienden nach. Ihr Zusehen hat im vorhinein das Sein des
Seienden gesehen
" (HW, p. 140).
54 HW, pp. 141 (Erscheinen des erscheinenden Wissens), 147 {Ziel schon in Sichte
176 (in die Absolutheit), 178 (Itckjttjjjlt)).
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pelled toward the achievement of itself. Initially, man finds himself in theTOxpoucnaof the Absolute according to the thoughthabits of natural Awareness, oblivious to his native cnce^tg into
the ontological dimension of the real. At this point the cxevptg is
genuine but unachieved because still latent, unaware of itself as
such. The <rxe^ achieves itself to the extent that it ad-verts
(XJm-kehr) to itself, puts aside the initial persuasions and convictions of natural Awareness and brings to light the Knowing
that constitutes it, sc. becomes aware of itself as ontological. 55
This ad-vertence to the antecedent mityi; is something that
lies within our power to achieve. We must collaborate (Zutat) in
the process. This is done by an act of willing on our part, sc. by
willing what the Absolute wills, hence by responding to Absolute Will precisely insofar as it wills this collaboration (Zutat).
This collaboration may be conceived on the one hand as a
turning-away-from the ontic and on the other as a turningtoward the ontological by "letting-shine-forth as such that
which shines-forth." To the extent that this collaborating advertence in man is necessary in order that Experience come-topass, we may say that it opens-up and de-limits the domain in
which Experience takes place, sc. where the process of shiningforth shines-forth unto itself in the dialectical movement that is
intrinsic to its nature.56
Note, therefore, a double polarity. On the one hand, the Absolute is prior to the human knowing and thereby enjoys a primacy
over man; on the other, it needs jnan as the domain in which to
shine-forth as itself, so that it is somehow dependent upon him.
The process of Experience taken in its totality implies the collaboration of both Absolute and man. When the process is complete, the result is an absolute human knowing, which may be
considered as the rays by which the Absolute, the light of truth
itself, shines upon us.57
Who are "we," then? Men. But which man? Apparently not
the individual. The oxs^u; which achieves itself:
M HW, pp. 189 (Gewohnheit des natürlichen
Bewußtseins), 181 and passim
XUmkehrung), 157 (Einfälle und Meinungen), 190 (vollziehen).
86 HW, pp. 174-175 (Weglassen, Lassen), 176 (öffnet und umgrenzt), 177 (8tocX£-

-yto&vi).

»7 HW, p. 130 (Licht bescheint).
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ox^^ic], insofar as it views t h a t b y which the K n o w i n g t h a t shines-forth
does shine-forth, sees the entire compass of [such a] Knowing. The indiv i d u a l ego cogito t h a t presents its objects to itself remains captive within
this compass. . . . 5 Ä

It would seem, then, that the individual awareness abides
within the domain constituted by mityic,, which in turn views
the Being of beings. Is oxjtyiq to be conceived as the essence of
man? If so, then the captivity of individuals within the compass
of < w o u l d constitute the essential relation between individual men and the Absolute, and ad-vertence would be an
activation of this relation. " . . . Then our essence itself belongs
to the TzoLpouaioL of the Absolute. . . . " 59
But does all this, despite its unquestionable value, solve the
problem of the individual man ? After all, who is it that wills the
ad-vertence which brings axe^is to its fulfillment, and with it the
Absolute's Experience of itself? And how? Does the Experience
take place not only for us but in us? Is it we who must bring
about the absolution of the Absolute? If so, what happens to
"us," once the absolution is accomplished and the Self-seizure
complete ? These are classical Hegel-questions, no doubt, but, in
the present context, we surmise that if we could answer them,
we would understand much better Heidegger's conception of the
relation between Being and its There.
5. Experience and Philosophy
Experience is the process by which Absolute Awareness
comes-to-presence as itself, sc. as the Being of beings. But when
Being is conceived as Absolute Awareness, this presence is
rather a present-ness, sc. the present-ation of present-edness.
This Self-presentation (presentation-to-Self) is effectively an
exposing of Awareness to itself, or, if we speak in terms of a
shining-forth and the metaphor of light, it is an e-lucidation of
58 " . . . Der Skeptizismus gilt hier nicht mehr nur als eine Haltung des vereinzelten menschlichen Subjekts.... [Die Skepsis] blickt, insofern sie auf das Erscheinen
des erscheinenden Wissens hinaussieht, in den ganzen Umfang des erscheinenden
Wissens. Das vereinzelt sich vorstellende ego cogito bleibt innerhalb dieses Umfangs
gefangen
" (HW, p. 141).
59 " . . . dann gehört unser Wesen selbst zur Parusie des Absoluten...." (HW,
p. 176). Heidegger italicizes whole. See p. 190.
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itself. Let this elucidating exposition of Awareness be called now
an "expose' (Darstellung). It follows that Experience of its very
nature includes this expose of Awareness."... It pertains to the
shining-forth of the Knowing which shines-forth to represent
itself in its presence, sc. to make an expose of itself. This expose
pertains to Experience, and, indeed, to its very essence. . . . " 60
Expose and Experience cannot be unqualifiedly identified, but
the relation is so close that we may say that Experience is the
movement by which the expose of Awareness is brought-to-pass,
and the expose is that process in which the Experience is elucidated. Like Experience, the expose, too, supposes man's willing
effort to collaborate in bringing-to-pass through ad-vertence the
into the ontological dimension of the real. " . . . Advertence turns and for the first time brings Experience into an
expose. . . . " 6 1
What does the expose elucidate? Awareness, to be sure, but
this insofar as it is that by which everything that shines-forth
does shine forth. The expose, then, elucidates beings as beings
(6v fi 5v), and inasmuch as the precise point at which the elucidation comes-to-pass is the moment of ad-vertence, then
" . . . properly speaking, ad-vertence lets fj come-to-pass in relation to ßv. . . . " 62 Since Aristotle, however, the elucidation
(interpretation) of 8v fj Öv is what men have called philosophy.
Philosophy for Hegel is the expose of the Knowing-thatshines-forth in terms of that by reason of which it shines-forth.
It is itself a type of Knowing (Wissen), for in making the expose
of itself Knowing knows itself. It is eminently a Knowing-ness
(Wissenschaft). This state of Knowing-ness would be called in
Latin scientia, but we shall retain the usual translation of
"Science," provided it be made clear that "Science" as designating the Hegelian notion of philosophy does not mean "research" or any procedure that has the normal conception of
"science" as a model; it means rather that philosophy becomes
60 " . . . Zum Erscheinen des erscheinenden Wissens gehört, sich in seiner Präsenz
zu repräsentieren, d.h. sich darzustellen. Die Darstellung gehört zur Erfahrung und
zwar in ihr W e s e n . . ( H W , p. 171).
6 1 M . . . Die Umkehrung kehrt und stellt die Erfahrung erst in das Darstellen
"
(HW, p. 174). See pp. 140, 150,168,177 (Bewegung), 130,147 (vollziehen, Mitvollzug).
62 " . . . Die Umkehrung läßt eigens das f j in Bezug auf das
geschehen...."
(HW, p. 174).
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with Hegel so permeated with the Cartesian ideal of self-certitude that it is conceived as unconditioned Knowing that is
interior to the Knowing of Self-certitude. " . . . Philosophy has
become thoroughly at home in Knowing as such. The whole
essence of philosophy is fashioned out of the unconditioned Selfknowing of Knowing. Philosophy is the Science. . . . " 63 Thus the
function of philosophy is to make an expose of the Knowing-thatshines-forth (8v) as shining-forth (f) 8v). " . . . The expose presents
the Being of beings. This is the Science of Sv fj 6v. . . . " 64 To the
extent that this expos£ is identified with the self-achieving
the Hegelian concept of philosophy corresponds to the Aristotelian notion offtecopla,sc. a beholding.
We are in a position now to appreciate the full sense of the
initial title that Hegel gave to the Phenomenology of the Spirit:
"The Science of the Experience of Awareness," where Science
means essentially the expos£, and Experience means the Being
of beings, sc. that by which the Knowing-that-shines-forth is
what it is (in its shining-forth). The Phenomenology is in an
eminent way philosophy: the elucidation of beings in their Being.
If the title of the work eventually changes, the sense does not,
and the new title remains faithful to the initial one: "Spirit"
corresponds to what we have called up to now "Awareness";
"Phenomenology" corresponds to what we have called "Experience." " . . . T h e essence of Experience is the essence of
Phenomenology. . . : " 65 <pa[vea#ou, because it is the process by
which Spirit (Awareness) shines-forth in and unto itself; Xiyoq,
because of its very nature the shining-forth is dialectical.

88 " . . . Die Philosophie ist im Wissen als solchem vollständig heimisch geworden.
Das gesamte Wesen der Philosophie ist durch das unbedingte Sichwissen des Wissens
beschafft. Die Philosophie ist die Wissenschaft
" (HW, p. 121). Heidegger's
italics. See pp. 121-122 (nicht Forschung).
64 " . . . Die Darstellung stellt das Sein des Seienden vor. Sie ist die Wissenschaft
des Öv ^ fr, " (HW, p. 174). See pp. 122, 134, 178 (Öv f j #v).
66 " . . . Das Wesen der Erfahrung ist das Wesen der Phänomenologie
" (HW,
P- 185). Heidegger italicizes whole. See pp. 178 (Wissenschaft), 181-182 (Erfahrung),
xi8, 180, 185 (Geist).
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II. General Remarks
A.

HEIDEGGER

WITH

HEGEL

Up to this point we have tried to be faithful to Heidegger,
who presumably has tried to be faithful to Hegel. Now we must
try to disengage the critique that is implied in all this, for critique
there is. There is much in Hegel, of course, that Heidegger can
endorse:
j. Being
Although Hegel himself uses "Being," at least in the early
stages of the Phenomenology, in a completely different sense
from Heidegger, sc. to designate beings as known by natural
Awareness prior to the discerning of them in their truth, Heidegger feels justified in using the term to designate what Hegel
calls "Absolute Awareness," on the grounds that language that
has grown out of one type of thinking, sc. his own, can serve to
bring into its own light another man's thought in order to liberate this thought into the fullness of its own essence.66
What is the nature of Being as Awareness ? It is an emerginginto-presence (non-concealment), sc. that by which beings appear, shine-forth in truth. It is Presence itself. Furthermore, this
emergence is dynamic, indeed dialectical, and through this
movement founds history.67 Because absolute, Being enjoys a
certain primacy, yet its nature is such that it must come-topresence in conjunction with man in order to emerge at all. It
needs a domain that it fashions itself (in the fashioning of which
it maintains the primacy), wherein it may shine-forth, for such
a domain pertains to its very essence.68 We interpret this domain
to be the There of Being-as-Awareness, hence the There-being.
2. There-being
The There of Being is correlated with the essence of man.
From the very beginning, man stands in the light of the 7tapooaiot,
•• H W , pp. 141-142 {"Sein" gebraucht Hegel), 143 (frei zu geben).
• 7 H W , pp. 188 (Aufgehen, Unverborgenheit), 131-132 (Wahrheit des Wissens),
130, 133, 171, 180, etc. (Anwesen), 169,177 (das Dialektische der Bewegung), 140-141
(Geschichte).
•» H W , pp. 187-188 (das Einsame), 134, 19* (Stätte).
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sc. is favored with a pre-ontological comprehension of
into) the Being of beings, sc. transcendence. Yet despite this
constitutional affinity with the ontological dimensions of the
real, man finds himself first of all and for the most part victimized by the spontaneous convictions of natural Awareness and by
the tyranny of what "people" think and say. In terms of SZ,
man is initially in a state of inauthenticity.69
Immersed amid the ontic yet comprehending the ontological,
There-being has the task of fully achieving the <JX£<J/LC by which
it is constituted. This it does by comparing the ontic and ontological dimensions of beings that it meets, sc. the known, a
function made possible by the fact that the There itself is the
difference between ontic and ontological, between natural and
real Knowing, sc. the ontological difference. This achievement
is brought about by the active cooperation of There-being with
the process by which the Being of beings emerges into truth, sc.
Experience. This cooperation takes the form of turning away
from the ontic and toward the ontological, ad-verting to the
Being-dimension of the beings-known - not destroying ontic
Awareness but simply discerning in it the ontological dimension
and endorsing its own situation.70
This coming-to-pass of ad-vertence is an active effort on the
part of There-being, implying the process of will, by reason of
which There-being lets the fi of 8v ^ 6v take place (lets Being be
itself). Thus There-being yields in docility to the Will of the
Absolute (Being) to come-to-presence in the 7capou<rta, thereby
doing its part to open-up the realm of disclosure in which Being
shines-forth. At the same time, by ad-vertence There-being
fully comes-to-presence itself, determined as it is by the relation
of its essence to Being. 71
In all this we feel at home. There-being achieves its own Being
by responding (ad-verting) through re-solve (willing) to the
exigency of Being for a There. All of the principal theses of SZ
69 HW, pp. 189 (schon in Parusie), 146 (über sich hinaus), 189 (nach Gewohnheit
des natürlichen Bewußtseins), 149-150 ("trockene Ich").
7 0 HW, pp. 159, 160, 163 (Unterscheidung), 174-175 (Weglassen, Erscheinenlassen), 190 (Aneignung seines Aufenthaltes).
7 1 HW, p. 175 (Erscheinenlassen des Erscheinenden, will Willen des Absoluten,
stellt in Wesen zurück).
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are here, except, perhaps, the insistence upon finitude.72 This
being so, what possible criticism of Hegel can Heidegger make?
B.

HEIDEGGER

VS.

HEGEL

j. Being and Subject-ism
The nub of Heidegger's critique of Hegel, as it may be disengaged at this point, lies in the fact that the sense of Being
(Awareness) for Hegel, though indeed it may be called a
"presence" (Anwesenheit), is rather "present-ness," sc. the
presence that characterizes the relation between a subject and
an object. In other words, Hegel's conception of Being is determined through and through by the subject-ism with which
he starts.
We know already that the "new land" which Descartes discovered but Hegel explores is the unconditioned Self-certitude
of Self-awareness, whereby that which fundamentally (subjectum) comes-to-presence as true (certain) is Self-awareness.
Hence, Self-awareness becomes a subjectum; the subjectum becomes aware of itself. The fundamental structure of a subjectbecome-aware-of-itself is this: it comes-to-presence by reason of
a relation it bears to an object that it proposes to itself. Insofar
as this relation renders the object present, it is a present-ation;
insofar as it renders the object present to the subject, it is a represent-ation; insofar as in the representation the subject becomes aware of itself as such, the representation presents not
only the object to the subject, but the subject to itself, sc. the
subject as subject becomes the object of its own reflection. This
relationship in all of its complexity is what makes the subject
to be what it is. " . . . The Being of this subject-object relation
that reflects upon itself is called subject-ness. . . . " 78
Obviously what characterizes the Being of this subject is the
present-ness that present-(represent-)ation implies. " . . . [This
7 3 The point is not insignificant. Any thorough study of the relation between
Hegel and Heidegger would have to examine carefully the radically different interpretations of the problem of finitude. This may well prove to be the fundamental
difference between them.
7 1 1 4 . . . das Sein des Subjekts als der in sich reflektierten Subjekt-Objektbeziehung
beißt die S u b j e k t i t ä t . . ( H W , p. 154). See pp. 121-122.
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Being] is presence [but] in the manner of represent-ation. . . . " 74
It is in this sense that we must understand the mxpouata, and
when the Being of the Absolute Subject is interpreted as Experience, then Experience itself remains radically, ineluctably
a present-(represent-)ation. " . . . In Being, in terms of which
Experience comes-to-presence, there lies, as the characteristic
of [its] shining-forth, the process of pro-posing in the sense of
present-ing. . . . " 75 All this is crystallized in the key-word of all
post-Cartesian philosophy: Awareness, sc. Being-aware (Bewußtsein)] for Being (-sein) means "to be" in the manner of a
"knowing" (Bewußt-), sc. of a cogitatio, of a pro-posing (re)presentation. 76
In what sense is this a critique? To interpret Being as subjectcentered present-ness is to bring to a culmination the conception
of truth-as-certitude, for, when all is said and done, this whole
conception expands Absolute Certitude (Self-awareness) into
Being itself.77 But in doing so, Hegel forgets the original sense
of truth-as-a-X7)&eLa, sc. Being ((puatq) as the process by which
beings emerge into non-concealment. To overlook this is to
disregard the ontological difference as it rises out of this emergent
truth; it is to be victimized in the Being-being ambivalence of
8v without taking full cognizance of its import.
That such is the case with Hegel, there is reason enough to
claim. Witness, for example, the abiding confusion between
Absolute Awareness conceived as Being (the process by which
beings shine-forth) and as a being (the Absolute Subject itself).78
More convincing still is the interior correlation, as Heidegger
sees it, between the Phenomenology and the Science of Logic. In
the System of Absolute Science, the Science of Logic does not
come after the Science of Experience, or even before it, nor,
74 " . . . Sie ist die Präsenz in der Weise der Repräsentation
" (HW, p. 134).
Heidegger's italics. See p. 122 (TtocpouaU).
76
. . Im Sein, als welches die Erfahrung west, liegt als Charakter des Erscheinens das Vorstellen im Sinne von Präsentieren
" (HW, p. 171).
7 6 HW, pp. 159 (Grundwort), 133 (Bewußt-sein). It would be possible to show
that the whole problematic of putting-knowledge-to-the-test (Prüfen), which plays
so central a role in Hegel's conception of Experience, arises out of the present-ative
character of Awareness which, conditioned as it is by the conception of truth-ascertitude, must verify the presentation. See v.g. HW, p. 127.
77 HW, p. 14z. What is said here is confirmed by a more thematic treatment of
Hegel and de-XV^cta in 1959 (HG, pp. 52-57).
78 HW, pp. 132-134, 165-166, 170-171, 175-176, 178, 180.
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for that matter, are they two coordinate Sciences either. They
are but one Science (metaphysics), one interpretation of öv fj öv.
The Phenomenology would meditate öv in its general characteristics and in effect constitute this Science as an onto-logy; the
Logic would meditate Öv under the guise of a supreme being
(Absolute Spirit) and in effect constitute the Science a theo4ogy.
Phenomenology and Logic are one Science because concerned
with but a single problem: Öv fj ov. But because öv is ambivalent,
it gives rise to an ambivalent (onto-theo-logical) structure within
the Science itself.79
To have overlooked the ambivalence of ov is perhaps not so
much Hegel's fault as the weakness of metaphysics itself.80 But
weakness it is, and even if he brings metaphysics, in all the
complexity of its onto-theo-logical structure, to the point of its
highest achievement, he does not - can not? - lay bare its
ground.

Resume
Hegel culminates post-Cartesian subject-ism, insofar as he
thinks the implications of truth-as-certitude through to the
level of Absolute Certitude in the Self-awareness of the Absolute
Subject, thus forgetting all the more profoundly the genuine
sense of truth-as-a-X^eia.

7 9 HW, pp. 179-180, 184, 187. See ID, pp. 49-50, 54-56so HW, p. 161.

c h a p t e r viii

NIETZSCHE

For Hegel, Absolute Spirit, the Being of beings, was also Absolute Will, whereby "Will" suggests the intrinsic necessity by
reason of which the Absolute unfolds into the complete seizure
of itself. In this respect, Hegel's dialectical idealism was no less
a philosophy of Will than Kant's, Fichte's or Schelling's. Between
Hegel and Nietzsche stood Schopenhauer. We have only to
advert to the title, The World as Will and Presentation, to realize
on the one hand how deeply immersed he is in the subject-ist
tradition, as Leibniz had stamped it after Descartes, and on the
other how close he stands to Nietzsche, whose debt to him, according to personal testimony, is long since a commonplace.1 As
we come, then, to Nietzsche's philosophy of universal Willing,
we are somewhat prepared for the thesis that Nietzsche is the
"consummation" of metaphysics in the West. Somewhat! Before we can appreciate the full import of this, however, we must
first see it in some detail.
The main lines of Heidegger's Nietzsche-interpretation appeared first in the essay entitled, "Nietzsche's Word 'God is
dead'." 2 Its theses can be stated in general terms quite simply:
1 V A , pp. 114, 83. The preface of Wille zur Macht remarks that it was written on
Schopenhauer's birthday.
2 "Nietzsches Wort 'Gott ist tot'," HW, pp. 193-247. This essay resumes an
interpretation that had been elaborated in five university lecture courses between
1936 and 1940, which were crystallized first in a public discourse in 1943. In addition,
W D (1951-52), pp- i~78, adds an important supplement, but "Überwindung der
Metaphysik" (VA, pp. 71-99) and ''Wer ist Nietzsches Zarathustra?" (VA, pp. 1 0 1 126) add only precisions. The two volumes on Nietzsche that appeared in 1961 give
full text of original lectures, together with some supplementary essays. For our
present purposes, we consider all as a unit.
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"God" for Nietzsche is what he takes to be the God of Christianity, but interprets in a non-Christian way. For Nietzsche,
God is the symbol of the entire supra-sensible world of Ideas
and Ideals, and, as we shall see, of values, for He is the ground
and final end of these Ideals, which in turn are the goal of
earthly life, determining it, so to speak, from above and from
without. Such a world, for a tradition as old as Plato, constitutes
the true, authentic, genuinely actual world, while the order of
the sensible and the changeable is only an apparent, non-actual
world. If we take this "merely apparent," sensible world in the
broad Kantian sense of the "physical" world, then the ideal,
supra-sensible world of the Platonic tradition is clearly the
supra-physical, sc. meta-physical world. "God" for Nietzsche,
therefore, symbolizes the "world," sc. the order, of metaphysics.3
To say that God is dead is to say that this metaphysical world
has lost its vitality, has lost all power to offer man something to
which he can hold fast or by which he can find his bearings, has
come to mean nothing at all. Such meaningless- (therefore
"nothing"-)ness is a nihil-(sc. "nothing"-)ism("ness"). Nietzsche's word, "God is dead," according to Heidegger, is but a
simple declaration of fact, sc. it describes in a striking formula the
metaphysical nihilism to which Nietzsche is witness. And this
nihilism is not simply a single phenomenon of history among
others, such as the Renaissance, Humanism, the Age of Enlightenment, etc. It designates for Nietzsche, Heidegger claims,
an entire historical movement, indeed the basic movement of
history in the West since Plato, which Heidegger identifies here
with the history of metaphysics. 4
There is no need to recall the fact that metaphysics is an interpretation of beings in their being-ness. Nietzsche's special
insight is to perceive that the interpretation of beings prevalent in his time is value-less, for it is an interpretation that has
recourse to values that are precisely without any value at all.
The reason: the supreme values, sc. "God" and the ideal, suprasensible (metaphysical) world, can not be translated into the
HW, pp. 199-200, 203-205.
* HW, pp. 196, 234 (Gott tot), 200, 201 and V A , p. 79 (Geschichte). The formula
itself is found in the young Hegel's Glauben und Wissen in a sense different from that
of Nietzsche, to be sure, but not completely unrelated to it (HW, p. 197). Cf. N, I,
pp. 432-43«; II. PP- 3I-7I, 272-282, 399-457.
1
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actual world of daily experience. Nietzsche's task is on the one
hand to proclaim the emptiness (de-valuation) of all traditional
values, thus soliciting a rejection of them, and on the other to
propose some new interpretation of beings in their Being that
could be accepted along with this rejection as a feasible way of
overcoming valueless-ness (nihilism). The first part of the
program could be called "negative" nihilism, the second "positive," both having their parallel in Schopenhauer's "pessimism
of weakness" and "pessimism of strength." 5
But positive nihilism must not be content with merely replacing the old values by new ones, v.g. by filling the place left
vacant by God and the hierarchy of supra-sensible values with
some cheap ersatz such as socialism or Wagnerian music. Rather
the entire fabric of values must be re-woven. De-valuation can
be overcome only by re-valuation. There must be some new
principle of values, not to be sought, however, in the lifeless
world of the supra-sensible. Let it be something alive that is
not supra-sensible. Let it be Life itself.6
Nietzsche's own metaphysics becomes thus the philosophy of
Life-force, claiming to overcome the metaphysical nihilism of the
times by a nihilism of a higher sort, a positive one. But it remains a nihilism! And Heidegger will argue that it fails completely to vindicate its claims simply because it remains metaphysics. The nub of the matter is that for Heidegger all metaphysics is a nihilism. For the essence of nihilism consists in the
fact that the Being-process itself, as emergent truth, means
nothing, " . . . to such an extent that the truth of beings-as-such
counts as Being, because the truth of Being [itself] retreats
"7
That is why " . . . in its essence, metaphysics is nihilism. . . , " 8
sc. a forgetfulness of Being. Obviously the only way effectively
to overcome such nihilism is to pass beyond metaphysics in
8 HW, pp. 205 (nie zu verwirklichen), 206 (Nein, Ja [see VA, p. X17J), 231 (negativpositiv), 207 (Schopenhauer). Cf. N, II, pp. 90-96, 279-280. In r955, the Nein-Ja
theme serves to characterize foundational thought (Gelassenheit [Pfullingen: Neske,
1959]» P- 25). (Hereafter: G).
* HW, pp. 208 (vollständige Nihilismus, Wertsetzung, Umwertung), 208-209
•(Leben). Cf. N, I, pp. 231-254, 339-348, 5*7-527(Biologismus).
7 " . . . die Wahrheit des Seienden als solchen für das Sein gilt, weil die Wahrheit
•des Seins a u s b l e i b t . . ( H W , p. 244).
8 " . . . In ihrem Wesen aber ist die Metaphysik N i h i l i s m u s . . ( H W , p. 145).
Cf. N, II, pp. 343, 350, 383- The theme is fully developed in "Die seinsgeschichtliche
Bestimmung des Nihilismus," N, II, pp. 335-398.
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order to meditate the Being-process itself. This is what Nietzsche
does not do - can not do — as long as he remains within the
confines of metaphysics.
Let us now see how Nietzsche attempts to determine a new
set of values, whose principle is an all-pervasive Life-force. We
wish to understand how this Life-force is to be understood and
how it founds the new values. In the most general terms we may
say that this Life-force is understood as having its ground in a
Becoming, not simply in the sense of endless change, but in the
sense of a universal dynamism that embraces all beings whatsoever and determines them as beings, constitutes them in their
Being. Heidegger makes use of the classical terms of essence and
existence to distinguish in the Nietzschean Becoming two correlative principles: Will-unto-Power (Wille zur Macht) as the
essence of its progressive dynamism; "the eternal recurrence of
the selfsame state of affairs" (ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen) as
the form of its existence:
. . . The two key-words of Nietzsche's metaphysics, "Will-unto-Power"
and "eternal return of the selfsame," determine beings in their Being
under those two aspects which since the earliest days have been guidelines for metaphysics, [sc.] ens qua ens in the sense of essentia and existential

We let these two aspects of Nietzsche's universal Becoming
polarize our analysis.
A.

WILL-UNTO-POWER

I. Life-force and Will
"...Will-unto-Power, Becoming, Life-force and Being in
the broadest sense mean, in Nietzsche's language, but one
['thing']. . . . " 10 Why the first of these formulae enjoys a primacy over the others we have already some idea and we shall
9 " . . . Die beiden Grundworte der Metaphysik Nietzsches, 'Wille zur Macht' und
'ewige Wiederkunft des Gleichen', bestimmen das Seiende in seinem Sein nach den
Hinsichten, die von altersher für die Metaphysik leitend bleiben, das ens qua ens im
Sinne von essentia und existentia." [sie] (HW, p. 219). See pp. 212-213. Cf. N, I, pp425, 464-467; II, PP- 283-287.
10
. . Wille zur Macht, Werden, Leben und Sein im weitesten Sinne bedeuten
in Nietzsches Sprache das Selbe
" (HW, p. 213). See V A , pp. 103, 115. Cf. N ,
I, pp. 44-46.
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understand it better as we proceed. For the moment, let us be
content with recalling that once Leibniz expanded the notion
of subject so that it embraced not only the human ego (Descartes)
but all beings, insofar as they are dynamic, sc. have an appetitus
("will") for further dynamism, the entire drift of modern thought
was to conceive Being as the dynamism of dynamic beings, in
one way or another as Will. It is only normal, then, that
Nietzsche should meditate Being as a universal Becoming (Lifeforce) and conceive it as Will. For our part, we must be on our
guard from the beginning against conceiving universal Will in
purely psychological terms. It is essentially not a striving after
what is not yet possessed, born out of a feeling of want. Nietzsche's conception is a purely metaphysical one, and we must
interpret it metaphysically, if we are to understand it at all. It
is an interpretation of the Being of beings, whose internal
dynamism, however, is of such a sort that it can be expressed
best in terms of what human experience calls "willing."
We comprehend this metaphysical reality by asking: what does
it mean, even in human terms, to "will"? For Nietzsche, it
means "to be a master." "To will is to-will-to-be-a-master. . . . " 1 1
It implies a domination (mastery) over what is willed, hence is
essentially neither a wishing nor a striving-after something but
a commanding, which implies a knowledgeable power of disposition over the possibilities of any given action to be performed.
What is commanded in the command is the exercise of this disposing power. In a command, he who commands accedes to this
power to dispose of an action and thus accedes to (obeys) himself. Genuine commanding, then, is different from simply
shouting orders to others; it is a submission to oneself, hence a
self-submission, a self-conquest.
If to will is to command by submitting to one's own power
to dispose (one is tempted to say, though Heidegger does not
introduce the terminology here, by letting one's own disposingpower be itself), then what the will wills is its own willing.
w . . . The will wills itself. . . . " 1 2 It is a will-unto-willing {Wille
zum Willen). By this very fact, it passes beyond itself, sc. on the
one hand brings itself under its own control and on the other
u

"

"Wollen ist H e r r - s e i n - w o l l e n . . ( H W , p. 216). Cf. N, I, pp. 50-52.
" . . . Der Wille will sich s e l b s t . . . ( H W , p. 216).
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continues to will further, to surpass the immediate moment of
self-conquest by willing to grow, to become stronger, to become
more and more itself in further willing.
There is a duality here, and the point is worth insistence. The
will is a life-force, and growth is a law of life. But the law of
growth implies a constancy (Erhaltung) as well as advance, sc.
further growing (Steigerung). The whole vitality of a rose-bush,
for example, is in a certain sense brought to a center of concentration in the first bud. In it, this vitality achieves a "degree"
of unfolding that may be considered as attained, a moment of
rest, a tentative permanence, a constancy that may be considered
as assured. Yet this is not a static thing. On the contrary, this
assured constancy is alive only to the extent that it is already
being surpassed by reason of its own internal dynamism, is becoming already in-constant, hence overcome by the progress of
life. The rose-bud is in the process of unfolding into the flower.
These two moments are correlative components of a single
movement, deriving from the unified essence of the living
process. The component of constancy (the moment of consolidating the hitherto evolution) renders service to the component
of "surpassment," for it is the level of achievement already attained that serves as basis for further achievement. On the
other hand, the component of surpassment renders service to the
verifiable constant by preserving it interior to the process of
growth. Both components of growth are necessary for the living
process, if it is to be itself. They are conditions of life; in the case
of universal Will, and insofar as they flow from its essence, they
may be said to be "posed" (Setzen) by Will itself.13
Now the moment of consolidation comes-to-pass when Will
submits to, and thereby overcomes, itself, sc. acts as its own
master. We may say that in the moment of constancy, Will exercises power (Macht) over itself. Likewise, the Will's surpassing
of itself in its drive to become stronger and more itself is a
movement toward more and more power. In this context, the
surpassing is an "overpowering" of self which the very nature
of willing renders possible, sc. empowers (ermächtigt). In the
18 HW, pp. 211—212. Cf. N, I, p. 219 (Zwiespalt); II, pp. 96-109. Because of the
awkwardness of "surpassing" as a translation for Steigerung, we are permitting
ourselves a neologism and will translate occasionally as "surpassment."
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formula "Will-unto-Power," then, the word "Power" designates
only the manner by which the Will wills itself, insofar as its
nature is to command. " . . . Will and Power consequently are
not conjoined for the first time in [the formula] Will-unto-Power,
but the Will as Will-unto-Willing is the Will-unto-Power in the
sense of an empowering unto Power. . . . " 1 4 Whatever the formula, the two components of constancy and surpassment are intrinsic to its very nature. " . . . The Will-unto-Power must pose
simultaneously conditions for the constancy and the surpassing
of Power. It is the nature of the Will to pose these correlative
conditions." 1 5
2. Will-unto-Power and Re-valuation
We said that Nietzsche's nihilism is not only negative but
positive, and that the metaphysics of Will-unto-Power is revaluation as well as de-valuation. How explain this re-valuation ?
What is the relation of value to Will? To delineate the Nietzschean conception of value, Heidegger analyses a definition that
Nietzsche himself offers. Value is "an aspect of the conditions of
constancy and surpassment with a view to the complex structures
of Life [that have a] relative duration within [the process of]
Becoming." 16 Many of the terms here are clear from what has
been said already: the Being of beings is conceived as a process
of Becoming, Life-force, Will, within which certain complex
structures form, that for a temporary duration enjoy consolidation but are soon surpassed and swept up into the dynamic
progress of Life (Will). We must understand now in what sense
value is an "aspect" of all this.
An aspect (aspectum) is that which is seen by a seeing (aspicere). The seeing sees the seen and makes what calculations it
must accordingly. But the aspect is seen only insofar as it is
1 4 " . . . Wille und Macht sind daher auch nicht erst im Willen zur Macht aneinandergekoppelt, sondern der Wille ist als Wille zum Willen der Wille zur Macht im
Sinne der Ermächtigung zur Macht
" (HW, p. 217). Cf. N, I, p. 52.
1 5 " . . . Der Wille zur Macht muß zumal setzen: Bedingungen der Machterhaltung
und der Machtsteigerung. Zum Willen gehört das Setzen dieser in sich zusammengehörigen Bedingungen." (HW, p. 219).
1 6 "Der Gesichtspunkt des 'Werts' ist
der Gesichtspunkt von Erhaltung*
Steigerungs-Bedingungen in Hinsicht auf komplexe Gebilde von relativer Dauer des
Lebens innerhalb des Werdens." (W.z.M. A. 715, cited HW, p. 210). Author's text
is italicized. Cf. N, II, pp. 263-272.
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posed (gesetzt) by the seeing itself. For whether we speak Kantianfashion of an a priori, or scholastic-fashion of the formal object
of sight, the sense is the same: a seeing takes place only on the
condition that the seer is antecedently so structured that what
is see-able in the seen can affect him. This a priori structure which
constitutes the seer in his affinity with the to-be-seen as such is
itself a type of "seeing," a seeing-structure that antecedes the
functioning of this structure. The structure, rendering possible
the function, so determines this function that we may say that
the seer sees (act) because he already has seen (a priori) by
reason of his structural affinity with the seen, sc. has already
" . . . pro-posed the seen as such to himself, that is to say posed
it. . . . " 17 It is this pro-posing pos-ition that antecedes all seeing
which makes the to-be-seen (aspect) seeable, sc. capable of
guiding the function of seeing and whatever activity follows upon
sight.
Now if value, Nietzsche claims, is an aspect (something seen),
it follows that " . . . values are not first of all something in themselves which subsequently at the opportune moment can be
seized as an aspect." 18 They are what they are only because they
are (pro-)posed b y and for a seeing. But in the case of value, what
precisely is seen (posed) and who (what) is it that sees (poses) ?
Heidegger's answer in Nietzsche's name is clear. What is
posed is the necessary conditions of the growing process of allencompassing Life, sc. the conditions of sustaining and increasing,
of constancy and surpassment, which are demanded by the
essence of universal Willing. What is it that poses? The living
principle itself, sc. Will-unto-Power. It is as if the Being of beings
(universal Will) is also a process of Self-awareness, seeing itself
as evolving. " . . . To Will belongs consciousness. . . . " 1 9 In these
terms, its vision is necessarily bi-furcated, so that it sees the two
indispensable conditions of itself as growing: the form of its
attainment at any given moment, constant and verifiable, which
must be surpassed; and the scope of those possibilities toward
1 7 " . . . das Gesichtete als ein solches sich vor-gestellt und so gesetzt
hat..
(HW, p. 210).
18
. . Werte sind also nicht zuvor etwas an sich, so daß sie dann gelegentlich als
Gesichtspunkte genommen werden könnten." (HW, p. 210).
1 9 " . . . Zum Willen gehört Bewußtsein...." (VA, p. 88).
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which it is still to advance.20 This seeing by which Will sees itself
as itself (Life in growth) is the seeing which poses the necessary
conditions of itself as Life in growth. What is thus seen and
posed is "value."
It is Will-unto-Power that poses all values, for values are
nothing more than the self-posed conditions of its own unfolding. " . . . T h e Will-unto-Power is, according to its very
essence, a value-posing W i l l . . . , " 21 and this value-posing we
call "e-valuation" (Schätzen). Will, as the Being of beings, is
therefore the ground and domain of all values, and, conversely,
if metaphysics interprets beings in their Being as Will-untoPower, it cannot help becoming a philosophy of values. By
way of example, let us remark the two fundamental values in
the Nietzschean system, truth and art. Both are posed by Willunto-Power as necessary conditions of itself.
a. T R U T H - We saw that one component of dynamic progress
is the consolidating and sustaining of what has been gained already. By this is meant some sphere of concentration to which
Will can at all times in perfect confidence return in order to win
reassurance (Sicherheit) of its gain. This sphere circumscribes for
Will that constant element in whatever comes-to-presence that
can be subject to the disposition of Will. The constant, thus
posed, abides, and what abides Nietzsche calls indiscriminately
"being," "Being" and "truth." 22 Truth as value is what is seen
when Will poses as necessary condition of its own Becoming
what we have called the moment of constancy, or consolidation,
of what has been achieved hitherto in the Will's unfolding as the
actuality of what is actual. It is the " . . . constant assurance of
the constancy of that sphere out of which Will-unto-Power
wills itself." 23
HW, pp. 218-219.
" . . . Der Wille zur Macht ist seinem Wesen nach der Werte-setzende Wille. . .
(HW, p. 219). See p. 220. Cf. N, II, pp. 233-234.
22 HW, p. 221; N, I, pp- 508-516,543-547. Heidegger thematizes this problematic
fully in the lecture course of 1939. See "Der Wille zur Macht als Erkenntnis," N, I,
pp. 473-658.
23 " . . . d i e beständigende Bestandsicherung des Umkreises, aus dem her der
Wille zur Macht sich selbst will." (H W, p. 222). If the moment of constancy, inasmuch
as it is part of a process of Becoming, is constantly being surpassed, sc. is essentially
»»-constant, then truth-as-value is un-truth, error (Irrtum). This poses again the
whole problem of "seeming." See N 1, pp. 619-625; II, pp. 314-318.
20
21
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b. ART - Correlative to the component of constancy, however, is the component of augmentation by reason of which Will
at any given moment of achievement in beings (truth) is already
in movement toward more achievement, more power, because
new possibilities are opened up to it. What Will sees in posing
this second condition of its continued Becoming is the value
Nietzsche calls "art." " . . . Art is the essence of all willing [insolar
as] it opens up perspectives and takes possession of them . . . 2 4
so that it is art that stimulates and goads Will-unto-Power to
come to itself by willing beyond itself. Art, as value, is grounded
in Will's vision of itself as surpassing itself, sc. as surpassing the
present moment of its Self-achievement. And, since in the dynamism of Life the component of increase enjoys a certain primacy
over the component of constancy, art as value is superior to
truth as value.25 In both cases, however, value is not something
in and for itself but is posed by universal Will.
3. Will-unto-Power and Truth
Of the two principal values which Will-unto-Power poses, the
more significant for us is the value of truth. We wish to see now
more in detail how truth-as-value derives from the more fundamental conception of truth-as-certitude. We recall from the
Descartes-analysis that the certitude which is the essential
characteristic of a present-ative subject consists in the subject's
guaranteeing itself as present-ative, sc. assuring itself to its own
satisfaction both of itself (present-ing) and of what it pro-poses
(present-ed). This self-assurance which constitutes certitude is
a derived form of truth-as-conformity (of present-ing to presented), which we ordinarily call "correctness" or "lightness." According to the new formula, truth consists not first of all in
conformity but in the accommodation of every object-to-beproposed to a standard im-posed by the pro-posing subject itself,
a standard dictated by the nature of the subject, sc. its exigency
for clear and distinct ideas. When any given presentation satis84 " . . . Kunst ist das Wesen alles Wollens, das Perspektiven eröffnet und sie
besetzt: . . . " (HW, p. 222). For a full development of this theme, see "Der Wille zur
Macht als Kunst," N, I, pp. 11-254.
m HW, p. 223 (höhere Wert). Cf. N, I, pp. 82-91, 166, 500.
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fies this standard, then it is held to be correct (true) because it is
certain.
A presentation thus certified is "right," and the certification
renders ''right" (recht-fertigt). Now when something is "renderedright" (in this case a presentation), all is as it "should be." One
may say that the situation is "just," for justice prescribes what
is "right." If this terminology is acceptable, then the process of
certi-fication (of "rendering-right") is a "justi-fication" (Rechtfertigung). A subject justi-fies its presentations insofar as it
certi-fies them, sc. certi-fies the relation between itself and what
it presented. "Justification" and "certification" are in this case
synonymous.26
In Nietzsche, it is under the guise of "justification" and
"justice" that the theme of certitude (certi-fication) appears.
Here the present-ative, self-assuring subject is not an individual
ego as in Descartes, but the Being of beings conceived as universal Will. Will-unto-Power sees itself as posing values through
its Becoming, certi-fies this pos-ition and thereby justi-fies it.
We have here, Heidegger argues, simply a new terminology to
express what we have seen already as the self-certification of a
present-ative subject, where Will-unto-Power is the subject and
the values are that which the subject (pro-)poses. "Justice, as
conceived by Nietzsche, is the truth of beings [whose Being is
conceived] as Will-unto-Power. . . . " 27
The words "justice" and "justification" for our purposes are
not important. What is important is to see how Heidegger argues
that Nietzsche's Will-unto-Power is but the elaboration and extension to a general ontology of Descartes' conception of a
present-ative subject that becomes certain of itself.28 This takes
26 HW, pp. 225-226. See VA, pp. 85-88. Heidegger goes on to say that the first
correlation of justice with certitude was not in Descartes but in Luther (VA, p. 85).
He then finds warrant for this correlation both in Leibniz and in Kant (HW, p. 226}.
An interesting use of Rechtfertigung in the context of Heidegger I occurs in WG, p.
45- Cf. N, I, pp. 632-648; II, pp. 314-333.
27 "Die von Nietzsche gedachte Gerechtigkeit ist die Wahrheit des Seienden, das
in der Weise des Willens zur Macht ist
" (HW, p. 228). Cf. N, I, pp. 632-648;
PP. 325-32928 Heidegger even thinks from Nietzsche back to Descartes. The reason why Descartes' individual ego can assure, sc. will, itself in certitude is that the Being of beings
(Will-unto-Power as universal Self-certifying Subject) has a relation to the individual
ego in the light (by the power) of which the individual wills its own certitude (VA, p.

86).
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place in the certi-fication of any given moment of attainment in
the process of Becoming, a moment which is veri-fiable precisely
because it has become a constant. This renders service to the
component of augmentation in growth, for " . . . the certi-fication
of any given level of power is a necessary condition for an increase of power. . . . " 29 The certi-fication consists in holdingthis-level-for-true (Für-wahr-halten), sc. for constant, definitively (once and for all) achieved. To certi-(veri-)fy as a constant
that which Will itself pro-poses is to control this constant and
submit it to the disposition of Will. 30 This rigorous certi-fication
Heidegger also calls exact "calculation" (Rechnung). " . . . Willunto-Will is the supreme and unconditioned state of Awareness
in the [process of] rigorously certi-fying [constants] through calculation." 31
Through this process of certi-fication (calculation), the Will
exercises dominion over what is constant, and to the extent that
the plurality of constants constitute the "earth" on which man
dwells, the universal Will, as the self-certifying Becoming that
constitutes the Being of beings, is a process through which
dominion-over-the-earth (Erdherrschaft) comes-to-pass. We can
see here more clearly than when we first approached the problem
in what sense willing is an exercise of power. For to exert dominion over the already achieved constant through continued
certifi-cation of it is to exercise power, and the Will exerting that
dominion wills power. To the extent that Will wills its continually augmented Becoming by successive moments of dominion
over successively posed and successively overcome constants,
the universal Will wills more power, sc. it is Will-unto-Power.32
Before we proceed further, it is worth-while insisting, if we
are to keep our bearings, that up to the present we have considered always the present-ative Will as the Being of beings in
the ensemble. In other words, beings for Nietzsche are the
constants posed by universal, self-certifying Will, and their Being
29 4 1 , . . Die Sicherung der jeweiligen Machtstufe ist die notwendige Bedingung der
Überhöhung der Macht
" (HW, p. 218). See p. 238 (Beständigung der Beständig
keit).
HW, pp. 220 (Für-wahr-halten), 216, 221 (Verfügen, Befehlen).
" . . . Der Wille zum Willen ist die höchste und unbedingte Bewußtheit der
rechnenden Selbstsicherung des Rechnens." (VA f p. 88). Cf. N, I, pp. 577~582" HW, pp. 216, 2x8.
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consists precisely in their certi-fiable constancy, sc. their "truth,"
which is at once their value. Even at this point we can appreciate the sense of the critique which Heidegger makes of the whole
process. On the one hand, Nietzsche is trying to overcome the
nihilism of values which, for Heidegger, is the nihilism of metaphysics itself. On the other, he has gone about it by founding
another philosophy of values, and this by resorting to conceptions that are themselves profoundly metaphysical: Being as
a universal present-ative subject (Will); truth-as-conformitybecome-certitude. In his very struggle against metaphysical
nihilism, then, Nietzsche has fallen prey to it in its purest form:
the forgetfulness of Being (<pu<n<;) itself. He has ignored the fact:
that Being is the process by which beings emerge into non-concealment; that this non-concealment is the genuine meaning of
truth (a-X-yj&eta). His thought, then, far from being the overcoming of nihilism, is actually the supreme fulfillment of its
for the same reason that it is the consummation of metaphysics itself.33
But we are not yet at the end of our pains. If the Being of
beings is Will-unto-Power, what must be said about the nature
of man? His task is to assume his proper place among the
ensemble of beings according to the nature of Being which permeates them all. More precisely, this means to respond to Being in
beings (himself included) as Will-unto-Power, hence endorse
with his own will this dominion-over-the-earth of universal
Will by assuming the responsibility of achieving to the limit of
his possibility the global certi-fication in which the truth and
value of all constants consist:
. . . Man certi-fies the material, corporal, psychic and spiritual constants,
but [only] for the sake of his own certi-fication that wills dominion over
[all] beings insofar as they could become objects, so that [thus] he may
respond to the Being of beings [as] Will-unto-Power.34

It is to achieve his own self-certitude, hence to achieve the truth
that is proper to himself (and therefore to be true to himself),
that man undertakes to dominate the earth:
38 HW, pp. 227-228 (Metaphysik in Vollendung), 23g (Vollendung des Nihilismus).
Cf. N, I, pp. 476-481, 652-657.
84 " . . . der Mensch die stofflichen, leiblichen, seelischen und geistigen Bestände
sichert, dies aber um seiner eigenen Sicherheit willen, die die Herrschaft über das
Seiende als das mögliche Gegenständliche will, um dem Sein des Seienden, dem
Willen zur Macht zu entsprechen." (HW, p. 242).
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. . . W h e n W i l l - u n t o - P o w e r . . a s principle which poses value, is willed,
t h e n the domination over beings as such in the form of dominion over the

earth passes over to man's new kind of willing, determined [as it is] by
Will-unto-Power. . . . 3 5

This effort of man to dominate the earth is crystallized in the
word "technicity" (Technik). All beings, even man himself, are
objects of which he can dispose. Thus the Being of beings is no
deeper than what man can certi-veri-fy (calculate), so that once
the possibilities opened-up by calculation have been explored,
the beings themselves have been completely exploited and used
up, reduced to a dull and indistinctive uniformity.36 Such is the
condition that characterizes contemporary society.
B.

THE

ETERNAL

RETURN

OF THE

SELFSAME

The correlation between Being (universal Will) and man, however, Nietzsche experiences more surely than he explains.37
We see this better, perhaps, if we pass from the order of essence
to the order of existence and consider the process of universal
Becoming under the guise not (as hitherto) of Will-unto-Power
but of the "eternal return of the selfsame."
In striving to overcome the nihilism of the times ("the desert
grows"),38 Nietzsche wishes to discern how man may pass from
his present condition to a new comprehension of Being and him35 " . . . wenn der Wille zur Macht wissentlich als das Prinzip alles Setzens der
Bedingungen von Seiendem, d.h. als Prinzip der Wertsetzung, gewollt ist, dann geht
die Herrschaft über das Seiende als solches in der Gestalt der Herrschaft über die
Erde an das neue, durch den Willen zur Macht bestimmte Wollen des Menschen über.
. . . " (HW, p. 235). Cf. N, II, pp. 311-3x2. In 1955, Heidegger resumes all the essentials of what we have just seen in terms of twentieth-century society apropos of
Ernst Jünger, Der Arbeiter {Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1932), where
Jtinger's conception of Work is tantamount to Will-unto-Power and the worker is
obviously man as such. See SF, pp. 10-26.
86 HW, p. 237 (Vergegenständlichung); VA, pp. 96 (Verbrauch, Vernatzung),
97 (Gleichförmigkeit). See also VA, pp. 72, 80-81, 91-98. Cf. N, II, pp. 20-27 (Sinnlosigkeit). The word "technicity" applies, too, in a larger sense to Will-unto-Power
itself and describes its fundamental form of appearance to modern man (v.g. VA,
pp. 80, 87, 98). As for the import of "calculate," Heidegger insists on its essentially
arithmetical connotation (rechnen: "reckon"). A reckoning thought, strictly speaking, is one that regards beings-to-be-known only insofar as they are capable of
numeration. They are measured in terms of quantity, and since calculation of this
type in measuring the largeness or smallness of beings can be extended indefinitely,
a reckoning thought easily gives the impression of productivity (WM, p. 48).
87 HW, pp. 232-233. The fleeting remark in HW is given full thematic treatment
in WD, pp. 1-78. Cf. N, I, pp. 356-365, 39988 WD, p. I i and passim ("die Wüste wächst").
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self wherein this nihilism of values is dissolved. He wishes to find
some "bridge" between man as he has been up to now and man
in some better, sc. superior, condition. Nietzsche calls man as he
has been hitherto the "last" man, and man as he should be the
"superior," or "super-,"man (Übermensch). The reason why man
up to the present (let us simply say the "modern" man) is lost
in the morass of a value-lessness (nihilism) is that he has not yet
really entered into himself so that he could come to a proper
appreciation of his own nature and assume it accordingly. The
super-man is superior precisely in this, that he has comprehended himself in terms of his relationship with Being (conceived, of course, as Will-unto-Power). " . . . The super-man is
he who first brings the essence of man as he has been up to now
into the truth [about himself] and [then] assumes this truth
[accordingly]. . , . " 3 9 The difference between the two is not
quantitative but qualitative, and seems to correspond exactly
to what in Heidegger's SZ context would be called the difference
between the inauthentic and the authentic man. Effectively
then, Nietzsche's problem as Heidegger sees it is this: how does
man in the context of Will-unto-Power overcome his present
fallen condition and achieve authenticity, sc. become superman?
The answer is elaborated in Thus Spake Zarathustra (Also
Sprach Zarathustra), the "book for everyone and no one": for
"everyone," sc. for every man as man who seeks to comprehend
the sense of his own essence; for "no one," sc. for no man so
victimized by the nihilism of values that he gives no thought to
authenticity (such a one would find it unintelligible). Zarathustra is the form under which Nietzsche describes the passage
unto authenticity. Zarathustra is not the super-man already
achieved but super-man in the state of becoming. Zarathustra
propounds the doctrine of super-man, and, indeed, principally
by example. Hence the pedagogical value of Zarathustra's selfinterrogation: " . . . Does my will respond to that Will which,

39 " . . . Der Über-Mensch ist derjenige, der das Wesen des bisherigen Menschen
erst in seine Wahrheit überführt und diese übernimmt
" (WD, p. 26). See WD,
pp. 27. 66 (Hinübergehens), 24-25 (bisherige Mensch), 67 (Übermensch nicht quantitativ sondern qualitativ). Cf. N, II, p. 292.
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as WiD-unto-Power, dominates the totality of beings?" 40
Clearly, Zarathustra teaches here that the function of super-man
is a responding to Will-unto-Power as the Being of beings. Now
curiously enough, Zarathustra not only teaches the doctrine of
super-man but "the eternal return of the selfsame" as well. The
problem becomes: what is the relation between the achieving
of authenticity as super-man and Being conceived as "eternal
return"?
We must proceed in roundabout fashion. Let us take as guideline what seems to be an unlikely text from the second part of
Nietzsche's work, where Zarathustra remarks: "That man may
be delivered from [the spirit of] vengeance: this is for me a
bridge to the highest hope, the rainbow after a long storm." 4 1
In terms of what we have said, we take the text to mean that:
what characterizes modern man, victimized by the nihilism of
values, is a "spirit of vengeance"; what characterizes super-man,
Zarathustra's "highest hope," is freedom from this spirit; the
achieving of authenticity, the "bridge" from one to the other,
consists precisely in the liberation from this spirit of vengeance
as such. Let us see now more in detail what this implies. We proceed by formulating once more a series of propositions.
x. What characterizes the nihilism of modern man is "the spirit of
vengeance" (Geist der Rache).
We begin with the fact that modern man for Nietzsche has
not yet learned to appreciate his own nature. What is this
nature? Man is for Nietzsche, as the metaphysical tradition has
always conceived him to be, a rational animal. If we name the
animal element in man "sensible" and the rational element
"supra-sensible," then he is the sensible-supra-sensible being.
If we name the sensible "physical," then supra-sensible means
metaphysical. Man is the being, then, who accomplishes in himself the passage from physical to meta-physical; he is the meta40 4 1 . . . entspricht mein Wille dem Willen, der als Wille zur Macht das Ganze des
Seienden durchherrscht ?'* (VA, p. 104). See WD, pp. 20-21 and VA, p. 101 ("für
Alle und Keinen"); WD, p. 27 and VA, p. 105 (werdende); WD, pp. 44-45 an< * VA,
p. 103 (Lehrer der ewigen Wiederkunft).
4 1 "Denn daß der Mensch erlöst werde von der Rache: das ist mir die Brücke zur
höchsten Hoffnung und ein Regenbogen nach langen Unwettern." (Nietzsche, Also
Sprach Zarathustra, Part II, cited with italics WD, p. 33).
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physical being pure and simple (das Meta-physische selbst). For
Nietzsche, Heidegger claims, man has not yet learned to appreciate the full sense of this fact. 42
Now metaphysics has always interpreted the ratio of this
rational animal as the power by which man renders beings
present to himself, calculating them in terms of purpose, ends
and means, causes and effects, etc., regulating his comportment
with them accordingly, so that it is only the present-ational
level of the beings encountered that has any value for him. So
profoundly is present-ational thinking identified with the ratio
of man that we might translate animal rationale as "the presentative animal." 43
But the present-ational character of metaphysical thought
has taken on for Nietzsche a special cast that is to be understood,
Heidegger claims, when he speaks of the "spirit of vengeance."
We must take the term very broadly and need not understand
it at all in the ordinary sense of a "retaliation." Rather we are
to understand more the sense of "doing violence," and, indeed,
with a certain implacable vehemence that we find suggested in
the phrase "with a vengeance," both of which nuances might be
suggested, perhaps, by the single word "persecution." Now
modern man for Nietzsche, as Heidegger reads him, not only
pro-poses beings but "persecutes" (verfolgen) them, sc. pursues
them, does violence to them, reduces them more and more to
his own control, decom-poses them by his analyses, dis-poses of
them at will. These various modalities of posing are derived
from the fact that the original pro-posing has become distorted,
we might almost say has become a de-posing. All of these modalities are to be understood when we speak of the "persecution"
of beings, for the author suggests them all by the word nachstellen. At any rate, this is how he understands the "spirit of
vengeance" from which the modem man must be delivered, if
nihilism is to be overcome. We discern here once more the essential characteristics of technicity.44

«

WD, p. 25.
WD, pp. 27-28, 30 (ratio), 64 (Zielen, Zwecken, etc.).
44 WT), pp. 32-33, 36, 37 and VA, pp. 1 1 2 - 1 1 3 (verfolgen, nachstellen, herabsetzt, widersetzt).
43
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2. The reason modern man remains inauthentic is that the "spirit
of vengeance 9 is not compatible with an authentic response to Being
as Pure Will.
. . . Insofar as man in his very essence . . . is related to beings in their
Being, hence to Being [itself,] and by this very fact is [himself] determined by Being, then, in accordance with this relation of Being (sc.
now Will) to the essence of man, man must also appear in a special way
as a willing.45

Now the manner in which man's Being as a willing comes to
expression in his activity indicates how man himself understands
not only his own Being but also the Being of beings as such.
That modern man's activity is marked by the "spirit of
vengeance" betrays the fact that his comprehension of Being
as Will-unto-Power is very faulty, his response inadequate. For
when we understand the full import of Being as Will-untoPower, we see that the "spirit of vengeance" is completely
foreign to it and man must be delivered from this spirit completely.
The "spirit of vengeance" is foreign to Will as Will. Why?
Because it implies that whatever it is to which violence is done
somehow resists Will, hence, initially at least, would seem to lie
beyond its power and need to be subdued. But it is repugnant
to universal Will that anything resist it in any way. The reason
is that willing in its purity implies a domination over what is
willed. The only "subduing" is a self-subduing, as, for example,
when Will poses and then overcomes the conditions of its own
unfolding. In the process of willing as such, the Will wills itself
and nothing outside of it can "resist." As we saw, this is the way
in which Nietzsche establishes a new set of values, whose function
is to replace the old "metaphysical" values which had pretended
to be "absolute" precisely inasmuch as they "resist" any such
evolution which is the essence of Being-as-Will.46 The "spirit of
vengeance," then, is repugnant to Pure Will, hence no response
to Being-as-Will that is marked by this spirit is authentic.
45 4 1 . . . Insofern aber der Mensch seinem Wesen nach als das denkende Tier vorstellenderweise auf das Seiende in seinem Sein und damit auf dieses bezogen und
dadurch vom Sein her bestimmt wird, muß diesem Bezug des Seins (d.h. jetzt des
Willens) zum Menschenwesen gemäß auch das Menschsein auf betonte Weise als
ein Wollen erscheinen." (WD, p. 36). See VA, pp. 114-1154« VA, p. 117.
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j. To achieve authenticity, man must respond to the universal Will
as the " eternal return of the selfsame."
Nothing is so independent of the process of pure Willing that
it "resists" Will - not even time. What is time for Nietzsche?
Like everyone before him since Aristotle, Nietzsche conceives
time as an endless succession of "nows," whereby the not-yet"now" (future) passes by the present "now" to become immediately a no-longer-"now" which we may call a "was" {"es war").
The past "resists" universal Will, which, as pure Will-untoWilling, is always facing forward toward more Willing. If there
were ever anything that could "resist" pure Will so that Will
could pursue and subdue it in the "spirit of vengeance," it would
certainly be the immutable past.47
But that is just the point. Nietzsche so conceives pure Will(ing)
that the immutable "was" of time is dissolved in a "now" that
abides, a nunc stans. Does time remain for Will-unto-Power?
Yes and no. Yes, in the sense that the movement of successive
"nows" remains. No, in the sense that the movement never passes
into the irretrievable "was" but keeps coming back upon Will,
circle-fashion, so as constantly to be willed again. Time remains,
if one will, for how can we speak of Being in a human way except
in terms of time? But it is purified of that which makes it
"merely temporal," sc. makes it become a "past." If it makes
any sense, we might even say that time for Nietzsche becomes
"eternalized." However this may be, let us designate the
movement of which we speak here as a "return" and its perdurance as "eternal." Then we understand how Nietzsche conceives "the eternal return of the selfsame": it is "the supreme
triumph of the metaphysics of Will," whereby " . . . W i l l
eternally wills the eternity of willing. . . . " 48
To respond to Being-as-Will in all its purity means to comprehend and acquiesce to Will as "eternal return." By such a response, modern man achieves authenticity, sc. becomes superman:
47 WD, pp. 42, 36-37, 43- Cf. p. 43, where Heidegger suggests an interesting
analysis in terms of hate.
48 " . . . Das ist er, wenn er als Wille die Ewigkeit des Wollens ewig will
(WD, p. 77). See VA, pp. 102-103 (Kreis); WD, p. 43 (der höchste Triumph der
Metaphysik des Willens). Cf. N, II, pp. xx, 284-287.
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T h e super-man becomes superior t o m a n as he has been up to now, inasm u c h as he enters into relation t o Being, which, as [the] Wülfing] of
t h e eternal return of t h e selfsame, eternally wills itself and nothing else
besides. . . . 4 9

4. Hence Zarathustra leads the way to super-man by teaching the
"eternal return ."
The bridge to authenticity is the liberation of man from the
manner of thinking characterized by the "spirit of vengeance."
It is the task of Zarathustra to preach this liberation:
W h o is N i e t z s c h e ' s Z a r a t h u s t r a ? H e is the teacher whose doctrine
would liberate [man's] p r e v i o u s [manner of] thinking from the spirit of
vengeance u n t o a y e s t o t h e eternal return of the self-same, 5 0

which is a yes to the e-valuation by which nihilism is overcome.
Zarathustra preaches the super-man because, and only inasmuch
as, he preaches the eternal return. He proclaims both at once,
for they are correlative: the Being of beings and the nature of
man. Indeed, " . . . Zarathustra is himself in a certain way this
correlation. . . . " 5 1
But farther than this Nietzsche cannot go. To go farther would
be to think the correlation between Being and the nature of
man as such. "This . . . relation of Being to man's essence as the
relationship of this essence to Being is, in terms of the essence
of this [relationship] and the origin of this essence, not yet
thought. . . , " 5 2 To think it means to go beyond metaphysics
with its interpretation of man as rational animal. It means to
pass from present-ative thinking unto foundational thought.
Nietzsche, slave to present-ative thinking, could not take this
step. That is why Heidegger feels he has the right to ask if this
49 "Der Übermensch geht über den bisherigen Menschen hinaus, indem er in den
Bezug zum Sein eingeht, das als Wille der ewigen Wiederkehr des Gleichen ewig sieb
selber will und nichts a u ß e r d e m . . . ( W D , p. 44). Cf. N, II, pp. 40, 62, 304.
60 "Wer ist Nietzsches Zarathustra? Er ist der Lehrer, dessen Lehre das bisherige
Nachdenken vom Geist der Rache in das Ja zur ewigen Wiederkehr des Gleichen
befreien möchte." (VA, p. 118). See HW, p. 206 (Ja zur neuen Wertsetzung).
61 " . . . Zarathustra ist selbst in gewisser Weise dieses Zusammengehören
"
(VA, p. 124). See HW, p. 233; WD, p. 45; VA, p. 118.
52 "Dieses aber, nämlich der Bezug des Seins zum Menschenwesen als Beziehung
dieses Wesens zum Sein ist hinsichtlich seines Wesens und seiner Wesensherkunft
noch nicht bedacht
" (WD, p. 45). Cf. N, II, p. 293-
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"bridge to the highest hope" does not in fact lead to a desolation
still more profound, the desolate nihilism of remaining oblivious
to the Being-process itself.53
RESUME

Nietzsche seeks to salvage nineteenth-century Europe from
its nihilism of values (the dead "God") by a philosophy of universal Becoming which would render possible a re-valuation. If
we consider this Life-force in terms of essence as Will-untoPower, we see that it simply evolves to their ultimate consequence the implications latent in metaphysical subject-ism with
its conception of truth as certitude. For, once Descartes's subjectism of the individual ego has been so expanded by Leibniz that
all beings become present-ative subjects, and once the interior
dynamism which propels the present-ative activity of each
subject is conceived to be a drive toward perfection which may
be interpreted quite legitimately as "will," subsequent forms
of subject-ism become in one way or another a metaphysics of
will, whether will be interpreted as reason (Kant), freedom
(Fichte), love (Schelling), Absolute Spirit (Hegel), etc. When at
last subject-ism in Nietzsche becomes a philosophy of will
simply considered as will, sc. of Will-unto-Power, the last possibility of metaphysical subject-ism has been exploited. This is
the sense in which Heidegger claims that Nietzsche's thought is
the "consummation" (Vollendung) of metaphysics in the West.54
But, for the same reason, this thought is the consummation not the overcoming - of nihilism, too, for it is metaphysics itself
that is nihilism, inasmuch as it is oblivious to the Being-process.
Nietzsche can not think the essence of nihilism (metaphysics)
until he re-collects that Being is the process of emergent
truth. 55
If we consider the Life-force in terms of existence as the
eternal return of the selfsame, we discover under the guise of
Zarathustra that Being and man are correlative, yet the correM

VA, p. 124 and WD, p. 74 (Denken); WD, p. 76 (Verwüstung); VA, pp. 121,

122.
64
58

N, II, pp. 201, 291-302.
V A , p. 91; N, I. pp. 469, 476-481.
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lation cannot be explained as such. For Nietzsche's man is only
"rational animal" - the man of traditional metaphysics itself.
Nietzsche can not think this correlation until he conceives
man as more than a rational animal, sc. in terms of his relation
to Being as such.
In each case, the mark of Nietzsche's failure is that he remains prisoner of metaphysics. To succeed at what he attempts
to do, one would have to go beyond metaphysics into its ground.
One would have to think Being (a-Xrj&eta) as the process out of
which the ontological difference arises, and this in its intimate
correlation with the essence of man. This is what Heidegger
himself has tried to do - to overcome metaphysics in grounding
it through the achievement of foundational thought. 56

50

See HW, p. 243.

c h a p t e r

viii

LOGIC

We have traced what Heidegger considers to be the devolution of Western thought from Plato to Nietzsche under the
guise of metaphysics. We wish now to review the same history
from two particular points of view which are for our problem
especially important. The first deals with the science of logic,
the second with the problem of humanism.
We know already, at least in a general way, how Xoyo<; in the
sense of a gathering-together comes to mean the expression of
a judgement, which becomes thus the proper place of truth. It is
but one step further to say that the expressed judgement becomes,
too, the tribunal which decides upon the nature of beings and
Being. For an expression is always about something (xara Ttvog).
This something can be expressed in different ways: according
to its quantity, its qualities, its relationships. These different
manners of declaring (xaT/jyopeiv) the something with which
expressions deal are the categories (xocT/jyopwct.) and are taken to
be the determinations of Being. 1 Henceforth, the doctrine of the
categories will have an unchallenged place in all ontology, the
"science of beings." Let it suffice here simply to underline the
fact that the categories are basically forms of declaration, sc. of
expression, hence of thought, that assume unto themselves the
determination of Being.
As the meaning of Xoyo? was transformed, so, too, was that
of voelv. The latter no longer signifies the containment of the
1 See P, p. 142. Cf. N, II, pp. 71-78. For another development of the relation between logic and metaphysics in the West, see N, I, pp. 527-533.
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Over-powering but comes to signify that seizure of the to-beknown which penetrates it through and through, and which,
when clothed in words, forms the complete expression. This
perceptive seizure that comes to expression is what essentially
characterizes the understanding in the sense of a presentationin-form-of-judgement.2 Noetv thus becomes understanding and
reason, which thereby come to the place of primacy, of domination over Being. 3
The domination of man's reason over Being reaches its culmination, according to Heidegger, in the science of logic, which, as
the "science of thought," is just such a tribunal before which
Being must stand. 4 The term "science of logic" translates the
Greek TJ £7RTAR/)[JLT) Xoyucq, "the comprehending [Verstehen] which
concerns Xoyo<;," where Xoyo<; is the substantive form of the verb
X£yeiv. In this case, Xeyetv means to speak or say something about
something, Xeyetv n XOCTOC TLVO<;. That about which something is
said "lies underneath" (u7coxetfzevov) the whole saying, supporting it, hence is called the "subject" (sub-jectum) of the saying;
what is said about the subject is called the "predicate," the
whole operation a "predication." This predication is what we
have been calling an "expression." 5
The thought with which logic deals is a thought that is articulated by expression and is interpreted in terms of expression.
Hence, only that is thinkable which is say-able. Now it is conceivable that we try to formulate a proposition where S and P
are incompatible, because they cannot be "said" together, v.g.
"square" and "circle." Both "circle" and "square" can be said
(-dictio) individually but not together, for they oppose (contra-),
8 EM, p. 142. Heidegger sees the origin of ratio {reri) in the Greek
"to speak/'
"talk over or out" (Durchsprechen), hence to thoroughly explore (Durchnehmen)
and thus enter into the possession of something. This taking-unto-oneself he understands as essentially a pro-posing (WD, p. 27).
8 EM, pp. 136-137. Cf. p. 35, where the author characterizes the domination of the
intelligence to the detriment of the "spirit" thus: intelligence has become mere intellectuality (Verständigkeit), whose function is reduced to reflection upon (Überlegung), calculation about (Berechnung) and contemplation (Betrachtung) of the
things that are given to it, their possible modification and multiplication.
4 EM, p. 19.
5 See WD, pp. 99-101. Aristotle's tfpyavov played a decisive role in the development of logic. Heidegger understands the word literally as a "tool" for gaining and
assuring correctness (EM, p. 143). However this may be, he makes it clear that the
science of logic, in the pejorative sense by which he usually refers to it, is not to be
attributed to Aristotle himself but to his disciples (EM, p. 92).
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therefore contra-diet, each other. Because two contradictory
terms cannot be said together, sc. identified by a copula, the
corresponding concepts cannot be thought together. That is
why, according to Heidegger, the "principle of contradiction"
becomes the first law of (logical) thought. It is an easy step to see
how such a law of thought immediately dominates the Being
of beings. Whatever cannot be thought cannot be, whatever can
be thought can be, where can-be and cannot-be always pertain
to that which is (beings), sc. that about which the expression
is made.
With time, it becomes clear that this simple pattern does not
satisfy all possible situations, so that the conception of Xoyo;
has to be broadened. After all, simple expressions often have
more than one meaning. For example, if we take the expression,
"God is the Absolute," the sense changes according to emphasis.
If we say "God is the Absolute," this means that God alone is the
Absolute. If we say "God is the Absolute," this means that it is
the nature of God to be absolute. The simple expression "says"
both these meanings, hence for its full sense to be articulated the
expression must be thoroughly (Sta-) explored in itself for all
possible implications (-Xeyeaftou). Such exploration is a dia-lectic
(SiaXeyea^at), and the thought that is embodied in it is "dialectical." 6
The essential here is not that logic necessarily becomes a dialectic but that " . . . even in a dialectic, thought is determined
by the expression, Xoyo*;. . . . " 7 The clearest proof of this is
Hegel, for, after the ground has been prepared by Kant's
"transcendental logic," Hegel thinks the dialectic through to
its ultimate consequences and brings it to definitive expression
as the dialectic of the Absolute Subject in his master work, the
Science of Logic. When Hegel's dialectic of consciousness becomes with Marx one of "reality" (Realdialektik) as dialectical
materialism, the matter is no different, for even in a dialectic of
"objects," the "objects" are at least implicitly objects of some
8 WD, pp. i o i 119-120. The term Siocvoeio&ai for Heidegger has a sense analogous
t
to SLaX^Yea&aL, where voeiv has become perception by a ratio, hence the term suggests
dialectic as considered from the viewpoint of the reason or understanding. See WD,
pp. 146, 138.
7 " . . . Auch in der Dialektik wird das Denken von der Aussage, vom X6yo^ her
bestimmt
" (WD, p. 101).
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knowing subject, hence such a dialectic is in one form or another
a dialectic of Self-awareness, hence ultimately a form of logic.
When logic under still another form becomes for contemporary
thought "symbolic" logic, this is simply the ultimate deterioration of logic-become-expression.8
Out of all this, let us retain that Heidegger's polemic vs. logic
(the "domination of reason") is not a repudiation of its rights
but a protest against its aggrandizement. For the presumption
of reason to arrogate to itself the right to pronounce judgement
upon Being is, when all is said and done, a usurpation by which
Being itself is impoverished and constrained to the narrow
limits of man. There is something "more original" in man than
his reason, for the lumen naturale of his intelligence presupposes
the lighting-process of Being. Foundational thought, as Heidegger conceives it, is merely an effort to allow to Being (the
lighting-process) its full rights. That is why " . . . foundational
thinking begins only when we have experienced the fact that
reason, glorified [as it has been] for hundreds of years, is the
most stubborn adversary of thought." 9
R£SUM£

Once Xoyo<; loses the sense of "gathering-together" and comes
to mean the expression that embodies thought, then the laws
of expression become the laws of thought and the science of logic
is born. Since expressions always refer to beings (xaxd TIVO<;),
logical thought can not deal with the Being-process as such.
Heidegger's polemic vs. logic is fundamentally a protest against
the tendency of logical thought to pronounce upon Being itself
and thereby to dominate it.

8 WD, pp. 145, M6 (Kant, Hegel), IOX, 170 (Marx), 10, 102, 145 (Logistik). In
1955, symbolic logic is seen as evidence of man's flight from the necessity of interrogating his own metaphysical situation (SF, p. 13).
* " . . . Das Denken beginnt erst dann, wenn wir erfahren haben, daß die seit
Jahrhunderten verherrlichte Vernunft die hartnäckigste Widersacherin des Denkens
ist." (HW, p. 247).

c h a p t e r viii

HUMANISM

The word "humanism" is a specifically Roman phenomenon,
insofar as it derives from the republican era when the word
humanus was used to distinguish the homo romanus from the
homo barbarus by reason of the Roman's cultural superiority.
This was based upon the Roman's appropriation of the Greek
7COCI§EL<X, interpreted in the Platonic schools of the later period as
erudüio et institutio in bonas artes.
What 7uat$eta meant for Plato himself we can gather, to some
extent, from the story of the cave-dwellers, for this pretends to
delineate, after its own fashion, the nature of 7cai8eia. This pretension explains the importance in the metaphor of the transition from one place of sojourn to another. IlatSeta is the conversion of the entire man in the depths of his Being. It is not
simply an accumulation of mere knowledge but a complete
transformation by reason of which man is transferred from the
domain of beings that he first of all and for the most part encounters (v.g. the shadows) into another realm where beings in
their essence shine-forth. To make an adaptation to this new
realm and consequently to assume an orientation toward that
which shines-forth as supremely un-concealed (the Ideas) - this
is the essence of 7uaiSeia. There is an intrinsic relation, then, between 7rai§£ia and the conception of truth. And as truth in the
sense of non-concealment is essentially negatived, so, too, is
TOXISELOC. Until the very end, it continues to be a struggle to overcome non-7ratSeta (a7Mci8eu<rfa): such is the meaning of the fourth
stage of the story.1
1 PW, pp. 24-25 (Höhlengleichnis), 23 (Umwendung), 25-26 (Versetzung), 23-24
(a7raid£OCTta).
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All this could be given an interpretation that would correspond with Heidegger's conception of the essence of man as a
relationship to Being. But Plato understands it otherwise and
the difference is revealing. Whoever is to have commerce with a
world determined by Ideas must have an antecedent vision of
those Ideas. The essence of 7ratSeta, then, is to render man free
and steadfast for the intuition of essence. Henceforth there
will be a striving after the "truth/' sc. correctness, of intuition. The "right" glimpse of the Ideas is all-important. The
sense of 7uoct8e[a is correlative with the sense of truth. 2
As the author sees it, the dichotomy in izonSeicn between seeing
and seen contains within it already, even if still undeveloped, the
fundamental pattern of present-ative thought which the subjectism of modern metaphysics will only unfold. Such is the
7cai$eta, in its very essence metaphysical, that Rome, through
the Middle Academy, proudly makes its own. When the Renaissance proclaims a renascentia romanitatis (therefore humanitatis) to liberate itself from what it considers to be the barbarism of the "gothic" Middle Ages, its ideal is ultimately the
TCatScta of the Neo-Platonic academies. So, too, the humanism
of the Enlightenment. Thus it happens in each case that one
returns to the study of classical (Roman and Greek) antiquity. 3
If humanism is taken out of this purely historical context, however, and examined for itself, it may be described as the liberating of man unto the dignity that is proper to his nature. This
gives the term a broader meaning that can apply to any type of
philosophical anthropology, such as Marxism, Sartrean existentialism or even Christianity, if this be considered in its
purely human dimension. The form of humanism differs, of
course, according to the way one conceives "liberation" and the
"dignity of man," but there is one common denominator:
" . . . the humanitas of homo humanus is determined with a viewto some already established interpretation of nature, history,
the world, ground of the world, sc. of beings in the ensemble." 4
2 P W , pp. 40 (frei und fest), 46-47 (Wandel des Wesens der aX^&eia).
* H B , pp. 62-63.
4 " . . . daß die humanitas des homo humanus aus dem Hinblick auf eine schon
feststehende Auslegung der Natur, der Geschichte, der Welt, des Weltgrundes, das
heißt des Seienden im Ganzen bestimmt wird." [sie] (HB, p. 63). See pp. 61 (Marx,
Christ), 62 {Humanitas...).
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But any interpretation of beings in the ensemble as such, sc.
in their Being, is clearly metaphysics. That is why "every
humanism is either grounded in a metaphysics or itself becomes
the ground of one. . . . " 5 Metaphysical in its historical origin,
metaphysical in its form, humanism shares the same destiny as
metaphysics. For example, when we are told that Marxist humanism experiences the alienation [Entfremdung) of modern man,
this is but an ulterior form of Nietzschean nihilism, sc. the forgottenness of Being. The essence of materialism, for Heidegger,
lies not in the fact that it reduces all reality to matter but that
it is only another form of technicity, sc. obliviousness to the
ontological difference. The same may be said of all forms of
nationalism, for that matter of internationalism - collectivism
of any kind 6 - for this is simply the subjectiveness of man
taken as a totality. None of these forms of modern man's
homelessness can be cured simply by a humanism of another
sort. It is metaphysics (therefore humanism) itself which must
be overcome.
What is the fundamental conception of man for the humanistic tradition? Animal rationale! This is more than simply a
translation of Aristotle's £coov Xoyov lyo^- It is a metaphysical
interpretation. Now Heidegger is at pains to insist that he does
not consider this definition false and to be rejected, but only
that it is locked within metaphysics and unable to escape its
limitations.7 What is the essence of his criticism? We have seen
it before: the definition interprets man in relation to animals,
even when it distinguishes him from them by a specific difference. To speak of him subsequently as subject, person, spirit,
etc. does not deliver him from the horizon of animality in which
the original definition has fixed him.
But such an interpretation sells man too short, leaves the true
value of his humanity, sc. his relation to Being, unthought. It
does not even do justice to man's body, for this is essentially
different from an animal organism, no matter how similar in
structure, for, after all, is not every part of him in one way or
another geared to that which is unique in him, the uttering of
5 "Jeder Humanismus gründet entweder in einer Metaphysik, oder er macht sich
selbst zum Grund einer solchen..
(HB, pp. 63-64).
• HB, pp. 87 (Heimatlosigkeit), 88 (Wesen des Materialismus), 89 (Kollektivismus).
' HB, pp. 64, 66, 75, 89.
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language ? However this may be, the author's position is clear.
" . . . Metaphysics thinks man from [his] animality, not to his
humanity." 8
So much for the metaphysical definition of man - now let us
say a word about his structure. Metaphysics normally speaks of
man as composed of essence and existence. For the scholastics,
existence means "actuality" in distinction from essence understood as "possibility" (in the sense of the shining-forth of a being
in its "Idea"),but the same duality perdures in one form or another through all metaphysics. It matters little if existence be
called in Kant the "objectivity of experience," in Hegel the "Selfknowing Idea of Absolute Subjectivity," or in Nietzsche "the
eternal return of the selfsame," the terms remain always a
manner of expressing the metaphysical conception of rendering
actual an essence that in one way or another precedes. When
Sartre reverses the formula but retains the original terms of it,
saying that existence precedes essence, it may be that he reverses
the sense of metaphysics that since Plato has always thought
essence as somehow prior, but (whatever his personal sympathies) he remains himself all the more profoundly metaphysical.
. . The reversal of a metaphysical principle remains a metaphysical principle...," 9 and with the reversal Sartre in our
own day has simply calcified metaphysics further in the forgottenness of the truth of Being.
How Heidegger breaks the circle we already have some idea,
for he conceives man on a level deeper than that of the traditional essence-existence dichotomy. He interprets man purely
out of his relationship to Being - as transcendence, as eksistence. How this is interpreted in terms of humanism we shall
see in due time. For the moment, it suffices to remark - and let
this serve as resume - that since metaphysics and humanism are
so intrinsically related, the effort to go beyond metaphysics in
order to ground it comports a new notion of the nature of man. 10

8 " . . . Die Metaphysik denkt den Menschen von der animalitas her und denkt
nicht zu seiner humanitas hin." [sie] (HB, p. 66). Writer's italics.
• " . . . Aber die Umkehrung eines metaphysischen Satzes bleibt ein metaphysischer Satz
" (HB, p. 72). See pp. 70 (Verwirklichung), 69 (Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche).
™ WM, p. 9 (Wandel des Wesens des Menschen).

c h a p t e r

TRANSITION:

viii

RILKE

We have seen in its essentials how Heidegger considers the
history of metaphysics to be a de-volution of authentic thought
as discernible in the Xeyeiv-voelv of Parmenides and Heraclitus.
We are prepared to appreciate the sense of Heidegger's effort to
re-trieve the original sense of these terms under the guise of
foundational thought. By way of transition, let us see briefly
how the author interprets the lyric poet R. M. Rilke. For Heidegger, Rilke is the poet par excellence of metaphysics in its
consummation as we saw it in Nietzsche, having experienced
and expressed in words the Being of beings as universal Will,
whose nature is simply to be itself as Will. V . . . The [universal]
Will comes to presence as a Will unto Willing." 1 Yet there is
something genuine in his experience of how it was to be overcome, and this entitles him to be called a "poet for needy
times." 2 We polarize our r£sum£ around these two points.
A.

RILKE

AND

NIHILISM

I. Being as Will
Will-unto-Power can be discerned in all the metaphors which
Rilke uses in order to describe the Being of beings. Consider the
1 44. . . Der Wille west als der Wille zum Willen." (HW, p. 258). As with Nietzsche,
we must make an effort to realize that "Will" here is not a psychological phenomenon but a manner in which to speak of Being.
8 The phrase "needy times" refers to Hölderlin's "Brod und Wein": " . . . and
whereunto the poet in needy times?" The sense: the times are needy because of the
nihilism which Nietzsche observed; what, then, is the function of a poet as such in
overcoming this nihilism? Heidegger cites the Hölderlin text and uses it to give a
title to his essay ( " . . .und wozu Dichter in dürftiger Zeit?," cited HW, p. 248).
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most important ones. Being is conceived as "Nature." After the
fashion of Leibniz1 Natura, Nature for Rilke is the universal
force that permeates all beings, "lets them loose" from one point
of view, "gathers them into themselves" from another. The
result is that beings are, not simply because they are willed but
because they are-willing, sc. are as willing, by reason of the Will
that makes them be. In the same sense, note Being as "Life,"
"Venture," "Ground," "Center." 3
This last metaphor has a double sense. Being is to be understood as a sort of gravitational force drawing all beings unto
their true selves, giving them "weight" as beings. By the same
token, however, it draws them unto itself, therefore unto one
another, gathering them thus unto a single unit. This drawing
power of Being is a "Traction" (Zug, Bezug), which works its
influence in beings, each in its own way, by "at-traction" (Anziehung).4 All of these terms say the same thing: they designate
the ensemble of beings as such, sc. in their Being, interpreted as
universal Will.
Rilke's most significant term for Being, however, is "the
Open." Being is the Open insofar as it admits of no enclosures
within itself. It is the universal drawing power of pure Traction
that encompasses all beings, drawing them into a Whole that
dissolves all barriers between them. Obviously Being as the
Open is another form of Being as universal Will. We must be
careful, however, not to let a similarity in terminology lead us
to think that we are dealing with the same conception of the
Open that we have met in Heidegger. Far from it. Heidegger's
Open is that which renders beings open, hence accessible one to
another, able to encounter each other. But en-counter implies
opposition, therefore enclosures that separate the two beings
that meet. These, however, are just the sort of barriers between
beings that Rilke's Open excludes. Where there is a genuine
meeting of beings or opposition between them, this takes place
outside the Open as such.5

3 HW, pp. 256-257 (Loslassen, Versammlung), 257-258 (Leben, Wagnis, Grund),
259-260 (Mitte).
4 HW, pp. 260-261 (Zug, Bezug), 261 (Anziehung).
5 HW, p. 262 ("das Offene").
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2. Man
This being the case, we see immediately that we must distinguish beings according to the relation they bear to each other
and to the Open. Beings other than man are found "in" the Open,
propelled by blind drive into the pure Traction of the Whole.6
Man, however, because he is endowed with the power to encounter beings, sc. to enter into comportment with them as
opposed to him, is to this extent outside the Open as Rilke conceives it.
What is it that distinguishes man from other beings ? It is this
power to deal with that which stands op-posed to him, sc. that
peculiar psychic structure that we call consciousness, by which
man pro-poses to himself the objects with which he deals. What
distinguishes man from other beings is that he enjoys a higher
level of consciousness (another Leibnizian thesis), founded more
ultimately still on the Cartesian principle that what properly
characterizes the ego-cogito is the power to pro-pose objects.7
This power of consciousness is that special property of man
which characterizes his at-traction as a being. Consciousness is
what most profoundly characterizes man in the depths of his
Being. It is the specifically human "activity," if we may use
this ambiguous term simply in its broadest sense to suggest
man's Being in action. If Being is a Willing, then human
consciousness, too, is a willing, the manner in which man is
(willing) as a being. That is why the pro-posing power of human
consciousness and all the comportment that it implies is a
willing.8
Because of the privileged nature of the Willing that constitutes him as a being, man is not absorbed into the universal
Traction the way other beings are, but is endowed with an independence (liberty) by which he can go along spontaneously of
his own accord with Being, pro-posing beings for and to himself.
The power to pro-pose we have seen before. Here the theme reHW, p. 263.
HW, pp. 265, 282.
8 HW, p. 266. The scholastics distinguish voluntas ut natura and voluntas 1tt facultas. To the extent that the language is acceptable, one might say that the present
conception corresponds to voluntas ut natura. The observation, however, has only
illustrative value.
6

7
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turns with an insistence not only upon the pro-posing of individual objects but of the whole ensemble of beings, sc. of Nature,
the Open as the World. Because man pro-poses the Open to
himself, he is excluded from it, takes his de-parture (Abschied)
from it, rather stands before it, lets it stand before him as an
object related to him as subject. 9
All that is new here is another word to describe the pro-posing,
sc. "com-posing," or, as we prefer to translate in the present
context, "contra-posing," which is intended to suggest a whole
manifold of nuances, the common denominator of which is that
man not only pro-poses objects but controls (or tries to control)
these objects, so as to suit his own disposition.10 The essential
is that man becomes the center of reference for beings to such an
extent that in objectivizing beings, sc. pro-posing them as objects
and entering into comportment with them accordingly, he imposes himself upon them by referring them to his own purposes.
Here we find the command character of Will in the comportment
of man's consciousness:
. . . In a willing of this sort, modern man presents himself as the one who
in all his relations t o e v e r y t h i n g t h a t is, hence e v e n t o himself, rises up
a s the self-imposing com-poser of t h e m all and establishes this ascendancy
.as an unconditioned domination over [all beings]. . . . n

The result is that, if beings still have a presence, it is only the
presence of (re)present-ation in and for a consciousness that is
by nature calculating. This pro-posing present-ation does not
have any intuitive contact with beings-to-be-known. The visage
of beings themselves is no longer viewed immediately but is
sacrificed to the projects of pro-posing, present-ing consciousness.
Hence beings owe their present-ness to the activity of man's
pro-posing power and " . . . the sphere of the objective-ness of

• HW, pp. 265, 266 (mit), 271 (Ab-schied), 262 (vor die Welt), 265-266 (in den
Stand gebracht).
10 We are trying to render Herstellen, which in itself would be translated better
as "pro-duce," but which we render as "corn-pose" ("contra-pose") for reasons that
appear as we proceed.
1 1 " . . . Der neuzeitliche Mensch stellt sich in solchem Wollen als den heraus, der
in allen Beziehungen zu allem, was ist, und damit auch zu ihm selbst, als der sich
durchsetzende Hersteller aufsteht und diesen Aufstand zur unbedingten Herrschaft
einrichtet. . ( H W , p. 266). See pp. 265-266 (vorsätzlichen Sichdurchsetzens der
Vergegenständlichung, Befehl).
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objects remains inside of consciousness. . . . " 1 2 Hand in hand
with all this goes the supremacy of man's reason (the power of
calculation par excellence) and, of course, the domination of
logic over man's interpretation of beings.
The consequence of all this is clear: technicity. As we know
already, the word does not designate simply technology, sc. the
mechanical techniques of contemporary civilization that scientific progress has made possible. Rather it is the fundamental
attitude in man by which all beings, even man himself, become
raw material for his pro-posing, contra-posing, (self)im-posing
comportment with beings. Technology is simply the instrumentation of this attitude, the organization of man's de-parture
from the Open. 13

B.

RILKE'S

ATTEMPT

TO

OVERCOME

NIHILISM

J. Theory
Now Rilke is aware of this situation, which corresponds to
what Nietzsche called nihilism. He knows that something must
change. What then does he propose ? On the one hand, man must
overcome the consequence of the subject-object polarity and
the de-parture it implies (in a word: technicity); on the other
hand, he cannot abandon his own nature as a conscious (therefore pro-posing) being. Is reconciliation possible? Yes, replies
Heidegger for Rilke, provided that man find in himself a deeper
level of consciousness: the interior world of the heart. There and
only there can he accomplish his return into that totality which
is the Open. What does this mean?
As long as man remains exclusively on the level of the subjectobject opposition, his de-parture from the Open is irreversible.
Even if he tries to set up some sort of barrier to protect himself
from technicity, the barrier itself would be separative, would
widen the distance between man and the Open. But if man were
to recognize his de-parture as a de-parture, would not the recognition itself, without removing the dichotomy, be nevertheless
12 " . . . Die Sphäre der Gegenständlichkeit der Gegenstände bleibt innerhalb des
M (HW, p. 281). See pp. 282, 287 (Logik).
Bewußtseins
1 3 HW, pp. 267 (Sichdurchsetzens), 268 (Instrument der Einrichtung), 271 (Organisation des Abschieds).
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a type of return? In this case, man would see the danger of technicity as threatening his own fundamental belonging-ness to the
Open which, after all, constitutes him in his Being. " . . . Once
we have seen the danger [of technicity] as a threat to our own
essence, inevitably we have accomplished the reversal of the departure from the Open. . . . " 14
This supposes, however, some contact with the Open that
permits man to see that this subject-object opposition is only
one form of his dealings with it. He must experience the manysidedness of Being. For Being is a sphere, like the moon, only
one side of which can be "seen" by calculating present-ation.
For present-ational thought, only what it can (re)present can be
considered positive. But the other side of the sphere is equally
positive. If the sphere of Being were taken as life, for example,
then death would be a side of it that is turned away from man,
whose calculating reason would consider it as something purely
negative. To experience the totality of the Open in this case
would be to experience death as a positive side of Being. 15 The
essential is that these positive sides of Being, that are, however,
"turned away" from man, are inaccessible to present-ational
thought.
But they are not altogether inaccessible. The level of objectivizing present-ation is only one level of man's conscious life,
and, indeed, a superficial one. There is another level, more profound: the interior world of the heart. Did not Pascal, almost
contemporaneously with Descartes, proclaim the "logic of the
heart"? Here in this invisible center, man discovers how and
what to love. This inner world of the heart remains immanent,
to be sure, but within it the barriers of calculating present-ation
dissolve, and beings are free to flow together in union with the
common Traction of the Open. Such is the reversal of man's
de-parture from the Open that Rilke suggests as antidote to
technicity: " . . . the reversal of consciousness is a re-collection
of the immanence of objects of present-ation into a presence
within the realm of the heart." 16
14
.. Mit dem Gesehenhaben der Gefahr als der Wesensgefahr müssen wir die
Umkehrung der Abkehr gegen das Offene vollzogen haben
" (HW, p. 277).
" HW, pp. 279-280 (Tod).
19
.. Die Umkehrung weist in das Innere des Innen. Die Umkehrung des Bewußtseins ist deshalb eine Er-innerung der Immanenz der Gegenstände des Vorstellens in die Präsenz innerhalb des Herzraumes." (HW, p. 284). See pp. 282-283,
285.
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2. Practice
Even if we grant all this, the essential question remains: how
does Rilke intend to effect the re-collection (Er-innerung) ? The
poet himself does not say, but Heidegger replies in his name: by
poetry. Such is the function of the poet in time of need. The
argument: Rilke speaks of the re-collection being achieved by
the more "venture-some'' among men. Recalling that "Venture"
is one name for Being as Will, Heidegger suggests that he is
"more" venture-some who is endowed in an extraordinary way
with access to Being, sc. he who has access to "more" than
Being, if this be considered from the point of view of beings. Now
how does man fundamentally have access to Being? Here Heidegger speaks for himself: by language. We have seen in EM
how such a thesis becomes plausible as soon as we re-trieve the
authentic meaning of Xoyo<;. For the present, let us (provisionally) accept the thesis without further comment, for the sake of
the present analysis. If language is the privileged means of
access to Being, then how can anyone be called "more" venturesome except in terms of language? Every man, of course, has
the power of language, but the more venture-some (Being-full,
if one may say so) among men will be those endowed with a
special gift for language. These are the poets. 17
Rilke, the poet, attempts to accomplish the reversal of man's
de-parture from the Open by means of language. Each level of
man's conscious life has a language proper to itself. On the level
of present-ative objectivation and calculating reason, language
is merely the expression of a judgement to be used as an instrument of human intercourse. In the realm of the heart, language
yields (without reflecting upon itself and making itself an object)
to what is to-be-said, simply because it must be said. It is this
latter type that Rilke ambitions - the language of the heart. He
will have nothing to do with the language of pro-posing, contraposing, (self)im-posing thought. He will bring the pure Traction
of the Open in its undiminished totality into words, and this
means to belong himself completely to the domain of beings.
Yet there is no "forcing" into words. On the contrary, the poet
must receive what is to be said, must accept it as coming from a
17

HW, pp. 274, 287 (wollender, wagender), 291 (Sagenderen).
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Source and, having accepted it, must let it unfold unto its
fullness. The true poet does not com-pose, he fulfills. 18
C.

HEIDEGGER'S

CRITIQUE

OF

RILKE

j. Debit
What is Heidegger's own judgement of Rilke? As with the
Hegel analysis, there is no explicit critique as such and we must
disengage it from occasional remarks that slip into a more general expose. We can crystallize it in terms of what we have seen
about the de-volution of Western thought under the guise of
subject-ism in general and of logic in particular.
a. S U B J E C T - I S M - Despite his efforts to overcome technicity, Rilke remains locked in the subject-ism of which technicity is but a consequence. To be sure, he tries to overcome the
present-ative objectivation of the subject-object polarity. But
how? B y a subject-ism still more profound. The inner world of
the heart is simply a deeper level within the conscious subject,
but it remains within it. If Rilke comes to speak of the Being of
beings as "worldly present-ness," or even as "existence" (Dasein),
this presence remains referred to the present-ness proper tö
consciousness ([re]present-ation), even if consciousness be understood as the inner world of the heart which has complete access
to the Open. That is why it does not occur to Rilke to interrogate further the nature of this inner realm:
. . . R i l k e does not meditate a n y more closely the spatiality of this inner
world, nor does he, moreover, ask whether or n o t this inner world, since
after all it gives sojourn to worldly presence, is itself, together with this
presence, grounded in a temporality whose essential time, in conjunction
w i t h essential space, forms the original u n i t y of t h a t time-space domain in
terms of w h i c h Being itself comes-to-presence. 1 9
18 HW, pp. 291 (sich in die Sage einläßt), 294 (In andere Weise als . . . Sichdurchsetzen), 292 (in den Bezirk des Seienden selbst), 275 (empfängt).
19 A bit of a day's work for a poet. " . . . Auch Rilke bedenkt weder die Räumlichkeit des Weltinnenraumes näher, noch fragt er gar, ob nicht der Weltinnenraum,
da er doch der weltischen Präsenz Aufenthalt gibt, mit dieser Präsenz in einer Zeitlichkeit gründet, deren wesenhafte Zeit mit dem wesenhaften Raum die ursprüngliche Einheit desjenigen Zeit-Raumes bildet, als welcher gar das Sein selbst west/'
(HW, p. 283). See HW, pp. 283, 288 (innerhalb der Sphäre der Subjektität), 281-282
(Immanenz), 286-287 (Sphäre der Präsenz). For an illuminating comparison of the
Heidegger-Rilke conceptions of the Sphere of Being, see HW, pp. 277-278.
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b. L O G I C - All this becomes clearer when we consider the
matter from the viewpoint of logic. Rilke could inveigh as well
as Heidegger against the excesses of logical thought, if this
thought be considered as a function of an objectivizing, calculating reason. He, too, could say that logic has not only developed
a set of rules for manifestive predication but that it has become
itself " . . . t h e organization of the domination of purposeful
(self-)imposition over what is objective. . . . " 20 Yet what does
he offer in its stead? Pascal's "logic of the heart"! But is it not
still a logic ? If the poet reverses man's de-parture from the Open
by a language of a deeper sort than that of mere expression, with
which the logic of predication has to do, the language of reversal
none the less remains something that man of his nature "has,"
hence a possession, an implement of his comportment. It remains
an opyavov, then, and still requires organization by a logic. Logic
remains inevitable as long as language is conceived as possessed
by man rather than possessing him, sc. as long as we remain
within the compass of metaphysics that forgets to think Being
as distinct from beings. " . . . Only inside of metaphysics is there
logic." 21
2. Credit
The ledger has its credit side, however. It must be said foi
Rilke that he recognizes the menace of technicity, sees it for
what it is, sees it in all its unwholesomeness. But to recognize
the unwholesome as unwholesome, is this not already an orientation toward what is wholesome, whole, the Holy? 22 This is
itself a major service.
More than that, however, Rilke discerns that salvation from
the un-holy, thus understood, is somehow or other to be found
in a return to the authentic use of language. True enough, his
reflection upon language is an interrogative one that puts to
question the sense of the poetic vocation. But interrogative
thought, if the question is genuine, is already under way towards
20 " . . . die Organisation der Herrschaft des vorsätzlichen Sichdurchsetzens im
Gegenständigen
" (HW, p. 287).
21 ,4 . . . Nur innerhalb der Metaphysik gibt es die Logik." (HW, p. 287).
22 HW, p. 294 (das Heilige). See pp. 253, 291. As we shall see in the Hölderlin»
interpretations, Heidegger considers the Holy as another term for Being.
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an answer. That Rilke is at least under way toward a comprehension of the Holy entitles him to be called a "poet for needy
times/' 23
RESUME

Distilled into its simplest form, Heidegger's thesis is this: the
nihilism (nothing-ness) to which Nietzsche (and Rilke) testify
is but the last consequence of metaphysics itself, for which Being
itself means . . . nothing. To overcome nihilism, we must overcome metaphysics (and with it both logic and humanism) by
thinking Being as the process of a-Xy)#eia out of which the ontological difference arises. The process is somehow correlated with
language. To think Being thus is to ground metaphysics by
foundational thought.

n

HW, pp. 295, 251 {Dichterberuf), 294 (unterwegs).
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Section B
The Re-trieve of Thought

I am on the same ancient thoroughfare
That I was on that summer, on that day and hour.
Boris Pasternak, "Explanation"

C H A P T E R III

T H E O R I G I N OF A W O R K OF A R T
HÖLDERLIN

AND THE E S S E N C E OF

POETRY

Let us return now to 1935 and resume the chronological
method, in order to watch Heidegger as he moves step by step
toward a delineation of foundational thought. We must be
patient with provisional obscurities, content if only we can
comprehend the whole. EM was delivered as a course for the
university students from May to July, and in November Heidegger delivered in Freiburg a lecture which, after having been expanded into three lectures during the following year, comes to
us äs "The Origin of a Work of Art/' 1 During the course of that
year (April), "Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry" 2 was delivered in Rome. Contemporary and complementary, the two
texts should be thought together.

I. The Argument
By "origin," Heidegger understands the source whence
something springs, sc. that which renders it possible for a thing
to rise up (entspringen lassen) as what it is and how it is. Whence
does the work of art arise? From the artist ? Yet an artist is such
only by virtue of the work of art he produces. The work, then,
is as much the origin of the artist (as artist) as the artist of the
1 "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes," HW, pp. 7-68. In editing these researches,
we often omit or merely refer to what already has been made clear, sometimes
anticipate a subsequent explicitation, provided it be merely explicitation and not a
step in advance. The working principle has been to be faithful to the author's
thought level as he slowly makes his way.
2 "Hölderlin und das Wesen der Dichtung," Erläuterungen
zu Hölderlins Dichtung,
2nd ed. (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1951), PP- 31-45. (Hereafter HD).

404 FROM BEING TO T H E R E - T H E

DE-VOLUTION

OF THOUGHT

work. Both must spring from a source more primary still: art
itself. Yet what is art "itself," as distinct from the work in which
it is found and the man who produces it ? Do we have a right to
speak of it thus at all? The only way to approach the answer to
such a question is to examine that being in which, beyond doubt,
it holds sway: the work of art.3
A.

THING

AND

WORK

Let us begin by trying to discern what is proper to a "work"
of art as such, sc. as distinct from any other "thing." This presupposes that we know exactly what makes a thing to be a thing.
Philosophy has given three principal answers: for some, a thing
is a composition of substance and accident; for others, the unity
of a manifold of sensible properties; for still others, the fusion
of matter with form. Yet none of these explanations does complete justice to either the depth or the polyvalence of the phenomenon. We sense more in things than mere substance and
accident; things are closer to us than the sensations that announce them; matter and form do not explain the thing-ness of
things but suppose it, for such concepts derive their meaning
first in the order of human artifacts and are only transferred to
the entire order of "things." None of these explanations tells us
satisfactorily what a thing is.4
We must try again. Artifacts are more similar to works of art
than things are, insofar as human artifice has contributed to
their production, yet distinctly different from the latter, for,
characterized as they are by their adaptability to human service,
they lack a certain self-sufficiency. Perhaps we can discern what
a work is, then, if we can distinguish it from a mere artifact.5
Let us compare one of Van Gogh's paintings that depicts a
pair of farm-shoes with the shoes themselves. The former is a
work of art, the latter clearly an artifact. The adaptability of the
artifact (the shoes) is grounded in some still more fundamental
structure rendering possible adaptability, which Heidegger calls
» HW, pp. 7-8, 64. Cf. P, p. 270.
4 HW, pp. 12-14 (Substance-accident), 14-16 (manifold of sense properties),
16-19 (matter-form).
• HW, pp. 18-21. Henceforth, when writing "work" in this chapter, we understand
work of art.
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"reliability." It is this reliability of the shoes that makes them
what they are for the farmer and enables him, at least in a
limited way, to discover the world and play his role in it. This
reliability, however, is something that the farmer discerns without advertence, for simply to experience the reliability of the
shoes is to comprehend what they in truth are. But we ? We
comprehend what the farmer's shoes are, not by reason of
wearing them but by reason of Van Gogh's depiction of them.
It is the painting that reveals these beings to us in what and
how they are. " . . . In a work of art, (then), comes-to-pass this
opening-up, sc. the revealing, sc. the truth, of beings. . . . " 6 Art
is that process by which the truth of beings sets-itself-to-work,
comes-to-pass in a work, the work of art.
B.

WORK

AND

TRUTH

" . . . In a work, truth is at work . . . " - but a negatived
truth. 7 The nature of this negativity appears when the author
explains how the lighting-process by which beings emerge from
concealment comports at the same time a concealing as well.
This concealing can take two forms. It can be simply a "renege"
(Versagen), as if the effulgence refused to transgress its own
limits. The sense here is that the effulgence is limited by a
circumscribing frontier, hence a border at which effulgence from
one point of view ends, from another begins. A second form of
concealment not only pertains to the periphery of effulgence but
permeates the whole. This we may call r'dissimulation" (Verstellen). Here the effulgence does not simply renounce further
diffusion but continues to shine, in such a way, however, as to
make beings to shine forth as what they are not. This is the phenomenon we have called "seeming-to-be," and it renders possible every single oversight, mistake, aberration, transgression in a word, all our maladroit dealings with beings. We recognize
at once the pattern of "errance." Furthermore, included in the
process of dissimulation is the camouflaging of concealment it• " . .. Im Werk geschieht diese Eröffnung, d.h. das Entbergen, d.h. die Wahrheit
des Seienden
" (HW, p. 28). See pp. 23-24 (Dienlichkeit, Verläßlichkeit), 28
(Sich-ins-Werk-Setzen). Cf. SZ, pp. 148-149.
7 " . . . im Werk sei die Wahrheit am Werke,. .
(HW, p. 45). See p. 43 (Unwahrheit).
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self: "...concealing conceals and dissimulates itself. . . . " 8
Clearly this is what WW (1930) called "mystery." Errance and
mystery, which in WW constituted the "full non-essence of
truth," are assumed now under the single term "dissimulation,"
which, together with the simple renege (peripheral limitation),
constitute fully the concealment which negatives in this double
fashion the coming-to-pass of effulgence. They constitute the
non-truth which is essential to truth. 9 Furthermore, truth and
non-truth are in constant contention as original Discord, and
the battle-ground of this struggle is that place of open-ness in the
midst of beings where negatived truth comes-to-pass.10
Up to this point, we have been considering the negatived
lighting-process as such. Now let us consider more precisely
that being which in the present case serves as the battle-ground
of this struggle: the work of art. We are told, on the one hand,
that in the work of art the World is "opened-up," on the other,
that this World "reposes" in the "earth," sc. the material elements (v.g. pigments, marble, musical notes) out of which the
work is fashioned. Both are complementary. " . . . The World is
grounded on earth and earth permeates the World. . . . " 1 1 What
sense can this have ?
The text here is difficult and we are forced to interpret. Let us
recall from WG: that There-being's finite project was conceived
as a laying-claim to the entire expanse of the World; that this
project is always thrown among beings which captivate it and
which constitute the matter-of-fact situation in which Therebeing finds itself. The project implies positivity, the constriction
negativity. Now we find a clear analogy to this correlation of
positivity and negativity in There-being when in terms of a work
of art the author speaks of the correlation between World and
earth. To be sure, the focus has shifted from There-being to the
art-work, but when we realize that There-being (as the There of
Being) is simply that place among beings where negatived truth
8 " . . . Das Verbergen verbirgt und verstellt sich selbst.. .." (HW, p. 42). See WW,
p. 22 and compare with present catalogue: Verstehen, Vertun, Verlaufen, Vergehen.
• HW, p. 43 (Verweigern). Cf. WW, p. 23.
10 HW, pp. 41 (offene Mitte), 43 (Streit), 49 (Lichtung und zwiefacher Verbergung).
See EM, p. 47 (7ü6XejJto?).
1 1 " . . . Die Welt gründet sich auf die Erde, und Erde durchragt die Welt
"
(HW, p. 37). See pp. 33~34 (Weit), 35-37 (Erde).

W O R K O F A R T , H Ö L D E R L I N A N D T H E E S S E N C E OF P O E T R Y

407

comes-to-pass in beings, and that, conversely, the art-work is a
being in which truth is at work only inasmuch as Being lights up
through its There, we understand that we have here a different
emphasis but no fundamental change in conception of the
process of truth as delineated in WG. In any case, World and
earth, though complementary, are in continual contention, with
the result that in a work of art the struggle between the positivity
and negativity of truth takes place. 12 " . . . The earth permeates
World, World is grounded in earth, only insofar as truth, the
primordial Dis-cord between effulgence and concealment, comesto-pass. . . . " 1 3 And truth here, we are told, is not simply the
truth of the being(s) depicted by the individual art-work (v.g.
the farmer's shoes) but the truth of the entire ensemble of beings.
At any rate, it is the unity of this struggle that gathers together
the art-work into the dynamic tranquillity of its own interior
unity. 14
C.

TRUTH

AND

ART

In a work of art, (negatived) truth is at work, sc. working,
coming-to-pass. But a "work" implies a worker, in this case the
artist. It is his creative effort that produces the work. How are
we to understand this relationship of creativity between artist
and work? Only by a further meditation upon the work itself,
since it is only by the work produced that the artist is artist.
What characterizes the art-work insofar as it is produced by
creative effort ?
The author suggests two characteristics. In the first place, the
elemental contention between World and earth is stabilized and
made manifest under the guise of the work's form. Secondly, the
work itself continually bears testimony to the fact that it is,
surprises us with the startling revelation of itself as itself, sc. as
the coming-to-pass of (finite) truth. The creative effort is that
human process by which this double character is set-to-work in
the artistic masterpiece.15
18 See HW, pp. 33-34 (Welt), 35-37 (Erde), 43-44 (Welt-Erde-Wahrheit), 51-52
(Riss).
13
. .Erde durchragt nur die Welt, Welt gründet sich nur auf die Erde, sofern
die Wahrheit als der Urstreit von Lichtung und Verbergung geschieht. .
(HW, p.

44).
14
15

HW, p. 38 (Innigkeit, Einheit, Ruhe). See p. 46.
HW, pp. 51-52 (Gestalt), 53-54 ("Daß").
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Yet truth-at-work in the art-work implies still more. For
if the masterpiece is said to "startle/' there must be someone
other than the artist who is jolted out of the ordinariness of
everyday routine and plunged into the open-ness that pervades
the art-work. He abides in this open-ness the while; he "whiles'"
(verweilen) there. It is by reason of this whiling that the work becomes completely itself. Therefore, to while in the open-ness of
the work is to let the work be what it is and simultaneously to
let truth come-to-pass. It cannot be called the "creating"
(Schaffen) of art; let it be called "conserving" (Bewahrung). In
order for truth to come-to-pass in a masterpiece, conservation is
as essential as creation, and even if the conservers of truth in
art are nowhere to be found, the masterpiece remains oriented
toward them, waits upon their arrival in order to be completely
itself. 16
At this point, the process of truth that takes place in the artwork may be conceived as a confluence of three different
movements: truth as the contention of World and earth establishes itself in the work; the artistic creator stabilizes this
contention in a form; contentious truth, thus stabilized, must be
allowed to come-to-pass by the conservers of art. The masterpiece emerges as itself when these three movements fuse into
dynamic unity. If we return now to the original question about
what is art itself when conceived as the origin of the work of art,
we must answer in terms of this unity and define it thus:
" . . . the creative conservation of truth in a work. . . . " 1 7
From this point on, Heidegger tries to think this unity. In
order to do so, he synthetizes the movements of creation and
conservation into the still more fundamental notion of "projecting," which is already familiar to us. The art-work comes-topass when truth advances from one direction and is met by a
project advancing from the opposite direction. The point is
difficult, but we understand it thus: EM spoke of Being, the
1 6 HW, pp. 54 (verweilen, Bewahrung), 55 (bezogen). We translate verweilen as
"to while" because: of the obvious affinity with the German ("while'' derives from
the AS hwil); of the temporal connotation of the English. Frequently "while" is
followed by "away" and suggests a pleasant passage of time. The complement,
however, is not absolutely necessary. In using "while" intransitively, we utilize an
unusual but perfectly orthodox sense.
1 7 " . . . die schaffende Bewahrung der Wahrheit im Werk
" (HW, p. 59).
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Over-powering, as 4 'contained'' (VOELV) in its advance through
the violence done to it by There-being, and we have every right
to conceive of this containment as the concentration of Being
in some "work" or other, sc. in some being other than Therebeing. 18 In the present instance, the work is a work of art. Since
There-being itself is simply the There of Being thrown among
beings as that being among the rest through which all (itself
included) are lit up as beings, then we may conceive of the
project that brings advancing truth to containment in the work
of art as proceeding itself from There, and, indeed, in its condition of having-been-thrown in the first place by Being. This
permits us to give a sense to the following enigmatic text:
" . . . The opening-up of [Being-as-]the-Open and the lighting-up
of beings [in this case, a work of art], takes place only insofar as
the open-ness which advances unto a thrown-forth [There] is
projected. , . . " 1 9 In other words, Being advances unto the
There which has been thrown-forth by Being itself and is met
by the project of There-being which forces it into disclosure as
the given work of art.
Three points are worth noting: that the essential structure of
the process here is exactly the same as in EM; that we see here
with distressing clarity the difficulty of reconciling Heidegger
II with Heidegger I, sc. the primacy of Being in the coming-topass of truth with a genuine spontaneity in There-being (project);
that the problem presumably would have been just as acute in
SZ, if we had been treated to an explanation of how a project of
Being (World) can be thrown.
But our troubles are just beginning. Now we are told that this
confluence of truth advancing from one direction and project
proceeding from another is the process of "poetizing" (dichten).
If this is comprehensible, then it is but an easy step to say that
" . . . all art, as the letting-come-to-pass of the advent of the truth
of beings as such, is in essence poetry. . . . " 20 But what sense
can this have ?
EM, pp. 47 (bannen), 120 (Bändigen).
" . . . Vielmehr geschieht die Eröffnung des Offenen und die Lichtung des
Seienden nur, indem die in der Geworfenheit ankommende Offenheit entworfen wird.
. . . " (HW, p. 59). Cf. " . . . Entwerfen ist das Auslösen eines Wurfes, als welcher die
Unverborgenheit sich in das Seiende als solches schickt. .
(HW, p. 61).
20 " . . . Alle Kunst ist als Geschehenlassen der Ankunft der Wahrheit des Seienden
als eines solchen im Wesen Dichtung. . .." (HW, p. 59).
18

19
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First of all, it does not mean that poetry in the ordinary sense
is the source of all the other arts, even though it may have a
place of privilege among them. But it does mean that all artistic
creation bears a profound relationship to language, 21 for the
primary sense of language, according to Heidegger, is not to be
simply an instrument of communication, but " . . . t o bring
beings as such for the first time into the Open. . . . " 22 Language
lets beings be (manifest) as what they are simply insofar as it
gives them a name, for authentic utterance projects a light
" . . . by reason of which is declared what kind of beings they
appear to be as they come into the Open. . . . " 23 Now it is this
projective utterance (entwerfendes Sagen) that Heidegger understands to be the fundamental sense of the poetic, designating it
as "poetry in the essential sense," as distinct from "poesy," or
"poetry in the narrow sense," the sort of thing that poets write.
It is only because language as such is the primordial poetizing
that poesy, which uses language as its medium, enjoys a primacy
among other forms of art. 24
So it is that we are forced to conceive the coming-to-pass of
an art-work as essentially a poetizing, simply because settingtruth-to-work is essentially the process by which language takes
its origin. We are prepared for this step, to be sure, once we recall
that the containing (voetv) of the Over-powering is also the
process of Xeyetv. But let us admit candidly that the whole
business is far from clear. The most that can be said for our
present situation is that we feel at home in obscurity. We must
be patient. It is still only 1935-36, and the author himself seems
still to be groping. Be this as it may, we must move forward.
We are told that the process of poetizing is the "origination"
(Stiftung) of truth and may be considered from three points of
view: as a "bestowing" (Schenken), as a "grounding" (Gründen)
and as a completely "originating" event (Anfang). It is at this
HW, pp. 60-61.
" . . . die Sprache bringt das Seiende als ein Seiendes allererst ins Offene
"
(HW, p. 60).
25 " . . . Solches Sagen ist ein Entwerfen des Lichten, darin angesagt wird, als was
das Seiende ins Offene kommt
" (HW, p. 6i).
24 HW, p. 61. For the sake of clarity, we use the following terminology: "poetizing" designates poetry in the broad sense and "poesy" in the narrow sense as explained here, whereas "poetry" should be considered as prescinding from (hence
encompassing) both.
21

22
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point in particular that "Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry"
is helpful.
D.

ORIGINATION

OF

TRUTH

This short essay may be taken as a further treatment of the
third part of the discourse we have been examining. We have
just seen that the essence of all art is poetry. Now the question
becomes: what is the essence of poetry? As a matter of fact, all
of the Hölderlin analyses attempt to answer this question. We
omit here elements of the problem that return more fully later
and limit ourselves to what clearly serves as a complement to
what we have just seen.
The proper domain of poetry is language, hence the essence of
poetry can be grasped only when we comprehend the essence of
language. The essence of language consists in "the origination
of Being through words." For language in its source consists in
giving a name to beings. Hence, naming (language) discloses the
Being of beings and in this sense "originates" Being, sc. truth.25
The origination of Being is at one and the same time (from the
point of view of Being) pure gift and (from the point of view of
There-being) a process of grounding. It is gift, insofar as it cannot
be commanded, cannot be derived from mere entities or forced
out of what lies under There-being's control. Rather it proceeds
from Being's own bounty - a free bestowal. Origination is a
grounding, insofar as There-being, in letting things be by naming
them in their Being, illumines the entire situation wherein the
gift of truth (Being) is bestowed. This means that both World
and earth are disclosed: the World that holds sway by reason
of There-being's relation to the non-concealment of Being, the
earth that tends to obscure the World and conceal it in beings.
If we try to correlate this with WG, we notice that here "project"
is used in a sense broad enough to include both "laying-claim"
and "taking-possession." The essential, however, remains the
same, sc. that through this project (broad sense) the grounding-

20 HD, pp. 32-33, 40 (Wesen der Dichtung aus Wesen der Sprache), 38 (worthafte
Stiftung des Seins). See HW, p. 62 (Stiftung der Wahrheit).
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process of There-being comes-to-pass in the sense that Therebeing is gathered-together into the ground of its own Being.26
A third aspect under which to consider the originating of
truth lies in the "origin-ality" [Anfang) of the "event/' 2? The
sense is that, when Being is originated, truth breaks out with a
new freshness, as if for the very first time.28 We have here an
early form of what will soon be called the "mittent" character
of truth. But let us not anticipate.

II. General Remarks
A.

BEING

In these essays, Being is essentially negatived and comes-topresence as the dynamic tension between positivity and negativity, truth and non-truth: clearly it is a-X^eia. In terms of
beings, the contention emerges as the struggle between World
and earth that is fought out in a given being, which in turn
renders manifest the struggle. Now the struggle here does not
mean a dissolution of all unity in Being or in the art-work where
Being is disclosed. On the contrary, it signifies the inner cohesion
of contentious elements that are essentially complementary. The
discordant components, positivity and negativity, are "gatheredtogether" in a work of art and, thus correlated, they constitute
its unity, its dynamic tranquillity. EM spoke of the cohesive
principle in primordial Dis-cord as Xoycx;. We infer: that what
correlates positivity and negativity in dynamic unity is X6yo<;;
that, when World and earth are stabilized in the form of a work
of art, it is actually X6yo<; that holds sway.29
28 HD, pp. 38, 39 and HW, p. 62 (Schenkung); HD, pp. 39, 42 and HW, pp. 62,
63 (Gründung). To be sure, there is nothing in all this which explicitly corresponds
to "transcendental founding" (Begründen). If this third component corresponds to
the existential component (5Z) of logos, then it permeates the whole problematic
here. The obscurity itself is revealing.
27 We deliberately use "event" here in order to call attention to the fact that the
word occurs significantly as early as 1935-36 (v.g. HW, pp. 53, 61 and HD, p. 35,
etc.).
28 HW, pp. 63-64 (Anstiftung, fängt die Geschichte wieder an). Cf. N, I, p. 389.
29 HW, pp. 38, 37 (Sammlung der Bewegtheit). See EM, pp. 47, 102. We do not
attempt to retain here the problematic of historicity. Because truth (Being) is a
process that comes-to-pass (Geschehen), art is essentially historical (HW, pp. 5°»
64-65) and so, too, of course, is poetry (HD, pp. 34, 37, 39).
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What is more, Being holds the primacy in the coming-to-pass
of art, "setting itself" to work, "establishing itself" in work.30
When all is said and done, no amount of efficacy in the materials
or virtuosity in the artist, provided his work be restricted to
the level of cause and effect, can succeed in pro-ducing a work
of art. This comes-to-presence only through the emergence of
Being itself, which cannot be forced out of mere entities (Vorhandenes) but must bestow itself spontaneously in pure bounty
as gift (Schenkung)?1 Primacy, therefore, - but an indigent one!
For Being is drawn toward the beings in which it must emerge
in order that it be itself. " . . . It belongs to the essence of truth
to establish itself in beings in order that thus it may first become
truth. . . . " 32 Clearly we are dealing with the problem of the
ontological difference.
B.

THERE-BEING

There-being is not thematized in the essay, but when we are
told that in the midst of beings in the ensemble " . . . there comesto-presence an open region. An effulgence i s . . 3 3 and that
this domain of open-ness is equivalent to the luminosity of There,
surely we are to understand the open region as the There of
Being.
But the important thing to note here is that the There cannot
be simply identified with the individual man. This open region,
insofar as it comes-to-pass in the art-work, is the confluence of
movements from three different directions: the gratuity of
Being, the creative activity, and the effort to conserve the truth
that is at work. If the two latter help to constitute the There,
they nevertheless do not take place in the same individual, exHW, pp. 25 and passim (Sich-ins-Werk-setzen), 51 (richtet sich ins Werk).
HW, pp. 59 (nicht Wirken), 41-42, 62 (schenkt).
88 "Weil es zum Wesen der Wahrheit gehört, sich in das Seiende einzurichten,
um so erst Wahrheit zu w e r d e n , . . ( H W , p. 50). Writer's italics. See p. 49. This
need of Being for beings in order to be itself explains the strange phrase that truth
"wills" to be established in work (HW, p. 51). Is this a lapse into a subject-ist
formulation for the conception of Being? We must understand the term, it would
seem, in the sense that EM spoke of the "need" in Being for the There and suggest
as hypothesis to explain the usage of "will" the author's preoccupation at this time
with Nietzsche, who will engage his attention for the next ten years.
33 " . . . Inmitten des Seienden im Ganzen west eine offene Stelle. Eine Lichtung
ist
" (HW, p. 41). See p. 49 (Lichtung des Da).
80
81
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cept, of course - but it is not Heidegger's sense - insofar as the
artist conserves the truth-in-work that he has already produced.
In fact, creator and conserver, taken in the ensemble, may be
said to constitute "the historical There-being of a people." 34
How characterize the process that takes place in creator, in
conserver and in truth-at-work ? The creator's task is to produce the work. This he does insofar as he leads it forth, out of
the concealment in the bare materials with which he deals, into
non-concealment (the open-ness of truth). But so dependent is
he upon the bounty of Being itself that his "leading" is more
properly a ' 'letting-go-forth,'' a receiving and an accepting of
what Being bestows. The method of the poet is a case in point.
He acknowledges a summons, receives a directive to which he
then accedes.35 The conserver, for his part, whiles in the work
pro-duced, responds to it as the coming-to-pass of truth.36
Both creator and conserver of art have this much in common:
both render themselves (though in different ways) tractable,
docile to Being, open unto it, free for its exigencies in the work
of art. It is this common denominator that Heidegger assumes
under the single term "project," which is to be understood as a
counterpoise (Auslösen) to the Self-emitting of Being.37 We
interpret this to mean that authentic freedom unto Being in
both creator and conserver of art gathers (therefore Xoyo^) its
(negatived) luminousness into single focus, receptively concentrates (voetv), therefore stabilizes, its light in the tranquil,
throbbing unity that is a work of art.
c.

THOUGHT

The term "thought" appears with relative infrequency in
these essays, yet it plays an essential role in the analysis. For in
EM we saw that thought is essentially the achieving of Therebeing in re-solve, and it is the same concept that is introduced
here to explain the conserving of truth-at-work in the art-work.
HW, pp. 64-65 (das geschichtliche Dasein eines Volkes).
HW, pp. 48 (Hervorbringen), 49 (Hervorgehenlassen), 50-51 (Empfangen,
Entnehmen); HD, pp. 42-43 (Empfangen, Winke).
86 HW, pp. 54-55. Note first significant use of "respond" (entsprechen).
87 HW, p. 61 (sich schickt).
84

88
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Our task here is to try to precise what the analysis of conservation can tell us about the nature of re-solve.
Recall that re-solve is the achievement of authenticity and is
brought-to-pass amid the ordinariness of everyday captivation
by beings in the World-about. In the conserving of a work of art,
there is a corresponding severance of the ties with the ordinary,
but the essential is that the conserver is caught up in what is
happening in the work: the coming-to-pass of truth. He responds
to it. He whiles in the process and the whiling lets the work be
what it is. To conserve a work of art, then, means to take (deliberately) a stand within its open-ness. To take a stand, however, means to know the truth-at-work, and, indeed, to will to
know it. 38
Now this knowing that is at the same time a willing of truth
is re-solve, " . . . the opening-up of There-being out of captivation by beings unto the open-ness of B e i n g . . 8 9 by which
man, in virtue of existence, ec-statically lets himself in on the
non-concealment of Being in beings. In the present case, to conserve the work of art means to achieve the re-solve by which
There-being " . . . exposes itself to the open-ness of beings [insofar] as this is set in work. . . . " 40
The knowing that is willed in re-solve is of the same order of
knowing, though different in manner, as that by which the artist
pro-duces (TEXVTJ) his masterpiece. In both cases, to know is tohave-seen. What the artist knows-as-having-seen is that which
comes-to-presence as such, and it is this that he reveals in his
work. What the conserver knows-as-having-seen is the struggle
between World and earth (hence between truth and non-truth)
that has been stabilized in the work. In taking his stand within
the open-ness of truth, it is a negatived open-ness that he knows,
sc. he wills to ex-pose himself to a truth that is essentially finite.
Now to will to know-as-having-seen truth (Being) in its finitude
is already to have achieved de-cision. " . . . To-have-seen is to
have made decision. . . . " 4 1
V.g. HW, pp. 62 (Gewöhnlichkeit, entrücken), 55 (Wissen).
" . . . die Eröffnung des Daseins aus der Befangenheit im Seienden zur Offenheit
des Seins. .
(HW, p. 55).
40 " . . . das sich der Offenheit des Seienden als der ins Werk gesetzten aussetzt.
88
39

..."

( H W , p . 55).

" . . . Das Gesehen-haben ist ein Entschiedensein;..." (HW, p. 56). See HW,
pp. 47-48 (t£xv7]).
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This re-solve that is de-cision brings There-being itself to its
fullness as a being, coming as it does to take its stand amid the
truth of beings. That is why the author can say " . . . the authentic accomplishment of man's Being comes-to-pass through
the freedom of de-cision. . . . " 42 It is especially in this sense of
There-being's coming-to-its-fullness-in-freedom that we understand the obscure passages which speak of the process of art as
an origination of truth that is at once the grounding of Therebeing.
Before we conclude, let us collect certain other references to
the nature of thought, even though they be casual and undeveloped. In the first place, thought is essentially interrogation,
and, indeed, the interrogation of Being. To think Being is to give
a name to Being in its question-ableness.43 Furthermore,
thought's proper concern is the ontological difference. The circle
in which the entire meditation moves (the essence of art is discerned in a work of art, but the work is such only because of the
essence of art; truth is discerned in what is true, but this is true
only by reason of truth) is imposed fundamentally by the necessary correlation of Being and beings: Being is found only in
beings; beings are what they are only by reason of Being. To
enter this circle and meditate it is to meditate the difference between Being and beings, the ontological difference. This is the
only thing that gives solidity to our thought.44 Finally, from the
purely negative point of view, it hardly seems necessary to insist
that the coming-to-pass of truth in the work of art can not be
explained in terms of the subject-object relationship. Hence
such terms as "esthetic experience" - for that matter, even the
term "esthetics" - are, since they imply this relationship, totally
unacceptable.45

48
.. Die Bezeugung des Menschseins und damit sein eigentlicher Vollzug geschieht aus der Freiheit der Entscheidung
" (HD, p. 34). See HW, pp. 55 (Innenstehen), 62.
« HW, pp. 50, 58. (Frag-würdigkeit, Frageschritten). See EM, p. 16 (Fragen ist
Wissen-wollen).
" HW, pp. 7-8, 39 (Kreis), 8 (Fest des Denkens).
46 HW, pp. 55, 64 (Subjekt-Objekt), 66 (Erlebnis), 56 (Gegenstand), 41 (Niemals
nur Vorstellung). We reserve the single term "experience" to translate Erfahrung,
hence translate Erlebnis as "esthetic experience" to avoid confusion.
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Resume
In analysing a work of art, we find that we are still inside the
hermeneutic circle of which SZ spoke, but we have reached a
level that is attainable only by Heidegger II, where Being has
assumed the primacy over There-being. As in EM, Being is a
primordial Dis-cord, sc. the process of negatived truth, bestowing
itself on There-being which, in turn, functions as a counterpoise
by projecting Being in a work, sc. in a work of art. Hence, in the
art-work truth is at work; the art-work originates both Being and
truth. But the originating of truth is simultaneously original
poetizing, for this is precisely the function of language. That is
why " . . . all art . . . is in [its] essence p o e t r y . . . . " 46 Thought
emerges under the guise of preserving the truth-at-work in the
work, and, indeed, through the process of re-solve: willing-toknow truth in its finitude as it takes-place in art.
How far have we come ? Thought as voeZv clearly pervades the
notion of counter-poise, but thought as Xeyetv is more fundamental still in the unmistakable drift toward thinking Being-astruth in terms of language. But much remains unsolved. How
conceive this event of truth where Being maintains the primacy
yet There-being retains its power to project? How conceive the
origination of truth as essentially the process of language ? How
conceive the relation of the thinker to "the There-being of an
historical people"?

« " . . . Alle Kunst ist . . . im Wesen Dichtung

" (HW, p. 59).

C H A P T E R III

T H E TIME OF WORLD-AS-PICTURE

The major value of "The Time of World-as-Picture" 1 consists
in the analysis of Descartes, which we have examined already.
What it says about foundational thought is, as far as the essay
itself goes, of secondary importance, but for us it is no less real
for that. Particularly illuminating are the passages where the
author contrasts the Cartesian version of presentative thought
with what he understands to be the Greek voelv.
The author returns to Parmenides' correlation of voetv-slvoci,
which he interprets to mean that it pertains to Being (because
demanded and determined by Being) that beings, or rather
Being in beings, be brought to containment. The pertinent text
reads:
. . . A being is t h a t which emerges and opens itself up, and which, insofar
as it comes-to-presence, comes over a man who likewise is coming-topresence, sc. over him who of his own accord opens himself up unto w h a t
is coming-to-presence, inasmuch as he brings it t o containment. . . . *

From this we infer: that the emergent-abiding-Power in beings
comes-over (therefore over-comes, dominates) man who accepts
these beings by forcing them to containment; that this mutual
1 4'Die Zeit des Weltbildes," HW, pp. 69-104. The essay, delivered in lecture form
in Freiburg, June 9, 1938, as conclusion to a series of discussions on the grounding
of the World-picture of modern times, bore the title "The Grounding of the Modern
World-picture through Metaphysics" ("Die Begründung des neuzeitlichen Weltbildes durch die Metaphysik"). Supplementary passages, not delivered publicly but
composed at the same time, we treat as belonging to main body of text.
1 " . . . Das Seiende ist das Aufgehende und Sichöffnende, was als das Anwesende
über den Menschen als den Anwesenden kommt, d.h. über den, der sich selber dem
Anwesenden öffnet, indem er es vernimmt...." (HW, p. 83). See p. 100. Cf. SG, p.
240 (überkommt).
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coming-to-presence of beings and man is achieved when man of
himself opens himself unto beings as they come-to-presence;
that it is this opening-up of man that is containment.
A being is not a being, then, insofar as a man perceives it, sc.
has a presentation of it in the sense of a perceptio (Descartes).
In that case, man would hold the initiative. Here the initiative
belongs to beings, sc. in their Being. Therefore it is more exact
to say that man is per-ceived by beings (vom Seienden Angeschaute), where the word has its original Latin force (per-capio)
of "seize," "lay hold of," "take possession of." We understand
this in the sense of the above-mentioned "over-come" and try
to suggest it by taking a liberty with idiomatic English in making
"per-cept" into a verb. Man is per-cepted by beings as they open
themselves up; he is himself gathered up in the process of
coming-to-presence as such; he is drawn into the Open within
them, retained and sustained there. It is Being that maintains
the initiative in the coming-to-presence of beings. And yet man,
if acceptive, is not thereby passive, for he must of his own
accord open himself up unto the process that is taking place.
" . . . In order to bring his own essence to its fullness, he must
gather together (A£yeiv) in its open-ness that-which-is-openingitself-up, preserve (cw^eiv), collect, conserve it. . . . " 3
All this receives another formulation when Heidegger contrasts Descartes' subject-ism and the famous dictum of Protagoras, "man is the measure of all things." Protagoras, he
claims, remains faithful to the Parmenidean-Heraclitean conception of man. Heidegger must explain how for Protagoras man
can be a "measure" for beings without being opposed to them
as a "subject." The argument runs as follows:
When beings emerge-into-presence in any given instance, the
domain of non-concealment is limited to a certain compass, for
the emergence, after all, is finite. The domain of disclosure thus
has "measure." It is the confines of this (measured) compass
that separate what comes-to-presence from what does not. Now
any given man whiles within this compass; whiling there, he
assumes it; assuming it, he, for his own part (to the extent that
3 " . . . Deshalb muß dieser Mensch, um sein Wesen zu erfüllen, das Sieböffnende
in seiner Offenheit sammeln (X£veiv) und retten (a<o£eiv), auffangen und bewahren.
(HW, p. 84).
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it lies within his power to do so), conserves it. It is in assuming,
conserving this measured domain of non-concealment that he
ac-cepts (contains) whatever comes-to-presence in it as being,
and at the same time recognizes the limits of its emergence. It
is in this sense, and this sense only, that he is the measure of
what comes-to-presence and what does not. B y no means is
man-as-measure for Protagoras a self-conscious ego that sets
down standards which beings in their Being must meet. On the
contrary, for Protagoras man receives and guards the measure
by which he is measure; he is open unto Being-as-finite, he is its
There. His fundamental attitude is one of ac-ceptance, of selfunveiling-for, of opening-himself-unto the self-revelation of
beings in their Being, whereby man himself in his own way
comes-to-presence with these beings and thus achieves himself.4
In contrast to this conception of the ac-ceptive containment
of beings - a conception which Heidegger considers to be genuinely Greek - is the attitude of subject-ist presentation that
dominates modern thought. Instead of simply opening itself up
for beings, presentative thought tries to put its hands on them,
to seize them in concepts (<Begreifen) in the sense of dominating
them and submitting them to its control. What matters " . . . is
not [that] what comes-to-presence holds sway, but [that] an
attack [on the being] succeeds. . . . " 5 We see here clearly what
Heidegger understands by "concept" and will not be surprised
if the polemic vs. subject-ism brings conceptual thought under
fire. Obviously it would be a mistake to take this as a denial of
all value in concepts; it is simply an insistence on the necessity
of meditating on a pre-conceptual thought.
All of this adds up to saying that foundational thought is presubjective. We close our remarks by enumerating briefly other
characteristics of thought that may help fill out the picture. In
the first place, thought brings to containment truth in its negativity, for when man is per-cepted by beings in their Being and
drawn into the Open in which they come-to-presence, he is tossed
4 HW, pp. 96-98, xoi. It is ia this context that we understand the difference between beings-as-across (Gegenüber) from man, sc. as the Greeks experienced them,
and as op-posed (Gegenstand) to a subject. See SG, p. 140. Cf. N, II, pp. I35-X41*
•• " . . . Das Vorstellen ist nicht mehr das Sich-entbergen f ü r . . . , sondern das
Ergreifen und Begreifen von.... Nicht das Anwesende waltet, sondern der Angriff
herrscht...." (HW, p. 100). See SF, p. 22 and WD, p. 128. Cf. N, II, pp. 168-173-
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about amid their contrarieties, scarred by the contention that is
interior to themselves. If he is to achieve himself, he must do so
by remaining ex-posed to all the divisive confounding that is
intrinsic to the full coming-to-pass of truth.6
More important, perhaps, is the fact that thought is historical,
at least to the extent that we can disengage its nature from what
Heidegger himself has tried to accomplish in this essay. For he
has meditated on the past, sc. upon There-being as having been
affected by the subject-ism of Descartes. This comports meditating on the modern era in its essenc-ing, yielding as much as
possible to the forces at work within it, sc. to Being in its truth
as it holds sway. This means opening oneself up, however, to
Being as still in ad-vent (future), hence it is "ad-ventive"
thought. 7 What constitutes the dimension of "present" in this
process we are left to infer, but let us do the inferring later on
when we have more to work with. We see clearly enough, however, from watching Heidegger at work that foundational
thought in this case has been a species of re-trieve.
A final word. To the extent that such thought succeeds, it
transfers man who is open unto the ad-vent of Being out of the
confounding obscurity of everydayness into the luminous clarity
of that situation which constitutes what may be called an inbetween area, a mediation between Being and beings, sc. Therebeing, " . . . the ecstatic domain of the revealing and concealing
of Being." 8 By reason of There-being, man dwells with beings,
to be sure, but always as a stranger among them, because he
himself appertains to Being. It is thus that through There-being
the ontological difference takes place.9
6 HW, pp. 83 (in Gegensätzen umgetrieben), 84 (Wirrnis). Cf. WW, p. 22. Once
certainly (HW, p. 89) and twice probably (HW, pp. 70, 95) the author uses the term
"de-cision" in the strict sense he gave it in EM, where it is equivalent to re-solve,
understood as freedom unto truth in its negativity. Other uses of the word are
loose and of no help to us, suggesting the assuming of any attitude towards beings
that corresponds to the prevailing conception of their Being.
7 HW, p. 89. Henceforth, we translate (zu)künftig as "ad-ventive,"
intending a
double meaning thereby: "ad-ventive" in the sense of open-ness to the ad-vent of
Being which determines (bestimmt) this open-ness; "ad-ventive" in the sense that
an essentially ek-sistent There-being continually comes to (therefore ad-vent) itself,
sc. achieves itself as long as it remains ec-statically open to the Being that comes to
(ad-vent) it. Both senses are, of course, correlative.
8 "Dieses offene Zwischen ist das Da-sein, das Wort verstanden im Sinne des
ekstatischen Bereiches der Entbergung und Verbergung des Seins." (HW, p. 104).
9 HW, p. 88 (dem Sein zugehört, ein Fremdling bleibt).
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RESUME

The present essay helps us to understand the non-subjective
character of thought, orchestrating in new terms what it means
for thought to let beings (and Being) be. Effectively it means to
let itself be over-come by Being in beings - to yield to Being in
its negativity.

CHAPTER

III

"AS WHEN UPON A D A Y OF R E S T ..

The second of Heidegger's Hölderlin-interpretations stems
from an oft repeated lecture in 1939-40 and treats of a poem
without title that begins "As when upon a day of rest . . 1
Written in 1800, the poem is composed of seven strophes, and
in it Hölderlin orchestrates again the meaning of the poet's task.
It offers another reason for calling Hölderlin "the poet of the
poet" and explains Heidegger's interest in the poem. For us, the
essay is only of secondary importance, for the author speaks of
thought only by indirection, yet we cannot afford to ignore it,
because of the close analogy which Heidegger sees between
poetic and philosophical thought.
There seems no point in trying to resume an argument that is
little more, in form at least, than a close analysis of the Hölderlin
text, so we shall pass immediately to three remarks of a general
nature, which will examine the principal themes of the essay:
A. Being, B. There-being as Poet, C. Thought.
A.

BEING

Throughout the essay, Being receives many designations, according to the fluctuations in Hölderlin's imagery, but the sense
remains the same. Initially it is called "Nature," but not in the
sense that we ordinarily give to the word as something opposed
to "art," "history" or the like (sc. as a sphere of beings), but
rather in the sense of the Greek <pu<xi<;: a going-forth, an emergence,
1 44Wie

wenn am Feiertage.HD,

pp. 47-74.
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an opening-up that enables all beings to be present, hence an
Omni-presence. The Open which thus opens-up is the lighting-up
of that light by which beings shine-forth and manifest themselves.
We are familiar with these notions. There is new insistence, however, upon <p\S<m as the source of light. It is the hearth and abode
of light, hence may be called metaphorically a fire, sc. source not
only of brightness but of warmth.2 None of this is very new, but
the author introduces several suggestive nuances.
j. Being as Immediate
Being functions as the mediation between beings, establishing
among them their mutual relationship, and they, since they are
mediated by Being, may be called "mediate." But Being, the
Open itself, as source of this mediation, is itself not mediated,
sc. rendered present by reason of another. It is the "im-mediate."
The point seems to be a double one: that Being, as the source of
presence by which beings are present to each other and to Therebeing, is absolutely ultimate and needs no further mediation between itself and the beings which it renders present (it is the immediate mediation between them); that it is because Being is
the im-mediate that it is inaccessible. We have here another
form, it would seem, of the interpretation of Being as Nonbeing. 3
2. Being as Ad-vent
Being as <piiatq is essentially Presence, but " . . . the manner of
the Presence is a coming. . . . " 4 By this is meant that Being is to
be understood as advancing toward the poet. To the extent that
Being abides, it is not a mere entity that simply endures but a
coming that is always new, always origin-al.
This permits us to understand the essentially temporal character of Being. Because Being is a continual coming to beings, it
is older than the time-spans (Zeiten) that are measured by beings
2 HD, pp. 51-52 (Allgegenwärtige, Anwesenheit, Machtende, Erscheinende, etc.),
54 (Anwesung), 55-5^ (<püai<;).
a HD, pp. 59-60. Cf. WW, p. 11.
* " . . . Die Art ihrer Gegenwart ist das K o m m e n . . ( H D , p. 65). See pp. 7 2 _ 73
(Anfang).

'as w h e n

upon

a day

ofrest...'

425

such as man, people and things. But it is not older than time, for
it is time in its origin. " . . . 'Nature' is the oldest time - not at all
that which is 'beyond time' in the metaphysical sense and certainly not the 'eternal' as Christians understand i t . . . . " 5 The
"oldest" time, it is also the "youngest" time, for perpetual
coming never grows old. What bearing this has upon history we
shall see subsequently. For the moment, note only how congruous this is with the problem of temporality as seen in SZ. The
only difference: focus here is on Being rather than on Therebeing.
3. Being as Spirit
The needs of the analysis bring Heidegger to speak of Being in
terms of Spirit, but since the reason is fundamentally the Hölderlin text, we need not see in the term any latent influence of
German idealism on Heidegger himself. Yet his use of the word
is interesting. Nature is Spirit, and insofar as it renders all beings
present, it be-spirits them all. This be-spiriting Spirit is the unifying unity that holds sway over all and lets the whole ensemble
of beings appear in its collectedness, drawing all beings-thatappear into the unity of its own Omni-presence.6
This unification of all beings into unique Presence is a dynamic
process that arranges all beings into a pattern of relationships
that Heidegger calls "essential thought." Why is the term used
here ? Possibly because of the spontaneous tendency to associate
Spirit with thought which is commonly taken to be the characteristic of Spirit. If this surmise be valid, then the unifying
arrangement will be the Spirit's "thinking" and the pattern of
relationship its "thoughts."
From another point of view, note the similarity between the
thought which proceeds from Spirit as suggested here and the
anticipated intimations of Nature when in repose. Repose is not
8 " . . . "Die Natur' ist die älteste Zeit und keineswegs das metaphysisch gemeinte
'Überzeitliche' und vollends nicht das christlich gedachte 'Ewige'
" (HD, p. 57).
See p. 61 (nie veraltet, Jüngste).
a HD, pp. 58-59. See pp. 62 (ahnenden Natur), 65 (alles denkend durchfügend).
Heidegger uses the term wesentliche Denken but we translate as "essential" rather
than "foundational," since clearly we are considering the pattern of the to-be-thought,
before thought itself comes-to-pass in There-being.
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simply inertia, but Nature's gathering of itself together for that
self-disclosure which is both an origin and a coming. As such, it
contains already within itself the pattern by which it will unfold
in beings. In terms of man, thought of this kind is a pre-thought.
Closely allied to Being as Spirit is the designation of Being as
Law. For the unified pattern of Presence which Spirit arranges
by thought becomes a matrix of relationships in the Open by
reason of which beings can encounter each other. We have seen
this already in terms by which Being, itself immediate, serves as
the mediation between beings. Now this same structure of mediation is called "Law" in allusion to the Greek vofxo^ as seen in
Pindar, and, because continually origin-al, "steadfast" Law. 7
4. Being as the Holy
The most striking designation of Being, however, and one that
will pervade the author's entire analysis of poetry, appears when
with Hölderlin Heidegger calls it the "Holy." At this point,
there is no question of making a phenomenological analysis of
the Holy in order to discern through it the sense of Being. Heidegger accepts the term as one that is imposed by Being itself
and enunciated by Hölderlin out of docility to this exigency.
The first reason for calling Being the Holy is that it is "older"
than the gods, for it is that by which they, too, are. Holiness is
not the borrowed property of a single god. " . . . The Holy is not
holy because it is divine, but the divine is divine because it is
'holy' in a way proper to itself. . . . " 8 Being is not only that by
which the gods are but that by which they are holy. That is why
it is itself the Holy. Again, Being is the Holy because it is a
continual coming and an endless origin, hence itself undefiled
and wholesome (heil). From another point of view, it is the Holy
insofar as it is unapproachable because of its very immediacy.9
Two characteristics of the Holy are worth special mention.
Firstly, it is de-ranging insofar as it dislodges by its coming all
7 HD, pp. 59 (Bezüge), 60-61 ("veste Gesez"). Being-as-law may be interpreted
also as ^dtos, provided this word be given its full Greek sense (p. 61).
• " . . . Das Heilige ist nicht heilig, weil es göttlich, sondern das Göttliche ist
göttlich, weil es in seiner Weise 'heilig' i s t ; . . . " (HD, p. 58)- See pp. 56 (nötigt), 58
(über "die" Götter).
• HD, p. 61 ("heil," unnahbar).
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experience from the ordinary patterns of everydayness. We
understand this in the sense of Being as the Awe-some as seen
in EM, by reason of which, when There-being is opened unto it,
There-being is estranged from its ordinary milieu. Such dislodging is a de-rangement.10 Secondly, the Holy is the ''eternal
heart" of beings: "heart," because it is the innermost source of
their presence; "eternal," because it is original time, sc. it is
perpetual beginning that lets all abiding (Bleiben) be, hence the
"eternality of the eternal." 1 1
Briefly, Being considered as the Holy includes the other
characteristics of Being we have mentioned. For it is the Holy,
always in ad-vent, that is the steadfast Law of be-spiriting Nature
through which the relations between all beings are mediated.
" . . . Everything is only because [it is] gathered together into
the Omni-presence of the Undefiled. . . . " 12
B.

THERE-BEING

AS

POET

To the Holy that advances toward him in Omnipresence, the
poet's unique task is to "respond." How conceive this responding? In general terms we may say it is a docile "readiness
for the Holy," hence a deliberate open-ness unto the Holy with
which he, by reason of his very essence as a poet, already has a
profound affinity. For since it is the very essence of the poet to
be drawn into the compass of the Holy, this induction itself already has educated him to his task. He belongs to the Holy,
stands open in the Open, is essentially "spirit-full" because he
essentially thinks omnipresent Spirit. The very heart of the poet
is that center within him where his own most proper essence
gathers to a fullness, in the " . . . stillness of his belonging-ness
within the compass of the Holy. . . . " 1 3 Since the Holy is pro10 HD, p. 62 (ent-setzend). There is a play on words impossible to retain in English
between ent setzend (de-ranging) and das Entsetzliche. Closest equivalent for the latter
would be "the Terrible," which would correspond well enough with "Awe-some"
but would not suggest "de-ranging." Cf. die Schrecknis des Unmittelbaren (HD, pp.
68, 70).
1 1 HD, p. 71 (Herz, Ewigkeit).
12 " . . . Alles ist nur, weil es in die All gegen wart des Un versehr Uchen gesammelt
. .. i s t : . . . " (HD, p. 71).
18 " . . . die Stille der Zugehörigkeit in die Umfängnis des Heiligen. . . . " (HD, p.
69). See pp. 54 (Ent-Sprechenden), 74 (Bereitschaft für das Heilige), 53 (Einbezug),
62 (zugehören, "geistig"), 54 and passim (Künftigen).
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foundly a coming, sc. an ad-vent (Kommen), the authentic poet,
by reason of his essential affinity with the Holy, is himself adventive, responding, as he does, to the Holy in its ad-vent. Let
us look now at this ad-ventive responding more in detail.
j. Prior to Self-disclosure of the Holy
How is one to conceive the situation that prevails prior to the
poetic moment ? In the present case where the emergence of the
Holy is conceived as a daybreak ("But lo, the dawn is come!"),
the moment prior to it is understood as the darkness before
dawn. Apparently Nature is asleep, the poet a solitary - both
share a common mourning. Yet in Nature's repose, there is an
immanent anticipation of the disclosure that is on the verge of
coming, and the poet, for all his apparent isolation, surmises
these incipient intimations because of his constitutional affinity
with the Holy. " . . . Because [the Holy] educates the poets of
ad-vent, inducted, as they are, into its compass, they themselves know the Holy. Their knowing is a surmise. . . . " 1 4 What
is called here "surmise" we take to correspond to what SZ called
the "pre-ontological comprehension of Being."
2. Poetic Moment
"But lo, the dawn is come!" (Jetzt aber tagts!) Thus the poet
cries out as the Holy discloses itself to him. Just as the new
insight of a man of thought is soon reflected in his eyes, so light
begins to radiate in the soul of a poet as the Holy reveals itself.
But this precedes the articulation of the poet's song, and the
poet's outcry but gives a name to this glowing radiance. 15 The
several elements involved in this process should be considered
separately.

14 " . . . Weil dieses jedoch die künftigen Dichter erzieht, wissen sie als die Einbezogenen das Heilige. Ihr Wissen ist das A h n e n . . ( H D , p. 62). See pp. 56 (Dunkel,
Nacht), 53 (scheint zu schlafen, Trauer, Vereinzelung).
1 5 HD, pp. 62 (Entwurf des sinnenden Mannes), 56-57 (Ausruf). The author
makes much of the fact the Holy's disclosure to the poet takes place in silence (v.g.
HD, pp. 57, 65, 66, 69) and we recall how in SZ silence was a mode of logos (SZ, pp.
164-165). See also US, p. 262.
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a. T H E H O L Y - The poet "cries out," to be sure, but it is
rather a calling to what is already in ad-vent, an address toward
Nature that enunciates what the poet has surmised already by
reason of his antecedent affinity. It is the Holy itself that determines what the poet is to say, and it never surrenders its
initiative. The poet's word (song) arises together with the
awakening of the Holy. Hence it is the Holy itself that in the
poet's song becomes a word, sc. is transformed into the poet's
song, so that " . . . the Holy [not only] bestows [the poet's] word
[but] passes itself into this word. . . . " 1 6
b. P O E T - Yet for all its primacy, the Holy needs the poet
if the word is to be enunciated, for " . . . there first must be a
poet in order that the word of a song be formed. . . . " 17 Orientated toward the Holy which opens itself up to him, and completely attuned to it, the poet must take his stand wherever the
Holy discloses itself. His work succeeds to the extent that it expresses a word that only the Holy, conserved within him, may
utter. 18
But the poet's success ("good fortune") is not easily attained;
he must first overcome the danger of mis-fortune. We see here
that the problem of negativity again appears. For the Holy,
since it is the absolutely immediate, is not as such directly accessible to the poet, he cannot name it in itself. " . . . The poet,
however, can never of himself name the Holy immediately. . . . " 1 9
It reveals itself to him mediately, sc. through the beings for
which it is the mediation.
This mediation can be considered from three points of view.
Firstly, it comes through that which is "about" the poet, sc.
that which he finds in the world about him. For " . . . the openness of the Open articulates itself into that which we call 'a
1 6 " . . . Das Heilige verschenkt das Wort und kommt selbst in dieses Wort..
(HD, p. 74). See pp. 56 (nötigt), 64 (entstammen), 70 (das Wort wird), 69 (gewandelt)
and WD, p. 85. It is in this sense that the coming-to-pass of the poetic word is an
"event," sc. has the Holy as Source.
17 " . . . Und erst muß ja ein Dichter sein, damit ein Wort des Liedes werden
kann
" (HD, pp. 65-66).
18 HD, pp. 67 (zugekehrt, Sich-öffnen), 65 (Durchstimmt), 69 (übernehmen),
66 (glückt).
19 " . . . der Dichter vermag dennoch nie von sich aus unmittelbar das Heilige zu
nennen. .
(HI), p. 66).
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World'. . . . " 20 From another point of view, mediation comes
from what is "above" the poet, some being superior to the poet
(therefore closer to the Holy, source of light), a god, if one will,
but not itself the Holy (because itself only a being, though a
superior one). Such a being gathers the light of the Holy into a
single luminous ray that sets the poet on fire. Finally, the word
itself that the poet forms is a being through which the Holy is
revealed.21 Does it not seem that we have returned here to the
bi-dimensional perspective of SZ, where beings are rendered
accessible to There-being only by reason of Being, but Being
itself is never found by itself (as a being) but only in the beings
it illuminates? In effect, is not this the ontological difference?
However this may be, there is a negativity implied here, for
when the Holy is mediated through the gods or the things of the
world, sc. when Being is mediated through beings and vice versa,
there is some sort of contraction and limitation. With this comes
the menace that the Holy be mistaken for a god (Being for a
being). In other words, if the ontological can come to us only
through the prism of the ontic, the inevitable consequence is a
risk that it be taken for ontic, sc. forgotten completely.
But when a poem succeeds, the poet has the good fortune to
give expression to the Holy for what it is. He does so, however,
only insofar as he avoids the mis-fortune that would allow him
to be so captivated by the god through whom the light of the
Holy comes as to forget the Holy itself. This would be misfortune, simply because it would be to lose the sense of what it
means to be a poet, namely not to be favored by a god but to be
encompassed by the Holy.22 To recognize the Holy as mediated
through the beings with which he is engaged and to accept, in
fact assume, this situation for what it is - this is the achievement
of the poetic task. " . . . Poets must leave to the immediate its
i m m e d i a c y . . s c . must respect the unapproachability of
Being in itself as itself, " . . . and yet accept its mediation as the
unique o n e . . 2 3 sc. must accept it as the unique means of
access to all other beings.
20 " . . . Die Offenheit des Offenen fügt sich zu dem, was wir 'eine Welt' nennen.
. . . " (HD, p. 62).
21 HD, pp. 66 (Entzündung), 70 (Gesang).
22 HD, p. 67 (nicht Empfängnis sondern Umfängiiis).
28 " . . . Die Dichter müssen dem Unmittelbaren seine Unmittelbarkeit lassen und
doch zugleich seine Vermittlung als das Einzige übernehmen...." (HD, p. 69).
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In other words, the poet must accept and assume the Holy
(Being) for what it is, and this implies the reciprocal dependence
between Being and beings as well as the consequences of Being's
contraction to beings (the menace of being forgotten completely).
This is the ideal response of a poet. It implies de-cision on his
part, indeed the supreme de-cision, insofar as he is a poet. For,
giving thus a name to the Holy in its essence, he distinguishes
it from its negativity, sc. its non-essence. He recognizes the
Holy for what it is. Essence and non-essence (positivity and negativity) of the Holy are in strife, and the poet's "scission" (scheidet) between the two, sc. his assuming of the Holy as negatived
(in the consequences of its contraction into beings) de-cides (entscheidet) this strife in any given poem. " . . . The word is a [decisive] weapon. . . . " 24 The poet's de-cision, so conceived, is
perfectly consequent upon de-cision as conceived in EM and
which we saw then to be re-solve.
C.

THOUGHT

The problem of thought is not thematized in the essay. Only
in two places is it even suggested: where Being-as-spirit is conceived as having "thoughts"; where history is said to come-topass only when the essence of truth is de-cided.25 We have no
right, then, to force the evidence. Yet we know that the Holy is
equivalent to Being, and poetry analogous to thought. If we
made the corresponding substitutions we would have the following results.
Being as ^liori*;, heart and abode of light, is absolutely immediate to all beings but cannot be grasped itself except mediately,
sc. in and through beings. It is essentially temporal, a continual
ad-vent to There-being. It is the gathering-together of beings
into collectedness within themselves and with each other. Therefore it is a X6yo<; that is at once an arranging of a pattern of relationships (SU73), a fixed law, within the matrix of which all
beings have their place. The disposition of this primordial X6yo<;
is a complex of incipient intimations that may be called
"thought," understood in the sense of a to-be-thought. Being
84
w

" . . . Das Wort ist Waffe
" (HD, p. 57). See p. 69 (höchste Entschiedenheit).
HD, p. 58 (das wesentliche Denken), 73 (Wesen der Wahrheit entschieden).
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discloses itself in silent fashion in the thinker, and the thinker's
response to the revelation is to transform it into word.
The task of the thinker as thinker is to respond to Being that
completely permeates him and thus discloses itself in and
through him. For, by reason of his very essence, he has a privileged intimacy with Being and its "thoughts." Thus he enjoys
a comprehension of these intimations of Being antecedent to
any moment of special revelation. His response consists in
uttering a cry toward Being advancing to him through beings,
that at once forms into verbal expression the revelation itself.
It is thus that Being passes into a word. (The primacy, however,
remains with Being, for the event has Being for its source.) This
word is de-cisive, hence the response is de-cision. For the thinker
must make a scission (hence a de-cision) between Being in its
positivity and in its negativity. This negativity consists, at least
partially, in the fact that Being always must be contracted
(therefore negatived) to beings, hence comports the risk of being
considered only as a being and thereby of being forgotten completely.
In this case, Being is submitted to the disposition of man and
made an object of thought. The true thinker will recognize this
situation. He will discern Being for itself (even if not by itself)
and will comprehend that, since it is absolutely immediate and
in continual ad-vent, it can never be an "object" of either
thinking or doing. Furthermore he will discern Being as negatived, with all the consequences of negativity. This non-objectivizing acceptance of Being in both positivity and negativity
is the full sense of de-cision. It is also what we have called "resolve."
RESUME

The second Hölderlin analysis rejoins the first in attempting
to delineate the essence of poetry, which we know to be the
origination of Being-as-truth. It advances the problem to the
extent that it precises the nature of the originating process as
comporting both the dimension of future (the Holy is in continual ad-vent) änd the dimension of present (the Holy is transformed into word once dawn has broken upon the poet). The
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dimension of past is implied, for what is-as-having-been is the
beings through which the Holy flames forth. This aspect of the
problem will become clear soon enough.
How far have we come ? We have a clearer conception of the
poetic process with probable application to thought, and beyond
that, further testimony to the effect that the drift of Heidegger's
reflection is more and more toward the problem of language. If
we surmise from EM the reason for this, the full force of it has
not yet appeared.

c h a p t e r iII

N I E T Z S C H E ' S W O R D " G O D IS D E A D "

The summer semester of 1940 brought the study of <puai<; in
Aristotle. It included one illuminating remark on Xoyo<; and the
problem of language, but since the whole matter will be treated
fully in 1944, we defer comment until later. We come, then, to
the Nietzsche analyses. It was 1950 before these reached the
public in the form of the essay, "Nietzsche's Word 'God is
dead'." 1 The essay was based on the university lecture courses
of 1936-1940.2 In 1961 the full text of these lectures themselves
appeared, together with certain essays that date from 1941. 3
For the sake of simplicity, we consider the latter as forming a
unity with the essay itself. The following remarks, then, should
be taken to represent the author's thought up to and including
1941.
A.

BEING

J. Mittence
We recall the conclusion that we have seen already: Nietzsche's
nihilism is the nihilism of metaphysics itself, insofar as it has
See "Nietzsches Wort 4Gott ist tot'," HW, pp. 193-247.
"Der Wille zur Macht als Kunst" (1936-37), N, I,pp. 11-254; "Die ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen" (1937), N, I, pp. 255-472; "Der Wille zur Macht als Erkenntnis"
(*939), N, I, pp. 473-658; "Die ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen und der Wille zur
Macht" (1939), N, II, pp. 7-29; "Der europäische Nihilismus" (1940), N, II, pp.
1

2

31-256.

3 "Nietzsches Metaphysik" (1940), N, II, pp. 257-333; "Die Metaphysik
als
Geschichte des Seins" (i94i),N, II, pp. 458-480; "Die Erinnerung in die Metaphysik"
(1941), N, II, pp. 481-490.
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forgotten Being. Heidegger is attempting to overcome both by
thinking the essence out of which they spring, sc. Being as negatived truth. What we are told here about Being (still more about
thought) is said only by indirection, but it is no less significant
for that.
In arguing that subject-ism is correlative with truth-as-certitude, Heidegger insists that truth-as-non-concealment and the
Being-process are one. But we know this already. What is new
in the essay is an important precision with regard to the primacy
of Being. For the first time the word Geschick is used significantly with the sense that it will have for the rest of Heidegger
II. In SZ, we translated this as "common fortune," but now we
must resign ourselves to a neologism, if we are to do the author
justice, and call it "mittence." 4 We understand thereby that
event in which Being is disclosed, when this event is conceived
as proceeding from the initiative of Being.5 We might add that
the word "event" (Ereignis), too, will now be used in the same
context and henceforth will become more and more significant
in the author's thought.6
What is important in the essay is the fact that now metaphysics and nihilism are conceived as proceeding from just such
an event. For Being bestows itself in such a way that it simultaneously withdraws, sc. mittence is negatived because Being
cannot bestow itself except in a finite way. If we thought the
problem through in terms of Being-as-mittence, " . . . it would
be due to the essence of Being itself that it remains un-thought,
[simply] because it withdraws. Being itself withdraws into its
[own] truth. . . . " 7 We understand "into its own truth" here to
4 Along with the German words for "sending" (schicken), for "history"
(Geschichte) and for "fortune" (Schicksal), the word Geschick derives from the verb
"to-come-to-pass" (Geschehen). For Heidegger it designates an event (Ereignis),
hence a coming-to-pass, by which Being "sends" (sich schickt) itself unto man. We
call the sending an "e-mitting." Considered as proceeding from Being, the sending
is a "mittence." Considered as coming-to-pass in man, it is a "com-mitting," or
"commitment" (Schicksal). Henceforth, the latter replaces the SZ translation as "fortune." The collectivity of mittences constitutes Being-as-history (Ge-schick-e,
Geschichte), and we translate as "inter-mittence." All this becomes clearer in the
meditation on Holderlin's "Re-collection."
5 V.g. HW, pp. 243-245.
6 V.g. HW, p. 2 4 4 ; N, II, pp. 483, 485, 489, 490.
7 " . . . Dann läge es im Wesen des Seins selbst, daß es ungedacht bleibt, weil es
sich entzieht. Das Sein selbst entzieht sich in seine Wahrheit...." (HW, p. 244).
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mean that in disclosing itself in beings as their truth, Being
withdraws behind the finitude of this revelation. The author
continues: " . . . it hides itself in this [disclosure] and conceals
itself [as] thus hiding." 8 This concealing by Being of its own
concealment is what we have seen already to be the "mystery"
of Being " . . . according to which the truth of Being comes-topresence." 9
In these terms, metaphysics, as the forgetfulness of Being, is
the forgetfulness or, if one prefer here, unawareness of the
mystery. Such a phenomenon we have called "errance." Metaphysics is marked not simply by the failure on the part of man
to pose the Being-question, nor can it be called in any proper
sense human "error." Fundamentally it is a mittence of Being,
so that " . . . metaphysics in its essence is the un-thought, because still withheld, mystery of Being itself. . . . " 10 If such is the
essence of metaphysics (and the essence of nihilism as well), it is
clear why neither can be thought in its essence until we have
thought the mystery of Being itself, sc. Being in its negativity.
2. The Ontological Difference
But precisely what is the nature of mittence - any mittence
of Being? More explicitly than hitherto, Heidegger now indicates that it is any special way in which the ontological difference issues forth (Austrag). For as a result of mittence, man
comports himself in any given way with beings simply because
of his relationship to Being itself.11 Hence the comportment is
grounded in the difference between Being and beings, sc. in the
ontological difference. 12 For example, metaphysics itself arises
out of the fact that Being e-mits itself to man in such a way that
man tries to comprehend beings as beings. That is why the entire
•
.. Es birgt sich in diese und verbirgt sich selbst in solchem Bergen." (HW,
p. 244).
• "Im Blick auf das sich verbergende Bergen des eigenen Wesens streifen wir
vielleicht das Wesen des Geheimnisses, als welches die Wahrheit des Seins west."
(HW, p. 244).
10 " . . . Die Metaphysik wäre in ihrem Wesen das ungedachte, weil vorenthaltene
M (HW, p. 244).
Geheimnis des Seins selbst
" N, II, p. 206. The author introduces here the terminology which will be developed more at length in 1950: Unterschied, Differenz, Austrag. See N, II, p. 209 and
cf. below III B, Ch. x6.
« N, II, p. 207.
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history of metaphysics for Heidegger is an event in which this
difference has issued forth. 13
But the differentiation is not the result of some extrinsic "act/'
which, so to speak, divides Being from beings. Rather
.. in
its origins the differentiation is the presenc-ing process of Being
itself, the originating power of which consists in the fact [simply]
that the e-vent takes place. . . . " 14 That is why, when all is said
and done, "Being-as-history is neither the history of men and
of humanity, nor the history of man's relationship to beings and
Being. Being-as-history is Being itself and nothing else. ..
All of these themes will be fully orchestrated as Heidegger II
develops.
B.

THOUGHT

Since man comports himself with beings in accordance with
his relationship to Being, man finds himself to be that "place"
where the ontological difference takes place. " . . . We take our
stand in the differentiation between Being and beings. . . . " 16
Since the ontological difference issues forth out of the event in
which mittence comes-to-pass, to think Being will be to think
Being-as-mittence.
i. Thought as Re-trieve
In trying to think Being-as-mittence, Heidegger has meditated Nietzsche after the manner of re-trieve. As such, his analysis is an elucidation of the genuine sense of Nietzsche's insight.
It does not pretend, however, to repeat simply what Nietzsche
said. For when we go the full way with Nietzsche, there appears
18 N, II, pp. 208-209. Cf. p. 408. That is why, since metaphysics is for Heidegger
ontology, the effort to ground metaphysics, sc. to develop a fundamental ontology,
has led him to explore more and more thematically the ontological difference as such.
Note how here in 1940 the author takes special pains to show the continuity between
his present reflection and the problematic of SZ. See N, II, p. 210.
14 " . . . die Unterscheidung ist anfänglich das Wesende des Seins selbst, dessen
Anfängnis das Er-eignis ist
" (N, II, p. 489)- See also p. 485.
14 "Die Seinsgeschichte ist weder die Geschichte des Menschen und eines Menschentums noch die Geschichte des menschlichen Bezugs zum Seienden und zum Sein. Die
Seinsgeschichte ist das Sein selbst und nur dieses. . . ( N , II, p. 489)18 " . . . Wir stehen in der Unterscheidung von Seiendem und Sein....*' (N, II,
p. 207). Heidegger italicizes. Cf. pp. 29, 485 (Inständigkeit).
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something in his thought that he himself was unable to think
further, and this is what Heidegger ambitions to think through. 17
In the concrete, this may seem to do violence to the written
word. But it would be a mistake to claim that the procedure is
purely arbitrary:
. . . T h e right kind of elucidation never understands the t e x t better t h a n
its author, but it does understand the t e x t otherwise. N o w this other wise
must be of such a nature that it deals with the identical " t h i n g " t h a t the
elucidated t e x t reflects upon. 1 8

In this sense, it is faithful to all that is truly essential in the
thought.
Delineating in greater detail the nature of such re-trieve, the
author uses certain formulae which will be developed more fully
as Heidegger II unfolds. Metaphysics, for example, is to be overcome by a process of "re-collection." 19 This will take the form
of an "attentive answer" to the "noiseless voice" of Being as it
makes its "claim" upon man.20 The formulae will return. For the
present, what is interesting is only the fact that they have fully
matured in the author's mind by 1941.
2. Thought as Preparation
In making the re-trieve, we must remain docile to Being. That
is why, when all is said and done, the human effort at thought is
essentially a preparation that disposes man for the disclosure
that Being alone can bestow. The task, then, is " . . . to light up
the domain within which Being can seize once more in an origi17 HW, pp. 215 (eigene Darlegungen); VA, p. 122 (nicht vermag). A ease in point:
the identification of Nietzsche's "justification" with truth-as-certitude. See HW, p.
228. Cf. N, I, p. 476.
18 " . . . Eine rechte Erläuterung versteht jedoch den Text nie besser als dessen
Verfasser ihn verstand, wohl aber anders. Allein dieses Andere muß so sein, daß es
das Selbe trifft, dem der erläuterte Text nachdenkt." (HW, p. 197). See p. 235
(alles Wesentliche zu denken).
19 See "Erinnerung in die Metaphysik," N, II, pp. 481-490. The author seems to
take Erinnerung and Andenken as synonymous (v.g. pp. 481, 484, 490). The former
would appear to be characteristic of Heidegger I (v.g. KM, p. 211), the latter more
characteristic of Heidegger II (v.g. HD, pp. 75-143). We translate both words by
"re-collection" because it is difficult to find a second English word which approximates
the author's thought as closely as this. The affinity of this term to the notion of
as the process of "gathering-together" or "collecting" makes it especially
congruous.
20 N, II, p. 482 (Anspruch), 484 (hörende Antwort, lautlosen Stimme, Anspruch).
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nating relation man in terms of his essence. . . . " In other words,
the thinker prepares himself to be seized by Being. " . . . To be
preparational is the essence of the thought we have described." 21
More precisely, in what does the preparation consist ? It means
learning how to overcome that presentative thinking which
characterizes the philosophy of Will-unto-Power. It means
letting Being come to thought as mittence in the beings with
which thought deals. Such preparation is ad-ventive (historical)
thought, and since it perseveres in posing the question of Being,
it is also an interrogative thought.
With regard to the beings themselves, such a thought will seek
not simply to use them for its own purposes; rather it will try to
receive the earth as a blessing bestowed upon it and make itself
at home on earth according to the exigencies of this acceptance,
sc. in such a way that it stands guard over the mystery of Being.
Note: that "to receive the earth as a blessing" is fundamentally
the same process as to respond to Being bestowing itself as
mittence (hence the task of thought is to let Being be itself);
that the proper response is made not simply to Being, but to
Being as negatived, sc. in its mystery; that in the terms "to
stand guard over," "to watch over" and "shepherds," we have
all the ingredients for the famous "man as shepherd of Being"
metaphor of HB (1947).22
RESUME

The primacy of Being-as-overpowering (EM) now comes to
expression under the guise of mittence, the issuing forth of the
ontological difference in that event wherein Being bestows itself. The bestowal is made, however, in finite fashion and therefore Being simultaneously withdraws, remains mystery. The
task of foundational thought is to think Being-as-mittence by
doing everything in its power to prepare for such a bestowal
through the accomplishment of re-trieve.
21 " . . . D e m
vorbereitenden Denken liegt daran, den Spielraum zu lichten,
innerhalb dessen das Sein selbst den Menschen hinsichtlich seines Wesens wieder in
einen anfänglichen Bezug nehmen könnte. Vorbereitend zu sein, ist das Wesen
solchen Denkens." (HW, p. 194) Cf. US, p. 124; WP. p. 46; SG, p. 121.
22 HW, pp. 239 (das Sein sein läßt), 233 (künftiges); VA, pp. 98 (Segen empfangen,
Geheimnis hüten), 97 (Hirten).

c h a p t e r iII

"HOMECOMING"
"RE-COLLECTION"

The next important delineation of foundational thought comes
in 1943 with two more Hölderlin interpretations. In the meantime
we have the Plato and Hegel analyses which touch our problem
only indirectly. We speak briefly of each in turn by way of
transition.

I. Plato's Doctrine on Truth
The Plato-interpretation, published in 1942, is clearly another
re-trieve that disengages what Plato did not - could not - say,
sc. that with him the conception of truth was transformed from
non-concealment to conformity and thereby Being reduced to a
being (elSo?). It is the un-said in a thinker which is his true
"doctrine," his "supreme gift," sc. that in his thought which is
most truly "creative," because this is the still withheld mystery
of Being, to which, indeed, he was ex-posed but which he could
not bring adequately into words.1 Re-trieving Plato thus in his
abiding nearness to us, we re-collect truth in its origins more
profoundly than before.
Truth in its origins obviously is a-Xrj&ewc, and the task of
thought is to recognize what is "positive" in the essence which
the "privative" form expresses. But to recognize the privative
as positive is to recognize the positive as privative, sc. truth in
its mystery. That truth even for Plato is negatived is clear, the
1 PW, pp. 5, 40-41 (Ungesagte, Lehre), 50 (nichts Vergangenes), 51 (anfänglicher).
Cf. WD, p. 72 (höchstes Geschenk) and VA, p. 122 (Schöpferische).
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author claims, inasmuch as all four stages of the cave-metaphor
must be thought as an ensemble. He insists that we may infer as
much, too, from the fact that Plato chose a cave as his metaphor.
For a cave is at once an open domain that is nevertheless shut
off from the ultimate source of light, sc. enclosed (finite):
. . . Only the essence of truth conceived in the origin-al Greek sense of dcX-rj-Jteta [where] non-concealment [is] related to something concealed
(disarranged, disguised) - this and only this has an essential relation to
the image of a cave [hidden] from the light of day. . . . 2

IL Hegel's Concept of Experience
As with the Plato study, so too in the seminar on Hegel's
Phenomenology of the Spirit (1942-43), the author is engaged in
a re-trieve which endeavors to "liberate" Hegel's thought unto
its own most proper essence.3 The value of the essay consists in
the Hegel-interpretation itself, and what it says about thought
is to be found only in the oblique.
There are some indications of a negative sort that it might be
worth-while to cull, principally with regard to the conception of
voeiv as it has been interpreted in the metaphysical tradition.
For we understand Heidegger to hold Hegel's distinction between natural and real Knowing as equivalent to Plato's distinction between 86i;a and voetv,4 where So^a perceives the
ontic, voeiv the ontological, dimension of ambivalent Sv. There
is no question that Hegel as well as Plato sought to achieve
a voetv by meditating the Being of beings, but it is equally
clear that he did not meditate Being as different from
beings, sc. the ontological difference as such. This is what Heidegger himself endeavors to do in interrogating the truth-process
through which it breaks out.
This unannounced preoccupation with the ontological difference as such accounts perhaps for a strange remark that otherwise would be disconcerting. " . . . The being-ness of beings . . .
2 " . . . Das im Sinne der dcX^Eta anfänglich griechisch gedachte Wesen der Wahrheit, die auf Verborgenes (Verstelltes und Verhülltes) "bezogene Unverborgenheit und
nur sie hat einen wesenhaften Bezug zum Bild der unter Tag gelegenen Höhle
(PW, p. 33). See p. 51 ("Positiven" in "privativen" Wesen).
3 "Hegels Begriff der Erfahrung," HW, pp. 105-192. See p. 143 (frei zu geben).
* HW, pp. 162, 180, 137. Cf. EM, p. 79.
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is for us only one manner of Being, albeit a decisive one, that by
no means necessarily shines-forth only as the presence of that
which is present. . . . " 5 We interpret the remark to mean that
although Being cannot be except in beings, it can manifest itself
sufficiently as itself to permit us to discern it in its difference
from beings. A case in point would be the Non-being analysis of
WM. The sense of the remark, then, would be to insist on the
possibility of thinking the ontological difference as such.
At best, however, this tells us what thought is not. For a more
positive statement of what it is, we have a remark that introduces the discussion of 86£a-vos!v:
. . . W h e n we use the words 6v and " b e i n g " thought-fully, it is presupposed from the beginning t h a t we think of, sc. t h a t we p a y heed to, the
e x t e n t to which for a [certain] time the meaning keeps changing, then
eventually, with the process of history, becomes settled. . . . 6

We interpret this to mean: that genuine thought meditates the
ambiguity of 8v, therefore the ontological difference; that
thought examines this ambiguity as a historical process, hence
it must be a historical thought; that the Hegel-analysis itself
is an attempt at just such a historical thought; that this process
is a "paying heed" (achten). But our precise problem is: what is
the nature of this "paying heed" ? On this we have no light at all.

III.

"Homecoming " "Re-collection"

What this "paying heed" may mean might be disengaged in
some fashion from the analysis of Hölderlin's "Homecoming/To
the Kinsmen" and "Re-collection." 7 They date from the same
period of Heidegger's development (1943), commemorate the
same event (the hundredth anniversary of Hölderlin's death)
5 " . . . Die Seiendheit des Seienden, die seit dem Beginn des griechischen Denkens
bis zu Nietzsches Lehre von der ewigen Wiederkunft des Gleichen sich als die Wahrheit des Seienden ereignete, ist für uns nur eine, wenngleich entscheidende Weise des
Seins, das keineswegs notwendig nur als Anwesenheit des Anwesenden erscheint.
. . . " (HW, p. 142).
6 " . . . Wenn wir die Worte ßv und 'Seiendes* denkend gebrauchen, ist als erstes
vorausgesetzt, daß wir denken, d.h. daß wir darauf achten, inwiefern jeweils die
Bedeutungsich wandelt und wie sie jeweils geschichtlich festliegt...." (HW, p. 161).
7 "Heimkunft / An die Verwandten," HD, pp. 9-30; "Andenken," HD, pp.
75'
14$. We are concerned, of course, only with what Heidegger is trying to say for himself. For an admirable study of the relationship between Hölderlin and Heidegger,
see Beda Alle mann, Hölderlin und Heidegger (Zürich: Atlantis, 1954).
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and, except for certain stylistic differences (one composed for
the lecture platform, the other for a commemorative volume),
both deal with the same problem in f u n d a m e n t a l l y the same
way. The common theme (the same that dominated "Hölderlin
and

the

Essence

of P o e t r y " and " 'As when upon a d a y of

rest . . . ' " ) : w h a t is the essence of poetry? more precisely, of the
poet ? T h e present essays are the term of a long fruition, the first
lecture course on Hölderlin h a v i n g been given nine years previously (winter semester, 1934-35), prior even to E M

(summer

semester, 1935), a second the previous summer ( 1 9 4 2 ) .
manifest an abiding interest

in Hölderlin,

"the

poet

They
of

the

poet," that we can explain, perhaps, only when we have appreciated the full import of w h a t it means to re-trieve the original
sense of Xsyctv in order to achieve foundational thought.
The two essays we are about to examine are sufficiently complementary to be taken as a unit. Both describe the poet as a
wanderer returning home. This is not simply the recounting of
a personal experience on the part of Hölderlin but delineates the
essence of poet as poet. " 'Homecoming' " treats the theme with
bolder strokes, " 'Re-collection' " examines more in detail the
necessity of the journey, its meaning, the exact nature of the
homecoming. T a k e n separately, " 'Homecoming' " could serve as
a guide to " 'Re-collection'," the latter as commentary upon the
former. W e shall take them as one, trying to disengage in coherent u n i t y the fundamental theses of both. Obviously, our
unique concern is with the thinking of Being and we examine
the essence of poetry only to understand thought. This gives us
three points of reference: A. Being, B. Poetry, C. Thought.

A.

BEING

r. The Characterization of Being
a. T H E

G L A D - S O M E - W e have become accustomed from

the beginning to conceive of Being in terms of the metaphor of
light. Here the metaphor is enriched by a further nuance when
the author characterizes it as the "Glad-some." This suggests
not only the brightness which is proper to light, but also a se-
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renity and even light-heartedness that we associate with joy. 8
Source of joy, the Glad-some is the Supremely Joyous itself.
Distillation of joyousness and light, the Glad-some imparts to
the homeland the benign splendor which welcomes the wanderer
when he reaches port, opens things up in the exhilaration of their
presence, lights up the disposition of men so that they may be
open unto all that is noble in their fields, their cities, their
homes.9
b. T H E H O L Y - In the light of the Glad-some, the "nature"
of beings (man and things) is maintained in wholesome integrity
(heil) as unimpaired and sound. To be the ultimate Source of the
conserving power that guards beings in the integrity of their
Being, this is what makes the Glad-some "the Holy." The Gladsome and the Holy are one. The Holy here is clearly neither God,
nor the gods; it is, as Heidegger interprets it, beyond both gods
and men, guaranteeing to both the integrity of their Being,
opening up the domain in which the gods and men may come-topresence. It opens itself up when the marriage-feast takes place,
wherein poet as poet is born. The Holy is a law unto itself, far
different from any human law, whose articulation constitutes
the unique primordial poem that the poet must fashion into
words. The primordial poem is also conceived as the "thoughts"
of Being-as-spirit.10
c. O R I G I N - Being-as-origin (Ursprung) is understood best,
perhaps, as an overflowing Source which gives rise to beings. It
is essentially an abundance, rather a superabundance, a continual overflowing. It is as if Being in its exuberance continually
surpasses itself, then flows back upon itself to make the experience of its own inadequacy to itself. This self-surpassing selfinadequacy is the very nature of Being-as-origin. Now what
8 HD, p. 18 (das Heitere). Scott (in Existence and Being..pp.
291-316) translates "the Serene," but this suggests only one element in das Heitere. We choose
"Glad-some" because it may be taken to suggest the brightness of a smiling face
(hence claritas) born of joy (hence hilar itas; that is tranquil, free from violent outburst (hence serenitas).
• HD, pp. 18 (das Freudigste), 14 (freundlichen Scheinen), 18 (hellt das Gemüt).
10 HD, pp. 17 (heil), 18 (Unverstörten, Heilen), 116, 108 (über den Göttern und
den Menschen), 139, 99 (Fest), 99 (Gesetz), 107, 116, 139 (unvordichtbare Gedicht),
86 (Gedanken des Geistes). The whole thesis of " 'As when upon a day of rest,
is crystallized on p. 86.
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properly characterizes the homeland to which the poet-wanderer
returns is its proximity to Being-as-source. " . . . What is most
proper and most precious in the homeland consists simply in the
fact that it is this nearness to the Origin - and nothing else besides. . . . " 1 1
d. G R O U N D - There is a certain steadfastness in Being-assource, for in giving rise to beings it nevertheless does not lose
itself in what has thus sprung forth but remains completely itself as Source. This self-retaining of the Source in the very process
of giving rise to what is not itself is a "holding fast" to itself that
enables it to be a "fast" support to what derives from it. This
fast support may be conceived more clearly if we change the
metaphor and consider Being, the steadfast Source, as "Ground."
Then " . . . the process by which the Origin holds itself fast is
[at once] the making-fast of Ground. In this process alone of
making-fast [-Ground] consists the steadfastness that is proper
to the Origin. . . . " 1 2
2. The Priority of Being
Whatever the metaphor used, it is perfectly clear in each of
the present essays that Being enjoys a primacy over There-being
(poet). The Open opens-up, and upon a great festival day lets the
poet in his essence spring forth. How are we to understand this
"birth" of the poet? The Holy itself is the Song to be sung, the
primordial Poem that the poet must bring into words. The Holy
imparts itself to the poet, therefore, as a mittence. Considered
in its term, this mittence is the essence of the poet himself as
poet, which he, for his part, must bring to fullness by forming
the Song into words. It is his "com-mitment" (Schicksal).
When the Holy bestows Being upon the poet, it "hails" him
- the mittence is the hailing. " . . . To let come-to-presence that
1 1 " . . . Das Eigenste und das Beste der Heimat ruht darin, einzig diese Nähe
zum Ursprung zu sein, - und nichts anderes außerdem....'* (HD, p. 23). See HD,
pp. 88, 138 (Entspringenlassen), 125, 138 (Quelle, sich übertreffende Sich-nie-genügen,
Reichtum, Überfluß).
1 8 " . . . Das Sichfestigen des Ursprungs ist ein Erfestigen des Grundes. Im Erfestigen allein besteht das dem Ursprung eigene Feste
" (HD, p. 138). As to
what occasioned HÖlderlin's conception of "origin" that permits interpretation as
"ground," see HD, p. 75-
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which comes-to-presence in its presenc-ing - this is the original
hailing. . . . " 1 3 To be sure, Being's hail may be brought to the
poet by means of emissaries that serve, so to speak, as intermediaries. But it is Being itself, whether as the Glad-some or the Holy,
that is the origin of the hailing and in the hailing appears. In any
case, the hail is more than a simple greeting. It is a summons as
well, for the Holy "bids" the poet accomplish of himself that to
which he is com-mitted. Through its emissary, the northeast
wind, Being " . . . 'bids' the poets find themselves in the mittence
by which they come-to-presence in historical fashion. . . . " 1 4
j. The Finitude of Being
It is perfectly clear from these two essays that, when Being
comes-to-presence in beings, it does so in a finite way. We can
understand best the sense in which Heidegger interprets Hölderlin to mean this if we return for a moment to the characterization of Being-as-source. We miss the point completely if we
conceive of Being merely as a spring hidden in the earth that
sends forth its waters into the unhidden world. The implication
here is that if we could penetrate far enough we could solve the
mystery it comports. What is important to realize is that the
Source as such is self-concealing. We have seen already the
reason: in giving rise to what springs from it, the Source does
not lose itself in it but remains itself as Source, hiding itself in
what has sprung from it, withdrawing into obscurity - and all
this in order to remain completely itself, sc. Source and nothing
more. This self-withdrawal in giving rise to beings, this bestowal
that is also a withholding, is Heidegger's explanation of why
Hölderlin calls Being "re-served." It is in this that consists its
18 " . . . Solches Wesenlassen eines Wesenden in seinem Wesen ist das ursprüngliche Grüßen...." (HD, p. 99). See p. 142. There is much to recommend Grüßen as
"hail.'' Deriving from the Middle English heil, it obviously has a parentage with das
Heilige (the Holy) which now hails (grüßt) the poet. The two standard meauings
of "to greet" and "to call after" concur nicely with the undertones of dialogue
(Gespräch) and vocation (gerufen, HD, p. 142), as well as com-mitment to a task-tobe-achieved (Aufgabe), that are clearly discernible here.
14 " . . . Dieser Wind 'heißt' die Dichter sieb in das Geschick ihres geschichtlichen
Wesens finden...." (HD, p. 82). We take the northeast wind here, the "angels"
and "gods" (HD, p. 19) all to have function of intermediary between Holy and poet,
which we saw in "As when upon a day of rest. - ." under the guise of "god" (HD,
p. 66). As to the nature of the mediation, see HD, pp. 16-17, where various functions
of "angel of the house" and "angel of the year" are distinguished.
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mystery. Furthermore, the poet, as hailed by negatived Being,
is also prey to its negativity. The There-as-poet is an open domain
that closes itself up, that reveals and conceals at once. 15
B.

POETRY

1. Nature of the Poet
The poet is a "half-god." This means that he is endowed with
a special prerogative by which he is more than a man but less
than a god, for he dwells in a privileged domain that lies inbetween ordinary humanity and divinity. He is eminently the
in-between-being whose prerogative is to be the There that is
exposed unto the Holy which opens itself up as the Open. Endowed with this privileged access to the Holy, the poet enjoys
an in-between-ness (between gods and men) that is founded in
the in-between-ness between beings and Being. The poet's vocation is to yield to the Holy as it hails him into poetic Being
and bring into words the primordial Poem, already formulated
(articulative) in the Holy itself but not yet articulated. Let this
yielding be called a hailing in turn, a perseverance in ex-position,
a counterpoise, a mutual viewing, a recollection, a tranquil
whiling, an appropriation of what is proper to the poetic nature,
an abiding, a dwelling in the Open which the Holy opens up the sense is always the same: it is a docility to the Holy, a readiness to respond to its bidding, an assuming of the commitment
to a poetic destiny to make manifest the Holy. In a word, we
may call it There-being's response to Being. 16
2. The Nature of Poetry
More precisely, how are we to understand the law of the poetic
nature? We consider the matter from two distinct but comple1 5 HD, pp. 138 {sichverbergendes, Sichentziehen), 14 (Gesparte), 23 (Geheimnis),
99» 109 (Offene verschließt sich, entbergen-verbergen). See also HD, pp. 16-17 (Spiel
des Lichtes), 104 (Nacht gleich ist dem Tag).
16 Sample: HD, pp. 98 (Halbgott, zwischen), 118 (über den Menschen, unter den
Göttern), 102 (Ausgesetzten), 139 (Dies Offene), 142 (gerufen), 107 (Gedicht), 91-92
(Grüßen), 27 (harren), 99-100 (Ausgleich), 15 (blickt-angeblickt), 92 (Einkehr),
100 (Weile), 129 (Aneignung des Eigenen), 137 (Bleiben), 138 (Wohnen), 82 (Bereitschaft), 109 (Zeichen).
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mentary points of view: according to the nature of Being's
address (hail) to the poet; according to the nature of the response which the poet must make to this hail.
a. B E I N G A N D T H E P O E T - Being in its manifestations
is necessarily finite. Hence it withdraws behind the beings to
which it imparts presence, concealing itself in its own revelations.
This self-concealing revealment is precisely what Heidegger
understands by the mystery of Being. If the poet's task is to
form Being into words, this means that from the beginning he
is endowed with the comprehension of Being, but precisely because Being in its mystery is so elusive, he must be schooled to
the use of his prerogative, disciplined to discern the ontological
difference. This pedagogy comports three moments: initially,
the poet, although endowed with an antecedent and constitutional ("pre-ontological") seizure of Being, is nevertheless
preoccupied with the ontic dimension of beings; he must in
time experience Being for itself; then, having come to his maturity, he weaves his Being-comprehension into words by
bringing to light the Being-dimension in the beings of which he
sings. It is thus that he articulates the Holy. In the two essays
under discussion, these three moments are thematized in terms
of one basic metaphor, sc. of Being-as-source. This is complemented by another metaphor, whereby the poet's own proper
homeland is that domain where this Source is to be found.
" . . . What is most properly characteristic about the homeland . . .
consists uniquely in being this nearness to the Source - and
nothing else besides. . . . " 1 7 Let us try to trace the poet's pedagogy in terms of these two concomitant metaphors.
Moment I - In his youth, the poet grows up close to the Source
without knowing it as Source, familiar with his native surroundings without appreciating what is really most proper to
them: nearness to Being-as-source. To be sure, he has some
awareness of Being. As a poetic spirit, he is from the very beginning "open unto the Open," but this awareness is obscured
("pre-ontological") - and, indeed, through no fault of his own.
1 7 " . . . Das Eigenste und das Beste der Heimat ruht darin, einzig diese Nähe zum
Ursprung zu sein, - und nichts anderes außerdem
" (HD, p. 23).
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The Source, insofar as it gives rise, is known only through the
beings that spring forth from it, while it itself withdraws into
concealment. In his youthful naivete, the poet, dimly aware of
the Source as such and desiring to penetrate its mystery, seizes
upon these beings about him in hopes of thus being able to fasten
upon something that will satisfy his unexplained longing. But
it is all in vain, for the more he seeks to fasten Being thus, the
more it evades him. He is doomed to frustration. He is for the
time oblivious to the difference between beings and their Source
(the ontological difference), but since the reason for his forgetfulness is less his own negligence than the self-concealing
character of Being itself (hence has its source in the Source), it
is less true to say that he has forgotten Being than that Being
has forgotten him. 18
What can he do ? Only be faithful to the demands of the voiceless longing within! The poetic spirit, still "open to the Open"
despite this initial state of forgetfulness, remains orientated to
the Source, so that this very orientation awakens the will in him
to leave home, to go abroad to seek that which can bring him
closer to what is properly his own at home, nearness to the selfconcealing Source.
The situation of the German poet (for it is only this that Hölderlin pretended to be) suggests comparison with that of the
Greek poets, although it is antithetically different. Both have a
native gift proper to themselves. For the Greeks, it was the
"heavenly fire," sc. exposure to Being; for the Germans, it is
"clarity of exposition" [sic], sc. the power to seize upon the
matter of poetry, to organize it, schematize it, divide, control it.
Both have correlative weaknesses: the Greeks risked the failure
of being able to capture the fire in disciplined form; the German
risks a complete forgetfulness of the fire, and a preoccupation
with the ontic dimension of poetry. The ideal, of course, is to
achieve the perfect balance of fire and form, for it is only thus
that either becomes completely itself and the poets of the respective lands attain full freedom in the use of what is proper to
them. Both Greeks and Germans must learn something foreign
to their native temperament. The Greeks succeeded, and this
1 8 HD, pp. 87 (schon offen), 88 (Fassenwollen), 89 (Vergessen). For the sense of
Vergessen as used here, cf. VA, p. 264 and SF, p. 34.
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accounts for their greatness. The German poet, master of form,
will succeed only to the extent that he experiences the heavenly
fire that the Greeks knew so well. To do this, he must have the
courage to leave his native homeland, so that after the journey
and by reason of it he can return home and at last be genuinely
"at home" there. 19
One thing, however, is certain: homecoming and becomingat-home near the Source are impossible, unless the journey be
made. A journey is the condition of return. " . . . For [Hölderlin],
the journey abroad remains essential for the return home to the
proper law of his poetic song. . . . " 20 In fact, the journey as such
is from the first moment a returning, for it is only thus that the
poet learns to make his own what is authentically his.
In all this, note that the initial state of the poet, described
here as "open to the Open" but first of all and for the most part
lost in a state of ontic preoccupation, corresponds perfectly
with what we saw in SZ as the transcendence of There-being in
its everyday state of fallen-ness. But this condition is determined
by Being itself, which, on the one hand, accounts for the poet's
fallen-ness because of its self-withdrawal, and, on the other,
impels the poet to make the voyage as the means to overcome
this fallen-ness:
. . . The yearning [of the poet] for w h a t is alien-to-home for t h e sake of
becoming-at-home in w h a t is proper t o [his homeland] is the essential
law of [Being-as-] mittence b y which t h e poet . . . is com-mitted. . . . 2 1

to his poetic destiny.
Moment II - To know the Source as Source, the poet must
first follow its streams down to the sea, there to discover for the
first time its affluence. In fact, the Source becomes an affluence
only when it is experienced as Source. To appreciate his native
soil as a homeland because it is close to the Source (Nahe zum
Ursprung), he must first know the land of the Greeks and there
« HD, pp. 83-84. Cf. p. 89 (tapfer Vergessen).
80 " . . . denn es ist ein Grundzug des Dichtens dieses Dichters, weil ihm die
Wanderschaft in die Fremde wesentlich bleibt für die Heimkehr in das eigene Gesetz
seines dichterischen Gesanges. .
(HD, p. 79). See pp. 87 (Heimischsein), 89 and
passim (Aneignung des Eigenen).
21 " . . . Die Liebe zum Unheimischsein umwillen des Heimisch Werdens im Eigenen
ist das Wesensgesetz des Geschickes, durch das der Dichter in die Gründung der
Geschichte des 'Vaterlandes' geschickt wird. . ( H D , p. 83).
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be "almost burnt up" by the fire of Being. But at every point of
the voyage, Being remains near, guiding his journey, and whatever attracts him abroad does so because of its affinity with
home, helping him to understand more and more what is proper
to his nature. Finally, the heavenly fire itself lets him understand that it must be brought back with him, if the native land
is to be really home:
. . . T h e fire has let him experience t h a t it itself m u s t b e b r o u g h t b a c k
f r o m abroad into the homeland in order t h a t t h e r e t h i s proper endowment, t h e facility for clear exposition, can release its n a t i v e powers
in relation t o t h e fire. . . .

and produce poetry of proper depth.22
Note that we have here an experience of Being that is dominated and determined by Being itself. The poet only submits to
it. On the other hand, the fact that the poet is almost consumed
by the fire indicates that he is not meant for sheer exposure to
Being as such but must return to the shade of the homeland
where a gentle coolness, which comes with beings that by their
limitation temper Being, protects the poet from its blazing
heat.23
Moment III - It is not the journey abroad as such that brings
the poet to maturity but rather the return home enriched by his
experience. It is just such a return that "Homecoming" describes,
for now " . . . the homeland opens up and gestures toward what
is its proper possession, so that [now] it can be made [the poet's]
own. . . . " 24 He realizes that what he sought all along is already
at home, but now is comprehended for itself. It is now that the
poet understands that if on his journey, when no longer near to
his Source, he was almost burned up by the fire of Being, nevertheless, without this experience of fire, even his native endowment for facile exposition would not have been liberated
1 8 1 1 . . . Das Feuer bat ihn erfahren lassen, daß es selbst aus der Fremde in die
Heimat zurückgebracht werden muß, damit dort das Eigene, das Vermögen der
klaren Darstellung, im Bezug auf das Feuer seine Wesenskräfte löse, um sie in das
Darzustellende zu binden
" (HD, p. 89). See HD, pp. 137-138 (Reichtum der
Quelle als Quelle), 78-79 (Land der Griechen), 90 (fast verbrannt), 88 (nur die Mutter),
129 (Widerschein des Eigenen).
" HD, p. 90 (der milden Kühlung).
a * 4 4 . . . In der Befreiung des Eigenen Öffnet sich die Heimat und weist in ihr
Eigentum, damit es angeeignet werde...." (HD, p. g 9 ). See p. 20 (erfahrener).
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completely unto itself. Only when the experience of what is
foreign, sc. fire, and the exercise of his native propensity for
disciplined style are discovered in the unity that is grounded in
a common essence - only then is the poet's poetry mature.25
If we are to understand clearly the full sense of the poet's
homecoming, we must realize that it does not mean taking
possession of his homeland, as if it were personal property to
have and to hold. Rather, it must be conceived as belonging to
the order of movement: it is a passing unto the place of nearness
to, a following of, the Source. But it is a passage that must be
content never to penetrate to the Source and dissolve its mystery,
for insofar as the poet appreciates it as Source, he understands
that it is necessarily self-concealing and therefore continually
evasive. That is why he can never get "at" the Source. As near
as he comes to it, he remains essentially "far." This is the
mystery of Being and the proper disposition of the poet in its
presence is a reverential awe (Scheu), born of the realization that
he can never experience the Source immediately.26
We see here a correlation of nearness and farness that permits
Heidegger a play on words of which he never tires. We understand the terminology in the following way: Being is "far,"
simply because it is not a being and can never be fastened by
There-being in, for or by itself. This is the same thing as saying
that it conceals itself behind the beings to which it gives presence.
Hence, Being-as-source " . . . remains to that degree far-off as
there belongs to itself an essential self-withdrawal. . . . " 27 Being
is "near," because it is that by which beings that are near are
(and, therefore, are near), and, as the Source of all nearness, is
nearer to There-being than anything that is near, even its self.
That is why the Gladsome is nearer than any of the beings that
appear in it. This double aspect of Being-as-source permits us to
resolve the paradoxes with which Heidegger loves to play. For
example: " . . . the essence of nearness appears now to be that
it brings near that which is near insofar as it holds it a f a r . . . , " 28
HD, pp. 14 (begegnet dir schon), 109 (Wesenseinheit, reif).
HD, pp. 113 (zurückgehende Gehen), 138 (Folgen), 124 (Scheu).
27 4 1 . . . Dieses bleibt in dem Grade ferner, als zu ihm selbst ein wesentliches
Sichentziehen gehört.../' (HD, p. 138).
28 " . . . Jetzt dagegen erscheint das Wesen der Nähe darin, daß sie das Nahe
nahebringt, indem sie es fern-hält. .
(HD, p. 23). See pp. 16 (Nahender und näher),
23 (Geheimnis).
25

28
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for the nearness of Being is always re-served, self-concealing.
This paradoxical fusion of nearness and farness is precisely what
is meant by Being in its mystery.
However all this may be, one thing is certain: the following,
passing unto, drawing near to the Source is not an act accomplished once and for all but a process that continues as long
as the poet is poet. The homecoming itself is simply the first
moment of return. It must be sustained by a continued effort
to learn to be "at home" at home, an effort that consists not only
in the initial passage unto a place of nearness to the Source but
in abiding (Bleiben) there in an indefinite whiling, making it a
place of dwelling (Wohnen). " . . . Indeed, even homecoming is
only the beginning of the return to what is the proper domain
[of the poet]. . . . Therefore upon arrival he longs . . . to be able
to abide [there]. . . . " 2 9
To abide thus in nearness to the Source, the poet must keep
always fresh before him what he learned on the long voyage into
the southland, sc. an appreciation of the sense of Being. He
should keep aware of the beginning, the brief sojourns, the
turning-points and the return trip of his voyage:
. . . T h e one condition of becoming-at-home in his proper domain, sc. the
journey abroad, has been fulfilled. B u t this fulfillment remains fulfillment only on the condition t h a t w h a t has been experienced (the glare
and h e a t of the heavenly fire) is preserved. . . . 3 0

But how can it be preserved? Only if the poet re-collects it.
" . . . Abiding comes-to-presence as original re-collection. . . . " 3 1
b. T H E P O E T A N D B E I N G - In order to understand the
import of "re-collection" (Andenken), we are going to use during
the following expose the expanded form: "thinking-upon-whatis-past." Although it is a thinking-back, it must not be conceived as if that which is thought were something that was once
29 " . . . Doch selbst die Heimkunft beginnt nur die Heimkehr in das Eigene.
Deshalb ruft der Angekommene nach dem Becher und verlangt nach dem Bleibenkönnen im Eigenen
" (HD, p. 121). See pp. 137-13^ (Bleiben, Wohnen).
30 " . . . Die eine Bedingung des Heimischwerdens im Eigenen, die Ausfahrt in die
Fremde, ist erfüllt. Aber die Erfüllung bleibt nur Erfüllung, wenn das Erfahrene (die
Helle und die Glut des himmlischen Feuers) bewahrt wird,..." (HD, p. 91). See p.
131 (Beginn, Aufenthalte, Wendepunkt).
81 " . . . Das Bleiben west als das ursprüngliche Andenken.,."
(HD, p. 141).
Heidegger's italics.
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and is no more, simply made present by the act of remembrance
and nothing more. Such a thought must be understood in terms
of its three different dimensions (directions): past, future,
present.
i. The Past - The past upon which the poet must think in
order to abide near the Source is a past that still comes-topresence and works its influence upon him. It is a past that still
is-as-having-been. In the present case, the past is the experience
of the heavenly fire (Being) that the poet made on his journey
into foreign lands. By reason of his thinking upon it, the experience is as vital to him now as when he made it. 32
"The thinking-upon-the-past is a hailing. . . . M 33 It is through
this metaphor of "greeting," "saluting" that Heidegger in Hölderlin's name elaborates the sense of what it means to think
upon what-is-as-having-been. For if we meditate the essence of
what it means to "hail," we discover a certain self-surrender on
the part of the one-who-hails to the one-who-is-hailed. Hail-er
enters into the hail only enough to say that he defers completely
to the hailed. He lets the hailed shine-forth in the light proper
to its own essence and unfold in the nobility proper to itself. In
a word, he lets it be! Furthermore, there is a reciprocity in authentic (echte) hailing. Hailed accepts the hail and the very
acceptance is reply. " . . . The hailed as the hailed now hails the
hail-er in turn. . . . " 34
Now if the poet hails the past as his way of thinking-upon-it,
the same reciprocity takes place. When the poet turns his
thoughts to what-is-as-having-been, then in these thoughts
themselves the past flows back, becoming warp and woof of his
thought, even as he thinks it. Hence, by reason of his thinkingupon-that-which-is-past, the past imposes itself upon him under
the guise of his own thinking itself. " . . . The heavenly fire imposes itself on him who hails it as [his own] thought and abides
near him as that which comes-to-presence in . . . what-ispast. . . . " 35
HD, pp. 79-80, 91, n o (Gewesene).
"Das Andenken ist ein G r ü ß e n . . ( H D , p. 91).
34 " . . . Das Gegrüßte grüßt jetzt als das Gegrüßte den Grüßenden wieder,
(HD, p. 92).
85 " . . . Das himmlische Feuer denkt sich selbst dem Grüßenden zu und bleibt
ihm nahe als das Wesende des göttlich Gewesenen. .
(HD, p. 110).
88
88
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it. The Future - If what-is-past still comes-to-presence in
the poet's thinking-upon it and as this thinking, is it not
something still-to-come as well as having-been, perhaps even an
abiding past because it is a future ?
. . . If the thinking-upon-what-is-past allows the p a s t [to follow the l a w
of] its o w n essence . . . ,

t h e n w e experience t h a t what-is-past, in

its

return t h r o u g h [our] thinking upon it, swings out over o u r present a n d
comes t o us as a future. A l l a t once our t h i n k i n g - u p o n - w h a t - i s - a s - h a v i n g been m u s t consider this past as something-not-yet-unfolded.

...88

What is it that is thus the poet's future, still coming to him as
he thinks upon what-is-past ? It is the Holy itself (Being) in continual ad-vent. The Holy is clearly the poet's past, for it is by
reason of the Holy's hail to him that he emerges-into-presence
as a poet and is now as having thus come to be on the great
festal day. That is why to think-upon-the-past is to think upon
this festal day. According to a different metaphor, it is the light
of the Holy " . . . that bestowed itself upon the poet through his
journey to foreign lands, and as this bestowal still comes-topresence in the poet's hailing of what is past. . . . " 37
But the Holy is also the poet's future, for it was on the festal
day when he was born to his poetic destiny that " . . . the Open
lit itself up for him so that he saw that coming to him which his
[own] word must utter: the Holy. . . . " 38 The Holy comes to him
as the primordial Poem that is before and for his own poetizing,
Poem which he must then fashion into human words. It imposes
itself upon him as the pattern of poetical thoughts that he himself must think. For the poet, to think-upon-what-is-past is to
think upon what is coming to him as future, and, conversely, to
think upon what is coming is to think upon what is past. The

s® " . . . Wenn das Denken an das Gewesene diesem sein Wesen läßt und sein
Walten durch eine übereilte Verrechnung auf eine Gegenwart nicht stört, dann erfahren wir, daß das Gewesene bei seiner Rückkunft im Andenken über unsere Gegenwart sich hinausschwingt und als ein Zukünftiges auf uns zukommt. Plötzlich muß
das Andenken das Gewesene als ein Noch nicht-Entfaltetes denken
" (HD, p. 95).
Heidegger's italics.
87 " . . . Dem glänzenden Licht des Heiligen, das sich dem Dichter bei der Ausfahrt
in die Fremde geschenkt hat, und das als dieses Geschenk im Grüßen des Gewesenen
noch w e s t , . . ( H D , pp. 111-112). See HD, p. 101 (das Kommende).
88 " . . . das Offene sich lichtet, so daß der Dichter das kommen sieht, was sein
Wort sagen muß: das Heilige...."
(HD, p. 98). Heidegger's italics.
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poet's task is to think upon both what is coming and what is past,
or rather upon the Holy itself which is the unity of both.39
Hi. The Present - Heidegger speaks about the poet's past
and future but never explicitly about his present. We are left to
conjecture what this could mean, but there seems little doubt
as to how it must be understood. For when the Holy as primordial Poem continues to come (future) to the poet who is poet
precisely as having-been-hailed into his poetic Being by the
Holy itself (past), the poet's task is to render present (present)
the Holy in the words of his song. This he does to the extent
that he learns in an abiding way to be at home near the Source.
More precisely, for the poet to be "at home" in what is properly his own means that he learns to use his native propensity for
clear exposition with an authentic freedom of spirit. Now in his
initial situation close to the Source, but where he was unable to
appreciate it as Source and was, therefore, prone to regard what
proceeds from the Source as the Source itself, the poet tended to
make use of such beings in his poetry with a freedom that was
not authentic, treating them as mere entities of which in his
poetry he could take possession by forcing them into patterns
at will. Through the experience he has had of the heavenly fire
of Being, however, which still comes to him out of the past, he
has discovered a new depth in these beings and a new dimension
for his poetic creativity. He understands now that to achieve
his poetic essence and give full value to his native endowment,
this clarity of exposition must be suffused with the glowing
warmth of the heavenly fire itself. This is a great liberation for
him, because it frees his talents from their slavery to the ontic
and releases them unto their authentic fullness, which consists,
indeed, in clearly exposing that alone which warrants exposure:
the heavenly fire of the Holy. " . . . [The poet] exercises [his]
native endowment, the clarity of exposition, 'freely' only then,
when what is clear in his utterance is permeated by the open
experience of that which is exposed. . . . " 40
8® HD, pp. 107-108 (vor, für), 116 (zudenkt), 133 (Geweseue im Künftigen), 100
(Ankunft [im] Gewesenen), 115 (einmütigen Denken an das Gewesene . . . Kommende),
141 (von wo aus, wohin zurück).
40 " . . . Das Eigene, die Klarheit der Darstellung, gebraucht er nur dann 'frei',
wenn das Klare des Sagens bestimmt ist durch das offene Erfahren des Darzustellenden
" (HD, p. i n ) . Cf. HD, p. 112 (den freien Gebrauch).
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In this liberation of his proper gifts, the homeland itself opens
up to the poet and points to its treasures so that now he may
assume them as his own. " . . . N o w our flowers and our
woodlands bestow upon him the joy that consists essentially in
sheltering what is true [in these things]. . . . " 4 1 Now the truthsheltering joy is entrusted to the poet, who by the genuinely free
use of his native talent lets them appear as what they are.
Letting beings appear as what they are means exposing them
in their truth, their beauty, in the Beon (Seyn) by which they
are. 42 This is done by the poetic word. The poetic word must fit
the dazzling light of the Holy which comes to the poet out of the
past and shines in the things he meets upon his homecoming. As
such, it is a word of "hailing," inasmuch as it greets what is past;
at the same time, it is a "prophetic" word, inasmuch as it articulates that which is coming; and both for the same reason, because it seeks to utter past and future in their original correlation, the Holy as such. Such a word can be uttered only if the
poet has learned to use his native talent with a freedom that is
genuine. This means that, in casting his poems into form, he
" . . . more and more exclusively adjusts himself to the state of
being open to what is intimated to him, of being alert for thatwhich-is-coming. . . . The sober, observant openness for the Holy
is at the same time . . . the power to abide in what is proper to
himself. . . . " «
c. SCHOLIA - There are some general observations to be
made in the light of what we have just seen, which, despite a
certain inner coherence, do not admit readily of logical sequence.
i. The Poetic Dialogue - One special form that thinking-uponthe-past takes is worth special mention: the poetic dialogue
(Gespräch). This is conceived as taking place between the poet
4 1 " . . . J e t z t schenken unsere Blumen und unsere Wälder die Freude, deren
Wesen es ist, das Wahre zu behüten
" (HD, p. 89). Heidegger's italics.
42 HD, p. 127. Heidegger uses occasionally the older German spelling Seyn (as
does Hölderlin). We render it by the A S form of Being: Beon. Alternative: Beyng.
The import appears later.
43 " . . . Den freien Gebrauch des eigenen Vermögens lernen, heißt, sich immer
ausschließlicher fügen in das Offensein für das Zugewiesene, in die Wachsamkeit
auf das Kommende. . .. Die nüchtern aufmerkende Offenheit für das Heilige ist . . .
das Bleibenkönnen im Eigenen. .
(HD, p. 112). See HD, pp. 119 (im freien Gebrauch des Wortes), 111-112 (sich fügen), 96 (Grüßen), 108 (prophetisch).
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and his "friends/' but it is of such a nature that it can take place
in him alone. For what characterizes dialogue as such is not that
one person listens to what another says. This is the case only in
a spoken dialogue, and the duality is conditioned by the fact
that the physical organs of hearing and speech happen to be
separated. When dialogue is considered in its origins, hearing
and speaking are seen to be unified.
For the fundamental structure of the dialogue is identical with
the process of the poetical thinking-upon-the-past. After the
Holy hails the poet into Being, the Holy continues to come
(future) to the poet who has-been-hailed (past). When the poet,
in turn, hails the Holy, he hails the still-coming-past, whereby
the past, thus hailed, returns upon him in his thoughts themselves, imposing itself upon him as the texture of these thoughts.
This situation where the poet is turned toward (ad-tendere) Being,
hailing it inasmuch as he is hailed by it, we have called already
the power of "attending" (Hörenkönnen) to Being, the origin of
all "hearing." But the Holy as past and future becomes present
only insofar as the poet utters it in words. This is the origin of
utterance (Sagen)**
The ultimate unity of attending and utterance which constitutes dialogue in its origin derives from the unity of past-futurepresent in the unity of time. Authentic dialogue between
"friends" is the encounter between two different spirits which
permits both to think upon that which all thought should think,
sc. what-is-past. Their thinking-upon-the-past, then, is accomplished together, so that what is attended to and what is
uttered are but one. But what happens when the "friends" are
no longer together? Does dialogue become impossible? Not at
all, we are told, but it does take a different form. 45 What this
different form will be we are left to surmise. Let us leave the
matter for a moment and return to it below.
it. Poetry and Ground - We have seen that Being-as-source
enjoys a certain steadfastness that is best conceived if we consider it under the metaphor of ground, provided we remember
that Being-as-ground is not a static but a dynamic thing, simul46

HD, p. 1x7.
HD, pp. 1x9 (Gesagte und Gehörte das Selbe), 130 (andere Art).
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taneously entitled to the name "Source." We know, too, that it
is by thinking-upon-what-is-past that the poet "abides" near
the Source. We wish now to understand more clearly the relation
between the poet's abiding and the Source when it is conceived
as Ground.
When we say that the poet abides near the Source, we mean
that having traced the streams back to their origin he keeps
following the Source, even though he keeps realizing that he
cannot get " a t " it completely, for it is of such a nature as always
to evade him. Now to abide by such a Source means not to dissolve its mystery but to follow the Source in such a way that
the nearer he comes to it, the better he comprehends and manifests the fact that the distance between himself and the Source
as such never can be traversed. This is not to unveil the mystery
but to guard and preserve it as mystery. 46
"Pure" nearness to the Source as Source means sustaining
this essential distance (its mystery). It means entering into the
process of self-concealment by which Being remains steadfast
as Source. Now when the poet abidingly makes himself one with
the mysterious process in which Being remains steadfast by
reason of continued self-withdrawal, his own steadfastness
makes common cause with the steadfastness of Being, becomes
"stuck fast," so to speak, in Being-as-ground. In other words,
he plays a part in the process by which Being-as-origin becomes
manifest, and in this sense he does what lies within his power to
let Being be Origin, sc. to "origin-ate" Being. This phenomenon
we already have called "origin-ation" (Stiften). We must insist,
however, that this origin-ation does not "make" Being-as-source
in any sense that idealism can give to this term. But on the other
hand, it does not find Being before it either, as some ready-made
entity. Origin-ation means to let Being appear as Source-Ground.
But since Being is Ground because it is a (continually recessive)
Source that lets beings emerge-into-presence (appear), then to
the extent that the poet lets the Source of all appearing appear
as itself (as mystery), he helps it come-to-pass as Ground, therefore according to his measure "grounds" it. 47
4«

See HD, p. 23.
HD, pp. 138-139 (Erfestigung, Stiften, Zeigen), 135, 139 (Festmachen, sich
erfestigt, festhalten).
47
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How does the poet achieve this? Recall what it means to
"abide": it means for the poet to render continuous his homecoming by constantly thinking-upon-what-is-past. In other
words, it means thinking upon the Holy as still coming to him
(future) whom the Holy itself already has hailed (past) to articulate the Holy now (present) in words. The poet thus achieves
perfect liberty in the use of his native talent by suffusing form
with fire. When all is said and done, the poet origin-ates Beingas-ground when he achieves authentic utterance. As the half-god
inhabiting a privileged domain in-between the gods and men:
. . . the poet manifests the Open of this in-between [-state] wherein he
himself first must dwell, insofar as his utterance, b y manifesting the
Source, [thereby] follows it and thus [comes to] abide [near it], an abiding
that becomes steadfast in the Holy that [now] must come into words. . . . 4 8

W e must add to this an important supplementary remark.
Through all this discussion of the coming-to-pass of Ground, one
is struck by the constant resonance of the language and perspectives of WG, which, as we saw, were fundamentally faithful
to the principal themes of SZ. In SZ, the fundamental structure
of There-being, the coming-to-pass of truth, consisted in the
three existential components, unified in the single process of
concern, whose own well-spring is the unity of time. In WG, the
problem of ground was seen to be the problem of truth, and the
coming-to-pass of ground was composed of a three-fold dynamic
(the "triplex strewing of ground") whose unity likewise arises
out of the unity of time. In the present essays we have the
following data:
In the first place, we have seen how, by this abiding near the
Source in manifesting it as mystery, the poet joins forces, so to
speak, with Being-as-origin so as to help origin-ate it, and, indeed, to help ground (ergründen) Being-as-ground. As such, this is
a thinking upon the Holy and its primordial Poem. Does not
this concord substantially with the sense of the project of World
that is a laying-claim to untrammelled possibility? If the two
48 " . . . Der Dichter zeigt dieses Offene des Zwischen, worin er selbst zuerst
wohnen muß, dadurch, daß sein Sagen zeigend dem Ursprung folgt und so das
Bleiben ist, das sich in das Heilige festigt, das in sein Wort kommen s o l l . . ( H D ,

p. 140).
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contexts are completely different, the author's word for both
phenomena is the same: Stiften. For a man such as Heidegger,
who uses language with such rigor, this fact alone, even with
allowances for the Hölderlin original, is not unimportant.
Furthermore, the second component of WG's groundingprocess is suggested quite clearly, not so much in terms of the
poet's captivation by beings as in terms of the open-ness to Being
in the order of affectivity. In SZ we called this the ontological
disposition. The same problematic appeared in WW, where
"attunement" in There-being is seen to be a mode by which
beings-in-the-ensemble are disclosed. Furthermore, this affective disposition has been seen to disclose the negativity of
There-being, so that we could call it the "component of finitude"
in There-being. In analysing the process of poetizing now we
find once more the fundamental importance for the poet of
"attunement," plus a correlation between this attunement and
Being as negatived.
The poet's attunement takes different forms according to the
different ways in which Being is conceived: joy in the presence
of the Joyous; dread in the presence of Being as the Extraordinary or as the Non-actual, discerned by the poet in his inbetween condition; wonderment and awe before the Extraordinary; reverence and awe in the presence of Being as the
Holy and Source. The sum total of such dispositions constitutes
the affective temper of his poetic soul. Whatever the form that
attunement takes, it seems clear that what ultimately determines it to be what it is is not the poet but Being itself that
is thus disclosed in it. It is Being, by virtue of the fact that it
hails the poet, that "calls the tune" of his attunement, and his
function is to reverberate accordingly. 49
What strikes us, however, is that the attunement of which
there is question here discloses Being in its negativity, sc. in the
mystery of its self-concealment. This is particularly apparent
in the two most important forms of attunement that we find
mentioned in the essays: joy and awe. " . . . Joy in poetizing
[consists] in knowing that in every joyous being that already is
encountered, the Joyous hails [the poet] insofar as it holds itself
4® HD, pp. 24-25 (Freude), 97, 98 (Erschrecken), 97 (Erstaunen, Scheu), 101, 124
(Scheu), 116 (Gemüt), 117 (Stimme), 99 (in Bestimmung schwingt).
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in re-serve. . . . " 50 If a poet knows sorrow, this is a correlative
of joy, inasmuch as it derives from the reserved character as
such of the Holy. " . . . Awe [consists] in knowing that the
Source does not admit of an immediate experience. . . . " 5 1 In
both cases, the attunement discloses Being, but in its finitude.
In the same sense and more explicitly still, we are told that the
condition of poetic intoxication (Trunkenheit), which is the most
sublime form of attunement, brings the poet to that lucidity
" . . . wherein the depths of concealment are opened up and
darkness appears as the sister of clarity. . . . " 5 2 We infer that,
if attunement plays an essential role in the process of poetizing,
one reason is that it discloses in a special way the properly
mysterious (negative) character of the Being that must be
brought into words.
The third component of the coming-to-pass of ground likewise
may be disengaged from the text. For if the sense of the existential, logos, is to let-be-seen, and if this may be interpreted
as a founding of ontic truth by letting beings be seen in their
ontological dimension, is this not precisely what happens when the
poet manifests the Holy in words, once he becomes "at home"
in what is proper to himself: disciplined form suffused with
celestial fire? Slowly the logos of SZ is being transformed into
the power of authentic speech.
Finally, the three components of poetizing, when interpreted
as the coming-to-pass of ground, are gathered into the unity of
the single process which is the poet's concern. Whether we describe it now as a thinking-upon-the-past whose attunement is
awe, or as an abiding in joy by putting into words his nearness
to the Joyous that is always re-served, the sense is always the
same: to guard the mystery of Being by giving it an authentic
utterance. This is the only concern of the poet:

" . . . Die dichtende Freude ist das Wissen davon, daß in allem Freudigen, das
schon begegnet, das Freudige grüßt, indem es sich s p a r t . . ( H D , p. 25). Cf. US,
pp. 269, 234-235 (Trauer-Freude).
81 " . . . Die Scheu ist das Wissen, daß der Ursprung sich nicht unmittelbar erfahren l ä ß t . . ( H D , p. X24).
** 44 ... Die Trunkenheit hebt in die lichte Klarheit, in der die Tiefe des Verborgenen sich öffnet und die Dunkelheit als die Schwester der Klarheit erscheint..
(HD, p. 113).
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So it is that the joy of the poet is in truth the concern of the bard whose
song guards the Joyous in re-serve and lets what he has sought be in [its]
nearness to him, [though] in a nearness that is [to be sure] re-served. . . . 5 3

Such a concern, however, identified as it is with thinking-uponthe-past (unity of past, future and present) has its ultimate
Source in time.
If this correlation that we have suggested between the process
of ground in the Hölderlin interpretations and in SZ-WG is
valid, is there any difference between them? Of course: the
difference between Heidegger I and Heidegger II.
Hi. Poet and People - The present essays make abundantly
clear that the poet is never poet for himself alone - he is essentially a "man of the people." For every man, and this is a
fundamental thesis of Hölderlin that Heidegger makes his own,
has a poetic nature: " . . . in poetic fashion/Dwelleth man upon
the earth." 54 Provisionally, we take this to mean that every
man, despite the fact that he is first of all and for the most part
preoccupied with beings that he can control, remains nevertheless open unto Being in such a way that he can and should respond to it by authentic utterance, and this as an abiding state
in which he dwells. We take this to be the sense of "in poetic
fashion," or simply "the poetical" as such. But the difference
between the poet of vocation and ordinary men - the "sons of
earth," his "countrymen" - is this: ordinary men need someone
to show them the way to be " a t home" in the homeland,
someone to go abroad and seek the experience of the heavenly
fire and, returning, open-up for them the sense of their own
nearness to the Source. The poet is a "sign" before his fellow
men. 55
Obviously, if the poet is to help the "sons of earth" comprehend their poetical nature, he must at first become "at home"
in the law of his poetic task, hence learn to abide in a place of
nearness to the Source where he makes a permanent dwelling.
68 "Darum ist die Freude des Dichters in Wahrheit die Sorge des Sängers, dessen
Singen das Freudigste als das Gesparte hütet und das Gesuchte in der sparenden
Nähe nahe sein läßt." (HD, p. 25). See pp. 124 (Scheu-Denkens), 24 (Heimischwerden).
54 "Voll Verdienst, doch dichterisch wohnet / Der Mensch auf dieser Erde."
(Hölderlin, "In lieblicher Bläue blühet". . .). Cited HD, p. 84.
66 HD, p. 116 With the whole present treatment, cf. pp. 43-44-
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In this dwelling-place he joins in the process of the coming-topass of ground, thereby origin-ates, after his fashion, the Origin
and thereby accomplishes in himself an authentic poetizing.
This poetic Ground that he thus has gained for himself becomes
accessible to his countrymen simply because he is one of them.
" . . . The dwelling of the poet that origin-ates [Being-as-origin]
points out and consecrates the Ground [on which] the sons of
earth poetically may dwell. . . . " 5 6
iv. Poet and History - Insofar as the process of poetizing involves a thinking-upon-what-is-past that comports the three
directions of past-present-future, clearly the process is a temporal one. Time is the foundation of history, and therefore the
process of the poet's concern is as profoundly historical as it is
temporal. The law, too, which dictates this tri-dimensional
structure of his poetic function, sc. which demands that he voyage
abroad to experience what is foreign to his initial situation, then
return, then learn to be " a t home" in his native land by thinking
in abiding fashion on his experience - this law is the "law of
[his] historicity." "
What is the ultimate source of the poet's historicity and
history? It is the Source itself, the Holy, which hails him to his
poetic charge on the festal day when he is born, Being-asmittence, whose emitting bids him fulfill the commitment, dictated by the law of his poetic destiny, to form Being into words.
When the poet responds to his vocation and helps to ground
Being-as-ground, origin-ating the Origin as best he can by
letting it become manifest, he grounds thereby his own history.
Yet he does not do this for himself alone, since he is essentially
a man of the people. Just as he establishes the Ground on which
other men may dwell in poetic fashion, he grounds, too, the
history of his people:
. . . The festal day emitted b y the Holy remains the origin of history. . . .
If, however, the festal day is the origin from which the essence of a
people's history derives, and if the poet proceeds from this day, then the

8a " . . . Das stiftende Wohnen des Dichters weist und weiht dem dichterischen
Wohnen der Erdensöhne den Grund
" (HD, p. 143). See pp. 90 (zuvor im Gesetz
seines Wesens), 140 (zugleich Kinder des Himmels).
87 HD, pp. 90, 110 (Gesetz der Geschichtlichkeit).
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poet becomes he who grounds the history of a people. He makes ready
that poetical condition whereon a historical people dwells as upon its
[own] Ground. . . , 5 8

What is history in the sense that the natural manner of
thinking conceives it, sc. as the history of peoples? Here Heidegger achieves a subtlety impossible to translate. The German
uses the prefix Ge- to suggest plurality gathered into unity: v.g.
where Berg means "mountain," the Ge-birg means a "range of
mountains." Now Geschichte ("history"), Heidegger says, is Geschickt, where we are to understand a gathering-into-unity (Ge-)
of those moments wherein Being e-mits ([sich] schickt) unto poet
and folk the com-mitment to achieve the poetic destiny. 59 We
translate this (Geschicke-Geschichte) as "inter-mittence."
From all this, we infer: that the process of poetizing is original
time and original, origin-ating history; that for the poet himself,
his history is grounded insofar as he grounds himself in the
Ground that is Being, by joining in the process that lets Being
be manifest as Ground; that for his people, their history is
grounded insofar as through his example and with his help they
achieve their poetic destiny by learning the authentic use of
language as a people; that the history of a people taken as a
whole is the gathering into sequential unity of the various
manners in which Being has disclosed itself to a folk (poet plus
people).60 The consequences of this are, of course, obvious. All
authentic poetry must be historical; a people's language plays
an essential röle in this people's history. Being maintains its
primacy in the coming-to-pass of history. Such variations of the
poetic process as authentic dialogue are likewise profoundly
historical.
v. Poet and Re-solve - We have spoken much of the function
68 " . . . Das vom Heiligen zuerst geschickte Fest bleibt der Ursprung der Geschichte . . . . Wenn aber das Fest der Wesensursprung der Geschichte eines Menschentums ist, und wenn der Dichter dem Fest entstammt, dann wird der Dichter zum
Gründer der Geschichte eines Menschentums. Er bereitet das Dichterische, darauf
als seinem Grunde das geschichtliche Menschentum w o h n e t . . . . " (HD, p. 101).
Heidegger's italics.
5® HD, p. xox.
60 Does the authentic use of language exhaust the ways in which Being discloses
itself? See HD, p. 83, where the Greek tc6Xi<; is designated " . . . der vom Heiligen
bestimmten Wesensstätte der Geschichte...." This poses the problem of the relation
between language and other beings, but we are not yet in a position to discuss it.
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which the poet as poet is com-mitted to fulfill. We know that he
is hailed into this function by Being, that the song he must sing
is formulated already in Being itself and imposed upon him as
that which must be uttered. Thus far, everything proceeds from
Being. We wish now to bring into sharper focus the exact nature
of this function, insofar as it proceeds from the poet. To be sure,
it comes-to-presence as a profoundly temporal thinking-uponthe-past, but what precise attitude in the poet himself sets the
process in motion ?
In the simplest terms, it is a willing by which the poet consents to the law of his poetic destiny. We find the first evidence
of this consent in the poet's (Hölderlin's) opening address to the
north wind as "the most beloved wind of all." Heidegger understands this "love" to consist in "willing" that this wind be, and
that it be the kind of wind that it is. The poet accepts the north
wind according to its nature and makes his own will one with
it. 6 1
But what is the nature of the north wind? It is the emissary
that bears Being's original hail to the poet that com-mits him
to his poetic nature. " . . . B y standing forth in the blowing of the
north wind, the poet [becomes] hailed by the hail of the
Holy. . . . " 6 2 In hailing him thus, the north wind illumines for
him his situation, assuring him of the nature of his com-mitment.
This hail to the poet comes by a noiseless voice that bids him
achieve his poetic destiny. And all this transpires in the poetic
essence itself (though obviously not of itself) and constitutes the
law of this nature, inscribed in it by Being as coming to the
essence through its emissary and dictating the terms according
to which this nature can achieve itself. 63
The poet accepts these terms in endorsing with his own will
the law of his nature. He wills to accept the com-mitment to
which Being-as-mittence has com-mitted him. His will, in this
case, is the " . . . deliberate readiness for [his] appurtenance to
the mittence [of Being]. . . . " 64 He wills, then, what Being, still
« HD, p. 8i ("Der liebste unter den Winden / Mir,...")
82 " . . . Der Dichter, im Wehen des Nordost stehend, ist der Gegrüßte des Grußes
des Heiligen
" (HD, p. 101).
M HD, pp. 94 (aufheitert), 82 (Wesensschickung), 117 (lautlose Stimme), 82 (sich
in das Geschick finden, Wille "des" Kommenden).
" . . . die wissende Bereitschaft für die Zugehörigkeit in das Geschick....'*
(HD,p. 82).
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coming to him, bids (heißt). This deliberate readiness to fulfill
the com-mitment to which Being has destined him Hölderlin
expresses chiefly by a familiar metaphor, sc. that of "hail." If
Being com-mits the poet to his situation by hailing him into
Being, the poet expresses his readiness to appertain to the
process by a hail of reply. He has recognized the time of Being's
coming. If the north wind has brought Being's hail, it is the north
wind he hails in turn, but as already having constituted him in
what he is. In the poet's responding hail to the north wind, then,
he greets his own past. That is why the same emissary that
serves as Being's emissary to the poet (by which Being comes to
him as his future) becomes in turn the poet's emissary by which
he hails the past. 65
Now we are in the position of considering the poet's hail to the
past as proceeding from him. But we have seen already how the
past, when thus hailed, swings back upon the poet, imposing
upon him what thoughts and affective dispositions he must have.
Coming to the poet in this fashion, the past is once again the
future. We see clearly how complete is Being's primacy in the
whole process: Being-as-hailing is the poet's future; Being-ashailed is the poet's past, which imposes the thoughts he must
think. The intermediary between Being-as-future and Being-aspast is the emissary of Being itself, the north wind. What comes
from the poet ? Only the willingness that it be so. 66
Such is the structure of the poet's thinking-upon-the-past.
We can discern it again in that privileged form of re-collection
which is the poetic dialogue. For through this are uttered the
thoughts that lie deep in the poet's heart. These thoughts are
what the heart "desires" by reason of the determination within
its very essence. Such thoughts as these are the primordial Poem
of the Holy, disclosed to the poet on the great festal day as that
which he must bring into words. Such was his com-mitment.
Through the dialogue, he thinks upon this visitation that still
perdures (past) in him, and for his part he wills that it be so. He
acquiesces in his destiny and, consenting to it thus, he brings
into words (present) that which is still coming to him (future):
HD, pp. 90 (Zeit . . . anerkannt), 101 (läßt das Gewesene grüßen).
•• HD, p. 94 ("geht" fort).

65
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What the poet wills is that which is willed [by the Holy] in the desires
that spring from the foundations [of his heart], sc. his com-mitment. This
com-mitment does not come to the poet [simply] because he wills it,
but . . . because [this] is the still unarticulated Poem . . . of the Holy.
[That is why] he must desire [it] poetic-wise [as] that-which-is-[still-]
coming. . . . 6 7

Past, future and present fuse into the single structure of the
poetic dialogue, because the poet lets it be so.
There is one more important point to make. The nature of the
poetic destiny to which the poet consents is such that he must
show forth Being-as-source insofar as it continually recedes and
thus becomes steadfast Ground. B y thinking-upon-the-past, he
abides near the Source without ever hoping to traverse the
measureless distance that separates him from it. It is thus that
he respects the mystery of the Source and, according to his
means, articulates the mystery in words. 68 For him to consent
to his poetic nature is to consent to this law of Being's disclosure
that is fulfilled in him, law dictated to Being by reason of its
own negativity.
May we not discern in all this the fundamental structure of
what we have learned to call "re-solve"? Reduced to its essentials, this may be understood as that freely adopted attitude
of There-being by which it consents to its own situation that it
be a process in which Being becomes manifest, but according to
the law of finitude. This consent achieves authenticity. In SZ,
There-being is transcendence, because it is the power to project
Being; here the poet is a power through which Being is originated. In SZ, the complete negativity of There-being is symbolized by its thrown-ness; here the poet is com-mitted to a poetic
destiny insofar as he is "thrown" by Being. In SZ, the voice of
conscience calls There-being to achieve itself; here the noiseless
voice of the north wind bids the poet achieve his poetic task. In
SZ, response to the voice of conscience consists in There-being's
willingness to be called; here the poet's response to Being's hail
is his willingness to be hailed. In SZ, There-being's achievement
®7 "Was der Dichter will, ist das im wesentlichen Wünschen Gewollte, das Schickliche. Dies kommt nicht, weil es der Dichter will, sondern der Dichter muß das
Kommende dichtend wünschen, weil es das unvordichtbare Gedicht, der Traum des
Heiligen, ist
" (HD, p. 119). Heidegger's italics. See p. 117 (des Herzens Meinung).
®8 HD, pp. 138-139 (Grund), 23-25 (Geheimnis).
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of itself is the attaining of authenticity; here the poet's achieving
of the poetic function consists in making his own what is genuinely proper to him. In SZ, the process of concern is grounded
in original time which founds history; here the process of poetizing is tri-directional time, which grounds history for both the
poet and his people. In SZ, the principal method by which Therebeing achieves authenticity as a historical process is through
re-trieve; here the principal method by which the poet achieves
authentic utterance is through thinking-upon-the-past, sc. retrieve. In SZ, the whole process of There-being is the coming-topass of truth in the midst of beings, so that they may be manifest
in their ontological dimension; here the process of poetizing,
taken as a whole, is the coming-to-pass of language in such a
way that form is suffused with fire.
If in all this we were asked to explain how the north wind
metaphor fits into the earlier pattern, would it be possible to
explain it simply by taking it to represent the relation between
Being and There-being as such ? Perhaps this is forcing the evidence. In any case, the general parallelism seems clear. What
would be the principal difference between re-solve in the earlier
work and now? The difference between Heidegger I and Heidegger II.
c.

THOUGHT

All this is very interesting, but what has it to do with thought ?
The problem is hardly thematized in the two essays; references
are relatively rare. With one major exception, we are forced to
work largely in the oblique, but the results are worth-while. The
analysis of the poetic process had central to it a type of thought,
a thinking-upon-the-past, which now we can call once more
"re-collection." Yet a poet's thought must be distinguished
carefully from that of the thinker:
. . . The Extra-ordinary [sc. Being] opens itself up and opens-up the
Open only in poetizing (or in "thinking," but in a manner separated [from
poetry] b y a chasm of difference, and in a time all its o w n ) . . . . 6 9
69 M . . . Das Ungewöhnliche öffnet sich und öffnet das Offene nur im Dichten
M (HD, p.
(oder abgründig davon verschieden und zu seiner Zeit im 'Denken')
97).
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Our task, then, is to try to understand how this "chasm" is to
be understood and what is the "time" proper to thought.
The poet is a man of the people, but he cannot accomplish his
task without help. Even when an authentic word is uttered, as
we know already, there is a risk that in thoughtless repetition it
may lose its power to disclose the Holy and become a "mere"
verbal expression. But once the poet utters it, it becomes common
property, and he can no longer keep it under his protection. He
needs, then, assistance - someone to guard the full import of his
words and help the people comprehend it. Those who help him
thus are his true "kinsmen." They are the thinkers. 70
The thinker apparently is dispensed from that specific aspect
of the poet's concern which consists in uttering the mystery, but
not from all concurrence in the process. If the thinker need not
utter the mystery, he must at least attend to the poetic utterance
so that thereby he may be the first to learn from the poet the
essence of the homeland, sc. what it means to abide near the
Source in its mystery. The thinker, then, must heed the poetic
word, think upon it, so that it be given its proper sense, that this
sense be retained, that it be made perceptible to his less discerning countrymen:
B u t because the word, once uttered, slips away from the protection of the
poet in his concern, it is not easy for him, if he remains alone, to hold fast
in its truth the knowledge he has uttered with regard to . . . the near-ness
[of Being that is continually] in re-serve. That is why he turns to others
who b y [their effort at] re-coUection help [his] poetical word to be understood, so that b y this comprehension the homecoming of every man may
come-to-pass, [although] for each according to the manner of his own
[individual] com-mitment. 71

In the foregoing, we should note in the first place that the
thinker's task, like the poet's, is a re-collection, hence re-trieve.
The past in this case is that disclosure of the Holy that still is-ashaving-been captured in words by the poet. The structure of
such a thought will likewise be temporo-historical and, as such,
HDf pp. 28-29 (Verwandten).
"Weil aber das Wort, wenn es einmal gesagt ist, der Obhut des sorgenden
Dichters entgleitet, kann er nicht leicht das gesagte Wissen vom gesparten Fund und
von der sparenden Nähe allein fest in seiner Wahrheit halten. Darum wendet der
Dichter sich zu den anderen, daß ihr Andenken helfe, das dichtende Wort zu verstehen, damit im Verstehen für jeden je nach der ihm schicklichen Weise die Heimkunft sich ereigne." (HD, pp. 29-30).
70

71
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concerned with the future that is still coming to himself and to
his people through the poet. All that we have said about the
structure of re-collection as a thinking-upon-the-past can be
applied now in a proper way to thought.
Secondly, we should note that what is common to both the
poet's and the thinker's re-collection is that the concern of both
is identical: Being-as-negatived (mystery). What differentiates
them, apparently, is that the poet's principal concern is to utter
Being in words, the thinker's to attend to Being thus revealed
in poetic utterance. This helps a little toward clarity. But when
we realize that the poet, too, must attend to Being before he can
utter it and that the thinker as well must bring it to utterance
after having attended to it, the waters are muddied again.
However this may be, the uttering and attending to Being is
what we have called the original dialogue. 72 We infer, then, that
the kinship that exists between poet and thinker is the same as
that between two partners in the same dialogue. That the
thinker for his part may utter his comprehension of what the
poet has said, as Heidegger has done in these essays, and thus
open up the possibility of extending the dialogue to others (v.g.
ourselves) does not alter the fundamental structure of dialogue
between poet and thinker.
The poet-thinker relation suggests comparison with the creator-conserver relationship in terms of a work of art. We find
the same duality suggested in a completely different context
with the distinction between the making-fast and holding-fast
of Ground. " . . . To be sure, holding-fast is something different
from making-fast. . . . Neither can replace the other. That is
why when it comes to holding-fast what has sprung forth, art
must step back. . . . " 7 3 and yield its place to another. May we
understand "art" here to signify "creation" and "other" to signif y "conservation," sc. thought? Y e t such a hypothesis hardly
squares with the following: Recall that the poet must pass
through a condition of expatriation before becoming re-patriated
HD, pp. 28 (Hingebung zum Selben), 117 (das ursprüngliche Gespräch).
" . . . Freilich das Festhalten ist anderer A r t als das Festmachen. Zu diesem ist
das Höchste notwendig, zu jenem das Strengste. Keines vermag das andere zu ersetzen. Deshalb muß im Hinblick auf das Festhalten des Entsprungenen die Kunst
zurücktreten
" (HD, p. 140).
72
78
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in his native land, where he then abides near the Source as Source.
Now:
„ . . the thinker thinks on the condition of ex-patriation which for him is
not a state of passage but the condition in which he is "at home/' The
thoughtful interrogation of the poet on the other hand poetizes the condition of re-patriation. . . . 7 4

Resume
In " 'Homecoming'" and " 'Re-collection'" we find fully elaborated the conception of poetizing that was discernible already
under a different metaphor in "As when upon a day of rest
In effect, poetizing is a process in which the Holy (Being) addresses the poet and he responds by forming this address into
words. From one point of view (that of Being), the address is a
mittence in which the Holy conceals itself even in revealing itself, sc. is mystery. From the viewpoint of the poet, the response
is a re-collection (re-trieve), temporo-historical in structure,
where Being comes (future) through what is-as-having-been
(past) and is made present in words when the poet accedes to
the hail. This acceding has all the characteristics of re-solve. The
pattern of recollection avails for thought as well as for poetizing,
a fact that accounts for their affinity, even if it cannot as yet
adequately explain their difference.
There are other difficulties, too. How are we to understand a
domination of Being that is nevertheless dependent on Therebeing in order to be Ground, Origin, etc.? How explain the
structure of with-being (SZ affirmed but did not analyse it; HD
supposes but does not explain it) that permits poet-thinker to
ground the history of a people? How explain philosophically the
nature of the experience of Being essential to the poetic process
and here described only in metaphors (voyage, fire, etc.) ? How
explain precisely the difference between the authentic language
of a people which is uttered "in poetic fashion" and the language
of the poet himself as formed into poems, sc. the difference between original poetizing and poesy?

7 4 " . . . Der Denker denkt in das Unheimische, das ihm nicht ein Durchgang,
sondern das tu Hauß ist. Das andenkende Fragen des Dichters dagegen dichtet das
Heimische...." (HD, p. 122). Heidegger's italics.

c h a p t e r

viii

W H A T IS M E T A P H Y S I C S ? :

EPILOGUE

1943 was a prolific year. Besides the concluding part of the
Hegel seminar and the interpretations occasioned by the Hölderlin centenary, the fourth edition of WM appeared with an
important Epilogue, W W (maturing since 1930) reached the
public for the first time and the university lecture courses were
concerned with the pre-Socratics. Of all these, the most significant for our purposes is, perhaps, the famous Epilogue. 1
Fifteen years had passed since WM was delivered and first
published. During this time, the author's thought had matured
and become clarified; there could no longer be any doubt (the
foregoing analyses make it abundantly clear) as to the fundamental direction of his own search for the sense of Being. On the
other hand, criticism born of "misunderstanding" (sc. based
upon an interpretation of the early work that did not correspond
to the direction he himself actually had taken) had been
abundant. Y e t what had the critics to guide them since WM,
except PW, published in war-torn Berlin (1942), and the first
two Hölderlin interpretations, which, taken alone, could present
little more than a riddle ? It was time for a mise au point. The
Epilogue clarifies WM just as the "Letter on Humanism" will
clarify SZ. In fact, we have every right to consider the present
essay as the first draft of HB.

* "Nachwort," WM, pp. 43-51. (Hereafter: WM: Ep).

4 7 4 FROM B E I N G TO T H E R E - T H E RE-TRIEVE OF THOUGHT
A.

THE

ARGUMENT

The Epilogue is structured as a reply to the critics, who, in
one way or another, had claimed: i . that meditation on Nonbeing, as that alone which gives sense to metaphysics, is in
effect a pure nihilism; 2. that an acceptance of anxiety as a
privileged disposition is to raise cowardice to the level of a philosophical virtue by which Being (sc. Non-being) is disclosed; 3.
that the critique of logic is a renunciation of all rigorous thought. 2
If we strip the author's reply down to its essentials, it may be
summarized thus:
1. Non-being is not an Absolute Nothing but Being itself, considered, however, as Other than beings, when beings are taken
as the starting point of the consideration. " . . . This completely
Other to all beings is Non-being. . . . " and " . . . Non-being as the
Other to beings is the veil of Being. . . . " 3
2. The anxiety in question is not an emotional state on the ontic
level of some psychological subject but the most fundamental
modification of the ontological disposition that forms part of
There-being's structure. B y reason of this modification, Being
is disclosed in There-being as Non-being, so that There-being
learns to experience Being in, through and as Non-being. Once
we learn to experience Being for itself, as the Hölderlin interpretations tried to do, sc. without taking beings directly as the
starting point, the fundamental disposition in There-being becomes less anxiety than awe. In any case, acquiescence to
anxiety thus understood, far from being a surrender to pusillanimity, constitutes that stout-hearted open-ness unto Being
that alone can found genuine valor. 4
3. The critique of logic is less a denial of value than an insistence upon limitation, for at best logic is equipped to deal with
beings, not Being. And it is gratuitous to assume that, because
logic can make claim to exactitude in thought, it has a monopoly
2 W M , p. 45.
" . . . Dies schlechthin Andere zu allem Seienden ist das Nicht - Seiende. .
(WM, p. 45). " . . . Das Nichts als das Andere zum Seienden ist der Schleier des
S e i n s . . ( W M , p. 51). Cf. S F , pp. 36-40.
* WM, pp. 46 (das Sein im Nichts erfahren), 47 (Scheu, Tapferkeit). T h e phrase
heimisch bleibt im Bleibenden sets the entire passage in the context of the Hölderlin
analyses.
8
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on all rigor.5 It is with non-logical but rigorous thought that we
are concerned.
Such is "foundational thought," and now in 1943 - let us note
it with due solemnity - the formula in its characteristic sense
finally appears. Clearly in the present text "foundational
thought" designates the effort to "overcome" metaphysics, and
Heidegger insists that such was the purpose of the question that
gave WM its title in the first place. " . . . [The question 'What is
Metaphysics?'] arises from a thinking that already has entered
into the overcoming of metaphysics. . . . " 6 To the extent that
it poses the Being-question, the statement is obviously true; to
the extent that it suggests by innuendo that WM already was
engaged in the thinking of Being in the sense that this conception is elaborated in the rest of the Epilogue, the statement
is misleading, for such thought implies the reversal of 1930: the
passage from Heidegger I, who wrote WM, to Heidegger II, who
writes the Epilogue. B y the same token, the Heidegger of 1943
perceives much more clearly than the Heidegger of 1929 that the
grounding of metaphysics can not be achieved from the "inside"
but only from the "outside," sc. through a complete conquest.
The Nietzsche-analyses had made this clear. Between the text
and the Epilogue there is continuity, to be sure, but the continuity of growth. Let this suffice to indicate how misleading it is
to read WM in its present form as a "book," without adverting
to the difference of level that separates text (1929) from epilogue
(1943) and both from the introduction (1949).
One more point is worth stressing before we go to the problem
of thought itself. The entire drift of the Epilogue is toward an
analysis of that type of thinking which overcomes metaphysics
by meditating Being-as-truth, where truth is, of course, the
process of a-X-rj&eia. B y implication, Being-truth has a sense in
itself, can and must be thought for itself. This need not imply
that Being can ever be by itself, or that the ontological difference
as such is any less important to the author now than before. On
the contrary, it is out of the coming-to-pass of a-XTj&eia that the
ontological difference arises. But as in EM (1935), so, too, here,
WM, pp. 47-48 (Strenge).
" . . . Sie entspringt einem Denken, das schon in die Überwindung der Metaphysik eingegangen ist
" (WM, p. 43). Cf. p. 49 (das wesentliche Denken).
5

6
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the author speaks of thinking Being as if this were a preliminary
question to the interrogation of the ontological difference. Being,
as the Source of all beings (and such certainly is the sense of the
Hölderlin interpretations we have just seen), is conceived as
encompassing them all, therefore as including and giving rise to
the ontological difference. This explains such phrases as: " . . . In
Being, every mittence [unto] beings is in its origin already complete," 7 and the similar remark that appeared in the early pages
of SZ: " . . . Being is the absolutely transcendent. . . . " 8 This
permits us to understand the following remark: " . . . It pertains
to the truth of Being that Being indeed [wohl] comes-to-presence
without beings, [but] that a being never is without B e i n g . . . , " 9
where "comes-to-presence" is taken to be the domination of all
beings by Being-as-truth, which it is the task of thought to
interrogate. Given the context, is there anything surprising
about the remark? Certainly not! The surprise comes in 1949.
B.

THOUGHT

J. The Address of Being
We restrict our remarks to the problem of thought. What
distinguishes Heidegger I from Heidegger II, hence the level of
WM (which also attempted to think Being) from that of the
Epilogue, is the fact that in the latter it is Being that clearly holds
the primacy in disclosing itself. The difference becomes apparent
as soon as we examine the author's treatment of anxiety.
In WM, anxiety was a disposition by which There-being discovers itself in the midst of the ensemble of beings as already
having been attuned to them. It revealed a state of accomplished
fact, There-being's thrown-ness, nothing more. Here anxiety is
an attunement in There-being of which Being itself, so to speak,
calls the tune. For Being has (better, perhaps, is) that noiseless
voice which makes itself heard in There-being, attuning it so
with the attunement of anxiety that There-being may learn, if
7 " . . . Im Sein hat sich anfänglich jedes Geschick des Seienden schon vollendet."
(WM, p. 3X).
* " . . . Sein ist das transcendens schlechthin
" (SZ, p. 38). Heidegger italicizeswhole. Cf. SF, pp. 33, 371 " . . . zur Wahrheit des Seins gehört, daß das Sein wohl west ohne das Seiende,,
daß niemals ein Seiendes ist ohne das Sein." (WM, p. 46).
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it will, to experience Being itself, though under the guise of
Non-being. It is through anxiety that Being lights up in man its
own relation to man's essence. This noiseless voice is a call to
There-being, an appeal that comports its own exigencies but
proceeds from the bounty of Being as an event of great moment.
Y e t this bounty is not free from all indigence, for Being needs its
There in order that " . . . it find its domain in historical humanity. . . , " 1 0 where its truth can be preserved. From this need
arises Being's bestowal of itself on There-being in the self-disclosure through attunement. The function of the bestowal, then,
is to appeal to There-being to take upon itself the charge of
playing watchman to Being-as-truth. The event of truth, then,
is that coming-to-pass by which " . . . Being directs its appeal to
[There-being] for the sake of the truth of Being [itself]. . . . " 1 1
But is all this disclosed to There-being by anxiety? We need
not interpret the author so. Being-as-truth, -bounty, -graciousness (Gunst), -grace (Huld), -appeal, etc. are, after all, more than
Being simply as Non-being. Let us retain: Being's self-disclosure
to There-being takes the form of a voiceless appeal that is made
manifest through There-being's attunement; the attunement
corresponding to Being under the guise of Non-being is anxiety;
to other types of disclosure correspond other forms of attunement,
chief among which is awe; yet even anxiety, in disclosing Nonbeing, reveals inestimable wealth, for it manifests " . . . the
wonder of all wonders: that beings are. ..." 12
1 0 44 . . . d a ß es im geschichtlichen
Menschentum seine Stätte findet
" {WM,
p. 50). See W M , pp. 31 (Gestimmtsein), 46 (Stimme des Seins), 47 (in gelichteten
Bezug), 46 (in Anspruch nimmt).
11
. . des Ereignisses, als welches das Sein den Menschen für die Wahrheit des
Seins in den Anspruch nimmt. . . ( W M , p. 50). See p. 49 (Wächterschaft). We translate Anspruch as " a p p e a l " because: it is a close etymological neighbor to Anspruch
[Ap-pellare, An-sprechen); its ordinary sense is convenient: " t o call upon another to
decide a question, to vindicate one's rights, conduct, taste, e t c . , " i l t o call upon one
earnestly for aid, support, s y m p a t h y , " " t o call forth sympathetic response, to prove
attractive, e t c . " We wish the word to imply: an address to There-being of which
Being is the author; a request, the fulfillment of which makes heavy demands on
There-being; an exigency (Not), which, however, leaves There-being eminently
free.
1 2 41 . . . Einzig der Mensch unter allem Seienden erfährt, angerufen von der Stimme
des Seins, das Wunder aller Wunder: Daß Seiendes ist
" (WM, pp. 46-47).
Heidegger's italics. See p. 47 (Scheu). The negativity of Being's bestowal is not
emphasized here except for the fact that awe (Scheu) carries the nuance of an attunement proper to Being-as-reserved (HD, p. 124), therefore as negatived. As for
the translation of Huld as " g r a c e , " the reason is that Heidegger himself uses Huld
for the Greek
( V A > P- 2 °4)» a n d t h e word in English has a perfectly legitimate
non- theological sense.
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2. The Response of There-being
Being's appeal to There-being is made manifest not in any
of man's faculties but in the depths of his essence, in fact it is the
decisive characteristic of this essence. There-being's response
must be equally profound, equally complete, and come-to-pass
in this essence itself. The coming-to-pass of this response is
foundational thought.
In the most general terms, foundational thought can be described as an acquiescence. Let us examine the author's formulae
separately before trying to say anything more precise:
a. Thought is experience. Thought finds its wellspring in an
"experience of the truth of Being," in which attunement (v.g.
anxiety) plays an essential r61e.13 Further analysis of the nature
of the "experience" is not given. Presumably it is to be inferred
from the other characteristics which follow.
b. Thought is consent. When Being as Non-being makes its appeal to There-being through the mediation of anxiety, Therebeing's response should be a "readiness for anxiety," a willingness
to undergo its rigors that by fulfilling all of Being's exigencies
effectively says "yes" to its appeal thus expressed. 14
c. Thought is self-diffusion. When Being addresses There-being
in more positive fashion than simply as Non-being, There-being's
response is likewise characterized more positively. There-being
"pours itself out" completely in the task Being demands of it,
sc. to give Being a place of disclosure among men. " . . . [Thought]
pours itself out in Being for the sake of the truth of Being.
as this becomes manifest in beings. 15
d. Thought is self-surrender. There-being surrenders its entire
essence to Being's need for this place of disclosure. 16
e. Thought is self-assumption. Being entrusts itself to Therebeing in order that There-being assume the charge of watching
WM, p. 47 (Erfahrung der Wahrheit des Seins).
WM, p. 46 (Bereitschaft für A n p t , Ja).
1 8 " . . . verschwendet es sich im Sein für die Wahrheit des Seins
*« WM, p. 49 (überantwortet, Not).
13

"

" (WM, p. 49).
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over its truth. But this guardianship comes-to-pass by reason
of There-being's relation to Being, which Being itself has established and which constitutes the very essence of There-being.
For There-being to assume this charge, then, means to assume
itself as the ek-sistent relation to Being. It is self-assumption. 17
f. Thought is an echoing of Being. The proper answer of Therebeing to Being's muted voice is to let it reverberate with such
fidelity that There-being's thought is but an echo of this voice,
endorsed, however, by There-being's liberty so that it can be
called There-being's own thought. 18
g. Thought is docility. Such faithful echoing of Being's voice is
a docility to it that is both observant and heedful of its
demands. 19
h. Thought is assistance to Being. It alleviates Being's need for
a place of disclosure in historical humanity and thereby helps it
to be itself. 20
i. Thought is an offering. This self-diffusive surrender to Being
is a gift to Being that belongs to the order of sacrifice. Part of
this sacrifice is the foregoing of attachment to the ontic in order
to be at home in the process of truth that Being is bringing-topass. That is why foundational thought is so foreign to the
reckoning of calculative thinking. That is why, too, it can bring
no tangible success as evidence of its efficacy. Such accoutrements pertain to the order of beings, not Being. For the same
reason, we can speak of thought as a type of noble poverty, because the Being with which it deals is so supremely simple and
intangible. Yet this looks at Being still from the point of view
of beings. In itself, Being is a genuine wealth that thought
possesses only in self-surrender. This paradox of poverty and
wealth is proper to thought as offering. 21
1 7 WM, pp. 49 (Wächterschaft des Seins), 46, 47 (Bezug zum Nichts, Bezug des
Seins zum Menschen).
1 8 WM, p. 49 (Widerhall).
1 9 WM, pp. 50 (aufmerksam, gehorsam), 46 (Achtsamkeit).
20 WM, p. 50 (Stätte, hilft).
2 1 WM, pp. 49-50 (Opfer, Abschied vom Seienden, keine Erfolge, Adel der Armut,
dem Einfachen).
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j. Thought is commerce. Despite its great poverty, thought never
becomes so detached from the ontic level of There-being that it
has nothing to do with beings. On the contrary, it is achieved in
continual intercourse. After all, it is by thought that the truth
of Being is preserved for beings. 22
k. Thought is freedom. The self-surrender involved in Therebeing's offering to Being, though solicited by Being's need for a
place of disclosure among men, is made completely without
constraint, for There-being simply lets Being be in and through
itself. Such letting-be is freedom. What is more, this freedom in
There-being derives from the abyss of all freedom, which is the
non-concealment of Being-as-truth. All that There-being adds
is consent that it be so. The consent suffices to make thought
belong to There-being, yet in another sense we can say that
Being itself, since it is the Source of There-being's freedom and
holds the initiative in the disclosure of truth, is the origin of
thought. " . . . Foundational thinking is an event of Being." 23
1. Thought is thanks. This liberated, liberating self-surrender
of There-being to Being as it comes-to-pass in the event of truth
is more than simply a response to Being's appeal, it is a profound
and total gesture of gratitude - the only fitting one - for this
marvelous bounty. Thought thus understood becomes the wellspring of all gratitude in man. To think in foundational fashion,
then, is to thank: in both cases, There-being accepts; Therebeing reciprocates. 24
m. Thought is a historical process. The point is not thematized,
but it is latent everywhere, insofar as the essence of man, on
whom Being bestows its bounty, is "historical." One sentence,
however, suggests at least that thought here is discerned as
having the same temporal structure as in HD: " . . . F o u n -

22 WM, pp. 50 (Handeln), 49 (für das Seiende). Concerning Handeln, cf. SZ, p.
294 and passim.
23 " . . . Wohl dagegen ist das wesentliche Denken ein Ereignis des Seins." (WM,
p. 47). See p. 49 (dem Abgrund der Freiheit erstehende).
34 WM, p. 49 (Denken-Danken). Cf. HD, pp. 81, 142.
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dational thought . . . heeds . . . [Being] . . . and knows in it the
arrival, not yet thought-out, of the Ineluctable. . . . " 25
n. Thought is interrogation. WM was essentially the posing of
a question and, as such, it was moving already in the direction
of foundational thought. Interrogation, then, can be an important form of thinking. Thought as interrogation is a step-bystep advance towards an answer which, in turn, contains within
it a momentum toward further interrogation, and which imposes
the responsibility of probing deeper and further into origins. A
better example of such spiral interrogation than WM would be
W W . The concluding note to W W (1930), added in the same
year as the text we are now examining (1943), remarks:
. . . The successive steps of the interrogation are in themselves a way of
thinking that, instead of offering presentations and concepts, experiences
and proves itself as a transformation in the relation to Being. 26

Interrogation of such a type is a form of the experience of (the
relation to Being that is) foundational thought.
If we put all this together and reduce it to the bare essentials,
what do we have ? Being, in order to be itself (to come-to-pass
as the truth of beings), needs a There in which to disclose itself.
In disclosing itself to There in There, Being bids There achieve
itself as There and thus help Being bring-to-pass the disclosure
in all its fullness. The There (There-being) achieves itself and
this disclosure by thinking Being. There-being thinks Being to
the extent that it achieves itself (self-assumption) as the There
of Being. This is done by collaborating in the event by letting
Being have its way, hold sway in it (therefore consent, selfdiffusion, self-surrender, echo, docility, offering). The process is
temporo-historical in structure and achieved in commerce with
beings, but the fundamental sense of it is simply the process of
liberty by which There-being, as the There of Being, lets itself
26 " . . . Das wesentliche Denken achtet auf die langsamen Zeichen des Unberechenbaren und erkennt in diesem die unvordenkliche Ankunft des Unabwendbaren..
(WM, p. 50).
28 " . . . Die Schrittfolge des Fragens ist in sich der Weg eines Denkens, das, statt
Vorstellungen und Begriffe zu liefern, sich als Wandlung des Bezugs zum Sein erfährt und erprobt." (WW, p. 27). WW, then, because of the reversal that it accomplishes, is the classic example of the passage from logical to foundational thought.
See WM, p. 44 (Verantwortung, ursprünglicher). We understand this "responsibility"
in the content of "need" and "freedom" as discussed above.
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(and therefore Being) be. Now if we make allowances for the fact
that Being is profoundly negatived (a thesis that will regain the
center of the stage very soon), this process is exactly what SZ
called "re-solve."
j. Thought and Language
Insofar as foundational thought is an "answer" to the call of
Being, it may be conceived as a "word" of response, which gives
rise to enunciation in articulated words. The thinker's docility
to Being comports a careful concern for the use of words, if b y
these words the truth of Being is to come to expression. But between the "word" of response and the external enunciation of
language, there may be a long period of incubation when the
thinker, despite his foundational response to Being, in fact because of it, remains externally "speechless"; yet it is only
" . . . from the long-guarded speechlessness and the careful clarification of the domain that is illuminated thereby that the
utterance of a thinker comes. . . . " 27
But is not this exactly what we have called "poetizing"? Indeed! " . . . O f similar origin is the naming-process of the
poet. . . , " 2 8 For all their similarity, poetizing and thought,
however, are separated b y a chasm of difference. Thinker and
poet may enter into dialogue, yet they " . . . dwell near one another on mountains far a p a r t " (Hölderlin). But once more we
ask: what precisely is the difference? We are told: " . . . the
thinker utters Being. The poet names the Holy. . . . " 29 But this
is a help only if we know the difference between Being and the
Holy, and everything we have seen so far leads us to identify
them. Heidegger sees the problem and deliberately leaves it
open.

87
. . Aus der langbehüteten Sprachlosigkeit und aus der sorgfältigen Klärung
des in ihr gelichteten Bereiches kommt das Sagen des Denkers
" (WM, p. 50).
One obvious type of such speechlessness: anxiety (p. 51). Cf. p. 49 (Antwort, Verlautbarung).
88 " . . . Von gleicher Herkunft ist das Nennen des Dichters
" (WM, pp. 5051)
89 " . . . Der Denker sagt das Sein. Der Dichter nennt das Heilige
" (WM,
p. 51). Hölderlin ("nahe wohnen auf getrenntesten Bergen") cited WM, p. 51.
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RESUME

If there is continuity between text (1929) and Epilogue (1943)
of WM, there is clearly development, too. Non-being is but the
veil of Being, which discloses itself as Non-being through anxiety
in There, for which it calls the tune. But there are other types
of attunement (v.g. awe) by which Being can disclose itself as
Bounty, Bestowal, Graciousness, Grace. Being, then, is conceived much more "positively" than in 1929.
Furthermore, thought is response to Being, thus disclosed,
complete acquiescence in its initiative, and the appeal-response
theme places us clearly in the context of the reciprocal hail of the
Hölderlin analyses of the same year. Thought is the process by
which There-being freely lets itself be as Being's There and retains the same structure as re-solve in SZ. Chief difference:
passage from Heidegger I to Heidegger II.

c h a p t e r viii
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Heraclitus Fg. 1 6

In the same year that W M : E p appeared, Heidegger devoted
his lecture courses to a s t u d y of the pre-Socratics: "Parmenides"
(winter semester, 1 9 4 2 - 4 3 )

and " T h e

Beginnings of

Western

T h o u g h t , " sc. Heraclitus (summer semester, 1 9 4 3 ) . These crystallized later, at least partially, in edited form in the Heraclitus
(VA) and Anaximander (HW) studies. In content, both come
from the same level

of

Heidegger's

development,

though in

form the Anaximander analysis was not edited until 1 9 4 6 . W e
understand all three of these texts, then, to form an integral
whole.
That

the

'°AX7)&eta"

1

author

should

entitle

his

essay

on

Heraclitus

is noteworthy, for the t e x t t o be analysed (Fg. 16)

does not contain the word, nor does the author emphasize the
fact t h a t his theme is specifically the problem of truth. B u t the
point is obvious, for the essay deals with the lighting-up process
of beings, and the point is to make clear t h a t the lighting-process
is never

undiluted

revealment

but

comports

shadows,

con-

cealment, therefore non-light as well. It is an essay on truth, but
truth in its negativity

(finitude). Hence, there is a close affinity

between the present work and W W (published 1 9 4 3 ) , meditating
as it does the n e g a t i v i t y of truth (mystery, errance). Furthermore, since truth and Being are one, the

Being-to-be-thought

b y foundational thinking ( W M : Ep) is a l w a y s
T h e fragment in question

(Fg.

16) reads:

finite.
to

jit]

Suvov

tzo-zz

n&s <5cv xlq X<x$oi; and Heidegger interprets it to mean : how could
1 "Aletheia" (Heraclitus, Fg. 16), V A , pp. 257-282.
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anyone remain concealed from the process-of-light which never
disappears into concealment because always emerging from it ? 2
The justification of such a reading does not matter very much,
as far as we are concerned. We dispense with a resume of the
argument and pass immediately to the general remarks: A.
Being, B. There-being, C. Thought.
A.

BEING

The author appeals once more to <puca<; to explain Heraclitus'
conception of Being. As before, the key phrase is: "<pii<7i<; tends to
conceal itself," sc. necessarily comports negativity. " . . . Selfrevealment not only never puts concealment aside but needs it
in order to come-to-presence as [itself], as revealment. . . . " 3
Revealment and concealment are, then, mutually correlated in
such a way that they constitute but one identical process.
This is the sense that the author gives to pr} SGvov tzotz of
Fg. 16. He finds a special nuance in jjltj. O u x expresses simply a
negation, absence. Mtj, he claims, suggests what another terminology would call a privation, sc. that which it negatives comesto-presence, but always as other than itself. This is important for
the proper conception of seeming-to-be, but the point is not
developed here. An interesting corollary: Heidegger claims that
it is the self-retracting, self-retaining character of Being that is
the original meaning of reticence (awe). Are we not to infer, then,
that the reticence in There-being, which is one fundamental
type of attunement that may serve as a means of summoning the
thinker to his task and may, indeed, accompany foundational
thought, has its origin in Being itself as reticent, inasmuch as it
is intrinsically finite ? 4
Of special importance in the present essay is the manner in
which the author finds this reveal-conceal-ment of Being as the
common denominator of all the words that most significantly
characterize Heraclitean thought. rrEv: If self-concealing and
self-revealing constitute complementary movements in one
identical process, the uniqueness and unity of the process are
VA,
"...
braucht,
4 VA,
2
3

p. 276.
daß das Sichentbergen das Verbergen nicht nur nie beseitigt, sondern es
um so zu wesen, wie es west, als Ent-bergen. . . . " (VA, pp. 271-272).
pp. 267, 372 (jX7j Suvöv 7Core), 269 ({juq-oÜx).
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what Heraclitus means by the One. 'Ap^oviTj: In this unique
process, there is a perfect complementation of positive and negative, a meshing of both into the common pattern of a single
comprehensive arrangement. These terms, "mutual complementation" and "pattern of arrangement," anticipate the analysis of these words in the Anaximander study, where they receive
their full resonance. Zyjv: From the stem za-, this word has,
prior to the sense of "living," a more primary meaning that can
be identified with cpuau;. IIup: The fire which characterizes the
xoorfjLo<; is to be understood in the same sense as that dominating
Power that gathers its force together (therefore Xoyo^) into the
process of coming-to-presence that comports congenital negativity. Uok£\iQQ : The aboriginal Discord through which both gods
and men come-to-presence is the harmonious contention between positivity and negativity in the coming-to-pass of truth.
In all of this, what is essential is to realize that " . . . Heraclitus,
in the multiplicity of different names: <p\iai<;, Tuup, Xoyo<;, apixoviTj,
^oXe^o*;, gpic, ((ptAta), §v, thinks the fullness of the essence of
[what fundamentally is] identical," 5 sc. the process of emergence
that endures as Being that is negatived.
B.

THERE-BEING

Clearly There-being is not a subject in any sense that modern
philosophy in general and idealism in particular have given the
term, whereby man in one way or another is the radiating center
of non-concealment. Here the opposite is the case. As Heidegger
sees it, Heraclitus meditates the relationship between man and
Being, and thinks man in terms of this relationship. How is the
relationship to be understood? " . . . [There-being's] relationship
to the lighting-process is nothing else than the lighting-process
itself, insofar as it gathers-in . . . [There-being] and retains
[it]." 6 In other words, the relation of There to Being is the relation of Being to its There.
5 " . . . Heraklit denkt in der Vielfalt verschiedener Namen: q>u<R£, mip, X6yoq,
apfiovto), 7?öX£(iO£, £ptq, (<piX£a), gv die Wesensfülle des Selben." (VA, p. 276). See
pp. 272 (2v, dtpfXciviTj), 273-274 (SSjv), 275-276 (7rup), 277 (7t<SXe(io<;).
• " . . . Weil ihr Verhältnis zur Lichtung nichts anderes ist als die Lichtung selber,
insofern diese die Götter und Menschen in die Lichtung einsammelt und ein behält."
(VA, p. 278). Heidegger speaks (p. 278) of the "e-vent" (Ereignis) of truth as "appropriating" (vereignet) There-being. This terminology will be thematized very soon.
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But when all is said and done, does this add anything to what
we know already? No. What does advance the problem, however, is an explicitation, still rather obscure, of the relation between There-being and Being as negatived. We are told that the
ultimate Source of There-being's fallen-ness - and the point is
important - is not primarily There-being's own laxity but the
concealment intrinsic to Being itself. That is why the Greeks
thought of "forgetting" (Xocv&aveiv) as in its origins a condition
of Being-as-mittence, where the self-emitting is simultaneously
a withdrawal, so profound that it obscures both emitting and
withdrawal, sc. Being both in its positivity and negativity. This
is the primordial obscurity (Xtq&tj) whence truth emerges. 7
It becomes more clear and more explicit than ever: that the
finitude of There-being's comprehension of Being, and all that
this implied in the perspectives of SZ, is founded more originally
in the finitude (self-concealment) of Being itself whose There it
is; that Being must be thought in its negativity, if it is to be
thought at all; that the thinking of Being, the total acquiescence
of There-being (WM: Ep) to Being-as-negatived ( " ' A X y ^ i o c " ) is
clearly the process of re-solve, thought through to the level of
Heidegger II. T o endeavor to think Being in such a way - this
is the genuine sense, Heidegger claims, of Heraclitus' question:
how is it possible for a being whose nature it is to be enlightened
to be oblivious to the light ? 8

c.

x.

THOUGHT

Interrogation

Fundamentally, this is Heidegger's question, too. No wonder
he finds it so congenial. This gives us the occasion to signal the
first characteristic of thought insofar as it can be disengaged
from the essay. Heidegger's thought, as Heraclitus's, is interrogative. W e must put aside the impetuous self-assurance of everydayness in order to become at home in experiencing a genuine
question. W h y ? Because it is by a question that we best express
7

V A , pp. 280-281 (alltägliche), 264-265 (XocvJWcvetv). Cf. HD, p. 89 and HW, p.

3368

See V A , p. 281.
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the primal wonderment that most characterizes authentic
thought. This wonderment is familiar to us as the astonishment
before the "wonder of wonders" that beings are. Now it takes on
a new cast. What is wonder-ful here is the fact that the process
by which they are comports negativity as well as positivity, sc.
the mystery as such of Being. Is the wonderment here
consciously a translation of the Aristotelian &au{i.a£siv? This is
quite plausible. In any case, our task is to yield to Heraclitus'
wonderment and thus think Being. A t every step of the way,
our own reflections are but extensions of the original question.9
This attitude of releasing ourselves unto wonderment by posing
the question of Being-as-negatived is in complete concord with
that attitude of open-ness, docility and free surrender that
characterizes foundational thought.
2.. Dialogue
This effort on Heidegger's part to enter into the Heraclitean
question is clearly a thought-ful dialogue. We recognize the
structure of the dialogue as analysed in "Re-collection." The
author thinks upon what-is-as-having-been (past), which in this
case is Heraclitus' fragment. He receives it as still coming
(future) with perennial freshness:
. . . The [present] effort limits itself to abiding close to the word of the
Heraclitean utterance. This could help, perhaps, to direct an ad-ventive
thought into a [whole] domain of intimations to which [we] have not yet
attended. 10

Having attended to such intimations, the author tries to render
them present by formulating them in language, as Heraclitus
did before him.
This brings us to a critical point. Heidegger is quite ready to
admit that he may be hearing more in Heraclitus' words than
they say. But that is precisely the function of ad-ventive thinking,
to let the Being that Heraclitus brought into words continue to
• VA, p. 259 (Frage, heimisch werden, Erstaunen, das denkende Erstaunen);
WM, pp. 34, 41, 46 (Verwunderung, Wunder); HD, p. 142 (das Wunderbare); V A ,
p. 279 (Wege-Fragen).
1 0 " . . . Das Bemühen beschränkt sich darauf, näher am Wort des heraklitischen
Spruches zu bleiben. Dies könnte dazu beitragen, ein künftiges Denken in den Bereich noch ungehörter Zuspräche einzuweisen." (VA, p. 260). See p. 279 (zum Sprechen bringen).
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come now to the thinker who again expresses it in language. No
one thinker can express by what he says the inexhaustible
abundance which Being imparts to him in the moment of experience. Even Heraclitus was forced to express Being as it disclosed itself to Am. There remains hidden in what a thinker says
the entire wealth of Being that he does not say, can not say, yet
which remains present in what he does say, in mysterious, submerged fashion. We have here in another form the law of Being's
concealment-in-revealment. It is the un-said that is interior to
Heraclitus' utterance that Heidegger has sought to express, and
thus the whole essay is another example of re-trieve. 11 That the
interrogative method is especially adapted to this type of
thought is worth remark.
RESUME

Another re-trieve! Heidegger seeks to disengage the un-said
from a fragment of Heraclitus to the effect that the common
denominator of all Heraclitus' most characteristic terms lies in
the fact that the Being-to-be-thought in foundational thinking
is negatived. Such a re-trieve is no relativism and has its own
rigor. But what is the nature of that rigor ?

11 VA>

PP- *79 (unabhängig, Ungesprochenen}, 261 (der ihm gewährten).
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That Heidegger should devote a formal study to Wyo^ in
Heraclitus is not at all surprising. 1 What is surprising is that it
took him so long t o do so. The indices in EM were, after all, only
incidental to another problematic and deserved elaboration for
themselves. The fact is that the problem of Xoyoq has been with
him since the beginning, if only under the guise of "logic." We
have only to look at the list of the author's lecture courses and
seminars at Freiburg to realize how frequently he recurred to
the theme. 2
Of all these titles, perhaps the most significant for our present
purposes is the lecture course of the summer semester of 1934.
Prior to EM, prior even to the first of the Hölderlin courses, it
must be considered as part of the movement of "reversal" to
which W W (1930) bears first witness. According to the students
who followed the course, Heidegger declared that his purpose
was not to explain conventional logic but to shake it to its foundations in an attempt to develop a new and more original type
1 " L o g o s " (Heraklit, Fg: 50), V A , pp. 207-229. Composed in 1951 as contribution
to a commemorative v o l u m e f o r Hans Jantzen (Berlin, 1951) and delivered as a
lecture (Bremen) in the same y e a r , the essay is based on the University lecture course
with the same title in s u m m e r semester, 1944. Hence we insert it here.
2 Restricting ourselves to those titles which explicitly mention logic or its principal
themes, we find that t h e a u t h o r treated logic in: 1916 (seminar, Aristotle's logic),
1922 (course, Aristotle's logic and ontology), 1925-26 (course on logic and seminar on
Hegel's Logic), 1926-27 (seminar, construction of concepts), 1927 (seminar, Aristotle's ontology and Hegel's Logic), 1928 (course, logic), 1928-29 (seminar, ontological
principles and the categories), 1930-31 (seminar, construction of concepts), 1933
(seminar, principle of contradiction), 1934 (course, logic), 1939 (seminar, the essence
of language).
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of thought. This could be done by probing the essence of
language, for although logic as a science deals with the laws of
"thought/'
this
thought
crystallizes
fundamentally
in
judgements which are expressed in the language of predication.
The laws of language and the laws of thought are, from the beginning, inseparable, and the term "logic," the science of
"thought," derives from Xoyoc in the sense of language. If logic
is to be "shaken to its foundations" (and the necessity of such
an effort was made abundantly clear in WM), the most effective
method is to probe the nature of language. Hence:
. . . Because traditional logic, as a science of thought processes, vaunts
itself as the supreme and authoritative norm for all determination of
Being, this claim must [now] be examined in its origins and relentlessly
renewed in terms of an original conception of the essence of l a n g u a g e . . . . 3

How this was to be done we have some inkling already in the
lectures of the following year (1935), published as EM. W e recall
that there the Xoyo<; of Heraclitus was identified on the one hand
with cpuo-is and on the other with voetv. We recall, too, that the
process of Xeyeiv was also the coming-to-pass of language. The
present essay does nothing but elaborate these themes.
As before, we are engaged here in another re-trieve, this time
of Fg. 50. The convolutions of the argument are less important
for us than its general sense, which is to explain how Xoyoc passed
from the original meaning of "gathering" to mean "language."
This enables us to see more clearly the relation of thought both
to Being and to language. Let us pass immediately, then, to the
general remarks: A . Being, B. There-being, C. Language, D.
Thought.
A.

LOGOS

AS

BEING

Aoyo«;, we are told, must be understood in terms of X£yeiv,
whose original sense, according to Heidegger, is to " l a y , "
whether in the sense of "to-lay-down" or "to-lay-before." To
lay-down-side-by-side is to lay-together, hence to bring together
3 " . . . Und weil diese bisherige Logik als Lehre von den Denkakten beanspruchte,
als oberste und maßgebende Regel aller Bestimmung des Seins zu gelten, deshalb
muß dieser Anspruch ursprünglich gefaßt und rücksichtsloser erneuert werden
aus den ursprünglichen Begriffen des Wesens der Sprache
" Cited from students*
•lecture notes with Professor Heidegger's approval.
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in the sense of gathering or collecting. Such a gathering or
collecting, if we consider it closely, is not simply a transient
accumulation but suggests a permanence b y reason of which
what is gathered-together is preserved and guarded in its collectedness.
The process of laying may be considered, of course, from the
point-of-view of that which is laid, as a lying-forth. In this case,
the lying-forth and the laying which lets it come-to-pass are
correlative in a single process, which we may describe as a
"letting-lie-forth-in-collectedness." It is with this formula that
Heidegger describes the genuine sense of X£yetv. Notice in passing
(we shall return to the point presently) that this single process
may be conceived as proceeding from two directions at once:
from that which lies-forth, as if it were emerging of itself; from
that which lets it lie-forth, therefore lets it be, in the sense that
it lays the being down. 4
It is an easy step from here to see that the lying-forth in
question is an emergence into non-concealment, hence the
coming-to-pass of truth in that-which-lies-forth. B u t we are not
allowed to forget that non-concealment is permeated with negativity, for
not only is prior to a-X^cia but remains intrinsic
to it at all times. However this may be, the process of truth which
takes place in Xsyeiv is the coming-to-presence, therefore the
Being, of beings. Hence to let beings lie-forth-in-collectedness
is to let them be. Such a conception of X6yoc, perseveres in Greek
thought even as late as Aristotle and accounts for the fact that
there, as we saw in SZ, Xoyo^ can mean dhtc^aiveor&at, sc. the
process that lets-shine-forth in illumined self-revelation beingsthat-appear, sc. which come-to-lie-forth in the Open. 5
U p to this point we have been speaking of Xsyetv. W h a t , then,
of AoyoQ ? W e understand it as the absolutely original Source
out of which the entire gathering-process proceeds. Heidegger
claims that Heraclitus' formula "Ev-ITavra
(one-in-many
[-beings]) describes the manner in which Aoyo? functions. A s
"Ev, Aoyos is the One, the Only, that unifies all beings in them4 For the two preceding paragraphs, see VA, pp. 208-211 (legen, nieder- und vorlegen, zusammenbringen, Verwahren, beisammen-vor-liegen-lassen).
5 VA, pp. 220—221 CAXrfteioc), 213 (dc7ro<paivecrihxi). Cf. P, p. 271-272; SZ, pp. 32,
34.
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selves, insofar as it gathers them into themselves, letting them
lie forth in non-concealment as themselves. Because Aoyoq is
"Ev, it may be called the utterly Simple. "Ev is likened to a
lightning-bolt, b y reason of which beings are lit up in their
Being. ""Ev IlavTa tells [us] what A6yo<; is. Aoyoc, tells [us] how
"Ev riavra comes-to-presence. Both are but one." 6 Briefly,
Aoyoq is the Being of beings-in-the-ensemble. " . . . The word
o A6yo£ names that which gathers all [beings] into [Being] and
thereby lets [them] lie forth. . . . " 7 An important annotation:
the event by which Being thus collects itself in beings is also
called "mittence." 8
Two observations are in order. In the first place, the implicit
supposition here is that "Ev and IlavTa are inseparable. Unless
something is gathered-together (beings), there simply is no
gathering (Being). Secondly, the gathering-process of Aoyoq may
be considered as a letting-lie-forth of beings in the sense of
supplying for them a firm ground, that whereon they may rest
firm. 9 It is a simple inference from the first observation to add
that just as no beings can be grounded unless Ground (Aoyoq)
comes-to-pass, so, conversely, Ground cannot come-to-pass
except in and through the beings that it grounds. Aoyos, Being,
Ground: but one!
B.

THERE-BEING

Aoyos, the One, comes-to-pass in a Xeysiv. Let us return now
to Xeyeiv as a letting-(beings)-lie-forth and a preserving them in
collectedness. The gathering-together which is in question here
implies that the gatherer is itself gathered together in and
through the very process of gathering. We understand this to
mean that the gathering-process supposes a certain point of
concentration (the term is not Heidegger's), which itself must
ipso facto be constituted in order that the gathering-into-unity
8 ""Ev rtavroc sagt, was der A6yo? ist. A6yo<; sagt, wie "Ev IlavToc west. Beide sind
das Selbe." (VA, p. 221). Cf. pp. 215 (ausgezeichnete Legen), 220 (Einzig-Eine,
Einende), 207 (Einfachen), 222 (Blitz). Cf. N, II (1941), p. 483 (Insichruhen des Einfachen).
7 " . . . Das Wort 6 A6yo$ nennt Jenes, das alles Anwesende ins Anwesen versammelt und darin vorliegen läßt. . ( V A , p. 227).
8 V A , p. 218 (Geschickliches), afterwards passim.
9 See SG, pp. 178-188, n.b. p. 180; ID, p. 54.
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be accomplished at all. What can we call this gathering-point
"itself"? Heidegger does not give it a name. W e venture to call
it simply a "self," understanding by the term the There of Being,
which, as we saw in SZ, is a self simply inasmuch as it is transcendence (ek-sistence), a unified place of open-ness unto Being
among beings. A t any rate, when we think of There-being as
achieving its self, we understand this in the sense of fulfilling
the function of a gathering-point. 10
W h a t may be said now about the nature of this gatheringpoint (There), through which the unifying process of Aoyoq is
achieved? In the first place, it takes place in the essence of man.
Furthermore, it is itself constituted as a self by Aoyo<;, for it is
part of the gathering-process as such. In this sense, we have
every right to say that the gathering-point of There "belongs"
to Aoyo?. 1 1 Aoyo?, then, will always dominate its own gatheringpoint. Y e t for all its primacy, Aoyo? has want of this gatheringpoint in order to be itself, b y reason of the very exigencies of the
gathering-process as such. The There, then, in "belonging" to
Aoyo<;, serves its needs. W e might call it an "attend-ant" of
Logos.
How does the gathering-point of There function? Its task is
simply to enable the gathering-process of Aoyo? among beings
to proceed. The There is the "place" wherein the process takes
place. It must let the process (and therefore itself) be. W e have
mentioned already that the unified process of lying-laying-out
of beings may be imagined as proceeding from two different
directions. On the one hand, as a lying-forth it seems to proceed
from the beings themselves. From this point of view, the
movement may be considered as proceeding ultimately from
Aoyo?. On the other hand, the laying-down seems to proceed
from the gathering-point of There (though ultimately, of course,
the There, too, derives its collecting-power from Aoyo<;). The
There must lay-out (Xeysiv) the very same (o^o) beings that
Aoyo? lets lie forth in the Open, and in the very same way. When
this happens, the Xeyew of the There as a gathering-point "corre1 0 VA, pp. 210 (Im gesammelten Sarameln waltet Versammlung), 226 (braucht,
schickt sich). One wonders if the conception of a "gathering point*' does not give us
a fresh way of understanding There-being as the "ultimate whereunto" (Woraufhin)
of beings.
1 1 VA, pp. 215, 216 and passim (gehören).
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sponds" (ofioXoyetv) with the Tiyetv of the aboriginal Aoyo<;.
Correspondence comes, however, at a price. The There must
acquiesce to Aoyoq, must so comport itself as effectively to commit itself (sich schickt) to Aoyo<; and for Aoyoq. But There's
acquiescence brings fulfillment, and, indeed, of a double sort:
by acquiescence to A6yo<;, There fulfills its own com-mitment to
be the gathering-point of Aoyo<; among beings and thus achieves
itself, sc. its own authenticity as a self; by acquiescence to Aoyo<;,
There helps fulfill this gathering-process as such, for it lets Aoyo<;
bestow itself as mittence upon beings and thus come-to-pass as
what it is. 12
From all this, observe: that the process of correspondence
with Aoyoc, concurs in its essentials with the process of re-solve
in Heidegger I and at the same time with the notion of "fulfilling" Being as it unfolds in Heidegger II; that if Aoyo^ be conceived as Ground, then the function of There, simply because it
is There, helps bring Ground (the grounding-process) to pass.
C.

LANGUAGE

Heidegger's purpose in this essay is not explicitly to probe the
nature of thought so much as the nature of language. From this
point of view, it is extremely valuable. His thesis is radical and
unequivocal: the sense of X£yetv, which unquestionably means
"to speak," " t o say," as it always has been translated, does not
pass from one meaning (sc. "letting-lie-forth") to another (sc.
"to speak," etc.), but the original sense of "speaking" is nothing
less than "to-let-lie-forth":
. . . Uttering and speaking come-to-presence as [the process of] lettinglie-forth-in-collectedness everything that comes-to-presence [precisely
inasmuch] as [it is] laid out in non-concealment. . . . 1 8

The thesis is elaborated less clearly than it is enunciated, and
we are often forced to conjecture. The principal difficulty arises
once more from the obscurity as to the relation between A6yo<;
and its There. Making the most of what indices we have, we
1 2 V A , pp. 215 (liegt aus einem Legen, ä^oXoyetv), 217-218, 221 (Geschick, dasGeschickliche, vollbringen).
1 8 " . . . Sagen und Reden wesen als das beisammen-vor-liegen-Lassen alles dessen,
was, in der Unverborgenheit gelegen, anwest. .
(VA, p. 212).
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understand the author to mean: wherever we find Xeyetv in the
above exposition, we may read "to utter" (Sagen).1* This will
mean that we may understand the Aoyo<; to be the aboriginal
Utterance (Sage)t sc. the utterance of Being, or Being-as-utterance, and human language as having the same relation to aboriginal Utterance as the gathering-point (among beings) has to
the gathering-process as such, or as There-being has to the Being
(of beings) to which it belongs. Presumably, authentic language
comes-to-pass when There-being acquiesces to Being-as-utterance and, true to its com-mitment, achieves its own authenticity.
There are several things to underline here. Firstly, we must
insist that for Heidegger the essence of language is not to be
sought in terms of sound or meaning, but in the complete identity between uttering-in-language and letting-be-manifest. 15 We
see this conception clearly when the author explains what he
understands by "name" and "naming." To name, he claims, is
to call-forth, in the sense of laying a being out in the Open, in
such a way that the being can shine forth as what it is:
. . . The process of naming (flvopct) is not the expressing of a word-signification but letting-something-lie-forth in that light wherein it takes its
stand [as a being, simply] inasmuch as it has a name. 16

Furthermore, we must realize that authentic utterance takes
place only insofar as There-being achieves its own authenticity.
In this respect, the author was more explicit in an aside during
the Physics seminar (1940) than in 1944, at least according to
1 4 We translate Sagen as "utter" because Heidegger finds an affinity between
Sagen and Zeigen (to show-forth, let-appear-in-the-Open, in the same sense that we
are using ^ y e i v ) , and the word "utter" derives from the comparative of A S ut,
meaning "out," hence may be taken to mean " t o give or bring out," sc. into the
Open. (See US, pp. 145, 200* 214, 252). Where it is necessary to distinguish, we use
"Utterance" for Sage, and "uttering" or "to utter" for Sagen. Incidentally, we sense
here the importance of the word Zeigen in describing the poet's function (v.g. HD,
pp. 138, 139)1 6 VA, pp. 212, 228 (90W), (TY)|xa(veiv). Heidegger does not deny, of course, the
correctness (richtige) of conceiving language as qp6)V7} cnj^avrtXT], or, for that matter,
as expression (Aussage). He merely denies that such a conception is the ultimate
«explanation of its origin (Wesen). See VA, p. 229.
1 6 " . . . Das vom >iyetv her gedachte Nennen (8vo[xa) ist kein Ausdrücken einer
Wortbedeutung, sondern ein vor-liegen-Lassen in dem Licht, worin etwas dadurch
steht, daß es einen Namen hat." (VA, p. 223). Note that when in 1957-58 Heidegger
ogives a lecture course on "The Essence of Language," he meditates Stefan George's
line (from "Das Wort"): "Kein Ding sei wo das Wort gebricht," but effectively he
does no more than explicitate what is said here. See US, pp. 168-169, 170, 215.
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the text we have at our disposal. In 1940, he remarked that
Xeyeiv-Xoyo*; signifies that relationship
. . . on the ground of which [beings] as such gather themselves for the
first time around man and for him. And because man is only insofar as
he comports himself with beings as such, revealing them and concealing
them, man can and must have the "word/' sc. utter the Being of
beings. The words, however, that [daily] language uses are only the leftovers of the [original] Word, [and] on the basis of these man never finds
his way back again to beings except on the ground of Xiyeiv. . . . 1 7

Such a Xeystv as this occurs when human language concurs
(o^LoXoyeiv) completely with the aboriginal utterance of Being
(sc. with the Being-of-beings-0s-utterance). 18 B y letting beings
lie-forth in the Open as what they are, There-being concurs with
the process of Aoyos, which is the process that gathers these
beings at once unto themselves and unto itself as aboriginal
Utterance. In concurrence, authentic language comes-to-pass.
Notice that in this moment, language, insofar as it proceeds
from There-being, is fundamentally an attending to the still
more original Utterance of Aoyoc; (Being) itself as articulated in
the beings that now come-to-presence insofar as this concurrence
lets them be. 1 9 B y such an attending, There-being surrenders to
its com-mitment as an attend-ant of Being, in complete acquiescence in Being's intimations.
So it comes about that Heidegger, re-trieving as he does the
original sense of Xcyeiv, thinks " . . . the essenc[-ing] of language
in terms of the essenc[-ing] of Being, indeed as this essenc[-ing]
1 7 " . . . jenes Verhältnis, auf dessen Grunde erst Anwesendes als ein solches um
den Menschen und für ihn sich versammelt. Und nur weil der Mensch ist, sofern er
zum Seienden als einem solchen, es entbergend und verbergend, sich verhält, kann
der Mensch und muß er das 'Wort' haben, d.h. vom Sein des Seienden sagen. Die
Wörter aber, die die Sprache gebraucht, sind nur die aus dem Wort herausgefallenen
Abfälle, von denen aus der Mensch niemals zum Seienden zurück- und hinfindet, es
sei denn auf dem Grunde des X£yeiv...." (P, p. 272). Heidegger's italics. Notice how
the negativity of Being is here transposed into terms of language through the negativity of There-being {entbergend-verbergend).
1 8 There is no mention of Eigentlichkeit, but the repeated insistence on eigentliche
Hören is thoroughly convincing. See VA, pp. 214-218.
1 9 V A , pp. 213-214, 216 (Hören-Horchen). Heidegger describes There-being's
attitude of complete docility to A6yo? by saying that we must be "all ears" (ganz
Ohr) (VA, p. 214), a phrase not uncommon in colloquial English to suggest avid
attentiveness to what is said. Its humorous connotation, however, leads us to avoid
incorporating it into the text. It is typical Heidegger to be told that man doesn't
hear because he has ears to hear with, but he has these organs to hear with because
he is structurally an attend-ant of Being (VA, p. 215).
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itself," 20 and from now on, to "bring something into language"
means always " t o guard Being in the coming-to-presence of
language," sc. b y letting A6yo<; shine-forth in, through and as
words. 21 To the extent that Aoyo; is Ground, then to bring A6yo<;
into language is to join in the "grounding" of Ground. This helps
us to give a sense to the theses: that poetizing is an origin-ating
(grounding) of Being-as-origin (-ground); that every work of art,
because an origin-ating of truth (Being, Origin, Ground), is in its
essence a poetizing.
D.

THOUGHT

What the essay tells us about thought is minimal, but what it
shows us b y way of example is important. W e have a right to
understand ofxoXoyetv to be not only the coming-to-pass of
language but also the process of thought, for insofar as the -Xoyslv
of o|ao- is conceived as proceeding from There in a direction opposite to the movement of Aoyos and bringing it to a point of
concentration, there is no other way t o understand it except in
terms of VOELV.
W h a t does the essay permit us to say of thought, once we
interpret thought as o f x o X o y e t v ? Firstly, that thought belongs to
Aoyo<; as an attend-ant, insofar as it proceeds from Aoyo<;. Hence,
what it lays-out in the Open, sc. lets-be (manifest), does not have
its origin in thought as such but ultimately in the Aoyos wherein
thought "reposes." 2 2 In this sense, the coming-to-pass of
thought is always an event of the primal Aoyos itself, b y which
A6yo<; ap-propriates for itself that domain among beings of which
it has want. Proceeding thus from Aoyos, thought is clearly the
thinking " o f " A6yo<;.23
3 0 " . . . das Wesen der Sprache aus dem Wesen des Seins, ja sogar als dieses
selbst g e d a c h t . . ( V A , p. 228).
2 1 " . . . Sein in das Wesen der Sprache bergen
" (VA, p. 228).
82 The word "repose," both as verb (beruht) and noun (Ruhe), suggests still
another nuance for X£yeiv, this time when used in the middle voice in the sense of
4 'laying-oneself-d own-to-rest," sc. the tranquillity of complete (self) re-collection
(VA, p. 208). The word will occur frequently in the later works and we must always
understand it with these overtones. In the present case, thought reposes in A6yo<;
insofar as it is itself gathered-together into what it is by reason of aboriginal A6yo^.
23 V A , pp. 224 (er-eignet, vereignet), 226 (braucht). The fusion of ereignen and
vreignen constitutes the phenomenon of Ereignis, as it will be explained later in ID
(1957)« It is important to note here simply how early the terminology crystallizes
(1944). See ID, p. 28.
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Furthermore, thought not only belongs but attends to Aoyo^,
and it is precisely by attend-ing that thought achieves the task
of attend-ance in all its authenticity. For the attend-ant itself
gathers There-being into its own fullness in endeavoring to respond to the demands and intimations of Aoyo<; coming to it
through beings. How is authenticity achieved? B y a comportment through which thought com-mits itself completely to
Aoyo^. And this comportment is described not only according
to the metaphor of hearing but also of sight, anticipating thus
the double modality of thought that we shall find in WD. It is
important here to note only that both metaphors fuse into the
conception of that complete abandonment and docility which
we saw to characterize thought in the Epilogue to WM. Proceeding from Aoyo<; and attend-ing to it, thought is the thinking
"of" Aoyos in a two-fold fashion. 24
The coming-to-presence of thought is profoundly a historical
process. On the one hand, A6yo<; e-mits itself among beings. On
the other, There-being, through thought, com-mits itself in free
surrender to Aoyo? thus bestowed, thereby fulfilling its own
com-mitment as a There. This fusion of the e-mitting of Aoyoc
and the (self-) com-mitting of its There through thought is what
constitutes the coming-to-pass of mittence as such, which is the
structural unity of inter-mittence (Being-as-history). 25 Notice:
that the primacy in the process belongs clearly to Aoyo?; that
the correspondence of thought is, however, necessary to the
process; that thought is genuinely historical, not by reason of
itself but by reason of the Aoyo<; to which it does no more than
respond; that the mittence takes place as the coming-to-presence
of beings in their totality, "Ev-IIavTa.26
Now what Heidegger is trying to do is to re-trieve the mittence
of Being to Heraclitus that took place at the beginning of
2 4 Vg. V A , pp. 215-217 (eigentlich), 214 (auf Anspruch, Zuspruch), 217 (Gehörthaben, Gesehenhaben, sich schicken).
2 5 V A , p. 221. It is impossible to suggest b y a single word such as 4 4 com-mitment"
all the nuances which Heidegger connotes with Geschick and geschicklich. If we
understand Being as com-mitting There-being to the destiny of serving as Being's
There among beings, we must understand, too, that There-Being is given the equipment for such a task. W e may speak of such equipment as an " e n d o w m e n t , " in the
sense that we use the word to describe talent, etc. This is clearly one of the nuances
of Geschick (v.g. V A , p. 217).
2 6 V A , pp. 221 (eigentlich Geschickliche), 218 (ereignet sich Geschickliches), 224
(nie das Geschick selbst), 221 (wie " E v - I I d v r « west).
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Western thought. But notice that despite his apparently meticulous care to expound the original sense of Aoyo?, he does not
really claim to be saying what Heraclitus said, but rather what
he did not say. That is very clear when it comes to explaining
the correlation between Aoyo? as the process of letting-lie-forth
in the Open and as the coming-to-pass of language. Aoyo? does
not lose one meaning and gain another, but language in its origin
is the process of letting-be (manifest). The Greeks, he claims,
experienced this identity but did not - even Heraclitus did not think it as such. " . . . Nowhere do we find [any] trace of the fact
that the Greeks thought the essenc[-ing] of language immediately out of the essenc[-ing] of Being. . . 2 7 On the contrary!
From the very beginning, language was always interpreted in
terms of phonetics and expression. Yet even if no one comprehended it as such, nevertheless the genuine sense of language
comes into the words which Heraclitus used when he thought
Being in terms of Aoyo?. We have here a classic example of a
mittence of Being bestowed upon a thinker and uttered in his
words, yet with such re-serve that it withdrew from the thinker
himself even in the bestowal, hiding, indeed, its own withdrawal.28
Heidegger's task has been to re-trieve this mittence precisely
in its withdrawal and thus achieve in his own historical moment
an authentic response to a mittence of Being. Such a re-trieve,
of course, does not dissolve the essential mystery that accounts
for the entire process, but it does recognize it as such and thereby preserves it in its original freshness. Briefly: Heidegger's own
interpretation of language is not attributed as such to Heraclitus
but results from his own free-wheeling effort to think Being that
only takes its lead from what Heraclitus said and then proceeds
to think the un-thought.29
With regard to Being as the to-be-thought in foundational
thinking, there is one point which strikes a new note that will
re-echo later. Up to this point we have underlined the fact that
the search for the sense of Being has been an effort to understand it as the process of truth out of which the ontological
27 " . . . Nirgends finden wir eine Spur davon, daß die Griechen das Wesen der
Sprache unmittelbar aus dem Wesen des Seins dachten
" (VA, p. 228).
88 VA, pp. 229 (der Blitz verlosch jäh), 213 (aufspart).
89 VA, pp. 208 (Rätsel als Rätsel), 207 (im freien Überlegen am Leitband).
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difference arises. But the emphasis has been given to Being itself, on the grounds, as EM said explicitly, that this is a necessary preliminary to interrogating the ontological difference as
such. Heidegger poses the question of the relationship between
Aoyoq (Being) and its gathering-point (There), or, as we may
say now, thought, and then declares:
. . . Not only what comes-to-presence in the X£yeiv of ofxoXoyetv but also
what comes-to-presence in the Xiyziv of A6yo? has at once a [still] more
original derivation in the simple middle [-point] between them. Is there
for human thought a way to reach this middle [-point] ? 30

Notice: that the question presupposes the complete correlation,
therefore inter-dependence, of Being and beings; that this
"middle point" is really the ontological difference as such, which
now emerges unequivocally as his principal theme (confirmed
by the otherwise inexplicable phrase, "difference as difference") ; 31 that the question whether or not the ontological difference as such is thinkable is posed but not answered; that the
question is purely Heideggerean and bears testimony to his
relentless pursuit of an always more fundamental, always receding Source.
RESUME

It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of the step
we have accomplished here, and only the development that
follows will enable us to see that in these few pages we touch the
heart of Heidegger's whole endeavor. Being ( A 6 y o i s at once
aboriginal Truth, Ground, Utterance. There-being, as the
concentrating point of the gathering-process, is opLoXoyetv.
Whether under the guise of poetizing or of thought, There-being
corresponds with A6yo<; and thereby helps it come-to-pass as
Truth, as Ground, as Utterance. Since Being in its truth is at
once aboriginal Utterance, we may discern the sense of Beingas-truth by interrogating language. That is why the Hölderlin
analyses, in groping for the sense of poetizing, are an unswerving
interrogation of a-X^eta. The suggestion of some "middle-point"
between Aoyo$ and its There suggests a new aspect of the Beingprocess, which it is the task of foundational thought to think.
30 " . . . Dann bat sowohl das Wesende im Xeyeiv des ipLoXoyetv, als auch das Wesende
im X^ysw d e s A6yoq zugleich eine anfänglichere Herkunft in der einfachen Mitte
zwischen beiden. Gibt es dahin für sterbliches Denken einen Weg?" (VA, p. 225).
8 1 V A , p. 227 (Unterschied als Unterschied).

c h a p t e r viii

TOWARDS AN A N A L Y S I S OF
N I H I L I S M IN T E R M S OF

RELEASE

BEING-AS-HISTORY

The dialogue on the nature of thought between scientist,
savant and master reached the public only in 1959 but dates
from 1944-45. 1 Who the scientist and savant are we are not told,
but who the master is there can be, indeed, no doubt. From the
same period (1944-46) comes as well another essay on Nietzsche,
entitled "Nihilism in Terms of Being-as-History," which appeared in 1961. 2 The latter, however, is so clearly a complement
to the former that it seems best to treat them as one.

I. Towards an Analysis of Release
A.

BEING

W e come to the heart of the matter at once when we say that
Being is conceived here as an open domain, or as a broad expanse that is utterly free, wherein beings m a y while, and whose
special magic consists in " . . . gathering together every being
unto itself and all beings unto one another in the whiling-process
of repose within themselves. . . . " 3 Clearly, Being is still understood as a gathering-process (Aoyo<;), even if now it goes by the
name of "Expanse" (Gegnet). It is that domain " . . . which in
1 " Z u r Erörterung der Gelassenheit," Gelassenheit
(Pfullingen: Neske, 1959)»
pp. 29-73. (Hereafter: G).
2 " D i e seinsgeschichtliche Bestimmung des Nihilismus," N, II, pp. 335-398- Cf.
"Überwindung der Metaphysik" (1936-46), V A , pp. 7 1 - 1 0 0 .
3 " D i e Gegend versammelt, gleich als ob sich nichts ereigne, jegliches zu jeglichem
und alles zueinander in das Verweilen beim Beruhen in sich s e l b s t . . ( G , pp. 4 1 42). See pp. 40-42 (Gegend aller Gegenden, freie Weite, Weile).
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gathering beings together opens itself up in such a way as to
establish and maintain the Open which permits every being to
emerge and repose within itself [as what it is]. . . . " 4
Especially valuable in the present essay is a precision about
the relationship between Being (Aoyo<;, Open, Expanse), in the
sense that we speak of it now, and Being-as-horizon-of-transcendence, in the sense that we spoke of it in KM. The difference
is this: to speak of Being-as-horizon implies, no matter how we
nuance it, that we take man as the center of reference and horizon as man's field of vision, within which beings appear as
objects to man-as-subject. "Horizon and transcendence are
experienced therefore in terms of objects and of our presentation,
and determined only with a view to objects and our presentation
[of them]." 5 This is true, even when with Kant we speak of
"things in themselves" as distinguished from "beings-as-theyappear," for things-in-themselves are thought in reference to
beings-as-they-appear by a thought that is equally representative in either case.6
This does not mean, of course, that man himself constitutes
the field of vision as such, but it does mean that the effort to get
beyond the subject-object relationship by resorting to terms
such as "horizon" and "transcendence" remains itself inescapably conditioned by a subject-centered thinking that it strives
to renounce. The passage from the Heidegger of K M (1929) to
the Heidegger of W W (1930) seems to have consisted, then, in
the discovery that even the horizon-of-transcendence was in itself "open" before it could function as a field-of-vision. " . . . The
field-of-vision is therefore an open domain, whose open-ness
does not come to it [simply] because we behold it," any more
than the shining-forth of beings-as-objects that we discover
there is completely our own doing.7 Being-as-horizon, then, is
4 "Die Gegnet ist die verweilende Weite, die, alles versammelnd, sich öffnet, so
daß in ihr das Offene gehalten und angehalten ist, jegliches aufgehen zu lassen in
seinem Beruhen.*' (G, p. 42). Familiar notes: G, pp. 61, 64-65 (das verborgene Wesen
der Wahrheit); 42, 51, 61 (En tbergung-verborgen), 44, 45, 68 (Nähe-Ferne).
5 "Der Horizont und die Transzendenz sind somit von den Gegenständen und
von unserem Vorstellen aus erfahren und nur im Hinbück auf die Gegenstände und
unser Vorstellen bestimmt." (G, p. 39).
8 See G, pp. 54-557 " . . . Der Gesichtskreis ist also ein Offenes, welche Offenheit ihm nicht dadurch
zukommt, daß wir hineinsehen.1' (G, p. 39). Cf. pp. 50—51 (eher verhüllt).
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only " . . . the side of the encompassing Open that is turned
toward us. [In this case] the Open is filled with our gaze upon
the visage of what shines forth to presentative thought as objects," so that we may say that in revealing itself as horizon
Being conceals itself as the Open. 8 What interests Heidegger II
is precisely the Open as such. " . . . What is this Open itself,
when we prescind from the fact that it can shine forth also as
horizon of our presentation?" 9
The dialogue, however, has as its theme the nature of thought,
sc. the thinking of Being-as-expanse. If we keep the focus for a
moment on Being, we discover that once more Being maintains
the initiative in the process. For thought comes about only because Being has want of it, indeed to such an extent that
" . . . without [thought] it cannot come to presence as it does." 1 0
That is why Being ap-propriates to man his own proper nature,
which consists in the fact that he is "released" (Gelassenheit)
unto Being. Thus it is that from the very beginning, sc. according to the very origins of his nature, man belongs to Being
as its own. W e may even say, although Heidegger does not put
it into these words, that in ap-propriating to man his nature,
Being ap-propriates him to itself, and it is this double appropriation that we try to suggest by saying that man by nature is an
attend-ant of Being, whose proper task is to attend to it. 1 1
This whole process Heidegger characterizes by a new name.
If we try to follow his word-play, then (recalling that Being has
been called here a free "Expanse") we may suggest this appropriation of man to Being-as-expanse by calling it the "exp a n d i n g " of man. The awkwardness of the expression is redeemed to some extent if a very radical (expandere) reading of
8 "Das Horizonthafte ist somit nur die uns zugekehrte Seite eines uns umgebenden
Offenen, das erfüllt ist mit Aussicht ins Aussehen dessen, was unserem Vorstellen als
Gegenstand erscheint." (G, p. 39).
9 " . . . Was ist dieses Offene selbst, wenn wir davon absehen, daß es auch als
Horizont unseres Vorstellens erscheinen kann?" (G, p. 40).
1 0 " . . . dieses Wesen so wesenhaft der Gegnet gehört, daß diese ohne das Menschenwesen nicht wesen kann, wie sie west." (G, p. 64). The same must be said, of course,
for Being-as-truth. This does not mean that truth ceases to be "independent"
(unabhängig) of man, for Being always maintains the primacy, but it does mean that
the process-of-truth does not come-to-pass except in relationship to man. See G,
pp. 65-66.
1 1 G, pp. 51-52 (gelassen, ge-eignet, gehört), 63-64 (Herkunft seines Wesens,
vereignet), 52 (Gegnet-vergegnet), 52 and 64 (geeignet, vereignet). Cf. N, II, p. 482
(eingelassen).
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the word detects the suggestion of an opening-up to the Open.
In this case, we may interpret the expand-ing to mean the constituting of man as ek-sistence, which, if we resort to the language
of Heidegger I, we may understand as the "throwing" of the
There. In any case, this expand-ing of man by which Being
"throws" or, according to the present terminology, "releases"
man into ek-sistence, is what we mean by the relation of Being
to man. That the whole process of expand-ing should assume
the guise of a hail, or an address to man, is natural enough after
"Re-collection," but the conception will not be elaborated until
W D (1952).12
B.

THOUGHT

Up to this point we have considered thought from the viewpoint of the Being that it thinks. When we shift the focus to man
himself, what does the essay tell us? Briefly this: that thought,
to the extent that it proceeds from man, is in reciprocal relation
to thought as it proceeds from Being. This and only this. The
relation must be comprehended in all its purity, and this means
that it must be considered as sustained in its own essence as a
relation by the term to which it refers. 13 More precisely, how is
this to be understood ?
Thought in man as relation-to-Being may be conceived in two
distinct moments, both of which have Being as origin as well as
term. The first is the basic structure of man as ecstatic open-ness
to the Open, as expansion to the Expanse. This we may call
thought in the broad sense and understand it to be simply eksistence as such. The second moment we call thought in the
strict sense, whereby the structural relationship is brought to
its authentic fulfillment. In the present essay, this second
moment of thought is called "waiting," and we shall examine it
in detail presently. Here we wish only to insist that thought-aswaiting is grounded in a still prior moment, sc. in the ek-sistent
structure of man as the There of Being. " A s a matter of fact,
[thought-as-] waiting, provided it be foundational, sc. a
1 2 G, pp. 52-56, 59 (Gegnet, vergegnet, Vergegnis), 32-33, 52, 73 (angesprochen,
angerufen).
18 G, p. 51 (gemäße Verhältnis).
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thoroughly de-cisive waiting, is grounded in the fact that we
[already] appertain to that for which we wait / ' 1 4 The first moment
of thought is what the writer understands now by the antecedent
comprehension of Being that places man from the very beginning inside the hermeneutic circle, sc. it is man's constitutional appurtenance to Being, by reason of the fact that Beingas-expanse has expand-ed him to make him its own. As we
understand it, the reciprocal relation between Being and man
is the hermeneutic circle.
However, it is the second moment of thought which is the
theme of our research. Heidegger characterizes it as "waiting."
B y this we are to understand a deliberately assumed attitude of
attent-iveness to Being, which simply lets Being come-topresence as itself, sc. as the Expanse. It is the supreme moment
of thought and in the last analysis all that man brings to the
process. Asked what man must "do," the author replies: " W e
must do nothing but wait." 1 5 He insists that we speak of
"waiting," for we can a-wait only a being that we have proposed
already as an object. 1 6 Thought waits, indeed, for "something,"
but this "something" does not come to it in the form of a (representation. "When we wait, we leave that for which we wait
open . . . because the waiting releases itself unto the Open itself.
This non-presentative waiting comports a double aspect: a
liberation from presentations, even from Being-as-horizon-forpresentation; a liberation for Being, a resignation, a release unto
the Open. 18 A liberation, thought is the achieving of freedom.
The same double form of liberation in thought is articulated
1 4 "In der Tat gründet das Warten auf etwas, gesetzt daß es ein wesentliches,
und d.h. ein alles entscheidendes Warten ist, darin, daß wir in das gehören, worauf
wir warten." (G, p. 52). The terms "strict " - " b r o a d " and "structural"-' 4 functional"
are not Heidegger's but are introduced by the writer for purposes of clarity. They
seem harmless enough, provided "structural" be understood not statically but
dynamically, as we saw in the analysis of concern (Sorge) in SZ.
is "Wir sollen nichts tun sondern warten." (G, p. 37). Later Heidegger will suggest
that the waiting is also a hoping. See US, p. 100.
16 " . . . Das Warten hat eigentlich keinen Gegenstand." (G, p. 44)- Note affinity
between waiting-for and attending-to (attent-iveness).
*7 " I m Warten lassen wir das, worauf wir warten, o f f e n . . . . Weil das Warten in
das Offene selbst sich einläßt
" (G, p. 44)- It is as attent-ive waiting that we
understand thought to be "preparationai" (G, p. 33).
1 8 V.g. G, pp. 46 (loszulassen), 59 (transzendentalen Vorstellen), 46 (überlassen),
52 (Gelassenheit).
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in somewhat different terms when the release is described as a
"passage unto" the Open, as if the thinker were antecedently
outside of it. If "outside" be taken to mean that the thinker has
no relation to the Open prior to thought (strict sense), this is
certainly untrue, for, as we just said, his very structure is such
that from the beginning he ek-sists only by reason of his ec-static
relationship to Being. The very fact that beings-as-objects are
always proposed to him within the horizon of Being (that "side"
of the Open that is turned toward presentative thought) bears
testimony to this antecedent relation to the Open as such. But
if "outside" be taken to mean that initially the thinker adverts
only to his presentations, or at best to the horizon within which
they appear, forgetting the Open itself as such, then it is perfectly legitimate to say that "first of all and for the most part" he
ek-sists outside of the Open and must "enter into" it by way of
release. Note, however, that here we rejoin with remarkable
exactness the ontic-ontological structure of There-being in SZ,
where There-being, despite its unique (ontological) prerogative,
is "first of all and for the most part" lost in everydayness. And
when we read now (1944-45) that (thought-as-) waiting sojourns
in the "hither and thither" which this "yes and no" character
of man's appurtenance to the Open implies, have we not every
right to interpret this as the " v o r t e x " of his fallen condition? 19
The thinker's task in waiting, then, is to free himself from the
constrictions of his (re) presentations and abandon himself with
full freedom to the Open as such. It is to bring to fulfillment, as
far as lies within his power, his structural relationship to Being,
sc. that by which he himself is as man. In a word, he must
achieve authenticity. B y what gesture is this accomplished?
Not, we are told, by sheer willing. With this, Heidegger parts
company with his German predecessors for whom thought was
fundamentally a willing. This was true, he claims, even for Kant,
insofar as Kant conceived thought as a "spontaneity." 20 If not
1 0 G, pp. 50-51 (sich einlassen), 53 (Hin und Her zwischen Ja und Nein). Cf. W W ,
p. 22 (Hin und Her, Umgetrieben hei t) and SZ, p. 178 (Wirbel).
20 G, pp. 51, 53 (eigentliche Gelassenheit, gemäße Verhältnis, wahrhaft), 31-32
(Kant). Since waiting is a n on-willing, Heidegger refuses to call it an "activity" of
man, for activity and passivity, he claims, are in one way or another categories of
willing. Not an activity, it is nonetheless an "achieving" (Tun), and, indeed, the
highest ot which man is capable (G, p. 35).
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by willing, then by a non-willing! This must be properly understood, however. T h e expression itself may be taken to mean
either that foundational thought must be the willing renunciation of willing, or t h a t thought has nothing to do with any type
of willing at all. Heidegger prefers the first sense, and we understand him to mean this renunciation as an effort to refrain from
imposing conditions of human origin upon Being as to-bethought. The classic example, for Heidegger, of thought which
imposes its own conditions on the to-be-thought is that which
unfolds in the scientific experiment, which, h^ claims, is essentially an " a t t a c k " upon its object. 2 1
But the effort at non-willing must be a deliberate one, hence
a willing non-willing. If these two terms seem hard to reconcile,
the sense is that
. . . the beginnings of [man's] self-resignation unto [hisj appurtenance to
the Expanse require a touch of willing, that disappears, however, in
resignation and is completely extinguished in release.22
We detect here the s a m e " t o u c h " of willing that we had to suppose in SZ in order t o speak of There-being's docility to the voice
of conscience as a willingness to be called to authenticity. In
both cases, it is an acquiescence to Being that is sufficiently
voluntary for man t o have the power to refuse it. Acquiescence
constitutes man's free endorsement of his own freedom as it
rises out of its origin in Being, itself the ultimate Freedom, the
open Expanse that c a n b y no means be conceived as a willing.
This liberation is m a n ' s simple acceptance of himself as expansion unto Being-as-expanse, where the expansion, proceeding
from Being, is in turn another form of his liberation. 23
In SZ, this moment of authenticity, as we know, was called
"re-solve." What is i t called here, when conceived as the culmination of thought? T h e v e r y same thing, sc. "re-solve" - and
G, PP- 32-33 (des erst genannten), 71 (Angriff).
22 " . . . der Anlaß zum Sicheinlassen in die Zugehörigkeit zur Gegnet bedürfe
einer Spur des Wollens, welche Spur jedoch im Sicheinlassen verschwindet und vollends in der Gelassenheit ausgelöscht ist." (G, p. 59}. Cf. SZ, p. 288 (Gewissen-habenwollen).
28 G, pp. 60 (schwerlich als Wille), 61 (Empfängnis), 33 (Sammlung zwingt, ohne
Gewalt). In the rejection of Being-as-Will, we recognize, of course the critique of
Nietzsche. For Heidegger, willing means a working (Wirken), or an acting, whose
proper element is actuality (Wirklichkeit). He wants to get beyond the pale of
actuality and non-actuality, and into the realm of sheer open-ness.
21
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understood in the very same way: "as the s£//-assumed selfopening of There-being for the Open. . . . " 24 At this point, Heidegger formulates explicitly the thesis which all of the previous
research had led us to infer: " T h e essence of thought, sc. release
unto [Being], is re-solve unto truth in its presenc-ing." 25
This is the essential. What else the essay tells us about the
nature of thought is merely supplementary. In particular, note:
1. Thought as "In-stance"
The attitude of re-solve, when achieved, is not attained once
and for all. The thinker must persevere in it b y striving again
and again to make it more pure. If by re-solve authenticity is
achieved, by perseverance it is sustained, and it is only when the
thinker sustains authenticity that he may be said to repose in
himself as what he is. To express re-solve as it continues into an
abiding state of repose, the author suggests the term:
"in-stance." 26
2. Thought and Language
Re-solve which acquiesces to Being can never "describe" that
to which it yields, for any type of description is already an
objectification. What it can do, however, is bring it to expression
in language by giving it a name. The process of bringing-intowords, then, comes-to-pass in the same way that thought-asre-solve lets the Open be open. It has its origin not in man but in
Aoyog, or, as it is now called, "Being-as-name-able." All that
man does is articulate the name which the Name-able discloses
to him, inasmuch as he attends to its uttering. Soon (1946) we
shall be told that thought utters the "dictation" of Being in its
truth. The principal example of this naming-process in the
24 " . . . als das eigens übernommene Sichöffnen des Daseins für das Offene..
(G, p. 61). Heidegger's italics.
25 "Dann wäre das Wesen des Denkens, nämlich die Gelassenheit zur Gegnet, die
Entschlossenheit zur wesenden Wahrheit." (Gf p. 61). Writer's italics.
28 G, pp. 61-62 (Inständigkeit). Cf. N, II (1940-41), pp. 29,485; WM (1943), p. 50;
and HW (1946), p. 322. In re-solve thus sustained, Heidegger finds the genuine sense
of what Kant called the "spontaneity" of thought. Incidentally, note how the lines
of verse (p. 62) resonate (for better or for worse) with all the principal themes of
Heidegger II. In the prologue to WM (1949)» in-stance seems to be taken in a broader
sense than here, as identical with ek-sistence (WM, p. 15).
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present essay is the designation of thought as "release," with
minor specimens galore: Being-as-expanse, the expand-ing of
man, re-solve as in-stance and, in the final pages, release as
Heraclitus1 'Ayx 1 ?* 0 ^- 2 7

II. Nihilism in Terms of Being-as-History
The Nietzsche essay tells us very little that is new. 28 Its significance consists largely in the precision of certain notions that
appear in "Towards an Analysis of Release," and, like the latter,
it anticipates the further development of WD. Our treatment
may be brief.
A.

BEING

In the essay on "Release" we have just seen how man in his
essence is "released" or "expand-ed unto" Being-as-expanse.
Now the same process is described in terms of the negativity
interior to the process. For every time that Being, as the process
of non-concealment, renders beings manifest, it simultaneously
"retreats" (Ausbleiben), sc. finds some way to hide itself as itself,
and thereby abides (Bleibe) in concealment.
Now "the retreating of non-concealment as such and the
abiding of concealment come-to-presence in a [single] abode
which serves as shelter for the proper nature of both [positivity
and negativity]. . . . " 29 But the "shelter" (Unterkunft) is not
something distinct from this negatived process. On the contrary!
The shelter for the Being-process comes-to-presence along with
this positive-negative process itself in the very moment of its
arrival among beings. In fact, " . . . this arrival of Being is in
itself the arrival of a shelter for [Being]. . . . " 3 0 And where pre87 G, pp. 43 (beschreiben, gegenständlich vorführen), 46 (Wort nie vorstellt),
48-49 (Nennbare sagen, Nachsagen), 72 ('Ay^tpaa^J-Cf. HW,p. 303 (sagt das Diktat).
88 For the general tenor of the argument, see N, II, pp. 337-338, 342, 350 (Metaphysik eigentliche Nihilismus); 353-357, 383, 369-370 (Sein selbst ausbleibt); 372
(Rätsel).
29 "Das Ausbleiben der UnVerborgenheit als solcher und das Bleiben der Verborgenheit wesen in einer Bleibe, die dem eigenen Wesen beider schon die Unterkunft
i s t . . . . " (N, II, p. 357).
80 " . . . Diese Ankunft ist in sich die Ankunft ihrer Unterkunft
" (N, II, p.
357).

nihilism

in

t e r m s

of

b e i n g - a s - h i s t o r y

511

cisely is the shelter for Being among beings? In the nature of
man! This explains the intimacy between Being and man.
. . This 'where' as the There of the [aforementioned] abode
belongs to Being itself, 'is1 Being itself. That is why it is called
There-being." 31 The There, then, is clearly the There of a negatived process.
We have another indication of the importance of negativity
in Heidegger's conception of the There. B y reason of its negativity, Being itself may, indeed, retreat, or rather withdraw, but
in this withdrawal (Entzug) Being draws-with (Bezug) it the
nature of man so as thereby to constitute that relation by which
man becomes the shelter among beings where Being arrives. 32
This conception of Being as drawing There-being with itself as
it withdraws will return for significant development in WD.
There, too, we shall find fully thematized the note that returns
again here as a special sign of Being's indigence, namely that
Being is in want of its There. 33
B.

THOUGHT

There are special overtones of negativity, too, in the way the
present discussion conceives of thought. As in the preceding
essay, here, too, thought is interpreted in the first place as the
structural relationship between man and Being as it has just
been described:
The ecstatic in-stance in the Open of that place where the Being-process
[comes-to-pass] is, as .the relationship to Being (whether to beings as
such or to Being itself), the essenc-ing of thought. . . . 3 4

But precisely because this presenc-ing of Being always comports
a retreat within beings, it is easy for thought in its functioning
to forget the Being-process. Such is the case with the thought
that is proper to metaphysics:
3 1 " . . . Dieses Wo als das Da der Bleibe gehört zum Sein selbst, 4tst1 Sein selbst
und heißt darum das Da-sein." (N, II, p. 358). Heidegger's italics. Cf. p. 377.
32

N , I I , p. 368.

See N, II, pp. 390-394 (Brauch, Not).
"Das ekstatische Innestehen im Offenen der Ortschaft des Seins ist als das
Verhältnis zum Sein, sei es zum Seienden als solchem, sei es zum Sein selbst, das.
Wesen des Denkens. .
(N, II, p. 358). Heidegger italicizes whole.
33
34
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. . . It does not reject Being itself, but at the same time it does not hang
on to [an appreciation of] the retreating of Being as such. Thought [of
this kind] does not of itself respond to the withdrawal of Being. 3 5

We recognize here the same pattern of negativity that characterized man's fallen-ness in SZ. If thought is to be true to itself
and achieve authenticity (the author does not use the term here)
and thereby overcome the nihilism that metaphysics implies,
the thinker must respond to Being in both its positivity and its
negativity: in its positivity, for Being always gives a "promise
of itself" even when it retreats; 3 6 in its negativity, sc. in its
withdrawal, for inasmuch as it is a " . . . withdrawal as such of
Being, [it] remains a manner in which Being [comes-to-presence]
- an arrival. . . . " 37 In other words, authentic thought must step
back (Schritt zurück) from metaphysical thought and simply let
Being in both its positivity and its negativity be. 38 It must also
recognize and accept the negativity of itself as Being's There.
Such thought, then, is a "dangerous" thought, for the thinker
must acquiesce in the danger that his own essence find its term
in negation, sc. be annihilated. 39 Thought that is true to itself,
then, is a thorough-going acceptance of Being as the negatived
process of truth. Notice how clearly one can detect here resonances of SZ, where authenticity is achieved in re-solve by
acquiescing in the finitude of one's transcendence in complete
freedom unto death.
RESUME

In "Release" we are told that Being (Aoyo^, Expanse) releases (expands) man unto ek-sistence as an attend-ant of Aoyo<;.
As an attend-ant, man s task is to wait upon (attend to) Aoyo^
by releasing himself unto Aoyo<; in turn. The achieving of this
reciprocal release is the full functioning of thought. It is re-solve.
But we must never forget - and "Nihilism in Terms of Being35 " . . . Es wehrt das Sein selbst nicht ab. aber es hält sich auch nicht an das
Ausbleiben des Seins als solchen. Das Denken entspricht von sich aus nicht dem Entzug des Seins." (N, II, p. 359).
3 6 V.g. N, II, pp. 369, 383, 390 (Versprechen seiner selbst).
37 " . . . welches Sichentziehen noch, nämlich als solches des Seins, eine Weise des
: Seins bleibt - eine A n k u n f t . . . . " (N, II, p. 371).
88 N, II, pp. 368, 370, 389, 390 (Schritt zurück); 371, 3^9» 397 (läßt).
a® N, II, pp. 392-394 (Gefahr, Gefährdung).

nihilism

in

terms

of

being-as-history

513

as-history" reminds us again - that re-solve is a release unto
Being-as-negatived, even though this may mean acquiescing in
the eventual annihilation of the thinker as Being's There. Only
by a thought such as this can Nietzsche's nihilism as a mittence
of negatived Being be successfully overcome.
Briefly: the two essays are at once an explicitation of the
"Aoyoq" essay and the first draft of WD.

c h a p t e r viii

T H E S A Y I N G OF

ANAXIMANDER

"The Saying of Anaximander" is another dialogue, sc. the
re-trieve of a gnome that comes down to us from one of the
earliest thinkers in the West. 1 Committed to writing during the
enforced retirement of the de-Nazification period (1946), the
essay deals with a theme that had been treated in the Freiburg
courses as early as the summer semester of 1932 under the title
"The Origin of Western Philosophy/' Only the latest version of
the author's reflections is available to the public. If this does not
permit us to trace textually any development in Heidegger's
thought, we know, at least, that what is said here is the result of
long maturation. Hence the text, more than ordinarily obscure,
is to be interpreted in terms of what we know of the development
between 1932 and 1946. In this perspective, much of the inscrutability disappears. W e polarize the content of the essay around
two general remarks: A. Being, B. Thought.
A.

BEING

We have been told often enough that Being is the process of
negatived truth. This conception was last developed in the
Heraclitus-analysis (1943) and we are going to see that in the
present essay it is orchestrated again still more elaborately. We
are interested in what the analysis adds by way of precision and,
more particularly, in what way it advances our understanding
of the problem. Our treatment falls naturally into two parts: 1.
The Text, 2. The Advance.
1

" D e r Spruch des Anaximander,** HW, pp. 296-343.
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j. The Text
The present study orchestrates the same theme three separate
times with different materials and increasing complexity but
without destroying the unity of the whole.
a. reveai<;-9&opa — The Anaximander fragment as given by
Diels contains two full sentences:
<ov St Y) ysveai<; scm, toZq
oticn xotl TT)V <p&opav ziq Taura ylvea&ai xara TO XPE<*>v. StSovat yap
aura StxTjv xat xiaiv OCXXTQXOK; TTJ<; a8ixia<; xara r*]v T O U X P O ° U TCX^IV.
Burnet, however, rejects the major part of the first sentence
on critical grounds and Heidegger accepts Burnet's reading,
though not completely his reasons. There are two words in particular, yivzciq and cp&opa, which, even if they do not pertain to
the original text, nevertheless bear faithful testimony to Anaximander's thought, the author feels, and the opportunity to
explain them offers him the first occasion to develop the theme
of Being's self-concealing-revealment.
In the simplest terms, Heidegger takes yeve<rt?-<p^opa to be
correlative and their unity to be understood in terms of <puai<;,
interpreted as the self-illuminating process of universal emergence
and submergence:
V

2

. . . r^veau; is the coming forth and arriving at the [condition of being]
non-concealed. <D«&opdc means for that which has [thus] arrived to leave
the non-concealed [condition] and pass into a concealed [state]. . . . 8

Important here is to note that yev£crt<; and <p&opa are not to be
understood as taking place successively in time but as complementary moments of the same dynamic movement by which
beings come-to-presence as such. Such a dynamic conception of
Being, of course, gives the author warrant to reject the traditional dichotomy of Being-Becoming which implies that Being
is purely static. 4
b. THE NATURE OF OV - The second thematic development
is more elaborate and comes in the analysis of what the early
Full text cited according to Diels in HW, p. 296.
" . . . Die
ist das Hervor- und Ankommen in das Unverborgene. Die
9&opa bedeutet: als das Angekommene aus dem Unverborgenen hinweg- und abgehen
in das Verborgene
" (HW, p. 315).
4 See HW, p. 316. Cf. EM, pp. 73-74 and V A , p. ißz.
2

3
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Greeks understood by ov, an analysis which the author makes by
re-trieving the word in Homer. In the beginning of the Iliad (I,
68-72), Homer speaks of Calchas as wisest of the seers because
he comprehends all that is, was and will be. The word for
"what is" is sov (therefore ov), sc. " t h a t which is present,"
whether this be future (eaarojxeva) or past (npo eovra). The nonpresent, however, is equally well known to the seer as the present,
for in this lies his superior comprehension. Now Heidegger explains "present" by a play on the German gegen (gegenwärtig),
which normally means "against" and to the everyday mind
suggests that which in a " n o w " of time stands "against" the
knower in the sense of an object (Gegenstand). Here, that is by
no means the case. Gegen must suggest for us Gegend, sc. "domain." That which is present means that which has " . . . arrived
at [the condition of] whiling within the domain of Non-concealment. . . . " 5 That which is non-present is that which is not
found in this domain, either because it has not yet arrived at
non-concealment (earcrajxeva), or because it has passed out of the
domain into concealment again (7upo eovra). B u t in either case,
the fact that it can be spoken of at all means that it is related to
the domain and in this sense is illumined, if only conversely, by
its light.
W e understand now w h y the seer in seeing " w h a t is, was and
will b e " sees beings insofar as they are both present, sc. nonconcealed, and non-present, sc. concealed. In other words, he
sees them as they are, inseparable mixture of revealment and
concealment. We must introduce a refinement in terminology,
then, which is more than a nicety: beings are, insofar as they
come-to-presewc£; they come-to-presence, insofar as they emerge
into non-concealment, become p r e s e t ; but non-concealment
cannot escape negativity, nor can the beings that become
present through it - they remain in some w a y or other nonpresent, sc. concealed; therefore that which comes to presence
is a mixture of the present and the non-present; insofar as that
which comes-to-pres£wc£ is negatived, sc. non-present, it is that
6 " . . . angekommen in der Weile innerhalb der Gegend der Unverborgenheit...."
{HW, p. 319). See pp. 317-320. The word "whiling" (Weile, Verweilen, etc.) we met
in "Origin of a Work of Art," and it occurs frequently here. We take it to mean "is"
with a strong connotation of time. It takes on a new richness of connotation by reason
of the essay itself.
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which does-no/-come-to-pres0MC£.6 What is important here is to
see that we are simply refining the terminology of what we have
known for a long time. In any case, who will deny that, if the
seer sees this all at once, he is very wise indeed?
c. THE SAYING - The received reading of Anaximander's
saying runs as follows: XOCTOC T O xPec*>v- SiSovat yap auxa SIXTJV xotL
TtCTiv dXX-rjXot? t9)? aSixia?. This compound sentence has two
clearly distinguishable parts: in the first, according to Heidegger,
the focus is on Being; in the second, on beings. The theme of
both is identical: the process by which beings come-to-presence
in non-concealment. The relation between the two clauses suggests the relation - and the distinction - between Being and
beings: the ontological difference. Since we have been thinking
the problem so far in terms of beings (Övroc), let us retain the same
perspective now and begin, as the author does, with Clause II.
i. Concerning beings (in their Being) - <xut<x: We are dealing
with beings in the sense that we have just discussed them (Svra),
therefore with that which comes-to-presence through a mixture of
what is present and non-present, sc. that which emerges into
negatived truth.
aSixEa: The word denotes literally the privation (a-) of S i x t j ,
hence can be understood only in terms of SUtq. What, then is
Sixrj ? What is its privation ?
We have met the word SIxtj in EM as it appeared in Sophocles,
and translated it basically as "organization" or "arrangement."
Let us retain the latter word now, for it is sufficiently flexible
to allow the legalistic connotation the conventional translators
have found in the term (which Heidegger, of course, rejects) and
at the same time permits us to understand the author's own
sense, the complete meshing of positivity and negativity, of
revealment and concealment, in the coming-to-presence of beings.
The process of negatived emerging he calls the "whiling" of
these beings.7 It is supremely important to keep clearly in mind
• Based on H W , pp. 319-320. In this paragraph, we use " t h a t which comes-topresence" for das Anwesende; " t h a t which is present" for gegenwärtig; " t h a t which
is not present** for ungegenwärtig; " t h a t which does not come to presence" for das
A bwesende.
7 The author calls beings the Je-WeiHge, a play on words, whereby he suggests
t h a t any given being (je-) is as a being, insofar as it whiles (-weilige) b y coming-topresence in negatived fashion. See H W , pp. 322-323, 327-329 and passim.
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that the whiling of beings is a dynamic movement, and that at
the very moment that beings are emerging into revealment, they
are submerging again into concealment. For beings are never
completely static. Nor are they to be understood merely as
proceeding out of darkness and returning into darkness, but
themselves as undiluted light separating the two darknesses.
Darkness remains at all times interior to the light, helping to
constitute it as light - as light that is finite. This intermingling
of light and darkness is the whiling of beings that we now call
their dynamic "arrangement" as beings (Sixtj). " . . . W h i l i n g
comes-to-presence in [this] arrangement." 8
So far, so good, but the real question is not arrangement so
much as the privation of arrangement (a-Stxta). What sense can
this have? The author suggests that, despite the intrinsic dynamism of the process by which beings emerge, there remains
interior to the process a certain "drag," an inertia that is subject
to some hidden law of gravity which gives it the tendency to
impede the movement, diminish or destroy its fluidity. The result
is that within every being there is the impulse to freeze into
rigidity, to instigate an insurrection against the law of dynamic
movement and perdure in some given form that is completely
static. The sense here is that beings somehow strive to refuse
the negativity that is proper to them and to become constant in
their revealment, as if this were possible. This is what is meant
b y "mere" constancy. It is completely different from what we
might call "authentic" constancy, b y which we mean simply the
abiding character ( 9 6 ^ is emergent-ataZmg-Power) of the
whiling process, in which positivity and negativity play coordinating röles.9 Such a tendency to negate the whiling process
(arrangement) as such may justly be called "dis-arrangement"
(a-Stxta). How it is possible for beings, that at all costs must not
be conceived anthropomorphically, to "refuse" or to "accept"
8 " . . . Weile west in der Fuge.' 1 (HW, p. 327). If forced to look for analogies to
describe this phenomenon, could we say, perhaps, that beings are not like actors who
step before a curtain, then disappear behind it, but rather they are as if fashioned out
of turbulent quicksand which is in the process of disappearing at the very moment
that it becomes visible? This is not Heidegger's terminology, however, and has many
disadvantages.
• HW, pp. 328 (beharrt, versteift sich), 331 (Sucht, Neigung, beständige Andauern),
328 (bloßen Beständigkeit).

the

saying

of

anaximander

519

their negativity we are not told. Still less are we told why there
must be such a tendency in the first place.
SiSovai . . . Sfocrjv: But this drag toward dis-arrangement is
only the tendency toward rigidity, nothing more. The fact is
that arrangement maintains the upper hand over dis-arrangement.10 But how? By maintaining the proper mixture of
negativity in the process through which beings emerge. " . . . What
comes-to-presence is present insofar as it lets itself belong to
[sc. be negated by] the non-present. . . . " 1 1
Ticiv OCXXYJXO^: All that we have said so far pertains to beings
as such. The beings we are dealing with are not simply an arbitrary plurality, however, or even a given region of beings. They
are all beings, coming-to-presence as they do in and as an
ensemble. Within the ensemble, there is, of course, a manifold
of relationships that bind individual beings to one another and
to the ensemble as such. Each being, in order to be itself, must
not only maintain the upper hand over its own tendency to disarrangement, but must retain, too, its place in the general
pattern, maintain the relationships which bind it to other beings
and to the whole. There prevails among beings a sort of mutual
deference to one another which we may call less anthropomorphically "com-patibility." 1 2 The dynamic process by which beings
come-to-presence in negatived fashion is the process by which
they while in com-patibility with other beings within the domain of non-concealment.
xoti: But com-patibility between beings supposes first of all the
harmony of revealment-concealment within the beings themselves. The one follows as a consequence upon the other.13
1 0 HW, p. 333 (Verwindung). Why does the author use Verwindung rather than
the more usual Überwindung (v.g. Überwindung der Metaphysik) ? Perhaps to suggest
that, since the drag towards dis-arrangement continues in beings, it must be mastered
continually, not conquered once and for all and then put aside, as Überwindung might
suggest. The more precise sense of Verwindung, then, would be "maintain-ing the
upper hand over."
1 1 " . . . Das gegenwärtig Anwesende ist das gegenwärtige, insofern es in das
ungegenwärtige sich gehören l ä ß t : . . . " (HW, p. 329). It is worth nothing that for
Heidegger it is in terms of such a process as this that we must seek the essence of
tragedy (HW, p. 330). Wouldn't it be a delicious irony to take this as the point de
depart for another study of Heidegger I considered as the philosopher of "tragic
existence," as seen by Heidegger II?
1 8 HW, pp. 304, 315, 323 (Seiende im Ganzen), 331-332, 333, 335 (Rücksicht,
Ruch).
" HW, p. 333.
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With this we absolve Clause II of Anaximander's saying. If it
be taken as a totality, what can be said of it? It enunciates in
obscure language a thesis that rings familiar: beings-in-theensemble (aura) come-to-presence insofar as, in com-patibility
with each other (rtcrtv aXX^Xoi?), they overcome (StXovai . . . SIXTJV)
the tendency within themselves to deny the negativity (aSixias)
that is a very condition of their presenc-ing. It is thus that they
while in presence according to the law of arrangement (SLXTJ).
All of this is plausible enough, perhaps. In any case, this much
is clear: the saying deals with beings in their Being and the law
of negativity is essential to the process.
ii. Concerning the Being (of beings) ~ If Clause II thinks from
beings up to Being, Clause I, as Heidegger reads the three words
that compose it, thinks from Being down (XOCTOC) to beings. The
essential word is rb xpewv, and the author claims that this is the
earliest formula for Being that we have, " . . . the oldest name
by which thought brings the Being of beings into language." 1 4
What does the word say ? We must re-trieve the sense of it by
going beyond the conventional meaning of "necessity" to its
origin in XP*6^ XP^F*1» meaning "to handle" something (cf.
Xetp: hand). Heidegger translates it by Brauch, a word that conventionally means "use," whose re-trieved sense is likewise a
"handling." In giving to Being the name TO XP£(*>V> Anaximander
would suggest that Being " . . . hands something to its own
essence and keeps it in hand, preserving it in its truth as comingto-presence in this way." 1 5 The author claims that Anaximander
conceives of Being as handing to beings their essence, more precisely as handing-out beings in that by which they come-topresence, as im-parting to them their part in the process of
whiling. The whiling is the whole dynamic movement of negatived presenc-ing that we have called arrangement. Curiously
enough, the author speaks in such a way as to imply not only
that Being hands essence to beings but that it hands beings over
to (their) essence, as if beings were manu-ducted by Being into
14 " . . . der älteste Name, worin das Denken das Sein des Seienden zur Sprache
bringt." (HW, p. 334).
1 8 " . . . etwas seinem eigenen Wesen aushändigen und es als so Anwesendes in
der wahrenden H a n d behalten." (HW, pp. 338-339)- See p. 337 (xp&ü).
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the process of coming-to-presence that clearly holds the primacy
over them. 16
s a Y s something, too, about the problem of
The word
finitude. The arrangement that fuses in beings positivity and
negativity is that which establishes these beings within their
limits (7rspoc<;). " . . . The arrangement of whiling puts-an-end-to
and de-limits that which comes-to-presence as such. . . . " 1 7 Now
if Being hands beings out and thereby hands out to beings their
part in the whiling process, then it imparts to them their limits
(7tepa^), their finitude. Furthermore, since Being is not that
which it hands out, Being is without limits: obretpov. If Being
(apX*o) is limit-less (foretpov), however, does this not mean that
it is non-finite? Not necessarily. Only that it is Non-being!
The Advance
All that we have said thus far, however, is simply a more
complicated orchestration of the same theme that we have heard
many times before. Does the essay hold anything new? It would
seem so. The problem of the ontological difference becomes
thematic and for a brief but significant moment assumes the
center of the stage.
The importance of TO XP£&>V *S NO* only that it is a name for
Being but that it expresses the relation between Being and beings.
What this relation is we have seen already in its essentials when
we examined Tb xps&v as a hand-ling of beings (hand-ing them
out, keeping them in hand). To xp£^v, we repeat, names this
relation but it does not name it as such. On the contrary, " . . . in
the process of coming-to-presence as such, the relation to that
which comes-to-presence is announced, and, indeed, in such a
way that coming-to-presence comes into words as this relationship/' 18 and, conversely, this relationship finds expression
in and as the process of coming-to-presence as such.
X6 Perhaps it is straining out gnats, but it is interesting to note that Heidegger (HW,
P. 339) conceives the process of im-parting (erteilt) to beings part (Anteil) in the
whiling-process, when the conception of "participation" as manner of speaking about
the emergence of the ontological difference presumably would be (because a relapse
into metaphysics) anathema.
1 7 " . . . Die Fuge der Weile be-endet und be-grenztdas Anwesende als ein solches.
. . . " (HW, p. 339).
1 8 M . . . Wohl dagegen mag sich im Anwesen als solchem die Beziehung auf das
Anwesende bekunden, so zwar, daß das Anwesen als diese Beziehung zu Wort kommt."
(HW, pp. 336-337). Heidegger's italics. See p. 334 (Beziehung).
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We see more clearly Heidegger's relationship to the early
Greeks and his own task, as he sees it, with regard to them.
Being bestowed its light upon them through a privileged experience, and they, in response, brought Being into words. They
named Being as such and, implicitly, its relationship to beings,
but the (ontological) difference between Being and beings
remained as such forgotten. What is made clear now is that even
the pre-Platonic thinkers were oblivious to the ontological difference as such. For Heidegger, their superiority to Plato and his
successors seems to have been their awareness of Being as
d-XYj&eta and their corresponding docility to its bidding, but to
the extent that they did not name the ontological difference as
such, they too were victims of forgottenness, for " . . . the forgottenness of Being is the forgottenness of the difference between Being and beings." 1 9 Y e t this was not simply a forgetfulness, hence a weakness, on their part. The true origin of
their forgottenness was Being itself, which, in disclosing itself
to them in their epoch of history, concealed itself (and inevitably
so) as well.
We conclude by adverting to t w o texts which, typographically speaking, are almost perfectly juxtaposed on opposite pages
of HW, and which we now wish to confront with each other so
that we may see clearly the paradox:
. . . In xpeckv, when [we] think it as the [Being of beings], somehow or
other the relationship of [Being] to [beings] is thought, especially if the
relation of Being to beings can only come from Being and rest in the
presenc-ing of Being. 20

Add to this in the same sense a later remark:
. . . The hand-ling process [of Being] hands out . . . [beings] in such a way
that it antecedently contains within itself the [beings that are] handed
out, gathers them into itself and guards them as [beings] in their
[Being].21
1 9 " . . . Die Seins Vergessenheit ist die Vergessenheit des Unterschiedes des Seins
zum Seienden." (HW, p. 336). Heidegger italicizes whole. Cf. US, p. 134.
80 * ' . . . Einmal, daß es das Anwesen des Anwesenden nennt, zum anderen, daß
im xpecov, wenn es das Anwesen des Anwesenden denkt, irgendwie die Beziehung des
Anwesens zum Anwesenden gedacht ist, wenn anders die Beziehung des Seins zum
Seienden nur aus dem Sein kommen und im W e s e n des Seins beruhen kann." (HW,
P- 334).
2 1 " . . . Der Brauch händigt Fug und Ruch in der Weise aus, daß er das Ausgehändigte sich im vorhinein vorbehält, zu sich versammelt und es als das Anwesende
in das Anwesen birgt." (HW, p. 339).

the

saying

of

anaximander

523

In both of these texts, the complete primacy of Being over
beings is emphasized. Both name the ontological difference, but
neither as such. To meditate either is to think Being but not the
ontological difference. In this perspective, the statement of WM:
Ep (1943) seems the most obvious thing in the world: " . . . Being
indeed comes-to-presence without beings. . . . " 22
But on the opposite page of HW, we read: " . . . It is the
business of Being to be the Being of beings." 23 The implication
is that Being, for all its primacy (and the genitive would indicate
the genesis of beings from Being), can not come-to-presence without beings. This implication is confirmed when we learn that
when beings, by resisting the drag to dis-arrangement, maintain
the arrangement in themselves, they do not maintain this arrangement precisely for themselves but for Being, granting to
Being the arrangew^ which, as a process of arranging, Being
needs in order to be itself.24 " . . . The [Being] of [beings] is such
a process of maintaining the upper hand [over the drag toward
-dis-arrangement]. . . . " 25 This text thinks the ontological difference as such. We are prepared already (1946) to give a sense to
the unannounced change of the original Epilogue text (1943) to
its direct opposite (1949): " . . . Being never comes-to-presence
without beings. . . . " 26
Finally, this latter perspective permits us to surmise the
answer to two questions raised above: how can beings be said to
resist, refuse the drag toward dis-arrangement? how explain the
necessity of this drag ? We are left to our own resources here but
propose the following hypothesis:
We begin with the second question. Since it is the business of
Being to be the Being of beings, it cannot be itself without them.
But since beings are intrinsically limited because of the negativity interior to them, Being, too, even if limit-less (because
Non-being), is as intrinsically finite as the beings it hands out.
.. das Sein wohl west ohne das Seiende,..." (WM, p. 46). Writer's italics.
" . . . Aber die Sache des Seins ist es, das Sein des Seienden zu sein." (HW, p.
335)- Heidegger's italics.
24 Argument: compare " . . . Wem aber lassen die Anwesenden den Fug der Fuge
gehören?" (HW, p. 333) with " . . . Der Fug gehört dem, dem entlang Anwesen, und
d.h. Verwindung west. . .." (HW, p. 335).
25 " . . . A n w e s e n
des Anwesenden ist solches Verwinden...." (HW, p. 335).
Heidegger's italics.
Ä6 " . . . das Sein nie west ohne das Seiende, . . . " (WM, p. 46). Writer's italics.
22

28
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So profound is the negativity of Being that it has the tendency
to negate itself. We have seen already the tendency of self-concealment to conceal itself, which we call the mystery of Being.
This is one evidence of this self-negating negativity. The tendency of beings to dis-arrangement would be another, for this drag
would be imparted by the self-negating of Being that brings
them to presence. " . . . This hand-ling [of Being] in itself is at
once the process of handing out [Being] to dis-arrangement. The
hand-ling mani-pulates the dis-." 27
The drag toward dis-arrangement is the tendency of beings
to become frozen in the "renunciation" of Being as the comingto-pass of truth. It is the tendency of beings to fall away from
their true ontological dimension and treat themselves and each
other as mere entities. Insofar as There-being is one of these
beings, we häve now in 1946 an echo - faint, if one will, but quite
sure - of the whole problematic of fallen-ness and inauthenticity
in SZ. If this surmise is legitimate, then what the present perspective would add is a clearer insistence that such a condition
is not due primarily to the ineptitude of beings (There-being)
but to the finitude (negativity) of Being itself.
B.

THOUGHT

j. The "Shepherd of Being"
The structure and function of the thinker we discern in the
present essay principally under the guise of Calchas, the seer.
What does he see? "What is, was and will be," sc. the entire
ensemble of beings, insofar as they emerge out of the Beingprocess in its positivity and negativity, sc. out of the presenc-ing
of a-X^&eia.28 Our concern for the moment is with the seeing
itself.
Strictly speaking, Calchas' seeing is a having-seen, which in
Latin would be vidit, (in German Wissen) and which in English
we might suggest by "wisdom" or, more precisely, by "knowing"
in the sense that we have been using the word "comprehend."
27 " . . . So bleibt der Brauch iu sich zugleich die Aushändigung des Anwesens in
den Un-Fug. Der Brauch fügt das Ün-," (HW, p. 340).
1 8 HW, p. 321 (ein Anwesen).
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Calchas is the wisest of the seers, then, because he has a comprehension of Being in its negativity. Having seen the to-be-seen,
the seer "stands in view of it" (steht im Angesicht), but this view
is not primarily a vision that proceeds from the seer. He sees because the lighting-up of Being has been visited upon him. He
stands himself inside the process of truth. What is more, his
knowing can be called a form of thinking, and in this comprehension-become-thought the process of truth is fulfilled.
" . . . Knowing is the thought-ful preservation of Being as it conserves [its own truth]/' 29 All at once, the seer has become not
only a viewer of the process but an essential part of it. The
process of truth incorporates, so to speak, the seer into itself, so
that non-concealment takes place only inasmuch as the seer
sees.30
Taking the seer's seeing to symbolize There-being's thought,
we discern in the essay the same double aspect of thought that
we have noticed before. Sometimes it is conceived as the structure
of There-being, so that thought is considered as coming-to-pass
insofar as There-being ek-sists. For example: " . . . [thinking]
is insofar as Being comes-to-presence...."; 3 1
. . the essence
of man rests in thinking the truth of Being." 32 At other times,
thought is considered as the full functioning of ek-sistence in
achieved authenticity. " . . . Man can [preserve the truth of
Being] only within the re-solve of There-being." 3 3 More striking
than this, however, is the fact that in both senses, man helps
conserve and guard the truth of Being. To express this, the
author introduces a metaphor which will become famous in HB :
There-being is the "shepherd of Being." 34

29 " . . . Wissen ist das denkende Gewahren der Wahrnis des Seins." (HW, p. 322).
See pp. 320 (Angesicht), 321 (Gesehen-haben). It is not at all impossible to interpret
Angesicht here as a "seeing" of the seer by the beings (in their Being) that he sees.
Hence the preserving of truth would involve a mutual see-ing.
80 HW, pp. 323 (Anwesende in der Beziehung auf das Sehen).
81 " . . . Es ist, insofern Sein west..
(HW, p. 325).
82 " . . . Wenn das Wesen des Menschen im Denken der Wahrheit des Seins beruht ?"
(HW, p. 343). In this connection, note how the seer's comprehension-as-thought
is called Gedächtnis of Being (HW, p. 322), clear anticipation (1946) of thought-asrecord in W D (1952).
88 " . . . Beides vermag der Mensch nur innerhalb der Ent-schlossenheit des Daseins." (HW, p. 321). Writer's italics.
34 HW, p. 321 (Hirt des Seins, cf. Hut).
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2. The Historicity of Thought
That thought is historical is clear enough from the author's
practice. At this point, it is worth mentioning, perhaps, only that
the dialogue with Anaximander takes the form of "translating"
his saying into another language. The saying to be translated
here is obviously a "past." Future and present are suggested by
the intentional ambiguity of "translate." The German, as the
English, permits a double use of this compound: when the prefix
(über: "over") is used inseparably with accent on the stem
(setzen: "to set"), the sense is figurative, signifying the transferring of something said from one language to another (v.g. to
"translate" a book); when the German stem is used separably
with accent on the prefix, the sense is literal and suggests
movement from one place to another (v.g. the remains of the
soldiers were "translated" back home). Now to translate the
saying of Anaximander, sc. render it present in another language
(present), we must trans-late ourselves into what he truly
uttered, make a spring, so to speak, into Being, and, releasing
ourselves unto it by attend-ing to it and heeding it, we so open
ourselves up to it as to let it come all over again (future).35
Briefly: by dialoguing with Anaximander, we let Being come
once more into words.
RESUME

By another process of re-trieve, this time in dialogue with
Anaximander, we discover how profoundly the law of negativity
permeates every aspect of Being's emergence as the truth of
beings-in-the-ensemble. Gradually, this process comes to be
considered as the outbreak of the ontological difference as difference. In any case, this is the process which There-being, the
shepherd of Being, must think, if it is to achieve authenticity in
re-solve.

35 V.g. HW, pp. 318 (Übersetzung in Übersetzung beruht), 303 (Sprung), 306
(einzulassen, hinhörend auf), 312 (achten, öffnen uns), 300 (Kommende). Cf. P, p. 136.
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xiii

WHEREUNTO THE POET?

As for the Rilke study contained in the essay "Whereunto the
Poet?" (1946), composed to help commemorate the twentieth
anniversary of the poet's death, we have seen already the essential: Rilke fell prey to Nietzsche's metaphysical nihilism but
comprehended that it was to be overcome somehow through the
authentic use of language.1 The present general remarks may
be brief.
A.

BEING

(Aoyos)

Heidegger's own conception of Being appears on several occasions where he compares himself, at least implicitly, with
Rilke. We have noted already how radically different is the
interpretation of Being as the Open. More illuminating, perhaps,
is his comment upon the metaphor of Being as a sphere. For
Rilke, this is meant to suggest the many-sidedness of Being,
conceived as a conglomerate whole. For Heidegger, however,
Being is a sphere because it is Parmenides' "One" (f'Ev), which
he understands, of course, as the process of coming-to-presence
in all beings which is everywhere the same, hence a circle whose
center is in every being, lighting it up from the inside as what it
is. " . . . The spherical element of the One and the One itself have
the character of a lighting-up process that reveals [beings].
Within this process [beings] can come to presence. . . . " 2
"Wozu Dichter?," HW, pp. 248-295.
" . . . Das Sphärische des Einens und dieses selber haben den Charakter des entbergenden Lichtens, innerhalb dessen Anwesendes anwesen k a n n . . ( H W , p. 278)..
1

2
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The lighting-process for Heidegger takes place through
language. Now that we have seen how Being must be conceived
as aboriginal Aoyos in the most radical sense of that word, there
is no special difficulty in understanding language to be the domain of Being which Being itself "cuts out" (Tejxveiv). The author,
in a few dense phrases, does much with this Greek word. On the
one hand, he recalls its association with tempus (time), as if to
suggest by a wave of the hand the temporo-historical character
of Being. On the other hand (and, for the moment, this is more
important), he recalls the relation between re^vetv and templum
(a "place cut off," sc. temple) and promptly calls language the
"temple," then the "house" of Being. And so is born the famous
formula of HB : " . . . Language is the house of Being. . . . " 3 The
sense is that since Being makes beings accessible, we cannot gain
access to beings except by passing through the house of language.
Being "dwells" in the words by which beings are named:
. . . If w e g o t o a spring o r stroll t h r o u g h the woods, we are passing alr e a d y t h r o u g h t h e word " s p r i n g , " t h r o u g h t h e word " w o o d s , " e v e n when
w e d o n o t express these w o r d s or t h i n k of a n y t h i n g linguistic. . . . 4

So radically must we understand Aoyog! We can understand now
why the Greeks, given their abiding experience of Aoyo;, may
be said to have "dwelt" in the essenc-ing of language, even if
they never thought this essenc-ing as such.5
B.

THOUGHT

Once this much is said, there is hardly need for us to develop
at length another remark about the nature of thought, beyond
underlining the fact that since Being "is" Aoyo;, we cannot
think it except in terms of the coming-to-pass of language.
" . . . That poetizing, indeed, should be likewise the business of
thought we must first learn in this present moment of [the history
of] the World.. .," 6 and the essay itself demonstrates the thesis.
" . . . Die Sprache ist das Haus des Seins
" (HB, p. 53).
" . . . Wenn wir zum Brunnen, wenn wir durch den Wald gehen, gehen wir schon
immer durch das Wort 'Brunnen', durch das Wort 'Wald* hindurch, auch wenn wir
diese Worte nicht aussprechen und nicht an Sprachliches denken
" (HW, p. 286).
Cf. US, p. 166.
* VA, p. 228 (wohnten, niemals gedacht). WP, p. 20.
• " . . . Daß freilich Dichten auch die Sache eines Denkens sei, müssen wir in
diesem Weltaugenblick erst lernen
" (HW, p. 256).
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RESUME

It is because Rilke somehow experienced Being in terms of
Aoyos and therefore comprehended the sense of language that,
despite his metaphysical nihilism, he was at least "under way"
toward the authentic exercise of language. That is why, he is a
poet for the time of need - and a worthy ally in the overcoming
(grounding) of metaphysics.

c h a p t e r xiii

L E T T E R ON

HUMANISM

Heidegger's reply in letter form to the question posed by Jean
Beaufret (Paris), how it would be at all possible,given these new
perspectives, to restore a meaning to the word "humanism,"
represents, despite the occasional nature of its motivation and
the informality of its tone, a culminating moment in his development. Without any doubt, the "Letter on Humanism" is the
most important of his writings since EM, not so much for what
it offers that is new but for a crystallization of the entire development we have seen him undergo. 1 The letter in its published
form dates from 1947. Since 1945, Heidegger had been living in
enforced retirement, and Beaufret's query gave him the opportunity (probably a welcome one) to expose in fuller scope the
mise au point suggested in WM: Ep, bringing into clearer focus
the relation between Heidegger I and Heidegger II. It is especially valuable, therefore, for the author's self-interpretation,
although this aspect of the letter is less important for us who,
thanks to subsequent publication of several works from the
1929-1947 period, are more familiar with the course of his development than his readers could be at that time.
As a matter of fact, Beaufret's question was a triple one: 1.
How restore a sense to the word "humanism" ? 2 2. How precise
the relationship between ontology and an eventual ethics? 3
3. How preserve the element of adventure which all research
* "Über den Humanismus," PW, pp. 53-119. (Hereafter HB).
"Comment redonner un sens au mot 'Humanisme* ?" (HB, pp. 56-104).
"[Comment] prdciser le rapport de l'ontologie avec une 6thique possible?"
(HB, pp. 104-117).
2

3
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comports, without making philosophy mere venturesomeness ? 4
Heidegger proposes to discuss only the first at length, leaving
the discussion itself to throw light on the other two. We follow
his example, omitting (with regret) all reflections on the second
question as not sufficiently germane to the problematic of
thought, sufficiently complex in itself.
We recall from the analysis of humanism as testimony to the
de-volution of Western thought that the metaphysical conception of man as a rational animal fails to take into account
the relationship of man's essence to Being. We know, too, from
the Nietzsche analysis how essential it is to interrogate this relationship, if we are to overcome (ground) metaphysics. Heidegger has been occupied with this problem from the first pages of
SZ, and the value of HB consists in thematizing this effort in the
light that Heidegger II sheds upon it. In a word, the author conceives man as ek-sistence, sc. ec-static open-ness to Being.
.. The standing in the light of Being is what I call the eksistence of man. . . . " 5 We can see with what justice he can disavow any responsibility for Sartre's existentialism and claim that
he is dealing with the level, not where there are principally men,
but where there is principally Being.6
With such a conception, we pass beyond the traditional interpretations of the nature of man - therefore beyond humanism.
Do we still have the right to use the term to describe an effort
of this type? If humanism be identified with metaphysics,
certainly not. In this sense, Heidegger's thought is anti-humanist, better pre-humanist, simply because humanism of this sort
esteems man too low. Man is immeasurably more than a rational
animal. But if Heidegger thinks the nature of man in terms of
its exclusive relationship to Being, is his thought not in its own
way a humanism after all? Does he not "restore" a meaning to
the word ? Or is it better to drop the word completely, with the
danger of being taken for anti-humanist, rather than run the
4 "Comment sauver 1*616ment d'aventure que comporte toute recherche sans faire
de la philosophie une simple aventuri&re?" (HB, pp. 1 1 7 - 1 1 9 ) .
6 " . . . Das Stehen in der Lichtung des Seins nenne ich die Ek^sistenz des Menschen.
. . ( H B , pp. 66-67). The author insists again on the difference between ek-sistence
and the existentia of the tradition, for he attempts to get to a point prior to the
essence-existence dichotomy (HB, pp. 68, 71).
• HB, pp. 73 (nicht das geringste gemeinsam), 79-80 (principaiement l'Etre).
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risk of having a subject-ist interpretation read into the notion
of ek-sistence ? 7
We come at once to our general remarks and polarize them in
the usual way: A. Being, B. There-being, C. Thought. The fact
is, however, that the essay is so fluid that it is not easy to strain
out different elements for separate discussion. We must make
an effort from the beginning to realize that these three approaches to the problem actually must be thought together.
A.

BEING

j. Mittence
We have seen often enough that Being for Heidegger is fundamentally a lighting-process b y which beings are lit up as what
they "are." This supposes, however, that among them there is
a domain where this lighting-up process takes place. This is the
There of Being. Now in this coming-to-pass, Being maintains the
initiative. It is Being that gives itself unto the There with the
There and, imparting itself thus, continues to dominate its
There. This is the mittence of Being. Yet mittence takes place
for the sake of Being, and the There, thus brought-to-pass, sustains the process, guards it, stands watch over it so that in the
light of Being beings may appear non-concealed - such is the
concern of the There. Being, for all its spontaneity, is still in
need of its There.8
Yet the primacy of Being is inalienable. Whether the process
takes place and how it takes place is not for the There to decide.
If in SZ it could be said that "only insofar as There-being is, is
there Being," this must be understood in the sense that only
insofar as the lighting-process comes-to-pass in a There does it
come-to-pass at all. That it comes-to-pass, however, does not
depend on the There but on the spontaneity of Being which
thus e-mits itself among beings. The There is "thrown," and it
is Being that does the "throwing." We understand this in no
7 HB, pp. 66 (zu gering), 75 (eigentliche Würde), 89 (mehr), 93-94 (seltsamer Art),
9*.-95 (Mißdeutungen ertragen).
s V.g. HB. pp. 80 (es gibt), 81 (waltet), 84 (Nähe), 83 (Schickung des Seins), i n
(Wahrnis), 75 (hüten, Hirt des Seins), 94 (Wächterschaft), 100 (Sorge).
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ontic sense, of course, but only as an insistence on the fact that
Being maintains the primacy in an event that de facto takes
place.9
The word that most characteristically crystallizes all these
notions in the essay is Being-as-mittence. It is the mittence of
Being in its truth that constitutes the process of history. Hence,
it is the history of Being that sustains and determines every
aspect of our human situation. 10
2. Negativity
But Being, as the coming-to-pass of non-concealment through
mittence unto a There, is a negatived process. We have met it
before as the "primordial Discord" between positivity and negaivity. Here it is called the Contentious, and we understand this
in the sense of the original contention between positivity and
negativity in the process of truth. 1 1 In the essay it takes two
forms:
a. I N T E R - M I T T E N C E - Every mittence of Being is negatived
because it gives rise to beings but is not a being, and it must
withdraw at the very moment that it reveals itself. For Being to
give itself, it must refuse itself as well, and therefore Being remains hidden as mittence. When this is considered in terms of
history, then the various phases of thought are each a mittence
of Being as truth. The supreme example, of course, is the history
of metaphysics, which can now be seen in its totality. Within
this movement we can discern subsidiary moments, each of
which can be considered in its own way a mittence of Being:
mediaeval scholasticism, Hegelian absolutism, dialectical materialism, Nietzsche's nihilism, contemporary technicity - each
in its own way is a mittence of Being in its truth. Each comports
negativity, self-concealment founding the errance whose essence
is obliviousness to Being-as-mittence. 12
• HB, pp. 75 (ob und wie), 83 (Daß), 71, 75, 84, 100 (Wurf, etc.).
1 0 HB, pp. 83 (Geschick), 81 (Geschehen der Geschichte), 53 (Wirken beruht im
Sein).
1 1 HB, p. : i 2 (das Strittige).
12 V.g. HB, pp. 82 (versagt sich), 86 (bleibt verborgen), 87-88 (Heimatlosigkeit,
Technik), 73 (Mittelalters), 82 (Hegel, Marx,Nietzsche). Cf. HW, pp. 245 (Metaphysik),
310 (Griechische, Christentum, Neuzeitliche, Planetarische), 3x1 (Irre).
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Now since the assemblage of mittences constitutes intermittence, sc. Being-as-history, an individual mittence constitutes
an "epoch" of history. 13 This notion is not very carefully elaborated and we are never told the precise difference, for example,
between metaphysics as an epoch and Hegelianism as an epoch.
We understand the matter thus: any single mittence constitutes
an epoch, but this may be understood in a broad sense, including
many phases of development (v.g. the mittence/epoch of metaphysics), or in a narrower sense, as referring to a single phase
within such a scope (v.g. the perennial essence-existence problematic), or in a strict sense, as referring to an individual thinker
who characterizes an epoch (v.g. Anaximander, Parmenides,
Hegel). But even with this, the matter remains obscure.
At any rate, we must see clearly that the forgottenness of
Being is due primarily to Being itself, hence not in the first place
to the failure of man. Yet even what we call "negativity" must
not be thought too negatively. It is no lack (Mangel) in Being
but rather its own withheld treasure. This explains why it can
still come to us across the past. When we are told that metaphysics not only does not interrogate the truth of Being but
cannot do so, the reason is partly that Being so withdraws in
the mittence of metaphysics that metaphysics is not sufficiently
aware of it to interrogate it, partly that it is this withdrawal
which makes metaphysics what it is, and to interrogate its own
essence would be to pass beyond itself into its own ground. It
simply does not lie within the realm of metaphysics to interrogate the relation between Being and the essence of man. Conclusion: if we are to think Being, thought must be historical;
thought must heed (achtet) the negativity as well as the positivity of the mittences of Being. This for Heidegger is the only
chance of "salvation." 1 4
b. N O N - B E I N G - Let us prescind from truth as an historical
process and consider it from the viewpoint of a non-historical
negativity. What do we find? Since Being is not a being but conis HW, p. 311 (Epoche).
HB, pp. 73 (Versäumnis), 77 (Mangel, vorenthaltene Schatz), 65 (Wesen des
Menschen), 118 (auf Geschick des Seins achtet); H W , p. 343 (Rettung). Cf. WM,
pp. 10-12.
14
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ceals itself in revealing itself, there is no way for There-being to
grasp it by itself except as Non-being. But the necessity does
not spring originally from There-being; it is rooted in Being
itself simply because Being comports this negativing element as
intrinsic to its nature. "The negativing element in Being is the
essence of what I call Non-being. . . . " 1 5 We have here an explanation of the puzzling phrase that Non-being is the "veil of
Being." We have, too, an illuminating comment on why the
"most profound finitude of transcendence" is a thrust into Nonbeing, sc. because it is the There of Being that is intrinsically
negatived. 16 Conclusion: the thinking of Being must meditate
Non-being.
3. Language
In the Rilke dialogue, we saw how language was described as
"the house of Being." Here the thesis moves to the center of the
stage and the formula is repeated several times. The nearness of
Being (Aoyog) dominates all beings unobtrusively, and " . . . nearness comes-to-presence as language itself. . . . " 1 7 " . . . Language
is the illuminating-concealing arrival of Being itself." 18 Hence
language is an event that has Being as its ultimate origin, a
house that is arranged according to a pattern inscribed in Being
and prescribed by it. " . . . Being is always underway toward
[language]. . . . " 1 9 Once it arrives in words, then " . . . language
is the language of Being in the same way that the clouds are the
clouds of the sky. . . . " 20 If at the same time that we speak of
Being as coming into language we add that it must be "brought"
into language, this is only another way of saying that Being has
need of its There in order to be itself. Conclusion: the thinking
of Being must go the way of language.
1 5 "Das Nichtende im Sein ist das Wesen dessen, was ich das Nichts nenne
"
(HB, p. 114).
1 6 WM, p. 51 (Schleier des Seins); KM, p. 214 (tiefste Endlichkeit).
17
. . Diese Nähe west als die Sprache selbst
" (HB, p. 78). Cf. HB, p. 53
and passim (Haus des Seins).
1 8 " . . . Sprache ist lichtend-verbergende Ankunft des Seins selbst." (HB, p. 70).
1 9 " — Es ist stets unterwegs zu i h r . . ( H B , p. 116). See pp. 79 (vom Sein ereignete), i n (Fuge, verfügt).
20 " . . . Die Sprache ist so die Sprache des Seins, wie die Wolken die Wolken
des Himmels sind
(HB, p. 119). See p. n 6 (bringt).
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I. Nature of Ek-sistence
Being throws its There. " . . . The There-being itself, however,
is as that which is thrown-forth. It comes-to-presence in the
throwing of Being which takes place as the e-mitting of
mittence. . . . " 21 Now it is the nature of man to be this There
of Being. " . . . Man comes-to-presence in such a way that he is
the 'There,' sc. the lighting-up of Being. . . , " and it is this special
character of man's nature that Heidegger has called "eksistence": " . . . This 'Being' of the There, and only this, has the
fundamental structure of ek-sistence, sc. taking a stance ecstatically within the truth of Being. . . . " 22 How understand,
then, the relationship between Being and ek-sistence? Being is
not just a term of the relation but itself is the relationship,
" . . . insofar as it sustains ek-sistence in its existential, sc. ecstatic, presenc-ing and gathers it unto itself as the domain of
the truth of Being in the midst of beings. . . . " 23
It is worth noting that in all this Heidegger wishes to emphasize that Source whence the essence of man derives, its distinctive characteristic. This leads us to believe that he is dealing
with human nature as such, not with the individual man. In
such a humanism, " . . . not man but the historical presenc-ing
of man in his origin out of the truth of B e i n g . . . . " is in question.24
Insofar as his nature proceeds from Being and stands forth as
exposed unto Being, we may say that he stands "in" the light of
2 1 " . . . Das Da-sein selbst ist als das ' g e w o r f e n e ' . E s west i m Wurf des Seins als
des schickend Geschicklichen." (HB, p. 71). Cf. H W , pp. 311-312, 252.
2 2 " . . . der Mensch west so, daß er das ' D a ' , d a s heißt die Lichtung des Seins,
ist. Dieses 'Sein* des Da, und nur dieses, h a t d e n Grundzug der Ek-sistenz, das
beißt des ekstatischen Innestehens in der W a h r h e i t des Seins
" (HB, p. 69). Cf.
W M , p. 12. Terminology: Ek-sistence at this p o i n t has a double nuance: g x - a r a a i c
(or ec-stance) suggests that man as a being s t a n d s outside of himself (therefore
transcendence); ^v-oraotc; (or in-stance: I n n est eh en, Inständigkeit) suggests that
man stands within the light of Being (v.g. H B , p p . 70, 74). B o t h are complementary:
the former is redolent of Heidegger I, the l a t t e r of Heidegger I I .
28 " . . . Das Sein selber ist das Verhältnis, insofern E s die Ek-sistenz in ihrem
ezistenzialen, das heißt ekstatischen Wesen an sich hält und zu sich versammelt als
die Ortschaft der Wahrheit des Seins inmitten des S e i e n d e n . . ( H B , p. 77)- Cf.
WM, p. 12.
2 4 " . . . A b e r es ist zugleich der Humanismus, bei dem nicht der Mensch, sondern
das geschichtliche Wesen des Menschen in seiner H e r k u n f t aus der Wahrheit des Seins
auf dem Spiel s t e h t . . ( H B , pp. 90-91).
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Being. This is the sense of "in" in the old formula "to-be-in-theWorld," for Heidegger here makes explicit the identification of
World and the lighting-up of Being. It is by reason of this inbeing that man dwells in the near-ness of Being as Being's
neighbor.25
2. Structure of Ek-sistence
How are we to understand the structure of ek-sistence? At
this point, Heidegger recalls the basic elements of the existential
analysis of SZ:
a. P R O J E C T - Obviously, project is not to be understood
as a presentative position of Being by There-being, but simply
that component in ek-sistence by reason of which it is ec-static,
sc. the ec-static relation to the light of Being, for it is by reason
of project that Being lights itself up in There-being. That is why
it is identified with There-being's comprehension of Being,
and ultimately founds the rationality of man - for that matter, his
animality, too. Since, by project, it is ultimately Being that
throws light on itself, we may speak of ek-sistence as a counterpoise to Being. But if project throws light on Being, it by no
means fashions it, for is it not thrown-forth by the very Being
it illumines? 26
b. T H R O W N - N E S S - The thrown-ness of S Z appears clearly
now as an affirmation of the primacy of Being in the coming-topass of truth. Obviously, we must avoid any ontic interpretation
in terms of a "creation" of sorts. We are still dealing with an
"emerging-into-presence." It is singularly important to realize
that Heidegger never abandons the phenomenological attitude
that seeks only to let the phenomenon manifest itself. For example: " . . . man alone is released unto mittence of ek-sistence,
as far as our experience [can say]. . . . " 27
HB, pp. ioo ("in"), 84-85 (Nähe).
HB. pp. 72 (ekstatische Bezug zur Lichtung des Seins), 84 (lichtet sich dem
Menschen), 71 (Seinsverständnis), 65 (gründet Wesen der Vernunft), 67 (animalitas),
90 (Gegenwurf), 84 (schafft nicht}. Cf. WM, p. 18; N, II, p. 481 (Entwurfsbereich).
27 " . . . denn der Mensch allein ist, soweit wir erfahren, in das Geschick der Eksistenz eingelassen
" (HB, p. 67). Writer's italics. Cf. WM, p. 18.
25

28
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The throwing sometimes goes by different names: an appeal
to There-being, a claim made upon it, a call.28 Is there an interior connection between them? To answer that, we would have
to know more about this emergence of the There, and this is
precisely what is in question. The author goes no further, but
one wonders if we should not understand that there is in Being
a certain adhesiveness to itself, by reason of which the throwing
down us such is a call to There to achieve its self.
Strictly speaking, thrown-ness is not a component of the
structure of ek-sistence so much as a general condition of the
There, disclosed by the ontological disposition. The third component (along with project) is logos, which we interpreted to be
that element which lets There-being see its ontological condition.
When Heidegger identifies here the throwing and the "call," is
he implying these two components, without wishing to go that
far into the existential analysis ? Possibly. If so, then we might
be warranted in interpreting the text, " . . . Being itself is the
relationship [of Being to ek-sistence] insofar as it . . . gathers
ek-sistence unto itself as the place of truth in the midst of
beings....," 29 in such a way as to mean that: between Being
and its There is a relationship, which Being itself is; if we think
of this relationship dynamically as a passage of Being to There,
we may conceive it as the throwing of There; if we consider it
as passing from There to Being, we may speak of it as a gathering
of There unto Being, in the sense of logos. Would not this be the
meaning of "call"? If so, we are on the verge here of the whole
problematic of conscience as explained in SZ, it would seem. We
must wait until WD (1952) for further precision.
c. F A L L E N - N E S S - If ek-sistence is the domain of luminosity in the midst of beings, it is nevertheless of such a nature
that it tends to become preoccupied with these beings and forget the Being-dimension by which they are disclosed. We are told
once more that this is the sense of fallen-ness. It is according to
the attitude which There-being adopts towards this tendency
HB, pp. 60, 74 (ansprechen), 90 (Ruf).
" . . . Das Sein selber ist das Verhältnis, insofern Es die Ek-sistenz in ihrem
existenzialen, das heißt ekstatischen Wesen an sich hält und zu sich versammelt als
88
2f
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that we may speak of it as authentic (recognizes the tendency
and accepts it) or inauthentic (does not recognize the tendency,
or, having recognized it, refuses to accept it). But in SZ, the
tendency is described simply as a situation of fact. Here, we are
told explicitly its foundation:
. . . This relation [between Being and There] is such as it is, not on the
basis of ek-sistence, but the essenc-ing of ek-sistence [comes] ec-statically
(in the existential sense) out of the essenc-ing of the truth of Being.30

We interpret this to mean that the reason why There-being is
victim of fallen-ness is that it is the finite There of finite Being,
that hides itself even from its own There.
d. C O N C E R N - But the There does not achieve its function
simply by the fact that it is thrown-down. It is a dynamic
process, the coming-to-pass of truth among beings, and entrusted
to the nature of man to accomplish. It is the process of truth
that constitutes man's concern (Sorge) as man. Insofar as his
concern is the bringing-to-pass of truth according to his measure,
he guards (hütet) truth, serves as watchman (Wächterschaff) to
it. " . . . Man is the shepherd of Being. . . . " 31
But if such is the nature of man, it is nevertheless possible,
given the drag of his fallen condition (and, conversely, the domination in him of errance) that he is unable to experience the
genuine nature of his concern as such and therefore to assume
it in his own name. Such we understand to be his everyday condition. But if he acquiesces in concern, thereby assuming it, he
goes along with Being's demands upon him. This means that at
one and the same time: he responds to Being's appeal to be
authentically its There; he willingly "stands with" his own ecstatic nature, insofar as he stands (-static) outside (ec-) himself
and within the light of Being, sc. he with-stands the There.
" . . . As the being which ek-sists, man with-stands the Therebeing, insofar as he makes his 'concern' the There as the lumi-

80 " . . . Aber dieser B e z u g ist so, wie er ist, nicht auf Grund der Ek-sistenz, sondern
das Wesen der Ek-sistenz ist existential-ekstatisch aus dem Wesen der Wahrheit des
Seins." (HB, p. 78).
81 " . . . Der Mensch ist der Hirt des Seins. .
(HB, pp. 75, 90). See HB, pp. 77
(sorgend übernimmt), 75 (hütet), 91 (Wächterschaft) and WM, p. 15.
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W e take this to m e a n : that the concern

for Being is man's nature; that it lies within his power t o endorse
this nature, sc. make it his " o w n , " or not; t h a t to m a k e B e i n g
"his own concern" is to assume himself as the There and thus
achieve authenticity - to fail to do so is to b e victim of inauthenticity. " . . . Man as ek-sistent takes his stand in this relationship
through which Being e-mits itself, insofar as he ec-statically
with-stands it, sc. [for his own part] assumes it out of concern. . . . "

33

It is only this that lies within man's power to accept

or reject. Whether the process of truth comes-to-pass in the first
place is not for him to decide. The only question is whether or
not he himself will discover the genuine sense of his own commitment corresponding t o the mittence of Being imparted

to

him. 3 4
e. H I S T O R I C I T Y -

Ek-sistence

is

of

itself

an

historical

process, not because it takes place " i n " time but because the
process of concern in its own w a y is time. 3 5 The sense is t h a t
There-being's playing shepherd to Being comports the

triple

dimension of future-past-present that constitutes original time.
H o w this is to be understood we shall see shortly.

3. Ek-sistence and Language
If language is the house of Being, how are we to understand
the relation between language and Being's There? I t is in the
nature of man (There-being) to be a lodger in this house, simply
because b y reason of ek-sistence he guards Being in its truth. A s
a result, language is proper to man, not simply because along
with his other faculties man also " h a s " the power of speech, b u t
because he has a privileged access to Being. B y the same token,
the function of his language is simply t o let Being b e itself.
Conversely, it is because other beings do not have this special
8 1 " . . . Als der Ek-sistierende steht der Mensch das Da-sein aus, indem er das Da
als die Lichtung des Seins in 'die Sorge' nimmt
" (HB, p. 71)- See HB, p. 75
(entspricht) and HW, p. 311.
w " . . . Weil der Mensch als der Ek-sistierende in dieses Verhältnis, als welches das
Sein sich selbst schickt, zu stehen kommt, indem er es ekstatisch aussteht, das heißt,
sorgend übernimmt,..." (HB, p. 77).
" HB, p. 75 (ob Schickliche findet).
»» See HB, p. 82 (Ek-sistenz geschichtlich).
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access to Being that they cannot talk. If the use of language for
modern man has become banal, we must not seek the reason in
moral or esthetic grounds but in the fact that the genuine nature
of

man

and

his essential

relationship

to

Being

remain

in

oblivion. 3 6
A case in point! T h e power to articulate a negation in language
does not derive originally from the power of man to reject a P
with regard to some S of predication, but from the fact that the
nature of man, sc. There-being, appertains to Being which itself
is intrinsically negatived. " Y e s " and " n o " are uttered in speech,
then, out of attend-ance (therefore response) to Being itself. W e
see here explicitated Heidegger's reply to the question raised in
W M as to the foundation of the " n o t " in speech, indeed of all
n e g a t i v i t y in human comportment. It is Non-being, sc. B e i n g
itself as negatived. I t is fundamentally " . . . Being [that] negates
- as Being. . . . "

37

C.

THOUGHT

T h e ec-static nature of man, which lodges in the house of Being
(language), accomplishes the guardianship over Being and its
truth when it assumes itself in concern. B u t b y what gesture on
the part of There-being does this take place? In SZ, it was the
supreme liberation of re-solve. N o w it is b y thought.

j. Thought as Fulfillment
B y reason of thought, Being comes to its fullness, for thought
is the achieving of the There among beings which Being needs
in order t o be itself as the lighting-up of these beings. The fundamental sense of thought, then, is that it lets Being be. It yields to
Being's demands upon There-being to bring truth to expression.
Such is the attitude of foundational thought. " . . . Thought accomplishes this letting [-be]. . . . "

38

86 HB, pp. 53 (Behausung), 79 (besitzt), 66 (das Ekstatische wahrt), 70 (fehlt
Sprache), 59 (aus einer Gefährdung). This is why Heidegger feels justified in taking
Aristotle's £oiov X6yov g^ov to mean: a being endowed with the power of language.
See P, p. 271'and WD, p. 66.
" . . . Das Sein nichtet - als das Sein
" (HB, p. 114). See WM, pp. 28, 36-37.
88 " . . . Das Denken vollbringt dieses Lassen
M (HB, p. 54). See p. zzx (läßt
das Sein - sein).
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I t is perfectly clear, however, that in the process of thought
Being itself maintains the initiative. W e are told that Being is
the " e l e m e n t " of thought, just as water is the "element" of

a

fish. Element here is to be understood as t h a t which renders
something possible, therefore enables an essence to emerge, or,
if one will, an essenc-ing to take place. More simply still, it l e t s be. B e i n g has the primacy over thought, simply because it g i v e s
rise to it. T o say that Being renders thought possible means f o r
B e i n g " . . . t o preserve [thought] in its essenc-ing, to retain i t
in its element."

39

W e see once more that t h e phrase " t h i n k i n g

of B e i n g " has a fundamentally ambiguous sense. It implies: t h a t
thought

belongs

to

Being

(as Being's attend-ant),

for it

is

brought about b y Being; that thought attends to Being because
it comes about in There-being. The genitive "of Being," then, is
at once b o t h " s u b j e c t i v e " and " o b j e c t i v e , " if these words a t
this point still h a v e any sense. 40
B u t if the There in its thinking process is fundamentally receptive, it is not for that reason passive. It m a k e s a contribution
to t h e event of truth simply b y acquiescing in it. It brings t h e
event to fulfillment, for to fulfill means " . . . to unfold or l e a d
forth something into the fullness of essenc-ing,

pro-ducere. ..."

41

W h a t is fulfilled in this case is the relation between Being a n d
the nature of man. Thinking does not fashion this relationship
b u t only unfolds i t ; it lets this relation be (manifest) as h a v i n g
been imparted to the There. T h u s rendered manifest, " . . .
is as the mittence [unto] thought. . . . "

Being

42

T h i s entire process can not be called an a c t i v i t y , if the w o r d
be taken to i m p l y any ontic comportment or to pertain merely
to the order of the actual. Hence, it never brings "results."

It

has no " e f f e c t s , " no "success" to which it can point, for all these
terms suggest ontic efficacity. " . . . [Thought] is sufficient u n t o
its own essence, insofar as it is. . . . "

43

For this reason, we cannot

s a y that it is a "practical" comportment of man, for npoL&c, is
M
" . . . es in seinem Wesen wahren, in seinem Element einbehalten." (HB, p.
58). See p. 55 (Element).
40 HB, p. 54. Cf. WD, p. 132 and WM, pp. 10, 13.
4 1 " . . . etwas in die Fülle seines Wesens entfalten, in diese hervorgeleiten, producere...." (HB, p. 53).
4 8 " . . . Das Sein ist als das Geschick des Denkens
,f (HB, p. 117). Heidegger's
italics. Cf. WM, p. 10.
48 1 4 . . . Es genügt seinem Wesen, indem es ist
" (HB, p. i n ) .
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restricted to the ontic. B u t it is not for that reason "theoretic"
either, for it is concerned with t h a t lighting-process that first
makes a Netopia possible. Neither "practical" nor "theoretic" in
the strict sense, the thinking of B e i n g surpasses these categories
and can be described perhaps only as a " d y n a m i c accomplishment." It is this non-ontic character that accounts for the tremendous simplicity of thought -

the poverty of the shepherd.

A n d it accounts for the strangeness, the difficulty as well. W e
must take a "step in reverse" and descend from the ontic level,
discover Being in its unseizable nearness. 4 4

2. Thought and Language
a.

FUNCTION

OF

LANGUAGE

-

B y r e a s o n of t h o u g h t ,

the

relation of Being (Aoyos) to man is brought to its fullness. For
Being is b y nature non-concealment, and it is through thought
as the culminating moment of There that the manifestation of
Being as Being takes place. N o w this manifestation comes-topass insofar as " . . . through t h o u g h t Being comes t o [expression
in] language. . . . "

45

Like thought itself, language must be con-

sidered in terms of a response t o B e i n g and as this response. I t
is thus that in the history of B e i n g , the event b y which Being
discloses itself to and in man comes t o expression in the words of
foundational thinkers. A n d if, w h e n all is said and done, thought
has nothing to "show" for its efforts, the reason is that it needs
no ontic results in order to recommend it. " . . . I t meets the
exigencies of its [own] essence, insofar as it is. B u t it is, insofar
as it gives utterance to [Being]. . . . "

46

It is thus that There-being t a k e s u p its lodging in the house
of Being. There-being's task is not to fabricate this house but,
b y thought, to play its role in bringing the house to completion.
For Being (Aoyo<;) of itself, because self-illuminating, is already
under w a y toward expression, a n d " . . . ek-sistent thought, for
its own part, brings [Being t h a t thus] advances [to it] through
44 HB, pp. 53, 115 (Handeln, Tun), 78 (Einfaches), 90 (Armut des Hirten), 116
(Befremdliche), 91 (Schritt-zurück), 103 (Abstieg).
45 " . . . daß im Denken das Sein zur Sprache k o m m t . . ( H B , p. 53).
46 " . . . Es genügt seinem Wesen, indem es ist. Aber es ist, indem es seine Sache
s a g t . . . . " (HB, p. i n ) . See pp. 79 (Entsprechung), 81 (im Wort der wesentlichen
Denker).
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Hence thought supplies words

f o r Being's self-disclosure, while Being, in turn, diffuses its light
on and through these words. Completing the house of Being in
this w a y , There-being b y this v e r y f a c t takes u p its lodging
w i t h i n it. " . . . T h o u g h t pays heed t o the lighting-up process
[ t h a t is] Being, insofar as it encloses its own utterance of Being
in language, as [if this were] the lodging of ek-sistence. . . . "

48

If thought is a responding to Being in and through language,
it follows that the thinker must remain profoundly docile to
B e i n g as he brings it into words, even if this means t h a t he speak
b u t seldom and have little to say. It is only thus t h a t he restores
t o words what is precious in them, a n d to man himself an appreciation of what it means to lodge in the house of Being. 4 9
b. T H O U G H T

AND

POETRY -

That

there is a funda-

m e n t a l similarity between the function of thought as described
here and the poetic moment is obvious. T h e poet, as well as the
thinker, is a w a t c h m a n over the house of Being. 5 0 Hence the
old problem: what is the relation between thought a n d poetry?
Perhaps the following will help. W e k n o w from W M : E p that
" . . . the thinker utters Being. The p o e t names the H o l y . . . , "

51

a n d we raised the question: how distinguish between Being and
t h e H o l y ? The present essay does n o t answer the question, but
w e are told at least that Being, imparting itself to m a n , declares
itself through poetry but remains hidden as such, sc. as Being.
If t h e poet "names the H o l y , " m a y w e infer that the H o l y design a t e s Being in its positivity, while B e i n g as such comports both
p o s i t i v i t y and negativity, revealment and concealment in the
coming-to-pass of a-Xrj&eia? That w o u l d explain, perhaps, w h y
" . . . the essence of the Holy can be t h o u g h t only in terms of the

4 7 " . . . Dieses Ankommende bringt das ek-sistierende Denken seinerseits in
seinem Sagen zur Sprache
" (HB, p. 116). Observe affinity between There-being's
lodging (Behausung) in the house of Being and becoming "at home" in the homeland
(heimisch, Be-hausung), in near-ness to the Source. See also HB, p. i n (baut).
48 " . . . Das Denken achtet auf die Lichtung des Seins, indem es sein Sagen vom
Sein in die Sprache als der Behausung der Eksistenz einlegt
" (HB, p. 115).
Hence the force of the phrase "to bring into language" (HB, p. 116; VA, p. 228).
49 HB, pp. 53 (läßt sich), 60 (wenig oder selten), 61 (Kostbarkeit seines Wesens).
HB, p. 53 (Wächter).
5 1 " . . . Der Denker sagt das Sein. Der Dichter nennt das Heilige
" (WM, p.

5I).
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T h u s the poet's task would be to give a

name to Being in its positivity (as the Holy), the thinker's to
comprehend that Being is negatived as well and is, therefore, the
coming-to-pass of a-X^eia.

J. Thought and History
The thinking of Being thinks Being as it imparts itself in
mittence.

Since the plurality

of

mittences

constitute

inter-

mittence (history), to think Being in and as mittence is to think
historically. " . . . T h a t is w h y thought which thinks upon the
truth of Being is as thought historical. . . . "

53

The word "historical," however, has a double sense. Thought
is historical simply if the mittence of Being, itself the origin of
history,

is formulated into words.

" . . . The history

[of

the

mittence of Being] comes into language through the words of the
foundational thinker. . . . "

54

B u t it is also retained in words and

can be re-trieved there. This re-trieving of thought which thinks
upon the mittence of Being as already cast into words of previous thinkers is another reason for calling thought "historical."
B o t h these senses are complementary, however, and manifest
the same structure in the coming-to-pass of non-concealment:
Being comes (future) to the thinker as having-been-already in
w h a t is (past) and is rendered manifest (present) through the
articulation of words. T h e fundamental structure of thought,
consequently, is that of re-collection: " . . . Insofar as thought
is, it is the re-collection of Being and nothing else. . . . "

55

But a

re-collection of this t y p e is the process b y which Being becomes
manifest, sc. b y which it is itself as the process of a - X ^ s i a . T h a t
is w h y we m a y say that at the same time that thought, as
bringing to a culmination the There, is com-mitted

(thrown-

52 " . . . Erst aus der Wahrheit des Seins läßt sich das Wesen des Heiligen denken.
. . . " (HB, p. 102). Cf. p. 86 (schon als Geschichte des Seins).
53 " . . . Darum ist das Denken, das in die Wahrheit des Seins denkt, als Denken
geschichtlich
" (HB, p. 81). Writer's italics.
54 " . . . Dessen Geschichte kommt im Wort der wesentlichen Denker zur Sprache.
. . . " (HB, p. 8i). Hence, history in the West took its origin when the Being of beings
became thought-worthy. See VA, p. 227.
5 5 " . . . Dieses Denken ist, insofern es ist, das Andenken an das Sein und nichts
außerdem
" (HB, p. i n ) . See WM, p. 9.
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forth) b y Being, " . . . Being is as the mittence of thought. . . . " 5®
A l l foundational thinkers are engaged in the identical task,
even though t h e y accomplish it differently. T h a t is w h y "progress" in foundational thought is impossible. " . . . If we heed
the essence of philosophy, it m a k e s no progress at all. I t remains
in place, in order always to think [that which remains] identical. . . , " 5 7 T o discern the i d e n t i t y of theme amid diversity of
expression, however, we must yield to the necessity of following
these thinkers in thought. If w e do so, we soon discover that the
divergences among them arise from the intrinsically contentious
character of B e i n g itself, which discloses itself to each of them in
negatived fashion. Hence, their mutual disputes help one another to comprehend the disclosure of Being that is imparted to
each of t h e m and to respond

(each in his own w a y ) to the

mittence thus comprehended. B u t if this is the case, w e can see
immediately t h a t it is impossible to refute a genuine thinker,
provided that thought remain historical. A l l t h a t w e can do is
accept him for w h a t he is b y removing the truth t o which he
gives expression from the realm of merely human opinion and
b y comprehending it as the (negatived) truth of B e i n g itself.
" . . . A l l refutation in the
absurd. . . . "

field

of foundational

thinking

is

58

W e touch here a delicate point. Does not thought of this kind
become a complete relativism? Heidegger recognizes the difficulty himself, and his answer is t h a t relativism m a k e s sense only
on terms of the subject-object polarity, where the truth of the
object is considered as " r e l a t i v e " to the knowing subject. Once
we pass b e y o n d the subject-object relationship,

"relativism"

** " . . . Das Sein ist als das Geschick des Denkens
" (HB, p. 117). Heidegger's
italics. Note in this conception of history a significant difference between Heidegger
and Hegel. For Hegel, Thought, evolving into System, enjoys a certain primacy over
History, because the law of Thought becomes the law of History, which, in turn, is
sublated into the expanding System (Thought). For Heidegger, history, sc. Being-as
history, maintains the primacy over thought. If thought re-collects this history and
therefore is "historical," nevertheless thought is brought-to-pass by (Being-as-)
history and therefore belongs to the historical process of Being as to its Source. For
Hegel, Thought dominates History; for Heidegger, history dominates thought. See
HB, p. 8j.
*7 " . . . Sie schreitet, wenn sie ihr Wesen achtet, überhaupt nicht fort
" (HB,
p. 81).
•• " . . . Alles Widerlegen im Felde des wesentlichen Denkens ist töricht
"
(HB, p. 82). See HB, pp. 1x8 (sich einläßt, nachzudenken), 1x2 (das Strittige). See
also SG, p. 136 and WD, p. 68.
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has no meaning.59 If relativism be understood thus, certainly
Heidegger is no relativist.
But if he is not a "relativist," is he therefore an "absolutist"?
Does he admit an "absolute" truth ? The matter is difficult, and
conventional terminology is laden with overtones. If "absolute"
be taken to mean "eternal," and if this be understood in the
sense of "praeter-historical," certainly not, for Heidegger's
Being is essentially a history. But if "absolute" may be understood simply as equivalent to "constant," then the problem of
"absolute" truth rejoins the problem of unity in Being-ashistory. Here the author's position is quite clear - or at least
quite explicit. We must distinguish ontic and ontological history.
If we consider history in the ontic dimension, we have no right,
as long as we restrict ourselves to Heidegger's perspectives, to
speak of a "continuity" between one epoch and another, for the
mittence in each is different. " . . . The epochs never permit
themselves to be derived one from another and, indeed, reduced
to the sequence of a consecutive process. . . . " 60 If we consider
history in its ontological dimension, however, there is undeniably a simplicity and a constancy that pervades every epoch:
. . . B u t it does not run between the epochs, like a cord connecting them.
Rather, the tradition comes each time out of the concealment of mittence,
just as different rills arise from a [single] Source [and] feed a stream that
is everywhere and nowhere. 61

Is it possible to speak of this truth of Being-as-source in itself
and as such as (although historical yet) "absolute" truth? For
the present, we müst leave the matter open.
However all this may be, it is only by an historical thinking
such as we have described that we can overcome the nihilism
of the times, which consists in the forgottenness of Being. One
form of this nihilism is Marx's dialectical materialism. Marx's experience of the alienation of man explores an essential dimension
19 VA, p. 26z (Relativismus). See pp. 258-261, where the problem is posed with
regard to the various interpretations of Heraclitus' thought by the great thinkers
(Plato, Aristotle, Clement of Alexandria, Hegel, etc.).
" . . . Die Epochen lassen sich nie auseinander ableiten und gar auf die Bahn
eines durchlaufenden Prozesses schlagen
" (SG, p. 154).
u " . . . Aber sie verläuft nicht zwischen den Epochen wie ein Band, das sie verknüpft, sondern die Überlieferung kommt jedesmal aus dem Verborgenen des Geschickes, so wie aus einem Quell verschiedene Rinnsale entspringen, die einen Strom
nähren, der überall ist und nirgends." (SG, p. 154).
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of the history of Being. Now if we take Husserl or Sartre as
representing prevailing types of contemporary thinking, then
since neither one nor the other (apparently) comprehends this
essentially historical character of Being, neither (Husserlian)
phenomenology nor (Sartrean) existentialism - this, at least, is
the way Heidegger sees it - can offer us ground for a fruitful
dialogue with Marxism. This can be had only through a historical thought, sc. one which comprehends Marx in terms of the
mittence of Being (of Being-as-history).62
But we must be sure to understand what it means to comprehend such phenomena as Marxism, Hegelianism, the essenceexistence tradition, etc. as a mittence of Being. It means not
only that we interrogate these movements as the disclosure of
Being in its negativity; it means as well that we pose the question
why precisely this question was never posed before, and why it
could not be posed before. 63 We already have an intimation of
the direction in which Heidegger thinks the answer is to be
found. The negativity of Being is such that it is not only negatived in any single disclosure, but it conceals this negativity and
even conceals the concealment. To interrogate Being in this compound negativity is to think Being in its mystery. Such thought
meditates the forgottenness of Being as the forgottenness of Being
and b y this very fact overcomes it. It is thus that we overcome
metaphysics and thereby lay the groundwork for it.
4. The Rigor of Thought
The thinking of Being, since non-ontic, is necessarily nonlogical. The fact remains, however, that for the natural way of
looking at things, it is only by the rules of logic that we have a
guarantee against sheer arbitrariness in thought. Heidegger must
face squarely a double question: since logic defines the laws of
human reason (ratio), is not a non-logical thought necessarily
ir-rational and therefore the plaything of caprice? if not, then
how explain rigor in thought which refuses to have logic for its
canon ?
« H B , p. 87.
63 See HB, p. 73. Heidegger later gives us specimens of this himself, v.g. with
regard to the problem of ground (SG), and with regard to the problem of technicity
("Die Frage nach der Technik," V A , pp. 13-44.}.
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With the author's answer to the first question we have already some familiarity, and the present essay crystallizes
his attitude nicely. The thinking of Being is non-logical, but this
means only that it is pre-logical (pre-rational). If someone is to be
charged with irrationalism, he retorts, should it not rather be they
who, in the name of logic, refuse to meditate Xoyoc, insofar as it
is the ground of reason and therefore the foundation of logic? 64
The second question is more serious. Pre-logical thought, however, is by no means law-less, nor is it wanting in respect even
for the laws of logic. All that Heidegger insists upon is that prior
to the laws of logic (or, for that matter, of ethics) there is a law
of Being which first intimates to man the pattern of arrangement
that subsequently can be transformed into the laws of human
thought and activity. If this were not so, then all laws would be
" . . . the fabrication of human reason. More essential than all
prescriptions of rules is for man to discover that he soujourns in the
truth of B e i n g . . . . " 65 By reason of this sojourn, the first law of
thought is the law of B e i n g , " . . . not the rules of logic, which only
by reason of the law of Being can become rules [at all]. . . . " 66
What is the law of Being that is the "first law" of thought?
For Heidegger, it is the historical character of d-X^fteta. This
means: from the point of view of Being, that Being imparts itself to man by mittence; from the point of view of thought, that
the There responds by re-collection. But how explain the rigor
of such a law? By the fact that thought, if it is to be true to
itself, must be bound only by Being in continual advent toward
thought. It must persevere in docility to this continual arrival.
It is thus that thought responds to Being's appeal, yields to
Being's demands upon it:
. . . Thinking in its essence as the thinking of Being is requisitioned by
[Being]. Thinking is referred to Being as that which is in a continual
state of arrival (Vavenant). Thinking, as thinking upon the arrival of
Being, is bound by Being [understood] as arrival. . . .®7
H B , pp. 98-99 (Einwände zurückgeben). See pp. 95-98 (Logik).
" . . . Anders bleibt alles Gesetz nur das Gemachte menschlicher Vernunft.
Wesentlicher als alle Aufstellung von Regeln ist, daß der Mensch zum Aufenthalt
in die Wahrheit des Seins findet
" (HB, p. 115).
M " . . . nicht die Regeln der Logik, die erst aus dem Gesetz des Seins zu Regeln
werden können
" (HB, p. 118).
6 7 M . . . Das Denken ist in seinem Wesen als Denken des Seins von diesem in den
Anspruch genommen. Das Denken ist auf das Sein als das Ankommende (l'avenant)
bezogen. Das Denken ist als Denken in die Ankunft des Seins, in das Sein als die
Ankunft gebunden. .
(HB, p. 117).
M
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This is how " . . . thought, insofar as through historical re-collection it heeds the mittence of Being, has bound itself already
to the [historical movement] that is proper to mittence. . . . " 68
It is because thought is ad-ventive that it is an enduring "adventure" (aventure).
The ad-venture of thought is saved from mere venturesomeness (aventuribre), if there is a total fidelity to Being as this
is imparted to thought. (We answer here Beaufret's third
question). And this fidelity itself must complete the historical
process, insofar as the thinker, responding to the ad-vent
(future) of Being as having been in what already is (past),
renders it present in his own language. " . . . [The rigor of
thought] reposes therein, that [its] utterance remains pure in
the element of Being and lets the simplicity of [Being] in its
manifold dimensions have its way. . . . " 69 In the concrete, this
fidelity to Being demands that the thinker pay strict heed to
what he must utter and how he must utter it. More precisely, it
requires that he reflect upon whether or not Being may be
brought to expression on any given occasion, and if so, then to
what extent and in what moment of the history of Being this
may be done. Briefly, it means " . . . rigor in reflection, meticulousness in expression, economy in words." 70
Such is Heidegger's answer to Beaufret. But the difficulty is
a major one and the author returns to it again in 1950 in the
form of a letter to another student who had asked about the
"warrant" for foundational thought. We introduce the letter
here for the sake of an integral exposition. 71 Since thought is
bound by the mittence of Being to which it responds, Being
itself is the warrant of this thought; besides this, thought has
M
. . Indem das Denken, geschichtlich andenkend, auf das Geschick des Seins
achtet, hat es sich schon an das Schickliche gebunden, das dem Geschick gemäß
ist
" (HB, p. 1x8). Cf. p. 117 {aventure).
•• " . . . [Die Strenge des Denkens] beruht darin, daß das Sagen rein im Element
des Seins bleibt und das Einfache seiner mannigfaltigen Dimensionen walten läßt.
. . . " (HB, p. 56).
7 0 " . . . die Strenge der Besinnung, die Sorgfalt des Sagens, die Sparsamkeit des
Wortes." (HB, pp. 118-119). See p. 118.
7 1 "[Das Ding:] Nachwort. Ein Brief an einen jungen Studenten," V A , pp. 182185. "Warrant" translates Weisung. Here the formula for thought is "responding to
the appeal" of Being (dem Anspruch seines Wesens entsprechen), where "appeal"
signifies Being-as-mittence. Hence, the conception is effectively identical with that
of HB.
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no credentials. But does it really need any? Who ever asks
Plato by what "warrant" he thinks Being as tSeoc, or Kant by
what "warrant" he calls Being a position (Gesetztheit) or the
transcendental dimension of objectivity? Their "warrant" consists simply in their docility to the mittence of Being. Is not
foundational thought as such, hence Heidegger's exposition of
it in particular, entitled to the same prerogatives? 72
If ligation to Being accounts for the stringency of thought,
however, it explains its frailty, too. The more thought binds itself to Being, the more it submits to its negativity, hence the
more surely it risks falling prey to errance. That is why " . . . the
possibility of going astray in this type of thinking is very
great. . . . " 78 This can be understood from two points of view:
the appeal comes from Being-as-errance, hence a response to
such an appeal also goes astray; the responding achieves the
negatived There of negatived Being and by reason of its own
negativity is prone to lose its way. From both points of view,
thought cannot escape the danger of errance, can never pretend
to be in its own right a way of salvation (Heilsweg).
Foundational thought, then, for all its excellence, is always
an indigent thing. And for that reason, it never can be anything
more than tentative. If the "pathway" of this thought demands
complete surrender to Being, then included in the renunciation
is the pretence of being a "doctrine" in its own right, whose
affirmations are binding on all. No, foundational thinking is not
a doctrine to be taught; it is an experience to be made - an experience that each must make for himself. Because the experience is so hazardous, we have no choice but inexorably and without respite to prove the fidelity of our own attent-iveness to
Being's appeal. Hence the need for ever renewed watchfulness.
"Everything here is the way of attent-ive responding that [continually] puts [itself] to the proof. . . . " 74

VA, p. 184 (Ausweiskarte, Platon, Kant).
" . . . Die Möglichkeit des Irrgangs ist bei diesem Denken die größte...."
(VA, p. 183). See pp. 183-184 (verhören, Irrgangs, Irrige, irrevollen, Irrweg). Cf.
"Wer groß denkt, muß groß irren." (ED, p. 17).
74 "Alles ist hier Weg des prüfend hörenden Entspreebens
" (VA, p. 185). See
pp. X84 (Verzicht), 183 (nie verbindlich als Aussage). Cf. Der Feldweg (Frankfurt:
Klostermann, 1953), p. 7* (Hereafter FW).
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RESUME

HB is a culminating point. (Relatively) simple in style, the
essay is, among the author's significant works, by far the most
readable, yet distills all of the major theses of Heidegger II,
resuming at the same time the most characteristic features of
Heidegger I. Here we see clearly that the existential analysis
of SZ was the first step toward grounding metaphysics by trying
to discern that structure in man which most profoundly characterizes him as man, his relationship to Being. Since the humanisms of the tradition are intrinsically correlative with the metaphysics that is thus surpassed, the conception of man as eksistence is in effect the surpassing of humanism, but inasmuch
as it discerns man's true value, is it not by that very fact a
humanism of a higher kind? Whether or not the word be retained is a matter of indifference.
In any case, man's relationship to Being appears more clearly
now as originally the relation of Being (Aoyoq) to man, relation
by which Being throws out its There among beings. The
throwing, as such, constitutes an appeal to the There to help
a-XTj&eta come-to-pass. When the There yields to this appeal in
re-solve, that is the coming-to-pass of thought, and since the
There is the There of A6yo<;, thought is also the achievement of
authentic language.

c h a p t e r

xiii

I N T E R L U D E

/. From the Experience of Thought
The way is long. Let us rest a while. We deal now with two
minor pieces that have, to be sure, their value, but give us a
chance to relax. The first bears the title "From the Experience
of Thought." 1 It is a series of epigrams, poetic in style, and,
dating from 1947, adopts a curious format: the left-hand side
of the page carries a single line of nature-description (sample:
"When the early morning light grows silently over the
mountains .. .") 2 and the right side four epigrams. One finds it
difficult to see a connection between individual lines of description and the corresponding epigrammatic groups, so it
seems that one must seek a significance in the structure of the
whole.
It is not at all impossible that these pages resume the author's
reflections upon the experience of Being (Aoyoq), made, presumably, in the mountain haunts of Todtnauberg which he
knows so well. By reason of the poetic description, we have
some knowledge of the beings about him through which Being
came. The descriptive portions, then, would be an effort to
bring these beings into words and thus preempt the poet's role.
The reflective portions seem to meditate the sense of what he is
doing and express it in words. Here he is more the thinker. Does
this give us any light upon the relation of poet to thinker ? At
least it adds another aspect of the problem to consider. We
polarize our remarks around: A. Being, B. Thought, C. Language.
1
2

Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens (Pfullingen: Neske, 1954). (Hereafter: ED).
"Wenn das frühe Morgenlicht still über den Bergen wächst. .
(ED, p. 6).
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BEING

Being (Sein) in the present pages is uniformly used with an
antiquated spelling (Seyn), which we render by an equally antiquated English form that comes from the Anglo-Saxon: Beon.
In the text itself, there is no indication of the significance of the
new spelling, but two years later (1949) in a note added to the
second edition of WW, we are told that the new form designates
the "difference that holds sway between Being and beings," sc.
the ontological difference as such as it emerges out of the process
of A-XFJ^-EIOC.3 We infer that such is the sense here and take it to
be significant that now for the first time the ontological difference as such is thematized throughout a whole essay, even if a
minor one.
What are we told about Beon? It is a process of light. It is
aboriginal Utterance, yet never "is" itself as a being, hence
never can be expressed adequately in the ontic dimension of
human language and remains for this reason necessarily unsaid. It shines forth in beings with utter simplicity. It is the One,
the Only that is worthy of thought, and retains primacy over
thought, giving rise to it, inciting it, gathering (is it not Aoyoc?)
thought into a unity within itself. There is nothing new here
beyond a new name: Beon now goes by the name of "the most
ancient of all that is ancient." 4
B.

THOUGHT

Genuine thought has but one task: to think Beon, which, like
a star in the firmament, remains constant as the concern of man.
In order to accomplish thought, we must take a step-in-reverse
from the normal preoccupations of philosophy, as long as philosophy is a presentational thought, and learn to discern the
difference between a being conceived as an object of presentation and as that through which Being comes to thought.5
What is the structure of thought? It is tri-dimensional, for
W W , p. 26 (den waltenden Unterschied von Sein und Seiendem).
ED, pp. 7 (Licht), 21 (das Gesprochene, in keiner Sprache das Gesagte), 13 (Die
Pracht des Schlichten), 7 (auf einen Stern, einen Gedanken), 13 (Ermunterung), 17
(versammelt), 19 (das Älteste des Alten).
5 ED, pp. 7 (Stern im Himmel), 9 (Gegenstand, gedachte Sache).
3

4
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in its essence it is re-collection. Thought implies the dimension
of past, for it is a thinking upon what-is-as-having-been, sc.
beings, which here seem to be the things of nature. Thought implies the dimension of future, for "in our thought [Beon] comes
from behind us and nonetheless toward us. That is why thought
deals with the [continued] arrival of what-has-been, and is recollection." 6 Thought implies the dimension of present, for it
renders Beon manifest in language. When thought responds to
the intimations of Beon, " . . . there flourishes the language
[proper to] mittence." 7
Since Beon keeps coming to authentic thought, the very heart
of thought is imparted to it by Beon itself, in fact is but the resounding of Beon in man. That is why "we never come upon
thoughts. They come to us." 8 We have a good example for this
in the case of genuine dialogue. Here it is not so much a question
of two partners accepting or rejecting what each other says as a
joint effort to attend steadfastly to Beon in continual ad-vent
to both.»
In any case, man's task is simply to remain docile to Beon in
advent. This docility can be expressed in terms of the metaphor
of sight, as if we saw before our eyes the Being-dimension of
beings, and also by the metaphor of hearing, as if we heard
within our hearts the word of aboriginal Utterance. There is, of
course, an appropriate attunement. At one point, this seems to
be a wonderment before the fact that thought takes place at all.
At another point, it seems to be sorrow and even pain. For want
of further elucidation, we understand this latter specimen of
attunement in the sense of the Hölderlin interpretations, where
sorrow is the negativity of joy, sc. the disposition of the poet
responding to the Joyous, insofar as this holds itself in re-serve.
This makes it clear, however, that the mittence of Beon with
which we are dealing is profoundly negatived.10
e "Das Älteste des Alten kommt in unserem Denken hinter uns her und doch auf
uns zu. Darum hält sich das Denken an die Ankunft des Gewesenen und ist Andenken/'
(ED, p. 19). See p. 17 (jeglich Ding).
7 " . . . dann gedeiht die Sprache des Geschicks." (ED, p. 9).
8 "Wir kommen nie zu Gedanken. Sie kommen zu uns." (ED, p. zi). See pp. 9
(Mut aus Zumutung), 17 (Widerklang).
• ED, p. 11 (geselligen Besinnung).
1 0 ED, pp. 9 (vor Augen, Gehör), 21 (Erstaunen), 13 (Traurigkeit, Schmerz).
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Not only is Beon negatived, but there is, of course, a correlative negativity in thought, for, because of this reserve of Beon,
thought is powerless to bring into words the totality of the
aboriginal Utterance. For thought to comprehend this impotence is to recognize Beon in its negativity, sc. as mystery. But
Beon is more than mystery, it is errance as well. To acquiesce
to Beon as negatived, then, thought must accept the inevitability of errance. "Who thinks in the grand manner must in the
grand manner wander in errance." 1 1
This negativity, however, must be understood not only as
consequent upon the re-serve of Beon but as characteristic of
thought as such. That is why thought is prey to a triple danger,
and it would be quite congruous with the text if we understood
this triple danger as indicating the innate "fallen" character of
thought. The first danger is the proximity of the poet. We
understand this to mean that, because of the intimate connection
between thought and language, there is danger that the thinker
forget his task as a thinker and play the part of a poet. It is very
nice to be told this, but would it not be helpful if the precise
distinction between thought and poetry were first made clear?
One wonders, too, if in the work we are considering Heidegger
himself escapes the danger of what he describes. It is a "good
and salutary" danger, after all. 12
The second danger is thought itself, for if it is to be authentic,
it must think "against itself." 1 3 We are left to our own resources here to inteipret this. It seems plausible, however, to
understand it as meaning that thought contains within itself a
drag towards presentative thinking, born of the fact that, while
comprehending Beon, thought must deal always with beings
within which Beon withdraws. In order to think Beon, thought
must deal always with beings, and therefore it must struggle
against this tendency inscribed in its nature, therefore think
against itself.
The third danger consists in philosophizing. We understand
this to mean that philosophy, insofar as it is characterized by
presentative thought and evolves into metaphysics, represents
11
18
18

"Wer groß denkt, muß groß irren." (ED, p. 17)- See ED, p. 21 (vor die Sache).
ED, p. 15 (gute, heilsame).
ED, p. 15 (gegen sich selbst denken).
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a forgetfulness of Beon. This is all the more insidious because a
philosophizing of this sort, in thinking beings as such, pretends
to be thinking Beon, whereas, totally oblivious to the ambivalence of ov, it fails to recognize the ontological difference as
such.14
Briefly, the heart of thought is imparted to it by Beon in all
its negativity; therefore it is a negatived thought. The epigrams give us no clear warrant for saying that thought is to be
conceived as re-solve. And yet we are told that "as soon as we
have become at home in the origin of thought, then we may
venture to take the step-in-reverse from philosophy into the
thinking of Beon." 15 If we may eliminate from "as soon as" any
suggestion of ontic succession, then recognizing thought in its
origins would be simply the indispensable condition for thinking
Beon. To become "at home" in the origin of thought may be
understood as recognizing and acquiescing in thought as the
(negatived) thinking of Beon in its negativity. We might interpret this to mean the attaining of authenticity, hence implicitly re-solve.
Perhaps we are forcing the matter, however. There is another
suggestion of a more indirect nature that is perhaps more convincing, when we are told what it means for man to grow old.
Beon has just been called the "most ancient of all that is
ancient," and for man to become old presumably means to grow
ancient with and in the ancient. May we not understand this in
the sense of achieving one's fullness as the There of Beon, of not
only arriving at but maintaining one's authenticity? If this is
permissible, then to grow old means that, once the propitious
time has come and authenticity has been attained, the thinker
must persevere in such thought. This means that he must continue to abide in that precise domain where thought, uniquely
proper to the way he has followed, has its origin. 16

ED, p. 15 (schlechte, Philosophieren).
"Den Schritt zurück aus der Philosophie in das Denken des Seyns dürfen wir
wagen, sobald wir in der Herkunft des Denkens heimisch geworden sind." (ED,
p. 19).
1 6 ED, p. 19. Free paraphrase of: "Alt sein heißt: rechtzeitig dort innehalten, wo
der einzige Gedanke eines Denkweges in sein Gefüge eingeschwungen ist."
14
15
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LANGUAGE

We know already that when thought responds to the ad-vent
of Beon (A6yo<;)
.. there flourishes the language [proper to]
mittence/' 1 7 Now the author calls the bringing of Beon into
language the process of original poetizing. It is the "topology of
Beon." It is the function of man to accomplish this task, and
from the very first moment that he exists the process already
has begun. 18
But it is important to note that we must distinguish clearly
between "original poetizing," as it is understood here, and the
poetic song that poets write and which we usually call poetry
or, as we have been saying hitherto, "poesy." Clearly for Heidegger the poesy of poets and the thought of thinkers are to be
distinguished, yet their unity is unquestionable, and it derives
from the fact that they both stem from a single root: original
poetizing. Since this common root itself derives all its vitality
from Beon, both poesy and thought stem ultimately from Beon
itself. 19 Thought, then, deriving from original poetizing, has a
poetizing character all its own. If it has remained hidden
up to now, the reason presumably is that we cannot appreciate
it until we have learned to comprehend the genuine nature of
language, sc. Beon as the process of A6yoQ.
R£SUM£

In HB, Heidegger thought Being without naming the ontological difference as such. Now it is named as such. With this
nuance, the present little work recalls in lapidary fashion the
perspectives already seen.

II.

The Pathway

Belonging to the same genre as the piece we have just seen,
"The Pathway" was composed to help the author's townsmen
of Messkirch commemorate (1949) the one hundredth anniversa1 7 " . . . dann gedeiht die Sprache des Geschicks." (ED, p. 9).
ia E D , pp. 25 (Dichtens), 23 (Topologie des Seyns), 7 (angefangenes Gedicht).
E D , p. 25 (Singen, Denken).
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ry of composer Conrad Kreutzens death.20 The setting is obviously Messkirch itself. The contents may be quickly resumed.
There is a path that begins at the courtyard gate, leads through
rolling meadows and woods down to the moorland and back. It
is rich with memories for the thinker. In the woods as a boy his
father would fell the trees for wood, and out of the shaven bark
the lad would fashion toy boats to sail on make-believe journeys,
long before he knew what it meant to embark on a voyage that
would leave all familiar shores behind. One oak-tree in particular brings pause. It stands beside a rough-hewn bench, where,
grown into a young philosopher, he would read and ponder
great thinkers of the past, then leave them aside to stroll along
the path and find there addressed to him a comprehension that
philosophy texts could not give.
How understand this strange appeal of the pathway? Wherever the path leads, whatever it passes along the way, its appeal
is always the one - the appeal of something wondrously simple
that permeates all. This ''Simple" we understand, of course, to
be Being, probably in the sense of Beon. "The Pathway," then,
is another description, prose-poetic in form, of the experience
of Being. We examine it in greater detail for what it suggests
with regard to: A. Being, B. Thought.
A.

BEING

Being is the "Simple." We know from "A6yo<;" that this is to
be understood as the "One." It holds sway with a gentle insistence that is at once an inexhaustible strength. It is the unspoken language of beings (Unausgesprochene ihrer Sprache). It
advances unto man without benefit of any mediation other
then itself, yet it must prevail for a long time before man learns
to discern it. It never appears as itself, but it is precisely by a
hidden efficacy that it bestows its benediction upon man.21
When the Simple makes its appeal, who is it that really
speaks? Is it the soul, the world, God? Notice that these are the
three types of beings which classical metaphysics studies, hence
«0 Der Feldweg (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1953). (Hereafter FW). Cf. G, p. i x .
a * FW, pp. 5 (sanften Gewalt), 7 (unerschöpfliche Kraft), 4 (Unausgesprochene
ihrer Sprache, unvermittelt, langes Gedeihen, verbirgt).
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the question seems to mean: is the Simple that appeals to man
on the pathway some being with which metaphysics can deal?
The question receives no answer. The author continues: "Everything speaks of abandonment to the [Simple which abides], . . . " 2 2
We take this to mean: that what addresses man on the pathway
is not some being but Being; that beings (Ilavra) only convey
to him the appeal proceeding from "Ev; that this appeal solicits
man to abandon himself to Being, sc. the Simple, the One.
One point is worth underlining. Among the beings through
which Being advances and makes its appeal to man is the old
familiar oak. It has learned the secret of long, slow growth and
is imagined to reveal the secret in saying: " . . . growing means
this: to open oneself up to the breadth of heaven and to sink
one's roots into the darkness of earth. . . . " 23 Since presumably
growing is a manner in which Being comes-to-presence in a tree,
we interpret this to mean that there is a certain bi-valence in the
process of Being as it comes-to-presence in things of common
experience, and it permits us to speak of the Simple in terms of
both heaven and earth. We shall soon see the importance of
this remark.
B.

THOUGHT

Being, however, needs its There, and the appeal of the Simple,
the One, is uttered only so long as man, endowed with a unique
affinity to it, is able to attend to this appeal. This affinity with
the Simple is of such a nature that man, too, shares in the ambivalence that we have just noted, and it is only thus that he is
able to let be the beings that he encounters.24
To attend to the appeal of Beon (the Simple), addressed to
man along the pathway, man must overcome the ravages of
technicity which distract him, dull his ear to the appeal, make
the wondrously Simple seem to be merely a dull uniformity. To
rouse man from the fallen condition of technicity, the appeal of
Being itself awakens in him a yearning for genuine freedom.
"Alles spricht den Verzicht in das Selbe
" (FW, p. 7).
" . . . daß wachsen heißt: der Weite des Himmels sich öffnen und zugleich in
das Dunkel der Erde w u r z e l n ; . . ( F W , p. 3).
24 FW, pp. 4 (in Luft geboren, hören), 3 (gleich recht beides).
22

28
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This is the call to foresake the fascinations of technicity and
abandon himself to Beon. This self-abandonment does not impoverish man. On the contrary, it is an enrichment, for by
reason of it all of the inexhaustible strength of Being becomes
abidingly man's own, and he walks along the path attuned with
a gladsomeness that Being itself imparts.25
RSsume
"The Pathway" may be taken to symbolize the way of thought
itself, where man's task is to abandon himself to the appeal of
bi-valent Beon, addressed to him through beings, which he encounters along the way. A pleasant divertimento.

86 FW, pp. 4-5 (einförmig, überdrüssig), 5 (Sinn, der das Freie liebt), 7 (Verzicht,
nimmt nicht, gibt, unerschöpfliche Kraft), 5 (wissende Heiterkeit).
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W H A T IS M E T A P H Y S I C S ? : I N T R O D U C T I O N
T H E ESSENCE OF GROUND:

PROLOGUE

Six years had passed since the fourth edition of WM (1943)
had given in the Epilogue the first full sketch of foundational
thought as the process of overcoming metaphysics. The passage
of time brought demand for a fifth edition, and this offered another significant improvement in the form of an Introduction,
which dealt with the nature of metaphysics that was to be overcome. What specifically does it tell us ? In general terms, we may
say that it not only tries to explain once more the meaning of
metaphysics and the means of overcoming it but also reviews
the bold lines of SZ, in order to emphasize the fact that this first
work, and by implication WM, which, all commentators agree,
profoundly concords with it, was uniquely concerned with this
problem.1 The first of these themes served as the basis for the
introductory chapter to this study. The second, along with
whatever oblique references are made to thought, we incorporated into the study of HB. There remains, then, practically
nothing left to say.
And yet, we are not dispensed from a very important remark.
For, concomitantly with the Introduction, the author made a
change in the Epilogue. Now it is one of the inalienable rights of
man that an author may emend his text. But what was the
emendation? The original (1943) reading was " . . . Being indeed
comes-to-presence without beings. . . . " Now it reads " . . . Being
never comes-to-presence without beings. . . . " Is this not a complete reversal? and, indeed, on an essential point? And the
1 "Einleitung," WM, pp. 7-23-

wm:
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unkindest cut of all is that the change is made without so much
as a word to call attention to it, much less to explain it. We must
probe the mystery.
A.

THE

CASE

OF THE A L T E R E D

EPILOGUE

We have already suggested in what sense the first text may
be understood, sc. that it insists on the primacy of the Beingprocess in the emergence of beings, therefore names the ontological difference, but not as such. The second text insists on the
fact that although Being must be thought for itself in order to
comprehend the ontological difference, it can never be by itself.
Hence, if it is true to say that beings cannot be without Being,
the reverse is also true: Being cannot be without beings. This
names the ontological difference as such.
Since the alteration is made concomitantly with the publication of the Introduction, the question must now be posed
whether or not there is reason to maintain that, independently of
change, the focus of Heidegger at this time is on the ontological
difference as such. We find two indications interior to the introduction and two exterior to it that lead us to say "yes."
In the closing paragraphs of the introduction, we read:
Which remains more of a riddle, the fact that beings are or that Being is ?
Or does even such a reflection as this still fail to bring us [genuinely] close
to the riddle that with the Being of beings has come-to-pass ? 2

It seems quite clear that Heidegger here is thinking Being and
beings in terms of their mutual dependence on each other,
therefore the ontological difference as such.
In the development of the metaphor of metaphysics as the
roots of the philosophy tree but Being as the element, or ground,
in which these roots are sunk, we are told that " . . . the ground
is ground for the roots...," 3 and again: " . . . presumably the
element is not an element, unless the roots are woven through
it." 4 We take this to mean that Being is not Being unless there
2 "Was bleibt rätselhafter, dies, daß Seieades ist, oder dies, daß Sein ist? Oder
gelangen wir auch durch diese Besinnung noch nicht in die Nähe des Rätsels, das
sich mit dem Sein des Seienden ereignet hat?" (WM, p. 23).
8 " . . . Der Grund ist Grund für die W u r z e l ; . . . " (WM, p. 8).
4 " . . . Vermutlich ist also auch das Element nicht das Element, ohne daß die
Wurzel es durchwebt." (WM, p. 8).
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be a mittence unto beings, which, in the matter under discussion, takes the form of metaphysics. This concurs completely
with the altered Epilogue.
There are two other important texts that appear in 1949, and
we introduce them as external evidence. With the third edition
of WG there is added a succinct but luminous Prologue, and the
second edition of W W adds a new first paragraph to its concluding note. Both deal explicitly with the ontological difference
as such.
The Prologue to W G reminds us of the intimate affinity between WM and WG. The first deals with the question of Nonbeing, the latter with the ontological difference. But if Nonbeing in WM simply formulates the "not" which characterizes
Being when it is experienced from the viewpoint of beings, the
ontological difference of WG, too, is the "not" which separates
beings and Being. Now this "not" that is intrinsic to Non-being
and the "not" which constitutes the ontological difference are
but one, not in the sense of a logical identity but in the sense
that " . . . in the coming-to-presence of the Being of beings, both
are correlative. . . . " 5 In neither case, then, is the "not" a mere
ens rationis; it is inscribed in the process of Being itself. This is
what we have been calling all along the "negativity" of Being.
" . . . This one ['not']," Heidegger continues, "is the [one problem]
worthy of thought that both essays, purposely kept distinct, try
to pose for meditation, without being up to the task." 6 We infer:
that the one problem common to both WM and WG was Being
as permeated with negativity; that the reason why neither essay
was up to the task of thinking it was presumably that both remained, like SZ, locked in the horizon of Heidegger I, where the
necessary language to think Being in its truth as such failed.
The additional note in WW takes the matter further still. It
offers us the famous text, whose content is to be found, however,
in the essay itself: " . . . The question about the essence of truth
finds its answer in the phrase: the essence of truth is the truth
6 " . . . w a s im Wesenden des Seins des Seienden zusammengehört...."
(WG,
P. ?).
6 " . . . Dieses Selbe ist das Denkwürdige, das beide mit Absicht getrennt gehaltenen Schriften einer Besinnung näher zu bringen versuchen, ohne dieser gewachsen
zu sein." (WG, p. 5).
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of Essence. . . . " 7 We are told once more that the truth of
Essenc(-ing) is Being in its truth (a-Xirj&eta), comporting both
positivity and negativity, sc. it is the lighting-up process of
beings that conceals itself in these beings, even as (and inasmuch
as) it enlightens them. It is at once both a hidden light and a
"luminous hiding" within beings. All this is familiar. What is
new is that it is by reason precisely of this "luminous hiding"
that Being is designated as Beon, and Beon is intended to suggest
the "difference that holds sway between Being and beings," sc.
the ontological difference as such. This helps us to see that the
entire problematic of revealment-concealment in Being is nothing
more than the problem of the "not" which constitutes the ontological difference as such. " . . . Because a luminous hiding [sc.
the 'not' of the ontological difference] belongs to Beon, Beon
shines forth in the light of a concealing withdrawal. The name
of this lighting-process is a-X^&eia." 8 What better evidence do
we need to show how profoundly the Heidegger of 1949 is preoccupied with the ontological difference as such?
Briefly, the formula of 1943 emphasizes the primacy of Being
and implies the ontological difference but does not name it as
such. The formula of 1949 names it as such. Both have a legitimate sense, and to appreciate the full complexity of Heidegger's
problem, we must think them no doubt together. But the second
formula expresses better what the author considers to be, as we
see in ID, the insight that is uniquely proper to himself.9 Did he
not have the right, then, to alter the first formula accordingly,
when the occasion of the new edition gave him the chance? Of
course! If there were reason for criticism, then, this would have
to restrict itself to the unannounced manner in which the change
was made. But when all is said and done, even this seems to be
a matter of taste: how do you take your philosophy? Straight or with a dash of legerdemain?

7 " . . . Die Frage nach dem Wesen der Wahrheit findet ihre Antwort in dem Satz:
das Wesen der Wahrheit ist die Wahrheit des Wesens
" ( W W , p. 26). Heidegger's
italics.
8 " . . . Weil zu ihm lichtendes Bergen gehört, erscheint Seyn anfänglich im Licht
des verbergenden Entzugs. Der Name dieser Lichtung ist dftjj&eia." (WW, p. 26).
• ID, p. 43 and passim.
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THE THING

We have spoken much of foundational thinking as something
other than the presentative, pro-posing thought characteristic
of the metaphysical tradition it is meant to overcome. The form
of thought which up to the present the author has most fully
developed is the process of re-trieve, as applied to the interpretation of other thinkers. We have had hints of a different style
of non-presentative thought, such as in the analysis of a work
of art (1935) and more recently in "The Pathway" (1949), but
no full treatment of this other style in recent years. Now in a
public lecture, entitled "The Thing," before the Bavarian Academy of Fine Arts in Munich (1950), Heidegger explores a way to
think Being through "things" of common experience.1
As a matter of fact, the author makes his meditation upon
"The Thing" in an effort to discern what is meant by the "nearness" of things. He takes as his starting point the fact that
modern means of travel and communication have reduced
enormously the distance between man and the things with which
he deals. Yet diminished distance need not mean that these
things are thereby nearer to man, for no matter how close they
come to him physically, they are genuinely near only when they
are comprehended in that which renders them near, sc. in their
dimension of near-ness as such. He proposes, then, to meditate
the things that are near precisely in their dimension of near-ness.
This means to meditate them as near, as what they are, sc. to
meditate things as things. We know already that, for Heidegger,
1

"Das Ding/' VA pp. 163-181.
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near-ness as such is Being itself, which withdraws in the things
it makes near.2 We have here, then, another effort to think
Being as such, by pondering things as things.
What, then, is a thing? Heidegger resorts once more to the
phenomenological method, which, as far as it goes, is masterful.
Let us take as our basic phenomenon an everyday thing like a
wine-pitcher. The question: what is this pitcher as a pitcher, the
thing-ness of this thing ?
In the most general terms, we may say the pitcher is a vessel,
a container, that by reason of its bottom and sides can hold a
liquid and be held (by its handle) in turn. But what is it in itself ? Does it suffice to say that it is an object and let it go at
that ? Certainly not, if this means that the pitcher is, only insofar as it is presented to a subject. It stands by itself on the table
and is, independently of all subjectivizing presentation. No,
the thing as thing is more than simply an object.
Well, then, shall we say that the pitcher is something-thatstands-by-itself? Even this is not enough, for it stands
by itself only because it first has been fashioned by a
potter. This fashioning, or pro-ducing, of the pitcher-thing we
shall call, in order to remain as close as possible to the German,
"corn-posing.'' 3 Prior to the standing-by-itself-character of the
thing, then, is its com-position. Now when we think the thing
as thing in terms of the fact that it has been com-posed, we
clearly comprehend it as more than merely what has been proposed as an object. This much is gain. But have we broken all
the bonds of presentative thought?
B y no means. For com-posing is still a ''-posing." The potter
"-poses" his material in such a way that at the end of his work
the thing stands "before," or "across" (gegenüber) from, him. For
the sake of precision, let us say that insofar as the thing, when
finished, stands by itself across from the potter, it is ''contraposed" to him. We intend that this be distinguished from that
VA, pp. 164 (Ding als Ding), 176 (Wesen der Nähe).
VA, p. 165 (Herstellen). If Herstellen were used independenUy, we would translate as "to pro-duce," for the prefix her- has clearly the connotation of "leadingforth ," which the prefix "pro-" would suggest. Because of the importance of the
stem "-posing" (Stellen), however, both here and in "Die Frage nach der Technik"
(1953)» w e settle for "com-posing," provided we be permitted to read into "com-" a
suggestion of "pro-." Cognates: HergestelUheit we translate as "com-position/1 Herstand as compositum.
2
3
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which is considered only as op-posed (sc. ob-ject) to a subject,
in which case the object, even though it may stand in and by
itself, is nevertheless considered only according to that dimension in which it is pro-posed by, to and for the subject.
Obviously, the thing, when considered as com-posed, or contraposed, is immeasurably more than it is when considered merely
as op-posed to a subject, but we are still interpreting it in terms of
a "-posing."
Furthermore, this posing that takes place in com-posing
depends upon a pro-posing of its own. " . . . The pitcher [in
question] is not a container because it was com-posed, but it
had to be com-posed because it is this container." 4 The question
is: what is this pitcher as pitcher, which at one time was to-becomposed, and which by this com-position the potter simply let
be itself in clay? Before the potter could approach his task, the
pitcher-to-be-composed had manifested its visage to him. The
visage of a thing-to-be-composed is its elSog, E8£a. The potter
"sees" the visage, insofar as the tS£a is pro-posed before him.
Heidegger maintains that Plato, and the whole metaphysical
tradition after him, got no further than this. His criticism is
that at this point we still have not explained what and how the
thing is, where we must understand "is" to mean, in Heidegger's
sense, ' 'emerges-into-presence." The whole emerging-process he
calls the thing's "essence" (Wesen) but obviously this must be
understood as essenc-, or presenc-ing:
However, what [and how] the container, thus offering its visage [to the
potter] . . . as this pitcher-thing, is can never be experienced, let alone
appropriately thought, in terms of the viewing of a visage, sc. the ISioc.
That is why Plato, who pro-posed the presence [of beings] in terms of
their offering of a visage, thought the [genuine] essenc [-ing] of a thing as
little as did Aristotle and all subsequent thinkers. . . . 5

4 " . . . Der Krug ist nicht Gefäß, weil er hergestellt wurde, sondern der Krug
mußte hergestellt werden, weil er dieses Gefäß ist." (VA, p. 166). Writer's italics.
5 "Was jedoch das so aussehende Gefäß als dieser Krag, was und wie der Krug als
dieses Krug-Ding ist, läßt sich durch die Hinsicht auf das Aussehen, die
niemals
erfahren, geschweige denn sachgemäß denken. Darum hat Piaton, der die Anwesenheit des Anwesenden vom Aussehen her vorstellt, das Wesen des Dinges so wenig
gedacht wie Aristoteles und alle nachkommenden Denker
" (VA, p. x66). Heidegger's italics. Obviously the problems suggested here are enormous. For Heidegger's
conception of elSoc in Aristotle, and the associated problems of T£XOC> ivreXlxeia,
HOp<pr), etc., see v.g. P, pp. 141, M5# 146» «69» «74, 276, 277> 281, 385.
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The thing as thing, than, is more than an objectum, more than
merely a compositum. Once more, then: what is the thing as
thing? From here on, Heidegger leaves the negative part of the
analysis and proceeds in his own name. Suppose we pour wine
into the pitcher. What happens? Do we pour wine into the
bottom and sides? Not exactly. At best we pour it between
bottom and sides. It is the emptiness between bottom and sides
that contains the wine, thereby making the container to be container. The potter, then, in working the clay, does not fashion,
properly speaking, the pitcher. He gives form to the clay, or
better, he provides a form for emptiness. " . . . F o r [this
emptiness], in it and from it he fashions clay into [the proper]
configuration. . . . " 6 What 4s the thing-ness of this pitcherthing? " . . . The thing-ness of the container by no means rests
in the material out of which it is formed but in the emptiness
which does the containing." 7
We must interrogate this emptiness. The term "containing"
suggests a double moment: a receiving and a retaining. Both
these moments, however, are gathered (X6yo?) into one. What
gathers them thus into unity ? Is it not the ultimate gathering
that lets the contain-ing, therefore the contain-er (thing) be?
For Heidegger, this ultimate unity must be understood in terms
of the functioning of the pitcher. The pitcher's function is not
only to receive and to retain the wine, but to pour it out into a
glass. It is precisely at this moment of pouring that the container is gathered into the unity of itself, that the pitcher is
what it is. This would be true, even if there were nothing in the
pitcher to pour, for the inability-to-pour of a pitcher without
wine can be comprehended only in terms of the pouring that the

* " . . . Für sie, in sie und aus ihr bildet er den Ton ins Gebild
" (VA, p. 167).
" . . . Das Dinghafte des Gefäßes beruht keineswegs im Stoff, daraus es besteht,
sondern in der Leere, die faßt." (VA, p. 167). Compare Heidegger's conception of
Leere with the following passage from Laotse (Elfter Spruch): "Dreißig Speichen umgeben die Nabe; doch erst die Leere zwischen ihnen macht das Wesen des Rades aus.
Aus Ton formt man Gefäße; doch erst die Leere in ihnen macht das Wesen des Gefäßes aus. Aus Wänden, in die man Fenster und Türen bricht, entsteht das Haus-,
doch erst die Leere innerhalb der Wände macht das Wesen des Hauses aus. Darum:
was man handhaben kann bestimmt das Aussehen; was man nicht handhaben kann
die Wesenheit." {Laotse, Der Anschluß an das Gesetx oder der Große Anschluß, Versuch einer Wiedergabe des Taoteking von Carl Dallago, 3rd ed. [Heidelberg: Lambert
Schneider, 1953}, p. 16).
7
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pitcher otherwise would do, and is profoundly different from
the inability-to-pour, say, of a hammer or a scythe. 8
The next step, of course, is to interrogate the "pouring" of the
pitcher, but at this crucial moment the rigor of the analysis
seems to disappear. The pouring is seen to imply a four-fold
polyvalence (Ge-viert), that itself is gathered into original Simplicity and One-ness.9 We shall examine the problem shortly.
For the moment, it suffices to see: that the pouring gatherstogether this pitcher-thing as thing; that the power of pouring
to gather-together derives from a still more original gatheringpower that springs from the polyvalent One; that " . . . this
manifold [yet] simple gathering is what comes-to-presence in the
pitcher. . . . " and as the pitcher, sc. is the Being of the pitcher,
the "thing-ing of the t h i n g " ; 1 0 that (to return to the beginning),
since near-ness comes to us only in that which is near, near-ness
consists in nothing else than the Being of things: " . . . Near-ness
in all its power draws near to us as the thing-ing of things." 11

A.

BEING

i. The Quadrate
When Heidegger speaks of the Being of things as essentially
a gathering-process, we understand Being in the sense of A6yo^,
which, of course, is to be understood as the original One. The
puzzling part of the essay, however, lies in the fact that Heidegger sees in this One a four-fold polyvalence. What does he mean
by Being as the Quadrate? The theme of our research is not
Being but thought, so we do not feel obliged to solve the problem
(if it can be solved). The purpose of our present remarks is
simply to see it clearly as a problem.
8 VA, p. 170 (Nehmen, Einbehalten, Geschenk). We translate Geschenk as "pouring
out," intending to suggest thereby the connotation of gift, effusion, bounty, etc.
that Heidegger certainly means to imply.
9 VA, pp. i7o-r72, 176-177.
10 " . . . Dieses vielfältig einfache Versammeln ist das Wesende des Kruges..
(VA, p. 172). S3e VA, pp. 172,176 (Einfalt), 170,172,176 (versammelt), 172 (Verweilen
des Gevierts), 176 (Dingen des Dinges).
1 1 " . . . Nähe waltet im Nähern als das Dingen des Dinges." (VA, p. 176)- The
author offers a short disquisition on the word "thing," examining the Old German
(dine), Greek (6v), Roman (r*s), mediaeval (ens, Dine), modern (Gegenstand) meanings
(VA, pp. 172-175).
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What is the Quadrate (Geviert)} The author disengages the
notion in meditating the pouring-out of the pitcher. He imagines
it to be a wine or water pitcher and considers that this pouring
somehow combines four "aspects" of Being, which he calls
earth-sky, mortals-gods: earth, for water comes from the springs
in the earth, wine from grapes on the vine; sky, for the springs
are fed by rain from the sky, wine-grapes nourished b y the sun;
mortals, for what is poured out may quench man's thirst or
warm his heart; gods, for the liquid may be used as a libation to
the gods. These four facets of Being are complementary. To
think one of them thoroughly is to think them all. They mirror
each other, and in this mutual mirroring each is properly itself.
" . . . This event of mirroring [each other] liberates each unto its
own proper self, yet binds what is thus liberated in the One-ness
of their essential mutuality." 12
How is all this to be understood? Firstly, let us note that,
although this is the first time that we hear of the Quadrate, it
is not the first time that such themes appear. "The Pathway"
suggested the duality of earth and sky in the coming-to-presence
of the oak-tree. The duality of gods and man might have been
inferred from the Hölderlin interpretations, where the poet was
called a half-god, because he inhabited the domain in-between
gods and men. 13 But this does not help very much. The essential
seems to be that the author here is trying to discern the richness
of Being, and since Being, as the One, has been conceived already as the gathering-process of Aoyo^, the Quadrate seems to
disengage those "features" in Being whose mutual mirroring
constitutes the collectiveness of Being as such. 14
1 2 " . . . Das ereignende Spiegeln gibt jedes der Vier in sein Eigenes frei, bindet
aber die Freien in die Einfalt ihres wesenhaften Zueinander." ( V A , p. 178). See pp.
1 7 0 - 1 7 1 , 176-177.
is F W , p. 3 (Himmel-Erde); HD, p. 98 (Halbgötter).
1 4 I t is worth calling attention to a certain similarity between Heidegger's Geviert
and a conception found in Laotse. (In the following passage, Anschluß translates T a o ) :
" D a s Urseiende kennt keine Trennung von Himmel und E r d e ; so tief, so still, so
eines ist es! Ewig sich gleich bleibend, kennt es keinen Stillstand. E w i g sich wandelnd,
kennt es keinen Wechsel. Man kann es fassen als Ausfluß alles Seins. Ich weiß seinen
Namen nicht, aber der Mensch erschließt es sich im Anschluß. Mich mühend, seine
A r t zu künden, nenne ich es: groß. Groß: das ist unermeßlich. Unermeßlich: das
ist unnahbar fern. Unnahbar fern: das ist völlig in sich gekehrt. D a r u m : der Anschluß
ist Großes, der Himmel ist Großes, die Erde ist Großes, und der Mensch ist Großes.
So gibt es vier erste Größen im Dasein; eine davon ist der Mensch. Der Mensch ist
der Erde unterworfen, die Erde ist dem Himmel unterworfen, der Himmel ist dem
Anschluß an das Gesetz unterworfen, das Gesetz ist sich selber unterworfen.**

( L a o t s e , Der Anschluß

. . . Fünfundzwanzigster Spruch, p. 30).
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In any case, one curious fact seems worth noting. The "sky"
here suggests nothing supra-sensible but is conceived in what
another language would call a purely "physical" way. Earth
and sky, taken together, then, would suggest the entire "world"
of "physical" nature. If we take them thus and think them together with "gods" (clearly designating the entire domain of the
divine) and "mortals," we are reminded of the trilogy that
characterized classical metaphysics: God, man, "world." This
is a hierarchy of beings, of course, and we are dealing here
clearly with Being. But is it possible that the sense of the
Quadrate consists in suggesting that polyvalent plenitude of
(the "simple") "Ev, by reason of which it can come-to-presence
in ndvra, sc. as God, as man and as "world"?
However this may be, Being as the polyvalent One is what
Heidegger understands by the World. We see how fully the perspective of SZ, where There-being was the ultimate whereunto
of the World, has shifted. In identifying now the World with
the One, he insists once more on the fact that the World is not
a being which, as far as he is concerned, has to be "grounded"
in a cause, but simply comes-to-presence in the same way as
Being itself. " . . . World comes-to-presence [simply] insofar as
it worlds. . . . " i s
2. The Negativity of Being
There is a significant passage where the negativity of Being is
underlined, and this brings us to the relation of Being to its
There. We are told again that Being is equivalent to Non-being,
when considered from the viewpoint of beings. This is due to its
"not"-character, by reason of which it recedes in the beings it
reveals, as, for example, near-ness conceals itself in what is
near. 16 Another manner in which to express this same "not"character (negativity) is to speak of the mystery of Being, a
term that suggests not only the self-concealment of Being but
the concealing of this concealment. Therefore Non-being, mystery
(and, as we know from WW, errance) are all different formulae
for the inherent negativity of Being.
1B

"

" . . . Welt west indem sie weitet
V A , p. X76.

" (VA, p. 178).
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All this has become quite ordinary for us. What is new in the
essay is an explicit correlation between the negativity of Being
and There-being as Being-unto-death. For Heidegger resorts to
the "not" which impregnates Being to explain what he means
by the term "mortals" in the Quadrate. That is mortal which
can die. But man alone, he says, properly speaking can die (animals simply stop living), for "to die" means to be able to know
death as death. What, then, is death as death? " . . . Death is
the shrine of Non-being. . . . As the shrine of Non-being, death
hides within itself the presenc [-ing] of Being. . . . " 1 7 Man can
know death as death, because he can comprehend it as the
"shrine of Non-being," where Non-being is not, of course, absolute nothing, but the shrine of Being in its negativity. And why?
Because the nature of man as ek-sistence " . . . is the presenc-ing
[of a] relationship to Being as Being," 18 sc. to Being as negatived.
We understand all this in the following way: The negativity
of Being is so profound that it negates, sc. limits, every modality
of its presenc-ing. Hence the There of Being is necessarily negatived, limited. Since the There comes-to-presence in man, the
limitation of There is designated in terms of the limitation, or
the end-ing, of man, sc. death. Hence, when we say, as in SZ,
that There-being is "Being-unto-death," we mean that it is the
There of Being whose negativity necessitates that its presenc-ing
come to an end which is death. The same law of negativity which
dictates that Being be mystery and Non-being dictates that in
There and as There it be-unto-death. We might even say that
by the There of Being we mean nothing else than Being itself,
precisely insofar as it presences unto an end which is death, sc.
in man. Since Being cannot presence except in a limited (negatived) way and the limit of the presenc-ing in There is death,
then death (limit) is a necessary condition for the presenc-ing
we call "There," and there is a legitimate sense in which we may
say that death is precisely that point where the There begins to
be, that death from the very beginning is immanent in Therebeing, that There is at every moment dy- (end-) ing. However
this may be, death is that "point" where the Being which re1 7 " . . . Der Tod ist der Schrein des N i c h t s . . . . Der Tod birgt als der Schrein des
Nichts das Wesende des Seins in sich. .
(VA, p. 177).
1 8 " . . . Sie sind das wesende Verhältnis zum Sein als Sein." (VA, p. 177). See V A ,
p. 151 (leere Nichts).
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veals itself in There as There withdraws into hiding. Death,
then, is the hiding-place where Being retreats as into a mountain
stronghold (Gebirg). " . . . Death as the shrine of Non-being is
the mountain fastness of Being. . . . " 1 9 Notice that in this the
only difference from the same problematic in SZ is the difference
between Heidegger I and II.
To be able to know death as death is to be able to comprehend
Being in its intrinsic negativity. When Heidegger says that
. . rational animals must first become mortal," 20 we may
understand this to mean that man must come to know death
as death, sc. he must pass from a merely metaphysical conception of himself as a rational animal to a comprehension of
himself as an ec-static relationship to Being as such, whose negativity dictates that man must die. To comprehend and acquiesce in this ineluctable fact is for man to achieve authenticity.
This is freedom-unto-death. It is accomplished in re-solve.
B.

THOUGHT

In the present essay, thought is profoundly a re-collection.
Once more, we discern the same three dimensions of re-collection
as before: the past in this case is Being-as-having-been-in-thatwhich-already-is, sc. the thing (v.g. pitcher) that we are interrogating; the future is Being (whether as the Simple, as polyvalent
One-ness, as Near-ness or as World), inasmuch as it comes to the
thinker through things; the present consists in rendering manifest this Being-dimension of things in language.21
By re-collective thinking of this kind, we let the thing be, sc.
we let it come-to-presence out of Being, which itself thereby
presenc-es in and as the thing. We might say that we thus let
Being come "into" the thing. But we do more than that. We let
Being come "through" the thing and upon us, so that it is in the
thing and as the thing that Being makes its appeal to us. May
we say that it is only through things that Being comes upon us?
Yes, provided that we understand "things" now as what we
" . . . Der Tod ist als der Schrein des Nichts das Gebirg des Seins
" (VA, p.
177). Cf. VA, pp. 7, 256.
80 " . . . Die vernünftigen Lebewesen müssen erst zu Sterblichen
werden(VA,
p. 177). Heidegger's italics.
81 VA, pp. 280 (das andenkende Denken, Ankunft, kommen), 168 (Vorschein).
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have hitherto called "beings," a broader sense than the analysis
of the pitcher would suggest. But what we know of the ontological difference would certainly warrant such an interpretation, and it would give a very satisfying (though not necessarily unique) sense to such a phrase as " . . . we are - in the strict
sense of the word - beings that are conditioned by beings [BeDingten]. . . . " 22
Be this as it may, thought is a letting things be, and
Being is essentially a liberation, a rendering-free. The term
"freedom" does not appear, but it is important to see that we
are still (1950) dealing with the conception of freedom in terms
of letting-be, as suggested by WW (1930). Here the characteristic term is less a rendering-free than a keeping-free, sc. a
sheltering, preserving, guarding - we prefer to say "tending to"
- the Being-dimension of things. " . . . When we think things as
things, then we tend to the presenc-ing of things in that domain
out of which they come-to-presence. . . . " 23 Notice that such a
process is tantamount to playing watchman, or shepherd, to
Being - not, of course, in itself but as it emerges in things. And
when the thinker tends to things in the domain of their origin,
he himself, by that very fact, dwells in this domain. " . . . Insofar
as we shelter things as things, we dwell in Near-ness...," 24 sc.
in the polyvalent One, in Being, in World. At this point, we
rejoin, it would seem, the conception developed in the Hölderlin
interpretations as "dwelling" near the Source.
But how does man succeed in dwelling by his thought in
Being, sc. in letting things come to him as things? " . . . Not
through the machinations of man as victim of technicity, yet
not without the watchfulness of man as mortal. . . . " 25 We interpret this to mean: that man as slave to technicity endeavors
to submit beings to his own disposition in a thought that is
2 2 " . . . Wir sind - im strengen Sinne des Wortes - die Be-Dingten
" ( V A , p.
179). Obviously there is a play on words here, with the German Idealists, beginning
with K a n t , as playmates. Note how Be-Dingten here recalls that aspect of Therebeing's finitude that we called "referential dependence" on beings.
88 " D e n k e n wir das Ding als Ding, dann schonen wir das Wesen des Dinges in den
Bereich, aus dem es w e s t . . ( V A , p. 179).
2 4 " . . . Insofern wir das Ding als das Ding schonen, bewohnen wir die N ä h e . . .
( V A , p. 180).
2 6 " . . . Sie kommen nicht durch die Machenschaft des Menschen. Sie kommen
aber auch nicht ohne die Wachsamkeit der S t e r b l i c h e n . . . ( V A , p. 180). Heidegger's
italics.
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merely presentative; that man as mortal comprehends the
authentic sense of death, hence discerns and acquiesces in his
own nature as the ec-static relationship to Being and its negativity; that man in the second sense is he who has achieved
authenticity as man, the slave of technicity has not; that it is
precisely the achieving of authenticity, sc. the comprehending
of Being in its negativity, that constitutes the foundational
thinking of things. This achieving of authenticity in Heidegger
I was called "re-solve," but here it is the "step-in-reverse," by
which the thinker retreats from presentative thinking into
foundational thought. All of this spins to a fullness in a succinct
phrase with which Heidegger closes: "Only as mortal do men
succeed at dwelling in the World as World. . . . " 26
R£SUM£

Being (A6yo?, World, Near-ness) as to-be-thought is here considered as the presenc-ing of polyvalent One-ness. Foundational
thought is considered as re-collection upon things, by which
mortal man, in full comprehension of his own nature as eksistence unto Being-as-negatived, tends to Being as it presences
in things. This is the step-in-reverse from presentative thinking
unto foundational thought. It is the achievement of re-solve.

" E r s t die Menschen als die Sterblichen erlangen wohnend die Welt als W e l t . . . . "
(VA, p. 181). See p. 180 (Schritt zurück).
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LANGUAGE

Several months after "The Thing" (June, 1950), Heidegger
delivered the lecture on "Language" (October, 1950), taking
Georg Trakl's short lyric, "Winter Evening," as occasion to
probe again the now familiar problem.1
A.

THE

ANTECEDENTS

Echoes of "The Thing" are unmistakable: again Being (the
One) is conceived as polyvalent plenitude under the guise of the
Quadrate, and this in turn as World which lets things be what
they are, sc. gives rise to the thinking of things.2 Likewise, Being
is clearly Aoyo<;. Recalling that A6yo<; grants beings repose in
and as themselves, we are told now that Language in its origins
is a Stillness in which all things find rest.3
There are other familiar notes. Recall how in the study on
Hölderlin's "Re-collection" (1943) we saw that the Holy has
need of the poet in order to be itself. This recalled the necessity
of Being for its There in EM (1935). In another context, we saw
in G (1944-45) how Being (Expanse) has want of man's expansion in order that it may come-to-presence, hence ap-propri"Die Sprache," US, pp. 9-33. For "Ein Winterabend," see p. 17.
US, pp. 22, 28 (Geviert, Welt). Once more we are told that World must not be
conceived in metaphysical sense: whether as the universe of Nature and History,
or as the totality of creation (tnundus) or as beings-in-the-ensemble (jc^ajioi;). See
US, pp. 23-24. Note that Heidegger clearly suggests that World and the Holy (das
rettend Heilige) are but one (US, p. 23).
3 US, pp- 29 (Stille), 28-30 (versammelt). Cf. p. 16 (die älteste Wesensprägung der
Sprache).
1

2
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ates to man his own nature in order thus to ap-propriate him to
itself. After this previous orientation, we find it hardly surprising
to be told now (1950) that the essenc(-ing) of original Language
has want of human language and by reason of this want appropriates to man what is proper to himself in order to ap-propriate him to itself in the process of its presenc-ing. Likewise,
apropos of "Re-collection" (1943) we saw that poetry was conceived as the poet's hail of response to the Holy's hail to him.
Now we are told that human language is man's hailing response
to the hail of Language as it presences.4
B.

THE

DIFFERENCE

If all of these theses have been stated before, what, then, is
new here ? We discern it best, perhaps, if we ponder what is said
about the hail of aboriginal Language (Aoyog), a response to
which takes the form of human language. Strictly speaking,
what is it that is hailed ? We have suggested quite legitimately
that it is man, but the author comes to this only at the close of
the essay. In the course of the analysis, that which is hailed is
rather things (beings) on the one hand and World (Being) on
the other. Yet this expression "on the one hand" and "on the
other" itself is unhappy, for it suggests a separation of Being
from beings that Heidegger resolutely excludes. If beings cannot
be except by reason of Being, neither can Being "be" except in
that which is. This theme is developed in various ways. For example, World "yields" things in their thing-ing; things give a
"bearing" to World. If World and things (Being-beings) must
be called distinct, under no circumstances can they be separated.5
Inseparable, Being-beings are correlative. This means that on
the one hand they are distinguished by more than simply a mere
4 US, pp. 30 (in Eigenes gebracht, übereignet), 30 (Rufen, Kommen-Heißen),
32-33 (Ent-sprechen), 31-32 (Geheiß).
8 US, pp. 21-22 (Dinge), 23-24 (Welt), 24 (Welt gönnt, Dinge gebärden).
Heidegger explicitly suggests that gebärden (ordinarily reflex: " t o deport oneself for,'*
" t o have a bearing," from Gebärde, sc. bearing, gesture) is to be understood in terms
of bern, bären, gebären ("to b e a r , " " t o bring f o r t h , " v.g. a child), which in turn is
meant to suggest a "giving issue t o " (Austrag). The English " b e a r " - " i n g , " from A S
bera (cf. bern, baren supra), admits, too, of these various nuances and in using it w e
intend to suggest them.
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rational distinction, but on the other the difference must not be
conceived as a "relation" that (re)presentative thought can
propose to itself as a subsequent coupling of two entities already constituted as separate. The difference must be understood in the deepest sense of a dif-ferre, a "bearing of each other
out," as if both shared a common center which remains interior
to each (the cum, so to speak of correlation), a common measure
by which each is measured, which serves as the single dimension
of both, a primal unity by reason of which each adheres to the
other and out of which both "issue forth." We must conceive the
(ontological) difference, then, as a scission (-Schied) between
(Unter-) Being and beings that refers them to each other by the
very fact that it cleaves them in two. 6
What is hailed in the coming-to-pass of A6yo<;-as-language,
then, is the correlation of Being and beings (World-things).
Whereunto are they hailed? Unto the unifying scission of the
dif-ference prevailing between them. " . . . In the hailing which
summons things and World, what properly speaking is hailed is:
[their] scission." 7 This may be acceptable enough until we go
a step further and ask who or what does the hailing? Here we
have the disconcerting answer: the scission itself. " . . . T h e
scission is that which hails. . . . " 8
How can the dif-ference be at once both hailing and hailed?
We propose to understand it this way: "Difference" says "differentiation," which implies both differentiating and differentiate.
If we may speak here of a terminus a quo of differentiation, this
we would conceive to be the moment of differentiating. Conversely, the terminus ad quem of differentiation would be the
moment when the differentiated issue forth as such. The differentiating must be conceived as unity, as one-ness,and the differentiated as necessarily two, or, as the author will say later, as
• US, pp. 25 (nicht nachträglich), 24-25 (Unter-Schied, Austrag). The term
Austrag is thematized in I D (pp. 63 ff.). Note that it translates Siacpopdc and was used
already in 2944 for Heraclitus* St.a9ep6ii.evov ( V A , p. 221). It is rendered easily by the
L a t i n differre and English "dif-ference." W e prefer usually " i s s u e " as being more
supple but understand this always as "dif-ference." As for Unter-Sckied, might we
not translate as "splitting the difference" (auseinander)? We certainly might. B u t
a man must live with himself.
7 " . . . Im Heißen, das Ding und Welt r u f t , ist das eigentlich Geheißene: der
Unter-Schied." (US, p. 26).
« " . . . Der Unter-Schied ist das Heißende
" (US, P- 29).
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two-ness (ambivalence). The whole process of dif-ference consists in this tension, this mutual adhesion between unity and
duality which is the scission as such. Insofar as it is a unity, sc.
a differentiating, it is difference-as-hailiwg; insofar as it is a
duality, sc. a differentiate, it is difference-as-hailei. " . . . The
[unifying] scission gathers together the two [differentiated] out
of itself, insofar as it hails them into the fissure which itself
is.
Now the scission, as we have described it here, sc. as the
coming-to-pass of the (ontological) dif-ference out of original
A6yo$, is what Heidegger understands by Language in its ultimate origins. " . . . Language comes-to-presence as the scission
which takes place between World and things." 10 But in order
for Aoyo^-as-scission to come about, there is need of the nature
of man. We interpret this to mean that the differentiating can
not give issue to the differentiated except in, through and for
that being whose nature it is to be open unto Aoyoc-as-scission.
The dynamic tension between differentiating and differentiated
would be what constitutes the need for man which hails him to
be himself. This ec-static open-ness to the aboriginal A6yo^ is the
emerging of human language, which therefore does not have
human activity alone as its source but rather " . . . reposes in
[man's] relationship to language in its origins." 1 1
The ec-static open-ness may be considered in two ways (and
here we discern the double aspect of foundational thought): as
simply a structural relationship between man and aboriginal
Language, hence prior to any moment when he gives voice to
it by a spoken - or even a written - word; as the bringing of this
structural relationship to fully authentic functioning. Authenticity in the use of language is achieved in the moment of man's
free response to the hail addressed to him when the scission takes
place, sc. when the differentiating utters its need of him in order
9 " . . . Der Unter-Schied versammelt aus sich die Zwei, indem er sie in den Riß
ruft, der er selber ist
" (US, p. 29). Note that Heidegger already {1950) takes for
granted the terminology that first becomes public property with ID (1957) > sc A ustrag-Ereignis: " . . . Das Austragen von Welt und Ding in der Weise des Stillens
ist das Ereignis des Unter-Schiedes...." (US, p. 30).
10 " . . . Die Sprache west als der sich ereignende Unter-Schied für Welt und
Dinge." (US, p. 30).
11 " . . . Das Sprechen der Sterblichen beruht im Verhältnis zum Sprechen der
Sprache." (US, p. 31). See pp. 31-32 (aus dem Unter-Schied in diesen gerufen).
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that it may give issue to the differentiated. By responding, man
gives voice (Verlautbarung) to the differentiated, therefore
Being-beings. To the extent that his verbalization is authentic,
that which he brings into language never becomes a thing of the
past but remains in continued advent through the words he has
used. It is his hail of reply. 12
Obviously this responding hail comports first of all a docile
attend-ing that pays heed to the hail of address that comes to
him out of Aoyo^-as-scission, of which man is by nature an attendant. That the attend-ing be docile, man himself must remain unobtrusive, without at the same time being passive. He
must advance, though with reticence, toward the hail as it
comes to him. "[This] advancing with reticence characterizes
the manner in which mortal man responds to [the hail of A6yo<;as-] Scission. In this fashion mortal man dwells authentically in
aboriginal Language." 1 3
RESUME

Foundational thought here is elaborated in terms of the origin
of language. Being is conceived as A6yo<;. Inasmuch as Aoyoq is
d-X-yj^eta, it is the coming-to-pass of that scission which gives
rise to the ontological difference. Inasmuch as Aoyo<; is essentially
Utterance, it is the coming-to-pass of aboriginal Language. In
either case, man's task is to respond to the hail addressed to him
out of the need of A6yoq for a There in order that the differentiating may give rise (issue) to the differentiate. Response
to this hail is the coming-to-pass of human language in complete
authenticity.
12 US, pp. 12 (schon aufhalten), 26-27 (Gewese), 30 (Rufen). Language as structural
relationship to A6yoq recalls the conception of the hermeneutic circle and invites comparison with SZ, no. 32 (n.b. pp. 149 and 150), and no. 34, where we find the answers
of Heidegger I to the questions that Heidegger II (1950) poses: "Zu seiner Zeit wird
es unumgänglich, dem nachzudenken, wie sich im Sprechen der Sprache als dem
Geläut der Stille des Unter-Schiedes das sterbliche Sprechen und seine Verlautbarung
ereignet. Im Verlauten, sei dies Rede oder Schrift, ist die Stille gebrochen. Woran
bricht sich das Geläut der Stille? Wie gelangt die Stille als die gebrochene in das
Lauten des Wortes? Wie prägt das gebrochene Stillen die sterbliche Rede, die in
Versen und Sätzen erklingt?" (US, p. 31).
1 3 "Das Zuvorkommen in der Zurückhaltung bestimmt die Weise, nach der die
Sterblichen dem Unter-Schied entsprechen. Auf diese Weise wohnen die Sterblichen
im Sprechen der Sprache." (US, p. 32).
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What is new here is not that Being (A6yo<;) is conceived as aboriginal Language, for that was clear in 1944. What is new is the
thematizing of A6yo<; thus conceived in order to meditate the
difference as difference. 14

" Thus Heidegger makes the first attempt to answer the question (1944) raised as
to whether it is possible to meditate the difference as difference. " . . . Gibt es dahin
für sterbliches Denken einen Weg?" (VA, p. 225).

c h a p t e r

x v i i

WORKING, DWELLING,

THINKING

The lecture of August, 1951, entitled "Working, Dwelling,
Thinking," is effectively a prolongation of the meditation on
"The Thing." There we considered the thing-ness of the thing
and saw that its presenc-ing consists in the gathering-together
of polyvalent Being in and as this thing. In the present case,
Heidegger, retaining this fundamental conception of the presencing of things, takes advantage of a general discussion in Darmstadt on the theme "Man and Space" to explain how he conceives the "bringing-forth" of things. 1 Structurally the analysis
revolves around "working" and "dwelling," whereas "thinking"
seems thrown in for good measure. Since this is precisely our
problem, however, we cannot afford to disregard it.
A.

DWELLING

The sense of "dwelling" for Heidegger is familiar to us, not
only from "The Thing," where we saw that man dwells in nearness to Being, but from the Hölderlin interpretations, where
we learned that the poet dwells in near-ness to the Source. It is
no great surprise, then, to hear that dwelling is "the fundamental Being-structure" of There-being, hence the manner in
which There-being abides, sojourns, is. It comports two dimensions: open-ness unto Being in its polyvalent One-ness
( " . . . m o r t a l s are in [polyvalent Being], inasmuch as they
1 "Bauen, Wohnen, Denken," VA, pp. 145-162. "Bringing-forth" translates
Hervorbringen.
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dwell. . . . " ) ; 2 comportment with beings, sc. things, with which
from the very beginning There-being takes up its sojourn, and,
indeed, inevitably so. The old Saxon (wuon) and Gothic (wunian)
forms from which the German word for "dwelling" (wohnen)
derives, suggest, besides, the notion of "treating with consideration" or "taking care of" something, which we translate "to
tend," as this word is used with reference to a watchman,
caretaker or shepherd with his sheep.3
Now " . . . the fundamental characteristic of dwelling is this
[function of] tending. . . . " 4 which comes-to-pass in both dimensions of There-being: ontologically, insofar as " . . . tending
means: to guard [polyvalent Being] in its presenc-ing. . . . " ; 5
ontically, to the extent that " . . . dwelling as tending preserves
[polyvalent Being] there where [There-being] takes up its
sojourn: in things." 6 Hence There-being tends Being in its
coming-to-presence through beings, inasmuch as it lets these
beings as beings be. Note how completely this conception of
dwelling concurs in its essentials with what SZ called the "inbeing" of There-being as to-be-in-the-World.
B.

WORKING

"Working" admits both a broad and a strict sense.7 In the
broad sense, it is the equivalent of the word "dwelling," for, according to Heidegger, the stem of bauen (buan, bhu, beo) bears
affinity to the German form of the verb "to be" (ich bin, du bist,
etc.), hence suggests the manner in which There-being is or
2 " . . . Die Sterblichen sind im Geviert, indem sie wohnen...."
(VA, p. 150).
Heidegger's italics. See pp. 161 (Grundzug des Seins), 149 (Sich-Auf halten).
a "Tend to" translates schonen. It is an aphetic form of "attend," and suggests
very nicely what the German cannot: an affinity with attend-ing (hören) and attendance (ge-hören). Note, too, that the whole conception rejoins the nuance that will
be given to X^yeiv-voeTv in WD: to receive under one's care (in die Acht). We transcend here the author's formulae but not, we feel sure, his intention.
4 " . . . Der Grundzug des Wohnens ist dieses Schonen...." (VA, p. 149). Heidegger italicizes.
6 " . . . Schonen heißt: das Geviert in seinem Wesen hüten....' 1 (VA, p. 151).
• " . . . Das Wohnen als Schonen verwahrt das Geviert in dem, wobei die Sterblichen sich aufhalten: in den Dingen." (VA, p. 151).
7 For the purists, "working" will seem an unhappy translation of bauen, which
usually warrants "building," "constructing," or "cultivating," whereas "working"
usually translates arbeiten. We find "working," however, more flexible, and at the
moment this flexibility is necessary.
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dwells. In the stricter sense, it signifies a manner in which Therebeing comports itself in accordance with the structure of the
dwelling process. It is this sense which we wish to suggest by
"working." For this word admits the very general sense of "accomplishing by toil," sc. "doing something" by labor. Of the
manifold nuances that the word thus understood may have,
Heidegger underlines two: working in the sense of cultivating
(1colere), as a farmer "works" his fields; working in the sense of
building (aedificare), v.g. laboring to construct something.8 The
author concentrates on the second sense in the essay, hence in
using the word "work" here, we understand "doing something,"
where the "doing" has the sense of building, constructing, and
the "something" has the sense of some "thing," v.g. a bridge.
The question: what is the nature of the "thing" that is done?
what is the nature of the "doing"?
As to the nature of a "thing" as such, we have already some
idea from "The Thing": it is the gathering together of polyvalent Being in and as any given being. In the present case, this
conception is applied to a bridge. "The bridge gathers together
unto itself in its own way [the polyvalence of Being]." 9 There
is, however, a further precision. We are told that the bridge
gathers Being into a certain "location" that we may call a
"place." This "place," however, as Heidegger uses the term, did
not exist as an entity before the bridge (although there were
always many "sites" along the river bank where it could arise),
but comes-to-presence with and as the bridge. Furthermore,
this place ipso facto occupies "space," which Heidegger understands as a certain "free" area enclosed by those limits within
which the thing begins to come-to-presence.10
Once the thing in question is thus understood, then the
"doing" of the thing consists not merely in the human activity
which fashions steel and concrete into the structure we call a
bridge, but it is the process of bringing (-bringen) forth (her-)
polyvalent Being into the limits of the thing and thereby
VA, pp. 147 (colere, aedificare), 152 (hegen, pflegen).
"Die Brücke versammelt auf ihre Weise Erde und Himmel, die Göttlichen und
die Sterblichen bei sich." (VA, p. 153). Heidegger's italics.
10 VA, p. 155 (Stätte, Ort, Raum). We must forego the further analyses by which
Heidegger explains the origin of distance (Abstand, Zwischenraum), extension and
"absolute" space ("der" Raum). See VA, pp. 155-156. Cf. SZ, pp. 104-113.
8

9
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bringing the thing itself (-vor-) into presence as what it is (Hervorbringen). In this sense it rejoins the Greek conception of
TE^VT), sc. to let something appear as what it is, as itself. 11
Now it is precisely by this process of bringing-forth things as
things that There-being goes about tending Being in beings,
and " . . . dwelling, to the extent that it conserves [Being] in
things, is, as this conserving-process, [what is meant by]
working. . . . " 1 2 We infer, then, that to tend to Being in beings
and to work beings by bringing them forth as what they are both of these are one. The reason why There-being can "do"
things thus lies in the bi-dimensional character of the dwelling.
That is to say, it can let things shine forth in their own "place,"
occupying their own "space," because from the very beginning
its open-ness to Being is an open-ness to all possible "space," sc.
its ontological dimension is a constitutional near-ness to things.
But only when this ontological dimension is articulated on the
ontic level in the things among which There-being sojourns,
does There-being find itself genuinely "at home" in its near-ness
to things. 13
For all of There-being's bi-dimensional structure, however,
this condition may not be taken for granted. On the contrary,
it comes-to-pass only insofar as the dwelling-process of Therebring reaches the full achievement. This implies a complete
docility to Being, which always holds the primacy. In bringing
forth things, There-being must accept whatever intimations
Being imparts, assuming them in its own name as the measure
of its own activity, and thereby respond to the particular
manner in which any given thing comes-to-presence. It is this
that There-being brings to fullness, its "at home"-ness with
things. Hence by letting these things shine forth as what they
are, There-being effectively lets itself be as dwelling in their
near-ness. This is There-being's response to Being's appeal. It is
the moment when There-being overcomes its homelessness and
11 V A , p. 160 (Tfyvrj).
12 "...
Das Wohnen ist, insofern es das Geviert in die Dinge verwahrt, als dieses
Verwahren ein Bauen...."
(VA, p. 152). Heidegger's italics.
1 8 By reason of this ontological nearness to things, There-being can be far closer
to things that are ontically distant (v.g. the old bridge at Heidelberg) than those
who daily travel it, if they remain in inauthenticity, unaware of their ontological
prerogative (VA, pp. 157-158).
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all the nihilism that this implies. It is the moment of achieved
authenticity. The author concludes with an appeal to learn
what this means.14
C.

THOUGHT

The problem of thought, despite the fact that the word appears in the title, is hardly thematized in the present essay. The
principal remark comes toward the end when we are told that
"in the same sense" as "working," though "in a different way,"
thought, too, plays a role in There-being's dwelling-process.
Each in its own way is necessary; both are intrinsically complementary. As for further details of the relationship, we are left to
our own resources. Is it legitimate to surmise: that both working
and thinking have the same sense, insofar as both are a tending
to Being in beings, hence each is a way by which There-being's
dwelling in nearness to beings reaches fulfillment? This seems
plausible enough, but then how do they differ?
One thing is certain: by both working and thinking, Therebeing achieves its authenticity. "How else can [There-being]
respond to the address [of Being] than by endeavoring for its
own part to bring the dwelling-process, insofar as it can, into the
fullness of its presenc-ing ? . . . " 1 5 This it does by working and
thought.
R£SUM£

There-being dwells in near-ness to things by reason of the
double (ontic-ontological) dimension of ek-sistence. It tends
Being in beings, insofar as it helps bring them forth into truth.
This is what is meant by working. Such a process is complementary to thought, but we do not yet see precisely how.

1 4 VA, pp. 159-160 (Zuspruch entsprochen), 162 (wohnen erst lernen). We take
all of Heidegger's references to the "ordinary" way of doing or understanding things
as a continual repudiation of e very day ness, therefore of inauthenticity. V.g. VA,
PP-145-146» 147-148» 160, 192, 198, etc.
1 5 "Wie anders aber können die Sterblichen diesem Zuspruch entsprechen als
dadurch, daß sie an ihrem Teil versuchen, von sich her das Wohnen in das Volle
seines Wesens zu bringen?..." (VA, p. 162). Heidegger's italics. See pp. 161-162.
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xviii

" . . . P O E T I C A L L Y D O T H MAN D W E L L .

The preceding essay was delivered as a lecture in August, and
but a few months later, in October of the same year (1951), came
another, entitled " . . . Poetically doth man dwell . . . , " where
the author dialogues once more with his old friend, Hölderlin.1
It is so perfectly consequent with "Working, Dwelling,
Thinking" that the two should be taken together as a single
whole, for there only the first two of the three processes were
thematized. "Thinking" received only incidental treatment at
the end, more by way of promise then of realization. It is in the
present essay that the promise finds some measure of fulfillment,
for what Hölderlin calls "poetizing" is, despite profound difference, one with what Heidegger calls thought.2 With the necessary reserves, then, we might translate the title: " . . . Thought1 " . . . Dichterisch wohnet der Mensch . . . " (VA, pp. 187-204). We are familiar
with the lines from Hölderlin's poem that begins, "In lieblicher Bläue . . . " : "Voll
Verdienst, doch dichterisch, wohnet / Der Mensch auf dieser Erde."
2 VA, p. 193. The distinction between members of a comparison as being "one"
(Selbe) and being "same" (Gleiche) occurs often in Heidegger and is here explained:
Two different correlates may be called "but one" by reason of the unity of their
"mutual belongingness" (Zusammengehören), sc. the correlation which gathers them
together. This implies, however, that the difference between the two be preserved,
otherwise the duality, and therefore all correlation, disappears. In fact, it is the
difference as difference that gathers both correlates together. " . . . Correlative oneness is the mutual-belongingness of different correlates because gathered-together
through their difference
In the issuing forth of the different correlates, the essential cohesiveness of correlative one-ness comes to l i g h t . . . . " ( " . . . Das selbe ist
dagegen das Zusammengehören des Verschiedenen aus der Versammlung durch den
Unterschied
Im Austrag des Unterschiedenen kommt das versammelnde Wesen
desselben zum Leuchten
" (VA, p. 193). When two members of a comparison are
"same", however, all difference between them disappears, so that only uniformity
results.
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fully doth man dwell . . . " We take the present essay as a necessary complement of the former and polarize the discussion thus:
A. Dwelling, B. Poetizing.
A.

DWELLING

Once more the word "dwelling" designates the fundamental
structure of There-being as it sojourns in near-ness to beings.
Now, however, the conception is developed by a new metaphor.
The Hölderlin poem that Heidegger interprets here permits him
to say that if man dwells "on the earth," he also looks up toward
"heaven." Hence effectively he dwells "between" heaven and
earth, just as we saw that the poet is a half-god because he
dwells "between" man and the gods. This manner of thinking
permits Heidegger to speak of this "between" as a sort of "ontological space" (the term is not Heidegger's) that he calls "Dimension." Sustaining the metaphor - if such it is - the author
speaks of this Dimension as somehow admitting of "measure,"
and since man, as the in-between being, dwells in Dimension,
it is his task to do the measuring.3
The new terminology as such is not so important for us, for it
seems to be dictated by the poem in question. More important
is to see that we are dealing with the same old problem, the relation between Being and There-being. We know already that
the Quadrate designates Being in its polyvalence. To speak of
Dimension as an ontological Space between two members of the
Quadrate does not change matters very much. Besides, the
Quadrate is filled out shortly by the mention of "God" and the
poet. Dimension, then, is still Being in its polyvalence. Furthermore, it is measurable only because it is lit up. So that the new
metaphor even comports the familiar notion of light.4
If we turn now to man, we are told: that it is only in
"...measuring out [Dimension that] man is first man at
a l l . . . ; " 5 that
he " . . . i s insofar as he withstands Di3 VA, pp. 189 (Existenz aus Wohnen), 192 (Aufenthalt), 195 (Dimension, Vermessen).
4 VA, p. 195 (gelichtete und so durchmeßbare Zumessung).
5 "...in
solchem Durchmessen ist der Mensch überhaupt erst Mensch...."
(VA, p. 195).
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mension .. . ; " 6 that " . . . only insofar as man in this way
measures out his dwelling can he be in accordance with his
essence. . . . " 7 All this adds up to describing what we already
know about There-being's relationship to Being, in terms of the
new terminology of "measurement." Obviously, it is by fully
achieving the function of measurement that There-being dwells
authentically in near-ness to things. The pivotal point, then,
becomes: how comprehend this measuring-process by which
man achieves authenticity?
B.

POETIZING

The fundamental sense of "measurement" in the present case,
Heidegger tells us, lies in "taking a measure" (Maß-Nahme). We
must understand, then, what is meant here by "measure" and
what is meant by "taking." As for "measure," Heidegger suggests that it is the shining-forth of Being itself, and, indeed, in
negatived fashion, sc. in the process of revealing-concealment
that we have come to know already. His textual warrant lies in
the fact that Hölderlin speaks of the "unknown god." We are
restricting the word "god" here to the sense that it has as a
member of the Quadrate, hence as denoting a single valence of
Being, connoting, however, the whole gamut of Being's polyvalence. Heidegger argues that Being, under the guise now of
"god," is measure for man insofar as it remains "unknown." The
sense is that Being shines forth through beings, insofar as it reveals precisely what is being concealed, sc. itself, and thereby
guards itself in its own self-concealment. We recognize here all
the essentials of Being-as-mystery. " . . . Thus the unknown god
shines forth as unknown through the revelation of [the beings
of] heaven. This shining-forth is the measure by which man
measures himself." 8 Briefly, then: the "measure" which man as
* "Weil der Mensch ist, insofern er die Dimension a u s s t e h t , . . . " (VA, p. 198).
Heidegger's italics.
7 " . . . Nur insofern der Mensch sein Wohnen auf solche Weise ver-mißt, vermag
er seinem Wesen gemäß zu sein...."
(VA, p. 195). Heidegger's italics. See p. 19 6
(Vermessen).
• " . . . So erscheint der unbekannte Gott als der Unbekannte durch die Offenbarkeit des Himmels. Dieses Erscheinen ist das Maß, woran der Mensch sich misset."
(VA, p. 197).
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man must "take" is Being as it conceals itself by reason of its
"not"-character in beings. We understand this to mean the
ontological difference.
We come now to the "taking" of this measure. We are told
that the taking is not a seizing that in any way does violence to
the measure. Rather it comes about when There-being gathers
the measure into unity and thus brings it to a point of containment, a process that is the equivalent of "attending" to the
measure. More simply still, There-being simply "lets the measure
come" unto it.9
Notice now that the "taking" of the measure, as we have just
described it, coincides perfectly, once we understand the measure
to be Being-as-negatived, with what we know of foundational
thought. "Letting-come" clearly suggests the acquiescence that
we have come to call "responding" to Being, and the formula of
"gathered-together containment" unquestionably translates the
Xeyeiv-vosiv duality which in EM (1935) was interpreted as
thought, and which soon in WD (1952) will be explicitated once
more in the same sense. When we consider thought as "takingmeasure" and understand that it is thus that man measures-out
Dimension between heaven and earth wherein he dwells, we
realize that it is thought which lets man dwell in near-ness to
beings, and this is precisely what we called the authentic sense
of "working," sc. the building of the house wherein he dwells.
" . . . A u t h e n t i c working comes-to-pass insofar as there are
[thinkers], those who take the measure for the architectonic, the
structural design, of [man's] dwelling." 1 0
Thought and authentic working are but one: both bring to
fulfillment There-being's dwelling in near-ness to beings. This
accounts for the fact that both belong in the same sense to
"dwelling," and that authentic "working" maybe said to "assume
its measure" from Being. 11 All this is very coherent. There are
only two difficulties: 1. Since, as a matter of fact, Heidegger
9 VA, pp. 198 (nicht greifen, gesammelten Vernehmen, Hören), 199 (empfangen,
Kommen-lassen).
1 0 " . . . Das eigentliche Bauen geschieht, insofern Dichter sind, solche, die das
Maß nehmen für die Architektonik, für das Baugefüge des Wohnens." (VA, p. 202).
1 1 VA, pp. 161 (in das Wohnen gehört), 159 (übernimmt die Maße). Thought is
one with authentic, original working, in the sense of the bringing-forth of things as
things. Both are to be distinguished from inauthentic working, which is expressed
in terms of the present essay by "Voll Verdienst
" (VA, p. 191).
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accepts the designation of this measure-taking with Hölderlin
as "poetizing," in what way does thought coincide and in what
way does it differ from poetizing? 2. Granting that thinkingpoetizing coincide with working, how are they differentiated
from it ?
i. Thinking and Poetizing
From here on we are left pretty much to our own resources.
What is unmistakable is that the measure-taking we have just
described is what Heidegger understands Hölderlin to mean by
"poetizing." " . . . To descry this measure, to let it serve as
measure and to accept it as measure: this is what [Hölderlin]
means by poetizing. . . . " 1 2 But why call it poetizing? If we restrict ourselves to the text itself, there is only one hint. We are
told that the measuring-process, sc. There-being's response to
Being, is the "element" wherein man's dwelling is conserved.
At another point, we are told that man's responding to Being
(as it comes to him through language) is that utterance which
speaks in the "element" of poetizing. We take this coincidence
of "element," tenuous as it is, to warrant the surmise that
measure-taking is a poetizing insofar as, by reason of it, Being
(Maß) is brought (Nähme) into language. Then There-being
would fulfill its measuring function by taking, sc. attend-ing to,
Being-as-measure, insofar as Being is original Utterance. This
would give a very coherent sense to such a text as the following:
. .. Man speaks in the first place only to the extent that he responds to
[original] language, insofar as he attends to its address [to him]. Of all
the manners of address that we men for our part may cooperate in
bringing to expression, language is the highest and by all means the
first. .. .13
It is easy to see, then, why "poetizing is the fundamental power
of human dwelling. . . . " 1 4
1 2 " . . . Dieses Maß erblicken, es als das Maß er-messen und es als das Maß nehmen,
heißt für den Dichter: dichten
" (VA, p. 198).
13 " . . . Der Mensch spricht erst und nur, insofern er der Sprache entspricht,
indem er auf ihren Zuspruch hört. Unter allen Zusprächen, die wir Menschen von
uns her mit zum Sprechen bringen dürfen, ist die Sprache der höchste und der überall
e r s t e . . ( V A , p. 190). See VA, pp. 196, 190 (Element).
14 "Das Dichten ist das Grundvermögen des menschlichen Wohnens
" (VA, p.
203). This would explain, too, why the poet, in accepting the measure as it comes to
him through beings, responds by casting it into poetic diction (VA, pp. 200-201).
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All that we have just said is based upon the present text. If
we expand the horizon and recall all that we have seen about
Being as aboriginal Aoyoq, the case is thoroughly convincing.
On the old difficulty, however, of how poetizing and thought, as
two fundamental functions of There-being, differ - and the
difference is firmly insisted upon - we have no light at all. 15
2. Thinking and Working
Once we consider thought in terms of its essential relation to
language, is it possible to infer in what way thinking and working
differ from one another? We propose the following hypothesis:
Both processes would be manners in which There-being lets polyvalent Being shine-forth. They would differ only in this: working
brings forth Aoyo^ in things, such as the pitcher, the bridge, or,
for that matter, a work of art; thinking and poetizing articulate
A6yo<; in words.
We would understand "working," then, to pertain to the order
of man's dynamic intercourse with beings, and "thinking"
("poetizing") to the order of giving them a name. But it is the
one A6yoQ (aboriginal Utterance) that in either case There-being,
the There of Aoyo<;, lets-be, so that we may understand even
things (ÄS things) to be already inchoative words. This would
explain why Heidegger methodologically can pass from the phenomenological analyses of "The Thing" to the language analysis
which characterizes "Working, Dwelling, Thinking," without
so much as a shift in gears ( " . . . in the beginning and once more
at the end, language points out to us the essence of something. . . ."). 16 It would explain, too, why, whether the focus of
his attention falls upon a wine-jug, a Van Gogh or Indo-Germanic word stems, Heidegger has only one concern: to re-trieve
the authentic sense of Being, sc. Being conceived as Aoyo^.
RESUME

" . . . Poetically doth man dwell . . . " complements "Working,
Dwelling, Thinking" by thematizing thought under the guise of
VA, p. 193 (nicht das gleiche).
1® " . . . Die Sprache winkt uns zuerst und dann wieder zuletzt das Wesen einer
Sache zu. . ( V A , p. 190).
15
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poetizing, by reason of the relationship between thought and
language. This said, thought appears once more as an acquiescing response ("taking") to Being-as-negatived ("measure"),
sc. re-solve.
POSTSCRIPT

Concerning a Verse from Mörike
We add here, for the sake of completeness, a small appendage
concerning the exchange of letters between Heidegger and Emil
Staiger (1950-51) with regard to an interpretation given by
Staiger in a public lecture to a line of Mörike's poem, "On a
Lamp." 1 7 The dispute revolved about the proper reading of the
word scheint. Should it be taken in the sense of "seems" (videtur)
or of "shines-forth" (lucet). Staiger defended the former reading,
Heidegger the latter.
What is interesting for us in the exchange is not the argument
but the method of both men. Staiger goes about the task admittedly with all the instruments of literary criticism. In paying
respect to such methods, Heidegger is coolly proper, but one has
the impression that he could not care less. He passes on quickly
with the remark that such arguments can never be decisive but
only an "argumentative prelude" to the real work of interpretation. This is accomplished only by meditation of the work
itself. For what does it mean to "read" a work, if not to gather
it together into its fullness? But what is its fullness? The unspoken that lies concealed in the spoken. 18

17 Zu einem Vers von Mörike, Ein Briefwechsel mit Martin Heidegger von Emil
Staiger (Zürich: Atlantis, n.d.). (Hereafter: M).
18 M, pp. 6, 9 (mit literaturwissenschaftlichen Mitteln), zz (aus dem Gedicht
selbst), 15 (Ungesprochene im Gesprochenen).

c h a p t e r

x i x

WHAT E-VOKES THOUGHT?

In 1950, after five years of enforced retirement, Heidegger
was reinstated as professor at Freiburg, but not until the winter
semester of 1951-52 did he give his first post-war lecture course.
It bore the title "What E-vokes Thought?" 1 and was continued
in the summer semester of 1952, then published two years later.
The whole is, of course, a meditation on the sense of thought.
Stretched over two semesters, the theme is developed in two
different ways. In the winter semester, Heidegger's chief purpose
was to approach the problem in terms of the philosophical tradition. Nietzsche is his dialogue partner of predilection, and it
is here that the author elaborates the Zarathustra analysis as
signifying the correlation between Being and man. In the
summer semester, he devotes himself to an exposition of his own
conception of thought, developed chiefly by means of dialogue
with the pre-Socratics. It is this which concerns us now.
The essentials of Heidegger's conception of the relation between Being and man were crystallized for us already in HB
(1947): the essence of man lies in his ek-sistence, sc. an ec-static
relationship to Being; Being in turn is not only in relationship
with There-being but is this relation inasmuch as it imparts itself to man. There is nothing new, then, in being told now that
to speak of man's essence is to speak of the Being of beings.
" . . . In each of the two members of the relationship between
1 Was heißt Denken? (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1954). (Hereafter: WD). We include
here a study of "MoTpoc" (Parmenides VIII, 3 4 - 4 1 ) , VA, pp. 2 3 1 - 2 5 6 . It was intended
as part of the lecture course but not presented.
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human nature and Being there lies from the very beginning the
relationship itself. . . . " 2 We are on familiar ground.
What is more, we are accustomed to thinking of the problem
in terms of thought, for since the pathway-dialogue on thought
(1944-45) we have been led to consider thought in the broad
sense as ec-static ek-sistence, in the strict sense as the achieving
of authenticity by resolve. Before we even begin the present
analysis, then, we have everything we need to understand why
the meditation on the Being-man correlation should unfold for
Heidegger as an interrogation of thought.
The question which gives the meditation its title admits of
at least four possible interpretations: 1. What does "thought"
evoke for the student of language, sc. what is the meaning of the
word as word? 2. What does "thought" evoke for a philosopher,
sc. what has it come to mean in the history of ideas? 3. What
does thought evoke from someone who wishes to go about
thinking properly, sc. what are the requirements for authentic
thinking? 4. What evokes thought, sc. calls it forth into being
what it is? 3 Obviously, such a question as the fourth already
presupposes that the relation between Being and thought is
such as between call-er and call-ed, and Heidegger admits the
fact most readily.4 The analysis is not concerned, then, with
establishing this fact, but with probing its import. For our part,
we need not expect anything noticeably new. After all, we are
not so much following an argument as meditating a mystery. The
text for the meditation (we are making another re-trieve) comes
from Parmenides (Fr. 6), which Heidegger writes paratactically:
Xp-y): TO Xeyetv re voelv T' : eov: f {Ajjievai.5 W e disregard the author's

order in favor of simplicity in exposition and consider the single
correlation as suggested by this text from the point of view of
Being (call-er) and of There-being (call-ed).
1 " . . . In jedem der beiden Glieder der Beziehung zwischen Menschenwesen und
Sein liegt schon die Beziehung selber
" (WD, p. 74). In SF (1955), the author
returns to this same point with new insistence and, to emphasize the inseparability
of Being from man's essence in their mutual correlation, resorts to the curious device
of writing Sein as
Whatever the place in philosophy for visual aids, the device
reminds us of how close we are in 1955 to the SZ (1927) conception of Being as project of There-being. The only difference: the reversal of Heidegger I in Heideggerll.
(See SF, pp. 26-31).
* WD, pp. 79. 150.
4 WD, p. 162 (vorausgesetzt).
5 Cited WD, p. 108 and passim.
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I. The Argument
A.

BEING

A s to how Being is conceived in W D , there is at this point
relatively little more to say. T h e essential is that Being is always
the B e i n g (sfxfxevoct) of beings (eov), that b y which beings - all
beings - are. If beings are to be thought, what else in them is
think-able except the presenc-ing b y which t h e y are? T h a t is
w h y the author constantly refers to Being as "eminently thoughtw o r t h y " (das Bedenklichste),
its

sc. that which imparts to thought

to-be-thought. 6

N o w Being " w a n t s " thought. B y reason of its nature, Being
must itself be served, tended, guarded b y thought, hence is "in
w a n t o f " thought in order to be itself. Because of its own indigence, then, B e i n g wants thought to be, in order that in its own
w a y B e i n g can be itself. This latter sense of " w a n t " approaches
the meaning that Heidegger gives to the Greek xP~h> b y translating it as "there is want o f " (es brauchet).

W e h a v e met this

Greek word before. Deriving from xpaojjuxi (cf.

" h a n d " ) , it

suggests a process of hand-ling t h a t does not simply use that
which is handled b u t lets it be according to its own essence, lets
it appear as w h a t it is and conserves it thus. A l t h o u g h the formula is a w k w a r d , it is not impossible t o say that a hand-ling of this
sort " w a n t s " that-which-is-handled to be itself. However this
m a y be, w e understand the translation of

^ "there is want

o f " t o suggest: t h a t there is intrinsic to Being an "indigence" b y
reason of which it is " i n want o f " t h o u g h t ; that Being therefore
" w a n t s " to satisfy this indigence; that Being therefore " w a n t s "
t h o u g h t to be, and, indeed, in abiding fashion. Obviously, we are
refining here w h a t E M spoke of as Being's need for its There, If
there is a n y further precision, it consists perhaps in the author's
present insistence t h a t in releasing thought unto itself

Being

leaves to thought a certain liberty b y reason of which it is more
than a blind compulsion. W e shall return to this point later.
If B e i n g wants thought, this w a n t
"...in

this

wanting

there

is

7

as such is efficacious. Hence

concealed

an

enjoining,

an

• WD, pp. X3x (£6v g(x(i£vai), 2-3, 85 and passim (was uns zu denken gibt).
7 WD, pp. 12 (möchte), 85 (braucht), 1x8 (xpdtofxav), 1x4 (xpty» xx6 (Zwanges).
Cf. N, II, pp. 390-394 (Brauch, Not).
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e-voking. . . . " of thought. 8 W e are at the heart of the matter.
The want is efficacious, for it implies letting thought be in
abiding fashion. This is w h a t we mean b y s a y i n g that Being
"grants" to thought its to-be-thought. E f f e c t i v e l y , then, this
wanting is a giving, a giving of B e i n g itself as eminently thoughtworthy. " . . . W h a t [Being as thought-worthy] grants, the g i f t
it bestows on us, is nothing less than itself. . . . "

9

This is pre-

cisely what we called before the im-parting of B e i n g b y mittence,
where "im-parting" corresponds perfectly t o w h a t

Heidegger

understands Parmenides to mean b y Moipa. 1 0
B u t since the giving proceeds from a w a n t in Being itself, it
carries the overtones of an appeal t h a t calls t h o u g h t forth. T h i s
giving under the guise of an appeal is w h a t Heidegger understands b y the " e - v o k i n g " of thought. He describes it b y a profusion of terms. T h e appeal out of w a n t sets t h o u g h t on its w a y ,
summoning,

commissioning,

enjoining,

soliciting,

at-tracting,

laying-claim-upon it. In doing so, the appeal pledges Being t o
thought, imparting thus both precept and admonition,

com-

mitting Being completely t o its custody, and since it is thus t h a t
Being comes to thought, it helps thought arrive at presence as
itself. 1 1
T o the extent that we m a y reduce all these t o a common denominator, we are going to f i x this want-appeal t h a t e-vokes
thought b y the word we used to translate the same word in the
Hölderlin analysis, sc. "hail," intending thereby to suggest: t h a t
the e-vocation is an address t h a t proceeds f r o m Being, which
always retains its primacy; that it is a summons which is effi8
. . In diesem Brauchen verbirgt sich ein Anbefehlen, ein Heißen...." (WD,
p. 119).
9 " . . . Was dieses zu denken gibt, die Gabe, die es an uns verschenkt, ist nichts
Geringeres als es selbst, es, das uns in das Denken ruft." (WD, p. 85). Heidegger
suggests the fundamental accord of es braucht with the es gibt formula of HB, p. 80.
Cf. WD, p. 3.
10 VA, pp. 251-252 (Schickung),
1 1 WD, pp. 82-83 (auf den Weg bringen, auffordern, befehlen, anbefehlen, verlangen, aussprechen, verweisen, anvertrauen, Geborgenheit anheimgeben, Entgegenkommen, Helfen, Gelangenlassen). With "at-tracting" we translate auf dem Zug.
The sense is suggestive. By reason of its negativity, Being with-draws (Entzug) into
the beings it discloses. In this with-drawal, Being draws-with (zieht mit), sc. at-tracts,
thought. It would seem that we are to understand in the at-tracting thus described a
nuance of thought's intrinsic relation to Being-as-negatived. V.g. "
Dieser Entzug
ist das, was eigentlich zu denken gibt, ist das Bedenklichste. . . . " (WD, p. 55, cf.
PP- 5-6, 52). Cf. N, II (1944-46), p. 368.
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cacious; that its efficacy is such that it leaves to the hail-ed
full liberty of response. This will enable us to see how for Heidegger the hailing of the poet and the e-voking of the thinker
are in profound ac-cord.

B.

T H E R E - B E I N G

In hailing the thinker into Being, Being imparts itself to him
as gift, and this g i f t is w h a t constitutes the essence of the
thinker, the endowment b y which he is. W h a t is more, Being not
only bestows the gift but conserves, preserves, sustains it, sc.
remains the abiding "sustenance" of thought. This endowment
reposes in w h a t Heidegger now chooses to call the "heart" of
mail. 1 2

j. Thought as Re-cord
H o w precisely Heidegger comes to choose the word "heart"
is worth noting, though it is perhaps not essential to the analysis.
H e proposes it when dealing with the first of his studies of the word
" t h o u g h t " itself. T h e German word for thought, he says, derives
from Gedanc,
Gedächtnis

which suggests not only Denken
(usually

translated

"memory")

thank"). It is apropos of Gedächtnis

("to think"), b u t
and Danken

("to

that we come upon the term

" h e a r t . " For the primary sense of this word, the author insists,
is not " m e m o r y " b u t "(re-)collection," sc. a collectedness in the
sense of gathered-togetherness into a center that abides b y w h a t
it (re-)collects. B u t what does it (re-)collect? T h a t " . . . which
sustains us, insofar as it is thought b y us, thought, that is to say,
inasmuch

as

thought. . . . "

it
18

remains

[always]

as

that

which

is

to-be-

In other words, this "center" (re-)collects Being,

and, indeed, as it comes-to-presence in beings.
1 2 V.g. W D , pp. 86 (Mitgift), i (in Wesen hält), 97 (Verwahmis), 92 (Gemüt,
muot, Herz).
1 S " . . . Auf das, was uns hält, insofern es hei uns bedacht ist, bedacht nämlich
deshalb, weil Es das zu-Bedenkende bleibt
" (WD, p. 1). See pp. 92 (An-dacht,
Bleiben bei), 97 (Andenken). That re-collection is necessarily bi-dimensional is
suggested clearly enough, if one reflect on the hail in terms of at-traction. In withdrawing into beings, Being draws-with it There-being. This condition of drawn-ness
(bezogen) into the Being of beings is the relation (Bezug) we call ek-sistence, by reason
of which There-being manifests (zeigt) beings, sc. lets them shine forth as Such. The
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This " c e n t e r , " we are told, is what in L a t i n would be called
animus,

as opposed to anima;

Seelenfünklein.

it is what Meister E c k h a r t called the

Heidegger calls it the " h e a r t " of' man, under-

standing b y the term that "innermost core," sc. the essence of
man, insofar as it is in ec-static relationship t o Being, hence
man's ek-sistence. Ek-sistence here is considered as that constitutional open-ness to Being t h a t in SZ we called an "antecedent"
comprehension of Being. " . . . A l l [subsequent] re-collection of
the think-able
man's heart]

dwells itself
through

already in that gatheredness

which

everything

thought is hidden and concealed."

that

remains

to

[in
be

14

I t is b y reason of this antecedent comprehension of Being in
man's heart t h a t he is empowered to think. In fact, to speak of
a " p o w e r " for thought is simply to express under a different
aspect the d y n a m i c character of ek-sistence. This same dynamic
character we called in SZ a "drive-toward-Being." It is not too
awkward, then, t o speak of it now b y saying t h a t There-being
" w a n t s " Being. In fact, the affective overtones of

"wanting"

are coherent w i t h the connotation of the metaphor "heart." In
a n y case, w e c a n see that in the dynamic ecstasis that constitutes
man's

essence,

"wanting"

the

(mögen)

"power"

(Vermögen)

to

think

and

the

to think are profoundly related. W e have

here, then, it would seem, the k e y to such ploys as the following:
" . . . O n l y when we want

[mögen]

what is in itself

worthy do w e h a v e the power [vermögen]
If the p l a y on words (mögen-vermögen)

for t h o u g h t . "

thought15

dissipates in English,

we m a y nevertheless discern a genuine significance in speaking
of There-being, sc. structural thought, as " w a n t i n g " Being. For
we recall t h a t the reason w h y thought comes-to-pass in the first
place is t h a t B e i n g " w a n t s " thought, hence the correlation between B e i n g a n d thought

comes to expression as a

mutual

"want-ing":
showing-forth of beings, therefore comportment with them, is intrinsic to the drawnness into Being as such. It is this bi-dimensional relation to the Being of beings that
we are considering now as re-collection. See WD, pp. 5-6, 52, 95-96 - all taken as
unit. Note in passing that manifestation (zeigen) connotes for us now "utterance"
(Sagen).
1 4 " . . . Alles Andenken an das Gedenkbare wohnt selber bereits in jener Versammlung, durch die im voraus alles geborgen und verborgen ist, was zu bedenken
bleibt." (WD, p. 97). See pp. 96 (Gemüt, Herz), 157 (am weitesten nach außen).
1 8 " . . . Nur wenn wir das mögen, was in sich das zu-Bedenkende ist, vermögen wir
das Denken." (WD, p. x).
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. . . We have the power only for that which we want. But in turn we
truly want only that which for its own part wants us . . . insofar as it
addresses itself to our essence as that which sustains this essence. . . . 1 6
T h e want in T h e r e - b e i n g for Being, then, reposes in the w a n t of
Being for T h e r e - b e i n g (thought). T h a t is w h y Being is the ground
where man's h e a r t in its essence is sustained in an ultimate
dwelling-place. W e have here, it would seem, another evidence
of what in discussing H B we suggested as the "adhesion" of
Being to itself.
Briefly: t h o u g h t ,

as the gathering-together

b y which

man

(re-)collects B e i n g , rests in the center of man's Being, in his
"heart." In order to suggest these nuances with a single word,
we translate Gedächtnis
" h e a r t " (cor, cordis)

b y a derivation of the Latin word for
and say t h a t thought thus understood is

"re-cord."

2. Thought as Thanks
Once we see t h a t the original G e r m a n word for thought
danc)

(Ge-

suggests re-cord, it is not difficult to understand in w h a t

sense it also implies thanks-giving (Danken).

Being's supreme

g i f t to the t h i n k e r is the v e r y B e i n g b y which he is a thinker:
ek-sistence.

D o e s it not warrant acknowledgement

on man's

part? Such an acknowledgement in its purity, however, is not
in the first p l a c e a requiting of this g i f t with another gift. O n
the contrary, t h e purest form of acknowledgement is simply the
accepting of the g i f t , sc. assuming it, acquiescing in it, yielding
to its demands. Acceptance, then, is the most original form of
thanks. N o w w h e n There-being accepts the endowment b y which
the thinking c o m e s about, sc. ek-sistence, it accepts the g i f t of
thought as such. For There-being t o accept thought as thought
is to do what lies within its power to accomplish thought. T h i s
is b y that v e r y f a c t the fulfillment of thinking. Thinking thus
conceived in t h e moment of fulfillment is clearly thanks-giving.

" " . . . Denn wir vermögen nur das, was wir mögen. Aber wir mögen wiederum
wahrhaft nur Jenes, w a s seinerseits uns selber und zwar uns in unserem Wesen mag,
indem es sich unserem Wesen als das zuspricht, was uns im Wesen hält
" (WD,
p. i). See p. 97 (Wesensgrund, bewohnt).
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" . . . Pure thanks lies rather in this, that we simply think that
which solely and properly is to-be-thought." 1 7
Thinking as thanking consents to ek-sistence through complete acquiescence to Being. This is accomplished when Therebeing plays the r61e of an attent-ive attend-ant of Being in profound and docile re-collection. Effectively, There-being, once
Being has released it unto itself, must reciprocate by releasing
itself unto Being. Hence There-being must turn to Being,
opening itself up, com-mitting itself, abandoning itself to its
exigencies. Briefly, then, this means that "thought thinks
when it responds to [Being as] the eminently thoughtworthy. . . . " 1 8 It is the responding that is decisive, for although
we are engaged in thought by the very fact that we are, sc. by
reason of ek-sistence, this is, so to speak, but a structural thought
that becomes authentically functional only in the moment of
response. The author intimates here, it would seem, the answer
to the third question which the lectures pose (how does one go
about thinking?), for in the last analysis all we can do is ask
ourselves if we have attended, sc. responded adequately, to
Being's hail.19 In any case, all of these forms of letting-be are,
it would seem, but variations of the complete acquiescence of
There-being to Being by which thinking is thanking. It is the
process by which ek-sistence achieves authenticity.
All of this suggests a manner of formulating the distinction
between thought as re-cord and thought as thanks-giving. With
the necessary reserves for better judgement, we propose to
understand: thought as re-cord to correspond to There-being as
ek-sistence; thought as thanks-giving to correspond to Therebeing in the moment of re-solve.
5. Thought as X^yeiv-voeiv
Thus far we have considered the correlation between Being
and There-being in thought in terms of hail-er (Being), hail-ing
1 7 " . . . Der reine Dank ist vielmehr dies, daß wir einfach denken, nämlich das,
was es eigentlich und einzig zu denken gibt." (WD, p. 9 4 ) . Cf. G, pp. 6 6 - 6 7 ; HD, pp.
8 1 , 1 4 2 ; WM, p. 4 9 .
18 "Das Denken denkt, wenn es dem Bedenklichsten entspricht
" (WD, p.
1 0 ) . Writer's italics. See pp. 9 3 (hörig, gehört), 1 5 8 (in Wesen belassen), 3 (uns zuwenden), z 0 3 (aufmachen, aufschließen), 8 6 (Sicheinlassen).
» WD, pp. 5 9 (noch nicht als Denkende), 1 6 0 (die dritte Frage).
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(the efficacious want) and hail-ed (There-being). In doing so, we
have considered in Parmenides' text, which forms the backbone
of the whole analysis, the following: &>v gfjLfievoci (the Being of
beings), XPRJ (hail-ing). Obviously, TO Xeyetv Te VOEIV R' corresponds
to that which is hailed, sc. thought. Both of these Greek words
are familiar. The present study of Xeyeiv itself refers to the analysis already made in V A and adds little more than a summary.
Noelv in EM we translated as "to ac-cept," in the sense of "to
bring to concentration or containment." Here the connotation
is less military, as the sense becomes rather "to receive or take
under one's care." 20
The correlative conjunctions, TE . . . T' have for Heidegger
their own importance: they indicate that Xeyetv and voecv are
profoundly meshed, though it is Xeyetv that ultimately gives its
stamp to the whole. It is Xeyetv that lets-lie-forth (in non-conceahnent) what voeiv accepts under its care. Again, this caring
of voecv is a constant gathering-together unto itself of that which
thus lies-forth, in order that this continue to appear as itself.
This gathering, however, (and even There-being itself is hereby
gathered-together in attentiveness), is in turn Xeyeiv. Conversely, Xiyeiv requires the care that voeiv supplies. A£yetv and
voeiv, then, are mutually complementary. 21 Notice, therefore,
how closely the two words, when taken together as "accepting
under one's care what one lets lie forth," coincide with the sense
we gave to "tending" (Schonen) in "Working, Dwelling,
Thinking." The sense is always: letting-be (manifest).
Now the mesh of Xeyetv-voeiv must be meshed (sich fügt) itself,
sc. must correspond, with the Being of beings, which must be
understood always as maintaining the primacy in the process.
The primacy is articulated when we say that it is Being that
hails thought. The corresponding that There-being must accomplish is simply the response to this hail. " . . . Only insofar
as [Xiyeiv-voeiv] accommodate to the [Being of beings], [sc.] remain directed toward, introverted into, it, does the unity of both
satisfy [Being's] demand [for thought]. . . . " 22 We interpret XfyeivWD, p. 1 2 4 (In Acht nehmen). See pp. 1 2 2 - 1 2 4 .
WD, pp. 1 2 5 - 1 2 6 (Gefüge).
22 " . . . Nur insofern das Vor liegenlassen und das In-die-Acht-nehmen dem £öv
E{j.fx£vai sich fügen, auf das £öv ^jijjievai angewiesen und in es eingewiesen bleiben,
genügt ihr Gefüge dem aus dem £6v ^(JLCvai her verlangten Wesen des Denkens...."
(WD, p. 146). See p. 139 (Gefüge, verfügt).
20
21
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voetv, then, as describing the process of thought in its moment
of complete acquiescence to Being - as thanking, as re-solve.
This permits us to understand how Heidegger can explain so
conveniently that the noun form of voetv, sc. vou^, originally
meant not intelligence but thought-as-record.28
Before we take the next step, let us recall what we are doing.
We seek to discern the correlation between Being and Therebeing (thought) by analysing: xpTj:
^yetv ts voetv t : eov:
lfi[ievai. According to the results of the analysis, the translation
should read, "there is want: both letting-lie-forth and acceptingthe-care-of-beings: Being." In paraphrase, we understand Heidegger to understand Parmenides thus: the Being of beings
wants There-being to let-lie-forth and accept-the-care-of beings
in their Being.
Now the combination of Xeyetv-voeiv is often expressed simply
as. VOELV and the Being of beings as T6 elvat. With these transpositions, we recognize another text of Parmenides that occupied
us in EM: TO yap OCÜTO voelv eor£v re xai elvai. We translate:
"[thought-as-] ac-ceptance and Being are correlative." The two
texts, then, are profoundly one. "Both [voetv and elvat] belong
together, sc. in such a way that the first named voeiv has its
essence therein that it remains orientated toward the [Being] of
[beings]. . . . " 24
This is for the author a point of major importance. The significance lies not so much in the fact that the two different texts
of Parmenides are fundamentally in deep accord, but rather
that we find formulated here at the dawn of Western thought a
theme that abides in it through the whole course of its history.
In modern times, we find one resonance of this correlation between Being and thought in the esse est percipi of Berkeley. It
comes to expression much more profoundly in Kant, who formulates the supreme principle of all synthetic judgements a priori
in the following terms: If we recall that for Kant in K R V beings
** W D , pp. 125, 172 (vow;). In the same context, Heidegger speaks of Ahnung,
which we have translated as "surmise," sc. the sum total of Being's intimations
which constitute the antecedent comprehension of Being. Notice how closely this
conforms to the poetic experience as seen in the Hölderlin analysis.
1 4 "Beide gehören zusammen, nämlich so, daß das zuerst genannte voelv sein
Wesen darin hat, in das Anwesen von Anwesendem eingewiesen zu bleiben...."
(WD, p. 148).

w h a t

e - v o k e s

t h o u g h t ?

605

are considered as the objects of experience and Being as their
objectness, whereas thought is considered as the presentation
of these objects of experience to the knowing subject, then the
question arises: what in Kantian terms is the relation between
the Being of beings (sc. the objects of experience in their objectness) and thought (sc. the presentation of objects)? Kant's
classic answer:
The conditions of the possibility of experience as such [therefore thought]
are at one and the same time [therefore correlatively] the conditions of
t h e possibility of the objects of experience [ t h e r e f o r e t h e B e i n g o f b e i n g s ] . 2 5

In different context and with different words, this is the same
principle as that of Parmenides. But why stop here ? Must not the
same be said for Hegels principle "Being is Thought"? And, to
come full circle, for Nietzsche's Zarathustra? 26 Heidegger's
contribution is simply to return to Parmenides and meditate
the correlation as such.

C.

THE

DIFFERENCE

But if the two Parmenides texts rejoin each other in a common
unity, have we come all this arduous way to find that we are
back where we started from in 1935? No! There is a difference,
it would seem, and a significant one. EM took its starting point
from the question about the ontological difference, but the
analysis, like that of SZ, was devoted to explaining and exploring
the preliminary problem about the sense of Being as such. Hence,
the correlation analysed was between thought and the Being
(of beings). Since 1941, however, we have witnessed a gradual
shift in emphasis. More and more the author has focused upon
the ontological difference as such, so that now (1952) the correlation is between thought and the Being of beings, where the
"of" points in both directions at once: "if we say 'Being,' this
means: the 'Being of beings'; if we say 'beings,' this means: beings
as " . . . die Bedingungen der Möglichkeit der Erfahrung überhaupt sind zugleich
Bedingungen der Möglichkeit der Gegenstände der Erfahrung,
" (KRV, A 158,
B 197). See VA, pp. 234, 236.
8® " . . . daß das Sein Denken ist." (G. W. Hegel, "Vorrede," Phänomenologie des
Geistes [Hamburg: Meiner, 1952], p. 45). See WD, pp. 149, 45 (Zarathustra).
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in terms of their Being. . . . " 27 The difference between EM
(1935) and WD (1952) is the ontological difference as such.
It is understandable, then, that Heidegger, in meditating the
correlation between Being and man, should insist so strongly
that it is a correlation between thought and the ontological
difference. It is the ambivalence of ov which is absolutely primary. B y the ontological difference, we understand here the difference between Being and beings as the reverse side of the ambivalence of Sv, sc. the necessary coupling of Being and beings. It
is this duality which is absolutely primary in the process of
thought. It is this duality which from the beginning has unfolded
the domain within which Being's hail has been addressed to man,
and where the authentic thinker in response to the hail - whether
it be Parmenides or Plato, Kant or Nietzsche - has gone about
his task. 28
But it is not enough to affirm this as a fact, the correlation
must still be interrogated. Even at the end of the laborious
study we have reached only the point where the question can
be posed: why must thought be conceived as response to a hail
in the first place ? Why is it the duality of 8v that hails thought ?
How does it do so? Again, we have been speaking about "correlation," but in fact it is a compound of two correlations: the first
between Being and beings, the second between this duality and
thought. What, then, is the intrinsic connection between the
two correlations? What explains the unity of the correlation, sc.
what is the element in which its members dwell? Is it something
prior to the correlation, therefore some "third" thing (ein
drittes), which, in fact, would be a "first" thing, sc. a genuinely
primary thing out of which the members of the correlation
arise? 2*
To be sure, Heidegger is already under way towards probing
such questions. In the essay on Parmenides' Motpot, for example,
the author meditates once more the sense of OCUTO as the unfolding duality which guards the orientation of thought to this
unfolding. AUT6, then, is presumably the absolutely ultimate
" "Sagen wir 'Sein', dann heißt dies: 'Sein des Seienden*. Sagen wir 'Seiendes',
dann heißt dies: Seiendes hinsichtlich des Seins
" (WD, p. 174).
W D , pp. 175 (vorgegeben), 174 (Parmenides, etc.), 148 (Geheiß).
W D , pp. 162 (daß Geheißenes), 148 (weshalb, auf welche Weise), 147 (drittes).
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' 'third' 1 thing which allows both Being (of beings) and thought
to arise. What is more, OCUTO is called the process of truth which
constitutes Being-as-history. But is this really an advance? Or
are we simply contemplating once more the aboriginal Discord ?
No matter. We are "under way" in thought, and for Heidegger
that is all that counts.30

IL General Remarks
Our main task has been accomplished. We wish now to cull
certain oblique remarks that are subsidiary to the main argument, which we have just seen. To give them a frame of reference,
let us profit from the intimate affinity that we have just noticed
between WD (1952) and EM (1935) and recall the basic characterization of the thought-process as it was delineated in 1935.
Then as now, thought was conceived as Xeyeiv-voeiv, whereby
There-being overcomes its de-cadence in order to discern the
law of negativity within Being and consents to be the There of
such a process. This is "de-cision." Concretely, this means a
willing (because re-solve) to know (because a standing within
the revelation of beings). To will-to-know, however, is to pose
a question, hence thought thus understood is essentially interrogative thought, where the to-be-interrogated (the eminently
question-able) is precisely the negatived Being-process itself.
Foundational thought tries to interrogate this process "more
originally" than ever has been done before, sc. by approaching
closer to the Soufce from which all thought derives. Hence, it is
a re-trieve of what others did not, could not, think/say, a procedure which, because itself intrinsically finite, must be repeated
again and again. Since the Being-process is A6yo;, thought-asretrieve must interrogate the sense of language. Thus far EM.
In examining WD, we let this pattern serve as orientation. Since
with this study we conclude our research, we include those indices in the works appearing after 1952 that add any significant
light, without pretending to completeness, however, with regard
to them.

8° V A , pp. 249 (a6x6), 252 CAX7)&eia, Geschichte). WD, p. 12 (unterwegs).
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A. T H E

HAIL

1. Being: 'A-XTJ^EWC

That Being for Heidegger is the coming-to-pass of d-X7)&eioc in
beings is clear enough by now. What is interesting in WD is to
see how the negativity of the process plays an essential role in
the e-vocation of thought, for in addressing man, and therefore
in revealing itself through beings, Being simultaneously withdraws. Yet even though this withdrawal is necessitated by the
"not "-character of Being, we must not consider it merely negative. It is withdrawal, after all, that gives any particular manifestation its special character. " . . . B y itself, [Being's] withdrawing is not nothing. Withdrawal is [an] event. . . . " 31 As we
saw in analysing the hail, Being in withdrawal draws-with it,
sc. at-tracts There-being. This is the hail that calls There-being
to play its rdle in the event, for the at-traction constitutes
There-being in the ecstatic condition we call ek-sistence. Eksistence thus understood, then, is open-ness to Being as negatived. Furthermore, it is precisely inasmuch as it is thus negatived that Being is thought-worthy. " . . . This withdrawal is
that which properly gives [us] the to-be-thought, [sc.] is [Beingas-] eminently-thought-worthy. . . . " 82
After all, is it not the withdrawal of Being in its bestowal that
constitutes the ontological difference? In other words, it is this
which constitutes the intrinsic ambivalence of 6v. That is why
the entire history of Western thought from Parmenides to
Nietzsche, which dealt with the intrinsically ambiguous 8v, is the
series of man's successive responses to the hail of Being-as-negatived, addressed to him through the beings in which this negativity comes-to-pass.
2. Being: Aoyoc
In EM, the process of £-Xiq&eia was identical with the process
of X6yo^, and since 1944 this particular conception has been
M . . . Allein - das Sichentziehen ist nicht nichts. Entzug ist Ereignis
" (WD,
p. 5). This theme is elaborated throughout all SG. V.g. p. 97.
" . . . Dieser Entzug ist das, was eigentlich zu denken gibt, ist das Bedenklichste
" (WD, p. 55). Note that Being-as-negatived is also the origin of awe, which,
when it comes to pass in There-being, may be a manner of Being's disclosure to man
(cf. V A , p. 263 and WM, p. 47).
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thematized more and more. This is just as true, if less explicitly
so, in WD. What is emphasized is the negativity of the process.
For a more explicit treatment of X6yoq in its positivity, we must
wait until "The Essence of Language" (1957-58) and "The Way
unto Language" (1959).33 In the former, for example, we are told
something that is for us at this point almost self-evident:
. . . T h e earliest [mittence of Being] t h a t through W e s t e r n t h o u g h t f i n d s
its w a y into word is the relation between thing and word, a n d , i n d e e d ,
in the form of the relation between B e i n g and U t t e r i n g . T h i s r e l a t i o n
overwhelms t h o u g h t so completely t h a t it is articulated in a single w o r d :
Xöyoq. This word speaks a t once the name lor B e i n g a n d t h e n a m e f o r
Uttering.84

In these latter essays, Being is explicitly thematized as aboriginal
Utterance, but it is remarkable how closely the conception of the
origin of language rejoins the appeal-response problematic of
WD. 35 For the moment, however, we restrict ourselves to WD.
Being (Aoyog) is negatived, hence Being withdraws in the
beings it reveals, sc. in the words that are just brought to expression. This means that there is a "not" in every word, behind
which Being, with all its inexhaustible wealth, retreats. This
constitutes the domain of the un-said, immanent in everything
that is said. But the un-said is not nothing. It is the hidden
wealth of the said. It is the noiseless voice that speaks within
the words to which we attend, constituting the said as such.
" . . . Every original and authentic naming expresses something
unsaid, and, indeed, in such a fashion that it remains unsaid. . . . " 38 We recognize the essentials of Being-as-mystery.
83 "Das Wesen der Sprache," US, pp. 157-216; "Der Weg zur Sprache," US, pp.
239-268.
34 " . . . Denn mit das Früheste, was durch das abendländische Denken ins Wort
gelangt, ist das Verhältnis von Ding und Wort, und zwar in der Gestalt des Verhältnisses von Sein und Sagen. Dieses Verhältnis überfällt das Denken so bestürzend,
daß es sich in einem einzigen Wort ansagt. Es lautet: X6yo?. Dieses Wort spricht
in einem zumal als der Name für das Sein und für das Sagen." (US, p. 185). As we
know, the identity was not thought. Hence the necessity for Heidegger, as he sees it,
to "make an experience" of language (US, p. 159}, to "bring language as language to
language" (US, p. 242).
35 The most significant change, perhaps, is conceiving the appeal of A 6 y o ? as
"sending man on his way" (Be-wegen) (US, p. 261 and passim). For the rest, the
"Language" study of 1950 contains the essential.
3® " . . . Jedes anfängliche und eigentliche Nennen sagt Ungesprochenes und zwar
so, daß es ungesprochen bleibt." (WD, p. 119). See pp. 168 (unerschöpflich), 90, 171
(Spielraum), 171-172 (wesentlich reicher), 154 (nicht durchgekommen).
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Furthermore, the negativity of Being in language is such that
it not only remains as such withdrawn in words, but it even dupes
man into disregarding it:
. . . T h a t is t o s a y , [ B e i n g - a s - U t t e r a n c e ] p l a y s in such a w a y w i t h our
process of l a n g u a g e t h a t i t g l a d l y lets our language w a n d e r astray in t h e
more obvious m e a n i n g s of words. I t is as if m a n h a d d i f f i c u l t y in dwelling
a u t h e n t i c a l l y in l a n g u a g e . I t is as if t h e danger t o w h i c h [man] m o s t
e a s i l y succumbs is t h a t of e v e r y d a y n e s s . 3 7

We interpret this to mean: that Being holds the primacy in the
coming-to-pass of language, not only in its positivity but in its
negativity; that man by nature is "thrown" into language and,
thus thrown, is the plaything of negatived Being-as-utterance
( " . . . the essenc-ing of language plays with us. . . . " ) ; 38 that it
is because man from the beginning is the plaything of Being-asutterance in its negativity that he is so susceptible to the lure
of everydayness in his use of words, sc. taking them as mere
"conventional signs," as "sounds filled with meaning," to be
used as the instruments of daily living; that we find here in
terms of the problem of language all the characteristics that we
discerned (WW) in Being-as-(negatived)-truth: Being conceals
itself (therefore mystery), dupes man into overlooking this concealment (therefore errance), dominates in every way his fallen
condition; 39 that in order to think the Being-process (sc. the
emergence of the ontological difference) in terms of language,
man presumably must learn how to achieve authenticity in this
fallen condition by responding to the negativity of Being in
language, and he does this by penetrating beyond the ordinary,
everyday meanings of words in order to enter the realm of the
un-said; that such an effort is precisely what EM called "decision."

37
. . Die Sprache spielt nämlich so mit unserem Sprechen, daß sie dieses gern
in die mehr vordergründigen Bedeutungen der Worte weggehen läßt. Es ist, als ob
der Mensch Mühe hätte, die Sprache eigentlich zu bewohnen. Es ist, als ob gerade das
Wohnen der Gefahr des Gewöhnlichen am leichtesten erliege." (WD, p. 83).
38 " . . . das Wesen der Sprache spielt mit u n s , . . . " (WD, p. 83). See p. 87 (gesetzt).
8® WD, pp. 168 (Zeichensystem), 87-89 (Gewöhnlichkeit), 120 (Betätigung der
Sprachwerkzeuge). Cf. VA, pp. 245 (Verhüllung), 253-255 (alltäglichen Vernehmen).
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RESPONSE

I. Thought as Spring
It is to the emergent ontological difference, appealing to man
out of the process of 'A-X-y^eia-Aoyo; to bring it to pass, that
There-being must respond. The response, as the author conceives it here, is a surrender to negatived Being in terms of
language. It is an attempt to re-collect the mystery, and whether
the re-trieve be made in dialogue with Nietzsche or Parmenides,
or simply in a single analysis of words (v.g. "e-voke"), the sense
is always the same. Stripping off the everyday meanings of
words, the author claims to discern their authentic sense, introducing us thus into the hidden domain of the un-said. His whole
method becomes a heeding-of, a caiing-for, a tending (better:
at-tending) to Utterance of words. He strives to find his own
way to their Source, discovering thus their abiding freshness.
Such for Heidegger is the way his thought must go. "The
heeding of the Utterance in words should be the decisive and
determining step on the way of thought that is known by the
name of philosophy. . . . " 40
Now such a passage unto the Source of language Heidegger
calls a "leap" or "spring." The word implies that there is no
"bridge" between presentative thinking and the meditation on
Being-as-source. That is why foundational thinking is not
simply a more energetic type of presentative thought but proceeds from a completely different origin. By such a leap, we accomplish the trans-lation of ourselves into the Being-process
which alone makes genuine translation of a thinker like Parmenides possible. It is only thus that we engage in true dialogue.41
It is a leap into the un-said (un-thought), which hides behind
the "not" that is intrinsic to every finite word (being). Since the
thinker passes thus unto the Origin itself, we see here what it
means to think the origins of thought "more originally" than
40 "Das Achten auf das Sagen der Worte soll jedoch der maß-und richtunggebende
Schritt auf den Weg des Denkens sein, das unter dem Namen Philosophie bekannt
ist
" (WD, p. 90). See WD, pp. 82-84 (ungewohnte Bedeutung), 89 (Brunnen,
quillend), 109 (Frische). Cf. "dwelling near the Source" in "Re-collection" (1943).
4 1 WD, pp. 4-5 (Wissenschaft), 140-141 (übersetzen), 110 (Gespräch). Heidegger
distinguishes dialogue (Gespräch) from "conversation" in this: dialogue deals with
"the un-said," mere conversation with the "said." As for the "influence" of one
thinker upon another in dialogue, see WD, p. 39.
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before (EM), to be "more Greek" than the Greek thinkers themselves.42 In all this, we are dealing clearly with re-trieve and
discern easily its tri-dimensional structure: meditating what-isas-having-been (past), thought lets the un-said Origin come
(future) and brings it into words (present). This spring Heidegger
calls a leap "backwards," sc. back and away from presentative
thinking, into the un-thought. We discern at once the structure
of the "step in reverse," which Heidegger in 1957 tells us is the
fundamental characteristic of his entire method.43
It is worth-while insisting that this is not so much a step back
from the "present" and into the "past," as through the past
and into the future, sc. into Aoyo? in continual ad-vent. But
this spring into man's Origin is a return to the element that he
has never left and cannot leave, for it is that by which he is.
" . . . A curious thing, indeed an uncanny thing, that we first
make a spring onto the [very] ground whereon, properly speaking,
we [already] stand. . . . " 44
This has a familiar ring. In SZ, were we not forced to admit
that in disengaging the characteristics of the antecedent comprehension of Being with which man by nature is endowed, we are
indeed "going in a circle," the "hermeneutic" circle? Whereas a
"logical" circle must be broken, the task in the case of the
hermeneutic circle is not to leave the circle of presupposition but
to enter into it more and more profoundly, in order to discern
all the more clearly the nature of what is presupposed. Here the
same returns:
. . . I n itself, the question, " W h a t E - v o k e s T h o u g h t ? / ' is n o t w i t h o u t
presupposition. So little is this the case t h a t w h a t people like t o call here
presupposition is precisely [the problem t h a t ] t h i s question a p p r o a c h e s
a n d enters upon. 4 5
42 US, p. 134 (griechisch Gedachte griechischer denken). This is the sense of Heidegger's meditation on the pre-Socratics: they thought Being as revealment but
not as an e-vent in which concealment plays an equally important rdle. Hence they
did not think the ontological difference as such. See WD, p. 145; VA, pp. 241, 247248.
« WD, p. 52 (Sprung zurück); ID,p. 45 (Schritt zurück). Cf. WM, p. 49 (Abschied).
A case in point: the entire effort of SG is explicitly an effort to accomplish this spring.
V.g. see SG, p. 108.
44 4 1 . . . Eine seltsame Sache oder gar eine unheimliche Sache, daß wir erst auf
den Boden springen müssen, auf dem wir eigentlich stehen..
(WD, p. 17).
45 " . . . Allein die Frage 'Was heißt Denken?' ist nicht voraussetzungslos. Sie
ist es so wenig, daß sie gerade auf das, was man hier Voraussetzung nennen möchte,
zugeht und darauf sich einläßt." (WD, p. 162). Cf. SZ, pp. 314-315, 310.
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What is the "presupposition" here? It is the correlation between Being and the nature of man, which first enables the
question to arise. For thought never goes "out" from man and
"over" to Being, thence to return and contemplate the bridge
which it itself has thus built. " . . . Much rather, every way of
thought from the very beginning moves within the entire relationship between Being and the essence of man, otherwise it is
not thought. .. , " 4 6 It is precisely this relationship which the
present question interrogates. And the more Heidegger probes
this correlation, the nearer he moves toward the center of the
hermeneutic circle. What is the nature of this center? This is
the question that more and more preoccupies him; it is thus
that we understand the "third" thing, the genuinely ultimate,
which presumably gives rise to both members of the correlation,
for " . . . the relationship between Being and the nature of man
sustains everything inasmuch as it brings as well the shiningforth of Being as the essenc-ing of man to issue. . . . " 47
2. Viewing
To achieve authenticity, the thinker must make a spring into
Being, better into the center of the hermeneutic circle. But it is
not a "blind" leap. On the contrary, the thinker must make it
with eyes wide open. We discern here, transformed into the
terminology of seeing, what we often have found expressed in
the terminology of hearing (attend-ing, attend-ant): the attitude of total docility to Being in ad-vent. The present form is
not unprecedented. Did not SZ admit that man's comprehension
of Being could be expressed in terms of the classic metaphor of
sight ? 48 But there is an interesting corollary, for There-being in
its leap is not only see-ing but seen. If we may say that by
see-ing the thinker "eyes" (Er-blicken) A6yo<;, then we must say
46 " . . . Vielmehr geht jeder Weg des Denkens immer schon innerhalb des ganzen
Verhältnisses von Sein und Menschenwesen, sonst ist es kein Denken
" (WD,
p. 74). Heidegger's italics.
4 7 " . . . Aber weil die Beziehung von Sein und Menschenwesen alles trägt, insofern sie das Erscheinen des Seins sowohl wie das Wesen des Menschen zum Austrag
bringt,. .
(WD, p. 45).
48 WD, p. 141 (Blicksprunges). Cf. SZ, p. 146. The attitude of docility which is
common denominator of both "metaphors" accounts for the insistence on their
fundamental unity. See VA, p. 217 and SG, p. 118.
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that A6yo^ "eyes" the thinker first (uns anblicht), and we must
call the correlation between Being and thought a mutual "eyeing," just as we previously called it a mutual want-ing.49 The
German word for "eye" is Auge, so that at one time the verb
form of "eye-ing" or "to eye" was er-äugnen. Even as late as
Lessing, this was the spelling of the current form (sich) ereignen,
which we have been translating as the "coming-to-pass of an
e-vent." What Heidegger currently calls Ereignis, then, suggests
the correlation of Being and thought conceived as mutual eyeing: Being casts its eye on man (appeal), and There-being
catches Being's eye in turn (response).50
There is another nuance to add here apropos of the leap (stepin-reverse) as an eye-ing of A6yo<;. With regard to the rigor of
foundational thought, we spoke about its warrant. What is the
criterion, we asked, which assures us that the un-said is really
uttered by Being? Heidegger answers in the present context:
Something viewed can be verified only insofar as it constantly continues to be viewed. Something viewed can never be proven by argument
of pros and cons. Such a procedure forgets the [one] decisive factor, the
[simple] viewing. . . . 5 1

What evidence is there, then, that it is Being which discloses itself to the thinker, when he leaps into the un-thought (un-said) ?
Being itself, nothing else! If the procedure seems arbitrary,
this cannot be helped, since it is impossible for the thinker to
produce any ontic argument to prove his case. The only evidence
is Being. The thinker's only task is to make a continual effort
to keep it always in view, and since every effort is finite, this
SG (X955), pp. 85, 97This conception of Ereignis has been discernible since at least 1946 (see VA,
p. 99). One would do Heidegger an injustice, however, to suppose that the matter
were as simple as all this. We must overhear also the word eignen ("to be adapted to/ 1
"to be the property of," etc.) and understand the process by which Being appropriates to man his essence in order to ap-propriate him to itself. (See ID [1957], PP2 8 - 2 9 ) . Obviously the English "e-vent" cannot hope to retain all these nuances, but
it has certain modest virtues not to be disdained: it connotes clearly the horizon of
time which is central to the whole perspective; it connotes the occasional character
of mittence which composes inter-mittence; it connotes by reason of its etymology
(e-venire) the sense of "issue" (A us trag), therefore permits us to understand it as
that ultimate unity whence difference-as-issue proceeds.
5» " . . . Erblicktes läßt sich stets nur so ausweisen, daß es je und je erblickt
wird. Erblicktes läßt sich nie durch Anführung von Gründen und Gegengründen beweisen. Solches Verfahren vergißt das Entscheidende, das Hinblicken...." (WD,
p. 141).
49
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means that it must be repeated, sc. the thinker must accomplish
the step-in-reverse again and again in order to keep his eye on
Being.52
3. Interrogation
More precisely, how is the thinker always to keep his eye on
Being ? Here the author's answer is clear and quite important,
for we see now the full sense of what he means by interrogative
thought. The attentive beholding of Being is sustained only insofar as we constantly put Being to question. We understand the
point best, perhaps, if we recall that the Being into which the
thinker leaps with-draws in beings and hides its inexhaustible
wealth behind a "not." It is thus that Being gives itself to us as
the thought-worthy. Inasmuch as it is thought-worthy, it is also
question-worthy, or, as we say more idiomatically, "questionable." " . . . What gives itself [as thought-worthy] is the gift of
the eminently Question-able." 53
Now in the inevitable with-drawing from man, Being-asquestionable naturally draws man with it. Hence man's eksistence as such is an open-ness to Being-as-questionable, and
the thought-ful response to Being that hails man thus, sc. the
achieving of authenticity, will take the form of interrogation.
" . . . Such thinking would be a thanks-giving to the Thoughtworthy . . . which would guard the Thought-worthy inviolable
in its questionableness. . . . " 54 In other words, docility to Beingas-questionable means to place it continually in question.
Is there an answer to the questioning? Of course there is. But
any answer lets us comprehend better the Question-able as such
and therefore devolves into an ever more penetrating interrogation. The way that thought must follow, then, (and here we
change the metaphor of "spring" but remain faithful to its
82 WD, p. 149 and VA, p. 139 (Ausschau); SG pp. 85 (ursprünglichere Aneignung),
159 (ursprünglicher springen).
S8 " . . . Was sich so gibt, ist die Gabe des Fragwürdigsten." (WD, p. 149). Cf.
pp. zo8, i x i - i i 5 passim, and above where apropos of WG we discuss the transcendental origin of "why," p. X70.
54 " . . . Dieses Denken wäre die Verdankung des Bedenklichsten in seine eigenste
Abgeschiedenheit, die das Bedenklichste unversehrbar in seine Fragwürdigkeit verwahrt
" (WD, p. 159). See pp. 162-163 (die ihm gemäße Frag-Würdigkeit), 1x5
(im Fragwürdigen halten), 128 (Weg in das Fragwürdige).
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sense) is not a well-traveled road, already laid out before us as
a mere entity which the thinker need only traverse in his turn.
Rather it is a path that every thinker must step by step break
for himself, and these steps along the way are successive stages
of the questioning. " . . . It is first and only by going one's way,
[and] here [we mean] by thought-ful questioning, [that] there is
movement along the w a y . . . , " 55 and only if the questioning
continues does the thinker remain "under way" in thought. If,
according to this conception, the thinker must let every step of
the way come to him as he proceeds, this is simply telling evidence for the fact that interrogative thought by nature is "tentative," where this word should be taken in its most radical sense
to suggest: that the effort (tentare) of thought never can be
remitted; that success is never more than provisional.56
The tentativeness of thought, thus understood, crystallizes
in the relentlessness of the questioning. There is ample evidence
of this in the analysis as it proceeds in WD. For example, the
translation of Parmenides, even after it is accomplished, and
even when stated declaratively, remains always a questioning
one, and this means that it is always open to question. In fact,
the author seems to count his effort a success if his readers
simply place Parmenides' saying in question, for what is desirable is not to absolve the questioning by an answer but simply
to achieve by it a deeper fidelity to Being-as-questionable.57
We are in a position now to appreciate why Heidegger's own
thought-process is so profoundly characterized by the question.
If he speaks of his whole work as an "effort at thought," this
must be accepted as more than an affectation, for the formula
makes clear that " . . . [he] has followed the way of questioning,
whereon [he] has assumed [Being], the Questionable^] as the

55
. . Erst und nur das Gehen, hier das denkende Fragen, ist die Be-wegung
"
(WD, p. 164). See pp. 164-165 (Frage immer fragwürdiger). What we translate here
(1952) as "movement along the w a y " (Be-wegung) becomes in 1958 more explicitly
the response to A6yo£ as the domain (Gegend) which has opened up for man the
ways of thought and sent him on his way (bewegen). See v.g. US, pp. 197-198. Cf.
the interpretation of o86<; in Aristotle (P, p. 281).
5 6 WD, p. 164 (Vor-läufigkeit). We are interpreting Vorläufigkeit here rather than
translating it. The explanation of "tentative" is not found as such in German.
5 7 WD, pp. 141 (stets fragendes), 145 (fragender als bisher), 161 (die Frage ins
Fragwürdige zu bringen). Cf. V A , p. 161 (Fragwürdiges: Denkwürdiges).
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only place of sojourn [worthy] of thought." 58 Even in KM
(1929) it was a case of "keeping the investigation open through
questioning." 59 Again in SF (1955), we see the attitude in all
possible concreteness, for the dialogue is sustained by resolute
questioning. At one point the author interrupts himself to say:
" I write all this in the form of questions, for at present a [foundational] thought can do no more, as far as I see, than give
unremitting thought to what the foregoing questions call
forth. . . . " « 0
Two observations are of special importance: 1. In "The
Question about Technicity" (1953), the author concludes by
saying that the closer we draw to negatived Being-as-questionable, the more interrogative we become, " . . . for interrogation
is the piety of thought." 61 This is perfectly consequent with all
that we have been saying. In 1958, however, he rejects the formula, and the reason is illuminating. The fundamental attitude of
thought is not, first of all, an interrogating, but an attending to
Being's appeal. Hence, we must always understand the interrogation as subordinate to attending and a function of it. This is
a salutary reminder but not an absolutely necessary one, for
already in EM (1935) we were told that even in interrogation
Being holds the primacy. "Only where Being opens itself up in
questioning does history come-to-pass. . . . " 62
2. The interrogative method is so deeply inscribed in the
nature of thought that for Heidegger there are no "absolutes"
in genuine thought. The point is made with regard to "absolutely valid" interpretations of any given text, but one feels that
the statement may be expanded to absolute truths of any kind,
for the reason given is that absolute validity can be had only within
the realm of presentative thought. The author does not deny that
such absolutes are possible, but only that they are accessible to
68 " . . . Diese Benennung erhebt den Anspruch, daß hier ein Weg des Fragens begangen wird, auf dem das Fragwürdige als der einzige Aufenthaltsbereich des Denkens
übernommen ist." (WD, p. 113). Heidegger's italics.
89 " . . . So bleibt nur das Eine, die Untersuchung durch Fragen offenzuhalten."
(KM, p. 221).
00 "Ich schreibe dies alles in der Form von Fragen; denn mehr vermag heute,
soweit ich sehe, ein Denken nicht, als unablässig das zu bedenken, was die angeführten
Fragen h e r v o r r u f t . . ( S F , p. 25). See SF, p. 10 (unentwegten Fragen).
" . . . Denn das Fragen ist die Frömmigkeit des Denkens." (VA, p. 44).
62 ««Nur wo das Sein sich im Fragen eröffnet, geschieht Geschichte...." (EM,
p. 109). See US, pp. 175-176,179-180.
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human thought as such. If such truths are to be had, they must
be grounded, he claims, in an absoluteness that faith can give
but not thought. "The unconditioned character of faith and the
questionableness of thought are two different domains [that are]
a chasm apart." 63
4. Freedom
There is one last step to take. What is the characteristic
gesture in man by which the interrogation of beings comes
about ? It is not an act of conquest; it is an act of surrender. It is an
abandoning of oneself to the question, a letting-oneself-in-upon
it, a com-mitting of oneself to its demands, an opening oneself
up, a throwing wide one's heart, a setting oneself upon the way
of thought.64 All these metaphors say the same: they describe
an act of freedom by which There-being acquiesces to Being's
hail.
An act of freedom, of letting-be! For Being's hail to thought
solicits but does not necessitate, invites but does not compel. It
leaves There-being free to refuse its call, for it is the hail of Being
that first constitutes There-being as free:
. . . T h e hail [of Being] brings our essence into t h e d o m a i n of the F r e e ,
and this, indeed, in so decisive a f a s h i o n t h a t w h a t s u m m o n s us u n t o
t h o u g h t constitutes in t h e first p l a c e t h e f r e e d o m of t h e Free, in order
t h a t w h a t is free in a h u m a n w a y c a n d w e l l therein. . . . 6 5

We interpret this to mean: that what is free in the most original
sense is not There-being but Being, because Being ('A-X^e«*)
is liberation, therefore a freeing from concealment, and as such
is the "domain of the Free"; 66 that There-being as the There of
Being is the There of (Being) the Free; that Being, in effi68 "Die Unbedingtheit des Glaubens und die Fragwürdigkeit des Denkens sind
zwei abgründig verschiedene Bereiche." (WD, p. 110). Cf. EM, pp. 5-6. See H.
Birault, "La foi et la pens6e d'apr£s Heidegger," philosophies Chritiennes, Recherches
et D6bats, no. 4 (Paris: Arthfcme Fayard, 1955), pp. 108-132.
84 V.g. WD, p. 103 (uns einlassen, schicken, aufmachen, aufschließen, auf den
Weg begeben).
85 " . . . Das Geheiß bringt unser Wesen ins Freie und dies so entschieden, daß
Jenes, was uns in das Denken ruft, allererst Freiheit des Freien gibt, damit menschlich Freies darin wohnen kann
" (WD, p. 153).
68 See VA, p. 33 (Freiheit: Bereich des Geschickes). When this is thought in terms
of Bcing-as-history, we understand in what sense Heidegger understands the historical tradition (Überlieferung) as a "de-Iiverance" (dHivrer). See WP, pp. 14-15; S G »
p. 171; N, II, p. 398.

w h a t

e-vokes

thought?

619

caciously wanting There-being to be, thereby constitutes it as
free, sc. as ek-sistence, ecstatically open unto (Being) the Free; 67
that the freedom of There-being therefore reposes still more
originally in the freedom of Being ( " . . . freedom, therefore, is
never something merely human. . . . " ) ; 68 that the supreme
moment of There-being's freedom comes-to-pass when of its
own accord, without constraint, it consents to be the There of
(Being) the Free, sc. when it achieves authenticity.69
What does Heidegger's own procedure in WD tell us about
the authentic response to Being-as-negatived in language ? The
thinker must overcome the everydayness by surrendering to
Being (A6yo<;). Whether the surrender be conceived as a selftranslation, or a spring-backward, or a fixing one's gaze upon,
or a relentless interrogating of Being, the sense is always the
same: the surrender in consummate freedom to the hail of Beingas-negatived. What are we to call this surrender? In SZ, the hail
was the voice of conscience, the acquiescence was re-solve. In
WD, the hail is an e-vocation, the response is foundational
thought.

Resume
What e-vokes thought? Being - 'A-X^-frewc - A6yo<;! As Being,
it is the process by which all beings emerge into presence; as
*A-XY]$Eia, this presenc-ing is a mingling of darkness and light,
hence comports a "not" in beings which constitutes the ontological difference; as A6yo<;, the emergent difference is aboriginal
Utterance. In order that the process take place, there is need of
a There among beings, in and through which the scission comesto-pass. This want of a There is already an e-vocation of thought,
conceived as a fundamental structure. Since this structure
constitutes the essence of man, it lies within the power of There
freely to accept or reject this com-mitment. To accept (thought• 7 VA, p. 32 (Mensch erst frei); Cf. p. 40 (höchste Würde).
68 " . . . Die Freiheit ist darum niemals etwas nur Menschliches,..." (WD, p. 133).
Cf. W W (1930), p. 16.
VA, pp. 26 (auf seine Weise entbirgt), 32-33 (Freiheit); WP, p. 34 (Ohr öffnen);
SG, p. 47 (nicht Zwang), 157 (Sprung: Gegend der Freiheit öffnet); ID, p. 24 (Sprung:
uns loslassen). In the concrete, we have some evidence of how this freedom is achieved
in authentic dialogue (US, pp. xio, 1x3, 114).

Ö20

w h a t

e-vokes

thought?

as-function) is to acquiesce in all the exigencies of Being-asnegatived-truth and t h u s achieve authenticity. Concretely, this
is accomplished

when

There-being

surrenders to the

Being-

process b y leaping t h r o u g h the past and into the future as into
the Source whence all t h o u g h t springs. B y reason of this leap,
There-being on the one h a n d achieves itself and on the other
h a n d brings to fulfillment t h e process of 5A-Xy)&eia, whose There
it is. Since 'A-X^&eux is a liberation from darkness, this leap is a
fulfillment of freedom. I t is this free acquiescence to Being-asnegatived (re-solve) t h a t w e understand b y foundational thought.
Inside the hermeneutic circle, round and round we g o !

CONCLUSION

"E<ncepe, 7cavT<x 9epov, oca 9aivoXis eaxeSaa* aöa

O star of evening, thou bringest all things homeward
That the shining dawn dispersed.
Sappho, Fragment 95

If at this point we draw our study to a close, the reason is not
that we have reached the end of the way but only that we have
discerned its direction with sufficient clarity to permit us to
comprehend its sense. We wish now to prescind from the different steps we have followed and to meditate the sense of the w a y
as such. W e conclude with an effort at xpiais, provided that this
word be understood in what for Heidegger himself is its genuinely Greek sense: the cutting off of a being (xptveiv) from all else
b y setting it within its limits, where "limit" must be understood
not as that point where something ceases but rather where it
begins to be what it is. 1 Our critique, then, has as its purpose to
let-be-seen the limits within which Heidegger is what he is for
contemporary thought.

A. H E I D E G G E R I A N D

II

We are in a position now to compare Heidegger I and II, and
we can see clearly: that the same problem preoccupies both (the
effort to overcome, sc. ground, metaphysics b y endeavoring to
think the sense of Being-as-truth); that in both cases the effort
is to overcome the subject-object polarity b y letting come-topass the negatived process of non-concealment (truth); that the
method characteristic of Heidegger II is the process of thought,
of Heidegger I the process of phenomenology.
Let us compare the methods in detail. The nature of the being
i See SG, p. 125. Cf. EM, p. 46 (Grenze).
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that executes the method in Heidegger I is characterized as
transcendence (to-be-in-the-World, existence), in Heidegger II
(beginning with WW [1930]) as ek-sistence - in both cases, that
being among other beings whose distinctive prerogative is to be
open unto Being. In both cases, the process is profoundly marked
by negativity (finitude): in Heidegger I by the finitude of transcendence, in Heidegger II by the finitude of the mittence of
Being. In both cases, the process is temporo-historical: in Heidegger I, it is the process of There-being, in Heidegger II, it is
Being, that is fundamental history. The structure of the process,
however, is the same in both: Being comes (future) as havingbeen-already in what is (past) and is rendered manifest through
the co-operation of man (present). Finally, in both cases, the
process comes to its fulfillment only when man endorses it with
his liberty: in Heidegger I, the process is called "re-solve," the
culmination of phenomenology; in Heidegger II, it is called
"thought."
If the analysis is valid, we must conclude that the thinking of
Being as it is discerned in Heidegger II is not simply the term of
an odyssey that began with the phenomenology of SZ. It is this
phenomenology - the very same process of hermeneutic interpretation - transformed into a new modality. What is more,
this transformation is not an arbitrary thing, determined by
extrinsic circumstances. Much less is it an escape into a new
problematic necessitated by the dereliction of the old. Rather,
the transformation of Heidegger I into Heidegger II is born out
of a necessity imposed by the original experience of Being as
finite (negative). For the shift of focus from There-being to Being
(which, as far as we can see, characterizes the decisive difference
between the two periods) was demanded by the exigencies of the
hermeneutic analysis itself, as soon as it became clear that the
primacy in the Being-process belongs to Being itself. And when
was this ? Precisely when the author began to meditate the negativity of truth as such. This we take to be the genuine sense of
the "reversal" in WW, for it was then that he began to appreciate the full import of what it means for concealment somehow
to precede non-concealment in the coming-to-pass of a-X^eta.
But a transformation it was! And it would be just as erroneous to claim that Heidegger II is the "same" as Heidegger I, as
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to see a cleavage between the two. For the Heidegger of the
early years was victimized by the metaphysics he was trying to
overcome. That is why the latter part of SZ never appeared and
could not appear, any more than the intended complement to
the essay "On the Essence of Truth" (which would have borne
the title "The Truth of Essenc-ing") was feasible. In each case,
the language of metaphysics, in whose ambiance each of these
programs was essayed, was inadequate to the task of giving expression to an essentially non-(pre-)metaphysical thought. After
all, " . . . no one can set himself outside a dominating ambiance
of presentative [thinking] with a single leap. . . . " 2
Yet the leap was attempted and eventually found a provisional success. The success consists in having found a way to bringto-expression that in the author's original experience which SZ
did not and could not say. In other words, we understand the
whole of Heidegger II to be a re-trieve of Heidegger I. Do not
the repeated attempts at self-interpretation say as much ? Such
an hypothesis permits us to take a middle position between two
schools of interpretation: with those who claim that there is a
complete dichotomy between the two periods, we can admit
that Heidegger II indeed says what Heidegger I did not say;
with those who insist on an absolute sameness, we can admit a
profound continuity between the two periods and a necessary
evolution from one to the other. Briefly: Heidegger I and Heidegger II are not the same (das Gleiche) - but they are one (das
Selbe).
If this interpretation is correct, then Heidegger I is a past
which still-is-as-having-been, which Heidegger II must recollect. Even for the contemporary Heidegger, then, SZ must be
considered as still in ad-vent and still to be re-trieved. That is
why a surprising number of the old themes keep returning - to
such an extent, indeed, that one is tempted to say that all of the
essential elements of the existential analysis of SZ can be disengaged from Heidegger II. For example, we can find the analysis
of: the World as such in the meditation on the Quadrate (Weltgeviert); 3 the World as Matrix and Total Meaningfulness in the
2 " . . . Niemand kann sich aus dem herrschenden Vorstellungskreis mit einem
Sprung heraussetzen,..." (US, p. 130). See WW, p. 26 and HB, p. 72.
3 V.g. "The Thing," "Language" (Weltgeviert).
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conception of what Heidegger calls Gestell;

4

with-being in the

relationship between poet (therefore thinker) and people;

5

the

ontological disposition in the insistence upon the need for attunement in poetry and thought;

6

comprehension, understood

as project of World (Being), in the conception of Being as
logos in the meditation on the essenc-ing of language;

8

7

death in

the designation of man as "mortal," sc. that being which alone
can know

death as

thought-as-record; 1 0
thanking ; 1 1

death;

9

concern in the problematic

of

authenticity in the notion of thinking-as-

historicity in the conception

of thought

as re-

collection. 1 2 The focus of SZ has changed completely b u t the
structures are exactly the same.
W e m a y go still further. If Heidegger I is still in a d - v e n t even
for the author himself, is this not even more the case for those
who would follow along the w a y that with SZ was first openedup ? There is no need, then, to look upon the later development
as a t y p e of receivership imposed b y the b a n k r u p t c y of SZ. On
the contrary, it is only in the later Heidegger that the earlier
becomes solvent, sc. truly free. It is from this point of view that
we would t r y to see in unity two widely divergent perspectives.
W h e n A . D e Waelhens says, for example, t h a t " . . . [the conception of] concern resumes in the ontological order the Husserlian notion of intentionality . .
nating insight - into Heidegger

1

3

this is certainly an illumi-

L When M. Müller, on the other

hand, tells us that "the intentionality of the 'self-emitting' or
the 'historicity' of Being is prior to all intentionality of conscience. .

1

4

that is perfectly comprehensible in terms of Hei-

"Die Frage nach der Technik," (VA, pp. 13-44) (Gestell).
H D (Dichter-Volk).
« WM: Ep, HD (Stimmung).
' SF
• "Language," and US passim (das Heißen der Sprache).
• "The Thing," "Working, Dwelling, Thinking" (Tod als Tod vermögen).
" WD (Gedächtnis).
" WG (Danken).
1 8 "Andenken," HD (Andenken).
18 " . . . le souci reprend au plan ontologique la notion husserlienne de Tintentionnalite." (A. De Waelhens, "Heidegger," in Les Phüosophes CSlcbres. La Galerie
des Hommes C£lebres, No. io, sous la direction de Maurice Merleau-Ponty [Paris:
Lucien Mazenod, 1956]), p. 34z.
14 "Die Intentionalität, das 'Sich-zuschickcn' oder die 'Geschichtlichkeit' des
S^ins ist also früher als alle Bewußtseinsintentionalität
" (M. Müller, ExistenzPhilosophie. . p . 126). Müller italicizes whole.
4

5
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degger II. Our own hypothesis permits us to insist upon the
coherence of these two positions, in fact their mutual complementation, for it is the "intentionality of B e i n g " (Heidegger II)
t h a t at all times was the un-said of Heidegger I, rendering possible the entire structure of concern.
Perhaps this is the opportune moment to call attention to
another problem that we have signalized several times before:
the difficulty of reconciling the primacy of Being in the e-vent
of truth with the nature of There-being as a project of this v e r y
same Being. One wonders if we might not approach a solution
b y meditating the sense of OCUTO, according to which Being and
thought (There-as-project) - these two "intentionalities" -

are

one in the identity of mutual belongingness.
W e understand the matter thus': Heidegger's perspective from
beginning to end remains phenomenological. B y this we mean
that he is concerned only with the process

b y which beings are

lit up and reveal themselves as what they are for and to man.
T h e lighting-process takes place in man - not through (sc. b y
reason of) him, y e t not without him either. If the lighting-process
does not take place b y reason of man, then the Light itself holds
the primacy in the process; if it does not take place without him,
then the There is necessary that the Light be able to light-up,
and to that extent m a y be considered as projecting the light.
W h a t the Light "in itself" or the projecting There "in itself"
might be, independently of the process in which thely cooperate,
is simply not Heidegger's problem, presumably because neither
one nor the other in that case would be a 9OUV6{JLEVOV. A correlat i v e identity such as this between disparate components in the
u n i t y of a single process

has m a n y parallels in the history of

thought (v.g. in Aristotle, T h o m a s Aquinas, Meister Eckhart,
Hegel, etc.), but we must leave further treatment of the matter
for another day.
However this m a y be, the program of SZ remains still-to-beachieved, not simply because it was left unfinished b y Heidegger I but because it is still in ad-vent by reason

of the perspective

opened in Heidegger II. A n d is it not legitimate to presume that,
once we have learned something about the sense of Being b y
passing

through

comprehend

it

the

experience

more positively

of

Non-being

as the

Holy

and

come

to

and as original

conclusion

628

Utterance, we

may

hitherto have b e e n

then

return to other phenomena

mentioned

only obliquely

which

(v.g. freedom,

boredom, work, presence of the There-being of a loved one) as
genuine w a y s b y

which t o experience B e i n g and bring it to

authentic expression ?
F r o m another p o i n t of v i e w , the same m a y be said for m e t a physics. Heidegger's purpose is not and never has been to "des t r o y " it, but t o ground it through thinking the Being-process
as such which g i v e s rise t o it. Foundational thinking " . . . does
not tear the roots of philosophy out but dresses the ground and
tills the s o i l . . . . "

15

from which it draws its strength. Once we

have come to appreciate the sense of the Being-process as such,
it seems to be a suitable task of foundational thought to re-examine the classical problems of metaphysics

(v.g. of

human

freedom, of co-ek-sistence with others and, above all, of God)
with the help of this L i g h t t h a t Heidegger has brought to light.
T o be sure, Heidegger himself is not moving in this direction,
but is it fair to d e m a n d it of h i m ? " . . . Indeed to every thinker
there is but one w a y a p p o i n t e d - his own w a y - whose traces he
must follow b a c k a n d forth over and over again . . . , "

16

and the

w a y we are suggesting is clearly not Heidegger's own. A l l that
we wish to m a i n t a i n is t h a t this w a y is a legitimate, indeed a
necessary, manner for others to achieve fidelity to the direction
that he has set.

B.

UR-HEIDEGGER

Heidegger I a n d I I are not the same, b u t t h e y are one. T h e y
belong to each other in profound identity. W h a t is to be said
now about this oneness? W h a t precisely is the living center of
Heidegger's experience? G i v e n the relatively limited character
of the d a t a at o u r disposal, it would be presumptuous at the
present time to a t t e m p t a n y t y p e of pronouncement that would
be a n y t h i n g more t h a n provisional. B u t at least we m a y gather
18 " . . . Es reißt . . . die Wurzel der Philosophie nicht aus. Es gräbt ihr den Grund
und pflügt ihr den Boden
" (WM, p. 9 ) . The SZ formula, "destruction of the history of ontology" (SZ, pp. 19-27), is interpreted explicitly in SF (p. 36) of what we
have come to understand as re-trieve. Cf. N, II, p. 415.
" . . . Doch ist jedem Denkenden je nur ein Weg, der seine, zugewiesen, in dessen
Spuren er immer wieder hin und her gehen m u ß , . . . " (HW, pp. 2 9 4 - 1 9 5 ) .
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what data we have and see what help they give. In this respect,
the conversation with a Japanese professor (1953-54) is especially illuminating. 17
The theme of the discussion is the nature of language, and in
the course of it the author explains how it came about that the
meditation upon language should become the principal method
of thinking Being. As we know, the first experience of the
problem of Being came through the reading of Brentano. That
somehow there is a correlation between Being and language began to become clear a few years later, when, as a seminarian, he
began to meditate upon the relation between Sacred Scripture
and the speculation of the theologians. An enthusiasm for Hölderlin and Trakl dates from the student years prior to World
War I, and in 1915 the habilitation thesis, entitled Duns Scotus9
Doctrine on Categories and Signification, touched again in groping
fashion the relation between Being and language, to the extent
that "category" pertains to the Being of beings and '"signification" suggests the relation between Being thus proposed and
the language in which it is expressed. 18 The teaching career began in the winter of 1915. What is to be said about these early
years we must infer from the titles of his courses and seminars.
The title of the first course, "The Pre-Socratics: Parmenides,"
rings familiar enough even today, and in the following year, a
course on "Truth and Reality" suggests that he was grappling
already with the problem of subject-ism, which would preoccupy
him for so long. At any rate, we know that as early as 1920,
when he devoted his lectures to the theme of "Expression and
Appearing," it was clear to his students that the Being-language
problematic was central to his thought. 19 The problem was considered, too, in conjunction with a meditation on the nature of
poetry and art, for at that time expressionism was in vogue and
invited philosophical reflection in terms of expression and appearance.
"Aus einem Gespräch von der Sprache," (US, pp. 83-155)Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus (Tübingen, 1916). See US,
pp. 91 (Habilitationsschrift), 96 (Theologiestudium).
1 9 US, pp. 91, 92. In US, this course is ascribed to 1921 with the probable title,
"Ausdruck und Erscheinung." The Vorlesungsverzeichnis (see Appendix) which
Professor Heidegger (subsequent to US) has verified, lists it as dating from 1920
with the title "Phänomenologie der Anschauung und des Ausdrucks." The theme,
however, was "Ausdruck und Erscheinung."
17

18
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In addressing himself to the problem thus posed, Heidegger
was quite consciously engaged in trying to get beyond the
subject-object relationship. As used in 1921, the word "appearing" (Erscheinen) received already an interpretation that
was completely radical, going beyond the normal Kantian one,
even beyond the entire post-Cartesian tradition, back to the
Greek <poctvea&ai, which meant, as we have been told before, the
process by which a being comes to shine forth of itself, thereby
emerging into presence. With this interpretation he was already
trying to explore, ever so haltingly, some realm that is "completely other" to the subject-object polarity. The term "expression," however, remains laden with subject-ist connections,
implying usually the making "external" of what is "internal,"
sc. to the expressing subject.20
With the summer semester of 1923, SZ began to take written
form, and for the first time there appeared the important word
"hermeneutic" in the university lecture course ("Ontologie").
To examine the role which the word plays in the author's
thinking is to trace his entire development. He had had his first
experience of the word as a seminarian when he heard in his
theology courses of "hermeneutic" as a method of interpreting
Holy Scripture. Latent here already in obscure, still inaccessible,
fashion, as we have mentioned already, was the whole problem
of the relation between Being and language. So far-reaching was
the import of this experience that forty years later the author
would say: "without this theological heritage I would never have
gained the way of thought. . . . " 21
Later he found the word "hermeneutic" in Dilthey, who had
taken it from the same source, sc. theology - in particular from
the theological writings of Schleiermacher, who had given to the
word the broad meaning of an art by which one correctly understands and judges the writings of another. It was an easy step
to expand this meaning of "hermeneutic" still further so that it
could apply to any type of interpretation whatever, even to the
plastic arts. 22 All this matured slowly. As SZ crystallized, the
US, pp. 132 (qxzlvca&ou), 129-130 (Subjekt-Objekt-Beziehung).
"Ohne diese theologische Herkunft wäre ich nie auf den Weg des Denkens gel a n g t . . . . " (US, p. 96).
" US, pp. 96 (Dilthey), 97 (Schleiermacher).
11
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author began to conceive "hermeneutic" more radically still.
It would mean for him not simply a manner of interpretation,
but interpretation itself would be conceived in terms of a still
more fundamental process of hermeneutic.
How was this process to be understood? Heidegger went to
the radical sense of epfrrjveueiv, which, he maintains, bears profound affinity with the Greek deity Hermes, herald of the gods.
'EpjjLTjveuetv for the maturing Heidegger came to mean to play the
role of herald, to bear tidings, or, more simply, to make
something manifest (Darlegen). What for him must be made
manifest, ever since the philosophical awakening with Brentano,
is the Being of beings in its difference from beings. So it happened
that "hermeneutic" came to mean the entire effort to let Being
be manifest, sc. to achieve a more original assumption of Being
in order to lay the groundwork of metaphysics. 23
But at the start, it was not explicitly the foundation of metaphysics as such that preoccupied him. Assistant to Husserl
until invited to Marburg in 1923, the young Heidegger gave his
first loyalty to phenomenology and sought simply to think the
essence of phenomenology in its origins, so as to give to it a
rightful place in the philosophical tradition of the West. This
probing into origins was from the very beginning the sense of
re-trieve. The early interpretation (1921) of <palvea&at is evidence
enough. A t any rate, it is easy to see how "hermeneutic" (the
process of letting-be-manifest) and 9atv6ji«va (that which manifests itself), plus -Tiysiv (to let-be-manifest), rejoined each other
to such an extent that "hermeneutic" and "phenomeno-logy"
became for Heidegger but one. If "hermeneutic" retains a nuance
of its own, this is the connotation of language. But it will be a
long time before this comes to fruition. In SZ, it remains in the
background while the phenomenological analysis unfolds in full
panoply, then it emerges tentatively in the summer semester of
1934 with the course on "Logic," more decisively in 1944 with
the course bearing the same title. At any rate, it was because
phenomenology seemed to offer promise of unfolding the hermeneutic that Heidegger dedicated SZ to Edmund Husserl.24
US, pp. 121 (ipjiTjveueiv), 109 (Aneignung).
US, pp. 95 (Wesen der Phänomenologie), 130-131 (ursprünglicher zurückzugewinnen), 93 (Hintergrund), 92, 269 (Husserl gewidmet).
88

84
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As Heidegger now, in the fullness of his years, looks back on
those early efforts, he concedes quite readily their stumbling
insufficiency. Neither in 1907 nor in 1915 did he discern the full
import of this experience. Even in 1921, when the direction already was set, he was only trying
. . . to follow a way which was leading [he] knew not where. Only the
immediate prospect was known to [him], for this was continually openingup, even if the field of vision often shifted and grew dark.25

However dark the way, this much is clear: Heidegger was not
his own master. He only followed a course (Spur) that was set
for him - but follow it he did:
The course was a scarcely perceptible promise of a liberation unto
freedom, now dark and confusing, now a lightning-flash of sudden insight
which then again for a long period of time withdrew from every attempt
to utter it.26

From this it becomes clear that, no matter what must be said
about the orientation of Heidegger I in SZ (1927), the experience
which comes to expression in Heidegger II (where Being in
simultaneous revealment-concealment holds the primacy over
thought) dates at least from 1921, when he was already engaged
in what he later calls the historical process of thought-ful dialogue. 27 What else is there to conclude than that Heidegger II is
more original than Heidegger J, went before him along the way?
B y the same token we are given to understand that if Heidegger
I reverses his perspective in order to become Heidegger II, the
reason is not that the effort went bankrupt but that the thinker
simply left one place in order to gain another along the same
way. " . . . What abides in thought is the way. . . . " 28
The way is the same today as in 1927, and even if the term
2 5 " . . . Indes regte sich darin der Versuch, einen Weg zu gehen, von dem ich nicht
wußte, wohin er führen wferde. Nur seine nächsten Ausblicke waren mir bekannt,
weil sie mich unablässig lockten, wenngleich sich der Gesichtskreis öfters verschob
und verdunkelte." (US, p. 91).
86 " . . . Die Spur war ein kaum vernehmbares Versprechen, das eine Befreiung
ins Freie ankündete, bald dunkel und verwirrend, bald blitzartig wie ein jäher Einblick, der sich dann auf lange Zeit hinaus wieder jedem Versuch, ihn zu sagen, entzog." (US, p. 137). Note how the conception of thought as making-one's-way along
paths that Being opens up for the thinker is based, apparently, on a personal experience of the author.
27 US, p. 128 (Geschichtliche des denkenden Gespräches).
M
" . . . Das Bleibende im Denken ist der Weg
" (US, p. 99).
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"phenomenology" has disappeared (in order to leave the process
name-less, so that no fixed formula would freeze its movement), 2 9
the whole effort is as much a hermeneutic as ever. In fact, inasmuch as Heidegger has found a w a y to probe the relation between Being and language, we have a right t o say that now in
the full unfolding of Heidegger II, as he meditates the sense of
Being in terms of A o y o w e

have achieved, however inade-

quately, the principal ambition of Heidegger I.
Y e t with this all is not yet said. For even if it be granted t h a t
Heidegger I I is more original (sc. closer to the origins of the primordial experience) than Heidegger I, it seems inexact to say
that even he is absolutely primary. A f t e r all, we are not y e t at
the end of the journey - clearly we are still "under w a y "

(unter-

wegs) . This is strikingly apparent if we note that the two words
which most profoundly characterize Heidegger's whole effort
now seem inadequate. The word " B e i n g , "

for example,

has

almost completely disappeared from his vocabulary. The reason:
this word is so saturated b y the metaphysical tradition t h a t in
passing unto the ground of metaphysics it seems better to drop
it completely. 3 0 Again, the word "language," too, has lost its
charm, and in its stead we find more and more the word " u t t e r ance," to designate language in its origins. 31 It is perfectly o b v i ous, then, that there is some hidden power still more original
Heidegger

II

than

which gives rise to both I and II. Let us call this

primordial source the "Ur-Heidegger."

32

W h a t can be said of

h i m ? T h e question must be posed, for unless we discern his
physiognomy, how can we delineate the limits (xpiveiv) of this
thinker so as to comprehend him in what he is for our time?

C. Kpiau;
In trying to discern the limits of Heidegger's conception of
thought, we must delineate the negativity in the mittence which
US, pp. 120—121 (im Namenlosen zu lassen).
US, pp. 109-110 (Sein-Metaphysik). Even in SZ, presumably, Heideggersensed
the inadequacy of the term but could find no other way to designate the process
under discussion (US, p. Xio).
81 US, p. 145 (die Sage).
82 We take it as a commonplace that the German prefix Ur- (originally denoting
"out of") suggests always "primitiveness," "origin."
29

30
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constitutes him b y resorting, for the most part, to the interrogat i v e m e t h o d . W e make e v e r y effort to avoid measuring him b y
a n y standards b u t his own. Implicitly, all of our questions come
d o w n t o this: having seen the general direction of Heidegger's
effort a t thought, to w h a t extent can we follow him along the
way?
B e y o n d a n y doubt, Heidegger's great service to philosophy
consists in h a v i n g forced contemporary thought, proceeding as
it does from a tradition that reaches from Anaximander

to

Husserl, t o pose again the question about the sense of Being. If
his w o r k had no other value than that, our debt to him would
still be immeasurable.

J. The

Thinker

B u t w h o is it that thinks ? Is ek-sistence merely the individual
man, or all men, or h u m a n i t y , or the essence of man as such?
In t h e introduction to W M , for example, we are told that the
There is the open-ness of Being as such and There-being the domain where B e i n g essences (Wesensbereich),
" s t a n d s " or into which he can "enter,"

33

within which man
as if There-being were

somehow t h a t region wherein Being and man encounter each
other. I t is thus that H. Birault comprehends There-being:
. . . T h a t hidden place where the essence of man and the essence of truth,
b o t h essential t o each other, meet in order t o " d e f i n e " one another
m u t u a l l y - this w e call There-Being - designating thereby that finite
place of B e i n g which man - finite being [that he is] ~ has not chosen b u t
where o u t of necessity he is called t o dwell. 3 4
T h e p r o f u n d i t y of this perspective no one will deny, and it is
quite possible t h a t on this level we have reached in There-being
a point of i n t i m a c y between Being and man t h a t precedes all
distinction

between

singular

and

plural.

Yet

is

there

not

s o m e t h i n g more to be said ? H o w precisely are we to understand
M
WM, p. 14 (Wesensbereich, Stelle, Ortschaft der Wahrheit des Seins . . . worin
der Mensch steht); WW, p. 27 (eingehen kann).
S 4 " . . . Corrglativement, ce lieu cach6 oü l'essence de Thomme et l'essence de la
v£rit£, toutes deux essentielles Tune ä l'autre, se rencontrent pour se 'd^finir' mutellement, nous l'appelons Da-Sein - en d^signant par lä ce lieu fini de l'fetre que I'homme
- fttre fini - n'a pas choisi mais oü il est appel6 ä demeurer ngcessairement." (H.
Birault, "Existence et v 6 r i t 6 . . p p . 37-38). Biiault's italics.
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the role of the individual in the process, and his relation to other
individuals? A f t e r all, unless the Being-process (in There-being)
emerges on the ontic level, it does not t a k e place at all. H a v e we
not the right to ask, then, which " m a n , " ontically speaking, is
to bring foundational thinking t o pass?
The same question m a y be posed in terms of time and historicity. If the mittence of Being to There-being in

thought

constitutes an epoch of history, how are we to understand the
relationship between an individual thinker and the epoch in
which he lives, or between a thinker in one epoch (v.g. K a n t )
and a thinker in another (v.g. Heidegger)? More concretely: in
the epoch of absolute idealism, Hegel and Hölderlin were " c o n temporaries." Were there at this time two mittences of

Being

and therefore two epochs? If only one epoch, how understand
the relationship of both Hölderlin and Hegel to this v e r y same
epoch ? to one another ? Again, how understand the relationship
between T r a k l and his epoch? and the epoch of Hölderlin? I n
terms of Being-as-history, does T r a k l belong, strictly speaking,
to the epoch of Hölderlin? W h a t is meant more precisely b y
"epoch"?

What

is the relationship between

Being-as-history

and ontic " h i s t o r y , " sc. political, social, military and cultural
events? D o not these, too, belong to t h e history of B e i n g ?
It is doubtful that Heidegger would deny the legitimacy of
these questions; he probably would tell us that
least as far as Being's grace (Huld)

t h e y are, at

to him is concerned, merely

premature. His own effort has g o t t e n to the point of interrogating the sense of the mittence t o Hegel, Hölderlin, T r a k l , etc.,
and no farther. A l l else is still to be thought. Fair enough. T h e
function of our xptaiq is not to show Heidegger's lacunae b u t his
limits.

2. Thought and Language
Heidegger has rendered great service b y interrogating the relationship between thought and language. W e can see clearly
the affinity between thinker and poet born of the fact t h a t both
dwell in a common near-ness to B e i n g (A6yoq).

T h e problem,

then, is how to differentiate them. T h e author gives us several
hints, none of them wholly satisfying.
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might

be

this:

Through

both

poet

and

thinker Being comes into words b y reason of a response
Being's hail which has the structure of re-collection:

to

Being

comes (future) as having-been-already in what is (past), and is
rendered manifest in words (present). W h a t would distinguish
poetry from thought would be the nature of the past. I n poetry
the past would be principally the things through which the poet
experiences Being (the World, the Holy), and to which the poet,
in response to Being's hail, gives a name. For the poet, then, it
would be this original nam-ing that holds the p r i m a c y . 3 5

In

thought, on the other hand, the past would be B e i n g as already
brought (in one w a y or another) into words, which must

be

retained in them b y a constantly renewed re-trieve. For the
thinker, it is re-trieve that holds the primacy. A c c o r d i n g to such
an interpretation, the thinker would play a role in the e-vent of
language analogous to the conserver's in the work of art. 3 6
Again, perhaps we could conceive of the hermeneutic

re-

lationship in such a w a y as to see in it two different directions:
from aboriginal Utterance (Aoyoc;) to articulation ( V e r l a u t b a r u n g )
and from articulation to Utterance. The first would b e the direction proper to the poet

(v.g. " N o thing is where

faileth

word"). 3 7 The second would be the direction proper t o thought
(v.g. " A n 'is' appears where word dissolves"), 38 sc. t h e thinker,
b y re-trieving the authentic sense of words, would let

Being

(Aoyos) shine forth. B u t such an explanation does n o t explain
w h y poetry is fundamentally a thinking, 3 9 nor h o w

thought

differs from poetry when the thinker for his part, too, brings
Being into words.
Once more for good measure! In W M : E p , we are told that
" . . . the thinker utters Being. The Poet names the H o l y . . . . "
B u t how distinguish Being and the H o l y ?

HB

told us

40

that

" B e i n g as the mittence which e-mits truth . . . announces itself

US, pp. 21-22.
Cf. HW, p. 54 and HD, pp. 29-30, 140.
37 "Kein ding sei wo das wort gebricht." (Stefan George, "Das Wort," cited US,
p. 162-163). See "Das Wesen der Sprache," (US, pp. 159-216) and "Das Wort,"
(US, pp. 219-238).
38 "Ein 'ist' ergibt sich, wo das Wort zerbricht." (US, p. 216).
3 * WM, p. 51.
40 " . . . Der Denker sagt das Sein. Der Dichter nennt das Heilige
" (WM, p. 51).
36
3e
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in poetry, without being manifest already as the history of
Being. . . . "

Is it possible to understand the Holy as Being

41

considered as revealment whose concomitant concealment is not
experienced as

concealment ?

It would be this to which the poet

gives a name. In thought, on the other hand, Being would be
experienced as the process of a-X^eia, sc. revealment and
cealment, and brought to expression

con-

as such.

Or is all this too complicated ? Could we find a more original
simplicity if we reduced all three explanations to this: in poetry,
B e i n g is uttered - but not as Being; in thought Being is uttered
as such?

Fine, but is the formula not still a bit too formal? A t

least, we are under w a y .

3. Thought and Re-trieve
Heidegger

has

always

emphasized

the

finitude

of

every

mittence of Being and seems ready to concede the finitude of
even his own efforts at thought. T o catalogue the textual indices
of such an attitude would be easy, indeed, but for reasons of
b r e v i t y we limit ourselves to the perspectives we have been considering heretofore. Witness the author's abiding effort continually to re-trieve his own un-said, the dissatisfaction with his
own formulae, the relentless effort at a "spiral"-interrogation.
G i v e n this finitude of Heidegger's own efforts, we are moved to
pose two questions. In the first place, is it not possible to retrieve this un-said differently than Heidegger himself has done?
" . . . For everything that foundational thinking has genuinely
thought retains - and, indeed, b y reason of the very essence [of
the process] - a plurality of meanings. . . . "

42

More concretely,

let us ask: does Heidegger II have any more right to re-trieve
the un-said of Heidegger I than, let us say, Jean Paul Sartre?
Again, if every thinker is in dialogue with his predecessors,
b u t still more, perhaps, with posterity, 4 3 is it not possible that
another thinker m a y re-trieve even Heidegger I I and bring

his

4 1 "Das Sein als das Geschick, das Wahrheit schickt, bleibt verborgen. Aber das
Weltgeschick kündigt sich in der Dichtung an, ohne daß es schon als Geschichte des
Seins offenbar wird
" (HB, p. 86).
42 " . . . Denn alles wahrhaft Gedachte eines wesentlichen Denkens bleibt - und
zwar aus Wesensgründen - m e h r d e u t i g . . ( W D , p. 68).
43 US, p. 123 (Nachkommen).
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un-said into language? If this is the case, is it not premature
to speak of an "eschatology" of Being and a "new dawn" of
World-history that would have arrived with Heidegger,44 as if
the mittence that has been bestowed upon him were, at last,
definitive ?

4. Being-as-Event
What are we to understand by the "e-vent" (Ereignis) out of
which the ontological difference "issues" (Austrug) ? As early as
1944, in the essay, "Aoyoc," Heidegger suggests that there is
some ' 'middle-point'' between Being and There-being that
somehow gives rise to both. In WD (1952), this "middle-point"
is spoken of as a "third" thing that for elvat and voetv would be
a "first" thing, sc. "prior" to both. In ID (1957), it is understood
as an origin that lies deeper than Being and man, and permits
them to belong to each other, an ultimate Simplicity that is
called a singulare tantumA5 This absolutely Ultimate (Thing) is
what is called the "e-vent" of truth.
Now if we restrict our attention to these texts, we are inclined
to infer that the author, in meditating the ontological difference
as such, is groping beyond it into the ultimate Unity (sc. the
"differentiating") out of which the duality of Being-beings (sc.
the "differentiated") derives. We find this same probing into
original unity when the author speaks of AY)$T) as an inexhaustible wealth, by reason of which the ww-said in any given expression is not absolutely nothing but merely an un-said:
. . . The un-spoken is not only that which lacks articulation but
[something] unuttered, which has not yet been shown, which has not yet
reached [the condition of] shining-forth. What must remain unspoken is
withheld in the un-uttered, whiles in concealment as unable to be shownforth, is mystery. . . . 4 6 •
44 HW, p. 302 (Eschatologie des Seins); "Hölderlins Himmel und Erde" (Hölderlin
Jahrbuch [Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck), i960], pp. 17-39 [hereafter: HE]), p. 36 (Morgen
des Weltgeschickes). The latter is a lecture delivered in Freiburg, November, 1959.
46 VA, p. 225 (Mitte); WD, p. 147 (ein drittes); ID, pp. 3 1 (Zusammenge hören lassen), 29 (Einfache, singulare tantum).
4« " . . . Das Ungesprochene ist nicht nur das, was einer Verlautbarung entbehrt,
sondern das Ungesagte, noch nicht Gezeigte, noch nicht ins Erscheinen Gelangte.
Was gar ungesprochen bleiben muß, wird im Ungesagten zurückgehalten, verweilt
als Unzeigbares im Verborgenen, ist Geheimnis. . . . " (US, p. 253). Writer's italics.
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In other words, it is a "something" which we can only imagine
as an original Unity.
So far, so good. But another series of texts leads us to believe
that the e-vent is only Being itself, whose sense we have always
sought. In this case, the Being which "arises" out of the e-vent
is simply Being inasmuch as it e-mits itself in any given mittence.
B y e-vent, then, Heidegger would simply mean Being as such,
insofar as it is the process through which the (ontological) difference breaks out. 4 7 Considered in these terms, e-vent designates nothing more than the process of a-X^&sta b y which Being
e-mits itself to man - in other words, it is another formula for
"mittence," whose only advantage would be that it suggests the
(ontological) difference as such. " . . .

T h a t which brings about

the e-vent is the e-vent itself, and nothing else besides. . . . "

48

If this is the sense of " e - v e n t , " however, in what sense is it a
singulare

tantum ? Does

singulare

tantum

mean

mittence-as-

such, insofar as it perdures through the entire history of Being ?
How are we to understand the following t e x t :
. . . Perhaps, indeed, through this analysis of the difference between
Being and beings something perduring appears . . . which passes through
the mittence of Being from the beginning t o its consummation. B u t it
remains difficult to say how this perdurance is to be thought, when it is
neither a generality t h a t is valid for all cases, nor a law which the necessity of a process in the sense of a dialectic certifies. 4 9
B u t must we not at least t r y to think i t ? A n d does the disjunction

between

"abstract

generality"

and

"dialectical

ne-

cessity" exhaust all possible explanations? If every mittence is
the identity (correlation) of Being and thought, is it not possible
that there be an identity of these identities that would supply
a unity to history? If not, then w h a t sense does it make to speak
of a "consummation" of Being-as-history ? If so, what is the
nature of this unity ?
ID, p. 63; SF, p. 29.
" . . . Das Ereignende ist das Ereignis selbst - und nichts außerdem. . .." (US,
p. 258).
49 " . . . Vielleicht kommt sogar durch diese Erörterung der Differenz von Sein und
Seiendem in den Austrag als den Vorort ihres Wesens etwas Durchgängiges zum
Vorschein, was das Geschick des Seins vom Anfang bis in seine Vollendung durchgeht.
Doch bleibt es schwierig zu sagen, wie diese Durchgängigkeit zu denken sei, wenn sie
weder ein Allgemeines ist, das für alle Fälle gilt, noch ein Gesetz, das die Notwendigkeit eines Prozesses im Sinne des Dialektischen sicherstellt." (ID, pp. 65-66).
47

48
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5. The Finitude of Being
F r o m the very beginning of the way, Heidegger has emphasized the negativity of 'A-X^eia, sc. the finitude of the phenomenon with which he is dealing. Being for him is the process
b y which finite beings emerge from concealment -

this and

nothing more. If we restricted ourselves to the perspective of
Heidegger I, we would have to say that Being "itself" is necessarily finite. For Heidegger II, however, must we not leave the
question open ? The most that we can say, it would seem, is t h a t
the mittences of Being are necessarily finite. A s for Being " i t self," the Ay)#T) that is mystery, what is to be said of it now? I t
is Wealth, Treasure, a hidden Fullness. It is inexhaustible Wellspring - ineffable! - the Simple, the All, the Only, the One. 5 0
B e y o n d this, we dare not say anything about Being "itself" at all ;
we must simply leave it without name.
A n d the thinker, too, - what of him? Is he condemned to ineluctable finitude? Is it not the task of foundational thought t o
put even this to question ? Is it possible that certain phenomena,
albeit

finite in themselves, nevertheless point beyond

selves -

them-

perhaps even beyond finitude? Suppose we take, for

example, the very phenomenon with which we have been dealing,
the dynamism which keeps Heidegger under w a y . Is it possible
that the v e r y restlessness of his interrogation, the dissatisfaction
with his own formulae, the dogged fidelity to "endless" dialogue, 5 1 the eager attentiveness to a noiseless voice - m a y not
all this be a phenomenon for itself

which perhaps m a y point be-

y o n d limit? Or, at least, m a y it not be itself an un-said t h a t
some other thinker can - and should - re-trieve? W h a t is the
living center of Ur-Heidegger ? Is it the Great Origin that comes
out of his past ? 5 2 Is the step-in-reverse a w a y of return ? Is his
a d - v e n t a coming-home ?
80 The following texts should be taken as an ensemble: VA, pp. 70 (Reichtum,
Schätze, Unerschöpfliche des Fragwürdigen), 220-221 ('A-Arj&eia ruht inArj^rj);
SG, pp. 107 (Schätze, unerschöpflichen Brunnen), 171 (verborgene Schätze des
Gewesenen), 184 (verborgene Fülle), 188 (Alles, Eine, Einzige); P, p. 156 (das
Verborgene des Unerschöpften); G, p. 70 (etwas Unsagbares); US, pp. 103 (Reichtum),
197 (verborgene Reichtum der Sprache); HW, p. 325 (Wesensreichtum des Seins).
FW, p. 4 (das Einfache).
5 1 See VA, p. 256 (das Endlose).
52 Cf. HE, pp. 31-37, passim (der große Anfang); FW, p. 4 (das Einfache); "Abendgang auf der Reichenau" (großen Einfalt).
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B u t these are questions, questions, questions. Are there no
answers t o be had? W h a t must we do to find them? " W e must
do nothing . . . but w a i t ! "

53

Night has fallen again on Reichenau - the Light has gone out
of the West. For those who watch with Heidegger, there is nothing
to do but wait - and hope - for the grace of a better dawn.

as "Wir sollen nichts tun sondern warten," (G, p. 37).

EPILOGUE

This essay was written to commemorate the death of Martin
Heidegger in 1976. It appeared under the title, "Martin Heidegger: In Memoriam" in Man and World 10 (1977), 6-12. Its
theme is taken from Martin Heidegger, " T h e Pathway," trans.
T . F. O'Meara, O.P., Listening, 2 (1967), 88-91.
At the weary age of 86, the old man went back home in death.
"Home is where one starts from" (T.S. Eliot), and home for
Martin Heidegger was Messkirch, a little Schwabian village
near the Swiss border, where he was born. In a sense, he never
left it. T h e short, squat figure, the rotund, mustached, somber
face, the heavy hands, the rusty voice, the long, slow, stride—
all belonged more to the peasant lumbering toward his morning
chores than the university professor striding to the podium to
address an audience as wide as the world. (His "Collected
Works," already partially translated into more than 50 languages, will be published in 57 volumes.) In the early years, he
sometimes even affected peasant dress in the classroom. At any
rate, he seemed much more at home with simple folk of Messkirch than with his academic peers. Only his eyes—piercing,
probing, relentlessly unsatisfied eyes—betrayed the depth,
restlessness and rigor of the tireless quest to articulate what the
peasant in him experienced as the simple nearness of home.
T h e full circle of that quest finds a kind of self-expression in
a little-known essay with which he once commemorated (1949)
the death of the Messkirch composer, Conradin Kreutzer. It is
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a brief pastoral meditation of the mature thinker as he treads
again a path back home that he first came to know as a boy.
T h e pathway leads from the courtyard gate over to Ehnricd and
back. Through meadow, hills, woods, and moor it comes at last
to the castle wall. Behind the castle itself rises St. Martin's
Church with its ancient bell "on whose ropes boys' hands have
been rubbed hot." Then along the castle wall the pathway continues until it reaches again the courtyard gate to end where it
began. " T h e end is where we start from" (T.S. Eliot).
T h e pathway guards rich memories for the thinker, "the
early games and first choices." In the woods he used to fashion
toy boats out of the bark of the trees that his father felled and
send them on make-bclicvc journeys long before he knew what
it was like to embark on a journey that would leave all familiar
shores behind. T h e n there was the ancicnt oak sheltering a
rough-hewn bench, where, as a university student, he would
read the great thinkers of the past until, wearied by their complexities, he would put them aside to find comfort in the pathway itself that spoke to him only o f . . . well, "the Simple." It
was the Simple that never ceased to captivate him—the primal
Source, the silent Origin out of which all things emerge into
light and announce themselves as what they arc. What is its
meaning? How give it a proper name?
To be sure, the first thing that he knew to call it was "Being,"
but that was at the beginning of his way. He himself oncc described the initial experience. At the age of 18 (in his last year
at the Gymnasium in Constance), a priest-friend had given him
a copy of Franz Brcntano's doctoral dissertation, On the Manifold
Sense of Being in Aristotle (1862). "On the title page of this work,
Brentano quotes Aristotle's phrase: to on legetaipollachös. I translate: 'A being [Seiendes : what-is] bccomes manifest (i.e., with
regard to its Being) in many ways.' Latent in this phrase is the
question that determines the way of my thought: what is the pervasive, simple, unified determination of Being that permits all
of its multiple meanings? . . . How can they be brought into
comprehensible accord? This accord cannot be grasped without
first raising and settling the question: whence docs Being as
such (not merely beings as beings) receive its determination?"
This much set him on his way, and even though he tired of the
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term " B e i n g " ("that long traditional, highly ambiguous, now
worn-out word"), the question itself would pursue him to the
end.
T h e details of the early steps of the journey seem less important at the moment: the essential role of man's existence (Dasein) in the experience of Being (for only man can say "is"); the
value of phenomenology as a method of exploring it (for phenomenology lets beings reveal themselves as what they "are,"
i.e., in their Being); the role of time in the process (for beings
"are" inasmuch as they comc-to-prcscncc, hcncc comport pastfuture-present, the dimensions of time); the essential finitude
of the experience (man's existence itself, as open to Being, is
circumscribed from the beginning by limit, the absolute limit
of human existence being "death"), etc. How all of this crystallized into the major opus, Being and Time (1927) is for philosophers to explain. What matters now is only the fact that
Heidegger's own complexities developed out of an attempt to
articulate the Simple, i.e., the simple experience of Being, with
which alone he felt at home.
To be sure, the task itself was not simple. If it began with a
phcnomcnological analysis of man's existence in its finitude (as
Being-unto-dcath), it had to move to a confrontation with philosophy, i.e., with "ontology," or metaphysics as he understood
it (from Plato to Nietzsche) in the philosophical tradition of the
West. Metaphysics for him deals with beings (what-is) and
therefore rests upon—but docs not explore—the mystery of
Being that is their ground. His search for the meaning of Being,
then, was both an undermining (in that sense a "destruction")
of Metaphysics and a founding of it on its essential ground. It
demanded, therefore, a type of thinking that was far more fundamental, i.e., "foundational," than metaphysics, thus understood, could achieve.
T h e task involved, too, a critique of contemporary eulture,
which he saw to be oblivious of Being. He described the modern era as the epoch of "technicity" (die Technik). By this he
meant more than "technology." Rather, technicity for him designated the manner in which Being manifests itself in the present epoch of history in such fashion that man experiences the
beings with which he deals (including himself) as objects that
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can be submitted to his control. It is as a consequence of this
experience that "technology" becomes possible. But by the
same token, Being itself (as revealing and concealing itself in
this experience) is all the more easily overlooked, so that man
remains oblivious of his essential at-homeness with Being (the
Simple). That is why contemporary man finds himself so uprooted and home-less ("alienated") in the world of objects, despite his technological achievements.
Then there was another kind of complication in his life: the
ill-starred association with German politics in 1933, for which
many of his critics never forgave him. Allegations are many,
facts are fewer—nor is this the place to review them. What is
clear is that Heidegger became Rector of the University of Freiburg in May, 1933, shortly after the Nazis came to power, and
resigned his rectorate prematurely the following February because of a conflict with the government over administrative (not
ideological) matters. Less well known is the fact that he accepted the position chiefly at the importunity of his University
colleagues who hoped that his prestige would enable them to
resist the invasion of the University by Nazi ideology. A secondary reason was the personal hope that he would have an opportunity to reorganize the faculties according to principles that
were suggested in his inaugural lecture, "What is Metaphysics?" (1929), and grounded in his conception of the unity of the
sciences as founded in the experience of Being. That there
were "compromises" along the way there is no doubt, but there
is no doubt, either, that after his resignation he was regarded
with suspicion by the Nazis, and that the many courses on
Nietzsche that followed constituted a subtle, but genuine, confrontation with Nazi ideology.
But these were all complexities—what mattered was the
Simple (i.e., Being). He queried the early Greeks and found
them speaking of Physis, Logos, A-letheia, and each of these
terms he meditated in turn. In a special way, A-letheia intrigued
him—"truth," yes, but in the sense of "non-concealment,"
hence "liberation" from darkness and in that sense "freedom"
in its origins. Then there was Logos, the original "gathered-togetherness," i.e., cohesion, of beings that found its correlative
response in the logos, i.e. language of man. This meditation on
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the nature of language became a means of access to the eminently Question-able, i.e., Being-as-Logos, the Simple. Hence
his fascination with poetry. Soon the correspondence of man
with the Simple in the form of thought was paralleled by the
correspondence of man with Being-as-Lögw, i.e., aboriginal
Language, in the form of "poetizing" (Dichten). For Heidegger,
then, thinking and poetizing—not technical achievement—became the "standard measure" of genuinely human activity.
T h e lonely searchcr found one fellow traveler along the way,
the poet Friedrich Hölderlin. Hölderlin was not just one poet
among the rest who exemplified a ccrtain theory of poetry, but
the "poet of the poet" who articulated in lyric language the
whole process of poetizing. In the poems "Homecoming" and
"Re-collection" in particular, Hölderlin articulates an experience that paralleled Heidegger's own. T h e y describe the process by which the poet learns to poetize. In his youth, the poet
grows up in familiar surroundings at home. Intrigued by the beings about him and yearning for deeper communion with them,
he nonetheless fails to realize that the source of nearness to
them is Being itself as their Source—Source that is known only
through the beings that spring from it, while it, itself, withdraws
within them. Fascinated by beings, yet still unaware that it is
their Source that he longs to experience more profoundly, the
poet remains ill-at-ease and unsatisfied. Finally, he is led to
leave home and seek the "heavenly fire" (i.e., Being as such)
of the Southland. But there he is almost burnt up by its rays
and soon learns that he is not meant for sheer exposure to the
blazing fire of Being but must return to the shade of the homeland, where beings (by their finitude) temper its heat. Having
returned home from his journey ("Homecoming"), he can then
re-tricve ("Re-collection") his experience of the heavenly fire
as filtered now through the beings around him. Thus he becomes "at home" at home in nearness to the Source. His poetic
task is to bring this whole experience into words through authentic poetizing.
Like Hölderlin thus interpreted, Heidegger announced to
contemporary man as victim of technicity the need to become
"at home" at home near his Source, i.e., Being. At the same
time, he insisted that this new awareness is not something that
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man can arrive at through his own resources. Particularly in the
present state of man's dereliction, only a new revelation of
Being can " s a v e " man. In an interview given in 1966 to the
German news magazine Der Spiegel, Heidegger declared that
philosophy as such in its traditional sense was of no avail in
achieving this insight. On the contrary, "only a god can save
us. T h e only possibility available to us is that by thinking and
poetizing we prepare a readiness for the appearance of a god .. .
we cannot bring him forth by our thinking. At best we can
awaken a readiness to wait [for him]."
We must wait for a new revelation from a god, then, but what
kind of a god would this be? Not a personal being, it would
seem, in any sense that is given to the word " G o d " in Western
thought. In all probability, Heidegger was using the word in the
sense that it appears in the Hölderlin interpretations, i.e., as a
highly specified manifestation of Being as "the Holy."
To be sure, such language is easily misleading and raises the
whole thorny issue of the relationship between Heidegger's experience of Being and the God of the Judeo-Christian tradition
of the West. It cannot be resolved here. Let it suffice to recall
that Heidegger's beginnings were deeply rooted in that tradition. His father had been sexton of St. Martin's church behind
the castle, and when he wrote in " T h e Pathway," "slowly, almost hesitatingly, eleven strokes of the hour sound in the night.
T h e old bell . . . shakes under the blows of the hour's hammer
whose dark-droll face no one forgets," apparently there was recorded here something of an experience at home that he himself never forgot. T h e early steps in his search for the meaning
of Being took him first to the Roman Catholic seminary in Freiburg, then to a brief postulancy in the Society of Jesus, before
he returned to the University of Freiburg to commit himself
definitively to philosophy. When he finally began to teach at
Freiburg, his interest in religion did not wane—in 1920-21, for
example, he offered courses entitled "Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion" and "Augustine and Neo-Platonism."
When, how, and why his disaffection from ecclcsiastical Christianity began is, on the basis of presently available evidence, a
matter of speculation. In retrospect, however, it is understandable that a personal God in the traditional sense would become
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more and more problematic for him a he probed further the nature of Being as different from beings, even if one of these beings was thought of (e.g., in metaphysics) as "supreme." It is
understandable, too, how faith would seem alien to thought if,
indeed, "the unconditional nature of faith and the questioning
character of thought are two different spheres that are a chasm
apart."
Understandable, yes—but not entirely acceptable to all. Is
the God of the Judeo-Christian tradition no more than a being
like the rest—even though designated "supreme?" Surely to
identify him with the causa sut of German rationalism, as Heidegger seemed to do, is to undersell the efforts of an entire tradition of thought that presumed to speak of God only by
analogy and developed a whole "negative theology" as a result.
Again, if one takes the "questioning character" of thought to
mean (as he suggested) a "willing to know"—where "willing"
means authentic "resoluteness," and "to know" means "to be
able to stand forth in the truth," [i.e.,] "the manifestation of
beings"—then is such a thought really separated by an unabridgeable chasm from faith, if this be taken as a resolute
openness to self-manifesting Mystery—and "all in the waiting
(T.S. Eliot)"?
However his may be, Being, as Heidegger experienced it, is
not God as Heidegger understood him, and although he respected—and encouraged—the efforts of theologians who
found inspiration in his thought (e.g., Bultmann, Rahner, Macquarrie, et aL), he steadfastly refused to ally their efforts to his
own. For him, there was only the relentless going of the way,
i.e., the pathway whose message spoke only o f . . . the Simple.
" T h e pathway's message awakens a sense which loves freedom
and, at a propitious place, leaps over sadness into serenity . . .
This knowing serenity is a gate to the eternal. . . T h e message
makes us at home after a long origin here."
So now the bell of St. Martin's church has struck midnight,
and "with the last stroke the stillness has become yet more still
. . . T h e Simple has become simpler." By all accounts, Heidegger's end was serene. When he knew it was near, he asked one
of his former students, Bernard Welte, priest of the Archdiocese

650

KPILOCU:K

of Freiburg, to preach a short sermon at his burial.* What text
of scripture that he would like to serve as a theme? "Ask and
you will receive, seek and you will find, knock and the door
will be opened to you" (Luke 11:9). Was it, then, an end or a
beginning? What we know for certain is only that it was a return
to where he started from, after the long origin here. Those who
admired his genius, who learned much from his efforts and honored him for his fidelity to his quest—for his own indefatigable
readiness to wait—can only respect the silence of that moment.
But they can hope . . . that "the inexhaustible power of the
Simple" (Aletheia, the Logos) finally rendered up its proper
name to him, so as to "surprise" him—and "free" him—in the
end. May his knowing serenity indeed prove a gate to the
eternal!

* B. Welte, "Seeking and Finding. T h e Speech at Heidegger's Burial" in Heidegger
the Man and the Thinker, ed. and trans. T . Sheehan (Chicago: Precedent Publishing, Inc.,
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APPENDIX

COURSES, SEMINARS AND

LECTURES

OF
MARTIN

HEIDEGGER

VERZEICHNIS DER
UND

VORLESUNGEN

ÜBUNGEN

VON MARTIN

HEIDEGGER1

Freiburg
WS 1915-16

Vorlesung

Über Vorsokratiker: Parmenides.
Übungen
Über Kant, Prolegomena.
SS 1916
Vorlesung
Kant und die Deutsche Philosophie des 19. Jahrhunderts.
Seminar
Übungen über Texte aus den
logischen Schriften des Aristoteles (mit Krebs).
WS 1916-17
Vorlesung Wahrheit und Wirklichkeit:
Über Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre
von J794.
1917-19
Nicht gelesen, weil zum Frontdienst eingezogen.
SS 1919
Vorlesung
Phänomenologie und transzendentale Wertphilosophie.
Vorlesung
Über das Wesen der Universität und des akademischen Studiums.
WS 1919-20
Vorlesung
Ausgewählte Probleme der neueren Phänomenologie.
Vorlesung
Die philosophischen Grundlagen
der mittelalterlichen Mystik.
Seminar
Übungen im Anschluß an Natorp, Allgemeine Psychologie,
1 This list was composed f r o m the F r e i b u r g and M a r b u r g U n i v e r s i t y catalogues
and then submitted to Professor Heidegger for correction, w h i c h he k i n d l y made,
adding whatever comments that appear. Because o f its value as a n historical
document, we r e f r a i n f r o m editorial changes, as well as f r o m t r a n s l a t i o n . T h e text
appears here i n precisely that f o r m i n w h i c h it was returned to the w r i t e r by
Professor Heidegger. W S signifies " w i n t e r semester"; SS signifies " s u m m e r
semester."
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SS 1920

APPENDIX

Vorlesung
Seminar

WS 1920-21

Vorlesung
Seminar

SS 1921

Vorlesung
Seminar

WS 1921-22

Vorlesung
Seminar

SS 1922

Vorlesung

Seminar
WS 1922-23

Vorlesung

Seminar

SS 1923

Seminar
Vorlesung
Seminar

Seminar

Phänomenologie der Anschauung und des Ausdrucks.
Kolloquium im Anschluß an
die Vorlesung.
Einleitung in die Phänomenologie der Religion.
Anfänger: im Anschluß an Descartes, Meditationen.
Augustinus und der Neuplatonismus.
Anfänger: im Anschluß an Aristoteles, De anima.
Phänomenologische
Interpretationen (Aristoteles, Physik).
Anfänger: Phänomenologische
Übungen.
Phänomenologische
Interpretation ausgewählter Abhandlungen des Aristoteles zur Cytologie und Logik.
Anfänger: Aristoteles, Nikomachische Ethik.
Der Skeptizismus in der antiken
Philosophie. (Phän. Interpr. zu
Sextus Empiricus, Hypotyposeon, III).
Phänomenologische Übungen zu
Aristoteles, Physik, IV und V.
Anfänger: Husserl, Ideen I.
Ontologie.
Anfänger: Phänomenologische
Übungen (Husserls Logische
Untersuchungen, Bd. II).
Kolloquium über die theologischen Grundlagen von Kant,
Religion innerhalb der Grenzen
der bloßen Vernunft, nach ausgewählten Texten (mit Ebbinghaus).
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Marburg:
W S 1923-24

Vorlesung

SS

Übung
Vorlesung
Seminar

1924

W S 1924-25

Vorlesung
Seminar

1925

Vorlesung
Seminar

W S 1925-26

Vorlesung
Seminar

SS

Seminar

SS

1926

Vorlesung
Seminar

W S 1926-27

Vorlesung
Seminar

SS

1927

Vorlesung
Seminar

Der Beginn der neuzeitlichen
Philosophie (Descartes-Interpretation).
Im Anschluß an die Vorlesung.
Aristoteles, Rhetorik, II.
Fortgeschrittene: Die Hochscholastik und Aristoteles.
Interpretation
Platonischer
Dialoge (Socpurnjc;).
Übungen zur Ontologie des Mittelalters.
Geschichte des Zeitbegriffes.
Übungen über Descartes, Meditationen.
Logik.
Anfänger: Phänomenologische
Übungen (Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft).
Fortgeschrittene: Phänomenologische Übungen (Hegel, Logik, I).
Die Grundbegriffe der antiken
Philosophie.
Übungen über Geschichte und
historische Erkenntnis im Anschluß an J. B. Droysen, Grundriß der Historik.
Geschichte der Philosophie von
Thomas v. Aquin bis Kant.
Ausgewählte Probleme der Logik (Begriff und Begriffsbildung).
Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie.
Fortgeschrittene: Die Ontologie
des Aristoteles und Hegels
Logik.
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WS 1927-28
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Vorlesung

Seminar
Seminar

SS 1928

Vorlesung
Seminar

Phänomenologische
Interpretation von Kants Kritik der
reinen Vernunft.
Anfänger: Begriff und Begriffsbildung.
Fortgeschrittene:
Schelling,
Über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit.
Logik.
Phänomenologische Übungen:
Interpretation von Aristoteles,
Physik, II.

Freiburg:
WS 1928-29

Vorlesung
Seminar

Seminar

SS 1929

Vorlesung

Vorlesung
Seminar

Seminar

Einleitung in die Philosophie.
Phänomenologische
Übungen
für Anfänger: Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten.
Phänomenologische
Übungen
für Fortgeschrittene: Die ontologischen Grundsätze und das
Kategorienproblem.
Der Deutsche Idealismus (Fichte, Hegel, Schelling) und die
philosophische Problemlage der
Gegenwart.
Einführung in das akademische
Studium.
Anfänger:
Über
Idealismus
und Realismus im Anschluß an
die Hauptvorlesungen (Hegels
"Vorrede" zur Phänomenologie
des Geistes).
Fortgeschrittene: Vom Wesen
des Lebens mit besonderer Berücksichtigung von Aristoteles,
De anima, Deanimaliummotione
und De animalium incessu.
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WS 1929-30

Vorlesung
Seminar

SS 1930

Vorlesung

Seminar
WS 1930-31

Vorlesung
Seminar
Seminar

SS 1931

Vorlesung

Seminar
WS 1931-32

Vorlesung

Seminar
SS 1932

Vorlesung

Seminar
w s

I 93 2_ 33

SS 1933

Vorlesung

Seminar
Seminar
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Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik (der Weltbegriff).
Für mittlere und höhere Semester: Über Gewißheit und
Wahrheit im Anschluß an Descartes und Leibniz.
Einleitung in die Philosophie
(Über das Wesen der menschlichen
Freiheit).
Anfänger: Ausgewählte Kapitel
aus Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft.
Hegels
Phänomenologie des
Geistes.
Anfänger: Augustinus, Confessiones, XI (de tempore).
Fortgeschrittene: Piatons
IIapfJievL8Y)<; (mit Schadewaldt).
Interpretationen aus der antiken
Philosophie: Aristoteles, Metaphysik, IX (SuvafA^-Evepyetoc).
Anfänger: Kant, Über die Fortschritte der Metaphysik.
Vom Wesen der Wahrheit
(" Höhlengleichnis'' und Theätet, über ^euSo^).
Kant, Kritik der praktischen
Vernunft.
Der Anfang der abendländischen Philosophie: Anaximander und Parmenides.
Mittelstufe: Piaton, 4><xi8po<;.
Nicht gelesen.
Die Grundfrage der Philosophie
(Wesen der Wahrheit: "Höhlengleichnis").
Oberstufe: Der Satz vom Widerspruch.
Unterstufe: Der Begriff der
Wissenschaft.
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WS Mai 1933 - Februar 1934
Rektor der Universität Freiburg. (Rektorat
wegen Differenzen mit dem Kultusministerium niedergelegt).2
Vorlesung
Vom Wesen der Wahrheit.
Seminar
Oberstufe:
Fichtes
Wissenschaftslehre von 1794.
Seminar
Unter- und Mittelstufe: Leibniz,
Monadologie.
Seminar
Hauptstücke aus Kants Kritik
der reinen Vernunft.
WS 1934-35
Vorlesung
Hölderlins
Hymnen
("Der
Rhein" und "Germanien").
Seminar
Unterstufe: Hegel, "Über den
Staat" (mit E. Wolf).
Seminar
Oberstufe: Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes.
SS 1935
Vorlesung
Einführung in die Metaphysik.
Seminar
Oberstufe: Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes.
WS 1935-36
Vorlesung
Grundfragen der Metaphysik.
Kolloquium Die Überwindung der Ästhetik
in der Frage nach der Kunst
(mit Bauch).
Seminar
Mittelstufe: Leibnizens Weltbegriff und der Deutsche Idealismus.
Seminar
Oberstufe: Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes.
SS 1936
Vorlesung
Schelling, Über das Wesen der
menschlichen Freiheit.
Seminar
Oberstufe: Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft.
WS 1936-37
Vorlesung
Nietzsche, Der Wille zur Macht
(als Kunst).
Seminar
Unterstufe: Ausgewählte Stücke
aus Schillers philosophischen
Schriften über die Kunst.
2 Parenthesized c o m m e n t added by Professor Heidegger.
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SS 1937

WS 1937-38

Vorlesung

Nietzsches metaphysische
Grundstellung im abendländischen Denken: Die Lehre von
der ewigen Wiederkehr des
Gleichen.

Seminar

Arbeitskreis zur Ergänzung der
Vorlesung: Nietzsche, über Sein
und Schein.
Grundfragen der Philosophie:
Vom Wesen der Wahrheit
(d&Tj&eia und Trohqau;).
Arbeitskreis zur Erläuterung
der Vorlesung.
Arbeitsurlaub.
Einleitung in die Philosophie.
Unterstufe: Die philosophische
und wissenschaftliche Begriffsbildung.
Nietzsches Lehre vom Willen
zur Macht (als Erkenntnis).
Oberstufe: Vom Wesen der
Sprache.
Kunst und Technik.
Mittel- und Oberstufe: Hegels
Metaphysik der Geschichte.
Nietzsche, Der Wille zur Macht
(II: Der Europäische
Nihilismus).
Über die Oucru; bei Aristoteles.
Vom Wesen der Wahrheit.
Grundfragen der Philosophie.
Fortgeschrittene: Leibniz, Monadologie.
Die Metaphysik des Deutschen
Idealismus: Schelling, Philosophische Untersuchung über das
Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit.
Übungen über den Anfang der
abendländischen Philosophie.

Vorlesung

Seminar
SS 1938
WS 1938-39

SS 1939

Vorlesung
Seminar

Vorlesung
Seminar

WS 1939-40
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Vorlesung
Seminar

1. Trimester, 1940 Vorlesung

Seminar
3. Trimester, 1940
WS 1940-41
Vorlesung
Seminar
1. Trimester, 1941 Vorlesung

Seminar
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SS 1941

Vorlesung
Seminar

WS 1941-42

Vorlesung
Seminar
Seminar

SS 1942

Vorlesung
Seminar

WS 1942-43

Vorlesung
Seminar

SS 1943

Vorlesung
Seminar

WS 1943-44
SS 1944

Vorlesung
Seminar

WS 1944-45

Vorlesung

Seminar
r944-51

Grundbegriffe.
Anfänger: Kant, Prolegomena.
Fortgeschrittene: o. Angabe.
Nietzsches Metaphysik.
Anfänger: Schiller, Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen.
Fortgeschrittene: Piatons Siebenter Brief.
Hölderlins "Andenken."
Anfänger: Die Grundbegriffe
der Metaphysik Kants.
Fortgeschrittene: Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes
und
Aristoteles, Metaphysik IX, 10
und VI.
Parmenides.
Fortgeschrittene:
Fortsetzung
vom SS 1942.
Der Anfang des abendländischen Denkens (Heraklit).
Fortgeschrittene: Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistesy Abschn.
B: "Das Selbstbewußtsein."
Beurlaubt.
Logik. (Heraklits Lehre vom
A6yo$).
Fortgeschrittene: Aristoteles,
Metaphysik, IV.
Denken und Dichten. (Nach der
3. Stunde am achten November
abgebrochen, weil durch die
Parteileitung zum Volkssturm
eingezogen).3
Leibniz, Die 24 Thesen. (Nach
der 1. Stunde abgebrochen).4
(Seit den Maßnahmen der nationalsozialistischen Partei Novem-

3 Parenthesized comment added by Professor Heidegger.
* Parenthesized comment added by Professor Heidegger.
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SS 1951
WS 1951-52

SS 1952
WS 1955-56

WS 1956-57
SS 1957
WS 1957-58
WS 1966-67

Seminar
(priv.)
Vorlesung
Seminar
(priv.)
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ber 1944 bis 1951 keine Lehrtätigkeit mehr, da die Besatzungsmacht 1945 ein Lehrverbot aussprach).5
Übungen im Lesen: Aristoteles
Physik II, 1 und III, 1-3.
Was heißt Denken?
Übungen im Lesen: Aristoteles,
Metaphysik, IV und IX, 10.

Vorlesung
Vorlesung
Übungen

Was heißt Denken ? (Emeritiert)
Der Satz vom Grund.
Zu Hegels Logik: Die Logik des
Wesens.
Übungen
Zu Hegels Logik: Über den Anfang der Wissenschaft.
Grundsätze des Denkens, Vorträge im Studium Generale.
Das Wesen der Sprache, Vorträge im Studium
Generale.
Seminar
Heraklit (mit E. Fink).

5 Parenthesized c o m m e n t added by Professor Heidegger.
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"Phänomenologie und Theologie." *
"Die Idee der Phänomenologie."
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Vom Wesen des Grundes.
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1930
Vom Wesen der Wahrheit.
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Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität.
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"Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes," HW, pp. 7-68.
1935-1936 Die Frage nach dem Ding.1
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"Hölderlin und das Wesen der Dichtung," HD, pp.
31-45Schellings A bhandlung über das Wesen der menschlichen
Freiheit (1809).
x 936-I937 "Der Wille zur Macht als Kunst," N, I, pp. 11-254.
* Apparently, the order of composition and the order of publication up until
1927 correspond.
1 This lecture course, given at Freiburg, during the winter semester of 1935-1936
under the title "Grundfragen der Metaphysik/' was published i n September 1962,
after the main text of the present study had been printed. The writer regrets that i t
was technically impossible to treat i t thematically.
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• This excerpt f r o m the lecture course of the winter semester, 1937-1938» was
published after this book had been printed and therefore receives no treatment i n i t .
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"Die Kehre." 4
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"Motpoc," VA, pp. 231-256.
*953
"Wer ist Nietzsches Zarathustra?" VA, pp. 101-126.
"Georg Trakl," US, pp. 35-82.
"Wissenschaft und Besinnung," VA, pp. 45-70.
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from the final redaction of the foregoing study, which stops with WD (1952). In
November, 1962, however, this essay was published separately (Pfullingen, Neske),
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lecture that had been given first in December, 1949, in Bremen. Clearly, then, the
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• These pages appeared in a commemorative volume honoring V.E. von Gebsattel
(1958). The author offers no explicit indication as to their origin, but they may well
have been composed earlier.
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III. Selective Bibliography

Earlier general bibliographies have been replaced by the careful and comprehensive work of Hans-Martin Sass (see below). The
selective bibliography that follows is limited to certain works
that the writer found especially useful in the preparation of this
study. Since its original publication (1963), much secondary
literature of high quality has appeared that would deserve
mention in an updated bibliography of this sort if practical considerations made it feasible to extend a revision far beyond its
present length. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Hence, we
have left it, regretfully, in its original form, calling the reader's
attention to this limitation.
A.

GENERAL

Feick, Hildegard. Index zu Heideggers Sein und Zeit. Tübingen:
Niemeyer, 1961.
Useful instrument of research. Despite the title, the author extends
coverage to some of the later works, without pretending, however, to
completeness with regard to them.
Sass, Hans-Martin, Heidegger Bibliographie. Meisenheim am
Glan: Anton Hain, 1968.
A thorough compilation, carefully researched, that profits from, and
surpasses, all previous efforts of this kind. Needs periodic updating.
Spiegelberg, Herbert. The Phenomenologiccd Movement. An
Historical Introduction. The Hague: Nijhoff, i960.1, 355-357.
Fairly complete bibliography of English titles, including a valuable
list of Ph.D. theses.
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Langan, Thomas. The Meaning of Heidegger. A Critical Study
of an Existentialist Phenomenology. New York: Columbia,
I

959-

A skillful, benevolent, highly articulate exposition, dedicated to the
proposition that Heidegger is an existentialist from beginning to end a proposition that the present writer, for his part, finds completely
unacceptable.
Vycinas, Vincent. Earth and Gods. An Introduction to the
Philosophy of Martin Heidegger. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1961.
For the most part, a fine introduction with several excellent translations
of Heidegger's terminology. The extrapolation on the gods, however,
seems to go beyond present evidence, and with debatable results.
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FRENCH

Beaufret, Jean. "Heidegger et le probleme de la verite," Fontaine, L X I I I (1947), 146-174.
The addressee of the "Letter on Humanism" combines a profound
insight into Heidegger with an extraordinary gift of language, both
together making him beyond any question one of the most authoritative
interpreters of Heidegger in France.
Biemel, Walter. Le concept du monde chez Heidegger. Louvain:
Nauwelaerts, 1950.
A brief, lucid examination of the problem of the World in Heidegger I,
as seen from the distance of Heidegger II. All things considered, perhaps
the best propaedeutic to SZ among the secondary literature.
Birault, Henri. "Existence et v£rite d'aprfes Heidegger," Revue
de Metaphysique et de Morale, LVI (1950), 35-87.
A brilliant expos6 that .touches on all of the essentials, by one of contemporary France's most gifted philosophical minds. The article was
the first sketch of a projected book, whose theme was to have been
''La pens6e de l'Etre dans l'oeuvre de Heidegger." If this work had
appeared, the present study would never have been undertaken.
Chapelle, Albert. L'ontologie phenomenologique de Heidegger.
Paris-Bruxelles: Editions Universitaires, 1962.
An illuminating reappraisal of SZ. With rigorous fidelity to the data
supplied by the work itself, the author exploits the ontological implications of the phenomenological analyses. A reliable and suggestive
commentary—rugged reading, but rewarding.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

695

Dondeyne, Albert. "La difference ontologique chez M. Heidegger," Revue Philosophique de Louvain, L V I (1958), 35-62,
251-293.
This sympathetic study orchestrates the theme that the ontological
difference is the single point of reference in Heidegger's entire effort.
Not every Heideggerean of strict observance will be happy, perhaps,
with the author's formulae concerning Heidegger's relation to "la grande
tradition de la philosophia perennis," and some may insist that the
"reversal" between the earlier and the later period deserves more attention than it receives. Nonetheless this study renders exceptional service
in providing an historically astute, highly readable orientation in a difficult
problematic.
De Waelhens, Alphonse. La philosophie de Martin Heidegger.
Louvain: Institut Superieur de Philosophie, 1942.
Lucid, incisive and richly documented, this admirably articulate work
was the first major treatment to make Heidegger accessible to the nonGerman reading public. Writing in war-torn Europe, when personal
contact with the philosopher's developing thought in Freiburg was
excluded by the nature of things, the author was forced to limit his
examination for the most part to Heidegger I, and it is not impossible
that, if he were to undertake the same task today, when many of the
Freiburg lectures of that period have been made public, he would express
himself differently. That is why anyone consulting this book at the
present time should take into full account the author's own carefully
nuanced restatement of his views in 1955 ("Heidegger," in Les Philosophes CdUbres, ed. Maurice Merleau-Ponty [Paris: Mazenod, 1956],
pp. 336-343). Be this as it may, the present writer, coming to Heidegger
at a later day and from a different starting point, personally feels more
at home with this same author's penetrating study of the relation between
Husserl and Heidegger: Phänomenologie et vdritd. Essai sur Involution
de l'id6e de v£rit£ chez Husserl et Heidegger. Paris: Presses Universitaires
de France, 1953.
Levinas, Emmanuel. En decouvrant Vexistence avec Husserl et
Heidegger. Paris: Vrin, 1949.
Although the articles which constitute this book are now somewhat
dated, the treatment of SZ (1932) by this fine student of Husserl remains
even today remarkably judicious.

D.

GERMAN

Allemann, Beda. Hölderlin und Heidegger. 2nd ed. Zürich:
Atlantis, 1956.
A profound student of Hölderlin offers the most perceptive treatment
thus far of Heidegger's conception of poetry.
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This series of brief, readable essays, by a keen student of history, dates
from a 1949 tribute to Heidegger on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday.
It sought to counter-balance the prevailing anthropological-existentialist
interpretations of the early work by situating the philosopher's thought
in terms of philosophia perennis, so as to make possible an eventual
dialogue between the two. Reissued in 1958 without major revisions but
with the addition of several fruitful appendices, the book (partly by
reason of its own success) need no longer fulfill its original apologetic
function but retains its value as an illuminating orientation in the
philosophical situation of mid-century Western Europe. A succinct restatement of the author's fundamental conception may be found in his
41 Klassische und moderne Metaphysik oder Sein als Sinn," in Sinn und
Sein, ed. R. Wisser (Tübingen: Niemeyer, i960), pp. 311-332.

Ott, Heinrich. Denken und Sein. Der Weg Martin Heideggers
und der Weg der Theologie. Zollikon: Evangelischer Verlag,
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This examination of Heidegger's relevance for theology, made b y an
expert on Rudolf Bultmann and successor to Karl Barth at the University
of Bale, is marked by its perspicacity, erudition and general good sense.
Anglo-Saxons will be especially grateful for the author's reliable transposition of Heidegger's thought into non-Heideggerean, quite manageable
German. Unfortunately, lack of indexing limits the usefulness of an
admirable achievement that is suffused throughout by the luminous
tranquillity of the Spirit.

Pöggeler, Otto, Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers. Pfullingen:
Neske, 1963.
This easily intelligible, comprehensive, well-informed (especially with
regard to Heidegger's pre-SZ development) analysis by the author of a
celebrated article ("Sein als Ereignis/' Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, X I I I [1959], 597-632) is probably the best book-length study of
Heidegger in any language. What a pity it has no index I

Schulz, Walter. "Über den phüosophiegeschichtlichen Ort
Martin Heideggers,1' Philosophische Rundschau, I (1954),
65-93, 211-232.
An authority on Schelling situates Heidegger in terms of the German
Idealists, underlining those elements in Heidegger's thought which
suggest an affinity with the transcendental tradition. The author's
well-informed and provocative interpretation of the "reversal" differs
considerably from the present writer's and offers a knowledgeable
challenge to it.
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Siewerth, Gustav. Das Schicksal der Metaphysik von Thomas zu
Heidegger. Einsiedeln: Johannes, 1959.
This serious effort to engage the dialogue between Heidegger and St.
Thomas is included in the present bibliography, not because it will
satisfy all Heideggereans (any more than it will please all Thomists),
nor because its turbulent style is always clearer than what it attempts
to clarify. It deserves mention, one would think, because it is the most
ambitious attempt so far to let Heidegger's experience shed light on
another type of thought, and because it offers, besides, the edifying
spectacle of one of Europe's most powerful speculative minds exuberantly
engaged in his task.
Wiplinger, Fridolin. Wahrheit und Geschichtlichkeit. Eine UnterT
suchung über die Frage nach dem Wesen der Wahrheit im
Denken Martin Heideggers. Freiburg im Breisgau: Alber, 1961.
An extraordinarily vigorous re-thinking of the entire problematic. Not
all Heideggereans will take the author's last step as he attempts to go
beyond the master, but the seriousness and high integrity of this expose
command respect.

IV English Translations

This list includes all the English translations known to the
writer by August i , 1973.
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"The Thinker as Poet," tr. A. Hofstadter, in Poetry,
Language, Thought. New York: Harper and Row, 1971.
Pp. 1-14.
Introduction to Metaphysics, tr. Ralph Manheim. New
Haven: Yale, 1958.
What is a Thing?, tr. W . Barton, V. Deutsch. Chicago:
Regnery, 1967.
The Pathway, tr. Thomas F. O'Meara, O.P., in Listening, II
(1967), 88-91.
Discourse on Thinking, tr. J. Anderson, E. H. Freund. New
York: Harper and Row, 1966.
"Letter on Humanism," tr. E. Lohner, in Philosophy in the
Twentieth Century, ed. W. Barrett, H. Aiken. New York:
Random House, 1962. Pp. 270-302. Reprinted in The
Existentialist Tradition, ed. N. Langiulli. Garden City:
Doubleday, 1971. Pp. 204-245.
"Remembrance of the Poet," tr. Douglas Scott, in Existence
and Being, ed. Werner Brock.Chicago: Regnery, 1949. Pp.
251-290.
"Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry," tr. Douglas Scott,
in Existence and Being, ed. Werner Brock. Chicago:
Regnery, 1949. Pp. 291-315.
"The Age of the World View," tr. Marjorie Grene, Measure,
II (1951), 269-284.
"The Origin of a Work of Art," tr. A. Hofstadter, in
Philosophies of Art and Beauty. New York: Random House,
1965. Pp. 647-701. Reprinted in A. Hofstadter, Poetry,
Language, Thought. New Y o r k : Harper and Row, 1971. Pp.
17-87. This revised translation is from a revised edition of
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the original German text (Stuttgart: Reklam, i960) with a
1956 addition by Heidegger.
Hegel's Concept of Experience, tr. F. Wieck, J. G. Gray.
New York: Harper and Row, 1970.
"What Are Poets For?," tr. A. Hofstadter in Poetry
Language, Thought. New York: Harper and Row, 1971.
Pp. 91-142.
Essays in Metaphysics: Identity and Difference, tr. K. F.
Leidecker. New York: Philosophical Library, i960.
Identity and Difference, tr. J. Stambaugh. New York: Harper and Row, 1969.
"The Idea of Phenomenology," tr. J. N. Deeley, J.S. Novak, New Scholasticism, XLIV (1970), 325-344.
Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, tr. James Churchill.
Bloomington: University of Indiana, 1962.
"Plato's Doctrine of Truth," tr. J. Barlow, in Philosophy in
the Twentieth Century, ed. W. Barrett, H. Aiken. New York:
Random House, 1962. Vol. II Pp. 251-270.
Schellings Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom, tr. J.
Stambaugh. New York: Harper and Row. In preparation.
Time and Being, tr. J. Stambaugh. New York: Harper and
Row, 1972.
The Question of Being, tr. W. Kluback, J. T. Wilde. New
York: Twayne, 1959.
Being and Time, tr. John Macquarrie, Edward Robinson.
London: SCM, 1962.
"The Turning," tr. K. R. Maly, Research in Phenomenology,
I (1971), 3-16.
"Language," tr. A. Hofstadter in Poetry, Language, Thought
New York: Harper and Row, 1971. Pp. 189-210.
On the Way to Language, tr. P. Hertz, J. Stambaugh,
New York: Harper and Row, 1971.
"Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra ?" tr. B. Magnus, Review
of Metaphysics, X X (1967), 411-431.
"Building, Dwelling, Thinking," tr. A. Hofstadter in
Poetry, Language, Thought. New York: Harper and Row,
1971. Pp. 145-161.
"The Thing," tr. A. Hofstadter. Ibid., pp. 165-186.
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" . . . Poetically Man Dwells . . . " tr. A. Hofstadter, Ibid.,
pp. 213-229.
What is Called Thinking?, tr. F. Wieck, J. G. Gray. New
York: Harper and Row, 1968.
The Essence of Reasons, tr. T. Malik. Evanston: Northwestern University, 1969
"Introduction" to What is Metaphysics? tr. Walter Kaufmann, in Existentialism from Dostoiewski to Sartre. New
York: Meridian, 1957. Pp. 207-221.
What is Metaphysics? tr, R. F. C. Hull, Alan Crick, in
Existence and Being, ed. Werner Brock. Chicago: Regnery,
1949. Pp. 353-392.
What is Philosophy? tr. W. Kluback, J. T. Wüde. New York
Twayne, 1958.
On the Essence of Truth, tr. R. F. C. Hull, Alan Crick, in
Existence and Being, ed. Werner Brock. Chicago: Regnery,
1949. Pp. 317-351.

GLOSSARY

The writer's original intention in composing this glossary was to list only those
terms which are specifically Heideggerean, sc. which are not to be found in the
normal dictionaries (v.g. Dasein: There-being). As the work proceeded, however,
it seemed wise to extend its scope so as to include even normal translations, when
the term in question has a specifically Heideggerean sense and plays an important role in his problematic (v.g. Welt: World). It is hoped that thereby the
reader will always have at his disposal the means of finding his bearings quickly
in the strange nomenclature as he proceeds along the way, without the risk of
losing time and patience in the complexities of the General Index.
An important caution, however, is in order. It would be a grievous mistake
to consider this nomenclature from a purely philological point of view apart from
the analysis in which it is elaborated. In very few cases are the "translations"
here anything more than approximations, and often they suppose an important
ellipsis in the argument (v.g. Nennung: bringing-into-words). To comprehend the
full sense of these "translations/' then, the reader must reinsert them in the
context from which they have been taken. Only then can xplaiq be both serious
and fruitful.
Conventions: italics indicate pages where a term is used in representative
fashion, but without any further explanation of it; boldface characters indicate
that an explanation either of the word in question or of the concept it articulates
appears in the main text; roman characters indicate that such an explanation
appears in the footnotes.

ENGLISH-GERMAN

abandon self. Sickeinlassen, 602.
abide, Bleiben, 453.
able to know, be, Vermögen, 573.
abode, not true, Unheimlichkeit, 74.
absolve, -vence, -ution, Absolvieren,
-venz, -ution, 333.
accept, Vernehmen, Vornehmen, 269.
acceptance, Empfängnis, 508.
accomplishment, dynamic, Handlung,
Tun, 543.
account, giving an, Ausweisung, 182.
achieve, -ment, Vollziehen, ~zug, 36,
61.
actually, Tatsächlich, 62.
adapt themselves, Sich-fügen, 262.
address [noun], Zuspruch, 592.
address [verb], Ansprechen, 505.
advance, Vorlaufen, 83.
ad-vent, Kommen, 424.
ad-ventive, Zu-künftig, 421.
ad-vertence, Um-hehr, 352.
alien-to-home, Unheimisch(sein), 450.
ambiguity, Zweideutigkeit, yi.
ambivalence, Zwiefalt, IT; Zweideutigkeit, 13.
antecedent» Vorgängig, 61.

anticipatory drive-to wards-Being, Sichvorweg-sein, 74.
anti-essence, Gegenwesen, 22$.
anxiety, Angst, 72-73.
appeal, Anspruch, -sprechen, 477; Zuspruch, 559.
appearance, mere, Anschein, 264.
appear(ing), Erscheinen, 630; Schein,
263.
appearing, process of (Hegel), Erscheinende, das, 345.
apprehension. Ergreifen, 96.
ap-propriate, Vereignen, 486.
ap-propriated (to, by Being), Ge-eignet,

504•
appropriation, Aneignung, 447.
appurtenance, Zugehörigkeit, 280.
arrangement, Fug (6bcr\), 262.
arrangement, pattern of, Fuge, 486.
articulate-ness, Rede, 67.
articulative whole, Gefüge, 262.
articulative-ness, Artikulierbaret das,
67; Gefügef 249.
articula-tion, Sprache, 67.
articulation, Verlautbarung, 636.
aspect, Gesichtspunkt,
32g,
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assume, Übernehmen,
8g.
attend, Hören, 2 9 4 .
attend-ant, be, Gehören, 494.
at-tracting, Auf dem Zug, 5 9 8 .
at-traction, Anziehung,
3g2.
attune, Durchstimmen,
42 g.
attunement, Gestimmtheit,
21g;
Gestimmtsein, 6 5 ; Stimmung,
461.
authenticity, Eigentlichkeit,
50.
awe, Scheu, 2 7 0 , 6 0 8 .
awesome of beings, most,
Unheimlichste, das, 270.
B
bearing, give, Gebärden, 5 7 8 .
becoming-at-home,
Heimisch-werden,

45o.

beginning, Beginn, 2 5 7 .
Being (-process), Sein, 4, 6, 10.
Being-as-history, Seinsgeschichte,
437.
Being as such, Sein als solches, 33.
Being of World, Weltlichkeit,
52.
Being-question, Seinsfrage,
7.
Being-structure, Seinsverfassung,
6 J.
Being-un to-death, Sein zum Tode, 75.
Being-worthy-of-question, -asquestionable, Fragwürdige,
das, 258.
being [verb, adj.], Seiend, 10.
being [noun], Seiende, das, 4, 10.
being-as-across. Gegenüber, 4 2 0 .
being-as-it-seems-to-be, Schein, n o .
being-as-taking-its-origin,
Entstand,

111.
being-destined, Bewandtnis,
54.
being-ness, Seiendheit (ovoia),
4.
being ready-at-hand (instrument), Zuhandenes, 53.
being-that-appears,
Erscheinende,

no.

being-that-whiles, Je-Weilige,
das, 5 1 7 .
being-under-way, movement (Hegel),
Be-weg-ung, 344.
"beings" in unauthentic sense (Plato),
312.
beings-in-the-ensemble.
Seiende
im
Ganzen, das, zgy.
Beon, Seyn, 554.
bestow, -al, Schenken, 4x0.
bi-dimensionality, Zweideutige,
das,

347-

bring-forth, Hervorbringen,
583.
bringing-into-words, Nennung,
sog.
C
calculation, Rechnung,
372.
calculative thinking, Verrechnen,
47g,
captivation, Eingenommenheit,
165.
care, Achten, 603.
Center (Rilke) > Mitte,
3g2.

center of institution, Mitte,
bildende,
123.
certify, -fication, Sichern, -ung, -heit,
Versicherung,
371-373.
claim [noun], Anspruch,
438.
claim upon, make, Ansprechen,
538.
close-over. Verschließen,
g6.
collected-ness, Gesammeltheit,
262.
collect(ing), -tion, Sammeln,
Sammlung (Xoyo$), 282.
collect-or, Sammler,
283.
coming-of-Being-into-words, Wort werden des Seins,
2g5.
come-to-essence, W^sew, 228.
come-to-pass, Geschehen, 36-37.
come-to-presence, ^ s e w ,
Anwesen,

228.
coming-to-pass, Geschehnis,
283.
coming-to-presence, Anwesung, 3 0 7 .
coming-to-presence, negatived,
bwesung, 310; Un-wesen, 2g3.
commerce, Handeln,
com-mit seif, Sich schicken, 495.
com-mitment, Schicksal,
435;
Schickliche, das, 540.
com-patibility, Ruch,
51g.
components, existential,
Existenzialien
49comport(ment), (enter into), Verhalten,

fsicA -

JJ^.

compose, Herstellen,
567.
com-position, Her gestelltheit, 5 6 7 .
compositum, Herstand, 567.
comprehend (ing), -sion, Verstehen, 34.
comprehensibility, Verstehbarkeit,
85.
comprehensible, Verständlich,
107.
comprehension (of Being), fSßiwsJverständnis, 3 4 .
conceal, -ing, -ment, Verbergen, -bergung, -borgenes, -borgen heit, 221.
concentrate, Vernehmen (voeiv), 272.
concept, mere (Hegel), Begriff,
nur,

34z.

concept, (Self-) seizure (Hegel), Begriff, 341.
concern, Sorge, 4 0 .
concordance, Übereinstimmung,
94.
concur, [Entsprechen?]
(dfxoXoyeiv),

497-

conditioned by beings, Be-Dingt, 575«
conformity, Übereinstimmung,
213.
conserve (work), KcrwaArß«, 5^6.
conserving, -vation, Bewahrung,
408.
constancy, Erhaltung, Bestand, 366.
constancy, mere, Beständigkeit,
bloße,

518.

consummation, Vollendung,
contain (-ment, bring to),

(VOELV), 269.

381.
Vernehmen
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contention, Auseinandersetzung
(710Xefiog), 291; Urstreit, 268.
Contentious, the, Strittige, das, 533.
contra-pose, Herstellen, 3 9 4 .
correctness, Richtigkeit,
213.
correlation, Zusammengehören,
-igkeit,
12, 270.
correspond, [ Entsprechen?] (ofJtoXoyelv),
494-495.
counterpoise, Ausgleich, 447;
Auslösen,
414.
cover-up, Verdecken, 96.
creative effort, Schaffen, 407.
credentials, present [verb], Sich
ausweisen, 169.

D
dashed to pieces, be, Zerbrechen,
276.
de-cadence, Verderb, 275,
de-cision, Entscheidung,
284.
decom-pose by analysis, Zersetzen, 377.
deference, mutual, Rücksicht, 5 1 9 .
de-parture, Abschied, 394.
dependence, referential,
Angewiesenheit, 37.
de-ranging, Entsetzend,
427.
destined, let be, Bewendenlassen,
$7.
de-valuation, Entwertung,
dialogue, Gespräch, 2 9 5 .
difference, (ontological),
Differenz,
(ontologische),
12.
dif-ference, Unter-Schied, 579.
differentiate, -tion, Unterscheiden, -ung,

346, 437 •

differentiation, Scheidung, 282.
direction, Weisung, vüi.
dis-appearing, Abwesung,
313.
dis-arrangement, Un-Fug, 518.
disclose, Erschließen,
55.
disclosedness, Erschlossenheit,
58.
Discord, aboriginal, ^ useinanderSetzung (nöXejuog), 261; Urstreit,
406.
dis-cover, Ent-decken, 55.
discovering, (process of), Entdeckendsein, 94.
discoveredness, Entdecktheit, 94.
disintegration, ultimate,
Zerbrechen,
276.
dispose of at will, Widersetzen,
377.
disposition, (ontological),
Befindlichkeit, 64-65.
dissimulation, Verstellen, 405.
distress, JVof, 225.
domain, Spielraum,
J14.
domain where Being essences, Wesewsbereich, 634.
dominate, (Durch)walten,
221.
dominion-over-the-earth,
Erdherrschaft, 372.

dovetailing, Einfügung,
262.
drawn-ness, (relation of), Bezug, 5 9 9 .
draw-with, Mitziehen,
598.
drive-toward-Being, Seinkonnenf
39.
duality. Zwiefache, das, 23.
dwell, Wohnen, 584.

£

efficacious, Tauglich, 3 0 4 .
ek-sistence, Ek-sistenz,
217.
emerge, Aufgehen,
265.
e-mit, StcA schicken, 435.
entity, (mere), Vorhandenes, 53.
errance, Irre, 2 2 4 .
error, Irrtum, 224.
essence [noun], Grund,
213.
essence [noun and verb], Wesen, 228.
essential. Wesentlich,
425.
establish itself, StcA richten, 413.
es-tranged, Nicht heimisch,
275.
everydayness, Alltäglichkeit,
48.
e-valuate, -tion, Schätzen,
369.
e-vent, Ereignis, 614.
e-voke, Heißen, 596.
existence, Existenz, 35.
existential,Existenzial, 49.
existentiell, Existenziell,
49.
ex-pand, Vergegnen, 504.
Expanse, Gegnet, 502.
expansion, Vergegnis, 508.
ex-patriation, condition of,
Unheimische, das, 472.
expatriation, state of,
Unheimlichkeit,
Experience (Hegel), Erfahrung,
348.
experience, esthetic, Erlebnis, 416.
experience, living, Er-lebnis,
327.
exposä, Darstellung, 353~354ex-position, Ausgesetztsein,
256.
ex-posure, ^ussetewwg, 277.
expression, Aussage, 2x4,
eye on Being, ^wsscfeaw, 615.
eye, have eye for, Er-blicken,
613.
F
facticial, Faktisch,
178.
facticity, Faktizität, 64.
factually, Faktisch,
62.
fallen-ness. Verfallenheit,
37-38.
faraess, Ferne, 452.
fast, hold, Festhalten, 4717
Sichfestigen,

445-

fast, make, Erfestigen,
44$;
Festmachen,
471.
feast, marriage, Fes*,
finitude, Endlichkeit,
37.
first of all and for the most part,
nächst und zumeist, 48.
fissure,
5*o.
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force to bear, bring (-ing), Gewalt
brauchen, (Gewalttätig),
270.
forget (ting), Vergessen, 487.
forgottenness, Vergessenheit, 12-rj.
fortune, Schicksal, 91.
fortune, common, Geschick, g2.
found, Begründen, 167-168.
foundational, Wesentlich, 16.
"founding," " B e g r ü n d u n g J 6 J .
Free, the, Frae,
6x5.
freedom unto death, Freiheit
zum
Tode, So.
future, Zukunft, 86.
G
gathered-together coming-to-presence,
Gesammeltes Anwesen (Xoyog), 261-

262.

gathered-togetherness,
Gesammeltheit,
261.
gathering (-together), Sammlung (A6~
yog), 261.
gift, Schenkung,
413.
give over to be, Überantworten, 64.
Glad-some, the, Heitere, das, 444.
gladsomeness, Heiterkeit, 562.
going-from-presence, Abwesung,
312.
grace, HuW
477graciousness, Gunst, 477.
grant, Geben, sg8.
granted, (there) is, Es
grave, make, Erschweren, 28g.
ground, -ing-process, coming-to-pass
of, Gründen,
164.
ground, help, Ergründen,
460.
ground-question, Grundfrage, 7.
guide-question, Leitfrage, 7.
guilt, ScÄu/rf, 81.
H
hail [noun], Geheiß, 6x£.
hail [verb], Grüßen, 446.
hand(I)ing (-process), Brauch, 520.
having-been-ness, Gewesenheit, 143.
heart, Muf, 555.
heart imparted (to thought), Zumutung,
555heart of man, Gemüt, 600.
heed, (pay - to), Achten auf, 611.
hermeneutic, Hermeneutik,
47.
hidden-ness, Verborgenheit,
igg.
hide, Bergen, 436.
history, Geschichte, 21, 90.
history, primordial, Urgeschichte,
238.
history, scientific, Historie, 90.
historical, Geschichtlich, 90.
historicity, Geschichtlichkeit,
90.
hold self in re-serve, SicÄ sparen, 462.
holiness, Heiligkeit,
426.

Holy, the, Heilige, das, 426.
home, not at, Un-heimlich,
273.
homeless, (There-being as),
Un-zuhause, 81.
homelessness, Heimatlosigkeit,
38g.
house of Being, //aus <&s Seins, 528.
I
imagination, transcendental,
Einbildungskraft, transzendentale, 122-123.
immersed in, be, Sein-bei, 52.
im-parting, Schickung
(Molga),
5g8.
im-pose self, Sichdurchsetzen,
394.
impotence, Unmöglichkeit,
77.
inauthentic. Uneigentlich, 50.
in-being, In-Sein,
58.
in-cident, Zwischenfall,
266.
induction, Einbezug,
427.
initiative, taking, Anfänglich,
225.
innermost core, Innerste, das, 600.
in-sist, In-si stier en, 223.
in-stance, Innestehen, $11;
Inständigkeit, sog.
institution, Bildung, 123.
instrument, Zeug, 53.
instrument (ready-at-hand),
Zuhandenes, 55.
instrumentality, Zuhandenheit,
i$o.
instrumental-ness, Zeughaftigkeit,
53.
intelligible, Verständlich,
107.
interchange, mutual, Wechselbezug, 272.
inter-mittence, Geschichte, 435, 465.
interpretation, Auslegung,
47.
intimation,
428;
Zuspruch,
irruption, Einbruch,
43.
is granted, (there), Es
issue, Austrag, 579.

justice, Gerechtigkeit, 371.
justi-fication, Rechtfertigung,

A"AT.

371.

K
know (-ing), Wissen (rix?1!)•
271.
Knowing-ness, Science, Wiss$«scÄa//
(Hege/;, 354.
L
language, Sprache, 67.
language, bring into, ZW
Sprache
bringen, 4g8.
lay-claim, Stiften, 165-166.
laying free, Freilegung,
183.
laying foundation, Grundlegung,
3.
laying-out in full view, Auslegung,
47.
lead astray. Beirren, 224.
lead forth, Hervorbringen,
4x4.
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leap [verb], Springen, 42.
leap backwards [noun], Sprung
zurück,
612.
let-be, Seinlassen,
216.
let-be-seen, Sehenlassen, 46.
let-go-forth, Hervor gehenlassen,
414.
let-lie-forth-in-collectedness,
Beisatnmen-v or-liegen-las sen (Xeyeiv), 491492.
let stand opposed,
Gegenstehenlassen,

130.

liberation, Freigäbe, 57.
lighting-process, Lichtung, 6.
limit(ed), Ende, (endlich), 78.
listening, mere, Herumhören,
bloßes
Hören, 294.
listening to others, Hören auf, 68.
lodging, taking up, Behausung,
$43.
logos (as existential component), Rede,
66.
loquacity, Gerede. 71.
luminosity, Gelichtetheit, 59.
M
maintain free, Frei halten, 184.
maintaining upper hand over, Verbindung, 519.
make one's own, Übernehmen, 246.
manifestation, Offenbarkeit,
43.
matrix of relations,
Bezugszusammenhang, 56.
matrix of relationships, Verhältnis,
214.
matter-of-fact, Faktisch,
$3.
meaning, Bedeutung, 67.
Meaningfulness, (Total),
Bedeutsamkeit, 57.
measure (out), Durchmessen,
Vermessen, 5^9.
mesh, Gefüge, sich fügen, 603.
metaphysics, Metaphysik,
4-5.
meta-"physics," Meta-Physik,
5.
middle-point, Mitte, 501.
might, dominating, Macht, 256.
mine-ness, Jemeinigkeit,
45.
misapprehension, Vergreifen, 96.
mittence, Geschick, 435;
Geschickliche,
das, 493.
mood, Stimmung, 65.
mountain fastness, Gebirg, 5 7 4 .
moved-ness, Bewegtheit (xLvr\ai^ ), 310.
movement, being-under-way (Hegel),
Be-weg-ung, 344.
movement along the way, Be-wegung,
616.
mystery, Geheimnis,
N
name, (give), Nennen,
near-ness, Nähe, 6.

221.

292.

need, Not, 267.
needy. Dürftig,
391.
negate, Nichten,
541.
negation, logical, Verneinung,
Jpg.
negativing element, Nichtende,
das,

535negativity, Nichtigkeit,
76.
no-more-There-being,
Nicht-mehr-dasein, 76.
Non-being, Nichts, 38.
Non-being in its very essence, Nichten
des Nichts,
zgg.
non-concealment, Unverborgenheit, 9.
non-ground, Ab-grund,
172.
non-essence, Un-wesen,
172.
non-revealment, Un-entborgenheit,
221.
not at home, Un-heinUich,
273.
not present, Ungegenwärtig, 517.
not true abode, Unheimlichkeit,
74.
no-thing, Nichts,
ig6.
nothing, absolute, leeres Nichts, 573.

O

object (being-as-opposed),

Gegenstand,

IIO.

objectivate, Gegenstehenlassen,
112.
objectiveness, Gegenständlichkeit,
112-

H3-

objectivising,

323.

Ver-gegen-ständlichung,

obligation, Sollen, 260.
of itself (Hegel), An ihm selbst, 346.
one (vs. same), Selbe, das (vs. das
Gleiche), 588.
ontic, Ontisch, 8.
ontological, Ontologisch, 8.
onto-theo-logical, Onto-theo-logisch, 9-

10.
Open, the, Offene, das, 214.
open, that which is, Offenbare, das, 214.
open-character, Offenständigkeit,
215.
open-ness, Offenheit, 20; Offensein, 68.
op-posed, being-as-, Gegenstand, 420.
opposed-ness, area of, Dawider,
115.
organization, Fug (öbcr)), 262.
organized, that-which-is-, Gefüge, 263.
organizing, process of, Fügung, 262.
orientation, Zuwendung-zu,
114.
orientation, (self-), Sichbeziehen
auf,
108.
origin, Anfang, 257; Ursprung, 403.
original, Ursprünglich, 225.
originally, more, Ursprünglicher,
290.
originating, Anfänglich,
225.
originating event, Anfang,
410.
originating power, Anfängnis,
437.
origination, Stiftung,
410.
over-come (man), Uber (den Menschen)
kommen, 4x8.
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overcoming, Überwindung,
14.
Overpowering, the Überwältigende,
261.
over-reach, Über schwingen,

ENGLISH-GERMAN

das,

166.

P
past, thing of the, Vergangene, das, 581.
past
(what-is-as-having-been),
Gewesenheit, 8 7 .
past (what-was-and-is-no-more), Vergangenheit, 87.
pattern, purposeful,
Bewandtnisganzheit, $4.
pattern of references, Verweisungsganzheit, 54.
pattern of relationships, Gefüge, 425.
"people," Man, 71.
per-cepted, (man as), Angeschaute, der,
419.
permeate, Durchwalten,
271.
persecute, Nachstellen,
Verfolgen,
377.
place, take, Sicfc ereignen, 219.
poesy, Dichtung (im engeren
Sinne),
Poesie, 410.
poetizing, (process of), Dichten, 409.
poetizing, primordial, Urdichtung, 295.
poetry,
Dichtung
(im
wesentlichen
Sinne), 410.
polyvalence, (four-fold), Geviert, 5 7 0 .
pose, (posit), Setzen, 324.
potentiality, -ies, Möglichkeit,
-en, 3 9 ,

62.
pouring out, Geschenk, 570.
power, Vermögen, 600.
Power, emergent-abiding-,
Aufgehendes und verweilendes Walten (qrvaig),
17.
power, fundamental,
Grundvermögen,

114.

power-to-be, Möglichsein,
Seinkönnen,
62.
power-whicb-renders-efficacious,
Tauglichmachende,
das
(dyaß'ov),

304preoccupied with, be, Besorgen, 54.
pre-ontological, Vorontologiscfi, 343.
Presence, Anwesenheit,
147.
presence, that which comes-to-, Anwesende, das, 214.
presence [verb], Wesen, 228.
present, authentic [noun], Gegenwart,
87.
present [adj.], Gegenwärtig, 517.
present [verb], (render-), Vorstellen, 18.
present, render-, Präsentieren, 3 3 5 .
present-ation, Präsentation,
336.
presentation, Vorstellung, 108.
present-ative, Vorstellend, 18.
present-edness, Vor gestelltheit, 324.

present-ness, Präsenz, 325.
pre-thought, Vor-denken,
426.
pre-view [verb], Vorblicken,
141.
project, Entwerfen, -wurf, 60-61.
propensity, natural, Naturanlage,
pro-pose, Vorstellen, 18.
pro-posit, Sich-vorhalten,
120.

31.

Q
Quadrate, Geviert, 570.
Questionable, the eminently,
würdigste, das, 6/5.
questionable-ness, Fragwürdigkeit,

Frag416.

R
radiance, visible, Aussehen,
314.
reassurance, Sicherheit,
36g.
receive, Vernehmen (voeiv), 269.
re-collection, An-dacht, 602;
Andenken,
2 2 , 4 3 8 ; Erinnerung,
438; W i ^ y erinnerung, 49.
re-collective, Andenkend,
$74.
re-cord, Gedächtnis, Gedanc, 599-601.
reduce to control, Herabsetzen,
377.
referred to, essentially, Angewiesen,
37.
reference,
55.
references, pattern of,
Verweisungsganzheit, 54.
referential dependence.
Angewiesenheit, 37.
relation, Bezug,
relationship, Beziehung,
380.
release-unto [verb], Einlassen,
242.
release [noun], Gelassenheit,
504.
rendering-free, Freigabe,
186.
renege, Versagen, 405.
re-patriation, condition of,
Heimische,
repose, Ruhe, Beruhen, 4 9 8 .
represent, Repräsentieren,
335.
(re)presentation, Vorstellung, 1 0 8 .
rescendence, Reszendenz, 18.
re-serve, hold self in, Sich sparen, 462.
re-served, (Being-as-), Gesparte,
das,
446.
re-solve, Entschlossenheit,
83.
respond, -sponding, -sponse,
Entsprechen, -ung, 21.
retract, Nachholen,
189.
retreat, Ausbleiben,
510.
re-trieve, Wiederholung,
89.
re-valuation, Umwertung, 363.
revealed, Offenbar, 43.
reveal, -ment, -ing, Entbergen,
-ung,
218.
reversal, Kehre, 16.
re-view [verb], Rückblicken,
141.
right, render-, Recht-fertigen,
371.
rigor, Strenge 106.

709 g l o s s a r yeI n g l i s h - g e r m a n
S
said, what is (has been), Gesagte,

das,

159salvation, Rettung, 534.
salvation, way of, Heilsweg, 5 5 1 .
same (vs. one), Gleiche, das (vs. das
Selbe), 588.
sameness, Einerleiheit,
2jo.
Science,
(Knowing-ness)
(Hegel),
Wissenschaft, 354.
scission, -Schied, 579.
scission, (make), Scheidung, (-en), 284.
seeming-to-be, Schein, 263.
seen, let-be-, Sehenlassen, 46.
self, Selbst, 97.
selfhood, Selbsthcit,
181.
self-interpretation, Selbstauslegung, 47.
self-seizure, Sichbegreifen, 334.
(Self-)seizure, concept (Hegel), Begriff, 34* •
send on way, Bewegen, 616.
sens-ate, Sinnlich, 109.
sens-ating, Versinnlichung,
130.
sensate-ness, Sinnlichkeit,
109.
sense, Sinn, 85.
shelter, Unterkunft,
510.
shine-forth (Hegel), Erscheinen,
336.
shining-forth, Schein, 263.
show-forth, Zeigen, 496.
sign [noun], Zeigende, der, 463.
silence, keep, Schweigen, 68.
Source» ultimate, Ur-Sache, 304.
speech, /tafc, 292.
spring, Sprung, 6rr.
spring with eyes wide open, Blicksprung,
613.
steadfastness, Feste, das, 445.
step-in-reverse, Schritt-Zurück,
543.
strangest of beings, Unheimlichste,
das,
270.
strewing, Sfr^uung, 165.
subject-ism, Sübjektität, 1 7 .
subjectivity, Sub/eftfivitdl, 325.
subject-ness, Sübjektität, 325.
submergence, Untergehen, 5 1 5 .
succession of nows, Jetzt folge, 133.
surmise, Ahnung, 428.
surpassment, Steigerung, 366.
surrender, Sichloslassen,
200.
sway, hold, Walten, 223.
T
take stance within, Innestekcn,
536.
take under one's care,
In-Acht-nehmen,
603.
take-over, Übernehmen, 8g.
take-possession, Boden nehmen, 165166.
taking-measure, Maß-nahme, 590.

taking (a) place, Gestellung,
312.
technicity, Technik,
326.
temporality, Zeitlichkeit,
85.
temporalize, -ing, (Sich) zeitigen,
-ung,
88.
tend, Schonen, 584.
thanks, Dank, 480.
thanks-giving, Danken,
Gedanc, 601.
that being(s) is (are), Daß-sein,
316.
There, Da, 20.
There-being, Dasein, 34-35.
There-being-with-others,
Mitdasein,
68.
there is, Es gibt, 43.
think, -ing, Denken,
16.
thought, Denken, 16.
thought-ful, Denkend,
21.
Thought-worthy, the eminently, Bedenklichste, das, 5 9 7 .
throw-down, -out (There),
Werfen,
267.
throw-ing (of There), Wurf, 532.
throw-ness, Geworfenheit, 37.
thrust, Sichhineinhalten,
201.
tim-ing, Zeitigung,
145.
to-be, Zu-sein, 39.
to-be aware (Hegel), Bewußtsein,
347.
to-be-in-the-World,
In-der-Welt-Sein,
48.
to-have-seen, Wissen, 335.
totality of beings, Seiende im Ganzen,
das, 43.
Traction, Bezug, Zug, 392.
transcendence, Transzendenz,
Überstieg, 36.
translate, Übersetzen, 526.
trans-late, Über-setzen, 526.
truth, Wahrheit (d-hftsia),
9.
tune called by Being, Stimme des Seins,
461.
U
un-concealed, Unverborgen, 5.
uncover, Entdecken, 96.
un-said, the, Ungesagte, das, 609.
un-thought, the, Ungedachte, das, 290.
un-truth, Unwahrheit,
96.
un-veiling, Enthüllung,
182;
Entbergung, 218.
un whole (some), what is, Unheil, 399.
utter, -ance, Sagen, Sage, 496.
V
veiling, Verbergung, 218.
vengeange, spirit of, Rache, Geist
377.
Venture, Wagnis, 392.
venture-some, more. Wagender,
view, Anblick, 116.

der,

397.

7io
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view-of-the-World-about, Umsicht, 54.
view of, stand in, Angesicht, stehen im,

525.

violence brought to bear, Gewalttätigkeit, 271.
violence to, do (ing), Gewalt
brauchen,
(Gewalttätig),
270.
visage, offer. Aussehen, 264.
•ortez (of onticity), Wirbel, 71.
W
wait, a-, Warten,
er506.
wander (astray) in errance, Irren, 2 2 4 .
want [verb], Mögen, 597, 600.
want of, be in, Brauchen,
267.
want of, there is, Es brauchet, 597.
warrant, Weisung, 5 5 0 .
way-of-being-finite, Verendlichung,
32.
what being(s) is (are), Was-sein,
316.
what does not come-to-presence, Abwesende, das, 517.
Wherein, (World as), Worin, 5 6 .
whereunto, its own, UmwiUen
seiner,
180.
whereunto, (ultimate),
Worumwillen,

56.

while [verb], Verweilen,

whiling, Weile, 516.
whole (some), what is, Heile, das, 3 9 9 .
will-to-know, Wissen-wollen
(xiyyr\),
287-288.
with-being, Mitsein, 59.
withdrawal, Entzug, 166, 5 9 8 .
withdraw(ing), Sichentziehen,
608.
with-stand, Ausstehen,
53g,
with-World, Mitwelt, 59.
work [verb], Bauen, 584.
work, be-at-, Am-Werke-sein
(EVEQyeia), 257.
work, set-to-, Ins-Werk-setzen
(TEXvrj), 287.
workhood, Werkheit (evEQyeia),
317.
World, Welt, 58.
"World," "Welt,"
58.
World, familiarity with, Weltvertrautheit, 56.
World-about, Umwelt, 53.
World-as-picture, Weltbild, 326.
World-historical, Weltgeschichtlich,
90.
Y
yield (oneself), Sich einlassen, 397.
yield, -ing (by World), Gönnen, 578.

408.

GERMAN-ENGLISH

A
Ab-grund, non-ground,
172.
Abschied, de-parture, 394.
Absolvieren, -venz, -ution,
absolve,
-vence, -ution, 333.
Abwesende, das, what does not come-topresence,
517.
Abwesung,
negatived
coming-topresence,
310;
going-from-presence,
312; dis-appearing,
313.
Achten, care, 603.
Achten auf, (pay) heed (to), 611.
Ahnung, intimation, surmise, 428.
Alltäglichkeit, everydayness, 48.
Am-Werke-sein (evegyeia), work, beat-, 257•
Anblick, view, 116.
An-dacht, re-collection, 602.
Andenken, re-collection, 21, 438.
Andenkend, re-collective, 574.
Aneignung, appropriation,
447.
Anfang, origin, 257; originating
event,
410.
Anfänglich, originating,
225.
Anfängiiis, originating power, 437.
Angeschaute, der, man äs percepted,
419.

Angesicht, stehen im, sfawtZ in t/iew 0/,
5<s?5 \
Angewiesen, essentially referred, 37.
Angewiesenheit, referential
dependence,

37•
An ihm selbst (Hegel), 0/ ifce//, 346.
Angst, anxiety, 72-73.
Anschein, mir* appearance, 264.
Ansprechen, address, 505; roaÄe claim
upon, 538.
Anspruch, appeal, 4 7 7 ; claim, 438.
Anwesen, -ung,
come(-ing)-to-presence,

307-

Anwesen, gesammeltes (Aoyog), galherei-together coming-to-presence,
261-

262.
Anwesende, das, /Atz/ which comes-topresence, 214.
Anwesenheit, Presence, 147.
Anziehung, at-traction, 392.
Artikulierbare, das,
articulative-ness,

67.

Aufgehen, emerge, 265.
Ausbleiben, retreat, 5x0.
Auseinandersetzung (TEOA£/JO£) ,
tention, 2g 1; aboriginal Discord,
Ausgesetztsein, ex-position,
256.

eow261.

7io G L O S S A R Y :
Ausgleich, counterpoise,
447.
Auslegung, laying out in full view, 47.
Auslösen, counterpoise,
414.
Aussage, expression,
214.
Ausschau, eye on Being, 615.
Aussehen, offer visage, 264;
visible
radiance,
3x4.
Aussetzung, ex-posure,
217.
Ausstehen, withstand,
33g.
Austrag, issue, 579.
Ausweisen, sich, present
credentials,
169.
Ausweisung, giving an account,

182.

B
Bauen, work(ing), 584.
Bedenklichste, das, eminently
Thoughtworthy, the, 597.
Bedeutung, meaning, 67.
Bedeutsamkeit,?
Total) Meaning
fulness,
57.
Be-Dingt, conditioned by beings, 575.
Befindlichkeit, (ontological)
disposition,
64-65.
Beginn, beginning, 257.
Begreifen, Sich-, self-seizure, 334.
Begriff (Hegel), (Self-)seizure,
concept,

34*Begriff, nur (Hegel), mere concept, 341.
Begründen, found, 167-168.
"Begründung," "founding,"
161.
Behausung, taking up lodging,
343.
Beirren, lead astray, 224.
Beisammen-vor-liegen-lassen (Aeyetv),
let-lie-forth-in-collectedness,
491-492.
Bergen, hide, 436.
Beruhen, repose, 498.
Besorgen, be preoccupied with, $4.
Bestand, constancy,
366.
Beständigkeit, bloße, mere
constancy,

518.

Bewahrung, conserving,
-vation,
408.
Bewandtnis, being-destined,
54.
Bewandtnisganzheit, purposeful
pattern, 54.
Bewßgen, send on way, 616.
Bewegtheit (xivr}Ou;), moved-ness,
310.
Be-weg-ung (Hegel),
being-under-wayt
movement, 344.
Be-wegung, movement along the way,
6x6.
Bewendenlassen, let be destined, 57.
Bewußt-sein (Hegel), To-be-aware, 347.
Beziehen auf. Sich-,
(self-)orientation,
108.
Beziehung, relationship,
380.
Bezug, relation, 380.
Bezug, (relation
of) drawn-ness, 599;
Traction, 392.

GERMAN-ENGLISH
Bezugszusammenhang, ma/ri* of relations, 56.
Bildung, institution, 123.
Bleiben, a&tde, 453.
Blicksprung, spring with eyes wide open,

ÖJJ.

Boden nehmen, take-possession, 165-

166.
Brauch, hand(l)ing (-process), 520.
Brauchen, 6« in wan/ of, 267.
Brauchet, es, /Aire is wan/ 0/, 597.
D
Da, rfcere, 20.
Dank, thanks, 480.
Danken, thanks-giving, 601.
Darstellung, exposS, 353-354Dasein, There-being, 34-35.
Daß-sein, that being(s) is (are), 316.
Dawider, area of opposed-ness, 115.
Denken, think(ing), thought, 16.
Denkend, thought-ful, 21.
Dichten, (process of) poetizing, 409.
Dichtung (im engeren Sinne), poesy,
410.
Dichtung (im wesentlichen Sinne),
poetry, 410.
Differenz, (ontotogische), difference,
(ontological), 1 2 .
Durchmessen, measure (out), 589.
Durchsetzen, Sich-, im-pose (seif), 394.
Durchstimmen, attune, 429.
Durchwalten, permeate, 271.
Dürftig, needy, 39z.
E
Eigentlichkeit, authenticity, 50.
Einbezug, induction, 427.
Einbruch, irruption, 43.
Einbildungskraft, transzendentale, imagination, transcendental, 122-123.
Einfügung, dovetailing, 262.
Eingenommenheit, captivation, 165.
Einlassen, release-unto, 242
Einlassen, sich, abandon (self), 602;
yield, 397.
Ek-sistenz, ek-sistence, 217.
Empfängnis, acceptance, 508.
Ende (endlich), limited), 78.
Endlichkeit, finitude, 37.
Einerleiheit, sameness, 270.
Entbergen, -ung, reveal, -ment, -ing,
218.
Ent-decken, dis-cover, 55; uncover, 96.
Endeckendsein, (process of) discovering,

94.
Entdecktheit, discoveredness, 94.
Enthüllung, un-veiling, 182.
Ent-scheidung, de-cision, 284.

7io
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Entschlossenheit, re-solve, 83.
Ent-setzend, de-ranging, 427.
Entsprechen, -ung, respond, -sponding,
-sponse, 21.
Entstand, being-as-taking-its-origin,

111.
Entwertung, de-valuation, 363.
Entwerfen, -wurf, project, 60-61.
Entziehen, Sich-, withdraw(ing), 608.
Entzug, withdrawal, 166, 59S.
Erdherrschaft, dominion-over-the-earth,
372Er-blicken, eye, have eye for, 613.
Ereignen, sich, take place, 219.
Ereignis, e-vent, 614.
Erfahrung (Hegel), Experience, 348.
Erfestigen, make fast, 445.
Ergreifen, apprehension, 96.
Ergründen, help ground, 460.
Erhaltung, constancy, 366.
Erinnerung, re-collection, 438.
Erlebnis, esthetic experience, 416.
Er-lebnis, living experience, 327.
Erscheinen, appear(ing), 630.
Erscheinen (Hegel), shine-forth, 336.
Erscheinende, das, being-that-appears,
no.
Erschließen, disclose, 55.
Erschlossenheit, disclosedness, 58.
Erschweren, make grave, 289.
Existenz» existence, 35.
Existenzial, existential, 49.
Existenzialien, existential components,
49Existenziell, existentiell, 49.
F
Faktisch, facticial, IJ8; factually, 62;
matter-of-fact, 53.
Faktizität, facticity, 64.
Ferne, farness, 452.
Fest, marriage feast,
Feste, das, steadfastness, 445.
Festhalten, hold fast, 471.
Festmachen, make fast, 471.
Fragwürdige,
das, Being-worthy-ofquestion, -as-questionable, 258.
Fragwürdigkeit, questionable-ness, 416.
Fragwürdigste, das, eminently Questionable, the, 615.
Freie, das, Free, the, 618.
Frei halten, maintain free, 184.
Freigabe, liberation, 57; rendering-free,
186.
Freiheit zum Tode, freedom unto death,
80.
Freilegung, laying free, 183.
Fug (<)6c?7), arrangement, Organisation,

262.

Fuge, pattern of arrangement, 486.
Fügen, Sich-, adapt themselves, 262;
mesh, 603.
Fügung, process of organizing, 262.
G
Gebärden, give bearing, 578.
Geben, grant, xx.
Gebirg, mountain fastness, 574.
Gedächtnis, re-cord, 599-601.
Gedanc, re-cord, 599-601; thanks-giving

601.
Ge-eignet, ap-propriated(tot by Being),
504Gefüge, articulativeness, 249; articulative whole, 262; mesh, 603; pattern
of relationships, 42$; that-which-isorganized, 263.
Gegenstand, object, being-as-op-poscd,
n o , 420.
Gegenständlichkeit, objectivencss, 112-

113-

Gegenstehenlassen, let stand opposed,
130; objectivaie, 112.
Gegenüber, being-as-across, 420.
Gegenwart, authentic present, 87.
Gegenwärtig, present, 517.
Gegenwesen, anti-essence, 225.
Gegnet, Expanse, 502.
Geheimnis, mystery, 221.
Geheiß, /ww/, 6z£.
Gehören, be attend-ant, 494.
Gelassenheit, release, 504.
Gelichtetheit, luminosity, 59.
Gemüt, ft^arf of man, 600.
Gerechtigkeit, justice, 371.
Gerede, loquacity, 71.
Gesagte, das, what is (has been) said,
Gesammeltes Anwesen (Aoyog), gathered-together coming-to-presence, 2 6 1 -

262.

Gesammeltheit, collected-ness, gatheredtogetherness, 262.
Geschehen, come-to-pass, 36-37.
Geschehnis, coming-to-pass, 283.
Geschenk, pouring out, 570.
Geschichte, history, 21, 90; intermittence, 435, 465.
Geschichtlich, historical, 90.
Geschichtlichkeit, historicity, 90.
Geschick, common fortune, 92; mittence,
435Geschickliche, das, mittence, 493.
Gesichtspunkt, aspect, 329.
Gesparte, das, Being-as-re-served, 446.
Gespräch, dialogue, 295.
Gestellung, taking (a) place, 312.
Gestimmtheit, attunement, 219.

7io G L O S S A R Y :
Gestimmtsein, attunement, 6$.
Geviert, (four-fold) polyvalence, Quadrate, 570.
Gewalt brauchen, bring(ing) force to
bear, do violence, 270.
Gewalttätig, -keit, bringing force to
bear, force brought to bear, 271.
Gewesenbeit, past (what is-as-havingbeen), 87; having-been-ness, 143.
Geworfenheit, thrown-ness, 37.
Gibt, es, there is, 43.
Gibt, Es, (there) is granted, xx.
Gleiche, das (vs. das Selbe), same (vs.
one), 588.
Gönnen, yield, -ing (by World), 578.
Grund, essence, 213.
Grundfrage, ground-question, 7.
Grundlegung, laying foundation, 3.
Grundvermögen, fundamental power,
114Gründen, ground [verb], -ing-process,
coming-to-pass of, 164.
Grüßen, hail, 446.
Gunst, graciousness, 477.
H
Handeln, commerce, 480.
Handlung, dynamic accomplishment,
543Haus des Seins, house of Being, 528.
Heile, das, what is whole(some), 39g.
Heilige, das, Holy, the, 426.
Heiligkeit, holiness, 426.
Heilsweg, way of salvation, 55J.
Heimatlosigkeit, homelessness, 38g.
Heimische, das, condition of repatriation 472.
Heimisch-werden, becoming-at-home,
450.
Heißen, e-voke, 596.
Heitere, das, Glad-some, the, 444.
Heiterkeit, gladsomene'ss, 561.
Herabsetzen, reduce to control, 377.
Hergestelltheit, composition, 567.
Hermeneutik, hermeneutic, 47.
Herstand, compositum, 567.
Herstellen, com-pose, 567; contra-pose,
394Herumhören, mere listening, 294.
Hervorbringen, bring-forth, 583; lead
forth, 414.
Hervorgehenlassen, let-go-forth, 4x4.
Hineinhalten, Sich-, thrust, 201.
Historie, scientific history, 90.
Hören, attend, 294.
Hören, blosses, mere listening, 294.
Hören auf, listening to others, 68.
Huld (*agtc), grace, 477.

GERMAN-ENGLISH
I
In-Acht-nehmen, take under one's care,
603.
In-der-Welt-Sein, to-be-in-the- World,
48.
Innestehen, instance, 5 1 1 ; take stance
within, 536.
Innerste, das, innermost core, 600.
In-Sein, in-being, 58.
In-sistieren, in-sist, 223.
Inständigkeit, instance, 509.
Ins-Werk-setzen (rfcyvr}), set-to-work,
287.
Irre, -en, errance, wander (astray) in,
224.
Irrtum, error, 224.
j
Jemeinigkeit, mine-ness, 45.
Jetztfolge, succession of nows, 133.
Je-Weilige, das, being that whiles, 517.
K
Kehre, reversal, 16.
Kommen, ad-vent, 424.
Kommen, über (den Menschen), overcome (man), 418.
L
Leitfrage, guide-question, 7.
Lichtung, lighting-process, 6.
Loslassen, Sich-, surrender, 200.
M
Macht, dominating might, 256.
Man, "people,*1 71.
Maß-nahme, taking-measure, 590.
Metaphysik, metaphysics, 4-5.
Meta-Pbysik, meta-"physics," 5.
Mitte, Center (Rilke), 392; middle-point,
501.
Mitte, bildende, center of institution,
123.
Mitdasein, There-being-with-others, 68.
Mitsein, with-being, 59.
Mitwelt, with-World, 59.
Mitziehen, draw-with, 598.
Mögen, want, 597, 600.
Möglichkeit, -en, potentiality, -ties, 39,
62.
MögUchsein, power-to-be, 62.
Mut, heart, 555.
N
Nachholen, retract, 189.
Nachstellen, persecute, 377.
Nähe, near-ness, 6.
Naturanlage, natural propensity, j r .
Nennen, (give) name, 292.
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Scheidung, (-en), scission, (make), 284;
differentiation, 282.
Schein,
appearing,
shining-forth,
seeming-to-be, 263; being-as-it-seem sto-be, no.
Schenken, bestow, -al, 410.
Schenkung, gift, 413.
Scheu, awe, 270, 608.
Schickung (Motga), im-parting, 595.
Schicken, sich, e-mit, 435; com-mit self,
495•
Schickliche, das, com-mitment, 540.
Schicksal, fortune, 91; com-mitment,
435O
-Schied, scission, 579.
Offenbar, revealed, 43.
Schonen,
584.
Offenbare, das, that which is open, 214.
Schritt-zurück, step-in-reverse, $43.
Offenbarkeit, manifestation, 43.
Schuld, guilt, 81.
Offene, das, Open, the, 214.
Schweigen, keep silence, 68.
Offenheit, open-ness, 20.
Sehenlassen, let-be-seen, 46.
Offensein, open-ness, 68.
Offenständigkeit, open-character, 215. Seiend, being [verb, adj.], 10.
Seiende, das, being [noun], 4, 10.
Ontisch, ontic, 8.
Seiende im Ganzen, das, beings-in-theOntologisch, ontological, 8.
ensemble, 197; totality of beings, 43.
Onto-theo-logisch, onto-theo-logical, 9Seiendheit (ovola)* being-ness, 4.
10.
Sein, Being (-process), 4, 6, 10.
Sein als solches, Being as such, 33.
P
Sein-bei, be immersed in, 52.
Poesie, poesy, 410.
Seinkönnen, drive-toward-Being, 39;
Präsentation, present-ation, 336.
power-to-be, 6 2 .
Präsentieren, render-present, 335.
Seinlassen, let-be, 216.
Präsenz, present-ness, 325.
Sein zum Tode, Being-unto-death, 75.
R
Seinsfrage, Being-question, 7.
Rache, Geist der, spirit of vengeance, Seinsgeschichte, Being-as-history, 437.
Seinsverfassung, Being-structure, 61.
377.
Selbe, das (vs. das Gleiche), one (vs.
Rechnung, calculation, 372.
same), 588.
Recht-fertigen, render-right, 371.
Selbst, self, 97.
Rechtfertigung, justi-fication, 371.
Selbstauslegung, self-interpretation, 47.
Rede, logos, 66; articulate-ness, 67;
Selbstheit, selfhood, 181.
speech, 292.
Setzen, pose, posit, 324.
Repräsentieren, represent, 335.
Seyn, Beon, 554.
Reszendenz, rescendence, 18.
Sicherheit, reassurance, 36g.
Rettung, salvation, 534.
Sichern, -ung, -heit, certify, -fication,
Richten, sich, establish itself, 413.
Nennung, bringing-into - words, 509.
Nicht-heimisch, es-tranged, 275.
Nichten, negate, 541.
Nichtende, das, negativing element, 535.
Nichten des Nichts, Non-being in its
very essence, igg*
Nichtigkeit, negativity, 76.
Nichts, Non-being, 38; no-thing, 196.
Nichts, leeres, absolute nothing, 573.
Nicht-mehr-da-sein,
no-more-Therebeing, 76.
Not, distress, 225; need, 267.

Richtigkeit, correctness, 213.
Riß, fissure, 580.
Ruch, com-patibility, 5x9.
Rückblicken, re-view, 141.
Rücksicht, mutual deference, 579.
Ruhe, repose, 498.

S
Sagen, Sage, utter, -ance, 496.
Sammler, collect-or, 383.
Sammeln, -lung (loyog), collecting),
-Hon, 282; gather(ing) (-together), 26z.
Schätzen, e-valuate, -Hon, 369.
Schaffen, creative effort, 407.

372-373•

Sich-vorhalten, pro-posit, 120.
Sich-vorweg-sein, anticipatory drivetoward-Being, 99.
Sinn, sense, 85.
Sinnlich, sens-ate, 109.
Sinnlichkeit, sensate-ness, 109.
Sollen, obligation, 260.
Sorge, concern, 40.
Sparen, sich, hold self in re-serve, 462.
Spielraum, domain, 114.
Sprache, articula-tion, language, 67.
Sprache bringen, zur, bring into
language, 4g8.
Springen, leap, 42.

GLOSSARY:

GERMAN-ENGLISH

Sprung, spring, 611.
Sprung zurück, leap backwards, 612.
Steigerung, surpassment, 366.
Stiften, lay-claim, 165-166.
Stiftung, origination, 410.
Stimme des Seins, tune called by Being,
461.
Stimmung, mood, 65; attunement, 461.
Strenge, rigor, 106.
Streuung, strewing, 165.
Strittige, das, Contentious, the, 533.
Subjektität, subject-ness, 325; subjectism, 17.
Subjektivität, subjectivity, 325.

T
Tatsächlich, actually, 62.
Tauglich, efficacious, 304.
Tauglichmachende,
das
(aya&ov),
power-which-renders-efficacious, 304.
Technik, technicity, 326.
Transzendenz, transcendence, 36.
Tun, dynamic accomplishment, 543.
U
Überantworten, give over to be, 64.
Übereinstimmung, concordance, 94;
conformity, 213.
Übernehmen, assume, take-over, 89;
make one's own, 246.
Überschwüngen, over-reach, 166.
Über setzen, translate, 526.
Übersetzen, trans-late, 526.
Überstieg, transcendence, 36.
Überwältigende, das, Overpowering,
the, 261.
Überwindung, overcoming, 14.
Um-kehr, ad-vertence, 352.
Umsicht, view-of-the-World-about, $4.
Umwelt, World-about, 53.
Umwertung, re-valuation, 363.
Uneigentlich, inautherUic, 50.
Un-entborgenheit, non-revealment, 221.
Un-Fug, dis-arrangement, 518.
Ungedachte, das, un-thought, the, 290.
Ungegenwärtig, not present, 517.
Ungesagte, das, un-said, the, 609.
Unheil, what is unwholef some), 399.
Unheimische, das, condition of expatriation, 472.
Unheimisch (sein), alien-to-home, 450.
Un-heimlich, not '*at home," 273.
Uliheimlichkeit, not true abode, 74;
state of expatriation, 81.
Unheimlichste, das, most awesome,
strangest (of beings), 270.
Unmöglichkeit, impotence, 77.
Unseiende (Plato), "beings" in inauthentic sense, 312.

715

Untergehen, submergence, 575.
Unterkunft, shelter, 510.
Unterscheiden, -ung, differentiate, -Hon,

34t> 437Unter-Schied, dif-ference, 579.
Unverborgen, un-concealed, 5.
Unverborgenheit, non-concealment, 9.
Unwahrheit, un-truth, 96.
Un-wesen, non-essence, 172; negatived
coming-to-presence, 293.
Umwillen seiner, its own whereunfo,
180.
Un-zuhause, (There-being as) homeless,
81.
Urdichtung, primordial poetizing, 295.
Urgeschichte, primordial history, 238.
Ur-Sache, ultimate Source, 304.
Ursprung, origin, 403.
Ursprünglich, original, 225.
Ursprünglicher, more originally, 290.
Urstreit, aboriginal Discord, 406; contention, 268.
V
Verbergen, -bergung, -borgenes, -borgenheit, conceal, -ing, -ment, 221.
Verborgenheit, hidden-ness, 199.
Verdecken, cover-up, 96.
Verderb, de-cadence, 275.
Vereignen, ap-propriate, 486.
Verendlichung, way-of-being-finite, 32.
Verfallenheit, fallen-ness, 37-38.
Verfolgen, persecute, 377.
Vergangene, das, thing of the past, $81.
Vergangenheit, past (what-was-and-isno-more), 87.
Ver-gegen-ständlichung, objectivising,

323.

Vergegnen, ex-pand, 504.
Vergegnis, expansion, 508.
Vergessen, forget(ting), 487.
Vergessenheit, forgottenness, 12-13.
Vergreifen, misapprehension, 96.
Verhalten, (sich - zu), comportment,
(enter into), x 14.
Verhältnis, matrix of relationships, 214.
Verlautbarung, articulation, 637.
Vermessen, measure (out), 589.
Vermögen, be able to know, 573; power,
600.
Vernehmen (voeiv), accept, receive,
contain, bring to containment, 269;
concentrate, 272.
Verneinung, logical negation, 199.
Verrechnen, calculative thinking, 479.
Versagen, renege, 405.
Verschließen, close-over, 96.
Versicherung, certification, 371.
Versinnlich ung, sens-ating, 130.
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Verständlich, comprehensible, intelligible, 107.
Verständnis, (Seins-), comprehension
(of Being), 34.
Verstehbarkeit, comprehensibility, 85.
Verstehen, comprehend(ing), -sion, 34.
Verstellen, dissimulation, 405.
Verwahren, conserve (work), 586.
Verweilen, while [verb], 408.
Verweisung, reference, 53.
Verweisungsganzheit, pattern of references, 54.
Verwindung, maintaining upper hand
over, 519.
Vollendung, consummation, 381.
Vollziehen, -zug, achieve, -ment, 36,
61.
Vorblicken, pre-view, 141.
Vor-denken, pre-thought, 426.
Vorgängig, antecedent, 61.
Vorgestelltheit, presented-ness, 3 24.
Vorhandenes, (mere) entity, 53.
Vorlaufen, advance, 83.
Vornehmen, accept, 269.
Vorontologisch, pre-ontological, 343.
Vorstellen, pro-pose, (render) present,
18.
Vorstellend, present-ative, 18.
Vorstellung, (re)presentation, 108.

Wesentlich, foundational, 16; essential,
425Widersetzen, dispose of at will, 577.
Wieder-erinnerung, re-collection, 49.
Wiederholung, re-trieve, 89.
Wirbel, vortex (of onticity), 71.
Wissen (TEXVI?), know(ing), 2 7 1 ; tohave-seen, 335.
Wissenschaft (Hegel), Knowing-ness,
Science, 354.
Wissen-wollen (rexyrj), will-to-know,
287-288.
Wohnen, dwell(ing), 584.
Worin, (World as) Wherein, 56.
Worumwillen, (ultimate) whereunto, 56.
Wortwerden des Seins, coming-ofBeing-inlo-words, 295.
Wurf, throwing (of There), 532.
Z
Zeigen, show-forth, 496.
Zeigende, der, sign, 463.
Zeitigen, sich, temporalize, 88.
Zeitigung, temporalizing, 88; tim-ing,
T45'

Zeitlichkeit, temporality, 85.
Zeug, instrument, 53.
Zeughaftigkeit, instrumental-ness, 53.
Zerbrechen, be dashed to pieces, ultimate disintegration, 276.
W
Zersetzen, decom-pose by analysis, 377.
Wagender, more venture-some, 397.
Zugehörigkeit, appurtenance, 280.
Wagnis, Venture, 392.
Zug, Traction, 392.
Wahrheit (ä-Arfteux), truth, 9.
Auf dem Zug, at-tracting, 598.
Walten, hold sway, 223.
Zuhandenes, instrument (being readyWalten, (Durch-), dominate, 22X.
at-hand), $3.
Walten, aufgehendes und verweilendes
Zuhandenheit, instrumentality, 150.
(<pvoiz), emergent-abiding-Power, 17. Zukunft, future, 86.
Warten, er-, wait, a-, 506.
Zukünftig, ad-ventive, 42 z.
Was-sein, what being(s) is (are), 316.
Zumutung, heart imparted (to thought),
Wechselbezug, mutual interchange, 272.
555Weile, whiling, 516.
Zunächst und zumeist, first of all and
Weisung, warrant, 550; direction, xx.
for the most part, 48.
Welt, World, 58.
Zusammengehören, -igkeit, correlation,
"Welt", " W o r l d 5 * .
12, 270.
Weltbild, world-as-picture, 326.
Zu-sein, to-be, 39.
Weltgeschichtlich, World-historical, 90.
Zuspruch, address, 592; intimation,
Weltlichkeit, Being of World, $2.
488; appeal, 559.
Weltvertrautheit,
familiarity
with
Zuwendung-zu, orientation, 114.
World, 56.
Zweideutige, das, bi-dimensionality,
347'
Werfen, throw-down, -out (There), 267.
Zweideutigkeit, ambivalence, 13; ambiWerkheit (ivdgyeia), work-hood, 317.
guity, 7 j .
Wesen, essence [noun and verb],
Zwiefalt, ambivalence, 11.
presence [verb], (come-to-), 2 2 8 .
Zwiefache, das, duality, 13.
Wesensbereich, domain where Being
Zwischenfall, in-cident, 266.
essences, 634.
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455» 457
456, 457
452, 462
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HD
115
116
117

118
119

121
122
124
125
127
129
130
131
133
135
137
137-138
137-139
138
138-139
139
140
141
142
143

HW
456

444, 456, 461. 4^3
458, 461, 466, 468, 471

447
457. 458, 468
453
472
445
457
447.
455
453

451

456

459
447

451
453
445> 445, 4471h

496

459,
444.
460,
453.
442,
464

447' 459. 49&

446, 447, 480, 488, 602

638
640
638

33-34
35-37
37
38
39
41
41-42
42
43
43-44
44
45
46
47-48
48
49

331
359

7-8
7-6«

8

12-20
12-14

4*3

406
268, 405, 40611
407

407
405
407
4*5
4*4
268, 406, 413//, 4x4

61
62

409, 4 10 » 4*o, 4*2* 4*4
4*** 4*2, 4*3. 4*5» 4*6
4x2
4*2
404, 4x6
4*2. 4*4
4*2, 4*4
4x6
4x8

66

69-104
70
75

82

83
84
85

86

404,4x6
403
4x6

86-87
87

S3

89
91

404

405
4*3
4<>5. 405
406, 407
406, 407
406, 412
4<>7» 412
416
406, 413» 4*6

412, 413, 4x6
4*4
4*311
407
4x2
408, 4*4» 636
4*4
408, 4*5. 415//. 4*611

81
HW

404
404
404

50
50-51
51
51-52
53
54
54-55
55
56
58
59
60-61
63
63-64
64
64-65
64-65

HG

44-48
52-57

452> 452,

464, 471, 636

456

14-16
16-19
18-21
23-24
25

28

452, 461, 462, 463, 477

HE

17-39
31-37
36

CITED

88

415. 4*6
4*6

408, 409//. 4*3. 417
4x0, 4x0

327»42*
322
321, 322
326
418, 421
419, 42*
326

327

327

3*6, 326, 327
327. 42*
42*

326
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724
HW
94
95
96-98
98-99
99
100
101
102
104
105-192
118
119
120
121
121-122
122
123
124
125
126
126-127
127
130
131-132
132-134
133
134
136
136-137
137
139
140
140-141
141
141-142
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
149-150
150
151
152-153
153
155
155-157
157
158
159
160

CITED

HW
328
421
420
322

322
323, 323II, 4*8, 420

326, 420

324.
421
441

331,

345

326

332. 355

337, 338, 35*
328, 332, 355
*o8, 334, 355, 358
334, 336, 355, 359

332,
337

338

333, 337

345
338

334. 345» 359
336, 352, 354, 356
356
359
325, 333, 335, 335, 356, 359
335, 336//,355»35Ö, 358» 359
342, 343

342
343, 44*

332, 33^
344//. 345. 35J» 35*. 354,
356
356
35* IL 353, 359
356
442
343

344
357
35*, 354
337, 340.

342, 345

337

357
344»345» 354

345
346
346

340
34t

346, 35^

345
340,

346, 347. 357, 359
343//, 357

161
161-162
162
163
164
165
165-166
166
167
168
168-169
169
170
170-171
171
174
174-175
175
175-176
176
177
178
179-180
180
181
181-182
184
185
187-188
188
189
190
191
193-247
194
194-195
196
197
199-200
200
201
203-205
205
206
207
208-209
210
211
211-212
212
212-213
213
215
216
217
218

360, 442

JO
13, 269, 44I
347» 357
343, 345.

348
359

347» 35*

339» 348
349
354
344
349» 350///. 556

348///, 549
359
349, 354.
354//» 355

359

352, 357
337. 351. 357
359
350, 351II, 352, 353

337. 352, 354. 356
35*, 355 //» 359
360
355, 35*5, 359» 44*

352
355

360
355» 355
337» 35<5. 360
356

338, 352. 357
352, 353, 357
356
3<5J, 434
439

628
362
3^2, 438
362
362

362
362
363

363. 380
363
363

367» 368//
329
366

32911
364
364
438

365II, 372II

367

372» 372
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HW
218-219
219
220
221
222
223
225-226
226
227-228
228
231
232-233
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
242
243
243-245
244
245
247
248
248-295
251
252
253
256
256-257
257-258
258
259-260
260-261
261
262
263
265
265-266
266
267
268
271
274
275
277
277-278
278
279-280
281
281-282
282

CITED

HW
369
364. 367. 369
3^9, 372
369* 372
369. 370
370
37*
329II. 37*
373
371. 43*
363
374
380, 439
362

374. 438

326

374
37^
373, 439
326, 373
*3, 382

435
363. 435. 435. 436///
7. 363, 533
386
39*
527
400

556
399
528
392
392
391
392
392
392
392,
393
393,
394
393,
395
395
394.
397
398
396
398
527
39&
395
398
393.

394
394
394» 394

395

395

282-283
283
284
285
286
286-287
287
288
291
292
294
295
296
296-343

396
398, 398
396
596
528
398
395. 397. 399II
398
397. 398, 399
398
398, 399. 400

300
302
303
304
306
310
311
311-312
312
315
316
317
317-318
317-320
318
319
319-320
320
321
322
322-323
323
325
327
327-329
328
329
330
331
331-332
333
334
335
336
336-337
337
338-339
339
340
343

526
638
5*0, 526

400

5*5
5*4

519

526

533
533, 534. 540
53^
526
5*5> 5*9
5*5
10
11
5*6
JO, 526
516

5*7
525
524. 525II. 525
509. 525. 525
5*7
5*9. 525
525. 640
518

5*7
5*8
519

5*9
5*8
5*9
5*9 II. 523
520. 52*. 522
5*9. 523///
13, 487, 522
521
520

520
$21, 521, 522
524
525. 5J4

726

i n d e x

of

t e x t s

c i t e d

KM

ID

40
Jo

10
24
28
28*29
29
31
43
45
46-47
49-50
51
54
54-56
59
62
62-63
63
65-66
66-69
67

246
6x9

49*

246, 614
638
638

565
612

360
JO

493

360

11, 246
7»

246

«

579, 639
639

IX

II, 13

KM

5-6
7
8
13
13-14
14
15
17
20
22
22-23
24
24-25
25
26
28-31
29
29-30
30
32
33-34
34
35
36
37

93

29
106

15» 29, 31, 45
15, 202
62, 183

29> 93

40-41
42
45
47
48
49
55-56
56
61
63-64
65
65-66
69-70
70
71
72
73
74-75
76
77
78
80
81
81-82
82
82-83
84
86
86-88
87
88
88-89
90-91
91
92
98
99

in,
116

31
183,
117
117

149, 152, 234

*83 n

116, 1x7
118,119

ii9

117

12 X
117
119

114
XI4, IIS, 147
112, 135, 136, 19s,

US,
119
125

ZI

9> 147

125

120, 126, 148
121
127

127//
124
1X4
125

125, 125, 151
11* iL X2i

128

J3°

130
xi6

135

132
132

ix6t 123
133, 134» 134

10

30, 61,107
107,151

30
113, 1x4, 147
3i
29

W

107

151

108
108
107

3X, 109, 109//, 112
107
31, 1x0

i n
in H

102
103-104
105
106
107
109
110
111
111-112
113
113-114
113-115
114
115
118
118-119
119-120

116
129
135

135
113, 204
124
113.

IJ3

"3
135
136

136
*95
147, 148, 152
122
148

*83

19S
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KM
121
122
123
124
124-127
127-146
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
136
137
137-138
139
141
141-142
142
143
144-145
145-146
146
146-150
146-156
150
151
152
152-153
157
158
159
160
163-164
164-166
165
166
167-171
169
170
171-172
171-174
172-173
174-177
175
178
179
182
183
184
185
185-222
187
193-197
195-196

CITED

KM
IJ5
148,

197-198

183

124, 183
122, 124

*37

123
114, X22,

147, 1$2, 232
123, I37, I83
Il6, II7
IIJ, 124, I38
122,

117
II7

138

204
119

138, 156
*36* I53> 183

119, 139, 153

156

139,

139, 153

J55

140

155

200-204
204
204-205
205
205-206
206
207
208
210
210-211
211
212
212-213
213
214
216
216-217
218
220
221

32
33
34, 38
34, 43
4, 34- 35. 38
37, 45- 273
35, 38, 39» 43, 44- 45,
40, 45, 49
15, 202

38, 61
233
49, 438

*3, 36, 37,

29, 93

86
86

204

617

140

146
J22

M

154
*54
204

*47
154

6
9
11
15

142

141
141

*43
143

143//
144

594
594
594
594

NI

144

144

145
117

*57
157
*57

115
145, 146,

122

158
158,

93

157

159

29» 93. J06

29

3*
3*
32

11-254
31-71
44-46
50-52
52
79-81
82-91
166
219
231-254
255-472
272-282
275-276

48,

60, 62, 69

70
38. 4°. 72
38, 72, 73, 195, S35

370, 434
362
3^4
365
3^7
7
370
370
366
363
434
362
281

95

728

index

N I
325-329
339-348
356-365
389
399-457
399
425
432-438
454-462
460
464-467
469
473-658
476-481
476
500
508-516
517-527
527-533
543-547
577-582
619-625
632-648
652-657

of

t e x t s

cited

N II

371
3^3
374
412
362

374
364
3^2
5» 7

168-173

420

201
206
207
208-209
209
210
233-234

381
436
436,
437
436
437
369

257-333
263-272
272-282
279-280
283-287
284-287
291-302
292
293

434
3^7
3^2
3^3
364
379
381
375

304
311-312
314-318
314-333
335-398
337-338
342
343

380

350

363. 5X0
510

8

364
3Si
369, 434
373> 381
438
370
3^9
363
383
369
372
369
37111

373

N II

7-29
11
14-15
20-27
29
31-71
31-256

434
379
317
374
437
362
434

40
62
71-78
90-96
96-109
131-135
135-141
146-147

380

153
153-155
155
156
161
162
164

323
3*3
324
323
324
324> 324

380

383
3^3
366

321
420

321

324

357
358
359
368
369
369-370
370
371
372
377
383
389
390
390-394
392-394
397
398
399-457
404-405
405
407
408
409
411-412
412

437

380

374
371

563, 502

5X0
363
510//
511II
5*2

5ZJ, 512,

5X2
510
512

598

512, $12

510
5x1
3&3. 5to,
5x2
5X2U
5X1, 597
5x2
5x2
6x8
362
3X7
317
318

437
3X8
3X8
3!»

$12

i n d e x

413
413-416
413-417
414
415
416-417
418-419
421-426
423
425-426
436-450

3*8
3*9
319

451
452
458-480
481
481-490
482
483
484
485
489
490

325
326

319
93, 3*8, 628

318
319
321
3*9
319
328

434
438,537
434, 438
438, 504

435. 493
43811
435, 437 lb 5°9
435. 43711
435. 438

P

266
269
270
271
271-272
272
274
275
276

t e x t s

cited

P

n ii

131-133
133-134
136
137
138
140
141
142
143
145
146
147-149
149
151
153
156

of

3*0
3*0
526
31X
311
3**
568
383

3"

568
568
3**
3**
3*4
3*o
311, 314, 640
3**11
3", 3*4. 5^8
404
54*
3*4, 492

277
278
279

281
283
284-285
284-286
285
286-287
287
288
288-289
289

3*2
313
3*3' 5^8, 616

3*3
j/j
3*0
3*3

313
310
310
309, 314

PW

5
6-19
19-22
23
23-24
24-25
25-26
27
29-30
32
32-33
33
34
35
35-36
38
39
40
40-41
41
42
46
46-47
48
50
51

440
302
303

303t 387

287

387
387
303
303
305

305
305> 441

306II

301
307
304II. 304

304» 307

304, 319, 388
440

3<>7. 308
308
306, 307
388

5. 23

440

440,44*

SF

497
3x0, 568
3**
3**t 5^8

3**, 5^8

10-26
13

374, 617
386
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730

SU

SF
17

18
22

25
26-31
29
33
34
36
36-37
36-40
37
37-39
43

325
5>

J*

420

639
476

449
93.
5
200, 474
476

195
268

6zg
Z63
tz4, 6z$
608, 614
640

6Z2
315
315
613
439
623

546
zzo
418, 420

547//

6zg

6*5

6z8, 640

493
493

640
640

SU

8
9
9-10
9-11
10

257, 258

25b, 257.

257

256, 257

617
596

SG

47
75
84-86
85
97
107
108
112-113
113
118
121
125
136
139-140
140
154
157
159
171
178-188
180
184
188

11
12
13

SZ

3
5
6
7
7-8
8
12
12-13
13
14-15
15
19-27
25-26
28
28-34
30
32
32-34
33
34
35
35-36
36
37
37-38
38
41
42
42-43
43
44
46

93
34ll
42
34, 40
4i
41
34» 35.40. 49. 58.
50
*5> 35. 49, 50
59
185

52ff.
54-55
59-62
60-63
62-63
64
64-65
67

48

68
256, 258
256

25711

256, 27X
257

68-69
69
70
71
74-75

628
148
no, zzo
46
Z49
66, 492
204

1*5

492

46, 4 7 j 185
47
283

47
47
476
41
35, 39//, 5*. 9*
45. 50
48

49.

98

52

Z02
98
98
762
236

53
5*
54
53

52
54

zoo

204
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SZ

SZ

74-76
75
76
83
84
84-85
85-86
86
87
88
89-90

H9
55
56
54
55
57
56
56
57, 58* 100
56

104-113
no
111
114
118
123
126-130
132
133
134
134-135
134-136
134-140
135
137
138
140-141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148-149
148-160
149

585
99, 101
IOI
97. 98
59
55» 59
7i
J4-35, 102
59» 59
37» 64

150
151
152
153
158-160
160-161
161
162
163
164
164-165
165
166
167-170
170-173
173-175
175-176
176

CITED

178
179
180
182
183
184
184-190
185
186
187
187-188
188
188-189
190
191
191-192
192

98

64

65

60

37
65
65
72
69

59»62, 63

96
62
63, 63, 613
59» 63, 64

405

68, 102

581
58I
7.85,
63
42

100 [J

204
66, 67, 171
67, 68, 69, 100,

70
68, 68, 69
68
428
66, 204
70

7*
7*
7*

70

99» 233

171

193
202
202 ff.
202-208
203
205
207
209
212
212-213
214
218
219
219-221
220
220-221
221
222
223
223-225
226
227
228
229
230
233-234
236
237 241
243-244
244-245
245
246-248
250
259
261
262
262-263
263

7i> 233» 233, 236, 5.07
7i
7 85
72
I50

70

72
72
72
72, 194
73
73, 74> 99, 187, 187
273
73
187

74
74, 74 //, 99II
74
102
58
102
98, 102
102
103
102

43» 58, 150
94
94
94»z*5
204

44
95
95, 95
95
96 //, 186, 234//. 236
232, 274
102

95. 97

97, 101, 150
189

IOI

43» 150
75
75
76

75
75
75
75
76II
75. 76
77
77
188
78, 78, 188
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732

SZ

SZ
264
266
266-267
267-268
268
271
272-273
275
276-277
277
281-283
283
284
285
287
287-288
288
289-295
294
295
295-297
297
298-299
299
299-300
303
306
307
308
310
311
312
314
314-315
315
315-316
318
319-320
320
321
321-323
323-325
325
326
327
328
329
329-330
331-350
336-339
339
356-364
362
365
366

CITED

78///, 188
78, 79 ii. 80, 188
77

80
189
80
80
80

81, 194
81
82

82, 162
82, 232, 274
82
248

5 1 . 83,

370
376
378-379
380
381
382
382-383
384
384-385
385
385-386
386
387
388-389
395

48

90
90
90

90
IOI

ii

90
78, 91/I, 92, 189
92, 189

9i

92
91, 91, 92
90
90
92

189

508
80
189
189

US

S3

96

96
83.

189

235

185
76. 84
189,
233, 235
84
42, 612
185, 186

47. 50
4*
612

42, 50
99
97
J 5 5
xo 1
101, 157
IOI
85
87

87 it
87
87
88, 89
89
89
89
92

102
162

88
200,

IOI,

102,

192

9-33
12
16
17
21-22
22
23-24
24
24-25
25
26
26-27
28
28-30
29
30
31
31-32
32
32-33

577
58i
577
577
578,
636
577
5 7 7 , 578
578
579
579
579
581
577
577
5 7 7 . 579,
580
578, 580//, 581
58a, 581
578,
580
581
578

83-155
91
92
93
95
96
97
99

629
629 J/, 632
629, 631
4, 67, 171, 631
631
629, 630, 630
630

100
103
108-109
109

632

506
640
200
631
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VA

US
109-110
110
113
114
120-121
121
123
124
128
129-130
130
130-131
132
134
137
145

633
619, 633
619
619

633

32-33
33
38
40
44

619
618
6. 228
619

52-53
70
71-100
72
75
76
79
80
80-81
83
85
85-88
86
87
88
88-89
89
91-98
96
97
98
99

271
640
361, 502

617

631

637
439
632
630

3&R 625
631
630
$22, 6l2

632
496, 633

159-216
162-163
166
168-169
169
170
175-176
179-180
185
197
197-198

609, 636
636
528
496
462
496
617
6IY
609
640

200
214
215
216
219-238
234-235
239-268
242

496
496
496
636
636

252
253
258
261
262
269

496

6l6

462

609
609
638
639

609

428
63I

VA

7
13-44
21
26
32

CITED

574

548, 626
271
619
619

374
330
330
3^2
374
374
3^1
325
37*
37*
374
368, 372
329

330
374. 38I
374
374. 439
374. 439
614

101
101-126
102-103
103
104
105
112-113
113
114
114-115
115
117
118
121
122
124
139
145-146
145-162
147
147-148
149

376
361
379
364.
376
376
377
330
330,
378
364
363.
380,
38I

150
151
152
153
155-156

584
573* 584II
585. 586
585
585

376

36*

378

380

381, 438, 440
380, 381

6*5
587
583. 587
585
584. 584

index

734
VA
157-158
159
159-160
160
161
161-162
162
163-181
164
165
166
167
168
170
170-171
172
172-175
176
176-177
177
178
179
180
181
182
182-185
183
183-184
184
185
187-204
189
190
191
192
193
195
196
197
198
199
200-201
202
203
204
207
207-229
208
208-211
210
212
213
213-214
214
214-218
215

of

t e x t s

cited

VA
586
591
587

271, 586, 587
584, 591, 616

587
587, 587
53, 566
567
567
568II
569//
574
57° II
570,
571
570. 570II
570
567, 570. 570II, 572
570
573II, 574//
* f > 7 > 5 7 1 . 572
575II
574. 575II, 576
576
5*5
550
551, 55J
55T
551II
551
588

589
592, 592, 593
591
587, 589
588, 588, 5 9 3
589ih 589, 590
590, 592
590
5 8 7 . 590, 5 9 1 ' 592
591
592
591
592
477
493 >
490

500

215-217
216
217
217-218
218
218-221
220
221
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
231-256
234
236
241
245
247-248
249
251-252
252
253-255
256
257-282
258-261
259
260
261
263
264-265
267
269
271-272
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273-274
275-276
276
277
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280-281
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499
494.
499Ih
495
493.
11

497
6*3
499

493

492, 640

493. 495, 499 lh 579
I * U, 13, 493
496
11 /I, 13, 498, 499
501, 582, 638

494.
498
493. 501. 545
496, 4981/, 500, 528, 544
496, 500
595
605
605
612
610
612
607

598

607
610

574,

640

484

547

488

488
4*9. 547
60S
449,
487
485
485
485
485, 486
486
486

485. 486
4S6
486, 4S6
487

487

498, 500
492

494
495. 49^
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497
493- 494. 495. 497
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35-36
36
36-37
37
39
42
43
44
44-45
45

597
598, 602
611
608
598, 600
386, 602
374
597. 607
612
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376
375
377
375
375. 37*> 384
377
377
377
376
330
377. 378
379
377
6xx
379
3791!
380
376
380, 380, 605, 613

52
55
59
64
66
67
68
72
74
76
77
79
82-83
82-84
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85
86
87
87-89
89
90
92
93
94
95-96
96
97

598, 600, 612
598, 608
602
377
375. 54*
375
546, 637
440

38596,

613

99-101

384

101
102
103
107
108
109
110
111-115
113
114
115
116
118
119
119-120
120
122-124
124
125
125-126
128
131
132
133
134-135
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137
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140-141
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143
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385. 385. 386
386
602, 6x8
4> 34
596, 6x3
611
6ix, 618
6*5
617
597
615
597
597
598, 609
385
610
603
269, 603
604
603
420, 6x5
597
542
10
12
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4p 615
385
603
611
6x3, 614, 6x6
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386, 6x2, 6x6
385, 386, 603
6o6t 638
604, 6061/
605, 6i$t 615

150
153
154
157
158
159
160
161
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162-163
164
164-165
168
170
171-172
172
174

59Ö

38*

379
596
59*
610//
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599, 6°2
6x0
6x0
611
609, 611
59911
602
602
600
600
599II, 600, 601
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615
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[47 c 3-48 b 17] 167, z68, 178
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24-25
25-27
28-29
31
34
41
46

618
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238. 253
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245
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236, 252
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223, 224//,
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406

24-25
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25*11.253II
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245. 245, 253
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Aeschylus 256
Allemann, B. 442
Anaximander 484,514-526» 514, 515,
517. 520, 526, 534, 634
Aristotle x-xi, 4, 5, io, 22, 23, 27,
94, 95, 162, 169, 266, 309-316, 309,
310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316,
317, 318, 320, 351, 354, 379, 384.
389, 488, 490, 492, 541. 547» 56#,
627,663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 669, 670,
671
Augustine, St. 27, 664, 667
Bach, J. 297
Bacon, F. 331
Bauch 668
Beaufret, J. 46, 530, 550
Beck 135
Belloc, H. 26g
Berkeley, G. 604
Biemel, W. 37,3g, 50, 51, 65,123, 17g,
211
Birault, H. xxv, 34, 236, 618, 634
Böhme, J. 331
Brentano, F. viii-ix, 3, 4, 27, 629,
631
Brock, W. 71, ig8, 211
Burnet, J. 5x5
Clement of Alexandria 547
Crick, A. 211
De Raeymaeker, L. xxviii
Descartes, R. xiv-xv, 7, 17, 18, 19, 98,
316, 320, 321-330, 321, 322, 323,
324» 325. 326, 328, 329, 330. 331.
332, 335. 355. 358, 361. 365, 371.
381, 393» 396, 418, 419, 421, 664,
665, 667
De Waelhens. A. xxix, 59, 51, 65,
123,21X, 25g, 626
Dilthey, W. 28, 630
Dondeyne, A. xxix, 43
Droysen, j . 665
Duns Scotus 27, 629

Ebbinghaus, J. 664
Eckhart, (Meister) 600, 627
Eisler, R. 113
Eliot, T. S. 299
Fichte, J. G. xiv-xv, 326, 330, 361, 381,
663, 666, 668
Fink, E. xxix
Gadamer, H. G. xxvi
George, S. 496, 636
Greeks xxii-xxiii, 4, 238, 239, 255, 257,
261, 268, 285, 295, 296, 305, 310,
314, 449, 450, 487, 500, 516, 522,
528
Gröber, C. 3
Hegel, G. W. F. xxvi, 19,122, 325, 326,
329, 33°, 331-360, 331, 332, 333,
334> 338, 339. 340. 341. 342, 348.
349. 350, 353» 354. 355» 356, 358.
359. 360, 361, 381, 385, 386, 390,
398, 440, 441, 473, 490. 533» 534»
546, 547, 605, 627, 635, 665, 666,
667, 668, 669, 670, 671
Heraclitus 1 1 , 1 3 , 22, 23, 261, 265, 268,
280, 290, 294, 296, 310, 314, 316,
391, 419, 484-489, 484, 485, 486,
487, 488, 489, 490-501, 490, 491,
492, 499, 500, 5IO. 514» 547» 579.
670
Hölderlin, F. 4, 296, 3gi, 403. 411-412,
411, 423-433, 423, 425» 426, 432,
435, 440-472, 440, 442» 443» 445,
446, 449» 450, 454» 461, 463, 466,
467. 473» 474, 476, 482, 490, 555»
571» 575, 577, 583, 588, 589, 590,
592, 598, 604, 629, 635, 638, 640,
668, 670
Homer 10, 295, 296, 516
Hull, R. F. C. 2x1
Husserl, E. viii-ix, xii-xiii, 27, 28, 64,
178, 179, 194, 548, 631, 634, 664
Jantzen, H. 490
Jünger, E. 374
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607, 603, 604, 605, 606, 608, 611,
Kant, I. xiv-xv, i8, 27. 28, 29, 30, 31,
616, 629, 663, 667, 670
32. 33, 60, 64, 93, 98, 103, 106-160,
106, 107, 108, 109, 110, I I I , 112, Pascal, B. 396, 399
Pasternak, B. 401
113, 114, 116, 117, ri8, 120, I2i,
Picot 7
122, 124, 125, 126, 128, 129, 130,
Pindar 296
132, 133. 134. 135, 136, 137. 142,
Plato xii-xiii, 5, II, 12, 13, 17, 23, 227,
143, 144, 146, 148, 149, 150, 151,
230, 255, 30i-308, 301, 303, 305, 306,
152, 155. 157. 158. 159. 160, 162,
308, 309, 311, 313, 314, 316, 317,
182, 183, 191, 244, 326, 329, 330,
3*8, 3*9. 325, 362, 383. 387. 388,
332, 361. 37*. 381, 385, 386, 390,
503, 507, 509, 551. 575, 604, 605,390, 440, 441, 522, 547, 551, 568,
606, 665, 667, 670
606, 635, 663, 665, 666, 667, 668,
Pre-Socratics 17, 473, 484, 595, 612,
670
629, 663
Kierkegaard, S. 28
Protagoras 419, 420
Krebs 663
Kreutzer, C. 559
Laotse 569, 571
Lauer, Q. 44
Leibniz, G. W. 14, 18, 30,162,164, 203,
326,328-329, 328, 32g, 334, 361, 365,
371, 381, 392, 667, 668, 669, 670
Lötz, J. B. xxv
Luther, M. 371
Marx, K. 385, 386, 533, 547
Möller, J. 66
Mörike, E. 594
Müller, M. xxix, 27, 202, 626
Natorp, P. 663
Neo-Kantians 27, 29, 102, 149
Newton, I. 97
Nietzsche, F. xvi-xvii, 19, 281,
326, 328, 329, 330, 361-382, 361,
363. 364. 365, 368, 370. 371.
373, 374. 375» 376, 377» 378,
380, 381, 382, 383, 38g, 390,
395- 40°, 4*3. 434-439, 434,
438, 475» 502, 508, 510, 513.
531. 533, 595. 605, 606, 608,
668, 669, 670

297,
362,
372,
379,
391,
437,
527.
611,

Rilke, R. M. 391-400, 3 9 1 , 392, 393,
395. 396, 397, 398, 399. 4 00 » 5 2 7 ~
529, 527, 529, 535
Sappho 621
Sartre, J. P. 134, 388, 390, 531, 548,
637
Schadewaldt, W. 667
Scheler, M. 28
Schelling, F. 326, 330, 361, 381, 666,
668, 669
Schiller, F. 668, 670
Schleiermacher, F. 630
Schopenhauer, A. 361, 363
Scott, D. 444
Sextus Empiricus 664
Shakespeare, W. 209
Socrates 13
Sophists 22, 23
Sophocles 262, 268, 270, 290, 296, 517
Staiger, E. 594
Suarez, F. 319
Thomas Aquinas, St. 27, 320, 627, 665
Thomas, D. 25
Trakl, G. 577, 629, 635

Ott, H. x x v

Van Breda, H. xxix
Van Gogh, V. 404, 405, 593

Parmenides 11, 23, 94. 268, 269-272,
269, 280, 284, 290, 296, 391, 418,
419, 484, 527, 534. 595. 596, 597-

Wahl, J. 259
Welte, B. xxix
Wolf, E. 668

I I I . I N D E X OF G R E E K T E R M S
In this list: roman characters refer to the main text; italics refer to footnotes;
boldface characters indicate thematic treatment in whole chapters, or at least
in significant parts of them.

A. GNOMES
T& yip OCÜT& voelv laiiv rz xal elvat
xara TO /pewV. Si86vai yap AUTA
(Parmenides, Fg. 3) 269-272, 269,
Sbajv xal T£CTLV aXX:fjXoi£ TRJ?
604
(Anaximander, Fg. 9)
517-521
T6 ^ 8uv<Sv WORE n€ic, #V TU; XA&OI XpT]: T6 X£yeiv re voelv T' : iöv:
g^evai, (Parmenides, Fg. 6) 596,
(Heraclitus, Fg. 16) 484-486, 484,
597-605, 603, 604
485

B. WORDS AND PHRASES
<fcya&6v
303, 304, 306, 308
'ocyxißacb)
510
dtöixCa
515, 517, 518, 520
kd (Sv)
86
aWa
23, 304, 319
OCSTLOV
162
dtX7)&eia xii-xiii 313, 314, 359, 388,
441, 565, 669
'AX^eta
484-489, 487, 492, 607
dc-X^-freia xii-xiii, 7, 8, 9, 12, 14, 17,
20, 186, 191, 192, 201, 216, 217,
261, 262, 267, 268, 305, 308, 315,
316, 360, 373, 382, 400, 412, 440,
492, 501. 522, 524, 544, 545, 554,
565, 58r, 608, 624, 637, 639
'A-Xrj&eta 608, 611, 618, 620, 640,
656, 659
'A-A^&aa
xxii-xxiii, 640
aXrj^eOetv
x-xi, 271
av«(JW7)cns
xii-xiii
#v&pco7cos
280, 281
dwraiSeuota
387
&7retpov
521
dc7T09aivec-&ai
46, 492
apfxovta)
486
dtp*?} 23» 1&2> 310-311 (a. xtv7]<Teco<; =
<puau;)
313, 521, 651
dheX^s
311
afrca
515, 517, 520
aur6
269, 606, 607, 627
y^veou; (~9&opdc)

515, 657

8etv6v, -OTaTov
StjXouv
81a - X£yea$ai
349, 352,
SiavoELCT-öm
8ta(pep6{JLevov
8ia<popa
8i86vai (. . . StxTjv) 515, 517, 519,

2 70
46
385
385
579
579
520

StX7) 262-263, 262, 263, 271, 431,
SoxeTv
Suvajxi?
Suvov

515, 517, 518, 650
263
441, 442
667
484, 485

eT8o<; 307, 308, 311, 312, 313, 314.
317. 568
eI8os (-töetv)
17,18, 307
elvai 4, 86, 269, 272, 317, 418, 604,
638
536
gx-aracn^
^jxfjLevat
596, 597. 603, 604
"Ev (see also "Ev-IIavTa) 11, 22, 485.
486, 493. 560
IQ1.
hv bccuzolc (apx^))
33*
£v£pyeta 257, 314, 317, 318, 320, 667
£vepyeia 6v
317
499»
"Ev-IIdcvTa Ii, 1 3 , 22, 492, 493» 560
^v-aracng
^VTeXixeta 266, 310-311,
^vTeXc^ela ov

536

314, 317.
568
317
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10, I I , 516
596, 597. 6 o 3 . 604
516
23. 351. 384
317
486
631
22
516

gpyov
ipjx7jveueiv
Ipco?
&JTLV
g/Giv, -ov

II

A6yoq 11,
494» 495.
501, 502,
528, 527,
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13, 4 9 0 - 5 0 1 , 492, 493,
496, 497. 498, 499, 500,
503, 509, 512, 513, 527528, 529, 543. 552. 553.

554. 558, 559, 571. 576, 577-581,

577. 578, 579. 580, 581, 582, 593,
607, 608-610, 609, 611, 612, 613,
614, 6x6, 619, 633, 635, 636, 638,
650, 656, 657, 659, 670
280, 281
X6yoc #v#pw7iov g/ov

280, 281, 389
486

£wov X6yov

389,

f) (see ov ft Öv)

354. 357

54*

86

488
&Etov
&S<I)pElV
-Ö-eOlpTJTtXT)
•8-ecopla

9
257
23
2 5 7 ' 271, 355, 543

301, 306, 307,
töeiv
xac&6Xou
»cat
xaTa Ttvo?
xornqyopEiv
xa-nqyoplat
xlv7jais
XIVOUJJLSVOC
xoiv6v
X6O[JLOQ
xpCvetv
xpiais
XpUTTTEO&Ott

308, 313, 314,
551. 568
306, 307, 308

515. 517. 519
383» 384. 386
383
383
310, 313, 314, 651
310, 313
9. 3 "
486, 577
623, 633
623, 633, 635, 660
265, 3x0

Xav&avetv
484, 487
X£yew (see X£yciv-voeiv) x-xi, 46,
185, 262, 267, 268, 282, 283, 343,

349, 384, 410, 417, 419, 490-501,

491, 492,
498, 5 ° i .
X£yeiv-voetv
410, 417,

TERMS

493.
584,
267,
491,

494.
596,
268,
498,

495.
603,
282,
584,

496,
604,
283,
591,

497.
631
391,
596,

602-605, 602, 603, 604, 607, 659

Xt)£T)
9, 487, 492
Atj&7)
638, 640
XoyixVj
384
X6yoq x-xi, 9, 20, 22, 66, 204,
261-262, 263,
268,
280,
281,

282-283, 282, 283, 292, 294, 3x4,
315» 316, 355, 383, 384, 385, 397,
412, 414. 431, 434, 438,
486,

490-501, 497, 549, 569, 608, 609,
651

12
[xera
4
[IET £xetva . . . zii; TGCOTOC
5
jjLETa xa (puaixa
4, 13
\lZT0Xf]
11
JXT)
^
485
JX7) 80VOV 7TOTE
484, 485
[LTL OV
317
Motpa
595, 598, 606
jxopqjT) 311, 312, 313, 314, 315,56«. 651
VOEIV (see X£yeiv-voeiv) 267, 2 6 8 - 2 6 9 ,
268, 269, 272, 282, 283, 292, 301,
307. 309. 383. 384. 385. 410. 4M.
417, 418, 441, 442, 491, 498, 596.
603, 604, 638
v6(i.o<;
426
vouq
307, 604
6(z.oCo>ciLq
307
ojjLoXoyeiv 494. 495» 497» 498, 501
8v 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 86, 317,

343, 348, 441, 442, 515-517, 515,

516, 570, 606, 657
6v fj Öv 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 23, 27, 348,
354, 355. 357. 360
OV XOC&6XOU OXpÖTttTOV
9
ov X£yeTai rcoXXax&S
x-xi
(Svojia
496
ÖV70C
5. 315. 517
8VT<O<; Öv
86, 307, 317
tfpyavov
384, 399
17. 307. 308
oux
485
ouata xii-xiii, 4, 9, 23, 86, 307, 310,
3 « . 313. 314. 317. 3*8
äcp&eZaa
307
TratSeCa
303, 387, 388
IIotvTa (see *'Ev-IIavTa)
11, 22, 560
IIapjxevt87j?
667
Ttapouoia 86, 336, 337-339, 337. 338,

339» 345. 350, 351. 352, 353. 35^.
357» 359. 652
7r£pa£
Tcoif]aiQ
7roiouixeva
7r6Xetio<;

521
669
311
261, 262, 268, 406, 486
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4&5

7T6XI$
7roXXaxo>(;
7upaYM-aTa

x-xi
53
53» 542
516
23
486
484

TTpo e6vra
7rpwTai apxa£
7CUp
71
pico

384

aa<p£(rrepoc (fynv, 9uaei, aTCXcoq) 315
«T7)|iaLveiv
496
496
07}fjtaVTtX7J
ax^iq
35 1 » 352, 353. 355
S091CTT1f)<;
665
ao<p6v
22
otip7)cyt(; 240, 312-313, 312, 313,
315. 651
419
oco^eiv
596,
Te . . . T*
TeXeuTata
T^Xo?
265,
xijjLvetv
T^XVT)
271, 272, 287,
TICTLV aXXiqXoiq
515. 517.
t6 tL
elvat
uXT)

603, 604
304
310, 568
528
415, 586
519. 520

86

3 1 1 , 312, 314, 651

TERMS

U7rOXEl(jLEVOV
uTC^OTaat?

3 " . 384
311

<Pai8pO£
667
l
qxxlveö&ai
7> 355» 630, 631
<patv6fA£vov, -a
46,627,631
9atv6xaTov
304
cpOopa
515
9tXcIv
22, 265, 3IO
qjiXia
4 86
9uaet ÖVTCC
5» 315
«puaixa
4-5
q>üm<; 5, 17, 239, 261-263, 261, 262,
263, 264, 265, 266, 269, 272, 276,
277, 280, 281, 282, 2S4, 301, 308,

309-316,

3<>9. 310. 3 " . 313. 3 H .
315. 3i6, 359. 373. 423. 424. 431.
434. 485. 486, 491, 518, 650, 651,
669
496

Xaoc;
Xetp

520,
520, 521,
Xpaw, xpao(j.ai
515, 517, 520, 521,
Xpewv
596, 597. 603,
XP^
Xckpoc
Xtoptajj.6^
<fe08o<;

426
477
597
597
522
604
12
12
667

IV. G E N E R A L

INDEX

The complexity of the problematic with which the foregoing study deals makes
it difficult to compose an adequate Index and impossible to compose a complete
one. We have not tried to be exhaustive, and, in cataloguing terms which occur
frequently, we have sought to include only those references which, when taken
in conjunction with others, would add to the reader's understanding of any given
theme. The result is a series of references that are, if not exhaustive, at least, we
hope, significant. If this catalogue sends the reader through the documentation
of the present study to the works themselves of Heidegger, it will have served its
purpose well. Conventions: parentheses indicate subordinate entries within subentries; " n " added to a number indicates reference to a footnote.

Abide, -ing, meaning of, 453; and
authenticity, 557; and being at
home, 453, 557; as continuous homecoming, 460; and original time, 427;
of thinker, 470; and Source as
Ground, 459
Absolute, meaning of (Hegel), 332-334;
as antecedent to man, 338; as Being
consists in Shining-forth, 336-337;
in certitude, 331-332; and God
(dialectic), 385; and human individuals, 334, 337, 350-353 ; aspresentative subject, 335-336; as release
from dependence, 333; as Will (Hegel), 337; and God as ground of
certitude, 332; in knowing, aspects
of, 333; knowing prior to human
knowing, 337; and process of
absolvence, 340; see also Awareness
Absolutes, in thought, see Eternal,
Thought (foundational), Relativism,
Rigor
Accept, -ing, meaning of, 269; as
concentration, containment, 272;
correlative with to-be, 269-272, 604;
as taking under one's care, 603
Acceptance, in creator of art, 414; as
de-cision, 432; and man as measure,
420; of relation to Being, 287; as
thanks, 601
Access, to Being (by language) 397,
(and power of speech) 540; to beings
275. 278, (only through Being) 430,
(through house of language) 528
Accessibility, of beings and ontological
knowledge, 112; and the Open
(Heidegger vs. Rilke), 392; b y
transcendence of There-being, 149-

150

Achieve, -ing, -ment see Assume,
Thought (as fulfilment)
Acquiescence,
and
foundational
thought, 21; as re-solve, 237, 619;
and thanks-giving, 602; see also
Docility, Re-solve, Surrender,
Thought (as thanks-giving), Willingness.
Act, see Actuality
Across, being as, 567, (vs. op-posed)
420 n
Actuality, implies activity 318; supreme, 319; for Hegel (see also Real),
343; for Kant, 125 n; for Nietzsche,
Address, of Being (WM:Ep), 476-477;
see also Appeal, Claim, E-vocation,
Hail, Throwing
Advance, -ing, of Being, 559 (in artwork) 408, (contained) 409; and
freedom unto death, 78-79, 83-84;
and Life-force, 366; to poet, 424;
re-solve
and
ontic-ontological
authenticity, 7 7 ; see also Ad-vent,
Being-as-advent
Ad-vent, of Being, 421, 424-425, (and
adventure) 550, (and poetic moment) 428-429; as future, 455; SZ
still in, 625
Ad-ventive, meaning of, 421 n ; response as, 428; character of thought,
421; thought and un-said, 488-489 ;
see also Future, Re-collection, Retrieve, Un-said
Ad-vertence, as activation of man's
relation to Absolute, 352-353; and
expose 354; and ft of 5v ft 8v, 357
Affectivity, see Attunement, Mood,
Disposition
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Alpha privative, sense of, 185-186, 305
Alterity, in analysis of truth, 222-223,
225-226, 228, 243; of Being, 240,
244; of conscience, 80; implied
b y "liberation," 247; of Non-being,

203, 244
Ambiguity, of Awareness (knowingknown), 346-347; of being-ness, 7,
317; and inauthenticity, 7 1 ; of
natural knowing (Hegel), 343; of
g, (and genuine thought) 442;
of ouma, u7Toxst(zevov, 3 1 m ; see also
Ambivalence
Ambivalence,
and
Being, 12;
as
differentiated,
580;
forgotten
(Hegel), 359-360; of fxop<pY), 313;
of 8v, 10-13, 441» 606; and ontotheo-logical
structure
of
metaphysics, 11; and Plato, 1 1 - 1 2 ; and
Pre-Socratics, 1 0 - 1 1 ; and withdrawal, 608; of cpuatc;, 310
Amen, see Yes
Analysis, sense of (lay-free), 183; existential, 49 n, (discernible in Heidegger II) 625-626, (and ego) 98,
(function of) 50, (as interrogation of
Being) 243, (and problem of realismidealism) 103, (and subjectivism)
102, (of truth) 94-97; of language
and phenomenology, 593
Angels, and gods as intermediaries,
446 n
Antecedent, comprehension, see Comprehension; opposed-ness, see Opposed-ness; orientation, see Orientation
Anthropological, see Anthropology
Anthropology, and humanism, 327;
of Scheler influenced Heidegger, 28;
origin of, 336-327
Anticipation, as comprehension, 63;
and ecstatic nature of existence, 74;
see also Comprehension,
Drivetoward-Being
Antigone, choral ode of, 262, 268, 270
Anti-truth, 225, (as anti-essence of
Being) 240; see also Un-truth
Anxiety, 72-74, 196-199; and achievment of authenticity, 79-80, 84; and
conscience, 81; as cowardice, 474;
discloses (Being of There-being),
73-74, (totality of beings in its negation, sc. Non-being) 196-197;
vs. fear, 72; inspired by Overpowering, 270; and
Non-being,
72, 19&-197. 477; for self, 73; and
subjectivism, 99; rarity of, 73, 198;
as speechlessness, 482 n; unity of
about-for in, 73; in W M and SZ,

i n d e x
200; in WM (text vs.

Epilogue),

476-477
Appeal,
meaning of, 477 n; and
Being-as-mittence, 550 n; of Being
in things, 574-575; of Beon, 560;
and e-vent, 614; as efficacious evocation,598; and origin of language,
609; of pathway, 559; and throwing
of There, 538
Appear, -ance, -ing, sense of, 263;
mere, 264; pre-SZ, 630; see also
being-as-it-appears, Seeming-to-be
Apperception, transcendental, meaning of, 120-121; correlate of unity
of, 136; presupposes unifying unity,
126; unfied with pure intuition
by transcendental imagination, 127;
see also Deduction, Imagination,
Institution, Schematism
Appertain to Being, see Appurtenance
Appetitus, in Leibniz, 328-329; and
will, 329, 365
Apprehension, and mis-apprehension,
96; pure (as pure synthesis), 142143
Ap-propriation, and e-vent, xx-xxi,
486 n, 614 n; of man by Language,
578; as release, 504; of There by

A6yos, 498
Appurtenance, of man to Being, 280281, 421, (willed) 466
A-priori, and grounding of metaphysics, 30; for Kant, 113, 368;
knowledge grounded in transcendental imagination, 127; synthesis,
30; view of opposed-ness, 115; of
to-be-in-the-World, 99
Arrangement, sense of, 262-263; and
Anaximander, 517-518; and finitude, 518; see also Articulative-ness,
Dis-arrangement, Matrix, Meaningfulness (Total)
Art, conserver of, 408; creation of,
407-408, (needs conservation) 408;
essentially historical, 412 n; as
value (superior to truth), 370; and
poetizing, 409-412; pre-SZ, 629;
and truth, 405-409; see also Artwork, Discord, World (and earth)
Articulate-ness, as logos, 67; see also
Logos
Articlua-tion, and hermeneutic, 67;
see also Language
Articulative-ness,
as
arrangement,
262-263; and Total Meaningfulness,
67, {see also World); of truth of
Being, 249; of truth of beings, 247;
see also Arrangement, Matrix of
relationships
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Art-work, vs. artifact, thing, 404;
as battle-ground of truth, 405-407;
as confluence of three movements,
408-409; as created, 407-408; origin
of artist in, 403; not pro-duced by
cause, 413 ; and revealing of beings,
405; see also Art, Discord, World
(and earth)
Ascending path, see Deduction
Aspect, as object of vision, 329,
367-368; as value 367; see also See(n,
having-)
Assume, -ing, and authenticity, 50; of
commitment, 447; of disclosure of
beings, 271; as process of thought,
21, 282; as handing-over heritage,
90; by man as collect-or, 283;
measure, 591; as posing question,
289; of self and temporality, 89;
of way of seeming-to-be, 285; as
whiling, 419-420; as with-standing,
539-540; see also Authenticity, Recollection, Respond, Take-over
Attend-ant, as gathering-point, 494;
of Being, 504; of A6yoq, 497-498;
and thinking "of" Being, 542, ("of"
A6y°£) 498-499
Attend, -ing, meaning of, 294; to
appeal of Simple, 560; as concurring
(ojxoXoyew), 497; and dialogue, 458,
526; and double ap-propriation,
504; as letting measure come, 591;
as mode of logos, 68-69; as more
fundamental than questioning, 617;
as response to A6yo?> 581; to self,
69; and thanks-giving, 602; and
thinking "of" Being, 542, ("of"
A6yos) 498-499; as thought, 253;
to Utterance, 611; and viewing, 613;
to word of Being, 249
Attentiveness, see Attend, -ing
At-tract, -tion, meaning (Rilke), 392;
and consciousness, 393; as hail
(Heidegger), 608
Attunement, and Being as negatived,
461-462; to Beon, 561; and captivation by beings, 165; and ensemble
of beings, 219; kinds of (awe vs.
anxiety), 477, (wonderment, sorrow)
555; vs. ontological disposition (SZ),
65; and ontological disposition, 626;
and self-disclosure of Being, 476477; and thought as experience, 478
Authenticity, meaning of, 50-51;
achieving of, 77-84, 237, 287; and
ad-verting,
357;
by
assuming
measure, 591; of attend-ant, 499;
and Being-unto-death, 77-80,83-84;
and Being-as-negatived, 432; and
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call of conscience, 81; of concern,
540; by de-cision, 287-288, 610;
of dwelling by working, thinking,
587; and essence of truth, 233-237;
and eternal return, 379-380; and
every dayness, 71; in existential
dimension, 77-80,188; in existential
and existentiell dimensions, 83-84;
in existentiell dimension, 80-83,
188-191; as freedom, 187; as
freedom-unto-death, 77-80, 83-84,
574; and freedom of thought, 619;
of gathering-point, 494-495; as
grounding of There-being, 416; as
growing old, 557; for Heidegger I
vs. II, 624; in language, 293-294,
580-581; in language for Rilke,
399-400; by measuring Dimension,
590-591; for Nietzsche, 375, 380;
and per-cepting by beings, 419;
potentiality for, 73 ; by questioning,
615-617; byre-solve, 101, 508-509,
529, {see also Re-solve); as selfcommitment, 499; and spirit of
vengeance, 376; and step-in-reverse
512, 576 ; and thanks, 601-602, 626,
(see also Thought as thanks); and
thought as willing, 507-508; and
transcendental founding, 182, 192;
of utterance, 316, 496-497; and
with-standing, 539-540; and working, 586-587; see also Assume, -ing,
Re-trieve, Work, -ing
Aware, To be (Bewußtsein), 335, 347;
see also Absolute, Awareness, Consciousness
Awareness, history of, 344; as measure
and measured, 345-346; as Presence
of presentedness, 336 ; key-word of
post-Cartesian philosophy, 359; as
Absolute (own concept), 341-345,
(own norm) 345-346, (own test)
346-347; three principles of, 340347; unity of natural and real, 344;
see also Absolute, Self-awareness
Awareness, affective, see Disposition
Awe, vs. anxiety, 474; as attunement
of poet, 461; before mystery, 452;
origin of, 485, 608 n; and Therebeing as awesome, 270
Awesome, There-being as, 270, 273,
275

Bearing, given by things (beings) to
World, 578
Become, -ing, sense of word, 38 n;
and conditions of constancy - surpassment, 366-369; and ybtsaiQ <p&opa, 515; and Life-force, 364-
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365; as conceived by Lebniz vs.
Nietzsche, 329; and un-truth, 369 n;
see also Being and Becoming

Beginning, conserved, 290; vs. origin,
see Origin
Being, as aboriginal Utterance, 609,
(see Aoyo;); and Absolute (Hegel),
356, 358-360, (see also Absolute,
Awareness) ; as actuality, Act, 3 1 8 319; as Ad-vent, 421, 424-425;
dX7}0eta as law of, 549; as All, 640;
ambiguity of in W W , 245-246; and
ambivalence, 12; anti-essence of,
240; appeal of, 477; and appearing,
263-264; as arrival, 549, 555, {see
B. as Ad-vent); and Becoming, 260,
365, (see also Become, -ing); not a
being, 6; vs. beings, see Difference
(ontological); and beings inseparable, 493; gives beings their "is," 4;
as B. of beings, 165, 174, 246, 413,
418, 597, 605-606, (Holy reveals
self mediately) 429, (without beings)
476, 520-521; never without beings,
523, 562; of beings-in-the-ensemble,
245,
(see also beings-in-the-ensemble) ; of beings as such, not just
of man, 281-282; as Beon, see Beon;
bestowal of, 411; bounty of, 477;
as collectedness, 261-263; as comingto-pass of the ontological difference,
203, {see fl/soDifference[ontological]);
as coming-to-presence, 228, 239240; of beings as concealed concealment, 264, (when beings revealed) 236, (see also Concealment,
Errance, Mystery); as contentious,
546, (see also Discord); -unto-death,
see Death; determined by Time,
x x - x x i ; disclosed in There, see
Correlation, Need, There, Therebeing, Want; as dynamism, 365;
emergent power of, 17, 261, 263,
266-268, 277, 280, (see also <puai?);
-unto-end, see Death; as
266; as errance, 240, 242, 551, (see
also Errance); as Essence, 228, 239,
245, (see also Essence, [-ing]); as
eternal heart, 427; as e-vent and
ultimate unity, 638, (see also E-vent);
as existence, 318; as Expanse, 5025°3> 577-578; as Extra-ordinary,
461, 469; as finite, see Finitude;
as forgetting, 449, 487; and four
modes of (Aristotle), x-xi; as the
Free, 618-619; as Fullness, 640; as
gathering-process, 261-262,
491493, 512; and Y^etft^Bopd, 515'>
gift of, 411, 413, 598-599, 601; as

i n d e x
Glad-some, 443-444; grace of, 477,
635;
graciousness of,
477;
as
Ground, 445, 493, (and project)
460-461; as ground of metaphysics,
7; in general, 9-10, 134-135, 203,
(see also Metaphysics [general], Ontology, Onto-theo-logical); grammar and etymology of, 260; as
hailing, 445-446; as h a n d l i n g process, 520-521; for Heraclitus,
485-486; as history, 279, 533~534.
(consummation of) 639, (as Being
itself) 437, (and de-liverance) 618 n,
(and inter-mittence) 21, 435 n, 464465, (and There-being) 635, (vs.
There-being as history) 624, (see
also History); as Holy, 426-427,
444, (in ad-vent) 455, (and commitment) 445, (as de-ranging) 426,
(and the divine) 426, (and hailing)
446n, (as primordial poem) 445,
(and Rilke) 399-400, (source of
poet's historicity) 464-465, (becomes word) 429, (see also Poet,
Poetizing, Poetry); vs. Holy, 544 ;
as horizon, 147-150, 503-504; as
Immediate, 424; inclines to conceal
self
(Heraclitus), 265, 310; as
Ineluctable, 481; as the Joyous, 444,
(in re-serve) 555; as Language,293>
(see also Language, A6yoQ, Utterance) ; as Law, 426, 549; as lightingprocess of metaphysics, 6; as A6yoQ,
491^493» (a^d Ground) 493, 57°.
(see also A6yoq); as manifestation of
beings, 43; as mittence (meaning),
20, 435 n, (to poet) 445, (poet's
acceptance of) 466, (unto thought)
437, 542, 546, (see also Mittence);
as mystery, see Mystery; as nameable, 509; and nature, 17, (Hölderlin) 423, (Rilke) 392; need of, see
Need, Want; as negatived, see
Concealment, Negativity, Truth,
Un-truth; as Non-being, 38, 200201, 424, 477, 521, 535, (see also Nonbeing) ; as non-concealment in Hegel
356, (see also Non-concealment);
made object of thought, 432, (see
also Forgottenness); and obligation,
260; and " o f " as subjective and
objective genitive, 249, 498-499,
542; as Omni-presence, 425; as One,
492, 527. 554, 559-560, 640, (polyvalent) 570-572, (see also " E v ) ; as
One-and-Only, 240, 245; as Only,
492, 554, 640; as Open, 214-215,
217, 231, 288, (Heidegger vs. Rilke)
392, (presupposed by horizon of
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transcendence) 503-504; as Origin,
as Traction (Rilke), 392, 396-397;
444-445, (of awe) 6o8n, (and the
as Treasure, 640; and truth, see
Holy) 426, (and origination) 460;
Truth, (and foundational thought)
and origination, 411; as Over20, (independent of man) 504 n,
powering, see emergent power of B.;
(KM)^ 151-152, (WG) 174-176, (see
path unto, 284; as 9601.?, a-X7)&£ia,
also aXrj'&eta); is un-thematic, 33X6-yo<;, 8Ut), see 96ms, dt-X^&eta, 34, 148; and violence of re-trieve,
Xayoq, Sbaj; and poet, 448-453;
159; as wealth, 477, 479, 489, 609,
poly valence of, see Quadrate; not
638, 640, {see also Un-said, Unposed by subject, xviii-xix; as
thought); as well-spring, 295, 640;
power of fortune, 256; as Presence,
as what-ness, 306-307, 317; as Will,
see Presence, (-ing); as present329, 365, 371. (Rilke) 391-392. see
edness, see Present-edness;
as
also Will-unto-Power; dwells in
present-ness, 336, 358-359; problem
words, 528, {see also Language,
of, see Question of Being; processA6yoq, Utterance, Word(s)); the
character of, 6n; as project of
word disappears from vocabulary
There-being, 150, 204, 238, -244,
of Heidegger II, 633; as World,
273-274; as pure Act, see Actuality;
i67n, {see also World)
-question, viii-xv, (and comprebeing, -as-it-appears (vs. b. -as-ithension) 34, (as corresponding with
seems-to-be), non, (vs. thing-in-itreversal) xviii-xix, (and finitude) 33,
self) m , (and finitude of know(fulfilled in thinking reversal) xviiiledge) 110, (in KM) 263; as thatxix, (for Heidegger) 24, (and time)
which-comes-to-presence, 214; in it173--174, (primacy in SZ, WG), 174,
self (Kant vs. heidegger), 149; -to-be(validity of) xviii-xix, see also
judged, 212, 214-215; -to-be-known,
Question; as questionable, 15, 6152^3-215, (and horizon of transcen616; as residence of non-truth, 241,
dence) 30, (as outside knower) 112,
{see Un-truth); for Rilke (as Nature,
(and rule) 131; as measure of correctLife, Venture, Ground, Centre,
ness, 215; as that which is open, 214,
Traction, Open) 392; and seeming,
239; as taking origin and thing in itself
see Seeming-to-be; sense of, 7, (and
(Kant), i n ; -underway (Hegel), see
B. as questionable) 15, (common to
Movement; -as-across vs. op-posed,
Aristotle's
four
modes)
x-xi,
420 n, (see also A-cross); see also beings,
(discerned in other phenomena) 628,
beings-in-the-ensemble, Difference
(for Hegel) 358, (as seeableness) 307,
(ontological)
(not seized in concepts) 41, (sought
being-ness, 4, ambiguity of (Aristotle),
in terms of freedom and truth) 192 ;
as Simple, 493, 559~56<>. 640; as
313-314, 317; as Being, 7; double
something-to-be-seen (Plato), 306sense of, 9; as Experience (Hegel),
307, 325; as Source, 248, 257, (and
348; and moved-ness, 311; as
abiding of Poet) 459, (and beings)
9oart£, 310; and realism, 28; as
452, (metaphor of) 448, (of nearseeable, 18 n; see ouata
ness) 452, (recognised as such) 450,
beings, -that-appear, emergent Power
(self-concealing) 446, (of thought)
in, 272; vs. Being, see Difference
249-250 ; as Sphere, 396, (Heidegger
(ontological); Being of (Anaxivs. Rilke) 398 n, 527; as Spirit,
mander), 520-521; in their Being
425-426, (thoughts of) 431-432,444;
(Anaximander), 517-520; as beings,
structure of antecedently known,
114, (see also Comprehension); as
4, 257, 271-273, 283, (see also $v
subjectivity-objectivity, 18; and
^ 6v), (and Being) 43, (and beings-insubject-ness, 325; supreme, 9-11,
ensemble) 9, (and expos£) 354, (and
319,
(as ground [Leibniz]) 14, (Hegel)
language) 293, (manifested by Non360; and ti^vTj, '271-272, (see also
being) 201, 203, (and mittence of
T£XV*J) ; as temporal, see Temporality,
metaphysics) 436, (and metaphysics)
Time; as thing-itself of thought, xiv5, (and tending) 584; dis-covery of,
xv; as thought-worthy, 554, 59744; as free, true, 216, see also being,
598, (and withdrawal) 608, 615;
bein gs-in-1 he-ensemble, Difference
time-character of, xii-xiii; and Time
(ontological), Freedom, Liberation,
as matter for thought, xxii-xxiii;
6v
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beings-in-the-ensemble, as Being, 7, 9,

236, 239, 245-246, 249, 256; and
com-patibility, 519; concealment of,
219-222, 226, 235-236; as emerging
into presence, 239-240;
Therebeing's task to let-be-manifest, 227;
as negatived, revealed b y anxiety,
197-198; and Non-being, 200-201;
Non-being as logical denial of, 205;
orientation toward, 219; questioned
by Greeks, 238; revealing of, 2 1 8 219, (in Art-work) 407; as such,
227-228, 230, 289, (interrogation of)
253, (surrender to) 206, (truth of)
247, (wonderment before) 255
Beon, sense of, 554; as Being as such,
xvi-xvii; as coming-to-pass of reversal, xx-xxi; and mystery, errance,
556; and ontological difference as
such, 565; and poetic word, 457;
and re-collection, 555; as Simple,
559; as in want of thought, xvi-xvii
Between, Being-beings (Heraclitus),
1 1 ; gods and men, 447, (and authentic utterance) 460, (and Dimension) 589; subject-object (and
light of Being), 6, (transcendence
lies) 155, (There-being as) 101
Bid, see Hail
Broken to pieces, see Dashed to pieces
Calchas, 516-517, 524-525
Calculate, -tion, -tive, and aspect, 367;
as certi-veri-fication, 372-374; b y
consciousness (Rilke), 394; and
domination of intelligence, 384 n; as
guarantee of certitude, 323; and
scientific research, 326; and technicity, 327, 374; thinking and foundational thought, 479
Call, see Hail; of conscience, see
Conscience
Captivation by beings, as de-cadence,
275; and referential dependence,
165, 168; as winning ground, 166
Category, -ies, for Aristotle, 383; for
Heidegger,
49 n; as ontological
predicates, 119; and ontological
truth, 251; reality of (Kant), 125;
and schematism, 129, (see also Schematism, Sens-ate, -ing); transcendental deduction of, 124-128; see
also Imagination, Institution
Cause, -ality, and art-work, 413; and
Being-as-act, 318-319; and freedom,
180; and ground, 162, 169; Plato's
Good as first, 304, 3x9 n; and
transcendental founding, 169; uncaused, 319

index
Cave, metaphor of, interpretation of,
303-305; and finitude of truth, 441 ;
and humanism, 387; and metaphysics, 5; narration, 301-302
Center, where ascending-descending
paths cross, 125, 127; of hermeneutic circle, 209, (as correlation
of Being and There-being) 613, (and
e-vent of truth) 638, (see also
Middle-point, Third thing); of institution, 123-124, (see also Imagination, Root, Transcendence);
of man, (There-being as) 153-154,
(transcendental imagination as) 136141, (see also Root); of transcendence (and common root), 136-141,
(imagination as) 124, (see also
Imagination); transcendental imagination as and unity of time, 146
Certi-fication, as calculation, 372; as
justification, 371; of man, 373
Certitude, absolute, as Being, 359;
absolute character of, 19, 331-332;
as guaranteed truth, 323; as known
conformity, 321; and mediaeval
tradition, 319, 322; as norm of truth,
371; truth becomes (Descartes), 18;
of self (Descartes), 322-323, (and
value) 327-328
Choice, and authenticity, 51, 83; and
de-cision, 285; as existential, 190—
191; freedom of, 188; and finitude
of freedom, 189; of self as consummation of phenomenology, X92
Circle, and ontological difference, 416;
hermeneu tic, 41-42, (compared with
Hegel) 338, (correlation center of)
613, (as relation between Being and
man) 506, (and step-in-reverse) 612,
(and structural relationship toAöyoc)
58m
Coexistence, see With-being
Cogito, and Absolute, 331; captive
within (jx^i^, 353; ground of
certitude, 18, 322-323; and res
cogitans (Kant), 155, (Leibniz) 328;
see also I think, Self
Collaboration, with Absolute Will,
352; see Ad-vertence
Collectedness, 261-263; and language
292; of Being (and Quadrate), 571;
see also Gathering-together
Coming, see Future, Ad-vent
Coming-to-pass, as dynamic continuation, 36-37; of imagination, 123; as
process of transcendence, 115; of
truth as
492; see also
Process, E-vent

GENERAL INDEX
Com-mitment, meaning of, 435 n; assuming of (fulfillment of, surrender
to), 447, 466-467, 495, 497; and
endowment, 499 n; and fortune, 91 n;
by Holy, 445; as shepherd of Being,
21; as task-to-be-achieved, 540
Communication, and logos, 68
Com-patibility, and ensemble of beings,
519

Component (s) .existential, 49n, (equally
original), 69-70, (of World) 56; of
positivity, negativity, 9, 167; see
also Existential
Comportment, and accessibility, 114;
and comprehension, 38; concealing,
221, 235; with beings and drawnness, 600 n; grounded in Being, 6,
284, (in ontological difference) 436;
and intentionality, 178; negativity
of founded in Non-Being, 541; as
open (prior to judgement), 214-215,
226, 229; as pro-posing, contraposing,
self-imposing,
394"395
with beings and transcendental
founding, 167-168; types of negativing, 199; as willing (Rilke), 393;
see Encounter, Existentiell, Ontic
Com-pose, -ing, poet does not, 398; as
pro-posing, 394; of thing, 567-568
Comprehend (ingj, see Comprehension
Comprehensible, -bility, sense of, 85;
vs. intelligible, io7n; see also
Sense
Comprehension (of Being), meaning
(of Word), 34 n; as anticipation, 63;
authenticity of, 288; and consciousness (in idealism), 103; and contention between Being and T h e r e , 270;
of Being and correlation of Being and
time, 86; as dynamic process, 36-37;
as existence, 35; as existential component, 59-64; as familiarity with
World, 56; as finite, 37-40, 285; and
finite transcendence (as transcendence), 69; and finitude of man
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sistence, 505-506; and wisdom of
seer, 524-525; of what, how, that,
2i6n; see also Existence, Transcendence
Conceal, -ing, -ment, 5, 234, 256; and
alpha-privative in, 186; Being
inclines to, 265, 370; of Being and
"not," 8; of beings-in-the-ensemble,
219-221, 243; compound, 264, [see
also Errance); concealed (as Being of
beings), 264; concealing of, 221-222,
(forgotten) 222-223, 229, (see also
Mystery); congenital to Being, 265;
and emergence of Being, 17; implied
by emergence, 277, 515; kinds of
(Plato), 305; and finite knowledge,
152; law of, 285, 549; liberation
from, 191, (see also Freedom,
Liberation); of Non-being, 201, (see
also Non-being); precedes revealment, 244, 624, (see also Being as forgetting) ; preserved by There-being,
236, (see also Errance); as retreat,
510; in revealment (mittence), 21,
(see also Mittence); in SZ vs. KM,
i49n; struggle vs., 271, (see also
Violence); as wealth, 638 (see Unsaid, Un-thought); see also Nonconcealment, Un-truth

Concept(s), as Absolute, 341, (and
Meta-physics), 5n; as attack, 420;
and comprehensibility, 85; for Kant,
118, (see also Category, -ies); vs.
mere c. (Hegel), 341; as presentation
of unity, 118, 144; which reflect
(Kant), see Categories; and rule,
118, 131; as self-seizure (Hegel),
234n, 341-343; and shining-forth,
344-345; necessarily rendered sensate (Kant), 130, (see also Schema[ta],
Schematism); sensate-ness of pure,
134, (see also Sensate, -ing); structure
of (and schematism), 129
Concern, and Beon, 554; call of conscience^, 81; -unto-end, 79; and
finitude of reason, 32; formula for,
{status questionis of SZ), 33; finitude
74; as guarding, 532, (mystery) 462;
of, grounded in negativity of Being,
in HB, 539-540; and intentionality
487; and heart of man, 600; and
of Being (Heidegger II), 626-627;
in-being, 59; as initial fact, 33-34;
and need for Being, 72; as original
as innermost essence of finitude,
time, 85-87, 540; of poet, 462-463,
39-40; for Kant, 129; as knowing,
(historical) 464; and task of There,
524-525; of Non-being, 205; in pres282; of There-being for own Being,
ent, 289-290; presupposed, 41; prior
55; time as sense of, 85-87; and
to ontic truth, 163-164; and project,
thought as structure, 506n, (as
60-61; as pure horizon, 147; and
re-cord) 626; totality of, 74-76;
pure synthesis, 114; and re-cord,
unity of, 40, 71-74, (and conscience)
604 n; as relation to Being, 280; as
82; (and time) 88; see also Authensurmise, 428, 604 n; and thought as ekticity, Existence, Transcendence
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Concordance, see Truth as conformity
TraiSefoc, 388; in Plato, 307-308;
Condition (s) of possibility, Being as
and truth as value, 370
(KM), 148; of comportment, 231;
Correlation, of Being-man, 46, (Nietzand finite transcendence, 113; as
sche) 374, (and philosophy) 23, (as
pre-ontic letting-be, 57; and presentpresupposed) 613, (pre-SZ) 28, (and
ing objects (Kant), 18
thought) 595-596, (and Zarathustra)
Conscience, existential analysis of,
380; of Being and beings, 416, 605,
80-83, (see a^s0 Authenticity); and
(and ambivalence) 12, (hailed in
logos, 69-70, 82, (see also Logos) ;
process of Language) 579, (Worldand throwing of There, 538, {see also
things) 578; between Being and
Throwing); as willingness to be
language (pre-SZ), 629; of Being and
called, 83, 508, (see also Acquiesseeming-to-be, 263-266, 285; becence, Docility, Surrender)
tween Being as such and man as
Consciousness, and Absolute Knowing,
finite in fundamental ontology, 33;
332; and at-traction (Rilke), 393;
of Being and There (-being), 20,
determines Being, 324; as gathering43-44, 46, 176, 469, fin two texts of
together, 335; for idealism, 28, (vs.
Parmenides) 604; of Being and
comprehension of Being) 103; inthought, 260, (Berkeley,
Kant,
tentional
(and
thing-itself
of
Hegel, Nietszche) 604-605, (as
thought), xiv-xv; for Kant, 119-121,
mutual eyeing) 614, (and ontological
(see also Apperception); and man's
difference) 606; of Being and time
essence, 281; as moment of the true,
(SZ), xii-xiii, xvi-xxiii, 85-86; of in331; ontologically consequent to
tuition and thought (Kant), 108;
transcendence, 155-158; and proof positivity and negativity (X6yo?).
posing, 322-324, (Rilke) 393; as
412; not sameness, 270; as such
transcendental apperception, 120;
(Heidegger), 605; between Thereunity of grounded in unity of time,
being and man, 45, 97
157; belongs to Will, 368
Correspond, -ing, see Response
Consent, see Acquiescence, Docility,
Cosmology, 31
Surrender
Conserver of Art, see Art
Constancy, of beings, 17, 265-266,
269, 283; and Life-force, 366-369;
mere vs. authentic, 518; and truth
(Nietzsche), 369
Constituents of concern, see Components
Construct, (-tion), see Institution
Consummation, of metaphysics (Nietzsche).
361, 373, 391; of phenomenology and choice of self, 192; of
subject-ism, 326, 330; see also
Nihilism
Contain (ment), as acceptance, 269,
418, (see also Accept, -ing); as
assuming, 420; as attending, 59t;
as concentration in work, 409; and
language, 293; and Xöyos-voetv, 383
Contention, see Discord
Contradiction, and logical thought,
205; principle of, 384-385
Contra-pose, -ing, as pro-posing, 394395. (see also Pro-posing); of thing,
567-568; thought, 397
Copernican revolution, sense of, 30
Correctness, essence of truth as, 316;
(see also Truth [as conformity]);
freedom as ground of, 2x4-216, 241;
as measure of truth, 213; and

Counterpoise, and project, 414, 537
Cover-over, see Un-truth
Creation, of object-to-be-known, see
Finitude (of Knower); in art, see
Art, Art-work
Credentials, and founding, 169, (see
also Founding); of thought, 551
Critical problem, 102
Critique, sense of, 623; and founding
of ontology, 30; of Heidegger,
633-641; see also xplatg
Critique of Pure Reason (Kant), and
fundamental ontology, 30; first vs.
second edition of, 122, 146-147
Culmination, see Nihilismus
Curiosity, 71
Danger, of errance, 551; in thinking
Beon, 556; of thought, 512
Dashed to pieces, and death, 276-279;
and finitude of There, 286-287
Dawn, 638, 641
Death, and anxiety, 79; as end of
There-being, 75; existential analysis
of, 75-76; and finitude of Therebeing (EM), 276-279; freedomunto-, 77-80, 83-84; as immanent
in There-being, 286-287; and man
as "mortal," 573-574» 626'» a s
mountain fastness (stronghold) of

g e n e r a l
Being, 5 7 4 ; and negativity, 7 6 ;
in ontic dimension, 7 6 ; in Rilke
analysis, 396; in SZ and E M
(compared), 2 7 7 ; as shrine of Nonbeing, 573; and There-being in nontruth, 233; see also Authenticity,
Finitude, Freedom, Negativity
De-cadence, meaning of, 2 7 5 - 2 7 6 ;
consequences of, 2 8 6 ; ground of,
2 7 8 ; and language, 2 9 5 ; see also
Fallen-ness, Finitude
De-cision, as having-seen, 4 1 5 ; of
historical question, 2 8 8 - 2 8 9 ; and
language, 293, 295, (negativity of)
6 1 0 ; X6yoq as, 2 8 3 - 2 8 7 ; positivitynegativity (poetry), 4 3 1 ; as re-solve,
287-288, 4 1 5 ; as scission, 432; and
utterance, 316; see also Authenticity,
Re-solve
Decom-pose, 377
Deduction, transcendental, 1 2 4 - 1 2 8 ,
(descending path)
126-127,
(ascending path) 1 2 7 - 1 2 8
De-parture, meaning of, 394; recognized as de-parture, 3 9 5 ; reversal of,
396-397; and technology, 395
Dependence, referential, and captivation, 1 6 5 - 1 6 6 ; and dwelling, 5 8 4 ;
and existentiell, 4 9 ; and fallen-ness,
3 7 - 3 8 , 70, 236, see also Fallen-ness;
and finitude, 3 7 ; disclosed (by
ontological disposition) 65, 2 1 9 , (sc.
by anxiety) 7 4 ; and taking-possession, 1 6 6 ; and things, 575n; and
working, 5 8 6 ; see also Thrown-ness
De-pose, 377
Descending path, see Deduction
Destruction of metaphysics, 29; as
re-trieve, 93 n, 628 n; see also Retrieve
De-valuation, see Valuation
De-volution of thought, 268, 301, 383,
398; and re-trieve, 3 9 1
Dialectic, Hegel, Marx, 3 8 5 ; and logic,
3 8 5 ; as movement, 3 4 9 - 3 5 0 , (and
ad-vertence) 3 5 2 ; and Phenomenology (Hegel), 3 5 5 ; and Will, 361
Dialogue, and attending, 295, 458; and
Beon, 5 5 5 ; vs. conversation, 6 1 1 n;
as dialectic, 3 4 9 - 3 5 0 ; foundation of
(in existential analysis), 6 9 ; and
freedom, 6 1 9 n ; as historical, 4 6 5 ;
between poet and thinker, 4 7 1 , 482;
poetic dialogue, 4 5 7 - 4 5 8 , 4 6 7 - 4 6 8 ;
by question, 6 1 7 ; and re-collection,
21, 488-489, (see also Re-collection);
and re-trieve, 93, 158, (see also
Re-trieve); and translation, 526 ;
and with-being, 68; see also Un-said
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Dichotomy, subject-object, see Subjectobject polarity
Difference, ontological, meaning of,
1 0 - 1 5 ; in altered Epilogue of WM,
5 6 3 - 5 6 5 ; and ambivalence, 12, (see
also Ambivalence); in Anaximander,
517; and art-work, 4 1 3 ; and Beingas-measure, 5 9 1 ; Being as Source of,
475-476;
as
difference,
(focus
sharper in Heidegger II), 14; in
EM, 605; and essence of truth, 1 7 5 ;
forgetfullness of, 385, 449, (Hegei)
359, 4 4 1 ; and genuine thought, 442;
and ground-question, 14, 259; as
both hailing and hailed, 579; in
Hegel, 3 5 7 ; and history of metaphysics, 4 3 6 - 4 3 7 ; and metaphysics,
32; as middle-point, 500-501, (see
also Middle-point); and mittence,
436-437;
and
ontic-ontological
truth, 164, 1 7 4 ; as difference between Open and that-which-is-open,
2 1 5 n; and origin of language, 5 7 8 5 8 1 ; outbreak of, 2 4 8 - 2 4 9 ; and poet,
448; in poetic moment, 430; as
proper concern of thought, 4 1 6 ;
question about, 244; as such, 523,
564,
(and a-X7j&eia) 565, (forgotten) 522, 557, (and Pre-Socratics)
612 n, (thematized) 554, (in WD)
6 0 6 - 6 0 7 t a k e s place in There-being,
175, 421, 4 3 7 ; as the difference, 15 u;
thematized, 5 2 1 ; and transcendental
origin of " w h y ? " 1 7 0 ; and use of
"is," 7n; and withdrawal, 608; in
WM, 203-204, 206, 2 3 1 ; see also
Center of hermeneutic circle, Correlation of Being-beings, Third-thing
Differentiation(Hegel), and Awareness,
346; between ontic and ontological,

347
Dimension (s), Being as, 589-590, (see
also Being); of finite transcendence,
see Existential, Existentiell, Ontic,
Ontological
Dis-arrangement, drag toward, 5 1 8 519, 524
Disclose, to close-over, 96, 234; vs.
discover, 55 n
Disclosedness, antecedent (of There),
5 5 - 5 8 , 2 1 6 ; of Being as project of
whereunto, 6 3 ; a closing-over, 2 3 6 ;
re-solve as mode of, 83; and Therebeing-with-others, 68; of World,
Being, 5 9 ; see also Luminosity
Disclosure, of Being, 272, (by language)
4 1 1 , (and There) 20; of beings,
2 7 1 - 2 7 3 , (and language) 295; and
measure, 4 1 9 ; place of, 267
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Discord, aboriginal, meaning, 268;
in art-work, 407; X6yo? cohesive
principle in, 262, 412; as contentious,
533; in history, 284; and negatived
truth, 268, 406, 486; and Overpowering, 261-262; see also Truth,
d-XVj&eia, 7c6Xejio?
Dis-cover, -ing, -y, of beings, 44; to
cover-over, 96, 234; vs. disclose,
55 n; and essence of truth, 94; of
being as purposeful, 57; not imposition of signification, 100
Disintegration, see Dashed to pieces
Disposition, ontological, nature of,
64-66; anxiety vs. awe as modes of,
474; and attunement, 626; data
disclosed by ,64-65; discloses finitude
of transcendence, 69, (and Nonbeing) 206, (reference to World) 219;
proper to mystery (awe), 452; see
also Awe, Anxiety, Attunement
Dissolution, see Dashed to pieces
Distress, 225-226, 242, 279, 507
Docility, as "all ears," 497n; to Being
and philosophy, 23; to Beon, 555;
to Holy, 447; and metaphor of
seeing, hearing, 6i3n; as questioning,
615; and rigor, 253, 549; and silence,
544; to Will, 357; see also Acquiescence, Surrender
Domain, see Horizon, Open
Domination, over beings (and commanding of Will), 394, (and logic)
395; -over-the-earth (and authenticity), 373, (as certification) 372,
(and technicity) 374; over what is
willed, 365; of Being, see Alterity,
Technicity
Dominion, see Domination
Donation to self, 1 1 6 - 1 1 7
Drag, toward d is-arran gem en t( 5 1 8 519; im-parted by Being, 524
Drive-toward-Being, and anxiety, 73;
and comprehension, 62; and future,
87; and power for thought, 600; not
subjective, 99; as to-be-free, 187;
see also Concern, Existence, Powerto-be, Transcendence
Dwell, -ing, and foundational thought,
22; in language (Greeks), 528;
originates ground, 464; poetic, 463;
as
sojourn in
near-ness,
589;
structure of, 583-584; and tending,
575, 583-584; and whiling, 453;
as working, 586
Earth,
in art-work,
406-407; in
Quadrate, 5 7 1 ; and s k y in " T h e
Pathway," 5 7 1 ; see also World

index
Ecstasis, of temporality, 88
Ec-static, There-being as, 217, 290;
see also Ek-sistence
Efficacious, Good as, 304
Ego, existential dimension of, 97; as
to-be-in-the-World,
157;
and
transcendental imagination,
155;
transcendental (for Husserl), 178,
(for Kant) 221; see also Apperception,
Cogito,
Consciousness,
think, Self
Ek-sistence, culminating moment of,
237; and disclosure of beings, 280;
ecstatic character of, 39;
and
essence-existence,
390; and
exp a n d i n g of man, 505; and foundational thought, 20; as gift, 601;
and heart, 600; insistent, 223, 226,
231; and in-stance, s o g n ; and
language, 540-541; liberation of
man for, 247; modified b y not, 236;
and mystery, 221-222; nature of,
536-537; as open-ness to Being, 600,
(-as-negatived) 608; structure of,
537-540; and thought, 525, (as
re-cord)
602;
as
transcendence
(Heidegger I I vs. I), 624; and withdrawal, 599 a
Element, of Being, 550; of correlation,
606; of man's origin, 612; of metaphysics, 563, (Being as) 7; and
relation between poetry-thought,
592; of thought, 22, 542
Emergent-abiding-Presence, see Being,
9601^
E-mit, -ting, -tence, meaning of, 435n;
of Being, 20; see also Mittence,
Inter-mittence
"Empirical use," 148, 231
Emptiness, as thing-ness, 569
Encounter, and comprehension, 62; in
dialogue, 458; center institutes domain of, 128; and notion of "in,"
52; in Open, 214; made possible (by
Being), 6, (by transcendence) 231,
(by World) 58; and project, 6 1 ; and
pure
horizon,
136;
Rilke
vs.
Heidegger on, 392; and subjectivism,
98;
thrust
into
Non-being
as
condition of, 198
End, Being-unto-, see Death; and
ending, 266; for Greeks, 265; of
There-being and death, 75; see also
Limit
Entity, -ies (mere), meaning of, 5 3 n ;
Being not, 424; and drag, 524; and
ego-subject, 98; intettectus et res as,
94; past of, 87n; for realism, 28;
self as, 157; transcending of, 271-272
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Epoch(s), meaning of, 534; continuity
between, 547, 639; of history,
(dialectical materialism) 533, (and
forgottenness of Being) 522, (Hegelianism) 533-534, (Nietzsche's nihilism) 533, (scholasticism) 316,
533; and There-being, 635
Errance, meaning of, 223-224; and artwork, 405-406; belongs to inner
constitution of There-being, 224,
227, 232, 236; cognates of, 224 n;
experienced as itself, 237, 246; and
finitude,
278-279;
and
intermittence, 533; and language, 610;
and mystery incorporated into truth,
225-226;

non-truth

as,

223-227;

recognized for what it is, 246; and
rigor, 551; and seeming-to-be, 264;
in structure of WW, 229; and
technicity, 252; see also Forgottenness, Mystery
Error, 224-225; and truth as value,
369 n
Eschatology of Being, 638
Essence, (-ing), as coming-to-presence,
228; as essentia vs. e. as Wesen, 35n;
of Being (as essenc-ing of language),
497, (and fortune) 256; of language
and logos, 626; as ground (of
metaphysics), 13, (of possibility)
213; for Plato, 306; as possibility
(scholastics), 390; and reality (Kant),
125; of There-being as to-be, as
existence, 39; of thing, 568; of truth
(and essence of non-truth), 218, (as
truth of Essence) 228-229, 564-565;
as verb, 228, 239-240, 246; world
of (Plato), 303
Essence-existence, for Aristotle, 317318; in de-volution of thought, 316320; and ek-sistence, 390, 53m;
epoch of, 534; Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, Sartre, 390; in Nietzsche, 364;
as mittence of Being, 548; and
There-being as transcendence, 154;
and whatness-thatness, 317
Esthetics, criticism of, 416
Es-tranged, sense of word ("strange"),
27on; There-being as, 84, 273, 283,
427

Eternal, heart (Holy as), 427; return,
see Return; truth (absolute), 547,
(and truth as disclosedness) 97
Ethics, and law of Being, 549; and
ontology, 530; see also Obligation
E-valuation, see Valuation
E-vent, meaning of, 614 n; as appropriation, xx-xxi, 486 n; and
essenc-ing, 246; and issue, 437 (see
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also Issue); language as, 535; of
A6yoQ (thought as), 498; and
mittence, 435, 493,
(see also
Mittence); and mutual eye-ing, 614;
and origination of truth, 412; as
outbreak of ontological difference,
639; and poetic word, 429 n; of truth
as center of hermeneutic circle, 638;
as unity, 639; and withdrawal, 608;
word occurs 1935-36, 412 n
Everydayness, meaning of, 47-49; and
forgetfulness of mystery, 222-223;
liberation from, 286, 288; and
listening, talking, 294; and X6yo<; as
de-cision, 283-286; and negativity
of language, 610; and non-truth, 96;
as "ordinary," 587n; overcome by
thought, 619; and self as inauthentic, 101; and temporality, 89;
and There-being es-tranged (EM),
275; see also Errance, Fallen-ness,
Inauthenticity
E-voke, -ing, four senses of, 596; as
hail, 598-599; of thought and negativity of truth, 608
Exactitude, see Calculation
Excellence, ontic, see Prerogative,
Ontological
Existence, as actuality, 318, 390;
authentic, see Authenticity; as
comprehension, 35; as disclosing
beings, 280; as essence of man
(Heidegger), 39; and eternal return,
364, 374; and existentia

(as

yeta), 3i8n, (and traditional conception of) 35n, 53m; and existential-existentiell, 49; as irruption,
44, 273; for Kant, 98; and revelation
of beings, 43; for Rilke, 398; as
structure of self, 181; as transcendence, 35, 206; and transcendental
constitution (Husserl), 179; truth
of, see Truth; see also Ek-sistence,
Transcendence
Existential, vs. existentiell, 49—50;
dimension of authenticity,

77—80,

84, 188; e. -existentiell and transcendental constitution, 179; see also
Ontological
Existentialism (Sartre), 390, 531, 548
Existentiell, vs. existential, 49-50;
dimension of authenticity, 80-84,
188-191; potentiality as re-collection, 77; see also Comportment, Ontic
Expand-ing, constitutes ek-sistence,
504-505

Ex-patriation, and call to authenticity,
81; and re-patriation (of poet), 471472
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Experience, of language, 609 n; of
relation to Being, 230, 481; see
Thought
Experience(Hegel), nature of, 348-350;
as Being, 348; not cognition, 339;
and exposö, 354; in general terms,
339-340." and man, 35°-353.' and
philosophy, 353-355; as present(represent-) ation, 359; as Selfabsolvence, 340
Expose, 353-355; as ^eopta, 355
Expose, -ure, -ition, of There-being,
217, 256, 272; to truth in negativity,
421; see also Ek-sistence, Open-ness
Expression, and authentic utterance,
470; and categories, 383; and
essence of language, 496n; and
hermeneutic interpretation, 68 n;
judgement comes to, 214; as place
of truth, 316; and dialectic, 385;
as predication, 384; subject-ist
connotation of, 630
Eye, (-ing), for Being-question, xviiixix; for granting, xxii-xxiii; mutual
(and e-vent), 613-614
Facticity, connotation of, 62 n; determines existentiality, 74; and
epochs (Husserl), 178; and past,
87; in re-solve, 235; revealed by
disposition, 64; and thrown-ness,
37; and transcendence, 178-179;
and withdrawal of possibilities, 166167; of World, 53
Faith, vs. thought, 618; and truth-ascertitude, 319-321
Fallen-ness, meaning of, 70-71; not
axiological, 38; and drag toward
dis-arrangement, 524; in EM, 275276; and errance, 236-237; and
finitude (negativity), 487, 538-539;
and forgetfulness of Being, 38; and
non-truth, 234; and poet, 450; and
present, 87-88; revealed by anxiety,
74; of thought, 556; and thrownness, 37-38; and truth, 95-96
Farness, see Nearness
Fate, see Fortune
Fear, vs. anxiety, 72, 197
Feeling, see Attunement, Mood
Finite, knowledge, see Knowledge;
transcendence, see Transcendence
Finitude, of Being, 523-524, (and
death) 573-574, (disclosed by attunement) 462, (in emergence) 278279» (grounds fallenness) 524, (in
Hölderlin) 446-447, (in KM) 149,
(xptau;) 640, (and man as measure)
420, (see also Being); of beings,

index
265-266; and
52i; concern
as transcendental unity of, 72;
consummation of (and de-cision),
286-287; and death, 75-76, 192, 277,
286-287,573~574; disclosed by ontological disposition, 69; in EM, 273279; and encounter, 114; of existence and authenticity, 78-84, (see
also Authenticity); existence-transcendence as ground of, 39; and
fallen-ness, 38, 70, 539, (see also
Fallen-ness); and ground, 172-173;
and guilt, 81-82; Hegel insists less
upon, 358; in Heidegger I vs. II, 624;
of human knowledge (Kant), 31,
108-112, (of intuition, of thought)
109, (of known) n o ; for Kant vs.
Christian tradition, io9n; and
language, 293; law of (and seeming
-to-be), 285; of man in relation to
comprehension of Being, 33; as
Non-being of There-being, 79; nonessence and, 279; and non-truth,
96, 234, 237, 241; of self-disclosure,
291; and special metaphysics, 32;
not suppressed by authenticity, 83;
of temporality, 89; of There (EM),
274-279, 286; of thought and stepin-reverse, 614-615; as transcendence, 115; of transcendence, 3740, 234, (and free choice of authenticity) 190, (for Kant) 31; transcendental document of, 167; of truth
(in KM), 152, (in SZ) 95, 232-235,
(in WW) 235-237 ; of whiling, 518;
and withdrawal, 436; see also
Negativity; Un-truth
First of all and for the most part,
70, 89, 101, 185, 198, 273, 275, 463;
explained, 48; and cave metaphor,
387; outside the Open, 507; and
poet, 450; see also Everydayness
Force, see Violence
Forget, tendency to, see Propensity
Forgetfulness, see Forgottenness
Forgottenness, of Being (as f. of
ontological difference), 12-13, 522,
(and language) 541, (in Nietzsche)
*9» 373» (and Nihilism) 19, 363,
(Plato) 17, (due to withdrawal, decadence) 278; of beings in the ensemble, 222; and everydayness, 48 ;
and fallen-ness, 70; grounded in
Being, 240, 449, 4&7', o f the Holy,
430; of mystery, 220, 222-225, 251252, 436, (see also Errance); of nearness, 448; of ontological difference,
12-13, 522, (in ground-question) 14;
of thought as ek-sistence, 511; as

GENERAL
withdrawal, xii-xiii; see also Everydayness, Inautbenticity
Fortune, vs. com-mitment, 91 n, 435 n,
(see also Com-mitment); common
(and com-mitment), 435, (and withbeing) 92; power of, 256; and recollection, 91
Founding, as authentic, 182; and
freedom of transcendence, 192; and
logos, 1 7 1 ; of metaphysics, see
Metaphysics; transcendental (and
grounding of There-being), 412n,
(and ontic-ontological truth) 168169, (and un-truth) 172
"Founding/ 1 in scientific research, 161
Foundational thought, see Thought
Free, domain of, 318, 618-619
Free [adj.], be, become, 186-191, (and
existential dimension of authenticity) 188, (and existentiell dimension of authenticity) 188-191;
for death, 78, see also Freedom;
*ay, 183-184, 184-186; maintain,
184; in primary, secondary sense,
191; render, 186, (and TcaiSeloc) 388;
see also Freedom, Truth
Freedom, in art-work, 414; as authenticity, 187, (in existential dimension)
188, (in existentiell dimension) 188191; of Being, 23; of beingsencountered, 216; unto death, 7 9 80, (as existential dimension of
authenticity) 188, (as re-solve) 574,
(and thought) 5x2, (see also Death);
as ek-sistence, 217-218; as eksistent, 219, 224, (and concealment
of beings in the ensemble) 243, (and
man) 242, (not possessed but possessing) 241; essence of, 2x7, (as
truth) 191; and essence of truth,
191-192, 215, 226, 229; grounded
in truth, 480; in Heidegger I
(synopsis), 191-192; in KM, 182184; of poet, 449; of practical reason,

139—140; as process, 181; of pure
reason, 139; and re-solve, 190; of
self,
191-192;
as
spontaneity,
transcendental origin of, 181; in
SZ, 184-191; of There-being (WW),
216-218, 248; and thought, 618-619,
(as achieving of) 506, (see also
Thought); and transcendence, 1 7 9 192; in W G , 179-182; as willing,
180, (self as finite) 287; yearning
for, 560
Fundamentum, absolute, 332; verttalis, 321-323, 331
Future, sense of, 86; and drivetoward-Being, 87; for poet, 455-456;
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priority of, 88; in re-collection, 21;
and synthesis of recognition, X42,
144-145; see also Ad-vent, Recollection
Gathering (-together), of Being, 283;
of container, 569; as dialogue
(Hegel), 349-350; as Discord, 407;
as X6YO£, 261-262, 280, (see also
as nature of thing, 585;
-point (as correspondence), 494-495;
and pouring of pitcher, 570; of
positivity and negativity, 412
Generation, of time, sense of, 92
Genitive, subjective - objective, see
Of
Giving free, see Rendering free
God, and Absolute (dialectic), 385; and
Being, 6, (as simple) 559; as creating Cause, 319; as dead (Nietzsche),
19, 361-362; existence of (for
Descartes), 332; and finitude, xo9n;
as ground of certitude, 322 n; and
Holy, 430, 444; for Kant, 113n;
and mediaeval man, 326; and
nihilism of values, 363; as ontic
origin of beings, 150; and Plato's
Good, 319; and poet, 589; problem
of,xxviii, 628; in Quadrate, 572, 590;
and transcendence (Descartes^, 18;
see also Being (supreme)
Gods, and Holy, 426; and northeast
wind, 44&n; in Quadrate, 571-572
Good, role of (Plato), 303-304; as
ground of truth, 308; as ultimate
Source, 304^ 319 n
Grace (yip 15), 477n, 635, 641
Grant, -ed, -ing, of Being-as-thoughtworthy, 598; of Being, of Time,
xx-xxi; of gift xxii-xxiii
Ground, -ing, and cause, 162, 169;
components of process, 164-171;
and finitude, 172-173; as A6yo$,
493 ; in which metaphysics rooted,
7; of metaphysics, see Metaphysics;
of negativity, see Negativity; of
ontological difference, 175, (see also
Difference) ; as poetizing, 498; and
poetry, 458-463; of possibility, see
Conditions of possibility; principle
of, 162, (concerns beings) 175, (in
Leibniz) 163, (origin in freedom)
181; problem of, 162; -question,
(meaning of) 7, (first of all questions)
288, (formulated) 14, (Heidegger vs.
Leibniz) 203. (and luminosity) 200,
(and origin of "why?") 169, (presupposes ontological
difference)
259; strewing of, 165, 170; in SZ,
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161; and temporality,
173-174;
and truth, 163-164
Guard, -ing, Being in language, 498;
as concern, 532; and lodging, 540;
measure (Protagoras), 420; mystery,
459« (by authentic utterance) 462;
as shepherd, 525, 539
Guide-question, vs. ground-question,
7n
Guilt, meaning of existential, 81-82;
chosen b y re-solve, 189; as ground
of negativity, 82, 161; vs. negatived
mittence,
624; and
ontological
dimension of authenticity, 77
Hail,
-ing, commits
poet,
466;
constitutes There-being as free, 618 ;
as e-vocation, 598-599, 619; as
ex-panding, 505; as mittence, 445446; of past, 454; of reply as
authentic verbalization, 581; response to, 464; as summons, 446;
and throwing, 538; as voice of
conscience, 619; as want-appeal,
598; see also E-voke, -ing
Hand(l)ing, 520-521; as wanting,

597
Heart, as center of re-collection, 599601; desires of, 467; and ek-sistence,
600, (see also Ek-sistence); eternal
(Holy as), 427; language of, 397;
logic of (Pascal!, 396, 399; of matter
for thought, xii-xiii,
xxii-xxiii;
of poet, 427; and subject-ism (Rilke),
398; of thought imparted, 555, (by
Beon) 557; and thought as re-cord,
601; world of (Rilke), 395-396
Heaven, 560; see also Quadrate
Heed, -ing, of negativity of mittence,
534; of Utterance, 611; see also
Accept, Attend
Hegelianism, 548; as an epoch, 534
Heidegger I, meaning of, 22, 230; and
ec-stance, 536n; and failure of
SZ, 564; and finitude of Being, 640;
and justification, 371 n; and primacy
of Being,
204;
and
question
There-being, 202; and re-solve, 495 ;
and re-trieve, 106; and throwing of
There, 505; un-said of, 63 7; in
WW, 230-238
Heidegger II, meaning of, 22; in EM,
259; and finitude of Being, 640;
and fortune vs. mittence, 9 m ; and
foundational thought as re-trieve,
106; and grounding of metaphysics,
531; and identification of WorldBeing, i 6 7 n ; and in-stance, 536n;
and mittence, 435; in Nietzsche-

index
analysis, 437-438; more original
than Heidegger I, 632; and presence,
148 n; and re-solve, 487, 5090;
retrieves H. I, 637; and WW, 220,
238-243
Heidegger I and II, compared, 623628; difference between, 463, 476,
574; and
ground,
163 n;
and
language, 5 8 m ; one, 245, (not same)
625; and Open vs. Horizon, 504;
problem of (WW), 243-245; and
re-collection, 438 n; reconciliation
of, 409; relation between, 530; resolve in, 469; distinction between,
xxii-xxiii; reversal between, 475,
596n, (see also Reversal); and "tragic
existence/' 5 i 9 n ; transition seen in
EM, 259n; and Ur-Heidegger, 633
Heritage, and fortune, 91, (common)
92; Heidegger's theological, 630;
of self, 90
Hermeneutic, for Heidegger II, 633;
inadequately formulated, 68; interpretation, 67, (and logos in WG)
171; and phenomenology, 47, 631;
pre-SZ, 630-631; relationship (two
directions), 636; see also Circle
Hidden-ness, see Concealment
Historical, see Historicity, Thought,
There-being
Historicity, art and, 412 n; of Being
and intentionality of conscience,
626; of poet, 464; of There-being,
90-93, 540, (and recollection) 626,
(and truth) 238; of thought grounded
in Aöyos, 499; and truth, 237-238;
see also Being (as history), History
History, beginningof, 238; decisions of,
242-243, (and essence of truth) 431;
in existential analysis, 90-91; foundation of, 247-248; for Hegel, 344,
356; Heidegger vs. Hegel, 546n;
and aboriginal Discord, 284; and
language, 465; as inter-mittence,
21»
533-534» (meaning of word)
435n, 465, (structural unity of)
499; man's place in, 247, 249; and
nature, see Truth of science; onticontological, 547; on tic dimension of
and There-being, 635; origin of for
poet and people, 464-465; preponderance of past in, 91; primordial, 238, 248; and question of
Being, 288-291, 617; and selfhood,
281; and temporality of Therebeing, 90-91, 237-238, 279-280;
(see also Temporality)
Hither and thither, see Distress
Holy, see Being

GENERAL
Home, at, and homecoming, 453; in
homeland,4 50; and law of historicity,
464; as liberation, 456; and lodging,
544 n; and logos, 462; in near-ness
to things, 586; in origin of thought,
557; near Source, 451; There-being
not, 273
Homecoming, meaning of, 451-453;
continuous, 460; and dwelling, 453;
of Heidegger, 640; journey as condition of, 450; and mystery, 452;
and thinker, 470
Homeland, domain of Being-as-source,
448; leaving of, 450; and liberation from ontic, 457; and nearness
to origin, 445; return to, 451
Homelessness, of modern man, 389
Horizon, of accessibility, 150 ; of Being,
see Being; of Being-question, 40;
of concealment, 221; and domain of
opposedness, 115, 136, (as necessity)
136; of nows, 142; of objectiveness,
114, 200, 214, 231, (as projected)
153, (and transcendental schemata)
134; of the Open, 214-2x5; of the
past, 143-144; subjective-objective
aspects of, 154; and tendency to
unify, 148; of transcendence, 30,
(side of Open) 503-504; as unity of
past-present-future, 145
House of Being, completed, 544;
language as (meaning), 528, 535;
There-being as lodger in, 540, (and
becoming "at home") 544 n
How being(s) is (are), 169, 216, 218;
and origin, 403; of There-being
(revealed by ontological disposition),
64; see also That being(s) is (are),
What being(s) is (are)
Humanism, Beaufret's- question about,
46, 530; Christianity as, 388; and
correlation Being-man, 46; and
Enlightenment, 388; and existentialism, 388; for Marx, 388-389; and
metaphysics, 389; for Plato, 387; of
Renaissance,
388; restored
by

Heidegger, 531; a Roman phenomenon, 387; and subject-ism, 19, 327
Human There-being, see Man
Husserl, see Intentionality, Index of
Proper Names
Idea(s), and conformity (Plato), 307308; and 7taiSela, 388; of pure
reason and transcendental imagination, 139; as shining-forth, 306;
and supra-sensible world,
362;
supreme (the Good), 303-304, (as
viewed) 307-308; universal, n o n ,
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(see also Thought [for Kant]); to-beseen, 17; world of, 303, 317, 362
Idealism, -ists, and critical problem,
102; and first edition of K R V , 122 n;
German, 575 n; man as center of
non-concealment in, 486 ; polemic
against,
157; and pre-SZ,
28;
transcendental (Husserl), 27
Imagination, transcendental, meaning
of, 121-124; "before" apperception,
126-127; as common root, 136-141,
(of intuition) 137-138,
(of pure
reason) 138-139, (of practical reason)
139-141; discovery of, 124-128; not
faculty of soul, 122; institutes
transcendence, 123-124; and objective reality, 138; and original
time, 141-146, 244; and schematism,
see Schematism; and subject of
knowledge,
154-158;
and
pure
synthesis, see Synthesis
Im-part, -ing, as granting, 598; as
handing-out, 520; of heart of
thought, 555; of law of Being, 549;
of limits, 521; of mittence, 540;
of relation to Being, 542; of There,
532; of to-be-thought, 597
Imperative, categorical, see Reason,
practical
Im-pose, 394-395» 397
In, see In-being
Inauthenticity, and everydayness, 70,
(see also Everydayness); and guilt,
82 ; in Hegel, 357 ; for Heidegger II,
524; and the ordinary, 587 n; and
"people/' 7 1 ; in SZ (r6sum6), 233;
and un-truth, 96; in W W , 237; see
also Authenticity
In-being, and comprehension, 63; as
disclosedness of World, 58-59; as
dwelling, 584; in H B , 537; and
subject-object-polarity,
99;
and
sense of "in," 52
In-cident, There as, 266-277
Incorrectness, and essence of nontruth, 218; of judgement, 225; see
also Correctness, Un-truth
Independence (of object), see Absolute
Indigence (of There-being), see Finitude, Negativity
Influence of thinkers on each other,
61 i n
Insistence, ek-sistent, 223, 231
In-stance, 509, 511
Institution, as construction, 123; of
horizon vs. creation of beings, 150;
of time, 141; of transcendence, 1 1 4 115, 123; see also Center, Imagination, Root
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Instrument(s), meaning of, 53; and
pattern, 54; truth of, 95
Intellect, in truth-as-conformity, 94
Intelligible vs. comprehensible, i o y n
lntentionality, of Being and of concern, 626-627; for Heidegger vs.
Husserl, 178-179
Interchange, mutual, 272, 279
Inter-mittence, see History
Interpretation, existentiell (of SZ), 80;
hermeneutic, 47, 67; violence of,
290; see also Hermeneutic
Interrogation, see Question
In the untruth, 96, 220, 233-234
In the truth, 96, 220, 233-234
Intuition, as finite (Kant), 108-109,
(see also Finitude); intuited, 117,
141; and intuitus derivativus vs.
originarius, i o 9 n ; in Kant, Husserl
for Heidegger, 64; and knowledge
(Kant), 107; primacy of (Kant),
108; pure, 1 1 6 - 1 1 8 ; transcendental
imagination as root of, 137-138
Irrational, thought as, see Pre-rational
Irruption, 43, 266, 293
Is, meaning of, 4, 33; as applied to
Being, 7 n ; as emerge-into-presence,
568; and language, 2 1 ; and ontological difference, 231
Issue, 579n, 613, 6i4n, 638; and ontological difference, 436
I think, Descartes, 324; Kant, 1 1 9 120, 155; see also Cogito
Joyous, the attunement in presence of,
461, (as reserved) 462; and Gladsome, 444
Judgement, comes to expression, 214;
and de-cision, 285; incorrectness of,
see Incorrectness; logical, 205; open
character of, 215; as place of truth,
94, 213, (grounded in ontic truth)
163; and predication, 384; as presentation, 107; synthetic a priori,
30; as tribunal, 383; universalizing
(Kant), 109
Justification, and truth as certitude,
371. 438n
Kinsmen, thinkers as, 470
Know, -ing, as Absolute, 332-333,
(prescinds from individual) 334,
(prior to human k.) 338, 345, (as
Shining-forth) 339, (see also Absolute, Shining-forth); as concreteabstract (Hegel). 341; death as
death, 573-574 '> M
ontic, preontological, 343; as Presence, 335336; as presentation of being-to-

index
be-known, 108; as questioning, 257;
as real vs. natural (Hegel), 342-343,
(and distinction between voetv and
86£a) 441; as to-have-seen, 335,
2 7 * . 287, 415,
415, 524; a s
(see also T^x^l) > and
thinking
(Descartes), 323; as thought, 525;
see also Knowledge
Knowledge, act of (and judgement),
214, (for Kant) 107, (and science)
256; and certitude (Descartes), 322;
and existential analysis, 98; falsity
of, 225; as finite (Kant), 31, 234;
as intimacy with world, 52; as
letting-be of objects, 191; cannot
know Non-being, 136, 204-205;
ontological, see Ontological; problem
of, 27; pure, see Ontological; theory
of (Kant), 29, 329; as transcendental (Kant), 113
Language, analysis of (as method of
thought), 291-296; as articula-tion
(SZ), 67; and Being (pre-SZ), 629;
in choral ode, 270; and ek-sistence,
540-541; essence of, 496; and
finitude, 293, 609-610; and foundational thought, 21, 258, 416,
543-545.
Mat?
of)
635-637;
function of (HB), 543-544; as house
of Being, 528, 535; human (and
aboriginal Utterance), 496, (as response to hail of Language) 578;
importance of (apparent in EM),
259;
as language
brought
to
language, 609 n; and logos (WG),
1 7 1 ; and A6yo$, 495-498; and man's
body, 389-390; and measure-taking
of Being-as-utterance, 592; negativity of, 609-610; örigin of, 295,
535, (and Being-question) 292, (and
openness of beings) 315, (response
to Beon) 558, (as scission) 580, (in
Stillness, repose) 577; and origination of Being, 4 1 1 ; for presentative thought, 397; primary sense of,
410; and re-trieve of logic, 491;
for Rilke, 397, 399; and transcendence, 100
L a y , see Lie
L a y (-ing)-claim, and origination, 460;
as project of World, 165, 411, 460;
and taking-possession, 165-167
Lay-free, see Free (adj.)
Leap, with eyes wide open, 613; of
Heidegger I, 625; into hermeneutic
circle, 42; thought as 611-613, (and
translation) 526
Leibniz-Wolff-tradition, 30

GENERAL
Let-lie-forth, -in-collectedness, 492,
(see also Gathering [-together],
iiyew); as taking under
one's
care, 603
Let-spring-forth, see Origin
Let(ting)-be, of Being, 21, 541; of
beings, 216, (attitude of foundational thought)
20; as concealment of beings-in-the-ensemble,
219, 226, 235; vs. creation, 150;
as rendering free, 186; as ek-sistent
freedom, 241; and forgetfulness of
mystery, 222; as letting-be-destined,
57; -manifest, 44, 227, 228, 234,
(and language) 496, (and Phenomenology)
xiv-xv,
(and
>iyetvvoetv) 603; as letting-oneself-in-on,
216; as ontological (antecedes ontic),
186; relation between Being and
man, 542; -seen and phenomenology, 46-47; of self, 188-189, (see
also Assume [-ing], Re-solve); as
tending to, 575, 584; as thought,
618; see also Authenticity, Freedom,
Liberation
Liberation, and authenticity (Nietzsche), 376; Being as, 618; for Being,
506; from hiddenness, 185, 191;
and humanism, 388; of instrument
in its Being, 57; of man unto eksistence, 248; from ontic, 188, 456;
pre-SZ, 632; from presentation,
506; by re-trieve, 441; from spirit
of vengeance, 380; as willing nonwilling, 508; from world of shadows
(Plato), 302; see also Free (adj.),
Freedom
Liberty, not act of will, 45; of modern
man, 321-322; of response and
hailing, 599; for Rilke, 393; as
temporo-historical,48i; and thought,
479» 597'» as transcendence, 45; see
also Freedom
Liberum arbitrium, 390
Life-force, constancy, surpassment in,
366; and will, 364-367; philosophy
of, 327, 363; as principle of values,
364
Lighting-process, not in focus of metaphysics, 8; and ground-question, 14;
of metaphysics (Being as), 6; presupposed
by
intelligence,
386;
There-being as, 58-59, (see also
Luminosity);
through
language.
528
Limit, where being begins, 266; and
end (death), 76, 276, (see also End);
and finitude, 265-266; Greek conception of, 265-266, 521, 623; as
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negativity, 573; of There-being's
power, 287; see also Finitude
Limitation, see Limit
Listening, mere, 294
Lodging, see House of Being
Logic, concerned with beings, 196,
204-205; criticism of, 204-205,
474-475; and de-volution of thought,
383-386; and domination over
beings, 395; of heart, 396, 399;
Heidegger's lectures and seminars
on, 49on; and language (Rilke). 399;
laws of, 206, (and law of Being) 549;
and Non-being, 205; polemic vsM
386, 490; as science, 19, 267, 383,
(shaken to foundations) 491, (as
tribunal) 384; in SZ, KM, 204;
symbolic,
386;
transcendental
(Kant), 385
Logical, negation, 205, (founded in
Non-being) 541, (presupposes comprehension
of
Non-being)
199 ;
thought (Non-being inaccessible to),
284, (and passage to foundational
thought) 48 m , (and principle of
contradiction) 385, (and question
about Non-being) 196; truth presupposes discovering, 94; see also
Logic
Logos, and being "at home/' 462;
as call of concern (conscience), 8081; and essencing of language, 626;
as existential component, 66-70 ;
and sense, 100; and throwing of
There, 538; in WG, 170-171; in
WW, 248
Loquacity, 71, 292 n, 293, 316
Lumen
naturale, and
ontological
structure of There-being, 58-59;
presupposes lighting-process, 386;
and subject-ism, 59n
Luminosity, and anxiety, 73; crowning
moment of, 287; as disclosedness of
World, 59; endorsed by self in resolve, 235; of ek-sistence, 218; and
ground-question,
200; of
Nonbeing, 201; as seeing, 63; and There,
61 n; untrammeled, 265; of World,
58-59, 217; see also Disclosedness
Maintain-free, see Free (adj.)
Man, Being of (and history), 291; as
in-between-being, 589; body of in
language, 389-390; as collect-or of
Being, 283; and community, 281;
not creature but subject, 326; and
decisions of history, 242-243; and
ek-sistence, 248, 531, (see also Eksistence); and ek-sistent freedom.
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242, (see also Freedom); essence of,
281, (and Being) 595, (as gathering
point) 494, (in its ground) 284, (and
X6yoc) 283, (and a x ^ i s ) 353. ( a ad
There-being)
242, 248, 279-282,
(and There) 536; expand-ing of,
504-505; and experience (Hegel),
350-353; Greek conception of, 280281; as historical, 223, (see also
Historicity, History); as individual
(and c t x ^ k ) .
352, (and There)
413; individual humanity of, 242;
liberation of, for ek-sistence, 247;
as measure (and acceptance), 420,
(and bringing-to-pass of truth) 539,
(Protagoras) 419-420; mediaeval,
319-322; as meta-physical, 376-377,
(definition of) 390, (interpretation
of) 279; modern, 321, (for Nietzsche) 376; ontic origin of (and
finitude of There-being), 173; ontological structure of, 45; as percepted, 419; not possessing but
•possessed by freedom, 241-242, (see
also Freedom); proper definition of,
280-281; as questioner of Being, 34 ;
as rational animal, see Rational
animal; and relation to Being,
x x - x x i , 380; released unto Therebeing, 242; for Rilke, 393-395
structure of (for metaphysics), 390;
and There of Being-as-awareness
(Hegel),
356; and
There-being,
221-222, 279-282; and Will-untoPower, 373
Manifestation, finitude of, 266; and
Non-being, 200; and utterance,
600 n; see also Letting-be, Lightingprocess, Non-concealment, Openness
Marxism, 388, 547-548; see also Marx
Matrix of relationships, and Being as
law, 426; as Open, 214, 231; and
purposefulness,
56;
as
Total
Meaningfulness, 57, 67; see also
Arrangement,
Articulative-ness,
Meaningfulness, Pattern, World
Matter-of-fact (-ness), see Facticity
Meaning, see Sense
Meaningfulness, Total, as articulativeness, 67, 249; as matrix of relations,
57; not superimposed, 100; see also
Arrangement,
Articulative-ness,
Matrix of relationships. World
Measure, -ing, as Being in its negativity, 590-591; beings as, 236, 252;
of Dimension b y man, 589; of
judgement, 215; man as (Protagoras), 419-420; of ontic truth, 222;

index
-taking of Being as original Utterance, 592; -taking as poetizing, 592
Mediaeval, man, 319, 322, (God and)
326; notion of certitude, 319, 322;
epoch in de-volution of thought,
316-320; scholasticism as mittence
of Being, 533; tradition, 332
Mesh, of positivity-negativity (arrangement), 5 1 7 ; of Xtyeiv-vozZv,
603
Metaphor, of cave, see C a v e ; of hearing
and sight, 499, 555, (and Leap) 613 ;
of seeing and comprehension, 63
Metaphysics, sense of word, 4 - 5 ;
Aristotle's definition of, 23; Being
as essence of, 19; as beginning with
early Greeks, with Plato, 13; as
coming to pass in ground of Therebeing, 200; and correlation of Beingtime, 85; destruction of, 29, 628;
dominion of logic over, 204; as
epoch, 534; founding of, 184, 202204, (and title
of SZ)
40-41;
general (and schematism),
135;
general-special (Kant), 29; and God
(Nietzsche),
362; grounding of,
3-10, 211, 259, (as fundamental
ontology) 15, (and hermeneutic)
631, (from inside, from outside) I5n,
475, (in KM) 146, (and question of
finitude) 32-33, (SZ) 93; history of,
533; and humanism, 387, 389; and
K R V , 29-30; laying free ground of,
183-184; and luminosity,
61 n;
cannot meditate own light, 8; as
meta-physics, 5n, 260; metaphysics
of, 202; as mittence of Being, 436;
and Neo-Kantianism, 27; as nihilism, 363 ; and Non-being, 199-200;
overcoming of (by recollection), 438,
(and WM) 475, (see also Overcoming) ; and philosophy, 23-24,
206, 227; for Plato, 5, 17, (and
essence of truth) 303-308;
and
question of Non-being, 2 0 m ; reversal of principle of, 390; as roots
of philosophy tree, 7, 563; and
science (Hegel), 360; and soul,
world, God, 559-560; special (disciplines of), 31, (and Quadrate) 572;
as transcendental philosophy, 329;
and truth-as-conformity, 17, (see
also Forgottenness, Truth); of Will
and eternal return, 379
Method, ascending of deduction, 127;
descending of deduction, 126-127;
of Heidegger. 106, 612, (as question)
616; of Heidegger I and II, compared, 623—624; of phenomenology.
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46-47; of re-trieve, 158, (see also
Re-trieve); of thought (in EM),

288-296
Middle-point, as center, 579; and
e-vent, 638; as ontological difference,
501; see also Center, Circle, Third
thing
Mine-ness, 45, 97, 281
Mittence, meaning, 20-21, 43511; in
beings-in-the-ensemble,
499;
of
Beon as negatived, 555; and disclosure of Being, 20; and epoch,
533-534, [see also Epoch); and
e-vent, 493, 614 n, (see also E-vent);
and eye for granting, xxii-xxiii; first
use of term, 434-436; in HB, 532533; and im-parting, 598; law of
(and poetry), 450; as negatived
(vs. finitude of transcendence), 624;
and ontological difference, 436-437;
and preparational thought, 438-439;
of thought as Being, 546; and truth,

412
Modes of Being, see Authenticity
Moment, poetic, see Poetic
Mood vs. ontological disposition, 65
Moral, order and luminosity, 61 n;
sense and conscience, 80; see also
Ethics
More original, meaning, 290; as more
Greek, 6 1 1 - 6 1 2 ; question, 205-206;
than reason, 386; and re-trieve of
language, 295
Mortals, and death, 573, 626, (see also
Death);
as
distinguished
from
rational animals, 574; in Quadrate,
571-572
Moved-ness (Aristotle), and generation,
312; and movement, 310; and
shining-forth, 313
Movement,
as
being-under-way
(Hegel), 344; qpuCTis as dpxh
(Aristotle), 310; along the way, 616
Mystery, meaning of, 221-222; and
Aristotle, 315; articulated by poet,
468; in art-work, 406; Being as,
240, 245, (and homecoming) 452,
(and A6yoq) 609, (as measurement)
590, (as re-served) 453; and Beingas-source, 446-447, 452; of beings
and
overcoming
of
subjective
thought, 251; and errance (complete non-essence of truth), 225-226,
237, (consequences of finitude) 237,
(modes of non-truth)
228, (as
negatived truth) 240; forgetting of
(and
subjective thought),
252;
forgottenness of, 222-223; guarded
(by poet), 459, (by utterance) 462;
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as hidden, 257; and language, 610;
as A7\&r) (for Heidegger II), 640, (see
also Aq-ib)); and mittence, 435-436;
as non-truth, 224; re-collection of,
226, 246; in structure of W W , 220,
229; of There-being, 226, 243;
yielding to, 227
Name, -ing, meaning of, 292-293;
and Being, 528; and disclosure of
Being, 411; and Xfyetv, 496; and
poet, 636; and poetic moment, 428;
and poetry, 410; and re-solve, 509
Nature, not Being, 17, (see also Being);
and history, 201; and <pu(jts, 5
Nearness, of Being, 6, 535, (and inbeing) 537; as Being of things, 566567, 570; to Being-as-source, 448;
and farness, 452-453; and ontological vs. ontic distance, 586n; to
origin and homeland, 445; poetthinker dwell in, 635; re-served, 463
Necessity, and freedom, 139-140, 183;
of " w h y ? " 170; see also Need
Need, of Being (for X6yo<;), 283, (for
There) 20, 277, 413 n, 477, 479, 481,
53 2 . 535. 560, 597; of Holy for poet,
429; of A6yo? for man, 580; of Overpowering, 267; of There-being (for
Being), 38, 72; as want, 597
Negation, logical, 205, (founded in
Non-being), 541; see also Negativity
Negativity, of Being (and Being unto
death), 572-574, (and drag) 524,
(as inter-mittence)
533-534, (in
language) 609-6x0, (and need for
scission) 432, (as Non-being) 5 3 4 535, (and "not") 564, (and poet)
468, (in terms of language) 497 n, (and
There-being) 511,
(and thinker)
637, t (as withheld treasure) 534,
(and withdrawal) 5n, 598 n, 608,
(and world-earth struggle) 412; of
coming-to-presence, 310; component
of, see Disposition; and death, 76;
in Discord, 268, (see also Discord);
as finitude, 202, 232, (see also
Finitude); of fortune, 256; ground
of (guilt), 82; and ground-question,
14; intrinsic to revealment, 219-220,
(see also Concealment); of joy, 555;
law of (Anaximander), 520; of man,
244; of mittence and inter-mittence,
21. 533-534; and yrii vs. otix, 485;
as not-character, 8-<>; in poetry,
429-431;
and
positivity,
8-9,
(jjLOpcprj) 313, (as wonder-ful) 488;
prior to and intrinsic t o truth, 492;
and privation, 313; and There as
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poet, 447; of There-being, 212, 222,
(and un-truth) 96, (see also Finitude, Limit); of thought and Beon,
556; as to-be-thought, 22; of truth,

95, 152, 211, 218, 225, 229, 232, 236,
240, 244, (Aristotle) 314, 315, (in
art-work) 405, (and containment)
420, (see also Concealment, Errance,
Mystery, Un-truth)
Neo-Kantianism, 27, 29
Neologism, 20, 224n, 269n, 435
Neo-Platonic, 388
Neo-Scholasticism, 27
Nihilism, and Christianity, 327n; as
consummation of metaphysics, 19,
(see also Consummation); as dialectical materialism, 547; as forgetfulness of Being, 381; of Heidegger,
200, 474; and humanism, 389;
Nietzsche's conception of, 362;
positive, negative, 363; in Rilke,
391-395, (overcoming of). 395^398;
as valuelessness, 363; and working,
586-587
Non-being, vs. absolute nothing, 72,
135. 474» 573; alterity of, 203, 244;
and attunement, 477; Being as, 147;
and Being, truth, 200-202; not a
being, 284; death as shrine of, 574;
delivered from hidden-ness, 205;
disclosure of, 205; in very essence,
201; experience of, 284; and finitude
of transcendence, 38; founds logical
negation, 205, 541; and Heidegger's
nihilism, 200, 474; and hidden-ness
of Being, 8; horizon of, 136, 212;
for logic, 20, 205; and anxiety, 72,
196-197, 477; and metaphysics,
199-200; as negation of totality of
beings, 196; and "not," 564; and
nothing, 195-196; not object, 204205; and ontological difference, 442;
as ontological knowledge (Kant),
1 3 5 - 1 3 6 ; path unto, 284; as project
of There-being, 204; renders possible
manifestation of beings. 198, 203;
revelation of, 201-202; for science,
195; in SZ (r6sum6), 194; of Therebeing (finitude), 79; as veil of Being,
474» 535
Non-concealment, of beings
subordinate to Good (Plato), 308;
concealed (and metaphysics), 5;
as Idea (Plato), 306-307; and Nonbeing, 201, 205, {see also Nonbeing); Open as, 217; and <puau;,
261-263; f ° r Plato, 303-305; and
primordial Discord, 268; and sense
of alpha-privative in dt-X-qfteta, 185-

INDEX
186, 305; as truth, 7; truth as
forgotten by Hegel, 359; way unto,
284; see also a-X^&eioc, Revelation,
Truth
Non-essence, of ground, 172; of There,
278; of truth, 220—221, 227, 229,
232, (authentic, inau then tic) 237,
(complete)
225, 228, 237,
(as
dissimulation) 406
Non-ground, 202; and non-essence of
ground, 172-173
Non-logical, see Pre-logical
Non-ontic, see Ontic
Non-presentative, see Pre-presentative
Non-revelation, see Concealment
Non-subjective, see Pre-subjective
Non-truth, see Un-truth
North-wind, and hailing of poet, 467;
intermediary between future and
past, 467; as relation between Being
and There, 469; as willed, 466
" N o t , " affirmed, 205; differentiates
Being from beings, 8; not ens
rationis, 564; foundation of, 541;
and guilt, 82; and logical negation,
199; of originating non-essence, 245;
permeating (ground), 172, (manifestative process) 236-237, (Therebeing) 222, 236, (transcendence)
235; and revealment-concealment,
565; separating beings (and Being),
564, (and Non-being) 203; in SZ,
233-234; see also Negativity
Not-character, see Negativity
Nothing, absolute, 72, (vs. Non-being)
135, (and Non-being) 474, 573; and
Non-being, 195-196
Notions, sense of (Kant), 118; see also
Categories (of understanding)
Now(s), horizon of, 142; and popular
conception of time, 86; and pure
apprehension, 142-143; as pure
reproduction, 143-144; succession
of, 141, (Kant) 133, (Nietzsche) 379
Object(s), sense of, n o n ; and Being,
6; dialectic of, 385-386; of human
knowledge, n o ; as humanly knowable, 323; and lumen naturale, 59 n;
metaphysics of (Kant), 330; as opposed, see Op-pose; and thing, 567;
transcendental (Kant), 136
Objectivate, -tion, and accessibility,
112;
see also Institution,
Objectiveness, Schematism
Objectiveness, constituted, not created, 112; horizon of, see Horizon;
as necessity, 139; outside consciousness (Rilke), 394^395

GENERAL
Objectivising, and pro-posing, 323;
see also Pro-posing
Objectivity, of object and horizon,
154; and subject-ness, 325
Object-ness, and Being of beings, 325
Obligation(s), and Being, 260; and
practical reason, 140; self-imposed,
see Necessity
Obscurity, see Concealment
Obscurity, primordial, 487; see also
Of, in "Being of beings," 605-606, (see
also Being); and double appropriation, 504; as objective genitive,
340; as subjective genitive, 523, 535,
(Hegel) 340; as subjective-objective
genitive,22, 542; thinking of (Being),
xvi-xvii, (Aöyos) 498
One, polyvalence of, 570, (see also
Quadrate); vs. same, distinction explained, 588 n
One-in-many, 11, 492-493» 499
On tic, excellence of There-being (and
World as existential), 58, (see also
Prerogative); as existentiell, 50, (see
also Existentiell); idols, liberation
from, 206, (see also Authenticity);
knowing (Hegel), 343, 346-347; vs.
ontological,
8n, (history)
547,
(knowledge) 30, (structure of Therebeing and thought-as-waiting) 507;
and ontological dimensions
(of
dwelling), 584, (simultaneous) 5 7 58; pre-ontological (and dialectic),
349-350,
(and ontological) 344;
truth in existential analysis, 95 n,
(see also Truth)
Ontological, meaning (vs. ontic), 8n;
context of problem of death, 277;
difference, see Difference; dimension
(and drag), 524, (of history) 547,
(of transcendence) 231; disposition,
see Disposition; judgement, see
Judgement; knowing (Hegel), 343,
346-347, 352, (Kant)
124-135;
knowledge (components of), r 1 6 I2i,
(not creative)
112,
(and
empirical use) 148, (as finite) 232,
(vs. ontic) 30, (and ontology, general metaphysics) 134-135, (as Open)
231, (as pure synthesis) 115, (and
reality of categories) 125, (and
transcendence) 113-114;
known,
135-136; predicates, see Categories;
synthesis, see Synthesis; truth (in
existential analysis), 95n, (vs. ontic)
151, {see also Truth); word becomes
suspect, 15 n; see also Existential
Ontologico-existential, see Ontological
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Ontology, and Being in general, 9; and
categories, 383; and ethics, 530;
fundamental (sense of), 15, (and
correlation of Being and time) 86,
(formula dropped)
273 n,
(Heidegger) 33-41, (Kant) 29-33, ( a s
laying-free) 183-184, (and ontological difference) 437 n, (and relation between finitude and Being)
39, (and shift to foundational
thought) 16, (and There-being as
transcendence) 36, (as transcendental philosophy) 31; and general
metaphysics, 29; and Neo-Kantianism, 27; and phenomenology, 4647; and schematism, 135
Onto-theo-logical, structure of metaphysics, 9-10, (and Heraclitus) 1 1 ;
structure of Science (Hegel), 360
Open, not a being, 231; de-parture
from, 395, 397; as ground of comportment, 214-215, 231; presencing
in» 313; see also Being, Horizon
Open(ing)-up, of World in art-work,
406; of beings-in-the-ensemble, 273;
see also Freedom, Letting-be, Liberation
Openness, to Being (and future), 289,
(in existential choice) 190, (see also
Existence,
Ek-sistence,
Transcendence) ; and
Being-question,
289; of beings (in art-work), 415,
(disclosed by anxiety) 197, (and
origin of language) 315, {see also
Freedom, Letting-be, Liberation,
Non-concealment); in cave metaphor, 303; Being as domain of, 6,
{see also Being); errance component
of, 224, (see also Errance); forcing
into, 271; need of Over-powering for
sphere of, 267; of Open, 214, 216;
to the Open, 218, (as transcendence)
231, {see also Ek-sistence, Transcendence) ; to others as attend-ing,
68; to power-to-be and logos, 69;
as prerogative of There-being, 20,
(see also Prerogative); There as
domain of, 413, (see also Luminosity,
There); as truth, see Truth; of truth
as negatived, 415
Op-pose(d), vs. across, 420 n; and
contradiction, 384-385; and object,
568, (see also Object[s]); and sensating, 130; terms of relationships of
cogitate, 323
Opposed-ness, see Horizon
Ordinariness, see Everydayness
Orientation, and accessibility, 114;
and theoretical reason, 140; recep-
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tive, 135; and transcendence, 30;
as self-orientation, 108n
Origin, meaning of, 403; vs. beginning,
257n; Being as, see Being; ontic (of
beings), 14, 150; as Ground, 445n;
of "why?" 170
Original, as that which lets-springforth, 117; thought, see Thought;
see also Origin, More original
Origin-ality, see Originate
Originate, -ing, truth, 411-412; of
Being-as-ground and poet, 459-460 ;
and Xeyetv, 498
Overcome, -ing, common sense, 251;
of forgottenness, 48; as going
beyond, 203; homelessness by working, 586-587; humanism, 389-390;
metaphysics, 14, 389, 548, 562, 623;
nihilism, 373-374» 547, (Rüfce) 395"
398; philosophy, 23; subject-ism as
root of idealism-realism, 28; subjective thought, 252
Over-powering, as awesome, 273;
disclosed as such, 286; inspires anxiety, awe, 270; maintains primacy
over There, 271; overpowers There,
274; resistance to, 269; and T£XVT),
271-272; violence to, see Violence
Participation, and distinction of whatthat, 306, 317; in Ideas (Plato),
306-307; and im-parting, 521 n; and
metaphysics, 17; presupposes ambivalence, 11-12
Past, in existential analysis, 86; and
facticity, 87; greeted in north wind,
467; and history, 91; for poet, 454 ;
and pure reproduction, 143-144;
in re-collection, 21, (see also Recollection); resists Will, 379; two
senses of, 87 n; of There-being, 289290; see also Re-trieve, Temporality,
Time
Pattern, of arrangement as law of
Being, 549; as original language,
535»' of poetical thought, 455;
purposeful, 53, (and ontological
dimension of There-being) 57, (and
World) 54; of relationships as
essential thought, 425; see also
Arrangement, Articulative-ness,
Matrix, Meaningfullness
People, history of, 464; and language,
295; poet in relation to, 465; and
There-being, 281, 414; see also Withbeing
"People," meaning, 71; and death,
79-80

INDEX
Per-cept, and presentation, 419
Perceptio, 328, 419; see also Appetitus
Persecution, and spirit of vengeance,
377
Person, moral, see Self
Phenomenological, analysis (of others'
death), 76 n, (and analysis of
language) 593, (ofthing) 567-570;
attitude (HB), 537; method pre-SZ,
x-xi; see also Phenomenology
Phenomenology, meaning of, 46-47;
achieved in existentiell comportment, 50; consummated by choice
of self, 192; and dis-covery of
beings, 44;
of
existence
and
knowledge, 98; function of, 283 n;
for Hegel, 355; Heidegger vs.
Husserl concerning, 178-179; and
hermeneutic, 47, 631; and Husserl,
x-xvii, 27, 548; and laying-free,
184-186; as liberation from hiddenness, 185-186, 191; as method of
Heidegger I, 623; and ontology, 4647; principle of, xii-xv; as transformed into thought, 624
Phenomenology of the Spirit, Hegel's,
333- 334» 338, 356, 441, (as Science
of Experience) 355, (and Science of
Logic) 359
Philosophy, sense of (Heidegger), 2224; for Aristotle, 23, 315; beginning
of, 240, 256, 285; and common sense,
229, 250-251, (and Being-question)
253; danger of presentative thought
in, 556; and experience (Hegel),
353-355." for Heraclitus, sophists,
Aristotle, 22-23; and hermeneutic
circle, 423 and interrogation of
language, 295-296; and language,
611; and metaphysics, 22-23, 206;
modern (and subject-ism), 326;
origin of, 257, 289; for Plato, 227,
230; and poetry, 296; and problem
of truth, 228, 230; and progress,
546; and question, 288; roots not
torn out, 14-15; scandal of (Kant
vs. Heidegger), 103; as Science
(Hegel), 355; transcendental, 329,
(meaning of) 31; tree of (Descartes),
7; of values, 369, (see also Value); as
mere venturesomeness, 531, 550;
in the West, influenced by Aristotle's
Physics, 309
Physics, and metaphysics, 5n, 260,
(and ambivalence) 11
Physics, Aristotle's, 309, 313
Place of disclosure, of lightingprocess, of openness, see There

GENERAL
Poem, primordial, articulation of
Holy, 444-445; fashioned into word,
455; thoughts of, 444, 467
Poesy, see Poetry
Poet, and disclosure of Being, 295;
future of, 455-456; German vs.
Greek, 449; as half-god, 447, 460,
589, (and Quadrate)
571; and
history, 464-465; and Holy, 544545, (see also Being); interpretation
of, 290; of metaphysics (Rilke), 391;
and origination of Being, 411-412,
459-460; past of, 454; pedagogy of,
448-453 ; present of (language), 456;
in relation to people, 463-464, (see
also People); and re-solve, 465-469;
as sign, 463; task of, 423, 427; and
thinker, 294, (relation between)
471-472.
544^545. 635-637; as
venturesome (Rilke), 397
Poetic, dwelling on earth, 463-464;
experience and primacy of Being,
451; function compared with SZ,
468-469; moment, 428-431; task,
43°, (see also Poet); word as prophetic, 457
Poetizing, and art-work, 409-411; as
bestowing, grounding, originating,
410; as common root of poesy,
thought, 558 ; as grounding, 498; as
originating, 498, (history)
465;
as power of human dwelling, 592 ;
primordial, 295, 410; and thought,
(one) 588, (different) 593. (similar
and different) 482; see also Poetry
Poetry, analogue to thought, 431; and
Being-question, 295; and business
of thought, 528; and essence of art,
409; essential vs. narrow sense of,
410; and ground, 458-463; and
philosophy, 295-296; pre-SZ, 629;
as projective utterance, 410; for
Rilke, 397; in SZ, 70n ; utters Being
but not as such, 637
Pose, -ing, by seeing, 368; of thing,
568; by will, 366; see also Com-,
Contra-, Op-, Pro-pose
Positivity, of Being and poet, 637;
and negativity (of arrangement),
517, (and de-cision) 431-432, (and
origin
of
"why?")
170,
(and
primordial Discord) see Discord,
(simultaneous in truth) 9, (as World
and earth) 406; of truth, 95; see also
Component(s)
Possibility, inner, see Essence
Possibilities, see Potentialities
Potentialities, and comprehension, 62;
horizon (sphere) of, 214, 231,
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(projected by There-being) 153; and
re-trieve, 91-93
Potentiality, for Aristotle, 318; finitude of and authenticity, 77; -forBeing re-trieved, 92; for being
dashed to pieces, 276; proper,
exclusive, definitive of There-being,
78; There-being its own, 39; of
There-being includes end (death),
75; see also Drive-toward- Being,
Power
Poverty, of shepherd, 543; of thought,
479
Power, -to-be (and comprehension),
62, (and finitude of reason) 32,
(There-being as) 39, (unveiled to
itself) 235; emergent-abiding, see
Being,
;
of
imagination
ordered to transcendental apperception, 127; transcendental imagination as, 122; for thought as
ek-sistence, 600; see also Drivetoward-Being, Potentiality
Preconception, see Presupposition
Preconceptual, comprehension, 33-34,
41; thought (necessity of), 420
Predicates, ontological, see Categories
Predication, see Judgement
Pre-discover, see Discover
Preoccupation, 53, 222
Pre-logical, foundational thought as,

19- 230, 549
Pre-ontic, comprehension, 211; lettingbe, 57
Pre-ontological, in Heidegger, 53; in
Hegel, 343, 347. 35<>. 357; seizure by
poet, 448; see also Ontic
Preparational, see Thought
Pre-Platonic, thinker, 522; thought,
i3n
Pre-predicative truth, 95 n, 176-177,

213, 215, 229

Pre-presentative, foundational thought
as, 19, 566; openness forgotten, 177
Pre-rational, foundational thought as,
20, 548; and intelligence, 386
Prerogative, pre-SZ, 28; re-collection
of, 51; of There-being, 20, 35, 231,
248, 274, (forgotten) 48, 70, 285, (vs.
subjectivism) 98
Presence, (-ing). Being as, 147-148,
(see also Being); coming-to- (Being
as), 240, (of beings-in-the-ensemble)
256, (and essence) 228-229, (gathered-together) 262, (and going from
presence) 312. (and Idea) 306, (as
known b y artist) 415, (and p.opq>7)uX7j) 312, (and moved-ness) 311;
and essence-existence (Aristotle),
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317-318; within heart, 396; knowing
as (Hegel), 335~33 6 i and ^op^Tj-uXT),
313; vs. present (Homer), 516-517; as
present-ation of present-edness, 353;
and present-ness, 324-325, 336,
358-359; of (re-)present-ation (Rilke), 394; seen b y oxi^t?, 351; as
shining-forth (Hegel), 336-337
Present [adj., noun], Being renders
beings, 6, 290; existential sense of,
87; and fallen-ness, 87 ; included in
future, 88; in interrogation of
Being, 289-290; of poet renders
Holy present in language, 456-457,
467; and pure apprehension (Kant),
142-143; in re-collection, 21, (see
also Re-collection)
Presentation, characterizes Absolute
Subject, 336; as common denominator of intuition-thought (Kant),
108; and Experience, 359; vs. percepting, 419; as presenting in
concepts (Kant), 107; and putting
Self to test, 359 n; vs. (re)presentation, 108 n; as (re)presentation
by conscious ego, 325; as seeing,
335; to Self as exposing of Awareness (Hegel), 353; and subjective thought, 253
Presentative, subject, 324; thought
(and Being-as-sphere),
396, (as
danger of philosophy) 556,
(in
Descartes) 18, (and foundational
thought) 611, (vs. vosTv) 418, 420,
(overcoming of) 380, (polemic vs.)
177, (and process of transcendence)
i8n, (and spirit of vengeance) 377
Present-edness, meaning of, 324-325;
as presence, 335-33 6
Present-ness, 324-325, 335-336, 358359; as Absolute Awareness, 353;
and Being for Hegel, 358-359; as
presence, 398
Fre-subjective, foundational thought
as, 19,176, 250-253; There-being as,
101, (see also Self, Subject)
Presupposition(s), circle of, 612; of
Heidegger, 41-44; of ontology and
subjectivism, 99; of philosophy, 42;
see also Circle, Hermeneutic
Pre-view, of now, 141; as rule, 131
Primacy, of Being, 20, 274, 277, 291,
432, 445, 521, 532, 586, 603, (in artwork) 413, (in attunement) 476,
(and change in W M : Ep) 563, (over
ek-sistent freedom) 24 z, (and evocation) 598, (-as-expanse) 504,
(as focal point of Heidegger II) 238,
(and forgottenness) 534, (and Hegel)

i n d e x
356, (and history) 465, (and inauthenticity of language) 610, (in
language) 293,
fand ontological
difference) 523, (in poetic process)
467, (in pre-SZ) 632, (in questioning)
617,
(vs. spontaneity
of
There) 409, (in SZ, KM, WG,
WM) 244, (and thought) 542, (in
thrown-ness) 537-538, (WM: Ep,
*943) 5 6 5 ;
Beon, 554; of correlation, 627; of the Holy, 429; of
Aoyo?, 499; of mittence, 435; of
(jtopcpy), 3 1 1 - 3 1 2 ; of
ontological
difference over There-being, 175;
of reason, 384; of There-being (focal
point of Heidegger I), 238, (SZ)
532
Priority, of concealment to revealment,
221-222; of truth to ek-sistent
freedom, 226, of word to man, 249
Privation, and alpha-privative, 185186, 305; of arrangement, 518; and
elSoq, 313; in Heraclitus, 485; in nonconcealment (Aristotle), 314; and
<rripy)<ri5, 312-313
Problem, critical, 102
Process-character, of Being, 6n; of
There-being, 36-37
Progress, in f o u n d a t i o n a l t h o u g h t , 546
P r o j c c t , in s e n s e of, 6 0 - 6 1 ; a r t - w o r k ,
408-409, 414; of Being by T h e r e b e i n g , 238; o f b e i n g s - t o - b e - k n o w n ,
394; and c o m p r e h e n s i o n , 6 1 - 6 3 ; a s
c r e a t o r - c o n s e r v e r , 4 1 4 ; as e c - s t a t i c
component
of ek-sistence,
537;
i n c l u d e s l a y i n g - c l a i m and t a k i n g p o s s e s s i o n , 4 1 1 ; as i n s t i t u t i o n of
h o r i z o n , 153; and o r i g i n a t i o n , 460;
as t h r o w n , 232; of t r a n s c e n d e n c e ,
63; and truth, 95; o f W o r l d , 626,
(as p o s i t i v e c o m p o n e n t o f transc e n d e n c e ) 166; see also C o m p r e h e n sion
Propensity, to adhere to beings, 223,
231, (to wander in onticity) 226, (see
also Fallenness); for authenticity,
187; for metaphysics, 31
Prophetic, poetic word as, 457
Pro-pose, -ing, and a priori structure
(Nietzsche), 368; comportment, 395;
as com-posing, contra-posing, 394;
and conception of Being, 324; and
consciousness (Rilke), 393; of object,
568; and persecution, 377; and
perceptio-appetitus, 328; as process
of objectivising, 323; thought, 397;
see also Present, Presentation
Pure, concept, see Rule; imagination,
see Imagination; reason, see Reason;

GENERAL
synthesis, see Synthesis; view, see
View
Purpose, in existential analysis, 53;
and sense, 100
Quadrate,
570-572;
and
classical
metaphysics, 572; and World, 625
Question, of Being (and de-cision), 291,
(and finitude) 266, (as historical)
288-290, (conceived as "metaphysical" in WM) 202, (and origin of
language) 292, (and poetry) 295,
(as re-solve) 227,
246-247, (as
question of There-being) 40, 202,
238, (as thinking) 253, (as Heidegger's contribution) 634, (in WM)
475;
of
beings-in-the-ensemble
(Greeks), 238, 257; of finitude and
ground-work for metaphysics, 32;
as knowing, 257; metaphysical, 202;
more original than logic, 205-206;
of Non-being, 199-200, 201 n, 205;
of poetic vocation (Rilke), 399-400;
as thought, 246, 251-253, 257, 288291; of truth and philosophy, 227;
as wonderment, 487-488
Radiance, as e!8o<;, 314, 317; placement in, 313; and shining-forth, 312
Rational animal, man (more than),
531, (as subject, person, spirit), 389;
and metaphysics,
19, 376; vs.
"mortal,"
574; as presentative
animal, 377; rationality of founded
in project, 537; as zoological concept, 280; see also Man
Readiness, for anxiety, 478; for appurtenance, 466-467; to be called, 83
Ready-at-hand, see Instrument
Realism, and critical problem, 102103; and idealism, see Idealism; and
pre-SZ, 28; and World as existential,
5»n
Real, -ity, for Hegel, 342-343» 354;
for Kant,
125;
transcendental
imagination and objective, 138
Reason, as adversary of thought, 386;
evolution of, 301; faculty of, 280,
(see also Rational animal); historical
(Dilthey), 28; and voeiv, 2Ö9n, 384,
(see also voetv); as vou?, and
thought-as-record, 604; and philosophy (Hegel), 331; as power of
calculation, 395; practical (rooted
in transcendental imagination), 139,
150, (and will) 330; pure (and
grounding of metaphysics),
30,
(imagination as root of) 138-139,
(inadequacy of) 330, (strict and
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broad sense) I39n; relation to Ideas,
307; see also vouq
Receptivity, and finitude of intuition
(Kant), 109; and freedom of pure
reason, 139
Recognition, pure, as pure synthesis,
144-145
Re-collection, meaning of word, 438n;
and abiding, 4 5 3 a n d
attentive
answer, 438; and authenticity, 51,
71, 212; of Beon, 555; as choice of
freedom, 189; and dialogue, 458,
467, 488; and fortune, 9 1 ; and
fundamental ontology,
49; and
heart, 599; as help t o poetic word,
470; and historicity of There-being,
626; and language, 6 1 1 ; of mystery,
223, 226, 246, 252-253; as ontic
comportment,
77;
of poet and
thinker, 469-472; and poetry (Rilke),
397; and reversal of de-parture, 396;
structure
of,
21,
453-457*»
structure of thought, 545; and
thanks-giving, 602; in things, 574
Re-cord, meaning of, 599-601
Referential
dependence,
see
Dependence
Reflection, Descartes, 325; Hegel,
345, 358; Kant, 118
Refutation, in foundational thought,
546
Reichenau, 1, 3, 24, 641
Relation (-ship), between Being and
beings (named but not as such), 521;
between Being and ek-sistence, 536;
between Being and man (and expanding), 505, (as fulfilled) 542,
(Heraclitus) 486, (as hermeneutic
circle) 506, (xplcrt? of) 634, (not
province of metaphysics) 534; between Being and There-being, 486,
539» (as Dimension-measure) 589,
(as A 6 y o ; - gathering-point) 501;
between Being and truth, 94; to
Being (constitutes There), 284, (and
reversal) x x - x x i , (structure of self)
281, (and super-man) 375, (transformation in) 230, 481, (and withdrawal) 598 n, (see also Ek-sistence,
Withdrawal); between poet and
people, 626; between subject-object,
see Subject-object polarity
Relativism, and subject-object polarity, 546-547; and truth, 97 n
Release, sense of, 504; and acceptance,
269 n; as double liberation, 506-507;
as expand-ing, 504-505; of poetic
talent, 456; as spring, 526; and
willing non-willing, 508
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Repose, sense of, 498n; of Nature, 425,
428; of thought in A6yo^, 498 n
Re-presentation,
connotes
presentation to subject, io8n; see also
Presentation
Reproduction, pure (and pure synthesis), 143-144
Rescendence, and transcendence, 18
Re-serve, of Being, 446, 453, (and
attunement) 462; of Beon, 555-556;
of Joyous, 463; of mittence, 500;
see also "Withdrawal
Resign, see Surrender
Re-solve, sense of, 83; as advance
toward self, 84, 90; and authenticity
80-84, 188-191, 226, 508, (see also
Authenticity); and Beon, 557; as
choice, 51, 188, (see also Choice); and
conscience, 83; as correspondence,
495; as culminating moment (of
ek-sistence) ,237, (of truth) 96,235;
asde-cision, 287-288; 415-416; 4 3 1 432; as essence of foundational
thought, 509;
and fortune, 256; as
freedom-unto-death, 574, (see also
Freedom); in Hegel, 357; in Heidegger II, 487; as letting self be,
235; and naming, 509; as most
original form of truth, 190; and
poet, 465-469; by question, 227,
288-291; as step-in-reverse, 576;
as surrender, 258, (see also Acquiescence, Docility, Surrender); in SZ,

212,

237,

(and

WW)

247-248;

discloses
temporality,
87;
as
thanking, 602, 604; of There-being
and thought as function, 525; and
transparency to self, 189; as willing to
know, 287, 415; in WM: Ep, 481-482
Respond, -ing, -se, to address of
Being, 478-482; as ad-ventive, 428;
to appeal, 21; and authenticity in
use of language, 580; to Being's
appeal and working, 586; to Being
(as the Holy), 427, 431, 448, 4 5 3 457, (as language) 543, (as Will)
373' 378'»
conserver of art-work,
414; as corresponding, xviii-xxiii,
603; as foundational thought, 619; as
grounding of history, 464; to hail,
467, (of language) 578; by interrogation, 615; to ontological difference, 611; and poetic dwelling, 463;
by receiving earth as blessing, 439;
as re-trieve, 500; as taking-measure,
591; to thought-worthy, 602; transforms into word, 432; to withdrawal,
512; as with-standing, 539; as
yielding, 447; of Zarathustra, 375

index
Re-trieve, sense of, 89; of beginning
of philosophy, 296; and destruction,
93 n, 628; and de-volution, 391; in
existential analysis, 9 1 - 9 3 ;
and
finitude, 291; of Heidegger I by
Heidegger II, 625; of sense of Being
as Heidegger's unique concern, 593;
and Heraclitus, 499-500; as historical, 421, 470, 545-546; and history
of people, 92; of Homer, 516; of
Kant, 29, 106; in KM, 158; of
language, 295; of logic, 491; and
maintaining-free, 184; origin of
There-being, 290; of potentiality,
9 I _ 93,
189; pre-SZ, 631;
not
relativism, 489; and science, 258;
as step-in-reverse, 612; and thinker,
636; of un-said, 489, 611, (see also
Un-said); of un-thought, 437-438,
500, (see also Un-thought)
Return, eternal, meaning of, 374-381;
as eternal, 379; as existentia of
beings in their Being, 364; and
Zarathustra, 380
Re-valuation, meaning of, 367; remained metaphysics, 19
Reveal, -ing, -ment, and art-work,
405; and concealment (in Heraclitus), 485-486, (in Homer) 516 (and
"not") 565; see also Letting-be,
Lighting-process,
Manifestation,
Non-concealment
Revelation, as accessibility, 112; of
beings (by freedom), 216, 229,
(standing within) 287; as guarantee
of truth, 319; of Non-being, 201,
205; permeated by not, 234
Reversal, sense of, 624, (Heidegger
explains) xvi-xxiii; of de-parture
(Rilke), 396-397; explained by Heidegger, xvi-xxiii; indications of in
Heidegger I, 244; role of "koyoq, in,
490; and language (of metaphysics),
36n, (Rilke) 399; and problem of
thought, 16; and 596n; and WM: Ep,
475; in WW, 48 m
Re-view of now, 141
Rigor, and calculation, 475; of thought
(as docile), 253, (explained) 458551, (and relativism) 97n, (and
constant viewing) 614; and retrieve, 106, (see also Re-trieve)
Root, common, problem of, 116; as
center of institution, 123; transcendental imagination as, see Imagination
Rules, sense of, 118; and pure recognition, 144; in sens-ating, 130-132;
see also Categories of understanding
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Said, see Un-said
Salvation, by thought-as-historical,
534; from unholy (Rilke), 399; way
of, 551
Same, vs. one, 588 n
Schema(ta), and horizon of objectiveness, 134; both intellectual and
sensate, 129,133; and rule, 132-133;
as transcendental product, 134; as
transcendental time-determinations,
1 3 3 - 1 3 4 ; see also Institution
Schematism, 128-135, 138
Scholasticism, mediaeval, 533; neo-f
27; see also Epoch, Mediaeval
Science, existential structure of, 102 n;
and Non-being, 195-196, 199, 284;
as philosophy, 255-258, (for Hegel)
354-355. (notion of) 255, (origin of)
256-257, (as process of There-being)
256, (re-trieve of) 258; as research,
327; see also "Founding," Scientific,
Subject-object polarity
Science of Logic, Hegel's, 359-360, 385
Scientific, attitude in existential analysis, 102 n; experiment as attack
on object, 508; philology, 295-296;
progress and technicity, 19; research
and world-as-picture, 326
Scission, and de-cision, 284, (see also
De-cision); and ontological difference, 579; of poet, 431
See(n), (having-), and aspect, 367-368;
Awareness as such, 351; as comprehension, 525; as de-cision, 415; as
knowing, 335, 415, 524
Seeming-to-be, sense of, 263-266; in
art-work,
405-406; and
Beingquestion, 266; as deceiving, 264;
and everydayness, 275, (see also
Everydayness); intertwined with
Being in truth, 278; and language,
293; law of, 286; and
283;
and negativity of truth, 314 n ; path
unto, 285; and phenomenology, 47;
and privation (Heraclitus), 485 ;
struggle against, 268, 284; world of
(Plato), 3 1 7 ; see also Fallen-ness,
Inauthenticity
Seer, see Calchas
Seizure of Being, see Comprehension
Self, -affection and pure intuition,
1 1 6 - 1 1 7 ; and anxiety, 73; -assumption
and temporality,
89;
-awareness (and experience), 339340, (and knowing) 333, (and selfseizure) 343, (see also Consciousness);
-certitude, see Certitude; as constituting,
X79n; consummation of
phenomenology b y choice of, 192;
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and ego, 97-98, 154-158; -e-mitting,
see E - m i t ; foundation of freedom in
dynamism of, 180; and freedom of
There-being,
191-192;
-hood of
man, 281; inauthentic and people,
7 1 ; initial conception, 50-51; for
Kant, 140; assumed in its negativity,
84; -orientation, see Orientation;
transcendental
imagination
as
center of, 1 5 5 - 1 5 8 ; and outside
world, 102; own potentiality, 74;
prior (to consciousness), I38n, (to
subjectivity)
1 5 6 - 1 5 7 ; not substance but process, 181; temporality
of and re-trieve, 189; as thrust, 204;
and time, 86-87; transparency of,
83, 189
Send(ing), of Being, see E - m i t
Sensate-ness, meaning of, 109 n; and
finitude (Kant), 109
Sens-ating, as antecedent donation of
a rule, 132; necessity of, 130; sse
also Schema(ta), Schematism
Sensation, and finitude (Kant), 109
Sense, meaning of, 85; and articulativeness, 67 n; of beings, 28, see also
beings; as non-concealment, 7; and
subjectivism, 100; and unity of
concern, 101
Sensible, and man as meta-physical,
376-377; and supra-sensible (and
ambivalence
of
6v),
11,
(and
emergence of metaphysics) 13, (and
Plato's metaphysics) 23
Sentiment, see Attunement
Shelter, as There of Being, 5x0-511
Shepherd of Being, and attending,
294 n; and com-mitment, 21; man
as, 439. 524-525» 539-540; poverty
of, 543". and tending, 575, 584
Shine (-ing)-forth, as Being of Absolute
Subject, 336-337; as being-ness of
work, 317; as e l 8 o 3 1 1 , (see also
tl&oc); and gp-yov, 318 ; as essence,
390;
to-let-,
492;
in-by-withthrough man (Hegel), 339; and
moved-ness, 313; as Presence, 336;
and radiance, 312, (see also Radiance); and seeableness, 314; and
seeming, 263, (Staiger vs. Heidegger on videtur) 594
Silence, and docility, 544; as mode of
logos, 68; and poetic moment, 428 n;
as speechlessness, 482
Simple, see Being
Simplicity, of Being, 550, (see also
Being); and ontological history, 547;
and polyvalence, 570; of thought,
543
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Singulare tantum, 638-639
Situation, 189
S k y , in quadrate, 5 7 1 - 5 7 2
Sophistry, 22, 251
Soul, and Being-as-simple, 559; faculty
of, 80; imagination as power of
(Kant), 122
Source, see Being
Space, origin of absolute, 585 n; of
things, 585-586; and time, origin in
Being, 6; see also Intuition
Speech, authenticity of, 294-295; as
X6yos, 292; radicated in transcendence, 100; see also Language,
Logos
Spirit, in Hegel, 333, 355, 360; see
also Being
Spontaneity, as freedom, 180; of
thought (Kant), 509n; of truth, sec
A l t e r i t y ; of understanding (Kant),

110
Spring, -forth, see Original, Leap
Star, 24, 554, 621
Stem, see Root, common
Step-in-reverse,
discerns
Being-dimension, 554; and homecoming,
640; from ontic level, 543; and
overcoming of metaphysics, 5 1 2 ;
through past into future, 612; from
philosophy into thinking of Beon,
557; from presentative thinking,
576
Strangeness, of beings, 201; of Therebeing, see Awesome, Es-tranged
Subject(um), Absolute, see Absolute;
and Being, 6; of certitude, 322-323 ;
as consequent to self
(transcendental imagination), 158; (see also
Self); as mere entity, 98, 1 5 5 ; of
expression, 384; for Fichte, Hegel,
K a n t , Leibnitz, Schelling, 326n,
329-330; and fundamentum
(Descartes), 18, 321-323, 3 3 1 - 3 3 2 ; and
individual (Hegel), 353; not individual (Nietzsche), 3 7 1 ; for Leibnitz,
328, 365; and lumen naturale, 59n ;
vs. man as measure,
419-420;
There-being and,
101,
176;
as
universal Will, 19, 364-365; see also
uTroxeifjLevov
Subject-ism, consequences of, 326-328,
(world-as-picture)
326,
(anthropology born) 326-327, (man seeks
"values") 3 2 7 - 3 2 8 ; and Descartes,
17, 3 2 1 - 3 2 6 , (as past) 421, (vs.
Protagoras) 4 1 9 ; and Hegel, 3 5 8 360; and K a n t , 320; in language of
Heidegger I, 1 7 6 \foi Nietzsche, 19,
363-364, 3 8 1 - 3 8 2 ; polemic against,

INDEX
420; post-cartesian, 328-330; preSZ, 629; of Rilke, 398; see also
Metaphysics, Nihilism, Subject-object polarity
S u b j e c t i v i s m , in existential analysis,
9 7 - 1 0 3 ; and problematic of SZ,
xviii-xix
S u b j e c t i v i t y , and horizon,
154-155;
and selfhood, 1 5 5 - 1 5 8 ; vs. subjectness, 325; see also Subject, Subjectism, S u b j e c t - o b j e c t polarity
Subject-ness, v s . s u b j e c t i v i t y , 325
S u b j e c t - o b j e c t polarity, and Absolute
K n o w i n g , 334; Being of (Hegel),
358; and conception of beings, 325;
in Descartes, 18, 325; and esthetics,
4 1 6 ; for Heidegger I - I I , 623; and
horizon
of
transcendence,
503;
Nietzsche's failure to escape, 19;
made possible b y transcendence,
154; and pre-subjective thought,
250; pre-SZ, 630; and relativism,
546; in Rilke, 395, 398; and Therebeing, 1 0 1 ; subsequent to initial
encounter, 1 7 7 ; see also Subject,
Subject-ism
Substance,
and
accident
(and
structure o f t h i n g ) , 404, (and Therebeing as transcendence) 154; and
subject,
97;
see
also
Subject,
L>7C0X£T(J.EV0V
Subsumption, a n d schematism, 128
Sufficient reason, see Ground, principle of
Super-man, and eternal return, 3 7 9 380; and relation t o Being, 380;
responds t o Will-unto-Power, 19;
superiority of, 375
Suprasensible (World), see Sensible
Surmise, and comprehension of Being,
428; and re-cord, 604n
Surpassment, and art as value, 370;
in Life-force (Will-unto-Power), 3 6 6 -

368
Surrender, t o B e i n g , 246; to beings-intheir-totality, 206; to finitude, 235,
237; t o hail of Being, 6 1 9 ; t o
mystery, 226-227; t o
power of
fortune, 2 5 6 ; thought as, 478; as
willingness, 4 6 7 ; as yielding, 447,
5 4 1 ; see also Acquiescence, Docility,
Re-solve
Synopsis, as p u r e intuition, 1 1 7 ; and
pure synthesis, 124; syn-character
of, 138
Synthesis,
of
double
presentation
(Kant),
108;
finitude of,
no;
necessity of, 1 2 1 ; ontological (and
fundamental
ontology),
33,
(as
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knowledge) 107, (and original time)
142, (possibility of) 3 1 ; presupposed
b y apperception, 126; pure (and
pure apprehension), 1 4 2 - 1 4 3 ; (and
pure recognition) 144-145,
(and
pure reproduction) 143, (of pure
thought, pure intuition) 115, (in
schemata) 134, (and synopsis) 124,
(and transcendence), 1 1 3 - 1 1 4
SZ, change from, 220; dedicated to
Husserl, 6 3 1 ; failure of, 35-36, 243,
564, 625, 626, 632; task of, 230, 238;
title of, 243, (reversed to " T i m e and
Being") x v i - x v i i , 244, (and reversal)
xvi-xxiii
T a k e , -ing, under one's care (VOELV
and Xoyos), 603; -measure, 590-591;
-over (need to), 82, (see also Assume);
-place, 2 i 9 n , (see also E - v e n t ) ;
-possession, 411, (and laying-claim)
165-167
Technicity, burgeoning of, 327; danger
of recognized (Rilke), 396, 399; as
dominion over earth, 19, 374; vs.
dwelling, 5 7 5 - 5 7 6 ; and errance, 252;
and inter-mittence, 533; and materialism, 389; its origin in Descartes, 326; overcoming of, 398,
548 n,
560-561;
and
referential
dependence, 37; and Rilke, 395-399 ;
and spirit of vengeance, 377
Temporality, of Being, 1 4 8 - 1 4 9 ; 424425; not a being b u t a process, 88;
in existential analysis, 85-90; explicitated as history, 90; and finite
transcendence, 40; and
ground,
1 7 3 - 1 7 4 ; and history (EM), 279;
of poet compared with SZ, 425 ; of
self and re-trieve, 189; and World,
88; see also Historicity, History
Tend, -ing, sense of,' 584n; as accepting under one's care, 603; as
bringing-forth, 586; t o utterance,
6 1 1 ; and working, 586
Tentativeness, of thought, 551, 616
Thank,-ing, see Thought
T h a t being(s) is (are), 4n, 162, 197,
201, 2 i 6 n , 477, 488; of art-work,
407; and spontaneity of Being, 532;
of There-being, 64, 81, 189, 532;
see also Facticity, H o w being(s) is
(are), What-being(s) is (are)
T h a t b y which beings are, see Being
That-ness, see T h a t being (s) is (are)
Theology, and Supreme Being, 9; see
also Onto-theo-logical
Theoretic, commerce with beings not,
52
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There, assumes Being, see Assume; as
attend-ant, see A t t e n d - a n t ;
and
captivation b y beings, 2 7 5 ; characteristics of (EM), 272-279, (transcendence) 272-273, (finitude) 2 7 3 279,
(thrown-ness)
274,
(fallenness) 275-276,
(Being-unto-death)
276-279,
(temporality)
279;
as
concern, 281; as disclosedness of
World, 5 8 - 5 9 ; as domain of openness, 413; as essence of man, 280;
finitude of, 277-278, 539 (see also
Finitude); forces Being into openness, 279; function of in grounding
process, 494-495; for Hegel, 356;
as history, 279; and individual man,
4 1 3 ; as irruption, in-cident, 266,
(see also Irruption); and nature of
man, 536; no longer There, 268,
286-287; as opened-up-ness, 2 1 7 ;
origin of, 289; penetrates beings,
272; as place (of disclosure), 266,
277, (of lighting-process) 532, (of
open-ness) 20; as poet, 447; n o t
possessed b y man b u t possessing
him, 280; as potentiality
unto
death, 2 7 6 - 2 7 7 ; pre-disclosed, u n thematic, 55; as shelter, 5 1 1 ; as
thrown, 274; as World, 56; see also
Ek-sistence, Existence, There-being,
Transcendence
There-being, meaning, 34n, 4 4 - 4 6 ; as
in advance of self, 7 3 - 7 4 ; as m o s t awesome, 270; as Being-unto-death,
see D e a t h ; between Being
and
beings, 421; as center of man, 1 5 3 154; characteristics of in W W , 2 3 0 238; as coming-to-be, 74, 233, 2 4 8 249, (see also Throwing); as concern
(with own Being), see Concern;
conditioned b y beings, 5 7 5 ;
as
creator -consexver of art-work, 4 1 4 ;
as dashed t o pieces, 2 7 6 - 2 7 9 , 2 8 6 287; own disclosedness, see D i s closedness, Luminosity; as ego, 97,
100; as ek-sistence, see Ek-sistence;
as existence, see E x i s t e n c e ; as finite,
see Finitude; formula for, 7 4 ; as
free, see Freedom; as gatheringpoint, 493-495; as ground (oi m e t a physics), 202, (see also Ground, - i n g ) ;
as historical, see Historicity, Histor y ; indigence of, see N e e d ; and
language, 293. (see also L a n g u a g e ,
Utterance); lets self be as dwelling,
586; logos and grounding of, 4X2n;
and man, x x - x x i , 20, 45, 242, 2 7 9 282, (see also Correlation, Mail);
more than it actually is, 6 2 n ;
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mystery of, 226, 243; as non-subjective, 204 (see also Subjectivism,
Self); no-more-, 75-76; and ontological difference, 175, 421, 437; as
open (free), 215, (see also Open-ness,
Freedom); as oscillating in distress,
see Distress; as project, see Project;
and question of Non-being, 199; and
realism-idealism, 103; as self, 100102, 494, (see also Self); as strangest
of beings, 270, 273, (see also Estranged) ; structure of (as dwelling),
583, (and errance) 232-233, (and
hermeneutic circle) 41-42, (onticontological) 235, (and time) 8687, (see also Existential, Ontic,
Ontological); as subject, 97-102,
154-158, 176; as taking initiative
(in WW), 243; task of, 227, (see also
Assume, Authenticity); as There of
Being, 44, {see also There); not thing
but happening, 36-37; as thrown,
see Thrown-ness; as thrust, see
Thrust; as transcendence, see Transcendence; and truth, see Truth,
Freedom; as truth, 94-95, 216; in
truth, 95; as original truth and
foundation of phenomenology, 185;
in un-truth, 96; and view-of-theWorld-about, 54; see also Existence,
Ek-sistence, Transcendence
There is, 43, 176, 532; and "There"being, 34n; and "there is want of,"
598 n; truth, 97; see also Grant, -ed,
-ing
Thing(s), meaning of, 57on; vs. artwork, 404; classical conception of,
404; not com-posed, contra-posed,
568; as inchoative word, 593; itself
(and principle of phenomenology),
xii-xiii; in itself vs. appearance
(Kant), HI, 503; not object, 567;
in SZ, 53 n; as thing, 566-567, 569;
thinging of, 570
Thinking-upon-the-past, see Re-collection
Third thing, 606-607, 613; see also
Center, Middle-point, OCUT6
Thomistic, 319 n
Thought, ambiguity of term, xiv-xv;
essential (and Being-as-spirit), 425;
for Greeks, 285; and idealism, 28;
for Kant, 107, 109, (pure) 118-121,
(as spontaneity) 507; logical, see
Logical
Thought, foundational, sense of, 16;
absolutes in, 617; as acquiescence,
478, (see also Acquiescence); as
adventure, 550; first appearance of

index
(WW), 247; as assistance, 479; and
authenticity, 525, (of dwelling) 587;
as commerce, 480; as consent, 478;
as correspondence, 494-495, xviiixxiii; as dangerous (and Being-untodeath), 512; as dictation of Being,
509; as docility, 253, 294, 479, 499;
not doctrine but experience, 551;
as echoing, 479; (broad sense) as
ek-sistence, 505, 511, (and hermeneutic circle) 506, (see also Eksistence) ; in EM (resume), 607; as
e-vent of Being, 480, (see also E-vent);
as experience, 478; as freedom, 480,
506, (see also Freedom, Liberation);
as fulfillment, 21-22, 525, 541-543,
601, (and language) 544; (strict
sense) as function, see Wait, -ing;
as historical, 21, 257-258, 421, 442,
480-481, 499, (and translation) 526,
(must heed negativity) 534, (double
sense) 545-546, (see also Historicity,
Re-collection); and history, 545-548,
(see also History); as hoping, 5o6n;
as in-stance, 509, 511; as interrogation, 288-291, 416, 481, 487-488,
(see also Question); and language,
247-250, 291-296, 482, 509-510,
528, 543-545» 558, 592-593» (see also

Language); lets Being be, 439; lets
beings-in-the-ensemble be, 251; as
X£yciv VOELV, see XiyeLv-voetv; and
X6yog, see X6yoq; as matrix of
relationships, 431; nature of (WW),
246-250; negative description of,
16-20; Nein-J a theme, 363 n; and
Non-being, 204-206, (see also Nonbeing); as non-objective, 204; as
offering, 479; as 6y.oXoyeTv, 498,
(see also o^oXoyeZv); and overcoming metaphysics, 475, (see also
Overcoming); as paying heed, 442;
and phenomenology, 47, (see also
Phenomenology); and Heidegger's
conception of philosophy, 24; and
poetizing (poetry), 469-472, 592593; vs. poetry, 482, 544-545, 635637, (see also Poet, Poetizing,
Poetry); positive delineation of,
20-22; as pre-thought, 426; neither
practical nor theoretical, 542-543; as
preparation, 438-439; vs. presentative thought, 611; as pre-rational,
386; aspre-subjective, -presentative,
-logical, -rational, 19-20; as preconceptual, -subjective, 420; as
re-collection, see Re-collection; as
re-cord, 599-601, (and ek-sistence)
602, (as voetv) 604; as re-solve, see
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Re-solve; as response, 478, 499, (to
hail of Language) 580; as re-trieve,
see Re-trieve; as self-assumption,
478-479; as self-diffusion, 478; as
self-surrender, 478; as shift from
fundamental ontology, 16; as spring,
526, 611-613, ( see a^so Leap); as
structural relation between man and
Language, 580; as structure of
There-Being, 505, 525; as takingmeasure, 591; as thanks (-giving),
480, 601—602, 604; first made thematic (EM), 259; as to-be-at-work,
257; as to-be-thought, 431; as
waiting, see Wait, -ing; as willing
non-willing, 507-508; and working,
591, 593
Thought-full, see Dialogue
Throwing, of There-being, 532, 536;
as call, hail, 538
Thrown (-down)-ness, disclosed
by
anxiety, 74; elements of, 64; and
everydayness, 48; and finitude, 37;
of freedom, 181; insistence upon
(SZ), 244; and language, 610; and
negativity, 82, 233; and ontological
disposition, 65; and Over-powering,
274; and primacy of Being, 409,
537-538; of project, 232; and takingpossession, 166; of thought, 22
Thrust into Non-being, as condition
of encounter, 136, 198; as metaphysics itself, 199; There-being as,
38,199-200,204; and transcendence,
201 n
Time, Being as origin of, 425; and
Being-question, 173-174; and Being
(SZ), xvi-xxiii, 85-86, 243-244; -determinations as schemata for pure
concepts, 133-134; and eternal
heart, 427; and finite transcendence,
40; as first name of Being, 86 n; as
lighting-up
of self-concealment,
xx-xxi; for Nietzsche, 379; for
popular mind, 86; priority over
space (Kant), 117-118; and process
of timing, 145; as pure view, 133134; and transcentendal imagination, 141-147, 244; ultimate
meaning (origin) of concern, 85-89,
2 37. 463, 540; unity of (grounds
unity of consciousness), 157, (andattending-utterance) 458
To-be, -achieved (and authenticity),
50, (in house of Being) 543, (and
negativity) 233, (revealed by disposition) 64, (see also Drive-toward Being); correlative with accept,
269-272; as essence of There-being,
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39; -free as drive-toward-Being,
187; -in-the-World (not mere entity),
99, (as transcendence) 48, (see also
Existence,
Transcendence); -atwork, 257
Topology, of Beon, 558
Total Meaningfulness, see Meaningfulness
Totality, of instrumental references,
see Matrix of relations
Tragedy, essence of, 5i9n
Transcendence, as accessibility, 114;
and ambiguity of ov, 10; and
anxiety, 73; and consciousness, 155158, (see also Self); as dynamic
process, 36-37; in EM, 272-273;
as existence, 35-37; and existential
choice, 190; finitude of, see Finitude;
and freedom, 45, 179-192, (see also
Freedom, Truth); and fundamental
ontology (Kant), 30, 33, (see also
Ontology); and Hegel, 357; as
horizon (pure), 136, (see also Horizon) ; instituted by transcendental
imagination, see Imagination, Institution; and ontological knowledge,
see Ontological; as passage beyond
beings, 4-5, 36; and philosophy,
metaphysics, 4-5, 206, (see also
Metaphysics); and poet, 450; positive moment of, 69-70, (and layingclaim) 165, (see also Comprehension);
and presentative thought, 18 n, (see
also Presentative); as primordial
history, see History; as projected
by comprehension, see Project,
Comprehension; and pure synthesis, 113-114, (see also Synthesis);
radicates speech, 100; as rescendence, 18; role of logos in, 70;
and self, see Self; and subject, see
Subject; and subjectivism, 101-102;
temporal structure of, 86-87, ( see
also Time); There-being as, 200, 204,
212, 217, (see also Existence, Therebeing) ; and truth, 95, 152, 230-232,
(see also Truth); ultimate meaning
(source) of, see Time; and World as
existential, 58; see also Existence,
Ek-sistence
Transcendental,
founding,
see
Founding; imagination, see Imagination; knowledge, see Knowledge;
time-determination, see Time
Translation, ambiguity of, 526; as
leap, 611; literal, xii-xiii
Trans-subjective, see Pre-subjective
Truth, absoluteness of, 97 n, (see also
Relativism, Rigor, Thought); in
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art-work, 405-409; and Being (and
grounding of metaphysics),
15,
(Nietzsche) 373, (and philosophy)
228, (WG) 174-176; of beings (and
art-work), 405; and certitude (Descartes), 18, 321-323, (and justification) 438 n, (for mediaeval man)
319-320, 322, (and value)
370;
as conformity, 94-95,
212-215,
228-229, 250, 314, (differs from
certitude) 332, (founded in Therebeing) 241, (and logic) 19, (and
monadology) 329, (Plato) 308, 388,
(presupposes discovering) 94, (and
self-assurance) 370; as correctness,
see Conformity; essence of (includes
non-essence), 218-227,240, (primacy
over freedom) 241-243, (as truth of
Essence) 228-229,
239-240; existential analysis of, 93-97; experience of for early Greeks, 305;
expression as place of, 3x6, (see also
Judgement); as finite (in art-work),
407-409, (see also Finitude); as
freedom, 215-218 (see also Freedom,
Transcendence); and ground, 163164; and history, relation between,
238, (see also History, Being); and
intertwining of Being and seemingto-be, 278-279, (see also Seeming-tobe) ; logical, see Logical; meditated
for itself, 244; of metaphysics and
transcendence, 201-202; and mutual
interchange, 272; and negativity
(vs. Aristotle), 315; as non-concealment (i-X-q&eta), 7, 9. 266,
(Aristotle) 314, (not due to choice of
Greeks) xxii-xxiii, (pre-SZ) x-xiii, (see
also Non-concealment, dc-fa^eta);
non-essence of grounded in negativity of Being, 241-243; nonessential essence of, 223; ontic,
151, 212, 222, (grounded in comprehension) 163, (and transcendental
founding) x68, (see also Ontic);
ontological (in existential analysis),
95 n, (and Non-being) 202,
(vs.
ontic) 15 z, (as revealment of Being)
2oi, (traditional notion of) 2x3, (as
unveiledness) 164; (see also Ontological) ; as opening-up of beings,
273; origin of, 220; for Plato (and
Idea), 306-308, (as mystery) 440,
(and iraiSela), 387; as pre-predicative, see Pre-predicative; as
project of There-being, i5on, (see
also Project); as rendering-manifest
presupposes existential
analysis,
151; of science (history, nature).
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201; traditional notion of logical,
213; transformation of essence of,
308; as value, 369; see also Founding,
Sense, Transcendence, Un-truth
Tune, to call, 461, 476, (see also
Attunement)
Un-concealed, see Non-concealment
Uncover, see Dis-cover
Understanding, and cosncience, 80;
for Kant (finitude of), 109, (as
power of rules) 119, (pure, rooted
in transcendental imagination) 138,
(and thought) 107; as voetv, 384;
and Non-being, 205
Under way, Heidegger,
606-607;
Heidegger still, 633; as continued
questioning, 616
Unifying function, see Unity
Unity, of anxiety about — for, 73; of
apperception, see Apperception; of
correlation,
606; of
existential
components (equally original), 69;
of grounding-process, 170; of Heidegger I-II, 628; of knowing process
(Kant), 115; of modes of Being in
Aristotle,
x-xi;
of
natural-real
knowing (Hegel), 344; of ontological
knowledge, 121, (in transcendental
imagination) 137; presupposed b y
apperception (Kant), 126; of senses
of " i s , " 4 ; of space and time (Kant),
117; of temporality, 88; of time and
of pure synthesis (Kant), 145-146;
of transcendental imagination as
root of anterior glimpse (Kant), 138;
of two concepts of cpuau; (Aristotle),
313
Un-said, and de-cision, 610; and
foundational thought, 22; of Heideggerl, 625, 627, (retrieved) 625;
of Heidegger II, 638, 640; of
Heraclitus, 500; as hidden wealth,
609; of Kant and re-trieve, 158-159 ;
in KM, 146; and negativity of
Being, 489; of Nietzsche, 437-438;
not nothing, 638; of Plato, 440; see
also Re-collection, Re-trieve, Unthought
Un-thought, ontological difference as,
13; and re-trieve, 290, (see also Retrieve); and step-in-reverse, 612;
see also Re-collection, Un-said
Un-truth, authentic, 236, 241; as
concealment, 220-223, (see also
Mystery); as errance, 220, 223-227,
(see also Errance); essence of, 211,
227; in existential analysis, 96;
included in truth, 202, 2 H - 2 1 2 , (see
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also Truth); in KM, 232; modes of,
228; in Nietzsche, 369 n; as nonconformity, 213; problem of, 218220; resides in Being, 241; and
transcendental founding, 172
Unveil, -ing, -edness, see Revelation,
Truth
Ur-Heidegger, 628-633; meaning of,
633; center of, 640
Utter, -ance, meaning of, 496n;
aboriginal, 496; authentic, 316, 410,
460,496-497, (see also Authenticity);
of Being-as-ground, 460; Being
opened up in, 292; Beon, as, 554;
guards mystery, 462; and manifestation, 6oon; origin of, 458; in
poetic response, 463; replaces the
word
"language,"
633;
and
speechlessness,
482;
see
also
Language, A6yo<;
Valuation, de-, 363; e-, 36g, 380; re-,
*9> 363, (and Will-unto-Power) 367370
Value, as aspect, 367-368; and Being
of beings (Nietzsche), 373; as condition of Life-force, 368-369; and
culture, 327-328; emptiness of, 363 ;
origin of (and subject-ism), 327-328;
principle in Life-force, 364; problem
of, 27; as pro-posed, 370; and
supra-sensible world, 362
Vengeance, spirit of, 376-381; meaning
377; and authenticity, 380;
foreign to will as will, 378; resistance to will, 379
Venture, see Being (for Rilke)
Venturesomeness, of thought, 550
Veri-fication, see Certi-fication
View, -ing, of intuitiDn not objective,
117; and lighting-up of Being, 525 ;
and non-concealment, 307; and
pure intuition, 116; in sens-ating,
132; as sketch for a rule, 132; of
thing, 568; as thought, 613-615;
and visage, 264, 568
Violence, to Being, 283; and de-cision,
286,
(see also
De-cision);
of
foundational thought, 438;
intrinsic to phenomenology, 185-186;
and language, 295; to original, 290;
to Over-powering, 268, 270, 274,
276-277, 290; in re-trieve, 93, 158159, (see also Re-trieve); and spirit
of vengeance, 377-379; and taking
measure, 591; see also Rigor, Unsaid
Voice, of Being, see Tune, Attunement
of conscience, see Conscience

775

Vortex, 236; and everydayness, 507,
(see also Everydayness); of onticity,
71» 233; see also Errance, Fallen ness, Inauthenticity
Wait, -ing, not activity but achieving,
507 n; vs. a-waiting, 506; for grace,
641; and hoping, 506 n, 641; as nonpresentative, 506; thought as, 505506
Want,-ing, of Being (for X^yeiv-voetv),
604, (for thought) 504, (and withdrawal) 511; of Beon for thought,
xvi-xvii; as e-voking, 597; as granti g . 598; of Language for human
language, 578; of A6yo? (for gathering point), 494. 498; mutual of
Being and There-being, 600; (be in
w. of) as need, 267, 597, (see also
Need)
Wrarrant, and eye-ing of X6yo<;, 614;
for foundational thought, 550-551;
for Plato, Kant, 551
Way, and growing old, 557; and
language, 611; and metaphor of
spring, 615; of questioning, 616;
pre-SZ, viii-xi, 632; of SZ still
necessary, xviii-xix; of salvation,
551; send man on his, 609 n;
theological heritage determines Heidegger's, 630
Weltanschauung,
and
world-aspicture, 327
What being(s) is (are), 4n, 162, 169,
216, 218, 257, 317; and origin, 403;
and Total Meaningfulness, 57; see
also How being(e) is (are), That
being (s) is (are)
Wherein, as World, 53, 56
Whereunto, of There-being (and subjectivism), 99; There-being as ultimate, 56, 63, 180, 49411; see also
Meaningfulness, Wherein, World
While, -ing, meaning of, 408 n; and
assuming, 419; of beings, 517-518,
(and arrangement) 518;
connotation of, 516 n; as responding, 414
Why, (ask) " w h y ? " 288; and groundquestion, 203; transcendental origin
of, 169-170; types of, 169; and
wonder, 201
Will, -ing, meaning of, 365-366; and
conscience,
80; and existential
choice, 190; for Fichte, 330; of finite
open-ness, 287-288; and freedom,
180; in German philosophy, 507;
in Hegel, 330, 337, 351, 361; for
Kant, 330; to know (as re-solve),
287-288,291,415, (see also Question);
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and Life-force, 364-367; -ness (and
authenticity), 51, (see also Acquiescence, Docility, Surrender); for
Nietzsche, 329; non-willing, 508 ;
-unto-Power (as essence), 364—374;
(and appetitus in Leibniz) 329, (and
re-valuation) 367-369, (and truth)
370-374, (as value-posing) 369-370,
(wills more Power) 366-367, 372,
(as w. unto willing) 365-367; not
psychological, 365, 3 9 m ; for Schelling, 330; and whereunto, 180; of
wind, 466
With-being, and coexistence with
others, 48; and common fortune,
92; and in-being, 59; and listening
to others, 68; and relationship between poet-people, 626
Withdrawal, of Being, 278, (and
Aristotle's conception of <pum<;)
315, (due to essence of) 435, (as
questionable) 615,
(and Source)
446; and Being-unto-death, 574;
and Beon, 555-556; draws-with,
511, 598 n; as e-vent, 608; and
farness, 452; as Greek sense of
forgottenness, xii-xiii; grounds forgetfulness, 450; and inter-mittence,
533-534. (see also Inter-mittence);
of A6yo<; (Heraclitus), 500; and
mystery, 436, 448; and negativity
of mittence, 21, 533-534, (see also
Negativity); of possibilities (and
facticity), 167, (and finitude of
transcendence) 166; pre-SZ, 632;
and self-emitting, 487; of Therebeing before beings, 216; into words,

609

With-stand, -ing, and authenticity,
540; and concern, 539-540; of
dimension, 589-590
Wonder, -ment, as basis of' 'why ? " 201;
before Being, 257; before ensemble
of beings, 255; as fact of thought,
555; of wonders (that beings are),
197. 477» 488
Word(s), answer to call, 482; Being
(brought into) 292, 544, (dwells in)
528, (passes into) 432; and Being of
beings, 497; of Being uttered in
thought, 250; as de-cisive weapon,
431; radicated in transcendence,
100;
There-being's
coming-topresence comes into, 248; thought
achieves
coming-into-,
249; as
translation of Xöyos, 261; see also
Language, Utterance, X6yoc
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Work, -ing, meaning of, 584-587;
and bringing-forth (T^VT)), 585, (see
also T^X^) ; a-ttd contention between
Over-powering and There, 270;
-hood (as actuality), 318, (as £v£pycta) 317
World, sense of, 58, (of word in SZ)
52; -about (contains beings other
than There-being), 53, (familiarity
with) 52, (view of) 54-55; analysis
of, 52-58; in art-work, 406-407;
and Being, 36n, i67n, (and the
Simple) 559; not beings-in-theensemble, 5 7 7 n ; disclosed, 411, (by
ontological disposition) 64-65; and
earth (as known in art-work), 415,
(as positivity-negativity of truth)
406, (struggle of) 412; as existential
component, 56, 58; ground of (and
Being), 6; grounded in earth, 407;
for Heidegger I (as project of Therebeing), 204; for Heidegger II, 572;
and lighting-up of Being, 537; and
Non-being, 72, 147; ontological
priority of, 54; as Open, 231;
-openness revealed by ontological
disposition, 65; -as-picture, 326,
(and values)
328,
(and Weltanschauung) 327; and Quadrate,
572, 625; of shadow, fire, sun, see
Cave, metaphor of; and temporality,
88; and There, 56, 58-59; as Total
Meaningfulness, 57, 67, 249, (and
Gestell) 625-626, (as Open) 231;
see also Articulative-ness, Matrix of
relationships; and truth, 95, (see
also Truth); as Wherein, 53, 56; as
with-World, 59; as World, 53, (and
subjectivism) 99; and "World," 58,
81, 222, 252; yields things, 578
Yes, to appeal, 478; to eternal return,
380; to finitude of transcendence,
189; and Nein-Ja theme, 363 n; to
Over-powering, 286
Yield, -ing, of Being to There, 279;
as characteristic of thought, see
Acquiescence, Docility, Surrender;
of shining summer day, 1; of things
by World, 578
Zarathustra, as correlation between
Being and man, 380, 595; and
spirit of vengeance, 376; and
super-man, 375; teaches eternal
return, 380
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PHILOSOPHY
This book, one of the most frequently cited works on Martin Heidegger in
<. i >y language, belongs on any short list of classic studies of Continental phi1< sophy. William J. Richardson explores the famous turn {Kehre) in
Heidegger's thought after Being in Time and demonstrates how this transformation was radical without amounting to a «imple contradiction of his earli
t r views.
In a full account of the evolution of Heio
. work 4» i whole,
Richardson provides a detailed, systematic and illuminating account of both
divergences and fundamental continuities in Heidegger's philosophy, especially in light of recently published works. He demonstrates that the "thinking" of Being for the later Heidegger has exactly the same configuration as
the radical phenomenology of the early Heidegger, once he has passed
through the "turning" of his way.
Including as a preface the letter that Heidegger wrote to Richardson and
a new writei' preface and epilogue, the new edition of this valuable guide
will be an essential resources for students and scholars for many vears to
come
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